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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Yarl's Wood Immigration Ltd & Ors v Bedfordshire Police Authority  EWCA Civ 1110 (23 October 2009)
Cite as:  2 WLR 1322,  EWCA Civ 1110,  2 All ER 221,  QB 698
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COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION COMMERCIAL COURT
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE BEATSON
2007 FOLIO 1241
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE WALL
LORD JUSTICE AIKENS
| YARL'S WOOD IMMIGRATION LIMITD
GSL UK LIMITED
CREECHURCH DEDICATED LIMITED
(being the sole member of D J Pye Syndicate 962 at Lloyd's subscribing to the contract of insurance policy number 0000014763)
|Appellants / Claimants
|- and -
|BEDFORDSHIRE POLICE AUTHORITY
||Respondent / Defendant
Mr James Watson QC & Mr Simon Cridland (instructed by Messrs Weightmans Llp) for the Respondent
Hearing date : Friday 26th June 2009
Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Rix :
"Where a house, shop, or building in a police area has been injured or destroyed…by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together, such compensation as herein-after mentioned shall be paid out of the police fund of the area to any person who has sustained loss by such injury…or destruction…" (emphasis added).
"The fact that YWIL and GSL [the appellants] were acting as public authorities exercising coercive powers of the state in carrying out its public function in respect of the Yarl's Wood immigration detention centre does not per se put them outside the scope of the 1886 Act. However, the fact that they are entities with public law powers and duties for order within the detention centre means that, in respect of loss suffered from riot damage caused by detainees within the centre, they are not qualifying persons within the 1886 Act. The 1886 Act and its predecessors imposed a statutory duty to compensate on those responsible for law and order in a given area. The intention behind the legislation was that local property owners should be entitled to obtain compensation from the body with responsibility for protecting them from the risk of riot. It was not to enable a public authority with a particular responsibility for order within a defined area to seek compensation from another public authority with a broadly equivalent, but not identical, responsibility for order in that area."
The responsibilities for good order at Yarl's Wood
"58. Those who operate contracted out detention centres do so for the Home Secretary and in order to enable the detention of persons pursuant to the Home Secretary's powers of detention under the Immigration Act 1971. The power to manage those detained has been delegated to the claimants by virtue of the contractual arrangements made under the 1999 Act and the powers and duties in the Act and the 2001 Rules. This, together with the degree of control given to the Home Secretary by the 1999 Act and the 2001 Rules and the Project and Operating Contracts, means that a contracted out detention centre is to be regarded as operated by and on behalf of the Home Secretary…59…[P]owers are divided between [Group 4] and their employees and the Home Secretary…"
"1…The safety and security of everyone detained, employed and visiting within the centre must rest with Group 4 and nothing in this Agreement shall in any way alter the responsibilities and obligations of Group 4 under its contract with the Secretary of State (the "Contract").
2. The Bedfordshire Police has a legal duty to act in certain circumstances, using their powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and the Immigration Acts.
3. The purpose of this Agreement is to ensure a speedy response by Bedfordshire Police officers to serious incidents at the Detention Centre and one, which does not adversely affect their other operational duties.
4. The command and control of police officers, however engaged, remains always with the Bedfordshire Police…
i. Serious incident…
AND in the opinion of Group 4's Centre Manager, that Group 4 employees cannot reasonably resolve the incident safely. In these circumstances the Centre Manager will formally hand over control to the police…
11. Group 4 will undertake to fund, without reservation, all officers judged by the officer in charge to be sufficiently needed to resolve the situation safely…"
"No doubt there is an absolute and unconditional obligation binding the police authorities to take all steps which appear to them necessary for keeping the peace, for preventing crime, or for protecting property from criminal injury…"
However, how the police respond to an incident is also a matter of discretion and the courts will be reluctant to interfere with a chief constable's decision: see Viscount Finlay, ibid at 285:
"There is no doubt that it is the duty of the police to give adequate protection to all persons and their property. In discharging this duty those in control of the police must exercise their judgment as to the manner in which the protection should be afforded."
"79. The public law responsibilities of the first and second claimants in respect of order and security within the detention centre do not of themselves remove the powers and duties of the Bedfordshire police force to maintain law and order in it. This is recognised in paragraph 2 of the Yarl's Wood JPA…
80. It is clear law that a contractual arrangement by a public authority may not fetter the authority in the exercise of its powers and duties: see eg Ayr Harbour Trustees v. Oswald (1883) 8 App Cas 623; Commissioners of Crown Lands v. Page  2 QB 274. The duty of the police to maintain law and order has been described as a fundamental duty. Given the fundamental nature of that duty, a provision of the JPA which expressly sought to remove the powers and duties of the Bedfordshire police force to maintain law and order in the Yarl's Wood detention centre would probably have amounted to an improper fetter on the police's duty to maintain order. But this does not mean that the first and second claimants' specific public law responsibilities in respect of order and security within the detention centre have no impact on the position of the police force…
82. It is clear from the assumed facts that the parties do not agree about the impact of the Yarl's Wood JPA on the common law and statutory duties of the Bedfordshire police force to attend and deal with serious incidents at the detention centre. However, both parties knew that the Bedfordshire police intended to include the Yarl's Wood JPA as an appendix to their Operational Order. Paragraph 7 of the Yarl's Wood JPA provides that it is the claimants' duty to manage all minor or protracted incidents within the centre. Paragraph 8-9 of the JPA provide for the police to assist with serious incidents if the centre's manager was of the view that the claimants' employees could not reasonably resolve the incident safely and formally handed over control to the police…
84. For the reasons I have given, while the police remain under their fundamental duty, where the claimants, with their public law duties for order in the centre and, in accordance with the procedures entered into by the claimants and the police, remain responsible for an incident, the police may not be in breach of the duty while the claimants remain so responsible for the incident…
98. The report of the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (HC 1257) published on 16 November 2004 stated (p 125) that, if there was widespread damage and threat to life, it is arguable that the police could only perform their duty to maintain order by taking control of the incident. The police undoubtedly had power to enter; the question was whether their decision to await a request was unlawful and put them in breach of their duty. In view of the claimants' public law responsibilities within the detention centre, and the arrangements made by the claimants and the police (in the JPA), and the powers of the Home Secretary which I have discussed, a decision by the police not to take over or to enter the centre until requested to do so by the claimants was lawful. Accordingly, until so requested (at the earliest at 0050), the police were not in breach of their public duty of enforcing the law and keeping the peace. If, as is the defendant's case, but is disputed by the claimants, the period of riotous and tumultuous behaviour ended at about 23.30 hours, before the police were asked to take over, the police were not in breach of their duty during the period of the riot.
99. The fact that a decision by the police not to enter the centre until requested to do so by the claimants was lawful does not, however, address the issue of the scope and intention of the 1886 Act, to which I now turn."
As do I.
The preliminary issues
(1) Whether Group 4 was acting as a public authority exercising coercive powers of the state in carrying out its public function, and, if so, whether claims in this action are outside the scope and/or intention of the 1886 Act?
(2) Whether Yarl's Wood was outside the effective scope of police control by reason of the fact that Group 4 was the sole, alternatively primary, body entrusted by the state with the responsibility for maintaining security and good order within Yarl's Wood and, if so, whether the claims in this action are outside the scope and/or intention of the 1886 Act?
(3) Whether by reason of the powers, functions and responsibilities of Group 4 for maintaining security and good order within Yarl's Wood identified in issues (1) and (2) above, the claims in this action are outside the scope and/or intention of the 1886 Act?
(4) Whether the terms of the JPA altered or displaced the statutory and common law powers and duties of the police to prevent or respond to criminal acts which occurred or were suspected to have occurred at Yarl's Wood and, if so, whether the claims in this action are outside the scope and/or intention of the Act or would be (a) if a handover pursuant to paragraph 9 of the JPA was invoked on 14/15 February 2002 and/or (b) if a handover pursuant to paragraph 9 of the JPA was not invoked on 14/15 February 2002?
"but in fixing the amount of such compensation regard shall be had to the conduct of the said person, whether as respects the precautions taken by him or as respects his being a party or accessory to such riotous or tumultuous assembly, or as regards any provocation offered to the persons assembled or otherwise."
The 1886 Act
"2 Compensation to persons for damage by riot
(1) Where a house, shop, or building in a police area has been injured or destroyed, or the property therein has been injured, stolen, or destroyed, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together, such compensation as herein-after mentioned shall be paid out of the police fund of the area to any person who has sustained loss by such injury, stealing or destruction; but in fixing the amount of such compensation regard shall be had to the conduct of the said person, whether as respects the precautions taken by him or as respects his being a party or accessory to such riotous or tumultuous assembly, or as regards any provocation offered to the persons assembled or otherwise.
(2) Where any person having sustained such loss as aforesaid has received, by way of insurance or otherwise, any sum to recoup him, in whole or in part, for such loss, the compensation otherwise payable to him under this Act shall, if exceeding such sum, be reduced by the amount thereof, and in any other case shall not be paid to him, and the payer of such sum shall be entitled to compensation under this Act in respect of the sum so paid in like manner as if he had sustained the said loss, and any policy of insurance given by such payer shall continue in force as if he had made no such payment, and where such person was recouped as aforesaid otherwise than by payment of a sum, this enactment shall apply as if the value of such recoupment were a sum paid.
3 Mode of awarding compensation
(1) Claims for compensation under this Act shall be made to the compensation authority of the police area where the injury, stealing or destruction took place, and such compensation authority shall inquire into the truth thereof, and shall, if satisfied, fix such compensation as appears to them to be just.
(2) A Secretary of State may from time to time make, and when made, revoke and vary regulations respecting the time, manner, and conditions within, in, and under which claims for compensation under this Act are to be made, and all such claims not made in accordance with such regulations may be excluded. Such regulations may also provide for the particulars to be stated in any claim, and for the verification of any claim, and of any facts incidental thereto, by statutory declarations, production of books, vouchers, and documents, entry of premises, and otherwise, and may also provide for any matter which under this act can be prescribed, and for the compensation authority obtaining information and assistance for determining the said claims.
4 Right of action to person aggrieved
(1) Where a claim to compensation has been made in accordance with the regulations, and the claimant is aggrieved by the refusal or failure of the compensation authority to fix compensation upon such claim, or by the amount of compensation fixed, he may bring an action against the compensation authority to recover compensation in respect of all or any of the matters mentioned in such claim and to an amount not exceeding that mentioned therein, but if in such action he fails to recover any compensation or an amount exceeding that fixed by the compensation authority, he shall pay the costs of the compensation authority as between solicitor and client…
6 Application of Act to wreck and machinery
This Act shall apply…
(b) in the case of the injury or destruction, by persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together, of any machinery, whether fixed or movable, prepared for or employed in any manufacture, or agriculture, or any branch thereof, or of any erection or fixture about or belonging to such machinery, or of any steam engine or other engine for sinking, draining, or working any mine or quarry, or of any bridge, wagon-way, or trunk for conveying minerals or other product from any mine or quarry;
in like manner as if such…injury or destruction were an injury, stealing or destruction in respect of which compensation is payable under the foregoing provisions of this Act…
7 As to claimants in the case of churches, public institutions, etc
For the purposes of this Act –
(a) where a church or chapel has been injured or destroyed, or any property therein has been injured, stolen or destroyed, the churchwardens or chapelwardens, if any, or, if there are none, the persons having the management of such church or chapel, or the persons in whom the legal estate is vested; and
(b) where a school, hospital, public institution, or public building, has been injured or destroyed, or any property therein has been injured, stolen, or destroyed, the persons having the control of such school, hospital, institution, or building, or the persons in whom the legal estate in the same is vested;
shall be deemed to be the persons who have sustained loss from such injury, stealing, or destruction, and claims may be made by any one or more of such persons in relation both to the building and to the property therein, and payment to any such claimant shall discharge the liability of the compensation authority to pay compensation, but shall be without prejudice to the right of any person to recover the compensation from such payee.
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires –
The expression "person" includes a body of persons, corporate or incorporate…"
"To encourage people to resist persons thus riotously assembled, and to reward those, who, by doing their duty, shall have incurred their resentment, the same law has made a further provision, that as the trespassers are to be hanged, the country shall pay the damages; and this, by way of inducement to the inhabitants to be active in suppressing such riots, which it is their duty to do; and which being made their interest too, they are more likely to execute. This is the great principle of the law, that the inhabitants shall be in the nature of sureties for one another. It is a very ancient principle; as old as the decennaries by Alfred…"
"The question, then, comes to this, can the owners, being insured, sue the hundred? Who is first liable? If the hundred, it makes no difference; if the insurer, then it is a satisfaction, and the hundred is not liable. But the contrary is evident from the nature of the contract of insurance. It is an indemnity. Every day the insurer is put in the place of the insured. In every abandonment it is so. The insurer uses the name of the insured. The case is clear: the Act puts the hundred, for civil purposes, in the place of the trespassers; and, upon principles of policy, as in the case of other remedies against the hundred, I am satisfied that it is to be considered as if the insurers had not paid a farthing."
Willes J said:
"I am of the same opinion…The hundred is not answerable criminally, but they cannot be considered as free from blame. They may have been negligent, which is partly the principle of the Act."
Buller J said (at 65):
"It has been admitted, and rightly, that the hundred is put in the place of the trespassers."
"In this case the police authority failed to fix the compensation to the satisfaction of the plaintiffs and they brought this action. It was an action to recover compensation under the statute; it was not brought to recover damages for any default on the part of the police authority; it was simply an action to recover such an amount as the county court judge might think right to allow as compensation for the damage done to the plaintiffs' property."
"The defendants contend that although it is true that a house, shop or building has been destroyed it is not a house, shop or building in any police district, as the police had no jurisdiction over Witley Camp, the action of the military having taken Witley Camp completely out of the police district."
"But the Act of Parliament does not give a citizen a right to compensation for damage by riot on any principle of blaming the police over the matter. The fact that the damage has been done in spite of the care and protection of the police or because of the negligence of the police does not affect the right of the claimant to have compensation. It is a right which is given to the individual who is hurt by a riot to have his damages shared by the whole of the community, and the community for the purpose of this sharing is the police district within which the building injured or destroyed is situated. The plaintiff is entitled to have the wrong which was done to her shared by all the contributors to the police fund in the police district of Surrey" (at 65).
"…it is said that this camp under the circumstances ceased to be within the police district. The circumstances are that this camp was inhabited by soldiers who were under military discipline and control by military police. It was more convenient and very much wiser that soldiers…should be controlled by their own police than by the civilian police in the district…But that is a long way from saying that the camp and the soldiers are to be taken out of the jurisdiction, if I may call it so, of the civilian police, and that the civilian police are in law to be deprived of the rights they would otherwise have within that part of the police district. There is no foundation, in my opinion, for saying anything of that sort. For convenience the officers wisely employed pickets and military police to look after the soldiers, and for convenience the police do not interfere, as a rule, but they still maintain their rights in that part of the police district just the same as they do in other parts of it. There may be difficulties in their way in exercising those rights because of the necessarily superior forces possessed by the military powers in time of war; but that does not affect the legal position in the least. Therefore it seems to me quite clear that this camp was within the police district, and the first requisite to bring the matter within the act is satisfied."
"Then it is said that the act must be so construed, whether by rule of commonsense or otherwise, as to exclude for the purposes of the Act from the expression "Police District" any district in which a body, not the ordinary civilian police, is by law charged with the maintenance of law and order, and is itself empowered to maintain a police force; and it is said that this area is such a district because the military authorities were charged with the maintenance of law and order, I suppose so far as those who were under their jurisdiction were concerned, and were empowered to maintain a police force. In my opinion that proposition is quite unsustainable; there is no authority for it; nor can I in reason see any ground for contending that, because the particular individuals who formed the military body were subject to military discipline, the area in which they lived should be withdrawn from the ordinary police protection of the rest of the county…But it is said that because they were soldiers and because their offence had the added gravity of being a mutiny, therefore they were not in civil law riotously and tumultuously assembled together. Really I fail to follow that. The Act of Parliament makes no exception at all – it provides simply that if injury is done by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together, then compensation is to be paid by the police authority in whose district that riot takes place."
"The area is part of the county of Surrey, but it is said that by virtue of the powers which the military authorities possess, having taken possession of it as I have mentioned, that area ceased to be part of the police district as defined under the Act and was taken out of it…No authority has been suggested for that proposition, and it cannot be contended that military barracks are an Alsatia. The law runs there. Everybody in the military barracks is subject to the criminal law and to the civil law, and the police authorities have the ordinary rights to enforce process there, subject to such limitations as may be imposed by the fact that the premises are premises of the Crown…The argument to the contrary consisted of a combination of two circumstances – namely that they were both soldiers and acting within the area of the camp. It can hardly be doubted but that if they were soldiers, that is to say subject to military law, and this offence were committed outside the camp, it would be within the Act. I can see no reason why it should not be. The possibility of a disturbance by three or four soldiers, which is enough to constitute a riot, must have been well within the contemplation of the Legislature at the time when they made this provision, and if in fact a riot took place within a camp or within barracks and damage is done, I see no reason why a person so damaged should not recover compensation. In an ordinary case if damage is done in barracks, the damage for the most part would be done to Crown property. I am far from saying that the Crown would not be entitled under those circumstances to recover compensation. Of course questions would arise which under the Act with regard to damage would make it difficult in some cases, at any rate, to recover compensation. For the above reasons it appears to me that the case is made out."
"Compensation for loss caused by riot was a special case. This raises the question: Why was it made a special case? If a crowd of people collect in angry and threatening fashion this should become obvious to the local forces of order, and it would then become their duty to prevent the crowd from becoming a riot. This is a duty which has been recognised for centuries, and which until the 19th century was put upon the local administrative area, the hundred or wapentape, or whatever name it might be called; and there was a duty upon them to compensate for damage which was done by persons assembled riotously and tumultuously. The Act of 1886, in fact, did no more than modernise the mode of obtaining compensation and transferred the burden from the inhabitants of the hundred or wapentape to the local police authority. There is nothing secret or furtive about a crowd of people who are acting riotously and tumultuously. It seems to me that the right to compensation from public funds was given because public authority had failed to protect the public who were menaced by a threat which was, or ought to have been, obvious to the forces of law and order as they existed from time to time. In my judgment the word "tumultuously" was added to "riotously" for the specific purpose that it was intended to limit the liability of compensation to cases where the rioters were in such numbers and in such a state of agitated commotion, and were generally so acting, that the forces of law and order should have been well aware of the threat which existed, and, if they had done their duty, should have taken steps to prevent the rioters from causing damage."
"142. The fundamental point which flows from the basis of the 1886 Act being a duty on the relevant police authority is that the purpose of the 1886 Act was to make provision for claims against the public authority with responsibility for order. The Act and its predecessors show an intention that local property owners should be entitled to seek compensation from the body with responsibility for protecting them from the risk of riot. To permit the claimants to seek compensation would be to permit a claim by one public authority with responsibility for order within the centre against another public authority with responsibility for order within it. While those responsibilities are not identical and those of a police force are more general, in relation to order on the part of the detainees within the detention centre they are broadly equivalent."
Group 4 as a public authority
The language of the 1886 Act
(1) The reference to "any person" (see also the broad and inclusive definition in section 9) is on the face of it without exception.
(2) The limitations on the scope of the 1886 Act are to be found elsewhere. There has to be injury, theft or destruction, by persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together, of a house, shop or building or of property therein.
(3) The person who has sustained loss by reason of such injury, theft or destruction can claim compensation to be paid out of the police fund of the police area in which the lost or damaged property is situated. Nothing whatsoever is said about the nature of the local police force's duties. It is common ground that the liability of the police fund to answer for the claim is strict.
(4) The claim is directed in the first instance to the compensation authority of the police area in question, but if the claimant is not satisfied by that authority's response, then the claimant may sue the authority in the courts.
(5) The compensation to be fixed is such as "appears" to the authority to be "just". The authority (and presumably the court too, but we are not concerned with that wrinkle) is therefore entitled to take a broad view of what the claimant is entitled to. That is emphasised by the proviso to section 2(1) which requires that regard shall be had to the conduct of the claimant, of which examples such as (lack of) precautions, complicity, and provocation are given, but the statute ends generally with "or otherwise". Therefore, the assessment of quantum is not a mere matter of valuation of the lost or damaged property. It is a global assessment which takes account of the claimant's conduct in the broadest sense.
(6) In the most relevant dictum in any authority put before us, Atkin LJ in Pitchers contemplated that where a claimant was the Crown (as in the case of damage to or theft from military barracks), the section 2(1) proviso would enable the assessing tribunal or court to reach a just result which would take account of just such factors of relative control and accountability as were raised in that case.
(7) The 1886 Act goes into greater detail about buildings in section 7. The word "building" is left unqualified, but section 7 makes special provision for who may claim in the case of a church or chapel, or a school, hospital, public building or public institution. It is clear at any rate therefore that such buildings are within the statute. It seems counter-intuitive therefore that public law responsibilities of the potential claimants with respect to such buildings or security in them should exclude such persons from qualifying as "any person". A detention centre cannot apparently be a "public building" because that has been interpreted as a building which the public is invited to enter or to which it can demand admission (Moses v. Marsland  1 QB 668). However, the judge ruled against the Authority's submission that Yarl's Wood was not a public institution (at para 110), and there is no respondent's notice against that ruling. The judge cited authority for prisons or places of detention being public institutions, see Royse v. Birley (1869) LR 4 CP 296, R v. Lydford  2 KB 378 and Evans v. University of Cambridge  EWHC 1382 (Admin).
(8) Section 6 of the 1886 Act makes specific reference to machinery, fixed or movable, and to mines and their workings including bridges and so on. It is well foreseeable that such property may be owned by the Crown or public authorities with specific responsibilities for order and security.
(9) The judge also referred to section 3(2) of the 1886 Act and to the 1921 Regulations. Section 3(2) permits "a Secretary of State" to make regulations respecting how a claim is to be made to a compensation authority. Under the Regulations the relevant Secretary of State to hear appeals from the refusal of a compensation authority to enlarge the time limit of 14 days for making a claim is the Home Secretary. The judge said that his conclusion as to the scope and purpose of the 1886 Act is consistent with the suggestion that it was not contemplated that the Home Secretary could be a claimant under it. That strikes me, however, as a refined point, and, as the judge himself said, the Regulations cannot drive the interpretation of the 1886 Act.
A purposive interpretation?
"But it is to be borne in mind that the office of Judges is not to legislate, but to declare the expressed intention of the Legislature, even if that intention appears to the Court injudicious; and I believe that it is not disputed that what Lord Wensleydale used to call the golden rule is right, viz., that we are to take the whole statute together, and construe it all together, giving the words their ordinary signification, unless when so applied they produce an inconsistency, or an absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince the Court that the intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary signification, and to justify the Court in putting on them some other signification which, though less proper, is one which the Court thinks the words will bear."
"This decision concerns only damage inflicted during a riot by those detained within a detention centre. Although the claimants' responsibilities under the 1999 Act, the 2001 Regulations and their contract with the Home Office include the security of the detention centre, where the destruction of or damage to its buildings and their contents is inflicted by outsiders who have gained entry the considerations differ."
And in his final paragraph (headed "Overall conclusion"), he puts it in this way:
"168. The fact that the first and second claimants are entities with public law powers and duties for order within the detention centre means that, in respect of injury or destruction to property from riot damage caused by detainees within the centre, they are not qualifying persons within the 1886 Act and cannot make a claim under it in respect of such loss" (emphasis added).
Lord Justice Wall :
Lord Justice Aikens :
"I have concluded that Parliament did not intend to include a person or entity with public law duties for order within a building or buildings containing detained persons within the scope of the 1886 Act. I accept the defendant's submission that an intention to permit the word "person" in section 2(1) of the 1886 Act to include and entitle a party with these duties to claim compensation for a riot arising within its own sphere of duty and control cannot reasonably be attributed to the legislature. Its purpose was to make provision of claims by ordinary citizens against the public authority with responsibility for order. There is nothing in the 1886 Act to indicate that it was concerned to re-allocate losses suffered by a public authority with a responsibility to maintain order within the premises of a custodial institution and custodial duties for the detainees and to impose them on the police authority".
"..regard shall be had to the conduct of the said person, whether as respects the precautions taken by him or as respects his being a party or accessory to such riotous or tumultuous assembly, or as regards any provocation offered to the persons assembled or otherwise".
Note 1 Judgment para 93. [Back] Note 2 Judgment paras 81 – 86. [Back] Note 3 Kaufman Bros v Liverpool Corporation  1 KB 860; Pitchers v Surrey County Council  KB 57; JW Dwyer Ltd v Metropolitan Police Receiver  2 QB 970; Edmunds Ltd v East Sussex Police Authority (6 July 1988); Bedfordshire Police Authority v Constable  EWHC 1375 (Comm). As the judge and Rix LJ note, there were earlier decisions on earlier Acts dealing with the same issue. [Back] Note 4 Paras 131 and 139. [Back] Note 5 Para 142. [Back] Note 6 (1877) 2 App Cas 743 at 764. [Back]
Note 1 Judgment para 93. [Back]
Note 2 Judgment paras 81 – 86. [Back]
Note 3 Kaufman Bros v Liverpool Corporation  1 KB 860; Pitchers v Surrey County Council  KB 57; JW Dwyer Ltd v Metropolitan Police Receiver  2 QB 970; Edmunds Ltd v East Sussex Police Authority (6 July 1988); Bedfordshire Police Authority v Constable  EWHC 1375 (Comm). As the judge and Rix LJ note, there were earlier decisions on earlier Acts dealing with the same issue. [Back]
Note 4 Paras 131 and 139. [Back]
Note 5 Para 142. [Back]
Note 6 (1877) 2 App Cas 743 at 764. [Back]