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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Walton International Ltd & Anor v Verweij Fashion BV [2018] EWHC 1608 (Ch) (28 June 2018) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2018/1608.html Cite as: [2018] ETMR 34, [2018] RPC 19, [2018] EWHC 1608 (Ch) |
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Neutral Citation Number: [2018] EWHC 1608 (Ch)
Case No: HC-2016-002488
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LIST (CHANCERY DIVISION)
Rolls Building
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL
Date: 28 June 2018
Before :
MR JUSTICE ARNOLD
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Between :
|
(1) WALTON INTERNATIONAL LIMITED (2) GIORDANO (HONG KONG) UK LIMITED |
Claimants |
|
- and - |
|
|
VERWEIJ FASHION BV |
Defendant |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Simon Malynicz QC and Andrew Lomas (instructed by Lewis Silkin LLP) for the Claimants
Charlotte May QC and Jaani Riordan (instructed by Bristows LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 11-15 June 2018
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Judgment Approved
MR JUSTICE ARNOLD :
Topic | Paragraphs |
Introduction | 1 |
The Trade Marks | 2-3 |
The sign complained of | 4 |
The Claimants' notice of partial discontinuance and the Defendant's application to set it aside | 5-28 |
Domestic procedural law: CPR Part 38 | 12-20 |
Subject-matter jurisdiction under European law | 21-28 |
The witnesses | 29-47 |
The Claimants' witnesses | 29-36 |
Consumer witnesses | 36 |
The Defendant's witnesses | 37-47 |
Trade witnesses | 47 |
Factual background | 48-88 |
The Claimants | 48-59 |
The Claimants' trade mark registrations | 60 |
The Defendant | 61-73 |
The Defendant's trade mark registrations | 74 |
The parties' knowledge of, and contacts with, each other | 75-88 |
Key legislative provisions | 89-92 |
Relevant dates for assessment | 93-105 |
The law | 93-98 |
Assessment | 98-105 |
The average consumer | 106-107 |
The law | 106 |
Assessment | 107 |
Invalidity of the EU Trade Marks on relative grounds | 108-110 |
Revocation of the Trade Marks for non-use | 111-184 |
The law | 111-123 |
The law with respect to genuine use | 114-115 |
The law with respect to genuine use in the Union | 118 |
Use of the trade mark in a form differing in in elements which do not alter its distinctive character | 119-123 |
Assessment:UK864, UK398 and EU651 (Classes 25, 35) | 124-173 |
The global e-shop | 125-146 |
The AliExpress store | 147-157 |
Social media | 158 |
Offline uses | 159-162 |
Overall assessment | 163-173 |
Assessment: UK444 and EU044 (Class 14) | 174-178 |
Assessment: UK444, UK757 and EU335 (Class 18) | 179-182 |
Assessment: EU150 (Class 9) | 183-184 |
Invalidity of UK297 on the grounds of bad faith | 185-197 |
The law | 186-188 |
Assessment | 189-197 |
Invalidity of UK297 on relative grounds | 198-201 |
Infringement | 202-216 |
The law as to honest concurrent use | 205-208 |
Assessment | 209-216 |
The Defendant's counterclaim for passing off | 217 |
Summary of principal conclusions | 218 |
Introduction
The Trade Marks
i) UK Trade Mark No. 2,000,864 consisting of the word GIORDANO for “articles of clothing, footwear and headgear” in Class 25 registered on 8 December 1995 with a filing date of 31 October 1994 (“UK864”).
ii) UK Trade Mark No. 2,010,444 consisting of the word GIORDANO for goods in Classes 14 and 18 including “wallets” and “belts made of leather and imitation leather” registered on 22 December 1995 with a filing date of 8 February 1995 (“UK444”).
iii) UK Trade Mark No. 2,140,398 consisting of the device for “clothing, footwear and headgear” in Class 25 registered on 23 January 1998 with a filing date of 24 July 1997 (“UK398”).
iv) UK Trade Mark No. 2,141,757 consisting of the device for goods including “bags, handbags, leather cases, travelling bags, shoulder belts; briefcases, file cases, attaché cases, purses, key bags …; umbrellas, parasols …” in Class 18 registered on 4 September 1998 with a filing date of 12 August 1997 (“UK757”).
v) UK Trade Mark No. 3,007,297 consisting of the stylised word for goods and services in Classes 18, 25 and 35 including “clothing, footwear and headgear” and “retailing … services relating to … clothing, footwear, headgear” registered on 12 December 2014 with a filing date of 4 September 2014 (“UK297”).
3. Walton is the registered proprietor of the following EU Trade Marks:
i) EU Trade Mark No. 966,150 consisting of the device for goods in Class 9 including “eyewear” registered on 16 April 2007 with a filing date of 14 October 1998 (“EU150”).
ii) EU Trade Mark No. 4,099,651 consisting of the word GIORDANO for services in Class 35 including “retailing … services in respect of … clothing, footwear, headgear” registered on 8 February 2006 with a filing date of 14 September 2000 (“EU651”).
iii) EU Trade Mark No. 1,856,335 consisting of the word GIORDANO for goods in Class 18 registered on 10 July 2010 with a filing date of 14 September 2000 (“EU335”).
iv) EU Trade Mark No. 2,239,044 consisting of the device for goods in Class 14 registered on 8 August 2002 with a filing date of 31 May 2001 (“EU044”).
The sign complained of
The Claimants’ notice of partial discontinuance and the Defendant’s application to set it aside
“1. First, assuming that the validity of these marks remains before the High Court, the parties have agreed to request a suspension of the proceedings before EU IPO. This avoids the prospect of parallel proceedings.
2. Second, this action before the High Court includes grounds of invalidity in relation to EU TMs 1 856 335 and 4 099 651 additional to those before the EU IPO. In addition to revocation for non-use (which is before the EU IPO), the Defendant has also put validity in issue in the High Court proceedings on the basis of earlier rights owned by the Defendant and an allegation of bad faith. According, the proceedings before the EU IPO would not, even if determined, resolve the dispute between the parties in relation to the validity of these marks.
3. Third, for similar reasons, the proceedings before the EU IPO will not resolve the overall dispute between the parties: conversely; the present English proceedings will consider both the validity of the Claimants’ rights and the lawfulness of the Defendant’s trade in the UK. It will therefore be necessary for the High Court proceedings to continue regardless of the outcome of the proceedings before the EU IPO.
4. Fourth, the current proceedings before the High Court raise substantially the same issues of genuine use in relation to other UK and EU marks of the First Claimant. The disclosure and evidence in relation to these marks will also apply equally to the EU TMs 1 856 355 and 4 099 651. It would therefore be far more efficient, and in accordance with the overriding objective, to determine all of those issues together.
5. Fifth, given the nature of the matters in dispute (in particular, concerning historical use of the EU TMs and bad faith) it is necessary and appropriate that disclosure be given in order for the factual issues in dispute to be fairly determined. Similarly, it will be necessary to test both parties’ evidence in cross-examination. Conversely, there is no procedure for disclosure or oral evidence before the EU IPO.
6. Finally, based on the Court Diary, the High Court proceedings are likely to come on for trial between February and May 2018. Early and comprehensive resolution of the dispute in the UK (including with respect to the EU TMs) is much more likely to provide the commercial certainty needed for the parties (and indeed third parties) as regards the validity of the EU TMs 1 856 335 and 4 099 651, rather than waiting until the proceedings before the EU IPO have run their course.”
6. On 11 May 2017 Master Clark made an order for directions by consent which included a direction that the trial of the proceedings take place in a window from 1 February 2018 to 31 May 2018 (although subsequently the trial was fixed for 11 June 2018). The order included the following recitals:
“UPON noting that the validity of EU trade mark numbers 4,099,651 and 1.856,335 is already in issue before the EU Intellectual Property Office in cancellation actions 11916C and 012500C but considering that there are special guards for continuing this action with respect to those EU trade marks so that all issues between the parties may be heard and determined together
AND UPON the parties undertaking to procure a stay of the abovementioned cancellation proceedings pending the outcome of these proceedings”.
8. On 6 June 2018 the Claimants served a notice of discontinuance of their claim in so far as it related to the EU Trade Marks. On 7 June 2018 the Defendant applied to set aside the notice of discontinuance. On the first day of trial, 11 June 2018, I heard argument on the Defendant’s application. At the conclusion of the argument, I announced that I would set aside the notice of discontinuance for reasons to be given later in writing. My reasons are set out below, considering the position as at 11 June 2018.
10. Secondly, it was not in dispute that the Claimants submitted to the in personam jurisdiction of this Court by bringing the claim against the Defendant, that that submission extended to the Defendant’s counterclaim and that the Court retained jurisdiction over the Claimants with respect to the counterclaim even if they discontinued the claim: see Fakih Brothers v A P Moller (Copenhagen) Ltd [1994] 1 Lloyds Rep 103 at 109 (Hobhouse J), Glencore International AG v Exter Shipping Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 524, [2002] CLC 1090 at [45]-[49] and [53] (Rix LJ) and cf. Linuzs v Latmar Holdings Corp [2013] EWCA Civ 4, [2013] ILPr 19 at [30]-[34] (Toulson LJ). As will appear, the issue in the present case is one of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Domestic procedural law: CPR Part 38
12. CPR Part 38 provides, so far as relevant, as follows:
“38.2
(1) A claimant may discontinue all or part of a claim at any time.
(2) However –
(a) a claimant must obtain the permission of the court if he wishes to discontinue all or part of a claim in relation to which –
…
(ii) any party has given an undertaking to the court;
38.4
(1) Where the claimant discontinues under rule 38.2(1) the defendant may apply to have the notice of discontinuance set aside.
38.7 A claimant who discontinues a claim needs the permission of the court to make another claim against the same defendant if –
(a) he discontinued the claim after the defendant filed a defence; and
(b) the other claim arises out of facts which are the same or substantially the same as those relating to the discontinued claim.”
13. The Court may set aside a notice of discontinuance if it is an abuse of the process of the court, but the court’s power to do so is not limited to such circumstances and it may be exercised whenever it is necessary to give effect to the overriding objective of dealing with the case justly and at proportionate cost: see Sheltam Rail Co (Pty) Ltd v Mirambo Holdings Ltd [2008] EWHC 829 (Comm), [2009] Bus LR 302 at [34]-35] (Aikens J) and High Commissioner for Pakistan in the UK v National Westminster Bank plc [2015] EWHC 55 (Ch) at [46] (Henderson J). As Aikens J observed in the former case, a useful question to ask is whether, if permission of the court had been required to serve a notice of discontinuance, that permission would have been granted unconditionally; and the court is also entitled to consider what the claimant is attempting to achieve by serving the notice.
19. Even if it did not amount to an abuse of process, I consider that the Court should exercise its discretion to set the notice of discontinuance aside because that would enable the Court to determine all of the issues raised in these proceedings justly and at proportionate cost. Moreover, that accords with the parties’ agreement, as set out in the Joint Letter, that that represented the best way in which to deal with the issues. Nothing had changed since then to justify the Claimants unilaterally withdrawing from that agreement.
Subject-matter jurisdiction under European law
21. The relevant provisions of the Regulation are as follows:
“Article 122
Application of Union rules on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
1. Unless otherwise specified in this Regulation, the Union rules on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters shall apply to proceedings relating to EU trade marks and applications for EU trade marks, as well as to proceedings relating to simultaneous and successive actions on the basis of EU trade marks and national trade marks.
2. In the case of proceedings in respect of the actions and claims referred to in Article 124:
…
(b) Articles 25 and 26 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 shall apply subject to the limitations in Article 125(4) of this Regulation;
…
Article 124
Jurisdiction over infringement and validity
The EU trade mark courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction:
(a) for all infringement actions and — if they are permitted under national law — actions in respect of threatened infringement relating to EU trade marks;
…
(d) for counterclaims for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity of the EU trade mark pursuant to Article 128.
Article 125
International jurisdiction
1. Subject to the provisions of this Regulation as well as to any provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 applicable by virtue of Article 122, proceedings in respect of the actions and claims referred to in Article 124 shall be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled or, if he is not domiciled in any of the Member States, in which he has an establishment.
2. If the defendant is neither domiciled nor has an establishment in any of the Member States, such proceedings shall be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the plaintiff is domiciled or, if he is not domiciled in any of the Member States, in which he has an establishment.
3. If neither the defendant nor the plaintiff is so domiciled or has such an establishment, such proceedings shall be brought in the courts of the Member State where the Office has its seat.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3:
(a) Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 shall apply if the parties agree that a different EU trade mark court shall have jurisdiction;
(b) Article 26 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 shall apply if the defendant enters an appearance before a different EU trade mark court.
5. Proceedings in respect of the actions and claims referred to in Article 124, with the exception of actions for a declaration of non-infringement of an EU trade mark, may also be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the act of infringement has been committed or threatened, or in which an act referred to in Article 11(2) has been committed.
Article 126
Extent of jurisdiction
1. An EU trade mark court whose jurisdiction is based on Article 125(1) to (4) shall have jurisdiction in respect of:
(a) acts of infringement committed or threatened within the territory of any of the Member States;
…
2. An EU trade mark court whose jurisdiction is based on Article 125(5) shall have jurisdiction only in respect of acts committed or threatened within the territory of the Member State in which that court is situated.
Article 127
Presumption of validity — Defence as to the merits
1. The EU trade mark courts shall treat the EU trade mark as valid unless its validity is put in issue by the defendant with a counterclaim for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity.
…
3. In the actions referred to in points (a) and (c) of Article 124, a plea relating to revocation of the EU trade mark submitted otherwise than by way of a counterclaim shall be admissible where the defendant claims that the EU trade mark could be revoked for lack of genuine use at the time the infringement action was brought.
Article 128
Counterclaims
1. A counterclaim for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity may only be based on the grounds for revocation or invalidity mentioned in this Regulation.
2. An EU trade mark court shall reject a counterclaim for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity if a decision taken by the Office relating to the same subject matter and cause of action and involving the same parties has already become final.
…
4. The EU trade mark court with which a counterclaim for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity of the EU trade mark has been filed shall not proceed with the examination of the counterclaim, until either the interested party or the court has informed the Office of the date on which the counterclaim was filed. The Office shall record that information in the Register. If an application for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity of the EU trade mark had already been filed before the Office before the counterclaim was filed, the court shall be informed thereof by the Office and stay the proceedings in accordance with Article 132(1) until the decision on the application is final or the application is withdrawn.
…”
22. In Adobe Systems Inc v Netcom Distributors [2012] EWHC 1087 (Ch), [2012] ETMR 38 Mann J held that, on a proper interpretation of what were then Articles 96 and 100 of Council Regulation 207/2009/EC of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (codified version) (now Articles 125 and 128 of the Regulation), this Court did not have (subject-matter) jurisdiction to entertain a counterclaim for revocation of what were then Community trade marks where the counterclaim would not provide a defence to the infringement claim even if it was wholly successful.
25. Counsel for the Defendant submitted that the Court was not so precluded for three separate reasons. First, she submitted that what mattered was whether the Court had jurisdiction at the date the counterclaim was served. If it did, then the Court could not lose jurisdiction subsequently. I do not accept this submission. In Case C-4/03 Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co KG v Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG [2006] ECR I-6509 the Court of Justice of the European Union held at [25] that the exclusive jurisdiction provided for by what is now Article 24(3) of European Parliament and Council Regulation 1215/2012/EU of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (“the Brussels I Regulation”) applied “whatever the form of proceedings in which the issue of a patent's validity is raised, be it by way of an action or a plea in objection, at the time the case is brought or at a later stage in the proceedings [emphasis added]”. Furthermore, Article 27 requires a court of a Member State which is seized of a claim which is “principally concerned with” a matter over which the courts of another Member State have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 24(4) to decline jurisdiction. It follows that the subject-matter jurisdiction of a court in European law can be changed by procedural steps which occur after the service of the relevant originating process: see e.g. Anan Kasei Co Ltd v Molycorp Chemicals & Oxides (Europe) Ltd [2016] EWHC 1722 (Pat), [2016] Bus LR 945.
26. Secondly, counsel for the Defendant submitted that, if the notice of discontinuance was set aside, then the parties would simply be returned to the position they were in the day before the notice was served. As she pointed out, there is no dispute that, as at 5 June 2018, this Court had jurisdiction to determine both the claim and the counterclaim relating to the EU Trade Marks. Absent a discontinuance by the Claimants of the claim, that would continue to be the case. I accept this submission. In effect, what I have concluded applying domestic procedural law is that it was simply too late, having got this close to trial, for the Claimants to be permitted unilaterally to discontinue their claim, and thus the Court remained seized of both the claim and the counterclaim. It makes no difference that the Claimants made it clear that they did not intend to pursue their arguments in support of the claim in any event.
The witnesses
The Claimants’ witnesses
29. Lau Kwok Kuen, also known as Peter Lau, has been the Chief Executive and Chairman of Giordano International Ltd, the parent company of the Giordano Group, which includes the Claimants, since 1994. Mr Lau has worked for the Giordano Group since 1987. He gave evidence primarily about the history of the Giordano Group and its historical use of the Trade Marks in the UK and the remainder of the EU. No criticism was made of his evidence.
30. Mark Loynd is the General Counsel and Company Secretary of the Giordano Group. He has been employed by the Giordano Group since September 2013. He became Head of International Brand Collaborations in 2015. (Prior to this, international operations and expansion were primarily dealt with by Dominic Irwin, Giordano Group’s former Chief Financial Officer, and Ishwar Chugani, the Managing Director of Giordano Group’s Middle East subsidiary and a director of Giordano International Ltd since 1 February 2013.) He has been a director of Walton since 15 March 2016, a director of the Second Claimant (“Giordano UK”) since 27 October 2015 and a director of Giordano International Ltd since 9 March 2017. He gave evidence primarily about the Giordano Group’s recent use of the Trade Marks in the UK and the remainder of the EU. Counsel for the Defendant submitted that Mr Loynd’s written evidence had to be treated with care, because it was expressed in broad and vague terms which gave an impression of use on a greater scale than was really justified by the facts. I agree with this. Counsel for the Defendant also criticised Mr Loynd’s oral evidence as being affected by selective recollection. I agree that Mr Loynd professed to have difficulty in remembering some points which one would have expected him to have a better recollection of, but this may be explicable as being due to jet-lag. In any event the points were not of particular significance.
31. Huang Chaoxiong is a senior programmer at Shenzhen Tiger Enterprises Ltd (“Shenzhen”) a company within the Giordano Group. He has been employed by Shenzhen since 2002. He gave evidence about the operation of the Giordano Group’s global e-shop website. Counsel for the Defendant submitted that Mr Huang’s evidence had to be treated with considerable caution for two reasons.
32. The first reason is that Mr Huang’s first witness statement described the geotargeting feature of the global e-shop as having been present in the period 2010 to 2016. In fact, this feature was only introduced in the 2016 version of the global e-shop which was operational from about 22 February 2016. Not only that, but it subsequently emerged that Mr Huang based his evidence in his first statement on the source code for the 2016 version of the global e-shop, and not the 2010 version. The source code for the 2010 version was only (partially) disclosed (following a specific disclosure application by the Defendant at the pre-trial review) on 4 June 2018, and it was only on 6 June 2018 that a third witness statement from Mr Huang was served correcting his first statement. This put the Defendant in considerable difficulties in dealing with this evidence (compounded by the Claimants’ notice of discontinuance and the consequent need to make the Defendant’s application to set it aside). Thus it was too late, for example, for the Defendant to attempt to adduce expert evidence about the source code. Yet further, Mr Huang was unable to explain why key files from the 2010 version of the source code showed last modification dates in August and September 2015.
The Defendant’s witnesses
Factual background
The Claimants
48. Giordano Ltd was founded in Hong Kong by Jimmy Lai in 1981. He chose the name from a pizza restaurant in New York. He thought it would be advantageous to have an Italian name. Mr Lai ceased to have any management role in the company in 1994 and he sold his shareholding in 1996.
49. Giordano Ltd started by manufacturing and retailing GIORDANO branded casual clothing in Hong Kong. To begin with, it just sold men’s clothing. In about 1986 or 1987 it branched out into unisex clothing, and in the early 1990s it introduced children’s clothing. By the late 1980s, the company had stores in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. It focussed on selling a relatively small number of garment designs in a wide range of colours, which enabled it to be very efficient and to compete aggressively on price. It also offered a full refund policy with no questions asked. This approach was very successful. Thus the company’s turnover almost tripled between 1989 and 1993 from HK$711.5 million (about £52 million) to HK$2,334 million (about £205 million).
51. On 1 May 1997 Giordano Ltd entered into a franchising agreement with Whittard of Chelsea plc (“Whittard”) and Giordano (UK) Ltd, a franchisee controlled by Whittard. The agreement, which was to last for an initial period of five years, provided for Whittard to set up GIORDANO-branded stores in the UK and the Republic of Ireland and to sell clothing, watches and leather goods in those stores. The first store opened in mid-June 1997 in Peascod Street in Windsor (“the Whittard Shop”). Whittard was dissatisfied with the level of sales, however. According to Dr Lau, Whittard closed the Whittard Shop in September 1997. The last period for which there are surviving sales records, however, is the week ending 13 July 1997. So far as the records go, the Whittard Shop sold some 960 items of clothing. Giordano Ltd subsequently terminated the agreement on 23 July 1999.
53. The Giordano Group established an online shop in the late 1990s. By 2005 it had separate websites servicing Hong Kong, China, Korea and Taiwan. By January 2010 it had an e-shop servicing Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates. In December 2010 it launched its global e-shop. This is central to the non-use issue, and I shall discuss it in detail below. It is convenient to note here, however, that I take the date of December 2010 from paragraph 4 of Mr Huang’s first statement, which is supported by a screenshot from the internet archive known as the WayBack Machine dated 25 December 2010.
57. In the 2017 annual accounts of Giordano International Ltd there is an analysis of GIORDANO sales by market. The markets are identified as, in summary, mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, various other Asia–Pacific countries, the Middle East, and “Overseas franchisees” (South Korea, Southeast Asia and other markets). There is no suggestion that the Giordano Group has an established market for GIORDANO clothing in the UK or the EU.
Location |
Store Number at December 2017 |
Store Number at December 2016 |
Mainland China - DOS - Franchised |
324 605 |
357 562 |
The rest of Asia Pacific |
602 |
581 |
Taiwan |
200 |
203 |
The Middle East - DOS - Franchised |
148 41 |
150 41 |
Hong Kong and Macau |
75 |
73 |
South Korea – franchised |
193 |
200 |
Southeast Asia – franchised |
212 |
217 |
Other Markets - franchised |
14 |
13 |
60. The Giordano Group’s total sales in the year ending 31 December 2017 were over HK$5.4 billion (over £520 million). There is no dispute that the GIORDANO brand is well known in its core markets, and in particular in Hong Kong, China and Taiwan. Moreover, Giordano Group has something of an international reputation. For example, it was presented with the Emerging Market Retailer of the Year Award in 2013 and the International Retailer of the Year Award in 2015 by Retail and Leisure International, an international retail industry publication.
The Claimants’ trade mark registrations
The Defendant
62. The Defendant is a family-run business based in the Netherlands. The business was founded by Arnold Verweij in 1955. The Defendant was incorporated in 1986, took over the business in 1987 and changed its name to its present name in 1997. It is now run by Karel and Robert Verweij.
i) IMC Menswear Show. The IMC buying group is a consortium of independent menswear retailers with about 100 members trading from over 200 shops. It holds trade fairs in Northampton in February and August every year. Approximately 40 suppliers are invited to exhibit their clothing ranges at the fair. The show is normally attended by over 70 buyers. The Defendant has exhibited annually since 2002. Around 80–90% of IMC members (including Mr Smart, Mr Raven and Mr Rawlings) sell or have sold the Defendant’s GIORDANO clothing.
ii) Moda. This is the UK’s largest fashion trade exhibition and takes place at the NEC, Birmingham. It also takes place in February and August each year (to reflect the summer and winter buying seasons, respectively). There are normally about 1500 brands or suppliers exhibiting, with 12,000 odd visitors over the course of the three-day event. The Defendant has exhibited every year since February 2008.
iii) INDX Menswear. This show takes place twice per year at the Cranmore Park Exhibition Centre in Solihull and showcases over 100 brands including GIORDANO. The Defendant has exhibited every year since 2016 (and also in 2008-2010 when it was previously known as the AIS Menswear show).
iv) Panorama, Berlin. This is an important European trade show for major buyers and store groups. The Defendant has exhibited five times since 2014.
v) Modafabriek, Amsterdam. This is a major clothing show with over 20,000 visitors. The Defendant exhibited in 2012 and 2013, hosting “open house” events for buyers during the show since its headquarters are nearby.
The Defendant’s trade mark registrations
The parties’ knowledge of, and contacts with, each other
82. In June 2012 the Giordano Group was approached by a Dutch retail group which expressed interest in stocking the GIORDANO brand. Although these discussions did not lead anywhere, it is evident from an email from Mr Chugani to a colleague dated 6 August 2012 that Mr Chugani was aware that there was “a company operating stores and selling Giordano shirts” in the Netherlands.
83. On 14 January 2014 Mr Chugani sent the Defendant an email with the subject “Introduction to Giordano International” in the following terms:
“To the Directors/Export Manager – Verweij Group
I would like to introduce our company and brand – Giordano.
Giordano International, founded in Hong Kong in 1981, currently operates 2,800 stores in 40 countries around the world.
We understand that your company has also been distributing Giordano branded shirts, especially in the Benelux countries, and I would like to start a discussion on the possibility of us working together.”
At the foot of the email was a panel containing further information about the Giordano Group.
84. Karel Verweij replied on 24 January 2014 asking for more information about Giordano Group’s proposals for cooperation. Mr Chugani responded later the same day enclosing a link to Giordano Group’s brochure and saying:
“We are now looking to expand our operations beyond Asia and the Middle East.
As you have been operating in the Benelux for many years now, there could be opportunities for both sides.”
He finished by suggesting a meeting.
85. On 26 March 2014 Karel Verweij replied saying that the Defendant had started selling GIORDANO shirts in 1989 and that it was currently selling to approximately 1500 retailers in countries across Europe. He said that the Defendant was interested to talk to the Giordano Group about possibilities for the future, “also with a view to avoid any possible conflicts”, and agreed that a meeting would be a good idea. On 1 April 2014 Mr Chugani responded suggesting a meeting in Amsterdam on 2 May 2014. This led to a meeting between Mr Chugani and Arnold, Karel and Robert Verweij at the Defendant’s offices on 3 June 2014. On 4 June 2014 Mr Chugani sent the Verweijs an email thanking them for their hospitality and expressing confidence that there could be many possible areas of cooperation between the parties.
86. About a month after Mr Chugani’s email dated 14 January 2014, on 18 February 2014 Walton applied to register stylised forms of GIORDANO JUNIOR and GIORDANO/LADIES in Classes 9, 18 and 25 and Classes 9, 25 and 35 respectively as EU trade marks numbers 12,611,075 (“EU075”) and 12,610,945. Walton did not inform the Defendant that it was doing this. The applications were published on 6 May 2014. On 31 July 2014 the Defendant and Abanicos filed oppositions on relative grounds relying upon their earlier Benelux and international registrations. (These oppositions were subsequently withdrawn on 27 November 2017, and so the applications proceeded to registration. Instead the Defendant and Abanicos filed cancellation actions on 23 January 2018 and 22 January 2018, but by then Walton had requested conversion of EU075 in Class 25 into national marks.)
87. Although discussions continued on a without prejudice basis intermittently for a year, no agreement was reached. On 27 May 2015 Karel and Robert Verweij sent Mr Chugani an email discussing various possible forms of cooperation, and suggesting that the most practical solution would be an agreement dividing the world into two areas of exclusivity. The email concluded by saying that, in order to safeguard the Defendant’s position, it had had no alternative but to file the oppositions referred to above and that it would do the same against some other applications of the Giordano Group. On 5 August 2015 Mr Chugani replied reiterating that the Giordano Group was willing to discuss a mutually beneficial solution, but in the meantime would protect its rights and interests in GIORDANO. On 27 August 2015 Mr Stöpetie wrote to Mr Loynd proposing a meeting with a view to reaching an agreement, but said that in the meantime the Defendant would protect its rights and interests in GIORDANO. On 4 September 2015 there was a meeting between the Giordano Group and the Defendant in Paris. On 17 September 2015 Anthony Tong of Giordano Group’s Hong Kong solicitors Robin Bridge and John Liu sent Mr Stöpetie an email informing him that, while the Giordano Group remained sincerely interested in finding a solution acceptable to both parties, until an agreement had been reached, Giordano Group considered that it was obliged to preserve its position by taking appropriate legal actions. On 22 September 2015 Mr Stöpetie replied saying that the Defendant understood this and that the Giordano Group would appreciate that the same went for the Defendant. To that end, he invited the Giordano Group voluntarily to surrender its European registrations, including the UK Trade Marks, failing which the Defendant would apply to cancel them. Mr Loynd accepted that, as a result, Walton was aware from that date that its trade marks were vulnerable to a revocation attack by the Defendant.
Key legislative provisions
89. At the dates when the applications for the EU Trade Marks were filed, the legislation which governed what were then called Community trade marks, and are now called EU trade marks, was Council Regulation 40/94/EC of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark. This was subsequently replaced by Council Regulation 207/2009/EC of 26 February 2009. It has in turn been amended by European Parliament and Council Regulation 2015/2424/EU of 16 December 2015 and then replaced by the Regulation. The Claimants’ infringement allegations relate to periods covered by Regulation 207/2009, Regulation 207/2009 as amended by Regulation 2015/2424 and the Regulation. There is no material difference for the purposes of this case between the relevant provisions of these regulations, although the numbering of the articles has changed. It is therefore convenient to refer to the provisions of the Regulation.
90. The key provisions of the Regulation are as follows:
“Article 8
Relative grounds for refusal
1. Upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for shall not be registered:
(a) if it is identical with the earlier trade mark and the goods or services for which registration is applied for are identical with the goods or services for which the earlier trade mark is protected;
(b) if because of its identity with or similarity to the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected; the likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.
…
4. Upon opposition by the proprietor of a non-registered trade mark or of another sign used in the course of trade of more than mere local significance, the trade mark applied for shall not be registered where and to the extent that, pursuant to the Union legislation or the law of the Member State governing that sign:
(a) rights to that sign were acquired prior to the date of application for registration of the EU trade mark, or the date of the priority claimed for the application for registration of the EU trade mark;
(b) that sign confers on its proprietor the right to prohibit the use of a subsequent trade mark.
…
Article 9
Rights conferred by an EU trade mark
1. The registration of an EU trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights therein.
2. Without prejudice to the rights of proprietors acquired before the filing date or the priority date of the EU trade mark, the proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade, in relation to goods or services, any sign where:
(a) the sign is identical with the EU trade mark and is used in relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which the EU trade mark is registered;
(b) the sign is identical with, or similar to the EU trade mark and is used in relation goods or services which are identical with or similar to the goods or services for which the EU trade mark, if there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public; the likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association between the sign and the trade mark;
…
Article 18
Use of an EU trade mark
1. If, within a period of five years following registration, the proprietor has not put the EU trade mark to genuine use in the Union in connection with the goods or services in respect of which it is registered, or if such use has been suspended during an uninterrupted period of five years, the EU trade mark shall be subject to the sanctions provided for in this Regulation, unless there are proper reasons for non-use.
The following shall also constitute use within the meaning of the first subparagraph:
(a) use of the EU trade mark in a form differing in elements which do not alter the distinctive character of the mark in the form in which it was registered, regardless of whether or not the trade mark in the form as used is also registered in the name of the proprietor;
…
Article 58
Grounds for revocation
1. The rights of the proprietor of the EU trade mark shall be declared to be revoked on application to the Office or on the basis of a counterclaim in infringement proceedings:
(a) if, within a continuous period of five years, the trade mark has not been put to genuine use in the Union in connection with the goods or services in respect of which it is registered, and there are no proper reasons for non-use; however, no person may claim that the proprietor's rights in an EU trade mark should be revoked where, during the interval between expiry of the five-year period and filing of the application or counterclaim, genuine use of the trade mark has been started or resumed; the commencement or resumption of use within a period of three months preceding the filing of the application or counterclaim which began at the earliest on expiry of the continuous period of five years of non-use shall, however, be disregarded where preparations for the commencement or resumption occur only after the proprietor becomes aware that the application or counterclaim may be filed;
…
2. Where the grounds for revocation of rights exist in respect of only some of the goods or services for which the EU trade mark is registered, the rights of the proprietor shall be declared to be revoked in respect of those goods or services only.
Article 59
Absolute grounds for invalidity
1. An EU trade mark shall be declared invalid on application to the Office or on the basis of a counterclaim in infringement proceedings,
…
(b) where the applicant was acting in bad faith when he filed the application for the trade mark.
…
3. Where the ground for invalidity exists in respect of only some of the goods or services for which the Community trade mark is registered, the trade mark shall be declared invalid as regards those goods or services only.
Article 60
Relative grounds for invalidity
1. An EU trade mark shall be declared invalid on application to the Office or on the basis of a counterclaim in infringement proceedings:
(a) where there is an earlier trade mark as referred to in Article 8(2) and the conditions set out in paragraph 1 or 5 of that Article are fulfilled;
…
(c) where there is an earlier right as referred to in Article 8(4) and the conditions set out in that paragraph are fulfilled;
…
All the conditions referred to in the first subparagraph shall be fulfilled at the filing date or the priority date of the EU trade mark.
…”
Relevant dates for assessment
The law
93. The relevant date for assessing whether a trade mark is invalid is the date on which the application was filed (unless reliance is placed by the proprietor on subsequently acquired distinctive character where the ground of invalidity relied upon is lack of distinctive character): see Case C-192/03 Alcon Inc v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market [2004] ECR I-8993.
94. The relevant date for the assessment of whether a trade mark was applied for in bad faith is the date when the application was made: see Case C-529/07 Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprungli AG v Franz Hauswirth GmbH [2009] ECR I-4893 at [35]. It is not in dispute that, although the relevant date is the application date, later evidence is relevant if it casts light backwards on the position as at the application date: cf. Case C-259/02 La Mer Technology Inc v Laboratoires Goemar SA [2004] ECR I-1159 at [31] and Alcon at [41].
95. The question whether the use of a sign infringes a trade mark pursuant to Article 10(2)(a),(b) of the Directive or Article 9(2)(a),(b) of the Regulation falls to be assessed as at the date that the use of the sign was commenced: see Case C-145/05 Levi Strauss & Co v Casucci SpA [2006] ECR I-3703. Where the use of the sign commenced more than six years (i.e. the limitation period) before the claim form, then the relevant date is six years before the date of the claim form: see Stichting BDO v BDO Unibank Inc [2013] EWHC 418 (Ch), [2013] ETMR 31 at [98].
96. The date for assessing a claim of passing off is the date the conduct complained of commenced: see Starbucks (UK) Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Group plc [2015] UKSC 31, [2015] 1 WLR 2628 at [16].
Assessment
i) for the UK Trade Marks (apart from UK297): 8 October 2010 to 7 October 2015 (i.e. the five years preceding the IPO Applications);
ii) for EU335: 12 October 2010 to 11 October 2015 (i.e. the five years preceding the Defendant’s revocation application in the EUIPO);
iii) for EU651: 9 February 2011 to 8 February 2016 (i.e. the five years preceding the Defendant’s revocation application in the EUIPO);
iv) for EU335 and E044: 21 October 2011 to 20 October 2016 (i.e. the five years preceding the Defendant’s counterclaim in these proceedings).
The average consumer
The law
106. It is settled that many issues in European trade mark law fall to be assessed from the perspective of the “average consumer” of the relevant goods or services, who is deemed to be reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. I reviewed this concept in Enterprise Holdings Inc v Europcar Group UK Ltd [2015] EWHC 17 (Ch), [2015] FSR 22 at [130]-[138]. Since then, it has been considered by the Court of Appeal in London Taxi Corporation Ltd v Frazer-Nash Research Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1729, [2018] FSR 7, where Floyd LJ (with whom Kitchin LJ agreed) said:
35. In the present case I cannot therefore see any a priori reason for excluding the hirer of a taxi from the class of consumers whose perceptions it is necessary to consider. The guarantee of origin which the mark provides is directed not only at purchasers of taxis but also at members of the public, such as hirers of taxis. The hirer is a person to whom the origin function of the vehicle trade mark might matter at the stage when he or she hires the taxi. I entirely accept that the hirer is also a user of taxi services, so that any dissatisfaction with the taxi or its performance is likely to be taken up with the taxi driver or his company. But if, for example, the taxi were to fail for reasons not associated with the taxi service, it would be on the manufacturer identified by his trade mark that the hirer would, or might, wish to place the blame. …”
Assessment
Invalidity of the EU Trade Marks on relative grounds
i) Benelux Trade Mark No. 465,445 for the word GIORDANO in Classes 18 and 25 in the name of Abanicos and exclusively licensed to the Defendant registered on 1 April 1990 with a filing date of 11 August 1989.
ii) International Trade Mark No. 566,522 for the word GIORDANO in Classes 18 and 25 in the name of the Defendant registered on 18 January 1991 based on the Benelux Trade Mark. The Defendant relies upon the designation of the International Trade Mark in Austria and Italy.
Revocation of the Trade Marks for non-use
The law
111. The law with respect to targeting. In order for use of a trade mark online to qualify as use in the UK or elsewhere in the EU, the use must be targeted at the UK or elsewhere in the EU. In Merck KGaA v Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp, [2017] EWCA Civ 1834, [2018] ETMR 10 Kitchin LJ, having considered the judgments of the CJEU in Joined Cases C-585/08 and C-144/09 Pammer v Reederei Karl Schluter GmbH & Co. KG and Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v Heller [2010] ECR I-12527, Case C-324/09 L’Oréal SA v eBay International BV [2011] ECR I-6011 and Case C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd v Sportradar GmbH [EU:C:2012:642], [2013] FSR 4, and a number of domestic authorities, summarised the relevant principles as follows:
“[167] First, in determining whether an advertisement of goods bearing a trade mark on the website of a foreign trader constitutes use of the trade mark in the UK, it is necessary to assess whether the advertisement is targeted at consumers in the UK and in that way constitutes use of the mark in relation to goods in the course of trade in the UK.
[168] Secondly, the mere fact that a website is accessible from the UK is not a sufficient basis for concluding that an advertisement displayed there is targeted at consumers in the UK.
[169] Thirdly, the issue of targeting is to be considered objectively from the perspective of average consumers in the UK. The question is whether those average consumers would consider that the advertisement is targeted at them. Conversely, however, evidence that a trader does in fact intend to target consumers in the UK may be relevant in assessing whether its advertisement has that effect.
[170] Fourthly, the court must carry out an evaluation of all the relevant circumstances. These may include any clear expressions of an intention to solicit custom in the UK by, for example, in the case of a website promoting trade-marked products, including the UK in a list or map of the geographic areas to which the trader is willing to dispatch its products. But a finding that an advertisement is directed at consumers in the UK does not depend upon there being any such clear evidence. The court may decide that an advertisement is directed at the UK in light of some of the non-exhaustive list of matters referred to by the Court of Justice in Pammer at [93]. Obviously the appearance and content of the website will be of particular significance, including whether it is possible to buy goods or services from it. However, the relevant circumstances may extend beyond the website itself and include, for example, the nature and size of the trader’s business, the characteristics of the goods or services in issue and the number of visits made to the website by consumers in the UK.”
112. What the Court of Justice said in Pammer at [93] was as follows:
“The following matters, the list of which is not exhaustive, are capable of constituting evidence from which it may be concluded that the trader’s activity is directed to the Member State of the consumer’s domicile, namely the international nature of the activity, mention of itineraries from other Member States for going to the place where the trader is established, use of a language or a currency other than the language or currency generally used in the Member State in which the trader is established with the possibility of making and confirming the reservation in that other language, mention of telephone numbers with an international code, outlay of expenditure on an internet referencing service in order to facilitate access to the trader’s site or that of its intermediary by consumers domiciled in other Member States, use of a top-level domain name other than that of the Member State in which the trader is established, and mention of an international clientele composed of customers domiciled in various Member States. It is for the national courts to ascertain whether such evidence exists.”
113. In a judgment delivered between argument and judgment in Merck v Merck, Abanka dd v Abanca Corporación SA [2017] EWHC 2428 (Ch), [2018] Bus LR 612, Daniel Alexander QC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge made some illuminating observations which in my judgment are consistent with the case law of the CJEU and Kitchin LJ’s summary of the principles:
“[102] The [Trade Marks Act 1994] and the relevant EU legislation are designed to ensure that a mark only remains on the register if some serious effort have been made by the proprietor itself to develop the market in the particular territory in respect of which use is alleged (see case law cited above). Where the proprietor has not sought to do so and it is a matter of happenstance that its customers are doing business in the UK and contact the proprietor in its “home” country in order to do so or present its (eg) credit cards for payment, it is hard to see why such indirect and passive mere visibility of the mark in the UK should constitute use. Were it otherwise, the continued registration of a mark would depend on the, perhaps fortuitous, fact that, in the relevant years, customers of the trade mark proprietor (rather than the proprietor itself) were doing business in the country in question, were living in the UK or the proprietor was in contact with the customer while in the UK. That would carry a risk that an undertaking would be treated as having used a mark in a wide range of territories, not on the basis of any acts it had itself undertaken or procured in those territories but simply on the basis that its customers in a foreign country had engaged in activities in the UK using services provided in that foreign country. If that approach were to be adopted, it may then become necessary to treat (for example) every presentation of a credit card for payment in a foreign country by a person taking advantage of credit services provided by a foreign bank as ‘use’ of the mark on the card by the card provider. Or, as soon as internet banking is made available, it may become necessary to treat the mark used as having been used in every place from which those services were accessible and had been accessed (at least to an extent that went beyond de minimis). In my judgment, that would not accord with the purposes of the provisions concerning use of the mark by the proprietor, nor would it be consistent with the existing case law. The availability of internet provided services requires a degree of new thinking but there does not seem a principled reason why the fundamental analysis here should differ from the approach taken to services not provided over the internet. For example, in a situation in which the only use alleged of a mark in the UK was by way of customers of a foreign bank who while in the UK telephoned or wrote to that bank to arrange for some services to be provided, it would be a stretch to say that the foreign bank was using its mark in the UK, even if (for example) people benefitted from its actions in the UK, such as by receiving money in the UK or undertaking transactions on their foreign account—such as paying a supplier in the UK.
[103] Put colloquially, a proprietor should be treated as having used a mark in the UK if it has, itself ‘pushed’ its business and mark into the UK, not if it has been ‘pulled’ into the UK by (for example) its customers abroad, even though they may be based in the UK. That is the upshot of the case law on ‘direction’ or ‘targeting’ of a website to the UK cited above (see the summary of CJEU case law in the Stichting BDO case [2013] FSR 35). Quite what constitutes enough push of goods, services or advertising for them to the UK is not always easy to determine, especially in cases where a proprietor may be, in effect, a ‘pulled-pusher’ in that, without having taken any active steps to develop the market in the UK, it none the less takes business from consumers based in the UK.”
114. The law with respect to genuine use. The CJEU has considered what amounts to “genuine use” of a trade mark in a series of cases: Case C-40/01 Ansul BV v Ajax Brandbeveiliging BV [2003] ECR I-2439, La Mer (cited above), Case C‑416/04 P Sunrider Corp v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2006] ECR I‑4237, Case C-442/07 Verein Radetsky-Order v Bundervsvereinigung Kamaradschaft ‘Feldmarschall Radetsky’ [2008] ECR I-9223, Case C-495/07 Silberquelle GmbH v Maselli-Strickmode GmbH [2009] ECR I-2759, Case C-149/11 Leno Merken BV v Hagelkruis Beheer BV [EU:C:2012:816], [2013] ETMR 16, Case C-609/11 P Centrotherm Systemtechnik GmbH v Centrotherm Clean Solutions GmbH & Co KG [EU:C:2013:592], [2014] ETMR, Case C-141/13 P Reber Holding & Co KG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [EU:C:2014:2089] and Case C-689/15 W.F. Gözze Frottierweberei GmbH v Verein Bremer Baumwollbörse [EU:C:2017:434], [2017] Bus LR 1795.
115. The principles established by these cases may be summarised as follows:
(1) Genuine use means actual use of the trade mark by the proprietor or by a third party with authority to use the mark: Ansul at [35] and [37].
(2) The use must be more than merely token, that is to say, serving solely to preserve the rights conferred by the registration of the mark: Ansul at [36]; Sunrider at [70]; Verein at [13]; Leno at [29]; Centrotherm at [71]; Reber at [29].
(3) The use must be consistent with the essential function of a trade mark, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services to the consumer or end user by enabling him to distinguish the goods or services from others which have another origin: Ansul at [36]; Sunrider at [70]; Verein at [13]; Silberquelle at [17]; Leno at [29]; Centrotherm at [71]. Accordingly, affixing of a trade mark on goods as a label of quality is not genuine use unless it guarantees, additionally and simultaneously, to consumers that those goods come from a single undertaking under the control of which the goods are manufactured and which is responsible for their quality: Gözze at [43]-[51].
(4) Use of the mark must relate to goods or services which are already marketed or which are about to be marketed and for which preparations to secure customers are under way, particularly in the form of advertising campaigns: Ansul at [37]. Internal use by the proprietor does not suffice: Ansul at [37]; Verein at [14] and [22]. Nor does the distribution of promotional items as a reward for the purchase of other goods and to encourage the sale of the latter: Silberquelle at [20]-[21]. But use by a non-profit making association can constitute genuine use: Verein at [16]-[23].
(5) The use must be by way of real commercial exploitation of the mark on the market for the relevant goods or services, that is to say, use in accordance with the commercial raison d’être of the mark, which is to create or preserve an outlet for the goods or services that bear the mark: Ansul at [37]-[38]; Verein at [14]; Silberquelle at [18]; Centrotherm at [71]; Reber at [29].
(6) All the relevant facts and circumstances must be taken into account in determining whether there is real commercial exploitation of the mark, including: (a) whether such use is viewed as warranted in the economic sector concerned to maintain or create a share in the market for the goods and services in question; (b) the nature of the goods or services; (c) the characteristics of the market concerned; (d) the scale and frequency of use of the mark; (e) whether the mark is used for the purpose of marketing all the goods and services covered by the mark or just some of them; (f) the evidence that the proprietor is able to provide; and (g) the territorial extent of the use: Ansul at [38] and [39]; La Mer at [22]-[23]; Sunrider at [70]-[71], [76]; Leno at [29]-[30], [56]; Centrotherm at [72]-[76]; Reber at [29], [32]-[34].
(7) Use of the mark need not always be quantitatively significant for it to be deemed genuine. Even minimal use may qualify as genuine use if it is deemed to be justified in the economic sector concerned for the purpose of creating or preserving market share for the relevant goods or services. For example, use of the mark by a single client which imports the relevant goods can be sufficient to demonstrate that such use is genuine, if it appears that the import operation has a genuine commercial justification for the proprietor. Thus there is no de minimis rule: Ansul at [39]; La Mer at [21], [24] and [25]; Sunrider at [72] and [76]-[77]; Leno at [55].
(8) It is not the case that every proven commercial use of the mark may automatically be deemed to constitute genuine use: Reber at [32].
(9) The territorial borders of the Member States should be disregarded in the assessment of whether a trade mark has been put to genuine use in the Union: Leno at [44], [57].
(10) While it is reasonable to expect that a EU trade mark should be used in a larger area than a national trade mark, it is not necessary that the mark should be used in an extensive geographical area for the use to be deemed genuine, since this depends on the characteristics of the goods or services and the market for them: Leno at [50], [54]-[55].
(11) It cannot be ruled out that, in certain circumstances, the market for the goods or services in question is in fact restricted to the territory of a single Member State, and in such a case use of the EU trade mark in that territory might satisfy the conditions for genuine use of a EU trade mark: Leno at [50].
119. Use of the trade mark in a form differing in elements which do not alter its distinctive character style='color:black'>. The CJEU stated in Case C-252/12 Specsavers International Healthcare Ltd v Asda Stores Ltd [EU:C:2013:497], [2013] ETMR 46 (“Specsavers (CJEU)”) at [29] that the objective of what is now Article 18(1)(a) of the Regulation was:
“by avoiding imposing a requirement for strict conformity between the form used in trade and the form in which the trade mark was registered, … to allow the proprietor of the mark, in the commercial exploitation of the sign, to make variations in the sign, which, without altering its distinctive character, enable it to be better adapted to the marketing and promotion requirements of the goods or services concerned.”
120. In BUD and BUDWEISER BUDBRÄU Trade Marks [2002] EWCA Civ 1534, [2003] RPC 25 Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe (with whom Pill LJ agreed) held that the correct approach to section 46(2) of the 1994 Act, which corresponds to Article 15(2)(a) of the Regulation, was as follows:
“43. …. The first part of the necessary inquiry is, what are the points of difference between the mark as used and the mark as registered? Once those differences have been identified, the second part of the inquiry is, do they alter the distinctive character of the mark as registered?
44. The distinctive character of a trade mark (what makes it in some degree striking and memorable) is not likely to be analysed by the average consumer, but is nevertheless capable of analysis. …
45. Because distinctive character is seldom analysed by the average consumer but is capable of analysis, I do not think that the issue of ‘whose eyes?—registrar or ordinary consumer?’ is a direct conflict. It is for the registrar, through the hearing officer's specialised experience and judgment, to analyse the ‘visual, aural and conceptual’ qualities of a mark and make a ‘global appreciation’ of its likely impact on the average consumer, who:
‘normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details.’
The quotations are from para.[26] of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-342/97 Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer GmbH v Klijsen Handel BV [1999] ECR I-3819; the passage is dealing with the likelihood of confusion (rather than use of a variant mark) but both sides accepted its relevance.”
121. As this indicates, and as the recent decision of CJEU in Case C-501/15 European Union Intellectual Property Office v Cactus SA [EU:C:2017:750], [2018] ETMR 4 at [68]-[71] confirms, the normal approach to the assessment and comparison of distinctive character applies in this context.
122. As the case law of the General Court makes clear, alteration or omission of elements which are not distinctive is not capable of altering the distinctive character of a trade mark: see Case T-690/14 Sony Computer Entertainment Europe Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [EU:T:2015:950] at [45]. Furthermore, when a trade mark is composed of word elements and figurative elements, the former are, as a rule, more distinctive than the latter: see Sony at [49]. Accordingly, it is possible in an appropriate case for use of the word element on its own to constitute use of the trade mark: see Sony at [51].
123. The proprietor of the trade mark is not precluded from relying upon use of the trade mark in a form differing in elements which do not alter the distinctive character of the trade mark by the fact that that different form is itself registered as a trade mark: see Case C-553/11 Rintisch v Eder [EU:C:2012:671], [2013] ETMR 5 and Specsavers (CJEU), which have been given legislative endorsement in Article 18(1)(a) of the Regulation.
Assessment: UK864, UK398 and EU651 (Classes 25 and 35)
127. Secondly, the general appearance of the home page was US-oriented or at best (from the Claimants’ perspective) international: the language was English; a tab at the top right of the home page displayed the legend “Shipping to” together with, as the default option, “United States” and a US flag; prices (when displayed) were in US dollars; the imagery, in the rare instances it had any identifiable location, was of the US (such as a photograph of the New York skyline); the models were predominantly (but not exclusively) Caucasian; symbols indicated that payment by PayPal, MasterCard, Visa, American Express and bank transfer were accepted; and two email addresses were given “bulk purchase: silas@giordano.com.cn” (apparently Chinese) and “your feedback: au-eshop@giordanogroup.com” (apparently Australian). No UK or EU address, telephone number or email address was given. It is therefore not surprising that Ms Reyes-Pava’s evidence was that she thought that the website (which she visited after buying trousers from the AliExpress store as discussed below) was operated by an American company.
128. Thirdly, the bottom of the home page contained small links to “Giordano Australia E-Shop”, “Giordano China Website”, “Giordano Taiwan Website” and “Complete List of Global E-Shop”. The first three links, as their names suggested, were to country-specific subsites located at country-specific subdomains for Australia, China and Taiwan respectively. There is no dispute that the country-specific subsites were targeted at the respective countries: for example, the Australian subsite was priced in Australian dollars, had Australian-specific content and Australian contact information and orders were fulfilled by an Australian subsidiary. Clicking on the fourth link led a page bearing the strapline “World Without Strangers” superimposed on a photograph of four models beneath the brand name GIORDANO. Below the photograph and strapline was the invitation “Visit our eshop/website” above a table displaying the names of 32 countries. 17 of these were European: 16 EU countries, including the UK, and Switzerland. One was the United States. Clicking on one of the non-European countries other than the US led to a country-specific subsite displaying the name and flag of the relevant country (except that in a few cases it was that of a different country, such as Australia rather than Oman). By contrast, clicking on any of the European countries or the US redirected the user back to the global home page described above. Although Mr Huang suggested that this would have led to the relevant country name and flag being displayed to the user, I am not satisfied that that was the case during the relevant period.
132. A user could also click through to the global e-shop from the Giordano Group’s Hong Kong website located at wwe.giordano.com.hk, but that was a website in Cantonese which Mr Huang accepted was targeted at Hong Kong. Similarly, a user could click through from www.e-giordano.com, but that was a website in Mandarin which Mr Huang accepted was targeted at China.
United Kingdom
Year |
Unique visitors |
Sessions |
Avg. pages per session |
Avg. session duration (s) |
2011 |
2795 |
3108 |
3.96 |
172.31 |
2012 |
2420 |
2789 |
4.18 |
186.20 |
2013 |
3073 |
3544 |
3.89 |
149.38 |
2014 |
2616 |
3061 |
3.89 |
151.06 |
2015 |
2949 |
3467 |
4.21 |
187.27 |
Rest of EU
Year |
Unique visitors |
Sessions |
Avg. pages per session |
Avg. session duration (s) |
2011 |
2191 |
2696 |
6.76 |
314.91 |
2012 |
3420 |
4091 |
5.47 |
249.54 |
2013 |
4723 |
5481 |
4.44 |
185.99 |
2014 |
3775 |
4297 |
4.62 |
178.45 |
2015 |
3662 |
4481 |
4.77 |
219.93 |
138. Eighthly, the current shipping fees for goods ordered from global e-shop are US$ 15 for the UK and US$ for 20 for other European countries. It appears that the same level of shipping fees applied during the relevant period (thus Ms Nicoll was charged US$ 15). Orders are shipped from Guangzhou, China and normally reach European countries within 10-20 days, but Giordano Group does not take any responsibility for delays. It appears that the same was true during the relevant period, although Mr Nudds commented that the goods he ordered arrived more quickly than he had expected. Returns must be made to Guangzhou within seven days of arrival. Again, it appears that the same was true during the relevant period (although the invoice sent to Ms Nicoll stated that the goods could not be refunded or exchanged).
Sales to consumers in the UK
Year |
Quantity |
US$ |
2010 |
0 |
0 |
2011 |
45 |
1,836.75 |
2012 |
38 |
2,225.38 |
2013 |
22 |
806.85 |
2014 |
26 |
686 |
2015 |
45 |
1,199.40 |
Total |
176 |
6,754.38 |
Sales to consumers in the EU (including UK)
Year |
Quantity |
US$ |
2010 |
2 |
60.09 |
2011 |
179 |
6,016.28 |
2012 |
155 |
7,610.13 |
2013 |
117 |
5,302.55 |
2014 |
142 |
2,668.55 |
2015 |
564 |
4,612.30 |
Total |
738 |
26,269.90 |
140. The US$ figures set out above include delivery fees. For example, the figure of US$806.85 for sales to UK consumers in 2013 includes US$120 of delivery fees. Thus the actual value of clothing sold in that year was only US$686.85. If that year was representative, the total of UK sales would be US$5,750. The EU figure would be no more than US$22,363, and almost certainly somewhat lower due to the higher shipping charges for the remainder of the EU. Doing the best I can, it is likely that the EU figure did not exceed US$20,000.
Witness |
How encountered GIORDANO |
Reason for visiting global e-shop |
Batchelor |
Had lived in Thailand and travelled in SE Asia and became customer then |
Repeat purchase |
Crawshaw |
Had lived in Hong Kong and became customer then |
Repeat purchase |
Donnelly |
Purchased shirts from shop in Singapore Airport |
Repeat purchase |
Nicoll |
Purchased shirts from shop in Singapore Airport |
Repeat purchase (to replace lost shirts purchased in Singapore Airport) |
Nudds |
Had travelled to Hong Kong and Thailand and became customer then |
Repeat purchase |
Schuck |
Had lived in Dubai and became customer then |
Repeat purchase |
i) “I was never in any doubt that the website was meant for me as a UK consumer” (Batchelor);
ii) “I never felt as though the website was not meant for me as [a] UK consumer” (Crawshaw);
iii) “I was never concerned that the Giordano website was not designed for me as a UK consumer” (Donnelly);
iv) “I had no doubt that this website was specifically making Giordano products available to UK consumers” (Nicoll);
v) “I always felt that the website was an international website which served UK consumers” (Nudds);
vi) “I always considered that the website … was specifically meant for me as a UK consumer” (Schuck).
147. The AliExpress store. AliExpress is an e-commerce platform operated by AliBaba which serves the world apart from China. The Giordano Group has operated a store on AliExpress located at www.aliexpress.com/store/1113130 since late January 2014. There is less evidence about this than about the global e-shop, and in any event it is not necessary for me to consider it in as much detail. I note the following points.
148. First, the AliExpress store is again an international one.
149. Secondly, in order to find the AliExpress store a consumer would again normally need to have heard of GIORDANO. Ms Reyes-Pava provides an exception, since she searched for fleece-lined trousers using Google Images, and found a pair she liked the look of for sale on what turned out to be the AliExpress store. Prior to this, she had never heard of GIORDANO. Thus it was pure chance that Ms Reyes-Pava encountered the AliExpress store. It is very unlikely that any other consumer will have found it in the same way.
151. Fourthly, the AliExpress store operated on Pacific Time.
153. Sixthly, although AliExpress provided free shipping to the UK by China Post air mail (or more recently AliExpress standard shipping), the estimated delivery time was 20-40 days and delivery was only guaranteed by the Giordano Group within 60 days.
Sales to consumers in the UK
Year |
Quantity |
US$ |
2010 |
0 |
0 |
2011 |
0 |
0 |
2012 |
0 |
0 |
2013 |
0 |
0 |
2014 |
3 |
49.78 |
2015 |
39 |
1,098.11 |
Total |
42 |
1,147.89 |
Sales to consumers in the EU (including UK)
Year |
Quantity |
US$ |
2010 |
0 |
0 |
2011 |
0 |
0 |
2012 |
0 |
0 |
2013 |
0 |
0 |
2014 |
32 |
773.93 |
2015 |
389 |
9,240.45 |
Total |
421 |
10,014.38 |
164. The Defendant particularly relies upon the following factors in support of this contention. First, the “pulled-pushing” character of the sales. The Giordano Group was not actively selling to the UK or the rest of the EU, it was passively accepting orders from those locations.
166. Thirdly, the nature of the market. The EU market for clothing is vast, and the UK market is very large. It is not a market with special characteristics, and it is an EU-wide market.
169. Sixthly, the scale of the sales is commercially insignificant when viewed just in the context of the Giordano Group’s online sales. By comparison, its Chinese website generated HK$310 million in sales in 2017, which represented 93.2% of its online sales.
171. Three points remain for me to deal with briefly. First, the Defendant contends that use of GIORDANO in plain type does not amount to use of UK398 in any event. I disagree. In my view use of GIORDANO in plain type amounts to use of the Trade Mark in a form differing in elements which do not alter its distinctive character. The distinctive character of UK398 derives from the word GIORDANO. Neither the word LADIES, which is wholly descriptive, nor the typography, which is essentially just a decorative font and a difference in the sizes of the two words, contribute any significant distinctive character to the Trade Mark.
Assessment: UK444 and EU044 (Class 14)
178. Overall, there is no evidence of use of UK444 within the relevant period. As for EU044, there is no evidence of use of the domino logo within the relevant period. While there is evidence of use of GIORDANO in Germany, I do not consider that amounted to use of EU044 in a form differing in elements which do not alter its distinctive character. A significant part of the distinctive character of EU044 derives from the domino logo, even if the dominant element is the word GIORDANO. Accordingly, both Trade Marks will be revoked from five years after their respective registration dates.
Assessment: UK444, UK757, UK297 and EU335 (Class 18)
Assessment: EU150 (Class 9)
Invalidity of UK297 on the ground of bad faith
i) Walton had no intention to use UK297 when the application was made;
ii) Walton knew about the Defendant’s prior use of the sign GIORDANO in respect of clothing in the EU before Walton filed UK297, and consequently it is to be inferred that the purpose of the application was to prevent the Defendant’s legitimate business and/or to confer a monopoly on Walton to which it was not entitled; and
iii) Walton filed the application after the Claimants had started negotiations with the Defendant in January 2014, and consequently it is to be inferred that Walton intended to block the Defendant’s trade in GIORDANO in the UK and illegitimately to bolster its position in the negotiations.
The law
186. I reviewed the general principles concerning bad faith as a ground of invalidity in Red Bull GmbH v Sun Mark Ltd [2012] EWHC 1929 (Ch), [2013] ETMR 53 at [130]–[138]. Leaving aside the question of the date of assessment, which I have already dealt with, these may be summarised as follows:
i) A person is presumed to have acted in good faith unless the contrary is proved. An allegation of bad faith is a serious allegation which must be distinctly proved. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities, but cogent evidence is required due to the seriousness of the allegation. It is not enough to prove facts which are also consistent with good faith.
ii) Bad faith includes not only dishonesty, but also some dealings which fall short of the standards of acceptable commercial behaviour observed by reasonable and experienced people in the particular area being examined.
iii) The purpose of this ground of invalidity is to prevent abuse of the trade mark system. There are two main classes of abuse. The first is abuse vis-à-vis the relevant office, for example where the applicant knowingly supplies untrue or misleading information in support of his application; and the second is abuse vis-à-vis third parties.
iv) In order to determine whether the applicant acted in bad faith, the tribunal must make an overall assessment, taking into account all the factors relevant to the particular case.
v) The tribunal must first ascertain what the defendant knew about the matters in question and then decide whether, in the light of that knowledge, the defendant's conduct was dishonest (or otherwise fell short of the standards of acceptable commercial behaviour) judged by the ordinary standards of honest people. The applicant’s own standards of honesty (or acceptable commercial behaviour) are irrelevant to the enquiry. (In this respect, the approach to be taken is consistent with that recently articulated by the Supreme Court in Ivey v Genting Casinos UK Ltd [2017] UKSC 67, [2017] 3 WLR 1212.)
vi) Consideration must be given to the applicant’s intention. This is a subjective factor which must be determined by reference to the objective circumstances of the particular case.
187. So far as the second class of abuse identified above is concerned, counsel for the Claimants relied on what I said in Hotel Cipriani srl v Cipriani (Grosvenor Street) [2009] EWHC 3031 (Ch) [2009] RPC 9 at [186]:
“It is clear that an application can be made in bad faith vis-vis a third party in circumstances where the third party cannot maintain a relative ground of objection to the registration of the Community trade mark under Arts.8 and 52. Generally speaking, bad faith in such a case will involve some breach of a legal or moral obligation on part of the applicant towards the third party. The classic instance of this is where the applicant has been in discussions with a foreign manufacturer about distributing the latter's goods in the Community, and then applies to register the trade mark under which the goods are marketed in the country of origin and under which the manufacturer proposes to market them in the Community. It is not necessary, however, for there to have been contractual or pre-contractual relations between the parties in order for an application to be made in bad faith. Thus bad faith may exist where the applicant has sought or obtained registration of a trade mark for use as an instrument of extortion, as in the Melly case. Nevertheless, I consider that Art.51(1)(b) has no application to situations involving a bona fide conflict between the trade mark rights, or perceived rights, of different traders.”
I adhere to what I said there, which I believe remains an accurate statement of law.
188. I reviewed the law as to whether lack of intention to use the trade mark amounted to bad faith at length in Sky plc v SkyKick UK Ltd [2018] EWHC 155 (Ch) at [175]-[234] and [2018] EWHC 973 (Ch) at [20]-[21]. For the reasons explained in those judgments, I have referred questions to the CJEU on this topic.
Assessment
191. Counsel for the Defendant did not challenge Mr Loynd’s evidence that Walton had had a genuine intention to use UK297 at the date of the application, and therefore it is not open to the Defendant to rely upon this ground for the allegation of bad faith.
192. Counsel for the Defendant did challenge the explanations Mr Loynd gave for the making of the application. As she pointed out, it was Mr Loynd’s own evidence that the Giordano Group had started using the particular stylised form of GIORDANO which is the subject of UK297 in about 2005. Thus it was nearly a decade old. When challenged, Mr Loynd said that Walton had also applied to register that form in Asia, but as counsel for the Defendant submitted, there is a difference between registering a mark in a core market and registering it outside that core market. When counsel for the Defendant pointed out that Walton already had the word GIORDANO registered in the UK, Mr Loynd claimed that he thought it was “important to have a uniform mark protected in all the regions we were interested in”. If that was the explanation, Walton would have applied to register the stylised form in Classes 18, 25 and 35 in the EU at the same time, but it did not. (In saying this, I do not overlook the fact that Walton had filed applications in various countries to register giordano/ladies and GIORDANO junior in the same font in February and March 2014.)
195. Mr Loynd accepted that he was aware of the discussions between Mr Chugani and the Defendant. When asked why the Giordano Group had not informed the Defendant of its intention to file UK297, he relied upon the stance taken by the Defendant that it would act to protect its interests. Although Mr Loynd referred to Mr Stöpetie’s email dated 22 September 2015, it is fair to say that Karel Verweij had previously adopted that stance in his email dated 27 May 2015. Either way, that took place in 2015, after the filing of UK297. Nevertheless, the fact of the matter remains that, by 4 September 2014, the trade mark war between the Giordano Group and the Defendant had already broken out. It does not matter whether one regards the first shot as being Walton’s EUTM applications filed on 18 February 2014 or the oppositions filed by the Defendant and Abanicos on 31 July 2014. By mid-August 2014, when the oppositions were notified to Walton, it would have been clear to both sides that the other was likely to take such steps in the relevant trade mark offices that it considered appropriate to protect its interests. I do not think that the timing of the filing of UK297 is a coincidence.
Invalidity of UK297 on relative grounds
201. Accordingly, I conclude that UK297 is invalid on this ground.
Infringement
The law as to honest concurrent use
205. Condition (vi) is not one which appears on the face of Article 10(2)(a) of the Directive or Article 10(2)(a) of the Regulation. Instead, it is a condition which has been read into those provisions by the CJEU as a matter of interpretation. I reviewed the law with respect to condition (vi) in Supreme Pet Foods Ltd v Henry Bell & Co Ltd [2015] EWHC 256 (Ch), [2015] RPC 22 at [86]-[164], and concluded that, once the trade mark proprietor has shown that condition (v) is satisfied, the defendant bears the onus of proving that the use does not affect, nor is liable to affect, any of the functions of the trade mark. Counsel for the Defendant did not take issue with that conclusion.
“Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 89/104 must be interpreted as meaning that the proprietor of an earlier trade mark cannot obtain the cancellation of an identical later trade mark designating identical goods where there has been a long period of honest concurrent use of those two trade marks where, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, that use neither has nor is liable to have an adverse effect on the essential function of the trade mark which is to guarantee to consumers the origin of the goods or services.”
207. It is clear that the same principle applies to infringement claims under Article 10(2)(a) of the Directive: see Budějovický Budvar at [67]-[70] and IPC Media Ltd v Media 10 Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1403, [2015] FSR 12.
208. In Victoria Plum Ltd v Victorian Plumbing Ltd [2016] EWHC 2911 (Ch), [2017] Bus LR 363 Henry Carr J considered the test for honesty in this context, and concluded at [79]:
“In my judgment, the factors which have been considered in the context of honest commercial practices in respect of the own name defence need a degree of adaptation when considering whether ‘concurrent use’ is honest. In particular: (i) The defendant has a duty to act fairly in relation to the legitimate interests of the trade mark proprietor. (ii) All circumstances must be considered when ascertaining whether or not the use by the defendant is honest, including whether the defendant can be regarded as unfairly competing with the trade mark proprietor. (iii) However, the question is not simply whether use of the sign complained of gives rise to consumer deception, as such deception may have to be tolerated. Similarly, the defendant may well be aware of the existence of such confusion, having lived with it for a considerable period. (iv) The question is whether the defendant has taken steps which exacerbate the level of confusion beyond that which is inevitable and so has encroached upon the claimant’s goodwill. (v) Whether the defendant ought to be aware that such steps will exacerbate confusion is a relevant factor.”
Assessment
210. So far as the first point is concerned, counsel for the Claimants relied on the facts that (i) although both sides had used the trade mark GIORDANO for clothing in the UK since December 2010, they had done so through different trade channels (the Claimants by online sales through their global e-shop and AliExpress store and more recently by sales in their pop-up shops, the Defendant by sales through independent menswear retailers) and (ii) the relatively small scale of both sides’ uses, and in particular the Claimants’. He argued that there was no evidence that consumers had learnt to differentiate between the two brands, and that it was inherently unlikely that they would have done. On the contrary, all of the Defendant’s trade witnesses said in their witness statements that they had never heard of the Claimants’ GIORDANO brand prior to these proceedings.
“49. … the Court has not ruled that honest concurrent use cannot avail a trader if the impugned use is liable to cause some confusion. Indeed, this court was required to consider that very question in deciding the ultimate outcome of that case, for Anheuser-Busch argued that, in the light of the guidance given by the Court, the doctrine could only apply where the level of confusion was de minimis. It continued that if there was a level of confusion above that, then the essential function of the trade mark relied upon would be impaired and a case of permissible honest concurrent use would not be made out.
50. This court rejected that submission. Sir Robin Jacob (with whom Ward LJ and Warren J agreed) put it this way ([2013] RPC 12):
‘20. I do not accept that. The Court could have said just that but did not. The rather self evident point as to the effect of a long period of honest concurrent use was clearly laid before the Court when I summarised Mr Mellor’s submission:
‘Mr Mellor suggests that the Court might recognise a further exception in the case of long established honest concurrent use. For in such a case the guarantee of origin of the mark is not impaired by the use of the mark by each party. Once such concurrent use is established the mark does not solely indicate the goods of just one of the users. It means one or the other. Hence there is no impairment of the guarantee and, if impairment is the touchstone of art.4(1), no infraction of it.’
21. The Court did not rule that only de minimis levels of confusion are acceptable when there is honest concurrent use. Nor did the Court rule that the inevitable confusion in a same mark/same goods case is enough to take a case out of acceptable concurrent use. Yet that is what Mr Bloch’s submissions involve.
22. More fundamentally, Mr Bloch’s submissions involve the unstated premise that even where there is long established honest concurrent use the mark of one party must provide a guarantee of origin in that party and not the other. That is quite unrealistic. Here for instance, Budweiser has never denoted AB’s beer alone.
23. So I do not think that there is any impairment of the guarantee of origin – of either side’s mark. The guarantee is different given a situation of long established honest concurrent use.’
51. I respectfully agree that there may well be more than de minimis confusion in a case of honest concurrent use. No doubt many consumers will recognise that the marks are used by different businesses, but others will not. In other words, once honest concurrent use is established, the mark does not solely indicate the goods or services of just one of the users. As Sir Robin Jacob explained, in such a case the guarantee given by the mark is different.”
The Defendant’s counterclaim for passing off
Summary of principal conclusions
218. For the reasons given above, I conclude that:
i) all of the Trade Marks except for UK297 must be revoked with effect from five years after their respective registration dates;
ii) UK297 is not invalid on the ground that the application was made in bad faith, but it is invalid on relative grounds;
iii) it follows that the Defendant has not infringed any of the Trade Marks; and
iv) it also follows that the Claimants are liable for passing off since December 2010.