[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | ||
European Court of Human Rights |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> TODOROV v. UKRAINE - 16717/05 [2012] ECHR 30 (12 January 2012) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2012/30.html Cite as: [2012] ECHR 30 |
[New search] [Contents list] [View without highlighting] [Printable RTF version] [Help]
FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF TODOROV v. UKRAINE
(Application no. 16717/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
12 January 2012
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Todorov v. Ukraine,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Dean Spielmann,
President,
Elisabet Fura,
Karel
Jungwiert,
Boštjan M. Zupančič,
Mark
Villiger,
Angelika Nußberger, judges,
Mykhaylo
Buromenskiy, ad hoc judge,
and Claudia Westerdiek,
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 6 December 2011,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
A. The applicant’s detention and criminal proceedings against him
B. Deterioration of the applicant’s health and the conditions of his detention
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Constitution of Ukraine of 1996
B. Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine of 1960
Article 23-2. Separate ruling of the court
“The court, in the event there are grounds for it, shall take a separate ruling (окрема ухвала), in which it shall draw the attention of the State bodies, public organisations or officials to the breach of the law established in the facts of case ...
A separate ruling may also be taken where the court reveals breaches of rights of citizens and other breaches of the law that took place during inquiry, pre-trial investigation or consideration of the case by a lower court.
...
The separate ruling must be acted upon as necessary and the court which issued the ruling notified of the results within a month.
In the event that an official leaves the separate ruling without consideration, the measures laid down in Articles 254 - 257 of the Code of Administrative Offences of Ukraine shall be applied.
Article 46. Waiver of the right to a defence
“A suspect, an accused and a defendant in court may at any moment waive [their right to be represented] ...
The waiver may not be accepted: ...
2) in cases concerning crimes by persons who, on account of their physical or mental disabilities (muteness, deafness, blindness and other), cannot exercise their right to defence by themselves;
...”
C. Ruling of the Plenary of the Supreme Court of Ukraine no. 9 of 1 November 1996 “On Application of the Constitution of Ukraine in Carrying out Justice”
“... 19. Article 59 of the Constitution of Ukraine provides that everyone has the right to defend himself from accusation and to obtain legal assistance. Therefore, examining a criminal case, the court must, in the circumstances provided by law, ensure the defendant’s right to defence.
... It shall be borne in mind that under Article 62 of the Constitution an accusation may not be based on presumptions or on evidence obtained in an unlawful way. Evidence should be considered as having been obtained unlawfully when, for example, it has been collected and recorded in breach of the human and citizens’ rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine, or of ... the law on criminal procedure ...”
D. International Materials with Respect to Healthcare Arrangements in Detention Facilities
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE HEALTHCARE ARRANGEMENTS IN DETENTION
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Admissibility
B. Merits
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION
“3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
A. Admissibility
B. Merits
62. Having regard to general principles established in its case-law (see I.A. v. France, judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VII, § 102; Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 153, ECHR 2000-IV; and Iłowiecki v. Poland, no. 27504/95, §§ 61-63, 4 October 2001), the Court notes that the applicant’s arrest of 2 August 1999 was based on the strong suspicion that he had committed the offences with which he had been charged. It accepts that the fact that the applicant was suspected of serious offences and could obstruct their investigation may have initially warranted his detention. However, after a certain lapse of time the authorities were obliged to give more detailed and updated reasons for depriving him of liberty. Regard being had to the particularly long period of the applicant’s detention in the present case and his health deterioration, (which had urged the detention facility’s administration to petition for his release), the Court considers that exceptionally compelling reasons were needed to justify keeping him detained.
63. In the meantime, it does not transpire either from the Government’s observations or from the other case-file materials that any such exceptional reasons existed. Lacking any specific indications as to how the applicant’s release would have been dangerous or detrimental for the resolution of the case, the Court cannot accept that the general complexity of the case and seriousness of charges against the applicant could be regarded as “sufficient” reasons for holding him in custody for over five years.
64. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED UNFAIRNESS OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPLICANT
“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ...
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
...
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;
...”
A. Admissibility
1. Breach of the right to be represented by a lawyer
2. Lack of impartiality and breach of the presumption of innocence
B. Merits
1. Submissions of the parties
2. The Court’s assessment
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME
82. The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the length of the criminal proceedings against him had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement.
A. Admissibility
83. The Government did not comment on admissibility of this complaint.
84. The Court notes that in criminal matters, the “reasonable time” referred to in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention begins to run as soon as a person is “charged”, in other words, given the official notification by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence. This definition also corresponds to the test whether “the situation of the [suspect] has been substantially affected”. As regards the end of the “time”, in criminal matters the period governed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention covers the whole of the proceedings in issue, including appeal proceedings (see Merit v. Ukraine, no. 66561/01, § 70, 30 March 2004).
B. Merits
V. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
VI. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
B. Costs and expenses
C. Default interest
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 18,000 (eighteen thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the national currency of Ukraine at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 January 2012, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Dean Spielmann
Registrar President