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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Sutton v Parking Adjudicator  EWCA Civ 1325 (26 July 2001)
Cite as:  EWCA Civ 1325
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COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(MR JUSTICE TURNER)
Royal Courts of Justice
Thursday, 26th July 2001
B e f o r e :
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Smith Bernal Reporting Limited
180 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2HD
Telephone No: 0171-421 4040 Fax No: 0171-831 8838
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Thursday, 26th July 2001
"The Applicant therefore renews his application for permission for Judicial Review in order to exhaust his right to 'an effective remedy' under article 13 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, before taking his case to the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg."
"1. Whether application should be reconsidered by Court of Appeal unfettered by Judgment of Turner J.
2. Whether Turner J was correct not to consider in detail of all the applicant's grounds for seeking permission for judicial review.
3. Whether Turner J was correct regarding reasons given by Ms Witts in her appeal decision dated 30 September 1999.
On the first point, this Court is unfettered by the judgment of Turner J in the sense that it is no way bound by it. The Court has to form its own views on the merits of the application for permission and to decide whether there is an arguable case that permission should be granted. That is not to say that the Court ignores the judgment of Turner J who set out in the course of 16 paragraphs the reasons why he refused the application.
As to the second point, Turner J was to have regard to the proceedings which had taken place before the application was made to him. He was not obliged, in my view, to set out in his judgment all the issues which had been debated before the Parking Appeal Service. It was for him to consider whether an arguable case had been made out for the case to proceed to a full judicial review of the decisions complained of. I do not criticise Turner J for dealing with the matter in the way he did, having regard to the manner in which it had been dealt with by the Parking Appeal Service.
As to the third point, in my judgment, the matter was sufficiently dealt with by Turner J. Mr Sutton has referred me to the case of Flannery and another v Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd  All ER 373, and set out in his supplementary argument a substantial part of the judgment of Henry LJ in that case. Turner J was, in my view, entitled to deal with the matter as he did having considered, as I have, the manner in which the decision had been reached and the appeals approached by the Parking Appeal Service.
In the course of his supplementary skeleton argument and in the further submission of this morning, Mr Sutton has referred to the decision of Mr Hickinbottom in Moulder v London Borough of Sutton Case Ref: 1940113243. In that case a copy of the report of which has been supplied, to Mr Hickinbottom decided that the Penalty Charge Notice issued in that case was a nullity and it was not such that the authority could rely upon it to found an NTO or any subsequent enforcement procedure. Mr Hickinbottom directed the London Borough of Sutton to cancel the PCN and the NTO based upon it. The decision is dated 24th May 1995.
The applicant seeks permission to amend his form 86A to incorporate the points which arose in that case. I indicated that I was not prepared to grant permission. No draft application has been submitted to me, though the grounds emerge from Mr Sutton's documents to which I have referred. It is important that judicial review proceedings are launched promptly. Having referred to the chronology and to the fact that this is a public law remedy in which there is a strong public interest in priority and in being dealt with promptly, I am not prepared at this stage, the matter having gone through the procedures it has, and in the way it has, to grant permission to extend the scope of the application.
I only add that Mr Hickinbottom has himself been involved in the appeal procedure in this case and must have been aware of the decision of Moulder which he had given in 1995. He considered the matter comprehensively in this case.
Points are raised as to whether these proceedings are or are not criminal proceedings. I do not find it appropriate to attempt to resolve that issue upon this application or to find that the need to resolve that issue is a reason for giving permission in this particular case.
I turn briefly to the general points raised in his final submissions in the documents of today. Mr Sutton states, at page 35:
"The issues raise important issues not least because of the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998 on 2 October 2000 and the right to both a fair determination of either civil rights or a criminal charge under article 6(1) of the European Convention and also 'peaceful enjoyment of possessions under article 1 of Protocol of the Convention in respect of which I should be afforded an 'effective remedy' under article 13 of the Convention.
The case would have widespread repercussions for the Parking enforcement and the conduct of appeal hearings before Parking Adjudicators throughout the whole country if permission is granted."