|[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]|
England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Tassell & Anor v National Westminster Bank Plc  EWCA Civ 1114 (17 July 2002)
Cite as:  EWCA Civ 1114
[New search] [Context] [View without highlighting] [Printable RTF version] [Help]
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY DIVISION
(MR JUSTICE HART and MR JUSTICE JACOB)
Wednesday 17 July 2002
B e f o r e :
|1. VICTOR SAMUEL TASSELL|
|2. MRS MARIE HETTY TASSELL|
|- v -|
|NATIONAL WESTMINSTER BANK PLC|
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 190 Fleet Street,
London EC4A 2AG
Tel: 0207 421 4040
Fax: 0207 831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
Crown Copyright ©
"While giving all the understanding I can to the strongly felt views of Mr and Mrs Tassell, I cannot find it arguable that the same matter can successfully be relitigated before this court. Any system of justice must include a concept of finality. However strongly losing parties in litigation feel, under the rule of law no system can operate whereby decisions of the court are repeatedly challenged by requests to hear the same issue as has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction with a right of appeal also having been exercised."
"Accordingly, I am left in the position where the Registrar has made an order based on a valid statutory demand, itself based on a valid judgment, and there are, there is simply no basis upon which I am entitled to look back behind that judgment and go into all the facts which Mr†Tassell would wish me to go into. In the course of his address, he has taken me to a number of matters which, he says, shows that the bank were quite capable of making mistakes. And he submits that, without at some point the court going into the matter in detail on the basis of all the documentation, it is simply unfair for him to be saddled with what he regards as the besmirching of his name by his being adjudged bankrupt.
The position, indeed, is that the court has not at any stage when giving its judgment against Mr†Tassell done so upon a full investigation of the whole history of his account. It has done so on the basis of summary applications by the bank, it being satisfied on the evidence before it that it was appropriate to do so, and Mr†Tassell has on each occasion had, and taken, his opportunity to seek relief from the Court of Appeal in respect of the judgments against him. It is the case that the court does have power to make judgments on the basis otherwise than on a full trial, and that is what has happened on this case. The consequence is, where the court so acts, that the litigant may well feel deprived of an opportunity fully to investigate how it is that he finds himself in the position of having a judgment against him.
As I have tried to indicate, that is not something that I think this court, on an appeal from a bankruptcy order, is in a position to cure."
"The appellant claims within the Human Rights Act 1998 within Article 34 of the Convention, being a 'victim' of an unlawful act in regards to (i)†'prejudice' (ii) 'oppression' (iii) 'bias' within the bankruptcy proceedings in judicial acts within section 7(1) of the Act and exercising right of appeal section 9(1) and 9(1)(a)."
"It is the duty of the court to foster the overriding requirement of a fair trial under Article†6 and Article 6(1) and to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments to follow and evidence requested on application and to be adduced by the parties, without prejudice or impartiality to its assessment of whether they are relevant to its decision within utmost good faith."
"The fact is that the whole of the claims are completely misconceived and should be struck out."