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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions >> Alpha Insurance A/S v Roche & Anor [2018] EWHC 1342 (QB) (25 May 2018) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2018/1342.html Cite as: [2018] WLR(D) 326, [2018] 3 Costs LR 545, [2018] EWHC 1342 (QB), [2018] 4 WLR 92 |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
35 ![]() ![]() |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
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Appellant (Defendant) |
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- and – |
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LORRAINE ![]() BRENDAN ![]() ![]() | Respondents (Claimants) |
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Mr Simon Dawes (instructed by Mark Reynolds Solicitors) for the Respondents
Hearing dates: 18 May 2018
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VERSION
OF JUDGMENT APPROVED
Crown Copyright ©
Mrs Justice Yip :
"A claimant may discontinue all or part of a claim at any time."
That may be achieved by filing and serving a Notice of Discontinuance, as the claimants did.
"(a) the court will normally direct that issues arising out of an allegation that the claim is fundamentally dishonest be determined at the trial;
(b) where the proceedings have been settled, the court will not, save in exceptional circumstances, order that issues arising out of an allegation that the claim was fundamentally dishonest be determined in those proceedings;
(c) where the claimant has served a notice of discontinuance, the court may direct that issues arising out of an allegation that the claim was fundamentally dishonest be determined notwithstanding that the notice has not been set aside pursuant to rule 38.4;
(d) the court may, as it thinks fair and just, determine the costs attributable to the claim having been found to be fundamentally dishonest."
"In all the circumstances, it is myview
that to set aside and identify a further trial date for the
ventilation
of that particular isolated issue in this particular case would be, on balance, a disproportionate use of limited and precious court resources, given the amount of time and court resources that have already been devoted to the pursuit of this case. When I say that, I expressly state for the record that I do not hold the defendant to be in any way to blame for the loss of the day's trial date. The defendant has, perfectly properly, sought to defend the case on the basis that is set out in the detailed pleading that was served on its behalf. There is [no] criticism levelled at the defendant here at all. In reality, there are many instances coming before these courts of cases where occupancy, or alleged phantom occupancy, turn out to be not sinister in the least, and certainly, there are reasons for parties discontinuing their litigation on multi-faceted and diverse (sic), and there is nothing, in my judgment, which suggests that there is any particular exceptional quality about this particular case that should cause me to give further directions and to set aside further court time to allow this particular isolated issue of dishonesty to be
ventilated."
"there is nothing … which suggests that there is any particular exceptional quality about this particular case that should cause me to give further directions and set aside further court time to allow this particular isolated issue of fundamental dishonesty to beventilated."
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The relevant sub-section does not require exceptionality. This may be contrasted with sub-section (b) which applies where proceedings have been settled rather than discontinued, where it is expressly provided that the court will not order that issues arising out of an allegation that the claim was fundamentally dishonest be determined "save in exceptional circumstances". The distinction highlights that "exceptional circumstances" are not required for directions to be given under sub-section (c). However, this appears to be the basis upon which the judge exercised his discretion.