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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> First-tier Tribunal (Tax) >> G Wilson (Glaziers) Ltd v Revenue & Customs [2011] UKFTT 731 (TC) (11 November 2011) URL: https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKFTT/TC/2011/TC01568.html Cite as: [2011] UKFTT 731 (TC) |
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[2011] UKFTT 731 (TC)
TC01568
Appeal number: TC/2011/05954
VAT
default surcharge – five defaults recorded and three surcharges levied –
whether a Time to Pay arrangement existed – on the evidence, no – whether genuine
belief that had a Time to Pay arrangement – yes – whether this amounted to a
reasonable
excuse
– yes for three of the five periods – whether it was fair and just not
to adjourn the appeal to hear further evidence – yes - appeal allowed in part
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX
G WILSON (GLAZIERS) LIMITED Appellant
- and -
TRIBUNAL: ANNE REDSTON (PRESIDING MEMBER)
JULIAN STAFFORD (TRIBUNAL MEMBER)
Sitting in public at Norwich Tribunals Service, 115 Queens Road, Norwich on 13 October 2011
Mr David Fiddy of Lovewell Blake LLP for the Appellant
Mrs Kay Walker of the HMRC Appeals and Reviews Unit for the Respondents
© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2011
DECISION
1. This was
the appeal of G Wilson (Glaziers) Limited (“the company”) against VAT
default
surcharges of £1,048.12, £3,691.49 and £7,803.42 for the periods ending 30
April 2010, 31 July 2010 and 30 October 2010 respectively. The total surcharges
were £12,243.03.
3. It was not
in dispute that, for each period, some or all of the VAT
had been paid after
the normal due dates. The issues in the case were whether the company had a
Time to Pay (“TTP”) arrangement in place, and if not, whether it had a
reasonable excuse
for late payment.
4. We found
that although there was no TTP agreement in place, the company had a reasonable
excuse
for late payment for the first three of the five periods. The surcharges
for the final two periods are thus reduced to nil and 2% respectively, making a
total surcharge of £1,040.50.
The law
6. Under s
59(7) a person is not liable to a surcharge if he has a “reasonable excuse
”.
7. Under s
59(8) the reasonable excuse
provisions apply not only to the surcharges actually
levied, but also to defaults “taken into account in the service of the
surcharge liability notice upon which the surcharge depends”.
8. There is
no definition in the legislation of a “reasonable excuse
”. It has been held to
be “a matter to be considered in the light of all the circumstances of the
particular case” (Rowland v HMRC [2006] STC (SCD) 536 at [18]).
9. It has
recently been held by this Tribunal that “an excuse
is likely to be
reasonable
where the taxpayer acts in the same way someone who seriously intends to honour
their tax liabilities and obligations would act” (B&J Shopfitting
Services v R&C Commrs [2010] UKFTT 78 (TC) at [14]).
10. In RMD Response
International v R&C Commrs [2011] UK FTT(472) at [27], the taxpayer’s “honest
and genuine belief” was found to be a reasonable excuse
, “at least until such time as it was put on notice
that the honest and genuine belief was incorrect.”
11. The Interpretation Act 1978, s 7, which HMRC refer to in their submissions, is as follows:
“Where an Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post (whether the expression "serve" or the expression "give" or "send" or any other expression is used) then, unless the contrary intention appears, the service is deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting a letter containing the document and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.”
The periods under appeal
12. Under the VAT
default
surcharge system the first default does not trigger a surcharge.
15. In relation to the earlier
defaults, no formal written appeal was made by the company. However, their letter
of 27 January 2011 and their Notice of Appeal to the Tribunal made it clear
that they believed the same “reasonable excuse
” defence applied to these
earlier periods as well as to the three periods for which a surcharge was
actually levied.
Evidence
(1) a schedule of defaults and the payments relevant to these defaults;
(2) internal HMRC notes of calls between Mr Roger Middleton, the company’s Managing Director, and HMRC;
(3) a document headed ‘Info Log Entry’ which contains further records of communications between HMRC and Mr Middleton.
18. On behalf of the company, Mr Fiddy provided the following:
(1) a photocopy of the visitors’ book for the company for the period from 2 July 2009 through to 23 July 2009;
(2) a witness statement from Mr Middleton, who also gave oral evidence and was cross-examined before the Tribunal;
(3) witness statements from Mrs Gabrielle Mendham, director of the company, and from Mr Robert Ingle, company secretary of the company;
(4) a schedule headed “Agreed Payment Schedule” for the period from 1 November 2008 through to 31 October 2010;
(5) a “Time to Pay” (“TTP”) agreement letter from HMRC dated 16 March 2009;
(6) emails between Ms Liz Hill of Lovewell Blake LLP and Mr Middleton, dated 5 and 6 October 2011.
The facts
19. From this evidence the Tribunal found the following facts.
20. Mr Middleton suffered from poor health and was absent from work on many occasions.
The earlier periods
21. In late 2008 and early 2009
the company suffered a significant downturn in income caused by the economic
recession. Cashflow was particularly difficult. Mr Middleton realised that the
company would be unable to pay all its VAT
on time.
22. On 2 March 2009 a TTP arrangement
was agreed with HMRC. The terms of the agreement were that the VAT
for the
quarter ended 31 January 2009 would be paid in three instalments on the 7th
day of March, April and May.
23. On 3 June 2009 Mr Middleton
again contacted HMRC and a further TTP agreement was made for the VAT
payment
due on 7 June 2006. Again, the amount was to be paid in three roughly equal
instalments, with each payment being made on the 15th of June, July
and August 2009.
24. One or both of these TTP agreements was agreed, on HMRC’s behalf, by a Mr Murphy.
26. Instead of paying the VAT
due for the period ending 31 July 2009 on the due date, the company continued
to pay by equal monthly instalments, on 9 September, 8 October and 10 November.
HMRC recorded this as a default, but as it was the first default, no surcharge
was levied. Mrs Walker says that HMRC sent a surcharge liability notice
(“V160”) to the company on 11 September 2009.
28. On the back of the form, there are a number of FAQs. FAQ1 reads:
“What is a default? You will be in default if
your VAT
return or the
VAT
shown on that return as payable is not received in the
VAT
Central Unit by the due date.”
31. The VAT
due for the period
ending 31 October 2009 was also paid in three instalments, and this was again
recorded as a default.
33. HMRC say that they sent out a form V161 on 11 December 2009; again we were provided with a facsimile. This says:
“Our records show that you are in default for the period from 1 August 2009 to 31 October 2009...the Commissioners do not propose to surcharge you on this occasion....if you default again...you may become liable to a surcharge assessment calculated at the rate of 5%.”
34. The back of the form, with its FAQs and note in bold at the end, is identical to the V160.
36. The next VAT
return period
ended on 31 January 2010. This period is not included in HMRC’s schedule of
defaults. Mr Fiddy says, and we accept, that the company again paid its
VAT
in
three equal annual instalments on 9 March 2010, 8 April 2010 and 11 May 2010. Mrs
Walker was unable to explain why this period did not trigger a default.
The first surcharge
37. The company paid its VAT
for
the return period ending on 30 April 2010 in three instalments. HMRC recorded
this as a default and charged a 5% penalty of £1,048.12. The surcharge notice
had an issue date of 11 June 2010.
38. On 21 June 2010 Mr Middleton called HMRC. The HMRC call record says:
“Caller made a TTP agreement in 2009 and has had a surcharge? Advised he has to make a separate TTP agreement for each return. Caller has never been told this and always sends as much as he can afford. Transferred to DMTC.”
The second surcharge
40. The due date for the return period ending 31 July 2010 was 7 September if paid electronically.
43. On 17 September 2010 HMRC
issued a default surcharge of 10% of the VAT
not paid by the normal due date.
This was £3,691.49 (10% of the two instalments paid in October and November).
The surcharge notice was received by the company on 22 September 2010.
“2 x £18,457.46 from 09/10/10 TTP Letter to TP
[taxpayer]. TP rang to complain about the surcharge. He was told some time ago
by a Mr Murphy from King’s Lynn office that he could always pay VAT
on a
monthly basis in arrears – prov he paid it that wouldn’t be a problem. TP
understood this was correct and for ever – I expl this wasn’t the case hence
the appeal...’
45. The ‘Info Log entry’ dated 4 October 2010 reads:
“Rang Mr Middleton and he advised a further payment of £18,457.46 had been sent...I have agreed the last instalment can be pif [paid in full] on 20/12/10 providing the 10/10 rtn due 30/11 is submitted and pif by the due date. I also explained that to get out of the DS cycle trdr [trader] needs to get the 3 rtns in and pif following the 10/10. Trdr seems to have received conflicting advice from all over the place. I have advised the trdr if he defaults on this agreement i will cancel it and further action will be taken to secure the debt – Butler.”
The third surcharge
48. The VAT
due for the quarter
ended 31 October of £52,025.48 was not paid on the due date (for an electronic
payment) of 7 December.
50. On 22 December 2010, the HMRC “Info Log entry” records as follows
“payt promise –gabby mendam (dir) PYT on 22/12/2010 for £20,000, PYT on 24/12/2010 for BAL, by BACS. Late due to dir adv that she thought they had TTP agreed. Explained this was for old pyment under provision that 10/10 was pif which wasn’t.”
51. Two payments of VAT
were
then made, the first on 23 December 2010 of £20,000, with the balance being
settled on 29 December 2010.
The meeting with HMRC
“He advised that he does not want to attend the Tribunal. I asked if he could supply copies of his note book – he said he had not taken any at the time. He said he was not 100% sure he recalled visiting you, but did remember your building and car park...
He said he had visited you as his job was to undertake checks on 5% of time to pay agreements...he confirmed that he had not visited you to agree any detailed arrangement – he merely checked what had been put in place and whether you were able to meet the terms of the arrangement. He also stated that as far as he was concerned, time to pay agreements would only be created to cover a certain debt for a certain period of time eg for a single return and are not designed to run on for ever. I advised that it appeared that no-one had discussed default surcharges with you. Mr Clarkson said he would not have discussed them with you as this was not part of what he did.”
61. We revert to the issue of adjournment later in this Decision.
Submissions on behalf of the company
62. Mr Fiddy said that the
company had a reasonable excuse
because it relied on its understanding that it
could continue to pay monthly.
65. The failure of the company’s
main customer compounded its financial stress and this, together with Mr
Middleton’s ill health, provided further grounds for a reasonable excuse
defence.
Submissions on behalf of HMRC
67. Mrs Walker said that HMRC’s
standard practice was only to agree a VAT
TTP agreement when the quarterly
payment was known. This was because they had to programme the computer so that
it knew what sum was to be received and the dates of receipt. Otherwise, when
HMRC received the
VAT
return without the matching payment, a default would be
recorded by the computer. Therefore no open-ended TTP agreements are made.
69. She submitted that the phone
records showed that Mr Middleton had been informed on 21 June 2010 that “he has
to make a separate agreement for each surcharge” and thus after that date it
was not reasonable
for him to rely on the
reasonable excuse
defence, even if it
had existed in the earlier periods.
Discussion
Was there a TTP agreement in place?
71. We noted that Mr Fiddy had
not asserted that there was, as a question of fact, a TTP agreement. However,
we thought it was right to consider this possibility. If there was such an
agreement, then for the period of that agreement, there could be no defaults.
It would be unnecessary to consider the question of reasonable excuse
.
72. We accepted Mrs Walker’s
submission that HMRC practice is only to agree a TTP when the VAT
for the
quarter is known. We considered whether Mr Clarkson had, nevertheless, made
such an agreement on HMRC’s behalf with the company. We took into account Mr
Middleton’s recollection of the meeting on 3 July 2010 and Miss Hill’s record
of her conversation with Mr Clarkson. We also considered the fact that no
surcharge had been levied for the period ending October 2009 (the 2% period) or
for the following quarter.
74. We thus went on to consider
the question of reasonable excuse
.
Reasonable excuse
and genuine belief
75. Mr Middleton gave oral evidence
that he honestly believed HMRC had provided the company with an open-ended TTP
arrangement under which it could pay its VAT
on a monthly basis without needing
to make quarterly calls to HMRC. We found Mr Middleton to be a highly credible
witness.
77. The company’s other actions
in the context of its VAT
payments were those which a compliant taxpayer would
take. Specifically:
(1)
The company had called HMRC in early 2009, in advance of the due date
for its first quarterly VAT
payment, in order to agree a TTP arrangement; and did
the same on 3 June.
(2) Once the TTP was in place, the company paid the agreed monthly amounts on time.
(3) In subsequent periods the company continued to make the monthly payments regularly and on time.
78. This Tribunal, in the recent
case of RMD Response, found that genuine belief can amount to a
“reasonable excuse
”, and that this subsists “at least until such time as [the company] was put on notice that the honest and genuine belief was incorrect.
We agree, with the further proviso that the “honest and genuine belief” should be
a
reasonable
belief.
79. We considered whether it was
reasonable
for Mr Middleton to have believed that Mr Clarkson had provided the
company with an on-going TTP arrangement. We found that it was. Mr Clarkson was
an officer of HMRC. His purpose was to discuss the TTP arrangement. The
arrangement was a continuation of what had already been agreed, twice, by
telephone, so it was not unusual or exceptional. Mr Middleton had no knowledge
of how the HMRC computer worked, so did not realise that such open-ended
arrangements were never granted.
80. Our provisional finding was
thus that Mr Middleton’s genuine belief provided a reasonable excuse
for the
company’s default until such time as the
company was put on notice
that this belief was incorrect.
The period ending July 2009
81. HMRC say they sent a form
V160 to the company when it did not pay all of its VAT
for the period ending
July 2009 by the due date. The company denies receipt of this form. On the
balance of probabilities we find that the form was actually delivered, but for
the reasons set out below, we consider that its import was not understood by
the company, such that Mr Middleton does not remember receiving it.
82. The V160 defines a default
as not paying the VAT
shown on the return by the due date. It does not define
“the due date”. It would in our view be
reasonable
for a recipient who
genuinely believed his company had a TTP, to think that the reference was to
the original due date. There is also no mention of TTP arrangements, other than
the oblique reference at the end to “a surcharge being paid for defaulting”.
84. We thus find that although
the V160 was delivered to the company, it was still reasonable
for the company
to rely on Mr Middleton’s understanding of his meeting with Mr Clarkson.
The period ending October 2009
85. When the company failed to
pay the VAT
due for the quarter ending October 2009 by the due date, HMRC say
that they sent the company a form V161. The company denies receipt.
86. We again find that although
on the balance of probabilities the form was received by the company, it was nevertheless
reasonable
of Mr Middleton not to have realised that receipt of the V161 meant
that the HMRC computer had no record of a TTP agreement.
(1)
the failure to charge a penalty, even though the system prescribed a 2%
surcharge of £1,077.30 (2% of the VAT
due of £53,865); and
(2) the fact that the Notice says “the Commissioners do not propose to charge you a surcharge on this occasion” – which concurred with his expectation that the TTP arrangement prevented penalties from accruing.
The first surcharge
90. Our provisional finding was
thus that the company had a reasonable excuse
for the first surcharge, in
respect of the period ending April 2010. Up to that point, there was nothing
which displaced Mr Middleton’s
reasonable
belief that the company had a TTP
agreement.
The second surcharge
94. We thus asked ourselves
whether it was reasonable
for Mr Middleton not to take the initiative and call
HMRC back before arranging for the company to make a further monthly payments
for the next period. In particular, would someone who “seriously intends to
honour their tax liabilities and obligations”, as the Tribunal put it in B&J
Shopfitting Services, have made such a call before the due date for that
return?
95. In our view, a taxpayer who “seriously intended to honour his tax liabilities and obligations” and who has:
(1) already received a 5% penalty for late payment (indicating that at two previous defaults have occurred);
(2) been explicitly told by HMRC that “he has to make a separate TTP agreement for each return”; and
(3) who has not received any further assurances from HMRC during the period from 21 June (when he made the call) and 7 September (the due date),
would have called HMRC again to confirm the position and
not simply paid the next quarter’s VAT
on a monthly basis.
96. Our provisional finding was
thus that Mr Middleton’s belief in the TTP arrangement does not provide the company
with a reasonable excuse
for the late payment for the period ending 31 July 2010.
97. We considered whether Mr
Middleton’s illness provided such an excuse
, but noted that, although he had
suffered from chronic ill health for some time, the acute episodes were after
the due date. So too was the collapse into administration of the company’s
customer.
The third surcharge
100.The question
before the Tribunal is whether, absent this reasonable
belief, the company has
any other
reasonable excuse
for the late payment.
101.We considered
whether Mr Middleton’s poor health constituted such an excuse
, and, while we
had sympathy with his illness, we found that it did not. He was hospitalised in
October 2010, and the payment was not due until 7 December 2010. Responsibility
for timely
VAT
payment could and could and should have been delegated to another
of the company’s 35 staff.
102.We also
considered whether the failure of the company’s customer in September constituted
a reasonable excuse
. Although an insufficiency of funds is precluded from being
a
reasonable excuse
by TMA s 59C(10), the courts have held that the reason for
the insufficiency can constitute such an
excuse
(Customs & Excise
Commissioners v Salevon (1989) STC 907 per Nolan LJ and Customs &
Excise Commissioners v Steptoe [1992] STC 757).at 770p per Donaldson MR).
103.The Steptoe
approach requires the Tribunal to take for comparison a person in a similar
situation to that of the actual taxpayer who is relying on the reasonable
excuse
defence. The Tribunal must then ask itself - with that comparable person
in mind - whether, notwithstanding that person’s exercise of
reasonable
foresight and of due diligence and a proper regard for the fact that the tax
would become payable on the particular dates, those factors would not have
avoided the insufficiency of funds which led to the failures.
104. We did not
consider that this test had been met. The company knew of the customer’s
failure in September 2010, and Mr Middleton injected funds into the company to
tide it over. We were not presented with any evidence to show that this funding
could not have been arranged in time for the VAT
payment to have been made, in
full, on the due date.
105.We thus found
that there was no reasonable excuse
for the late payment of
VAT
for the period
ending October 2010.
106.On the basis
of the evidence before us, our provisional decision (without considering any
possible evidence which might be added by Mr Clarkson) was that the company had
a reasonable excuse
for the periods ending July 2009, October 2009 and April
2010, but not for the periods ending July 2010 and October 2010.
110.We decided against adjournment for the following reasons:
(1)
Even if Mr Clarkson were to give the strongest possible evidence in
support of HMRC’s case - to the effect that he had not granted the company an
open-ended TTP agreement, the strength of Mr Middleton’s oral evidence, and the
other supporting factors discussed above, means that we are in no doubt that Mr
Middleton believed he had such an agreement, and that his belief was
reasonable
. We would thus have come to the same decision in relation to the periods
for which we found this
reasonable excuse
to be operative.
(2) Taking the opposite possibility, that Mr Clarkson accepted, under cross-examination, that he had given such a promise to the company, we may have found that there was, as a question of fact, such an agreement. Our provisional decision in the company’s favour for the first three periods would be confirmed, albeit on the basis of a different factual matrix. However, given Miss Hill’s summary of her conversation with Mr Clarkson, we thought this outcome unlikely.
(3) Mr Clarkson’s evidence would not have changed our decision in relation to the periods ending July or October 2010.
(4) We considered that we were able to give “proper consideration to the issues” on the basis of the evidence before us so as to deal with the issue fairly and justly, and the further delay which an adjournment would require was not necessary or proportionate.
111.Our Decision is therefore that:
(1)
there was no default for the periods ending July 2009, October 2009 or
April 2010 because the company had a reasonable excuse
;
(2) the penalty of £1,048.12 for the period ending April 2010 is discharged;
(3) there was a default for the periods ending July 2010, but as this is the first penalty, it is nil. The penalty of £3,691.49 is thus discharged;
(4) there was a second default for the period ending October 2010. The rate for the second default is 2%. The penalty of £7,803.82 is thus discharged but replaced by a penalty of £1,040.50, being 2% of the £52,025.48 which was due to be paid on 7 December.
The Value Added Tax Act 1994
S59 Default Surcharge
59 The default surcharge
(1) Subject to subsection (1A) below If, by the last day on which a taxable person is required in accordance with regulations under this Act to furnish a return for a prescribed accounting period—
(a) the Commissioners have not received that return, or
(b) the Commissioners have received that return but
have not received the amount of VAT
shown on the return as payable by him in
respect of that period,
then that person shall be regarded for the purposes of this section as being in default in respect of that period.
(1A) A person shall not be
regarded for the purposes of this section as being in default in respect of any
prescribed accounting period if that period is one in respect of which he is
required by virtue of any order under section 28 to make any payment on account
of VAT
.
(2) Subject to subsections (9) and (10) below, subsection (4) below applies in any case where—
(a) a taxable person is in default in respect of a prescribed accounting period; and
(b) the Commissioners serve notice on the taxable person (a “surcharge liability notice”) specifying as a surcharge period for the purposes of this section a period ending on the first anniversary of the last day of the period referred to in paragraph (a) above and beginning, subject to subsection (3) below, on the date of the notice.
(3) If a surcharge liability notice is served by reason of a default in respect of a prescribed accounting period and that period ends at or before the expiry of an existing surcharge period already notified to the taxable person concerned, the surcharge period specified in that notice shall be expressed as a continuation of the existing surcharge period and, accordingly, for the purposes of this section, that existing period and its extension shall be regarded as a single surcharge period.
(4) Subject to subsections (7) to (10) below, if a taxable person on whom a surcharge liability notice has been served—
(a) is in default in respect of a prescribed accounting period ending within the surcharge period specified in (or extended by) that notice, and
(b)
has outstanding VAT
for that prescribed accounting period,
he shall be liable to a
surcharge equal to whichever is the greater of the following, namely, the
specified percentage of his outstanding VAT
for that prescribed accounting
period and £30.
(5) Subject to subsections
(7) to (10) below, the specified percentage referred to in subsection (4) above
shall be determined in relation to a prescribed accounting period by reference
to the number of such periods in respect of which the taxable person is in
default during the surcharge period and for which he has outstanding VAT
, so
that—
(a) in relation to the first such prescribed accounting period, the specified percentage is 2 per cent;
(b) in relation to the second such period, the specified percentage is 5 per cent;
(c) in relation to the third such period, the specified percentage is 10 per cent; and
(d) in relation to each such period after the third, the specified percentage is 15 per cent.
(6) For the purposes of
subsections (4) and (5) above a person has outstanding VAT
for a prescribed
accounting period if some or all of the
VAT
for which he is liable in respect
of that period has not been paid by the last day on which he is required (as
mentioned in subsection (1) above) to make a return for that period; and the
reference in subsection (4) above to a person's outstanding
VAT
for a
prescribed accounting period is to so much of the
VAT
for which he is so liable
as has not been paid by that day.
(7) If a person who, apart from this subsection, would be liable to a surcharge under subsection (4) above satisfies the Commissioners or, on appeal, a tribunal that, in the case of a default which is material to the surcharge—
(a)
the return or, as the case may be, the VAT
shown on the return was despatched
at such a time and in such a manner that it was
reasonable
to expect that it
would be received by the Commissioners within the appropriate time limit, or
(b)
there is a reasonable excuse
for the return or
VAT
not having been so
despatched,
he shall not be liable to the surcharge and for the purposes of the preceding provisions of this section he shall be treated as not having been in default in respect of the prescribed accounting period in question (and, accordingly, any surcharge liability notice the service of which depended upon that default shall be deemed not to have been served).
(8) For the purposes of subsection (7) above, a default is material to a surcharge if—
(a) it is the default which, by virtue of subsection (4) above, gives rise to the surcharge; or
(b) it is a default which was taken into account in the service of the surcharge liability notice upon which the surcharge depends and the person concerned has not previously been liable to a surcharge in respect of a prescribed accounting period ending within the surcharge period specified in or extended by that notice.
(9) In any case where—
(a) the conduct by virtue of which a person is in default in respect of a prescribed accounting period is also conduct falling within section 69(1), and
(b) by reason of that conduct, the person concerned is assessed to a penalty under that section,
the default shall be left out of account for the purposes of subsections (2) to (5) above.
(10) If the Commissioners, after consultation with the Treasury, so direct, a default in respect of a prescribed accounting period specified in the direction shall be left out of account for the purposes of subsections (2) to (5) above.
(11) For the purposes of this section references to a thing's being done by any day include references to its being done on that day.
S71 Construction of sections 59 to 70
(1)
For the purposes of any provision
of sections 59 to 70 which refers to a reasonable excuse
for any conduct-
(a)
an insufficiency of funds to pay
any VAT
due is not
reasonable excuse
; and
(b)
where reliance is place on any
other person to perform any task, neither the fact of that reliance nor any
dilatoriness or inaccuracy on the part of the person relied upon is a
reasonable excuse.
(2) …..