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Neutral Citation Number: [2018] EWHC 2574 (Admin) |
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Case No: CO/2224/2017 |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
|
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Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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05/10/2018 |
B e f o
r
e :
HER HONOUR JUDGE EADY QC
(Sitting as a High Court Judge)
____________________
Between:
____________________
KAREN
REID
(instructed by Duncan Lewis, Solicitors) for the Claimant
ZOE WHITTINGTON (instructed by
Brent
Legal Services) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 26 September 2018
____________________
HTML
VERSION
OF JUDGMENT APPROVED
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
HER HONOUR JUDGE EADY QC:
Introduction
- This is the final hearing of the Claimant's application for judicial
review,
permission having been granted on two grounds by Karon Monaghan QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, on 18 July 2018.
- The claim was issued on 10 May 2017. Over the course of the proceedings, the issues between the parties have narrowed; the Claimant now identifies the questions for the Court as follows:
i) Is the Defendant's position, that the Claimant and her children should be housed within a 60-minute journey of the Claimant's parents and the children's school: (i) unreasonable on Wednesbury grounds (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd
v
Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223); (ii) a breach of the Claimant's article 8
right
to a private and family life under the European Convention on Human
Rights
("the ECHR")?
ii) In any event, has the Defendant acted unreasonably by failing to make an offer of accommodation to the Claimant within the geographical area it has thus identified?
- When giving permission, Ms Monaghan QC also made an anonymization order, directing that the identities of the Claimant and her children should not be disclosed in any Court documents or Judgments. With this in mind, I have
referred
to the children as "X" and "Y" in this Judgment and have sought to avoid giving unnecessary detail
regarding
the Claimant's criminal conviction.
The Factual Background
- The Claimant is the mother of two sons; her eldest ("X") was born on [a date in] 2008, and is now aged 9, her youngest son ("Y") was born on [a date in] 2013 and is now 5 years old. The Claimant has lived in
Brent
for some 13 years and her immediate family live in the
borough.
Her children have been brought up in
Brent
and both now attend a local primary school.
- In 2014, the Claimant was sentenced to 28 months and 7 days' imprisonment in
respect
of a terrorist
related
offence, seemingly at the instigation of her then husband, who had left the UK in 2013 to support a jihadist cause.
- The Claimant was first
released
from prison on 8 July 2015 but
recalled
after breaching the terms of her licence and
returned
to custody until 9 September 2016. Upon her
release,
she was initially subject to probation supervision and she has a continuing obligation to
report
to counterintelligence on a
regular
basis and is prohibited from accessing social media.
- When the Claimant was in prison, her children lived with their maternal grandparents; an arrangement that continued after the Claimant's
release,
albeit she always intended that they would
return
to live with her once she had secured appropriate accommodation. Upon her initial
release
in July 2015, the Claimant joined her children at her parents' home and, whilst there, made an application to the Defendant's housing department; the
view
was taken, however, that the Defendant owed the Claimant no duty under the Housing Act 1996 as she had made herself intentionally homeless when she abandoned her previous accommodation while serving a prison sentence. When
released
in September 2016, the Claimant approached the Defendant's housing department once again, but it declined to
re-consider
her application, although the Claimant was provided with temporary accommodation for the period immediately following her
release.
That temporary accommodation was provided solely for the Claimant and had ceased by the time of the claim in these proceedings, at which point the Claimant was homeless.
- Meanwhile, it seems that the Defendant's housing department
referred
the Claimant's case to social care, which, through its children's services team, accepted that X and Y were children in need for the purposes of section 17 Children Act 1989 and agreed to provide assistance to the Claimant in her efforts to look for suitable and affordable accommodation for the family; it was further agreed that financial assistance would be made available, up to £5,000, should the Claimant need a deposit to secure a particular property.
- Given the nature of her offences, the Claimant was subject to a multi-agency protection agreement ("MAPPA") and the Defendant has said that it continued to consult with other agencies in
relation
to its attempts to assist the Claimant secure private sector accommodation. Having initially identified two one-bedroom flats in south
London
(both unsuitable given the size of the accommodation), on 8 March 2017 the Defendant made two offers to the Claimant of two-bedroom properties, one in Kidderminster and one in Dulwich. The Claimant
rejected
these offers as unsuitable given the distances of each property from the
Brent
area, where her only support network was located - of particular importance given the ties her children had to their maternal grandparents and aunt and given her own
vulnerabilities.
- It is unclear precisely how the Defendant had assessed these offers to be suitable given that no Child and Family Assessment ("CFA") had been carried out at that stage and the evidence I have seen from the Claimant's former probation officer (set out in an email of 17 December 2016) suggests that other agencies attending MAPPA meetings with the Defendant had "made clear that it would not be in the children's best interest to be moved so far away from the only support network (i.e. [the Claimant's] family) given all the issues that they are experiencing and the fact that it will leave her
vulnerable
to further extremist exploitation should she be moved to an area where she has no support." It seems the Defendant had initially considered the possibility of an even more distant location and this observation may have been directed to that, but both offers would still have involved a journey of over an hour from the Claimant's parents' home and X's school (the Kidderminster property was between 3-4 hours' away; the Dulwich accommodation around 1 ½ hours).
- The concerns
raised
by other agencies in the MAPPA meetings
reflect
the conclusions
reached
in earlier
reports,
both in
relation
to the children (the Crown Court having ordered a pre-sentence
report
from a Dr Sharon Pettle, Consultant Clinical Psychologist, which discussed the traumatic impact of events on X and Y), and the Claimant (a Psychologist's
report
having been undertaken for the National Offender Management Service before her
release,
regarding
the potential
risk
of the Claimant
re-offending,
and advising of her potential
vulnerability
to external influences if she was isolated, without the support of stable family
relationships).
- The Defendant first undertook a CFA in April 2017, apparently at the instigation of the Claimant's then solicitors, who specifically
raised
the issue of the Claimant's
vulnerability,
stating she was "heavily
reliant
on the support of her family and friends as she is at
risk
of being
radicalized
again", and highlighted concerns about X's psychological development. Although the April 2017 CFA
records
the concerns of the probation service that the Claimant was "
vulnerable"
and "susceptible to extremist
views
and
re-offending
if she accepted accommodation outside of
London",
these matters do not feature in the Defendant's
recommendations
and it was noted that there were no actual
restrictions
on the Claimant's place of
residence.
As for X and Y, there were no safeguarding concerns while they were living with their grandparents, although it was noted that both children were
reported
to suffer separation anxiety and it had been
recommended
that X be
referred
to Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services. Whilst
recording
the Claimant's concerns about the lack of stability for her children and her desire that they be housed together, near her family, the Defendant considered she was unlikely to find suitably sized, affordable accommodation in the
Brent
area (noting that the Claimant was dependent upon state benefits). Although the Claimant's support network in
Brent
was acknowledged to be important, it was concluded that it was
reasonable
to continue to offer accommodation options outside
London,
with the Claimant staying in
regular
contact with her family by telephone, messaging or social media. It was
recommended
that the Claimant be made "one final offer of suitable and affordable accommodation anywhere outside of
London
under section 17 Children Act 1989 to end the cycle of homelessness". Should that offer be declined, the CFA concluded that "
Brent
Social Care will discharge its duty and [the Claimant] will be encouraged to make alternative arrangements to source her own accommodation".
- Following the CFA, and apparently pursuant to its
recommendations,
on 18 April 2017 the Defendant made a further offer of a two-bedroom flat, this time in Great Wryley, South Staffordshire; this was over 3 hours from the Claimant's parent's home and X's school and was also
refused
by the Claimant.
- On 10 May 2017, the Claimant issued the current proceedings, which included an application for urgent interim
relief.
That application was considered the same day by Green J, who ordered the Defendant provide the Claimant with accommodation pending determination of the application for permission. Pursuant to that order, the Defendant has since housed the Claimant and her children in temporary accommodation, first in a bed and breakfast in Southall and shortly afterwards in hotel-type accommodation in Harlesden. On the grant of permission, Green J's order was continued, pending the final determination of this claim. The Claimant and her children have thus been housed by the Defendant in temporary accommodation for some 16 months. Meanwhile, on 19 May 2017, the Defendant made an offer to the Claimant of a two-bedroom property in Wolverhampton; this was around 3 hours from the Claimant's parents and X's school and she again declined the offer.
- Before permission was granted, by order of Holman J in October 2017, the Claimant was directed to file evidence of her own attempts to find suitable properties in the private
rented
sector. Her statement of 10 November 2017 speaks of the difficulties she experiences looking for accommodation: even if a landlord might be willing to
rent
to someone on benefits, they decline to do so on learning of her criminal conviction. She also complains of the Defendant's
refusal
to cover agency administration fees and
refers
to
receiving
one offer of a suitable property in October 2016, which was lost when the Defendant failed to
respond
to the estate agent
regarding
the deposit.
- The Claimant's statement further attests to her dependency on her family and the impact of the situation upon X and Y, exhibiting a letter from the children's former social worker corroborating her concerns and supporting her
request
that the Defendant's housing department consider providing the family with accommodation in
Brent
or the wider
London
area.
- The Defendant completed up-dated CFAs in June and September 2017 and then in June 2018. By the time of the June 2018 CFA, a medical
report
from Dr Michael Korzinski, Trauma and Psychosocial expert, was available (dated 28 February 2018; obtained for these proceedings), further corroborating the concerns previously
raised
by other agencies, and advising that:
"[The Claimant] and her children all suffer from significant disruption to primary attachment figures at crucial periods in their development. Attachment disruption is a powerful predictor of a
range
of later social and cognitive difficulties and psychopathology."
- Dr Korzinski
refers
to the importance of the
relationship
between the Claimant and her parents,
recommending:
"Every effort must be made to support the
relationships
she has with her parents and extended family in order to support and
reinforce
the gains she has made in freeing herself from the psychological influenced that [her husband] had upon her and the catastrophic consequences that followed for herself and her children. Contact through What's App, Facebook or meeting with her family once a month will be insufficient to sustain the progress she has made in breaking free …"
Although
referring
to the possibility of using social media to maintain contact, Dr Korzinski later
records
the
restrictions
on the Claimant in this
regard.
- As for the children, Dr Korzinski speaks of the continuing difficulties X and Y face, exacerbated by more
recent
media
reporting
relating
to their father (which X is old enough to understand) and
refers
back to the pre-sentence
report
from Dr Pettle, adopting its conclusions and advising that:
"The question of where [the Claimant] lives is inextricably linked with what is in the best interest of her children. Dr Sharon Pettle's 2014 [
report]
stresses the importance of the
role
of the maternal grandparents in safeguarding the emotional social and psychological welfare of the children. I completely agree … [those] findings
remain
relevant
… in the here and now. It would put the children at
risk
if they were moved anywhere that interfered with or disrupted the unfettered access to their grandparents that currently exists. It is in the children's best interest to
remain
as close to where they are currently located. The mother herself needs considerable support from her parents and would also be less likely to be an effective single parent without their support. This would put the children at
risk.
Every effort should be undertaken to maintain and strengthen the system of support which is integral to the children's welfare. The children's system of attachment extends to the school where they are well grounded and integrated."
- While the June 2018 CFA continued to emphasise the difficulties in finding suitable and affordable accommodation in the
London
area (although, with updated information as to the Claimant's savings, it noted she might be able to make some contribution to any shortfall in
rent),
the Defendant's position shifted at this stage, with a
recommendation
that its social care department continue to assist the Claimant "source for suitable, affordable and sustainable property within a
reasonable
commute of 60 minutes distance journey time from maternal grandparents home within
London".
- Since the June 2018 CFA, the Defendant has made two further offers of properties to the Claimant, both of two-bedroom flats within the
London
area and accepted to be within a
reasonable
commute of her parents' home and the children's school. The Claimant accepted the first property offered but this was then withdrawn by the landlord without explanation; it is common ground the Defendant was not
responsible
for this. Whilst expressing an interest in the second property, the Claimant did not feel able to accept the offer given the likely shortfall in
rent.
That was something the Defendant declined to assist with, in part because it considered the Claimant had some savings that might be used for this purpose but also because its limited
resources
- from which the Defendant has to assist a number of
vulnerable
families and children in need – means it is unable to meet such costs on an on-going basis.
- In the meantime, the Claimant and her children continue to live in temporary accommodation that she contends is unsuitable, being used to house other
vulnerable
people, often with mental health and alcohol and drug dependency issues. There also appear to have been disputes between the Claimant and the landlord and it is said that the Claimant is in arrears in terms of
rent
and service charge due. For her part, the Claimant says she was unaware of any additional costs she had to meet and is seeking to challenge the assessment, whilst at the same time contesting the cap on her benefits (which, if successful, would assist in terms of finding alternative properties). Whilst accepting that the issues
regarding
the temporary accommodation are not the subject of any direct challenge in these proceedings, the Claimant contends these form part of the
relevant
context in which her claim is to be
viewed.
The
Relevant
Legal Framework
- The Claimant puts her case as a challenge to what she contends is the Defendant's continued failure to make a
reasonable
offer of
rental
accommodation pursuant to its duty under section 17 Children Act 1989 (see paragraph 1 of the Claimant's Skeleton Argument).
"Section 17(1) provides that it is the general duty of every local authority:
"(a) to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their area who are in need; and
(b) so far as is consistent with that duty, to promote the upbringing of such children by their families,
by providing a
range
and level of services appropriate to those children's needs."
- By section 17(2) it is provided that, for the purpose principally of facilitating the discharge of the general duty under subsection (1), local authorities shall have the specific duties and powers set out in Part 1 to Schedule 2. It is not, however, suggested that the Defendant has acted in breach of any mandatory duty under those provisions.
- Any service provided by a local authority in the exercise of a function conferred by section 17:
"(3) … may be provided for the family of a particular child in need or for any member of his family, if it is provided with a
view
to safeguarding or promoting the child's welfare."
And the services provided:
"(6) … may include accommodation and giving assistance in kind or, in exceptional circumstances, in cash."
- Section 17 thus provides a local authority with a wide discretion to provide a service for a particular child in need, or any member of their family (section 17(3)), which may include accommodation (section 17(6)). It does not, however, impose a specific duty to provide accommodation or any other service to meet the assessed needs of any individual child;
rather,
it confers a power to provide assistance in any particular case, the
refusal
to exercise which may be challengeable on public law grounds; see the guideline authority
R
(G)
v
Barnet LBC [2004] 2 AC 208 HL, in particular, per Lord Hope of Craighead at paragraphs 91and 94; Lord Millet at paragraphs 106 and 110, and Lord Scott of Foscote at paragraphs 135-136. More specifically, as was also observed in
R
(G), the provision of accommodation is not the principal or primary purpose of the Children Act 1989 and section 17 does not have the effect of altering the priorities that are otherwise laid down by the Housing Acts (Lord Hope at paragraphs 92-93).
- What services should be provided under section 17 will thus be a matter for the local authority; the Court's function is limited to
reviewing
the legality of what the local authority may decide and
require
it to
reconsider
if what it has determined to do, or not do, was unlawful - it is not for the Court to determine or substitute its judgement for that of the local authority as to what may be the appropriate service to be provided under section 17 (see per John Howell QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, in
R
(PO)
v
Newham [2014] EWHC 2561 (Admin) at paragraph 15). More specifically, appropriate
respect
must be given to the judgements
reached
under section 17 by social workers, often making difficult decisions in financially straightened circumstances, whilst not losing sight of the Court's duty to scrutinise those decisions with care (see the observations made by Helen Mountfield QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, in
R
(O)
v
LB Lambeth [2016] EWHC 937 (Admin) at paragraph 17).
- In the present case, the Claimant says the Defendant's decisions also amount to a breach of her article 8
rights
under the ECHR. Article 8 provides:
"(1) Everyone has the
right
to
respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights
and freedoms of others."
- The article 8(1)
right
to a private and family life is not absolute given that interference with the
right
may be justified on the grounds set out in article 8(2). Any such interference must, however, be proportionate, something to be determined by
reference
to the five questions identified by Lord Bingham of Cornhill at paragraph 17 in
R
(oao
Razgar)
v
SSHD [2004] UKHL 27 (a case involving a challenge to a proposal to
remove
the claimant from the UK):
"(1) Will the proposed
removal
be an interference by a public authority with the exercise of the applicant's
right
to
respect
for his private or (as the case may be) family life?
(2) If so, will such interference have consequences of such gravity as potentially to engage the operation of article 8?
(3) If so, is such interference in accordance with the law?
(4) If so, is such interference necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights
and freedoms of others?
(5) If so, is such interference proportionate to the legitimate public end sought to be achieved?"
- As was observed in
R
(G) (per Lord Hope at paragraph 60), the general duties set out in section 17(1) would seem to accord with the
requirements
of article 8, albeit the question whether decisions taken under section 17 do so will depend on the facts of each case. In
R
(Jalal)
v
Greenwich
Royal
LBC [2016] EWHC 1848 (Admin), it was said (citing Anufrijeva
v
Southwark LBC [2004] QB 1124 CA) that, in the context of a failure to provide welfare support, it would be hard to conceive of a situation where the predicament of an individual would be such that article 8
required
him to be provided with support where article 3 (prohibiting torture, inhuman or degrading treatment) was not engaged (see paragraph 45). That said, the Court in Anufrijeva acknowledged that article 8 may be more
readily
engaged where a family unit is involved (see paragraph 43).
The Decisions Challenged
- In her grounds of claim, the Claimant sought to challenge both the specific offers of accommodation made by the Defendant on 8 March and 18 April 2017, and what is said to be its continued failure to make a
reasonable
offer of accommodation pursuant to its duty under section 17 Children Act 1989. In the 16 months that have passed since the claim was issued, however, the position has changed; while making no concession in
respect
of its earlier decisions, the Defendant is no longer saying it considers it will have discharged its obligations by offering the Claimant properties more than a 60-minute commute from her family and her children's school. In the circumstances, the Claimant acknowledges that the offers of accommodation in Kidderminster, Dulwich and Great Wyrley, while part of the
relevant
context, are now largely academic. The focus of her case is now the more general ground of challenge, to what is said to be the Defendant's continued failure to make a
reasonable
offer of accommodation. That amounts to a
re-focusing
of the Claimant's case but the Defendant takes no point on this.
- More specifically, the Claimant now puts her case on two bases: (1) that the Defendant's
revised
position
remains
(Wednesbury) unreasonable and in breach of her family's article 8
rights,
alternatively (2) that, in any event, the Defendant has continued to act unreasonably by failing to make any accommodation offers within the terms of its
revised
parameters. Again, the Defendant takes no objection to this
re-statement
of the Claimant's case.
Oral Submissions, Discussion and Conclusions
- Having thus identified the grounds of challenge that
remain
live, the Claimant acknowledges that the force of her article 8 challenge is diminished given the Defendant now acknowledges that she, and her children, should be housed within a
reasonable
commute from her parents and from the children's school. She contends, however, that allowing for a journey time of up to 60-minutes
remains
(Wednesbury) unreasonable: such a commute might involve multiple changes, using different forms of transport, and may be unaffordable. Moreover, the need for her children to
remain
at the same school, maintain the same doctors and other services (
relevant
considerations in terms of their welfare, see Nzolameso
v
Westminster City Council [2015] UKSC 22, at paragraphs 16 and 18) engages article 8 ECHR and, given they are too young to travel alone, she could face 4 hours of travel each day and such a commute could only exacerbate punctuality issues with the children at school.
- The Defendant answers the Claimant's objections by observing that its acceptance that the accommodation would need to be "suitable, affordable and sustainable" and the commute "
reasonable"
means
regard
will be had not just to the time of any commute but also to its affordability and complexity. As for the burden on the Claimant in accompanying her children to and from school, it was not unreasonable to think that on many days the Claimant might
remain
near her family and support network during the school day, thus avoiding the need to duplicate her commute. The assessment of
reasonableness
in terms of the commute had been undertaken by experienced social workers, taking into account the particular needs of X and Y, and the detailed CFA of June 2018 demonstrated the Defendant had properly had
regard
to all
relevant
considerations; the high threshold for a Wednesbury challenge had not been met.
- In my judgment, faced with the Defendant's
revised
position, the force of the Claimant's complaints falls away. The parameters the Defendant has now set expressly
recognise
the particular need of the Claimant (and of X and Y) to be housed within a
reasonable
commute of her parents and of her children's school and other services. As Ms
Reid
(counsel for the Claimant) largely accepted in oral argument, that
really
disposes of the ECHR point: the Defendant's proposal gives
rise
to no interference with the private and family life of the Claimant and her children such as would engage article 8. More than that, however, there is no proper basis for saying the Defendant is acting unreasonably in how it now defines the
relevant
parameters for any offer of accommodation made pursuant to its section 17 obligations. The Defendant has a broad discretion in how it complies with its general duty under section 17(1). In the present case, an assessment has been made by social workers experienced with working with
vulnerable
families in
London,
that has – as evidenced by the June 2018 CFA – taken proper account of the particular needs of the Claimant and her children. The conclusion that properties within a
reasonable
60-minute commute might – if otherwise suitable and affordable – be offered to the Claimant is not unreasonable in any public law sense. The specific objections
raised
by the Claimant in argument are met by the caveats set by the Defendant. The challenge on this basis fails.
- As for whether the Defendant has acted unreasonably in failing to make any offers within the 60-minute commute it has now identified, the Claimant contends that the change to its position must mean the Defendant accepts it did not act
reasonably
in its previous offers, outside this
range.
Although it has now made two offers of
reasonably
located properties, the Claimant argues that its continuing
refusal
to offer social housing, to agree to meet agency fees or to cover a possible shortfall in
rent
means the Defendant is still acting unreasonably and failing to
respect
the article 8
rights
of the Claimant and her family. This is all the more so, given the unsuitability of the temporary accommodation and the particular needs of the Claimant and her children. Acknowledging there will be a limited number of affordable properties available in the
relevant
area, the Claimant argues that the Defendant cannot show it looked for suitably located accommodation before June 2018 and says she can point to at least one example (that
referenced
in her witness statement, in October 2016) when the Defendant failed to support her in obtaining a possible home.
- For its part, the Defendant does not concede that its earlier (pre-June 2018) offers were – given its knowledge at the time - unreasonable or amounted to an unwarranted interference with the Claimant's article 8
rights.
Its position changed given the further information that became available and given the length of time that passed, during which X and Y built up closer ties to their maternal grandparents. It was (and
remains)
reasonable
for the Defendant to have
regard
to affordability as an unaffordable
rent
would not provide a stable future home. The Claimant is ineligible for social housing and the Defendant's social care division does not have its own housing stock to draw upon. As for covering additional costs associated with agency fees and any shortfall in
rent,
the Defendant has
reasonably
declined to meet these costs (potentially open-ended insofar as
rent
is concerned) because the Claimant has some savings herself and because of the financial constraints facing the Defendant, from which it also has to meet its obligations to other
vulnerable
children and families. The Defendant has no plans to terminate the Claimant's current temporary accommodation before a suitable alternative is found. Accepting that accommodation is not suitable on a long-term basis, save for the two offers made, the Defendant has genuinely been unable to find properties that met the
requirements
identified.
- It is, of course, common ground that no suitable properties within a
reasonable
commute have been successfully sourced for the Claimant. To the extent this was because the Defendant was previously limiting its efforts to looking outside
London
– seemingly the
recommendation
of the April 2017 CFA – I have sympathy with the Claimant's contention that this was unreasonable. On the evidence before me, I cannot see that the Defendant's position, in making the offers it did in March and April 2017, had proper
regard
to the Claimant's particular
vulnerabilities
and dependency on her support network in
Brent
(and the inevitable knock-on effect of this on her children). Although (as I am told) the Defendant may not have been aware of the
restrictions
on the Claimant's use of social media at that stage and did not then have the benefit of Dr Korzinski's
report,
the
recommendations
of the April 2017 CFA demonstrate no engagement with the concerns
raised
by other agencies, such as the probation service, which had been highlighted by the Claimant's solicitors.
- As the Claimant accepts, however, the offers made in 2017 now fall to be considered as part of the background. Save as possibly
relevant
in
relation
to costs, they can no longer be the focus of her case given the
revision
to the Defendant's position. The question then becomes whether the Defendant has acted unreasonably in its continuing failure to source suitable properties for the Claimant? On this it seems to me that the Claimant's challenge must also fail. There is no evidence to suggest the Defendant has failed to look for accommodation that meets the criteria identified following the June 2018 CFA. Indeed, it is accepted that the offers it has made since have both been suitable; the fact that neither worked out does not evince any challengeable failing on the part of the Defendant. Even in the period prior to June 2018, the Claimant cannot point to any tangible failure by the Defendant to identify suitable properties meeting the criteria it has now set; such properties are simply not
readily
available. The most the Claimant can suggest is that she identified such a property in October 2016, but the evidence that she
relies
on in this
respect
falls short of proving that the Defendant acted unreasonably, in Wednesbury terms, in apparently failing to
respond
sufficiently quickly to this early
request
for financial support.
- For all these
reasons I dismiss this application.
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