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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Marley (UK) Ltd v Alcock  EWCA Civ 1478 (11 November 2005)
Cite as:  EWCA Civ 1478
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BIRMINGHAM DISTRICT REGISTRY
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE NORRIS QC
(sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court))
B e f o r e :
|MARLEY (UK) LIMITED||Claimant/Respondent|
|EDWIN ARTHUR ALCOCK||Defendant/Applicant|
Smith Bernal Wordwave Limited
190 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2AG
Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 020 7831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
The Respondent did not appear and was not represented
Crown Copyright ©
"I am the sole owner of the dwelling and all associated land identified above [identified by her address that she had stated] by virtue of:-
a) The original purchase of the property in the name of G.T. Alcock my deceased husband, myself and E.A. Alcock my son.
b) Dual ownership with my son on the death of my husband.
c) Sole ownership by deed of gift held by me of my son's half ownership. This follows the purchase of land adjacent to this site by means of a financing loan from the Co-Operative Bank, secured in the name of my son and now paid off.
In return for the deed of gift of full ownership of this property I have granted to my son, my sole heir, a home for the rest of his natural life and ownership of the land on which exists his workshop.
On the death of my son this property along with all my effects and monies are bequeathed to his immediate dependant children. By this means my son will not become owner of my property and effects on my death but will enjoy the normal rights and privileges of these items as the sole member of my immediate family for the rest of his natural life.
Should my son die before or after my death without issue of children, under no circumstances is this property to be disposed to:-
a) Any relative who has, or purports to have, a direct or indirect family connection related or not related to the family tree of my deceased husband or my family tree no matter how remote or close the family link the claimant may argue.
b) Any person living or related to any person living in the village of Longsdon ST9 XXX, Staffordshire."
"(1) show that the dismissal of the Court of Appeal of the defendant's appeal against the order of His Honour Judge Wilson-Mellor QC dated 18 April 1994 was perverse or in contravention of the Human Rights Act 1998;
(2) show that Marley UK Limited does not have the benefit of the judgment or the charging order relied upon in this claim;
(3) show the failure of the attachment of earnings order is attributable to acts of Marley UK Limited or its legal representatives."
"The judge has refused to accept that the provisions of my late mother's will dated 1994 are protected by Article 8 as above. As such he was operating out of his jurisdiction on a matter settled at a probate court."
"28. The only issue is whether that interest is an entire beneficial ownership or the sort of beneficial ownership created by the trust described to me by Mr Alcock. It seems to me that Mr Alcock's interest under that trust is as good as an absolute freehold interest. He has an entire life interest. There is then an intervening interest in favour of his dependant children of whom there are at present none. The will then makes an ineffective disposal of the remainder of the beneficial interests. There is accordingly a partial intestacy. On the evidence Mr Alcock is entitled to the entirety of that intestate interest. Effectively, therefore, if the will rules, he has an equitable fee simple, defeasible in the event that he has a dependant child who fulfils the condition. If the true arrangement is to be derived from the deed of gift, as described to me, it seems to me that once again Mr Alcock has a life interest in the property and there then follows an ineffective disposal of the reversionary interest which results to him, so that he is, in effect, the owner of the equitable fee simple."
"I do not have to determine for the purposes of the exercise of my discretion which precisely is the true analysis, for they are sufficiently close to be of equal weight in the exercise of the discretion. Whatever interest Mr Alcock has, has been found by the Court to be a chargeable interest, is (on the evidence which persuaded the Court to grant the charging order) a fee simple absolute, or is (on the alternative case advanced by Mr Alcock) virtually as good as a fee simple absolute. The arrangements which were entered into seem to have been prepared by a draftsman, I know not who, displaying all the artifice of one who seeks to keep High View from being available to Mr Alcock's creditors but all the artlessness of one unfamiliar with the English law of settled land then current."
"I am satisfied that there is no significant risk that Mr Alcock will be homeless unless that is the course that he chooses for himself."
ORDER: Application for permission to appeal refused; it is to be noted on the court record that the application is dismissed as being entirely without merit.