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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (High Court Judges) >> AB (A Child) [2018] EWFC 3 (16 January 2018) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2018/3.html Cite as: [2018] EWFC 3, [2018] 1 FCR 601, [2018] 2 FLR 137, [2018] WLR(D) 27, [2018] 4 WLR 20 |
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Sitting at the ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
In the matter of ![]() ![]() |
____________________
Mr Nicholas Stonor QC and Ms Amanda Meusz (instructed by Jung and Co) for AB's
parents
Mr Cyrus Larizadeh QC and Mr Tim Hussein (instructed by Miles and Partners) for AB's
children's guardian
Dealt with on paper
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division :
i) She noted the parents' "self-evident and obvious love for [AB],
feelings of parental protectiveness; they have behaved as devoted parents. Their
religious
beliefs also
require
![]()
respect
for life if not at almost all costs, certainly that it should be continued if at all possible."
ii) She noted that the hospital wanted
AB
to go home so that he would be spared "the dis-benefits of hospitalisation" and "would be
able
to have the permanent care of one or other of his parents, accepted by all to be exceptional caring, attentive and in lay terms, skilled." She observed that "These are distressing circumstances where the best option for him is that he has loving, supportive, end-of-life care from those who love him, supported to the highest level by medical and social work staff in that environment."
iii) She noted that there was "some evidence, particularly from the nursing staff, that when with [his parents]
AB
can be more settled, particularly in his mother's arms or on his mother's lap, that he may find some sounds more soothing than a noisy hospital environment." She further observed: "I accept the evidence of the doctors that this little boy has minimal awareness of his surroundings and minimal awareness of those who are with him although I do accept that he may find the presence of his parents soothing. They know him better than anyone else. They may be more tuned in to what he wants and he may find certain tones of voice and certain musical vibrations a more calming environment than a less soothing one."
iv) She noted that she was not being asked to control or
restrain
the parents in their care of
AB
outside the hospital setting and observed "I shall assume that unless or until some episode arises in which a Local Authority might intervene on safeguarding grounds (and we are very far from that at this stage) these parents are at liberty to treat their child as they wish."
"it is inAB's
interests to be
able
to
return
home immediately for periods of up to 48 hours, and in the long term; provided that an appropriate package of care can be provided to him."
In accordance with the various provisions of that order, on 2 September 2016 AB
was discharged home to the care of his parents.
"AB's
parents "have been
reported
[to] be[1] uncooperative, rude and aggressive and intimidating of medical and nursing staff."
"Due to the lack of co-operation from the parents, andrepeated
allegations
about
the carers, it has been impossible to implement a care package of support for [
AB].
[He] will suffer significant harm over time if the care package cannot be provided to him."
"The parents' behaviour has led to [AB]
not
receiving
the assessed level of care provision to meet his needs even when care staff were exchanged for nursing staff at the parents'
request.
The appropriate level of care cannot be given whilst [he] is in the home environment."
"57 … The parents have effectively taken over the giving ofrescue
medication even from qualified nursing staff. It may be that on odd occasions professional staff do give
rescue
medication, but that is the exception. In a situation where the parents have sought and obtained the substitution of professionally trained nurses for carers I find this striking. I find that the parents adopt this course in order not to give appropriate
rescue
medication at the doses
recommended.
This is because the parents know perfectly well that these medications may over time compromise
AB's
![]()
respiratory
system and shorten his life. I find that the parents
removed
the symptom management plan from
AB's
room for an unknown period of time before
returning
it. They did so in order to hinder professionals in the care of
AB,
specifically so as to make it harder for them to administer
rescue
medication. They compounded this failing by not telling the truth as to the amounts of
rescue
medication administered by the parents themselves. I find that the parents are prepared to countenance
AB's
ongoing dystonia, and therefore probable significant pain, knowing that they could do something
about
it but consciously deciding not to do so. They have known for a long time that this was against the advice of doctors …
58 Against those findings of fact it is but a short step to finding the threshold crossed. Dr X, on her monthly visits, sees a helpless child in significant amounts of unnecessary pain. I have no doubt but that the parents do not see things this way, but Dr X's vision is, in my judgment, the truth.
59 It is, in my view, a further short step to holding that the local authority's conclusion as to the steps necessary to be taken is also correct. If the parents wereable
to
respond
to this judgment, to change their viewpoint, to come to
regard
the quality of
AB's
![]()
remaining
life to be more important than its length, then this would not be so. The history of this case, and the earlier proceedings, demonstrate to my mind, however, that the parents will not change their position. They have had the advice of Parker J, but have effectively been unable to take it on board. They will not listen to me. The history of the parents' approach towards carers and professionals also demonstrates that they will dig their heels in in a manner which is, in the experience of those professionals, unprecedented. They will press their point of view aggressively even if it means they are barred from hospital wards. I wish it were otherwise, but the evidence in this case does not permit me to conclude that the parents will now take my advice, give, and permit staff to give, appropriate doses of medication,
record
all such doses, suction only as needed, and, in short, place
AB's
freedom from pain (I hesitate to call it comfort)
above
all other things. In future, in my judgment, only professional staff will be capable of such an approach. During this hearing, once it became more apparent that the threshold would be crossed, I gave very active consideration to adjourning
AB's
case in order to give the parents a further opportunity, but to do so would be to prolong the present very difficult position for no gain and to leave a young boy who deserves better in pain. Moreover, any change of heart by the parents (which as indicated I
regard
as highly unlikely) is much better assessed and tested over time and in
real
time by the local authority under a care order than by a court at a distance and only at particular points in time.
60 Only a care order, with its present care plan forresidential,
and perhaps in future foster, care for
AB
will do if his welfare interests are to be paramount. In making such an order it is of some consolation to me that I will bring to an end a difficult situation for professionals within the family home, and perhaps thereby make things a little easier for [
AB's
sister] (who will be
remaining
at home subject to any appeal against my order). I emphasise, however, that it is
AB's
interests alone which drive me to my conclusion. By
reference
to the welfare checklist, he cannot express any wish, but if a care order is made he will avoid harm, and his need to be free of pain will better be met. The effects of a change will be beneficial. No other use of any power of the court could achieve this
result."
"The evidence before me established that whilst the care to which the local authority took objection caused the child pain, it also prolonged his life. The evidence on this point was striking: the child would probably have died before now but for the care. He probably would die ifremoved
into care and subject to a different care
regime.
This seemed to me to amount to a compellingreason
for there to be an appellate process … Counsel elected to keep her powder dry on '
real
prospects of success'."
"LJ Patten: We have had an opportunity to view papers and it is our strong view that it should go back to the family division, and we would allow the appeal. Obviously we are not going to close the door on anyone who wants seriously to argue to the contrary, but havingread
the skeleton arguments and considered the issue, we think there are jurisdictional and other problems in
relation
to threshold. We are acutely conscious of the importance of achieving a speedy
resolution
of the problems. I have made enquiries with the President and the matter could get back into the division fairly speedily. Anyone here take issue strongly to maintain the judge's decision and that the order should stand?
LA: No. The Appellant raises an important point inrelation
to new evidence and the issue of pain vs prolonging of life.
LJ Patten: Case raises hugely important jurisdictional issues that are almost unique. Case is of enormous importance to the parents, and of considerable important inrelation
to jurisdiction issues.
LA: Experience at the Bar chimes that it is unique.
CG: There is nothing I wish to add.
LJ Patten: I am going to invite Lady Justice King to set out the terms of what we do.
LJ King: There are three key issues 1. Jurisdiction, 2. Threshold and 3. Welfare. All three issues are live and need to be considered by a High Court judge. The trial judge did notrefer
to
Re
C [
Re
C (Children: Power to Choose Forenames) [2016] EWCA Civ 374, [2017] 1 FLR 487], or how s100 might work. This case is a type where LA might be limited, in the way that I dealt with in
Re
C. That was not before the judge and for understandable
reasons,
and that was not argued in skeleton arguments. If it is being
re-heard
and going back, then that must be before the judge.
Second, if matter goes back, it goes back in its entirety. Welfare and threshold are intimately connected. We have discussed if you can salvage threshold and there are cases, which say CoA should not go behind a finding of the trial judge. This is not such a case. All issues are open,relating
to pain but also suction and the environment of care within the house. I do not want in a delicate case like this for there to be any confusion. Welfare is at large. Is that the appropriate course?
All QCs: Yes
LJ King: This case has been discussed with President, but given joint view of seriousness of case the President should look at it in first instance."
"However, despite thereservations
expressed, I need to gauge the benefit and impact on [
AB].
In my judgement, the evidence is that he is more settled, there is less suctioning, less dystonic episodes, with consequently
reduced
need for
rescue
medication. The current support Package is working satisfactorily and there has been a plethora of appointments for [
AB]
from a number of therapists which, again, will ultimately benefit him. The litmus test will be the parents' sustained cooperation with advice and professional judgement, beyond the Court Framework.
I havereviewed
the evidence of their past behaviour both when [
AB]
was in hospital, and since October last year when he
returned
home, which highlights that we need to be circumspect
about
this. I am mindful that even with the Court framework, the parents have made their views clear
about
what they perceive education will achieve for [
AB
and his sister].
Their behaviour hasreally
only improved in the last 4 months, since the cessation of the original hearing, and I need to be
reassured
that the parents accept and understand that less zealous suctioning will not only allow [
AB]
to
rest,
as we heard so clearly in [the expert medical] evidence in March, but ultimately benefits him medically for the
reasons
outlined in the later
reports
from [the medical experts].
In light of this evidence and the situation over the last 4 months, the Local Authority will not be seekingremoval
of [
AB]
from his parents. I have further considered whether any order would be in [his] best interests, and have considered the merits of a Supervision Order or Family Assistance Order.
My view is that neither are beneficial at present. As I have stated, professionals are gaining access to the family home, and [AB]
needs neither befriending, assisting nor advising, which are the thrust of these Orders. His paramount need is safeguarding, and that is afforded to him under the Child Protection process, which will
remain
in place."
"You will see that in light of the medical evidence in the case and after careful consideration of the complex and unusual issues in the case, the LA no longer seek to prove the 'threshold criteria' and therefore no longer toremove
the child from his parents' care. The proposal is that the child will
remain
at home with his sister and subject to a Child Protection Plan and an ongoing support package.
Therefore the LA now seeks permission to withdrawn the s31 application.
The … order also timetabled evidence to be filed from the parents and the Guardian, by 7.09.17 and 11.09.17respectively
and they will do so but ask for short extensions to 8.09.17 and 13.09.17. However they have all confirmed that they agree with the LA position.
In theabove
circumstances and following an advocates' meeting, all counsel would prefer you to deal with the LA's application to withdraw proceedings administratively by email without the need for a hearing in court as this would
reduce
costs and save time and given your previous management of the case … we would ask that … the existing 7 days hearing [be] vacated.
… All parties agree to the withdrawal of the proceedings and none seek a court hearing with physical attendance."
"AND UPON all parties agreeing that the Local Authority should have permission to withdraw their application and agreeing to invite the judge to make this order;
AND UPON the parties expecting to complete a draft final order by consent inrespect
of the conclusion of these proceedings, once the final evidence as directed below has been filed,
THE COURT ORDERS
…
3 The Guardian shall serve her final analysisreport
by 10am on the 13th September 2017.
…
6 The hearing listed to commence on the 14th September 2017 before Holman J with a time estimate of 7 days is hereby vacated.
7 The proceedings shall be considered and determined by The President by email.
8 An agreed draft final order shall be filed by the Local Authority by 4pm on the 15th September 2017 with The President for his approval …"
"I amrelieved
that [
AB]
circumstances have changed; it was very difficult to consider
removing
him from his parents who love him so much and who are so deeply committed to caring for him. I believe that [they] have always done what they believe is in [
AB]'s
best interests and struggled to accept professional opinion, advice and support or to consider that they were in fact causing [him] harm and distress. I sincerely hope that [they] continue with their present engagement with professionals and that the improvements in [
AB]'s
experience of being cared for is maintained in the long term. However, I also agree with [the allocated social worker] that there is a risk that, in the
absence
of the spotlight of these proceedings, the parent's cooperation with nursing staff and support of [
AB]'s
symptom management plan may deteriorate. In such circumstance the Local Authority may need to again consider taking protective action.
Given the improvements in [AB]'s
circumstances and the care he is presently
receiving
I do not support any order being made in
respect
of him. I do not see the need for any further assessments and there is no gap within the evidence to prevent the court in concluding this matter.
I have considered if the advice, support and assistance offered under a Supervision Order would assist [AB]
and his family. However, I conclude that the support and protection offered to [him] as a child subject to a Child Protection Plan in my experience supersedes that provided under a Supervision Order. I therefore support the local authority's
request
to withdraw its application and conclude the proceedings with no order being made."
"IT ISRECORDED
THAT
(1) The parties acknowledge that factual disputesremain
between them but they do not invite the court to determine those disputes on the basis that this is no longer necessary or proportionate.
(2) For the avoidance of doubt, no adverse findings have been made inrespect
of the parenting given to [
AB]
by his parents, their care of him and their adherence to the Symptom Management Plan.
(3) The local authority and the children's guardian consider that, at this stage, it is appropriate for [AB]
(and his sister) to
remain
subject to a Child Protection Plan; the parents consider that a Child in Need plan is appropriate. [
AB]
will
remain
a Child in Need throughout his life by virtue of his neuro-disability.
(4) Notwithstanding the factual disputes and the differences as to the appropriate auspices for continuing professional involvement with the family, the local authority and the parents are committed to working together in the future in the best interests of [AB]
(and his sister).
(5) The parties agree that the current care package, which is jointly funded by the LA and the CCG, is meeting the needs of [AB]
(and his sister); and that it will be
reviewed
systematically on a holistic basis taking into account the children's needs and the information from all clinicians involved in the children's care; the local authority has confirmed that it is committed to working with the health authority and the parents with a view to ensuring that the care package continues to meet the needs of [
AB]
(and his sister).
(6) Permission to withdraw the proceedings is granted on the basis that the court is satisfied, on the evidence filed, that:
a. The care being given to [AB]
by his parents, with the supporting care package, is meeting his needs;
b. The Symptom Management Plan is being followed, including the administering of medication by [AB]'s
nursing team;
c. It is in [AB]'s
best interests for the application to be withdrawn and for no order to be made.
…
THE COURT ORDERS
1 The Local Authority shall have permission to withdraw their application for a Care Order inrespect
of [
AB].
2 Any future applicationsrelating
to [
AB
or his sister], whether in the Family Court, High Court or Administrative Court, shall be
reserved
to Munby P if available."
i) Cases such as this (Re
Jake (A Child) [2015] EWHC 2442 (Fam), [2016] 2 FCR 118, is another example) raise very complex issues, as yet little explored in the authorities, as to whether the appropriate process is by way of application for a care order or application under the inherent jurisdiction. Local authorities need to think long and hard before embarking upon care proceedings against otherwise unimpeachable parents who may justifiably
resent
![]()
recourse
to what they are likely to see as an unnecessarily adversarial and punitive
remedy.
![]()
ii) A local authority does not need any specific locus standi to be
able
to invoke the inherent jurisdiction: see In
re
D (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation) [1976] Fam 185. Section 100 does not prevent a local authority invoking the inherent jurisdiction in
relation
to medical treatment issues: see
Re
C (Children: Power to Choose Forenames) [2016] EWCA Civ 374, [2017] 1 FLR 487, para 97.
iii) Whatever its strict rights may be, a local authority will usually be ill-advised to
rely
upon its parental
responsibility
under section 33(3)(a) of the 1989 Act as entitling it to authorise medical treatment opposed by parents who also have parental
responsibility:
see Barnet London Borough Council v AL and others [2017] EWHC 125 (Fam), [2017] 4 WLR 53, para 32, and the discussion in
Re
C (Children: Power to Choose Forenames) [2016] EWCA Civ 374, [2017] 1 FLR 487, paras 92-95. For a local authority to embark upon care proceedings in such a case merely to clothe it with parental
responsibility
is likely to be problematic and may well turn out to be ineffective.
iv) If, on the other hand, in a case such as this, a local authority is thinking of embarking upon care proceedings with a view, as here, to
removing
the child from the parents, it needs to think very carefully not merely
about
the practicalities of finding an appropriate placement, whether institutional or in a specialised foster placement, but also
about
the practicalities of ensuring that the parents have proper contact with their child during what may be its last few months or weeks of life. And by proper contact I do not mean contact two or three times a week for a couple of hours a time if the parents
reasonably
want more, even much more. As I said in
Re
Jake (A Child) [2015] EWHC 2442 (Fam), [2016] 2 FCR 118, para 29, "In terms of simple humanity, parents must have as much time as they want, not least because it may be a distressingly short time, with their much loved baby." And it is simply unbearable to contemplate the
reaction
of parents unable to be with their child at the moment of death because of geography or, even worse, bureaucracy.
Postscript
Note 1 I draw attention, yet again, to the impermissibility of this form of pleading: see Re
A (Application for Care and Placement Orders: Local Authority Failings) [2015] EWFC 11, [2016] 1 FLR 1, para 10 (approved by the Court of Appeal in
Re
J (A Child) [2015] EWCA Civ 222), and
Re W (A Child) (Adoption: Delay) [2017] EWHC 829 (Fam), [2017] 2 FLR 1628, para 32. [Back]