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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Inplayer Ltd & Anor v Thorogood  EWCA Civ 1511 (25 November 2014)
Cite as:  EWCA Civ 1511
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ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
MRS JUSTICE ROSE
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE LEWISON
LORD JUSTICE TREACY
| INPLAYER LIMITED (FORMERLY INVIDEOUS LIMITED)
|- and -
Mr Adam Tear (instructed by Duncan Lewis) for the Appellant
Hearing date: 21st October 2014
Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Jackson:
|Part 1. Introduction||Paragraphs 1 to 7|
|Part 2. The facts||Paragraphs 8 to 16|
|Part 3. The present proceedings||Paragraphs 17 to 31|
|Part 4. The appeal to the Court of Appeal||Paragraphs 32 to 51|
|Part 5. The appellant's skeleton argument||Paragraphs 52 to 57|
|Part 6. Executive summary||Paragraphs 58 to 62|
"Right to a fair trial
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;"
"The First Defendant do within 7 (seven) days of the date of this order provide and swear an Affidavit detailing each and every breach by him of the Shareholders' Agreement, including:
a. Details of discussions or correspondence (in any form) that the First Defendant (or anyone acting on his instructions or on his behalf) has had with each employee of the First and/or Second Claimants in the preceding 6 months in connection either with the termination of their employment with the First and/or Second Claimants or any offer of employment with the Second Defendant;
b. Details of any discussions or correspondence (in any form) that the First Defendant (or anyone acting on his instructions or on his behalf) has had with any client or partner of the First and/or Second Claimants in connection either with the termination of the provision of services to that client or partner by the First and/or Second Claimants, or in connection with the transfer (or possible transfer) of that client or partner's business to the Second Defendant or any other business (including, for the avoidance of doubt, any attempt by the First Defendant (or anyone acting on his instructions or on his behalf) to solicit or entice the client or partner to do business with someone other than the First and/or Second Claimants (whether that attempt was successful or not)."
"NOVP did not begin trading until November 2012. Until very recently, it has had only one client, and that client is not a client of IL or ID (nor has it ever had any connection with IL or ID)."
It is common ground that the client to whom Mr Thorogood was referring in that paragraph was Technicolor.
"The provision to clients of online video platforms and/or online video platform services, including, in the context of provision of such platforms, and/or services, online pay-per-view, online advertising software, monetization solutions, online storage, transcoding, embeddable players, bandwidth, custom app creation, 3rd party OVP integrations, API or multi-channel publishing."
i) setting up and working for NDS;
ii) pursuing a prospective deal with Technicolor on behalf of NDS rather than Invideous;
iii) pursuing business opportunities with a company known as Nexeven on behalf of NDS, rather than Invideous;
iv) dismissing or arranging the dismissal of employees of IDS in October 2012, so that they could be re-employed by NDS.
i) paragraph 10 of Mr Thorogood's affidavit sworn on 15th March 2013 was untruthful and a deliberate act of disobedience to the consent order.
ii) paragraph 14 of Mr Thorogood's affidavit sworn on 15th March 2013 was deliberately untrue and misleading. It omitted the names of ten members of staff whom Mr Micov had dismissed from the employment of IDS and re-employed on behalf of NDS during October and December 2012. Mr Micov had done this on the instructions of Mr Thorogood. Mr Thorogood was thereby in breach of the consent order.
i) The allegations of contempt were not formulated or notified to Mr Thorogood until after the hearing at which the judge found these instances of contempt to be proved.
ii) Because the trial and the committal hearing took place at the same time Mr Thorogood was effectively compelled to give evidence.
iii) Mr Thorogood was unrepresented, because no-one told him of the availability of legal aid in contempt proceedings.
iv) The claimants did not obtain permission to make a committal application in accordance with CPR rules 81.12 and 81.14.
i) Mr Thorogood was not informed at any time before judgment of the two alleged contempts which the judge found proved.
ii) Mr Thorogood was not informed of his right not to give evidence. Being unrepresented he would not know of that right. The litigation was so managed that Mr Thorogood had no choice but to give evidence.
iii) Mr Thorogood was not informed of his entitlement to legal aid. As a result he was unrepresented when facing the equivalent of a criminal charge.
Lord Justice Lewison:
Lord Justice Treacy: