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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Rahman, R (on the application of) v Local Government Election Court & Ors [2016] EWHC 1280 (Admin) (26 January 2016) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2016/1280.html Cite as: [2016] EWHC 1280 (Admin) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT
Strand London WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
MR JUSTICE SUPPERSTONE
____________________
THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF RAHMAN | Claimant | |
v | ||
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION COURT | Defendant | |
ERLAM & OTHERS | Interested Parties |
____________________
The Defendant did not appear and was not represented
Mr E Bartley Jones QC and Mr F Hoar (instructed by Richard Slade Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the Interested Parties
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
LORD JUSTICE LLOYD JONES:
"(a) all property belonging to or vested in the bankrupt at the commencement of the bankruptcy"
Section 436 contains a very wide explanation of the word "property":
"'property' includes money, goods, things in action, land and every description of property wherever situated and also obligations and every description of interest, whether present or future or vested or contingent, arising out of, or incidental to, property"
However, there are certain causes of action which, although they might appear to fall within this wide definition, do not vest in the trustee. Those sections to which I have just referred have been interpreted as excluding certain actions personal to the bankrupt. Thus, as Hoffmann LJ pointed out in Heath v Tang [1993] 1 WLR 1421, despite the breadth of the definition in section 436 there are certain causes of action personal to the bankrupt which do not vest in his trustee. These include cases where the damages are to be estimated by immediate reference to pain felt by the bankrupt in respect of his body, mind or character, and without immediate reference to his rights of property. Those words are taken from Beckham v Drake (1849) 2 HLC 579,604.
"All causes of action which seek to recover property vest in the trustee whether or not they contain other heads of damage to which the bankrupt is entitled."
Accordingly, the court concluded:
"The authorities are only consistent with the conclusion that the trustee is entitled to the damages for past and future loss of earnings and is not entitled to the damages for pain and suffering. As there is a single cause of action, it vested in the trustee... The trustee as constructive trustee would have to account to the bankrupt for the property which he obtained inadvertently or by arrangement in an action which vested in him for
the benefit of the creditors."
Ground 1: Paid canvassers
Count 2: Bribery
"113(2) A person shall be guilty of bribery if he, directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person on his behalf—
(a) gives any money or procures any office to or for any voter or to or for any other person on behalf of any voter or to or for any other person in order to induce any voter to vote or refrain from voting, or
(b) corruptly does any such act as mentioned above on account of any voter having voted or refrained from voting, or
(c) makes any such gift or procurement as mentioned above to or for any person in order to induce that person to procure, or endeavour to procure, the return of any person at an election or the vote of any voter,or if upon or in consequence of any such gift or procurement as mentioned above he procures or engages, promises or endeavours to procure the return of any person at an election or the vote of any voter.
For the purposes of this subsection—
(i) references to giving money include references to giving, lending, agreeing to give or lend, offering, promising, or promising to procure or endeavour to procure any money or valuable consideration; and
(ii) references to procuring any office include references to giving, procuring, agreeing to give or procure, offering, promising, or promising to procure or to endeavour to procure any office, place or employment and
(iii) references to procuring the return of any person at an election include, in the case of an election of the London members of the London Assembly at an ordinary election, references to procuring the return of candidates on a list of candidates submitted by a registered political party for the purposes of that election...
113(5) A voter shall be guilty of bribery if before or during an election he directly or indirectly by himself or by any other person on his behalf receives, agrees, or contracts for any money, gift, loan or valuable consideration, office, place or employment for himself or for any other person for voting or agreeing to vote or for refraining or agreeing to refrain from voting."
"The grant money was obviously not given directly to the voters and it is probably right to say that it was not given to another person 'on behalf of any voter'."
He then goes on to ask whether it was, however, given "to or for any other person in order to induce any voter to vote or to refrain from voting.
"The difference between pork barrel politics and bribery is that the former is not in the hands of a single individual or directed to the election of an individual candidate. The reason why Mr Rahman's conduct is on the wrong side of the line is because he was, in reality, the sole controller of the grant fund, and he manipulated them for his own personal electoral benefit."
Mr Knafler takes the corresponding point in relation to the word "gives" in section 113(2)(a). Here, as in the first limb, he accepts that the payments were in the form of grants. For reasons that I have already given, I consider that grants are to be regarded as "giving" within the meaning of this subsection. However, there were also findings made in relation to payments to Mr Jubair. Mr Jubair was the chief political correspondent of Channel S. The Commissioner observed that the dealings of Mr Jubair were murky in the extreme. Mr Rahman seems to have arranged for him to be employed by the Council, at the taxpayers' expense, apparently to advise on media relations with the Bangladeshi community. However, the judge found the payments made to Mr Jubair were, to a significant extent, unaccounted for and some £20,000 worth of expenditure was not represented by time sheets. Mr Jubair was not, in fact, called to give evidence. The Commissioner noted that beyond Mr Rahman's evidence there was no evidence before the court to show that Mr Jubair has carried out any work on behalf of the Council. The reality, in the Commissioner's view, was that Mr Jubair's function was to publicise Mr Rahman and his achievements and to ensure that favourable coverage continued in the media, particularly Channel S, with which he remained closely associated. I consider that, once again, such payments being payments beyond services provided are in the nature of a gift. I have already addressed under the first limb the requirement that the giving should be made in order to induce the voter to vote and the requirement that the payment must be made on behalf of the claimant.
Ground 3: Spiritual injury
Senior Courts Act 1981
Section 31(3)
(C) When considering whether to grant leave to make an application for judicial review, the High Court—
(a) may of its own motion consider whether the outcome for the applicant would have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred, and
(b) must consider that question if the defendant asks it to do so.
(D) If, on considering that question, it appears to the High Court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different, the court must refuse to grant leave.
(E) The court may disregard the requirement in subsection (3D) if it considers that it is appropriate to do so for reasons of exceptional public interest.
Stating a case
"If it appears to the election court on the trial of an election petition that any question of law as to the admissibility of evidence or otherwise requires further consideration by the High Court, the election court may postpone the granting of a certificate until the question has been determined by the High Court, and for this purpose may reserve the question by stating a case for the decision of the High Court."
Costs
MR JUSTICE SUPPERSTONE: