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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Your Response Ltd v Datateam Business Media Ltd  EWCA Civ 281 (14 March 2014)
Cite as:  1 QB 41,  WLR(D) 131,  2 All ER (Comm) 899,  4 All ER 928,  EWCA Civ 281,  QB 41,  3 WLR 887,  CP Rep 31
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ON APPEAL FROM THE BRIGHTON COUNTY COURT
(District Judge Bell)
2 RH 00211
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE DAVIS
LORD JUSTICE FLOYD
| YOUR RESPONSE LIMITED
|- and –
|DATATEAM BUSINESS MEDIA LIMITED
Mr. Stephen Cogley Q.C. and Miss Iris Ferber (instructed by Lopian Wagner Solicitors) for the respondent
Hearing date : 13th February 2014
Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Moore-Bick :
"It seems to me in the present case that a lien can apply to the electronic data which was in the possession of the Claimant. It would not be appropriate for the law to ignore the development in the real world of record keeping moving from hard copy records into electronic media. The decision which I have to reach today is of limited purview and no doubt this topic may arise again in other cases in other contexts. But for the purpose of the particular decision which I have to reach in this case, I do not accept the submissions by counsel for the Defendant that a lien cannot exist over the electronic data which was in the Claimant's possession in just the same way as it could exist over the hard copy records in the Claimant's possession."
"The common law lien of an artificer is of very ancient origin, dating from a time when remedies by action upon contracts not under seal were still at an early and imperfect stage of development: see the old authorities cited by Lord Ellenborough C.J. in Chase v. Westmore (1816) 5 M. & S. 180. Because it arises in consequence of a contract, it is tempting to a twentieth-century lawyer to think of a common law lien as possessing the characteristics of a contractual right, express or implied, created by mutual agreement between the parties to the contract. But this would be to mistake its legal nature. Like a right of action for damages, it is a remedy for breach of contract which the common law confers upon an artificer to whom the possession of goods is lawfully given for the purpose of his doing work upon them in consideration of a money payment. If, pursuant to the contract, the artificer does his work, he is entitled to retain possession of the goods so long as his charges, whether agreed in advance or (if not so agreed) payable upon a quantum meruit, are satisfied. The remedy can be excluded by the terms of the contract made with the artificer either expressly or by necessary implication from other terms which are inconsistent with the exercise of a possessory lien; cf. Forth v. Simpson (1849) 13 Q.B. 680, in the same way as the common law remedy in damages for breach of contract may be excluded or modified by the terms of the contract itself. But this does not mean that the remedy of lien, any more than the remedy in damages, is the result of an implied term in the contract to which what we may conveniently call the Moorcock (1889) 14 P.D. 64 criteria relevant to implying terms in a contract apply. The test whether or not the remedy exists is not whether or not its existence is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract. Judged by this test there would in modern times never be an artificer's lien.
The common law remedy of a possessory lien, like other primitive remedies such as abatement of nuisance, self-defence or ejection of trespassers to land, is one of self-help. It is a remedy in rem exercisable upon the goods, and its exercise requires no intervention by the courts, for it is exercisable only by an artificer who has actual possession of the goods subject to the lien. Since, however, the remedy is the exercise of a right to continue an existing actual possession of the goods, it necessarily involves a right of possession adverse to the right of the person who, but for the lien, would be entitled to immediate possession of the goods. A common law lien, although not enforceable by action, thus affords a defence to an action for recovery of the goods by a person who, but for the lien, would be entitled to immediate possession.
Since a common law lien is a right to continue an existing actual possession of goods (that is to say, to refuse to put an end to a bailment) it can only be exercised by an artificer if his possession was lawful at the time at which the lien first attached."
Lord Justice Davis :
(i) The first reason is that, although that approach found favour, in a context analogous to the present case, with the minority in OBG and Allen, it did not find favour with the majority.
(ii) The second reason is this. The law of unintended consequences is no part of the law of England and Wales. But it is worth paying attention to it, in an appropriate case, all the same. If a common law possessory lien can arise in a case such as the present, it would be a right in rem, not a right in personam. Probably, I would have thought, it would not be registrable as a charge. At all events, the right to such a possessory lien, if it exists, could have an impact on other creditors of the company (or individual) concerned and could confer rights in an insolvency which other creditors would not have. Further, the position of lenders could be affected: for they may well have ordered their lending arrangements and drafted their securities on the law as it is currently understood to be. Overall, given the number of IT companies and businesses in existence and the number of IT contracts being made the impact of the respondent's arguments – if accepted – could therefore be significant. Moreover, if, as Mr. Cogley says as one part of his argument, a database is to be regarded as tangible property, that may have possible implications for other areas of the law altogether – for example, the law of theft (as contrasted with the legislation relating to misuse of computers). These are but illustrations of at least possible implications, going beyond the present case, which may bring about unjust and unanticipated consequences in other contexts.
Lord Justice Floyd :