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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Public Safety Charitable Trust v Milton Keynes Council [2013] EWHC 1237 (Admin) (14 May 2013) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2013/1237.html Cite as: [2013] RA 275, [2013] EWHC 1237 (Admin) |
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THE
HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
THE
HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SALES
____________________
![]() ![]() |
Appellant |
|
- and - |
||
Milton Keynes Council |
Respondent |
|
CO/8425/2012 |
||
![]() ![]() |
Appellant |
|
- and - |
||
South Cambridgeshire District Council |
Respondent |
|
CO/12057/2012 |
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Cheshire West and Chester Borough Council |
Appellant |
|
- and - |
||
![]() ![]() |
Respondent |
____________________
the Public Safety Charitable Trust
Mr Cain Ormondroyd (instructed by the
Councils) for
the
Councils
Hearing dates: 1/5/13
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Sales :
Introduction
Factual Background
"I find thatthe
relevant part of
the
first floor was mainly redundant. Its main use was therefore not
charitable
. Marlborough Court had been designated as offices.
The
relevant part of
the
first floor office was but minimally in use and rarely attended by anyone.
The
operation did not require this amount of floor space, most of which was distinctly unused. I have already commented on
the
limited scope for use of
the
services.
The
constant transmission of messages and provision of free wi fi, and
the
constant use of electricity and phone lines does not detract from my view that
the
premises were not wholly or mainly used for
charitable
purposes" (emphasis in original).
"…
b)The
statutory test as to whether
the
main hereditaments were used "wholly or mainly" is a question of common sense looking at all of
the
evidence before us and deciding on a broad basis whether
the
properties were used wholly or mainly for
charitable
purposes; further,
the
nature and intended use of
the
Units is also a factor to be taken into consideration.
c)The
precise boundary between
the
two hereditaments in each Unit had not been specified, but in any event we did not think that
the
use of one or two sockets or plugs in
the
main hereditaments would satisfy
the
statutory test.
d)The
Units are clearly business/industrial premises and
the
use of them for
the charitable
purposes of
the
Appellant was not their intended use.
e) Commercial Links do not havethe
manpower and time to visit daily
the
numerous premises
the
Appellant leases in Cambridgeshire never mind their premises in
the
rest of
the
country.
f) Commercial Links had visitedthe
premises infrequently as they could access
the
wi-fi equipment remotely if required. Accordingly,
the
use made by
the
appellant of
the
Units during
the
period spanning
the
Respondent's complaint for liability orders was minimal.
g) Becausethe
use of
the
main hereditaments was minimal, and not what
the
buildings were originally intended to be used for, we concluded that
the
four main hereditaments were not being used wholly or mainly for
charitable
purposes."
"55. I am however faced withthe
difficulty of interpreting that determination, and that is clearly something which I am entitled to consider. For reasons which I have already outlined,
the
determination is poorly worded, vague and extremely hard to reconcile with
the
factual basis of this case.
56. It seems to me that, where there is ambiguity or lack of clarity inthe
definition of
the
hereditament, then fairness dictates that
the
hereditament should be construed narrowly so as to benefit
the
person liable to pay
the
rates and not
the
person seeking to collect
the
rates. In those circumstances, I have to be satisfied that a separate hereditament exists somewhere within
the
building and that it contains a Bluetooth/Wi-Fi transmitter. As a matter of fact, I find that
the
individual transmitters, whilst forming part of a wireless network, are not physically connected and are separate entities.
57. Howeverthe
VOA did not seek to create 13 separate hereditaments which must mean that at least 12 of
the
transmitters are located in
the
wider hereditament which comprises
the
office building and which is
the
subject of
the
current application for a liability order."
The
Legal Framework
"property which is or may become liable to a rate, being a unit of property which is, or would fall to be, shown as a separate items inthe
valuation list."
There is a considerable body of case-law in relation to questions concerning hereditaments and rating law generally that has built up over a considerable period of time.
"This subsection applies where onthe
day concerned –
(a)the
ratepayer is a charity or trustees for a charity and
the
hereditament is wholly or mainly used for
charitable
purposes (whether of that charity or that and other charities) ..."
This is the
provision in issue on these appeals.
Analysis
Construction of section 43(6) of the
LGFA
"35. In my judgment there is force inthe
difference of emphasis which [counsel for
the
billing authority] highlights between "occupation" in Section 43(1) and "use" in Section 43(6), and also in her submission that
the
qualifying adverbs "wholly" and "mainly" are important in looking at
the
context of
the
use. I would hold that there is no reason for limiting
the
ambit of
the
phrase in
the
way contended for by
the
Appellant. As was pointed out in
the
English Speaking Union case [English Speaking Union Scottish Branches Educational Fund v City of Edinburgh Council [2009] SLT 1051] and again in argument before us,
the
Appellant's construction would substitute
the
word "solely" for
the
word "wholly". I see no reason why
the
statute should be thus narrowly confined.
The
natural reading and meaning of
the
words used are, in my judgment, apt to cover not only consideration of
the
purpose of
the
use, but also
the
extent or amount of
the
actual use. It follows therefore that I would hold that
the
judge was right to take account of and place weight upon
the
extent to which
the
premises were used."
The
PSCT's further grounds of appeal in relation to
the
Milton Keynes and South Cambridgeshire cases
The
Council's further ground of appeal in
the
Cheshire West and Chester case:
the
extent of
the
wifi hereditament
Conclusion