FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF
M.K.N. v. SWEDEN
(Application no.
72413/10)
STRASBOURG
27 June 2013
This judgment will become
final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of M.K.N. v. Sweden,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as
a Chamber composed of:
Mark Villiger, President,
Angelika Nußberger,
Boštjan M. Zupančič,
Ann Power-Forde,
André Potocki,
Paul Lemmens,
Helena Jäderblom, judges,
and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 28 May 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no.
72413/10) against the Kingdom of Sweden lodged with the Court under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“the Convention”) by an Iraqi national (“the applicant”) on 24 November 2010. The
President of the Section acceded to the applicant’s request not to have his
name disclosed (Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court).
The applicant was represented by Mr A. Jussil, a
lawyer practising in Stockholm. The Swedish Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agents, Ms C. Hellner and Ms H. Lindquist, of the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs.
The applicant alleged that his deportation to Iraq would involve a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
On 14 December 2010 the President of the Section
to which the case had been allocated decided to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, indicating to the Government that the applicant should not be deported
to Iraq for the duration of the proceedings before the Court.
On 22 September 2011 the application was
communicated to the Government.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THE CASE
The applicant was
born in 1959 and originates from Mosul.
The applicant
arrived in Sweden on 2 January 2008 and applied for asylum two days later. In
support of his application, he submitted in essence the following. He is
Christian, and is married and has two children. His wife and children lived in Syria. He claimed that he had been persecuted due to his Christian beliefs and the fact
that he was well-off as part-owner of a sheet-metal workshop. In August 2006 he
had been kidnapped at his work place. The kidnappers had told him to pay money
to Al-Tawahid and Al-Jihad, groups fighting against the American troops.
After paying 50,000 U.S. dollars he had been released. In December 2006 he had
again been contacted by the groups mentioned, which demanded more money. They
had threatened to kill his children and to blow up his workshop, if he failed to
pay. He and his family had therefore left their house and stayed with various friends.
Two months later, he had been told that his workshop had been plundered and
blown up. In September 2007 the applicant and his family had left for Syria with the help of a smuggler. However, they had returned to Iraq shortly thereafter,
since the smuggler could not arrange for their departure from Syria. Again, they had stayed with friends. In December 2007 the applicant had departed for Sweden. The rest of the family had left for Syria, where they remained in difficult
circumstances. The applicant also claimed that his sister-in-law had been
murdered outside her work place in late 2008, allegedly as retribution against
the applicant and his family.
On 3 March 2009 the Migration Board (Migrationsverket)
rejected the application. The Board noted that a long time had passed since the
alleged incidents had taken place. It further pointed out that the applicant
had stayed in Mosul for almost a year after the kidnapping in 2006 without
facing any further threats. Also, the family had returned to Iraq after they had left for Syria. The Board further considered that there was nothing to indicate
a connection between the applicant and the murder of his sister-in-law. In sum,
there was no individual threat against the applicant.
The applicant appealed, adding that there was no
internal relocation alternative for him in the Kurdistan Region, as there were
entry restrictions and a requirement of a sponsor. Moreover, it was not a
reasonable alternative due to the lack of, for instance, work, housing and
food. Furthermore, he claimed that, after his departure from Iraq, the Mujahedin had found out that he had had a homosexual relationship and that, as a
consequence, his partner had been stoned to death. The Mujahedin had also been
looking for the applicant in 2009 due to this relationship. He had not revealed
this information earlier as he had not been aware that homosexual relationships
were accepted in Sweden. Despite this relationship, his intention was to
continue living with his wife.
In reply, the
Migration Board submitted that the applicant, as a Christian, had a need of
protection in regard to Mosul, according to the latest country information.
However, he was not facing any risks outside of Mosul and the Kurdistan Region constituted
a reasonable relocation alternative. As to the new personal information given
by the applicant, the Board noted that it had not been submitted in the
beginning of the proceedings, although the applicant must have understood the
importance of stating all the important facts at once. Noting that there was no
substantiation for the claim, the Board found that the story lacked
credibility.
On 18 May 2010 the Migration Court (Migrationsdomstolen)
upheld the decision of the Board. Like the Board, the court noted that a long
time had passed since the occurrence of the alleged incidents. It further held
that they were rather connected to the general security situation in Iraq than to the applicant’s religious affiliation. In regard to the applicant’s statement
that he had had a homosexual relationship, the court found that he had not
given a reasonable explanation for his having made this claim so late in the
proceedings. It noted, in this respect, that he had been informed, during the
interviews at the Board, that civil servants of the Board and all other people
present were bound by professional secrecy. Having regard to this and the
applicant’s account of the events, the court found reason to strongly question
the veracity of this statement. Referring to recent country information, the
court went on to state that there was no reason to deviate from the Board’s
assessment that, being a Christian from Mosul, the applicant was in need of
protection. In regard to the possibility of internal relocation, it held,
however, that recent country information showed that there were no restrictions
against entering the Kurdistan Region and that there were no systematic
discrimination of any religious groups in that area. Considering this and the
fact that the applicant was an adult married man in good health, the court
found that it was reasonable for him to relocate to the Kurdistan Region.
On 13 July 2010 the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrations-överdomstolen)
refused the applicant leave to appeal.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
The basic domestic provisions applicable in the
present case are set out in M.Y.H. and Others
v. Sweden (no. 50859/10, §§ 14-19, 27 June 2013 - in
the following referred to as “M.Y.H. and Others”).
III. RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT IRAQ
. Extensive
information about Iraq can be found in M.Y.H. and Others, §§ 20-36.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant complained that his return to Iraq would involve a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. This provision reads as
follows:
“No one shall
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that the complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. No
other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been invoked or established. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The submissions of the parties
(a) The applicant
The applicant claimed that, should he be
returned to Mosul or other parts of Iraq, he would face a real risk of being
subjected to treatment in breach of Article 3. He asserted that this claim was
not based only on the general situation of violence in Iraq, but also on the fact that he was Christian. In his reply to the Government’s observations in
the present case, he also invoked his relationship with another man.
The applicant maintained that the events that he
had experienced in Iraq attested to his being at real risk upon return. He
referred to what he had stated about his kidnapping and the destruction of his sheet-metal
workshop, the veracity of which had not been questioned in the domestic proceedings.
The applicant was convinced that these incidents, as well as the murder of his
sister-in-law, were interrelated and connected to his Christian beliefs, but
the Migration Board and the Migration Court had erroneously concluded that they
were rather due to the general security situation in Iraq, despite the
allegedly well-known fact that such crimes often had religious undertones.
Also, contrary to what the Migration Court had found, the applicant maintained
that he had left a reasonable explanation as to why he had not invoked his
homosexual relationship earlier in the asylum proceedings and that,
consequently, he should be given the benefit of the doubt in regard to this
claim.
The applicant further stated that available
country-of-origin information showed that Christians were subjected to lethal
violence and economically motivated kidnappings in Iraq. He claimed that the
Migration Board and the Migration Court had failed to take proper account of
such relevant and objective information in the domestic proceedings.
As regards internal relocation, the applicant
submitted that the crimes and persecution committed towards him and the threats
he had received were so serious that it was not reasonable for him to relocate
to the Kurdistan Region. Pointing out the short distance between Mosul and the Kurdistan Region, he stated that he would not be safe there.
(b) The Government
The Government acknowledged that country-of-origin
information showed that the general security situation in the southern and
central parts of Iraq was still serious and that Christians was one of the more
exposed groups, in particular in Mosul. However, the Government maintained that
there was no general need of protection for all Christians from Iraq and, that, consequently, assessments of protection needs should be made on an
individual basis.
As to the applicant’s personal situation, the
Government pointed out that he had stayed in Mosul for almost a year after his
kidnapping and the destruction of his workshop without anything further
happening to him. Moreover, they contended that he had failed to show that
these incidents were linked to his religious beliefs. As they could rather be
seen as related to the general security situation in Iraq, the Government
questioned that there would be a real risk of ill-treatment by members of
Al-Tawahid and Al-Jihad upon return. As regards the applicant’s claim that he
had had a relationship with another man, the Government, while not
underestimating the concerns that may legitimately be expressed with respect to
the current situation of homosexuals in Iraq, pointed out that the applicant
had expressed that the relationship had been conducted in secrecy and that he
intended to stay with his wife and children. Thus, he had no intention to
publicly demonstrate his sexual orientation upon return.
In any event, referring to international reports
on Iraq as well as information obtained from the Migration Board, the
Government contended that there was an internal flight alternative for the
applicant in the three northern governorates of the Kurdistan Region.
Allegedly, he would be able to enter without any restrictions or sponsor
requirements into this region, which had been identified as the safest and most
stable in Iraq, and he would be able to settle there, with access to the same
public services as other residents. As to the applicant’s personal circumstances
in relation to the possibility to relocate internally, the Government stressed
that he is an adult man, born in 1959, and that no information had emerged
about his health or any other circumstances that indicated that he was not fit
for work. Thus, he would be able to provide for himself, even in an area of Iraq where he lacked a social network. Furthermore, his wife and children, currently living
in Syria, would be able to join him in the Kurdistan Region. Also, in the
Government’s view, the homosexual relationship that he claimed to have had
would not prevent him from settling there.
The Government further asserted that the
Migration Board and the courts had provided the applicant with effective
guarantees against arbitrary refoulement and had made thorough
assessments, adequately and sufficiently supported by national and
international source materials. In the proceedings, the applicant had been
given many opportunities to present his case, through interviews conducted by
the Board with an interpreter present and at an oral hearing held by the
Migration Court, at all stages assisted by legal counsel. Moreover, having
regard to the expertise held by the migration bodies, the Government maintained
that significant weight should be given to their findings.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) General principles
The Court reiterates that Contracting States
have the right, as a matter of well-established international law and subject
to their treaty obligations, including the Convention, to control the entry,
residence and expulsion of aliens (see, for example, Abdulaziz,
Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28
May 1985, Series A no. 94, p. 34, § 67; Boujlifa
v. France, judgment of 21 October 1997, Reports
1997-VI, p. 2264, § 42; and Üner
v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 46410/99, § 54, ECHR 2006-XII).
However, the expulsion of an alien by a Contracting State may give rise to an
issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under
the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that
the person in question, if deported, would face a real risk of being subjected
to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving country. In these
circumstances, Article 3 implies the obligation not to deport the person in
question to that country (see, among other authorities, Saadi v. Italy
[GC], no. 37201/06, §§ 124-125, ECHR 2008-...).
The assessment of whether there are substantial
grounds for believing that the applicant faces such a real risk inevitably
requires that the Court assesses the conditions in the receiving country
against the standards of Article 3 of the Convention (Mamatkulov
and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, § 67,
ECHR 2005-I). These standards imply that the ill-treatment the applicant
alleges he will face if returned must attain a minimum level of severity if it
is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this is relative,
depending on all the circumstances of the case (Hilal
v. the United Kingdom, no. 45276/99, § 60, ECHR 2001-II). Owing to
the absolute character of the right guaranteed, Article 3 of the Convention may
also apply where the danger emanates from persons or groups of persons who are
not public officials. However, it must be shown that the risk is real and that
the authorities of the receiving State are not able to obviate the risk by
providing appropriate protection (H.L.R.
v. France, judgment of 29 April 1997, Reports
1997-III, § 40).
The assessment of the existence of a real risk
must necessarily be a rigorous one (Chahal
v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports
1996-V, § 96; and Saadi
v. Italy, cited above, § 128). It is in principle for the applicant
to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for
believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, he would
be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3.
In this respect, the Court acknowledges that, owing to the special situation in
which asylum seekers often find themselves, it is frequently necessary to give
them the benefit of the doubt when it comes to assessing the credibility of
their statements and the documents submitted in support thereof. However, when
information is presented which gives strong reasons to question the veracity of
an asylum seeker’s submissions, the individual must provide a satisfactory
explanation for the alleged discrepancies (see, among other authorities, Collins
and Akaziebie v. Sweden (dec.), no. 23944/05, 8 March 2007; and Hakizimana
v. Sweden (dec.), no. 37913/05, 27 March 2008).
In
cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers, the Court does not itself examine the actual asylum
applications or verify how the States honour their obligations under the Geneva
Convention relating to the status of refugees. It must be satisfied, though, that
the assessment made by the authorities of the Contracting State is adequate and
sufficiently supported by domestic materials as well as by materials
originating from other reliable and objective sources such as, for instance,
other contracting or non-contracting states, agencies of the United
Nations and reputable non-governmental organisations (NA. v. the
United Kingdom, no. 25904/07, § 119, 17 July 2008).
(b) The general situation in Iraq
The Court notes that a general situation of
violence will not normally in itself entail a violation of Article 3 in the
event of an expulsion (H.L.R. v. France,
cited above, § 41). However, the Court has never excluded the possibility that the
general situation of violence in a country of destination may be of a
sufficient level of intensity as to entail that any removal to it would
necessarily breach Article 3 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the Court would
adopt such an approach only in the most extreme cases of general violence,
where there is a real risk of ill-treatment simply by virtue of an individual
being exposed to such violence on return (NA. v. the United
Kingdom, cited above, § 115).
While the international reports on Iraq attest to a continued difficult situation, including indiscriminate and deadly attacks
by violent groups, discrimination as well as heavy-handed treatment by
authorities, it appears that the overall situation is slowly improving. In the
case of F.H. v. Sweden (no. 32621/06, § 93, 20 January 2009), the Court,
having at its disposal information material upto and including the year 2008,
concluded that the general situation in Iraq was not so serious as to cause, by
itself, a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in the event of a person’s
return to that country. Taking into account the international and national
reports available today, the Court sees no reason to alter the position taken
in this respect four years ago.
However, the applicant did not only claim that
the general situation in Iraq was too unsafe for his return, but also that his
status as a member of the Christian minority as well as his personal
circumstances would put him at real risk of being subjected to treatment
prohibited by Article 3.
(c) The situation of Christians in Iraq
In the mentioned case of F.H. v. Sweden,
following its conclusion that the general situation in Iraq was not sufficient to preclude all returns to the country, the Court had occasion to examine
the risks facing the applicant on account of his being Christian. It concluded
then that he would not face a real risk of persecution or ill-treatment on the
basis of his religious affiliation alone. In so doing, the Court had regard to
the occurrence of attacks against Christians, some of them deadly, but found
that they had been carried out by individuals rather than organised groups and
that the applicant would be able to seek protection from the Iraqi authorities
who would be willing and able to help him (§ 97 of the judgment).
During the subsequent four years, attacks on
Christians have continued, including the attack on 31 October 2010 on the
Catholic church Our Lady of Salvation in Baghdad, claiming more than 50
victims. The available evidence rather suggests that, in comparison with
2008/09, such violence has escalated. While still the great majority of
civilians killed in Iraq are Muslims, a high number of attacks have been
recorded in recent years which appear to have specifically targeted Christians
and been conducted by organised extremist groups. As noted by the UNHCR (see M.Y.H.
and Others, § 25) and others, Christians form
a vulnerable minority in the southern and central parts of Iraq, either
directly because of their faith or because of their perceived wealth or
connections with foreign forces and countries or the practice of some of them
to sell alcohol. The UK Border Agency concluded in December 2011 that the
authorities in these parts of the country were generally unable to protect
Christians and other religious minorities (M.Y.H. and Others, § 26).
The question
arises whether the vulnerability of the Christian group and the risks which the
individuals face on account of their faith make it impossible to return members
of this group to Iraq without violating their rights under Article 3. The Court
considers, however, that it need not determine this issue, as there is an
internal relocation alternative available to them in the Kurdistan Region. This
will be examined in the following.
(d) The possibility of relocation to the Kurdistan Region
The Court reiterates that Article 3 does not, as
such, preclude Contracting States from placing reliance on the existence of an
internal flight or relocation alternative in their assessment of an individual’s
claim that a return to the country of origin would expose him or her to a real
risk of being subjected to treatment proscribed by that provision. However, the
Court has held that reliance on such an alternative does not affect the
responsibility of the expelling Contracting State to ensure that the applicant
is not, as a result of its decision to expel, exposed to treatment contrary to
Article 3. Therefore, as a precondition of relying on an internal flight or
relocation alternative, certain guarantees have to be in place: the person to
be expelled must be able to travel to the area concerned, gain admittance and
settle there, failing which an issue under Article 3 may arise, the more so if
in the absence of such guarantees there is a possibility of his or her ending
up in a part of the country of origin where there is a real risk of ill-treatment
(Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, § 266,
28 June 2011, with further references).
The three northern governorates - Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah - forming the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, or KRI, are, according to
international sources, a relatively safe area. While there have been incidents
of violence and threats, the rights of Christians are generally considered to
be respected. As noted by various sources, large numbers of Christians have
travelled to the Kurdistan Region and found refuge there.
As regards the possibility of entering the KRI,
some sources state that the border checks are often inconsistent, varying not
only from governorate to governorate but also from checkpoint to checkpoint
(see the UNHCR Guidelines and the Finnish/Swiss report, which appears to rely
heavily on the UNHCR’s conclusions in this respect, M.Y.H. and Others, §§ 30 and 35 respectively). However, the
difficulties faced by some at the KRI checkpoints do not seem to be relevant
for Christians. This has been noted by, among others, the UNHCR. Rather,
members of the Christian group are given preferential treatment as compared to
others wishing to enter the Kurdistan Region. As stated by a representative of
an international organisation and the head of Asaysih, the KRI general security
authority, to investigators of the Danish/UK fact-finding mission, this is
because Christians are at particular risk of terrorist attacks in southern and
central Iraq and as the Christians are not considered to pose any terrorist
threat themselves (at 4.34 and 8.19 of the report, M.Y.H. and Others, § 36).
Moreover, while Christians may be able to enter
the three northern governorates without providing any documentation at all (see
Danish/UK report, at 4.34), in any event there does not seem to be any
difficulty to obtain identity documents in case old ones have been lost. As
concluded by the UK Border Agency (M.Y.H. and Others, § 31) and the UK Upper Tribunal in the recent country
guidance case of HM and others (M.Y.H. and Others, § 34), it is possible for an individual to obtain
identity documents from a central register in Baghdad, which retains identity
records on microfiche, whether he or she is applying from abroad or within
Iraq. In regard to the need for a sponsor resident in the Kurdistan Region, the
Upper Tribunal further concluded, in the case mentioned above, that no-one was
required to have a sponsor, whether for their entry into or for their continued
residence in the KRI. It appears that the UNHCR is of the same opinion as
regards entry, although its statement in the Guidelines directly concerns only
the requirements of a tourist (M.Y.H. and Others,
§ 30). The Finnish/Swiss report states that Christians may be able to
nominate senior clerics as sponsors (M.Y.H. and Others, § 35); thus, they do not have to have a personal
acquaintance to vouch for them.
Internal relocation inevitably involves certain
hardship. Various sources have attested that people who relocate to the
Kurdistan Region may face difficulties, for instance, in finding proper jobs
and housing there, not the least if they do not speak Kurdish. Nevertheless,
the evidence before the Court suggests that there are jobs available and that
settlers have access to health care as well as financial and other support from
the UNHCR and local authorities. In any event, there is no indication that the
general living conditions in the KRI for a Christian settler would be
unreasonable or in any way amount to treatment prohibited by Article 3. Nor is
there a real risk of his or her ending up in the other parts of Iraq.
In conclusion, therefore, the Court considers
that relocation to the Kurdistan Region is a viable alternative for a Christian
fearing persecution or ill-treatment in other parts of Iraq. The reliance by a Contracting State on such an alternative would thus not, in general, give
rise to an issue under Article 3.
(e) The particular circumstances of the applicant
It remains for the Court to determine whether,
despite what has been stated above, the personal circumstances of the applicant
would make it unreasonable for him to settle in the Kurdistan Region. In this
respect, the Court first notes that the applicant’s account was examined by the
Migration Board and the Migration Court, which both gave extensive reasons for their
decisions that he was not in need of protection in Sweden. The applicant was
able to present the arguments he wished with the assistance of legal counsel
and language interpretation.
As regards the incidents to which the applicant
was subjected in Iraq, as well as the alleged murder of his sister-in-law, the
Court notes, without underestimating their serious nature, that they all
occurred in Mosul between 2006 and 2008. It has not been substantiated that the
perpetrators of these crimes would have a continued interest in the applicant
several years after the events or that they would search for him in the
Kurdistan Region. Nor is there any indication that he would suffer further
injustice there on account of his Christian beliefs.
Turning to the applicant’s statement that he had
had a sexual relationship with another man and that, as a consequence, the
Mujahedin was looking for him in 2009 and that they had killed his partner, the
Court is aware of the very difficult situation for real or perceived
homosexuals in Iraq and that these difficulties are present also in the
Kurdistan Region. It notes, however, that the applicant has expressed the
intention of living with his wife and children. More importantly, the Court has
regard to the fact that, in the domestic proceedings, the applicant did not
make this claim until he appealed against the Migration Board’s negative decision
on his asylum application, more than one year after his arrival in Sweden. Moreover, no mention of the relationship in question was made in the present
proceedings before he replied to the Government’s observations, almost a year
and a half after lodging the application to the Court. In this connection, it
is noteworthy that, in that application, he stated that there were threats
against him emanating from Al-Tawahid and Al-Jihad, but did not even mention the
Mujahedin. The Court agrees with the Migration Court that the applicant did not
give a reasonable explanation for the delay in making this claim in the
domestic proceedings. Having regard to all the circumstances, including the
similar delay in the present proceedings, the Court considers that the
applicant’s claim concerning the homosexual relationship is not credible.
(f) Conclusion
Having regard to the above, the Court concludes
that, although the applicant, as Christian, belongs to a vulnerable minority
and irrespective of whether he can be said to face, as a member of that group,
a real risk of treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention in the
southern and central parts of Iraq, he may reasonably relocate to the Kurdistan
Region, where he will not face such a risk. Neither the general situation in
that region, including that of the Christian minority, nor any of the applicant’s
personal circumstances indicate the existence of said risk.
Consequently, his deportation to Iraq would not involve a
violation of Article 3.
II. RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT
The Court recalls that, in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the present judgment will not become final
until (a) the parties declare that they will not request that the case be
referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the
judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested;
or (c) the Panel of the Grand Chamber rejects any request to refer under
Article 43 of the Convention.
It considers that the indication made to the
Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see § 4 above) must
continue in force until the present judgment becomes final or until the Court
takes a further decision in this connection (see operative part).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Declares unanimously the application
admissible;
2. Holds by five votes to two that the
implementation of the deportation order against the applicant would not give
rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;
3. Decides unanimously to continue to
indicate to the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that it is
desirable in the interests of the proper conduct of the proceedings not to deport
the applicant until such time as the present judgment becomes final or until
further order.
Done in English, and notified
in writing on 27 June 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of
Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Mark Villiger
Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45
§ 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate
opinion of Judge Power-Forde joined by Judge Zupančič is annexed to
this judgment.
M.V.
C.W.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE POWER-FORDE
JOINED BY JUDGE ZUPANČIČ
For the same reasons as those set out in my dissenting opinion
in the case of M.Y.H. and Others v. Sweden, I voted against the majority
in finding that Article 3 would not be breached in the event that the
deportation order made in respect of this applicant were to be executed.
My dissent was based on the failure of the majority to test
whether the requisite guarantees required by the Court’s case law prior to a
deportation based on internal flight options, were established in this case.