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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> EK (Ivory Coast) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1517 (26 November 2014) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2014/1517.html Cite as: [2015] Imm AR 367, [2015] INLR 287, [2014] EWCA Civ 1517 |
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ON APPEAL FROM UPPER TRIBUNAL
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
UPPER TRIBUNAL
IA/02874/2013
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE FLOYD
and
LORD JUSTICE SALES
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EK (Ivory Coast) |
Appellant |
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- and - |
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The Secretary of State for the Home Department |
Respondent |
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Mr Andrew Bird (instructed by The Treasury Solicitors) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 11 November 2014
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Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Sales :
Introduction
The Facts
Discussion
"What does fairness require in the present case? My Lords, I think it unnecessary to refer by name or to quote from, any of the often-cited authorities in which the courts have explained what is essentially an intuitive judgment. They are far too well known. From them, I derive that (1) where an Act of Parliament confers an administrative power there is a presumption that it will be exercised in a manner which is fair in all the circumstances. (2) The standards of fairness are not immutable. They may change with the passage of time, both in the general and in their application to decisions of a particular type. (3) The principles of fairness are not to be applied by rote identically in every situation. What fairness demands is dependent on the context of the decision, and this is to be taken into account in all its aspects. (4) An essential feature of the context is the statute which creates the discretion, as regards both its language and the shape of the legal and administrative system within which the decision is taken. (5) Fairness will very often require that a person who may be adversely affected by the decision will have an opportunity to make representations on his own behalf either before the decision is taken with a view to producing a favourable result; or after it is taken, with a view to procuring its modification; or both. (6) Since the person affected usually cannot make worthwhile representations without knowing what factors may weigh against his interests fairness will very often require that he is informed of the gist of the case which he has to answer."
See also Lloyd v McMahon [1987] AC 625, 702-703 per Lord Bridge:
"… the so-called rules of natural justice are not engraved on tablets of stone. To use the phrase which better expresses the underlying concept, what the requirements of fairness demand when any body, domestic, administrative or judicial, has to make a decision which will affect the rights of individuals depends on the character of the decision-making body, the kind of decision it has to make and the statutory or other framework in which it operates. In particular, it is well-established that when a statute has conferred on any body the power to make decisions affecting individuals, the courts will not only require the procedure prescribed by the statute to be followed, but will readily imply so much and no more to be introduced by way of additional procedural safeguards as will ensure the attainment of fairness."
"… I endorse the view expressed by the Upper Tribunal in Shahzad [Shahzad (s 85A: commencement) [2012] UKUT 81 (IAC] (paragraph 49) that there is no unfairness in the requirement in the PBS that an applicant must submit with his application all of the evidence necessary to demonstrate compliance with the rule under which he seeks leave. The Immigration Rules, the Policy Guidance and the prescribed application form all make it clear that the prescribed documents must be submitted with the application, and if they are not the application will be rejected. The price of securing consistency and predictability is a lack of flexibility that may well result in "hard" decisions in individual cases, but that is not a justification for imposing an obligation on the Secretary of State to conduct a preliminary check of all applications to see whether they are accompanied by all of the specified documents, to contact applicants where this is not the case, and to give them an opportunity to supply the missing documents. Imposing such an obligation would not only have significant resource implications, it would also extend the time taken by the decision making process, contrary to the policy underlying the introduction of the PBS."
Conclusion
Lord Justice Floyd:
"… because the Home Office never put the appellant on notice that such evidence would be required or give him any opportunity to answer the result of their enquiries with his college. There was nothing at all in the application form to show that the appellant needed to include documentary evidence of his right to 'established presence'; and no chance of his producing any evidence to contradict the result of the inquiries, only revealed in the decision itself."
Lord Justice Briggs: