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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
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Cite as:  EWCA Civ 1739
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COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(MR JUSTICE POOLE)
The Strand, London
Wednesday 7 November 2001
B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE BUXTON
|PETER JOSEPH HANLEY||Appellant/Claimant|
|(1) STAGE AND CATWALK LIMITED|
|(T/S Acorn Studios)|
|(2) TERRENCE ARTHUR SANSOM|
|(3) JUDY SANSOM|
|(4) GERRY SANSOM|
|(5) NATIONAL CARRIERS LIMITED|
|(formerly known as|
|Lynx Express Delivery Network)||Respondents/Defendants|
Smith Bernal, 190 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2HD
Telephone 020 7421 4040
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
MR DAVID WESCOTT (instructed by Messrs Herbert Smith, London EC2A 2HS) appeared on behalf of THE RESPONDENTS
Crown Copyright ©
Wednesday 7 November 2001
"MR JUSTICE POOLE: Well, now, we come to Professor Strauss.
MR WESCOTT: We do.
MR JUSTICE POOLE: You rightly point out that that is perhaps interlinked with an application made by the claimant today, who also wishes to produce further evidence concerned with this issue.
My thinking at the moment, and it may be less than fully mature, is that I would take some persuading otherwise than that either both sides should be permitted to perfect their life expectancy evidence or neither."
"Mr Glancy has taken me to an unreported judgment of His Honour Judge Langan QC in the case of Bethany Ruff v RVI and Associated Hospitals NHS Trust in support of the submission that Professor Strauss' contribution would be possibly controversial and of limited value. It may be anticipated that Professor Strauss' approach to these matters of statistics in the field of life expectancy will be heavily attacked at trial. Nonetheless, this is a valuable claim, and it seems to me that the evidence of Professor Strauss is potentially valuable evidence. I have considered anxiously the objections that have been made by Mr Glancy, but on balance I feel that I ought to grant the defendants' application in respect of Professor Strauss and the evidence that he is able to give.
In conjunction with that, I make it quite clear that I also grant the claimant's application in regard to the further evidence of Mr Gardner on the same question of life expectancy."
"If parties are free to disregard successive court orders, then respect for orders of the court in general is undermined. At the same time the overriding principle is that justice must be done."
"I would take some persuading otherwise than that either both sides should be permitted to perfect their life expectancy evidence or neither."
"The appeal court will allow an appeal where the decision of the lower court was --
(a) wrong; or
(b) unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court."
"The epithet 'wrong' is to be applied to the substance of the decision made by the lower court. If the appeal is against the exercise of a discretion by the lower court, the decision of the House of Lords in G v G (Minors: Custody Appeal)  1 WLR 647 warrants attention. In that case Lord Fraser of Tullybelton said at page 652:
'Certainly it would not be useful to inquire whether different shades of meaning are intended to be conveyed by words such as "blatant error" used by the President in the present case, and words such as "clearly wrong", "plainly wrong", or "simply wrong" used by other judges in other cases. All these various expressions were used in order to emphasise the point that the appellate court should only interfere when they consider that the judge of first instance has not merely preferred an imperfect solution which is different from an alternative imperfect solution which the Court of Appeal might or would have adopted, but has exceeded the generous ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible.'"
"It seems to me that appeals of this kind, that is to say from interlocutory orders shortly before trial, should be discouraged by this court. If authority for that view is needed, it is to be found in the speech of Lord Templeman in Ashmore Incorporation at Lloyds  1 WLR 446, 453, and the judgment of Balcombe LJ in Charm v Murex (CA, unreported, 7 April 1993. For my part, I am prepared to approach this appeal on the basis that it should not succeed unless the judge's decision is shown to have been plainly wrong."