|[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]|
England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council v Hancock  EWCA Civ 1980 (29 November 2001)
Cite as:  EWCA Civ 1980
[New search] [Context] [View without highlighting] [Printable RTF version] [Help]
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(MR JUSTICE ELIAS)
Thursday, 29th November 2001
B e f o r e :
|DONCASTER METROPOLITAN BOROUGH COUNCIL Claimant/Respondent|
|- v -|
|DEAN WILLIAM HANCOCK|
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited
190 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2AG
Telephone No: 020 7421 4040
Fax No: 020 7831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
The Respondent did not attend and was unrepresented
Crown Copyright ©
Thursday, 29th November 2001
"If the matter is as clear as the plaintiff says it is, no doubt the trial can come on very quickly and will not take very long."
"9. The question I have to consider is whether there is any matter which is raised in the counterclaim which has not, in effect, been disposed of by the decision of Mr Justice Kennedy. I say in effect because, as I have already indicated, there was no express reference to the counterclaim. The counterclaim was to the effect that Mr Hancock was entitled to retain the redundancy payment he received; indeed it claims that his redundancy payment had not been calculated on the correct basis but on the basis that his pensionable pay was lower than in fact it should have been. However, he accepts that the substance of the case, whatever the amount of the redundancy payment concerned, is that he was entitled to have his redundancy compensation, or compensation for loss of office to put it rather more broadly, as well as his payments relating to the ill-health retirement.
10. He submitted that before Master Foster and then Mr Justice Kennedy; the only question had been whether he had been made redundant on the 15th December 1995. He says before me that there were another two arguments which he advances and which were not considered by either Master Foster or Mr Justice Kennedy. The first was that his original office had come to an end on the 1st October 1995 and that although he had remained in employment thereafter, nonetheless his entitlement to compensation for loss of office was triggered at that time. The second was that in any event even though he fell within the provision of ill-health retirement and received compensation in accordance with regulation D7 of the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 1995, that that did not preclude him at one and the same time also being treated as having his employment terminated by reason of redundancy or otherwise for the more efficient operation of the Council's functions.
11. In my judgment neither of these arguments can properly be advanced in the light of the determination of Mr Justice Kennedy. As I have already indicated, he made a finding in terms that no redundancy money was payable under the regulations, whether under the statutory scheme or under the regulatory scheme applicable in this case. I should add that I have, in addition, given specific consideration to the particular two arguments that have been made by Mr Hancock before me. Plainly those are matters which should have been urged before Mr Justice Kennedy in any event; that would have been the appropriate time to have made them. Be that as it may, I to understand Mr Hancock is a litigant in person and it is not always easy for arguments to be taken at the right time, but I should add that I have no doubt at all that both these arguments would fail and that it would be doing no kindness at all to Mr Hancock in any event to overturn the decision of Master Foster in this case."
"12. It seems to me quite plain that the structure of these regulations is specifically not to allow both compensation for loss of office and compensation by reason of ill-health to run together. It would be rather extraordinary, it seems to me, if the effect were that they could be and I am satisfied that it is not. As I have said, in any event it seems to me this matter has already been determined by the judgment of Mr Justice Kennedy and there was an application to obtain leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the Judge and that was refused, and his judgment was taken no further."
"Mr Hancock has said before me, and I accept, that there was certainly no intention to mislead the court in any way and that he had tried at all times to tell the truth to the courts. If and in so far as he may have understood that there was any implication to the contrary, I should perhaps say that I am satisfied that he has sought to tell the truth to the courts, and I am sure he has done that before me today."
1. Procedural unfairness
"It would be wrong for the Osmond decision to be taken as a signal that, even when the legal position is clear and an investigation of the facts would provide no assistance, the courts, should be reluctant to dismiss cases which have no real prospect of success. Courts are now encouraged, where an issue or issues can be identified which will resolve or help to resolve litigation, to take that issue or those issues at an early stage of the proceedings so as to achieve expedition and save expense. There is no question of any contravention of article 6... in so doing."
2. Complaints about order 14
3. Not dealing with the counterclaim
4. Redundancy occurring on 1st October 1995
5. Changes in the Regulations
6. Prevention of Corruption Acts
7. Article 1 of the First Protocol