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England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Allen v Bloomsbury Publishing Plc & Anor [2010] EWHC 2560 (Ch) (14 October 2010) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2010/2560.html Cite as: [2010] EWHC 2560 (Ch), [2010] ECDR 16 |
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CHANCERY DIVISION
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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PAUL GREGORY ALLEN (ACTING AS TRUSTEE OF ADRIAN JACOBS (DECEASED)) |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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(1) BLOOMSBURY PUBLISHING PLC, (2) JOANNE KATHLEEN MURRAY (PROFESSIONALLY KNOWN AS JK ROWLING)` |
Defendants |
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Andrew Sutcliffe QC and William Edwards (instructed by Reynolds Porter Chamberlain) for the 1st Defendant
John Baldwin QC and Adrian Speck (instructed by Schillings) for the 2nd Defendant
Hearing dates: 28th - 30th July 2010
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Kitchin :
Introduction
Background
Summary judgment – general principles
"20. It is important to keep in mind the principles to be applied in deciding whether a case is suitable for disposal on a summary basis. The most authoritative up-to-date statement is that of Lord Hope in Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 3) [2001] 2 All ER 513:
"In other cases it may be possible to say with confidence before trial that the factual basis for the claim is fanciful because it is entirely without substance. It may be clear beyond question that the statement of facts is contradicted by all the documents or other material on which it is based. The simpler the case the easier it is likely to be to take that view and resort to what is properly called summary judgment. But more complex cases are unlikely to be capable of being resolved in that way without conducting a mini-trial on the documents, without discovery and without oral evidence. As Lord Woolf said in Swain v Hillman, [2001] 1 All ER 91, at p. 95 that is not the object of the rule. It is designed to deal with cases that are not fit for trial at all."
21. Another frequently cited passage on the same theme is the judgment of Colman J in De Molestina v Ponton [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 271, 280 para 3.5, speaking of the difficulty of basing summary judgment on inferences of fact in a complex case:
"…, as Three Rivers District Council shows, where the application in such complex cases relies on inferences of fact, the overriding objective may well require the claim to go to trial in the interest of a fair trial. That is because the relevant inference could not be safely drawn without further discovery and oral evidence at the trial. It is thus necessary, where such inferences are relevant, to guard against the temptation of drawing them as a matter of probability, because the achievement of the over-riding object requires a much higher degree of certitude. Where in a complex case, as may often be the situation, the frontier between what is merely improbable and what is clearly fanciful is blurred, the case or issue should be left to trial."
22. To these familiar citations, Mr Reza adds the words of Potter LJ in ED&F Man Liquid Products v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 para 10:
"However, that does not mean that the court has to accept without analysis everything said by a party in his statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporary documents. If so, issues which are dependent upon those factual assertions may be susceptible of disposal at an early stage so as to save the cost and delay of trying an issue the outcome of which is inevitable…"
23. If Mr Reza was hoping to find in those words some qualification of Lord Hope's approach, he will be disappointed. The Three Rivers case was specifically cited by Potter LJ. He was in my view intending no more than a summary of the same principles. Lord Hope had spoken of a statement contradicted by "all the documents or other material on which it is based" (emphasis added). It was only in such a clear case that he was envisaging the possibility of rejecting factual assertions in the witness statements. It is in my view important not to equate what may be very powerful cross-examination ammunition, with the kind of "knock-out blow" which Lord Hope seems to have had in mind."
"4. Summary judgment procedures, which are designed for the swift disposal of straight forward cases without trial, are only available where the applicant demonstrates that the defence (or the claim, as the case may be) has no "real" prospect of success and if there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial: CPR Part 24.2 . Thus, without the assistance of pre-trial procedures, such as disclosure of documents, and without the benefit of trial procedures, such as cross examination, the court's function is to decide whether the defendant's prospect of successfully establishing the facts relied on by him is "real", that is more than "fanciful" or "merely arguable." The test to be applied was summarised by Sir Andrew Morritt V-C. in Celador Productions Ltd v. Melville [2004] EWHC 2362 (CH) at paragraphs 6 and 7.
5. Although the test can be stated simply, its application in practice can be difficult. In my experience there can be more difficulties in applying the "no real prospect of success" test on an application for summary judgment (or on an application for permission to appeal, where a similar test is applicable) than in trying the case in its entirety (or, in the case of an appeal, hearing the substantive appeal). The decision-maker at trial will usually have a better grasp of the case as a whole, because of the added benefits of hearing the evidence tested, of receiving more developed submissions and of having more time in which to digest and reflect on the materials.
….
9. I also wish to say a few words about the litigation expectations and tactics of claimants and defendants. Claimants start civil proceedings (including intellectual property actions) in the expectation that they will win and often in the belief that the defendant has no real prospect of success. So the defence put forward may be seen as a misconceived, costly and time-wasting ploy designed to dodge an inevitable judgment for as long as possible. There is also a natural inclination on the part of optimistic claimants to go for a quick judgment, if possible, thereby avoiding the trouble, expense and delay involved in preparing for and having a trial.
10. Everyone would agree that the summary disposal of rubbishy defences is in the interests of justice. The court has to be alert to the defendant, who seeks to avoid summary judgment by making a case look more complicated or difficult than it really is.
11. The court also has to guard against the cocky claimant, who, having decided to go for summary judgment, confidently presents the factual and legal issues as simpler and easier than they really are and urges the court to be "efficient" ie produce a rapid result in the claimant's favour.
12. In handling all applications for summary judgment the court's duty is to keep considerations of procedural justice in proper perspective. Appropriate procedures must be used for the disposal of cases. Otherwise there is a serious risk of injustice.
…
17. It is well settled by the authorities that the court should exercise caution in granting summary judgment in certain kinds of case. The classic instance is where there are conflicts of fact on relevant issues, which have to be resolved before a judgment can be given (see Civil Procedure Vol 1 24.2.5). A mini-trial on the facts conducted under CPR Part 24 without having gone through normal pre-trial procedures must be avoided, as it runs a real risk of producing summary injustice.
18. In my judgment, the court should also hesitate about making a final decision without a trial where, even though there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case."
"6. The relevant test is laid down in CPR Rule 24.2. The court may give summary judgment against a claimant or a defendant if it considers that the claimant or defendant has "no real prospect of succeeding" on its claim or defence as the case may be and that "there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial". I have been referred to a number of relevant authorities by counsel for Celador and Mr Melville, namely Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 91, 94–95, Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No.3) [2003] 2 AC 1 , 259–261 paras 90–97 and ED&F Man Liquid Products Ltd v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 paras 8–11. In addition I was referred to the notes in Civil Procedure 2004 Vol.1 paras 24.2.1, 24.2.3–24.2.5.
7. From these sources I derive the following elementary propositions:
a) it is for the applicant for summary judgment to demonstrate that the respondent has no real prospect of success in his claim or defence as the case may be;
b) a "real" prospect of success is one which is more than fanciful or merely arguable;
c) if it is clear beyond question that the respondent will not be able at trial to establish the facts on which he relies then his prospects of success are not real; but
d) the court is not entitled on an application for summary judgment to conduct a trial on documents without disclosure or cross-examination."
The issues
"4. The claim for breach of copyright is in some respects unusual, but it has to be tested by reference to the same principles as would be relevant in a more conventional case. If material is found in a later work which is also in an earlier copyright work, and it is shown that the author of the later work had access to the earlier work, an inference of copying is raised. Then it has to be considered whether there was in fact any copying, in relation to which the later author may say that he obtained the material from his own unaided efforts or from a different source. If it is found that any of the material common to both works was copied from the earlier work, then the question arises whether what was copied was a substantial part of the earlier work.
5. If the copyright work in question is a literary work, the allegation will normally be that part of the text of the earlier work was copied, exactly or with some modification, in the creation of the later work. In the present case that is not what is alleged as the basis for the claim in copyright infringement. What is said to have been copied is a theme of the copyright work. Copyright does not subsist in ideas; it protects the expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves. No clear principle is or could be laid down in the cases in order to tell whether what is sought to be protected is on the ideas side of the dividing line, or on the expression side.
6. The point was mentioned by Lord Hoffmann in the House of Lords in Designers' Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 2416, at paragraph 24, which concerned artistic copyright:
"there are numerous authorities which show that the "part" which is regarded as substantial can be a feature or combination of features of the work, abstracted from it rather than forming a discrete part. That is what the judge found to have been copied in this case. Or to take another example, the original elements in the plot of a play or novel may be a substantial part, so that copyright may be infringed by a work which does not reproduce a single sentence of the original. If one asks what is being protected in such a case, it is difficult to give any answer except that it is an idea expressed in the copyright work."
Lord Hoffmann addressed the point usefully in paragraphs 25 and 26 as well:
"25….The other proposition is that certain ideas expressed by a copyright work may not be protected because, although they are ideas of a literary, dramatic or artistic nature, they are not original, or so commonplace as not to form a substantial part of the work…
26. Generally speaking, in cases of artistic copyright, the more abstract and simple the copied idea, the less likely it is to constitute a substantial part. Originality, in the sense of the contribution of the author's skill and labour, tends to lie in the detail with which the basic idea is presented."
Lord Scott made a similar point at paragraph 64, quoting first a test proposed in Laddie, Prescott & Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright, to determine whether an altered copy constitutes an infringement:
"'Has the infringer incorporated a substantial part of the independent skill, labour etc contributed by the original author in creating the copyright work?'
My Lords, I think this is a useful test, based as it is on an underlying principle of copyright law that a copier is not at liberty to appropriate the benefit of another's skill and labour."
7. Accordingly, the judge had to consider:
i) what relevant material was to be found in both works;
ii) how much, if any, of that had been copied from HBHG;
iii) whether what was so copied was on the copyright side of the line between ideas and expression; and
iv) whether any of the material that was copied and did qualify as expression, rather than as ideas, amounted to a substantial part of HBHG.
The third and fourth of these issues, as often, are interconnected."
"122. In particular, in cases in which the issue of copying has to be decided on disputed evidence the court should be guided by the sound legal principle that proof of similarity between the alleged infringing work and the original copyright work, coupled with proof of direct or indirect access to the original, is prima facie evidence of copying for the defendant to answer: Francis Day & Hunter v. Bron [1963] Ch 587 at 612 per Wilberforce J (a wise judgment, which does not seem to have been cited to the judge).
123. The application of this principle and some reference to the applicable provisions of the 1988 Act (none of which feature in the judgment) would, I think, have disciplined the reasoning and strengthened the structure of the judgment.
124. The following issues frequently arise for decision in proceedings for infringement of literary copyright under the 1988 Act. Although this is not an exhaustive check list, the following are worth bearing in mind as issues that will usually need to be considered, preferably in a chronological setting or, in more complicated cases, of sub-sets of chronologies.
(1) What are the similarities between the alleged infringing work and the original copyright work? Unless similarities exist, there is no arguable case of copying and an allegation of infringement should never get as far as legal proceedings, let alone a trial. The 1988 Act confers on the owner the exclusive right "to copy the work" either directly or indirectly (section 16). This is not an exclusive right to prevent the publication of a work on a similar subject or a work which happens to contain similar material, thematic or otherwise.
(2) What access, direct or indirect, did the author of the alleged infringing work have to the original copyright work? Unless there was some evidence from which access can be directly proved or properly inferred, it will not be possible to establish a causal connection between the two works, which is essential if the Claimants are to prove that the Defendant's work is a copy.
(3) Did the author of the alleged infringing work make some use in his work of material derived by him, directly or indirectly, from the original work?
(4) If the Defendant contends that no such use was made, what is his explanation for the similarities between the alleged infringing work and the original copyright work? Are they, for example, coincidental? Or are they explained by the use of similar sources? If the latter, what are the common sources which explain the similarities? How were the sources used by the authors of the respective works?
(5) If, however, use was made of the original copyright work in producing the alleged infringing work, did it amount, in all the circumstances, to "a substantial part" of the original work? The acts restricted by the copyright in a literary work are to the doing of them "in relation to the work as a whole or any substantial part of it". See section 16(3)(b) of the 1988 Act.
(6) What are the circumstances or factors which justify evaluating the part copied in the alleged infringing work as "a substantial part" of the original copyright work?"
i) whether Mr Allen has a real prospect of establishing that Ms Rowling had access to WTW when writing Goblet and copied from it;
ii) whether Mr Allen has a real prospect of establishing that the similarities relied upon amount to a substantial part of WTW.
The similarities
i) the main characters of WTW and HPGF are wizards who are to compete in a wizard contest which they ultimately win (element 1);
ii) the main characters are required to deduce the exact nature of the main task (element 2);
iii) the main characters uncover the nature of the main task covertly in a bathroom (element 3);
iv) the main characters complete the main task using information gained from helpers (element 4);
v) the main task for the main characters involves the rescue of human hostages imprisoned by a community of half-human, half animal creatures (element 5).
Element 1
Element 2
Element 3
Element 4
Element 5
The sub-plots, themes and incidents
Element 1: sub-elements
Element 2: sub-elements
Element 3: sub-elements
Element 4: sub-elements
Element 5: sub-elements
Access and copying
"The tone of both books also has much in common. Both mix excitement with humour and both show an exuberant quality of invention when it comes to describing magical beings, happenings and institutions. Mention in both novels of wizard marketing, wizard newspapers, wizard prisons and a magical village of brewers, have not been common in wizard-themed stories up to the present. I also know of no other stories involving wizards taking part in a staged contest with each other, with the main characters in both novels solving problems associated with the coming contest while taking a bath. Both novels also feature the taking of hostages, whose final release would win points for the wizard able to bring this about. These repeated convergences suggest that at some stage, inadvertently or otherwise, some borrowing has taken place."
"62. …. I believe that the author of the HP books had seen and read a copy of WTW before they started writing any of the HP books. There is evidence that they consciously or unconsciously transferred some of the rare word clusters used in that book into their own writing. I am satisfied in particular that rare word clusters appear in both WTW and the HPGOF [Goblet].
63. There is a strong similarity and vocabulary overlap between some specific passages in the HP books and in WTW. Substantial proportions of the lexical vocabulary are shared between these books and I do not consider that this can be due to a similarity between the genres alone. My conclusion that the author of HPGOF has read WTW and transferred the language used in that book into their own language has not changed."
Reproduction of a substantial part
"140. It is unhelpful, as was done in some of the submissions to the judge and to this court, to use loose non-statutory terminology when characterising the nature of the copying alleged. For example, reference has been made in this case to "language copying" and also to "textual copying". The 1988 Act does not use these expressions to describe the nature of the copying of a literary work. The relevant statutory provisions refer simply to copying a substantial part of a work. The nature, form and extent of copying differ from case to case. If distinctions are to be drawn in respect of the nature of copying, it is important to be clear about what they are and what effect they have on establishing infringement.
141. For example, it is easier to establish infringement of the copyright in a literary work if the copying is exactly word for word (verbatim or "slavish" copying), or if there are only slight changes in the wording, perhaps in some optimistic attempt to disguise plagiarism. The essence of literary copyright is proprietary protection (in the form of exclusive rights to do acts restricted by the copyright in the work) for a literary work in recognition of the investment of effort, time and skill in reducing it into material form, such as words, signs and symbols. Although there is no objection to calling word for word copying "language copying", it is, in my view, potentially confusing to describe it as "textual copying" and it is better to avoid the use of that expression. The "text" of a literary work may cover more than the particular words in which it is expressed and extend to its overall content, including the selection, arrangement and development of ideas, theories, information, facts, incidents, characters, narrative and so on."
"143. The decision on the substantiality or otherwise of the copying of HBHG in DVC required a careful assessment or evaluation of all the relevant evidence by the fact-finding tribunal in the context of the pleaded case. This included the nature and extent of the copying, having regard to the importance, as well as the amount, of what has been copied from the original work, and the nature of the respective works.
144. The 1988 Act does not define "a substantial part" or even indicate what factors are relevant to substantiality. I do not think that there is any real point in asking: what does "a substantial part" mean? That sort of question is only a path to a dictionary and to the dubious substitution or addition of other words which do not help to answer the crucial question of fact: is DVC a copy of "a substantial part" of HBHG?
145. It is more sensible to ask whether there exist in this case the necessary and sufficient conditions for characterising the parts copied from the original work as "a substantial part" of the original work. The decided cases help in identifying the relevant necessary and sufficient conditions for substantiality. Thus, it is not necessary for the actual language of the copyright work to be copied or even for similar words to be used tracking, like a translation, the language of the copyright work. It is sufficient to establish that there has been substantial copying of the original collection, selection, arrangement, and structure of literary material, even of material that is not in itself the subject of copyright.
146. It is not, however, sufficient for the alleged infringing work simply to replicate or use items of information, facts, ideas, theories, arguments, themes and so on derived from the original copyright work.
147. I agree with Lloyd L.J. that no clear principle can be laid down on how or where to draw the line between the legitimate use of the ideas expressed and the unlawful copying of their expression.
148. A judgment has to be reached by careful attention to the facts of each particular case. In this instance the amount of word for word similarity between HBHG and DVC was trifling in amount and importance. Only nine instances were cited in the claimants' pleadings. The judge was right to hold that they were not "a substantial part" of HBHG."
"156. The literary copyright exists in HBHG by reason of the skill and labour expended by the claimants in the original composition and production of it and the original manner or form of expression of the results of their research. Original expression includes not only the language in which the work is composed but also the original selection, arrangement and compilation of the raw research material. It does not, however, extend to clothing information, facts, ideas, theories and themes with exclusive property rights, so as to enable the claimants to monopolise historical research or knowledge and prevent the legitimate use of historical and biographical material, theories propounded, general arguments deployed, or general hypotheses suggested (whether they are sound or not) or general themes written about."
Conditional order
Conclusion