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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Representative Claimants v MGN Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1291 (17 December 2015) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2015/1291.html Cite as: [2016] EMLR 9, [2016] 2 WLR 1217, [2015] EWCA Civ 1291, [2017] QB 149, [2016] FSR 13, [2016] 3 All ER 799, [2015] WLR(D) 535 |
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ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION
Mr Justice Mann
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
LADY JUSTICE RAFFERTY
and
LORD JUSTICE KITCHIN
____________________
Representative Claimants |
Respondents |
|
- and - |
||
MGN Limited |
Appellant |
____________________
David Sherborne and Jeremy Reed (instructed by Atkins Thomson as Lead Solicitors for Atkins Thomson, Clintons, Hamlins, Steel & Shamash and Taylor Hampton) for the Respondents
Hearing dates: 20 - 21 October
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
LADY JUSTICE ARDEN:
Principal issue: level of compensation for phone hacking
(1) the awards should have been limited to damages for distress;
(2) the awards were disproportionate when compared with, in particular, personal injury awards;
(3) the awards were disproportionate when compared with the less generous approach adopted by the European Court of Human Rights ("the Strasbourg Court"), and
(4) the awards involved double-counting.
MANN J'S FINDINGS AND REASONING RELEVANT TO THE FOUR GROUNDS OF APPEAL
Scale of the hacking
(iii) Considerable areas of the private life, or the private affairs, of each of the claimants will have been revealed, going a long way beyond stories that were published. Each of the claimants gave evidence that the use of voicemail was a very significant part of their personal communications, and I accept that evidence. That means that their exposure was great. I also find that it is likely that a very substantial amount of this material will have passed to journalists other than those who listened to the voicemails. It is likely that there will have been discussions about it amongst the journalists either as a matter of salacious gossip, or as part of discussion as to whether to publish or develop a story. In all events, aspects of their private lives will not have been confined to single journalists actually listening to the voicemails. This would be a sensible inference anyway, but it is strengthened by the Armory v Delamirie principle. Again, however, it has to be kept within bounds. It was not the case that everything that was heard was shared with all journalists and more senior personnel. That would not be realistic.
(iv) Each private investigator invoice which can be matched to a claimant represents an invasive activity. That much has been admitted by the defendant. Precisely what that invasion was is not known, and cannot be identified on the evidence. In one or two cases (as will appear) there are indications of what the information was that might have been obtained, and I shall draw appropriate inferences in that context. Otherwise the appropriate inference is that on each occasion the information obtained was serious, though not at the most serious level. If one assumes, by way of example, that medical details would be the most serious category of information disclosed, then it would not be appropriate to assume that level of seriousness in the case of every invoice. However, it would often be appropriate to infer information of a level of seriousness comparable to a list of numbers called (essentially an itemised phone bill) or a credit card bill, at least. (Judgment, para.99)
How in general the hacking affected the respondents
(i) [The respondents] all spoke of their horror, distaste and distress at the discovery that Mirror group journalists had been listening, on a regular and frequent basis, to all sorts of aspects of their private lives. Their use of voicemail was such that many aspects of their personal, medical and professional lives were, to a very significant degree, laid bare in the voicemails they left and in the voicemails they received. Several of them re-visited their distress in the witness box. I am completely satisfied that these expressions of their emotions were accurate, and that the emotions they felt were genuine, not exaggerated and entirely justified.
(ii) They all spoke of the effect on their lives caused by the distrust that the newspapers' activities engendered in them and those around them. When newspapers were publishing matters known only to a very few (sometimes only two) people, those privy to the information suspected others of leaking it. That led to distrust which had a very adverse effect on close relationships, including family relationships. It also got in the way of claimants seeking to forge new, or retrieve damaged, personal relationships. In other words, the published stories were very damaging to their personal lives. Again, they were forced to re-live this in the witness box, to the obvious distress of some of them. Again, I was completely satisfied that their evidence on these points was correct and without exaggeration.
(iii) They all spoke of their personal distress and anxiety of seeing articles published about them. This was, in the main, great. Their evidence on this was convincing and I accept it. (Judgment, para. 32)
Damages for the fact of intrusion and not just for distress
A right has been infringed, and loss of a kind recognised by the court as wrongful has been caused. It would seem to me to be contrary to principle not to recognise that as a potential route to damages.
Accordingly, it seems to me that the only realistic course is to select a figure which marks the fact that an unlawful intrusion has taken place while affording some degree of solatium to the injured party.
Global award or atomised approach?
i) The wrongs had too great a degree of separation for a single award. The articles were spread out over a period of time, and the three areas of wrongful behaviour had to be looked at separately (Judgment, para. 155).ii) While the starting point was that each article should be treated separately, in some cases it might be appropriate to take two or more articles together, for example, if they seemed to relate to the same thing (Judgment, para. 156).
iii) The judge directed himself that he must avoid double-counting if he allowed a global sum for hacking generally, including hacks that gave rise to articles, and then allowed a further per article sum which counted again the hack or hacks which gave rise to the article (Judgment, para.156).
iv) There was a danger of double-counting also in awarding damages for distress. The judge recognised that he had to bear in mind so far as distress was concerned the effect of the articles was likely to have been cumulative so that later distress built on the distress already caused (Judgment, para. 156).
v) Blagging by private investigators would have to be considered separately (Judgment, para. 158).
vi) General distress also had to be considered as a separate item but care had to be taken to avoid double-counting where distress had already been taken into account when making an award for a particular article (Judgment, para. 159).
Awards in earlier cases of little assistance because of MGN's repeated intrusion
Novelty of awards for misuse of private information
Judge's reasons for rejecting the tariff used in discrimination and harassment
Top band for the most serious cases, such as where there has been a lengthy campaign of harassment | £18-£30,000 |
Middle band for serious cases which do not merit an award in the highest band. | £6-£18,000 |
Bottom band for less serious cases, such as a one-off incident or an isolated event. | £600-£6,000 |
Personal injury damages tariff was a "reality check" and little more
…where there are multiple occurrences (which there have been in the present cases) one has to make sure that sufficiently discrete wrongs are treated discretely and not treated as single wrong. If there is any useful reality check from personal injury cases in the present matter it is not against the total award for each claimant, which is made up from the aggregate of a number of wrongs, but with individual elements within it.
Extent of publication of articles
Judge's general approach
229. In making my assessments in respect of the individual claims I do not apply any general bands or tariffs, with one exception. The variable nature of privacy claims makes that a difficult, if not impossible, exercise. I have, however, sought to apply the following principles (inter alia):
i) The subject matter of the disclosure is not a rigid guide to the amount of compensation. However certain types of information are likely to be more significant than others. Thus medical information is more likely to be high in the ranks of information which is expected to be private, so its interception and disclosure is likely to attract a higher, rather than a lower, figure. That information can relate to matters of mental health as well as physical health (if that is an appropriate description of non-mental health issues). However, even that kind of information has a range – not all medical-related disclosures will be treated equally seriously. It depends on the nature of the information.
ii) Information about significant private financial matters is also likely to attract a higher degree of privacy, and therefore compensation, than others.
iii) By contrast, information about a social meeting which is used to get a photograph is, of itself, likely to attract a lower degree of privacy (in terms of compensation), though it is capable being magnified by other factors, such as contributing to a sense of persecution.
iv) Information about matters internal to a relationship will be treated as private. The amount of compensation payable will depend on the nature of the information listened to and disclosed, in part on the amount of distress and upset caused and in part on the effect on the relationship. Information which is disruptive of the relationship, or which is likely to affect adversely the attempts of the couple to repair it if that is what they are trying to do, is likely to be treated as a serious infringement deserving substantial compensation.
v) Further categorisation is not realistically possible.
vi) The appropriate compensation will depend on the nature of the information, its significance as private information, and the effect on the victim of its disclosure. A short-lived effect based on embarrassment will attract less compensation than a life-changing intrusion such as that inflicted on Mr Mosley.
vii) The effect of repeated intrusions by publication can be cumulative. What starts out as irritation or embarrassment on the first disclosure can become a justified persistent feeling of distress or upset on repeated disclosures.
viii) The extent of the damage may be claimant-specific. A thinner-skinned individual may be caused more upset, and therefore receive more compensation, than a thicker-skinned individual who is the subject of the same intrusion. Mr Nicklin accepted that, in relation to distress, the "egg-shell skull" principle applied, though I should add that I do not think that any of the claimants in the 8 cases before me were particularly sensitive.
Individual awards
Size of awards due to number of intrusions
702 It will be apparent that my awards of damages in this case are very substantial — far more substantial than in any hitherto reported privacy case. They are more substantial than in many libel cases. I have, however, reviewed each of the awards at the end, with an eye to the total awarded, so ensure that, as a total, it is not excessive (or indeed an under-award). I consider that none of them is. The fact that they are greater than any other publicly available award results from the fact that the invasions of privacy involved were so serious and so prolonged. None of the articles in respect of which I have awarded compensation would (on the admitted case) have been published had it not been for the underlying prolonged phone hacking that went on, which was known to be wrongful. That hacking existed in all cases whether or not an article resulted. The length, degree and frequency of all this conduct explains why the sums I have awarded are so much greater than historical awards. People whose private voicemail messages were hacked so often and for so long, and had very significant parts of their private lives exposed, and then reported on, are entitled to significant compensation.
MGN'S FOUR GROUNDS FOR CHALLENGING THE JUDGE'S AWARDS
GROUND 1: The judge should have awarded damages for distress only
It is one thing to say that the award of compensatory damages whether substantial or nominal serves a vindicatory purpose: in addition to compensating a claimant's loss, it vindicates the right that has been infringed. It is another to award a claimant an additional award, not in order to punish the wrongdoer, but to reflect the special nature of the wrong.
Privacy lies at the heart of liberty in a modern state. A proper degree of liberty is essential for the well-being and development of an individual.
GROUND 2: The awards were disproportionate when compared with the tariff in particular for personal injury awards
"It has often and rightly been said that there can be no precise correlation between a personal injury and a sum of money. The same is true, perhaps even more true, of injury to reputation. There is force in the argument that to permit reference in libel cases to conventional levels of award in personal injury cases is simply to admit yet another incommensurable into the field of consideration. There is also weight in the argument, often heard, that conventional levels of award in personal injury cases are too low, and therefore provide an uncertain guide. But these awards would not be relied on as any exact guide, and of course there can be no precise correlation between loss of a limb, or of sight, or quadriplegia, and damage to reputation. But if these personal injuries respectively command conventional awards of, at most, about £52,000, £90,000 and £125,000 for pain and suffering and loss of amenity (of course excluding claims based on loss of earnings, the cost of care and other specific financial claims), juries may properly be asked to consider whether the injury to his reputation of which the plaintiff complains should fairly justify any greater compensation. The conventional compensatory scales in personal injury cases must be taken to represent fair compensation in such cases unless and until those scales are amended by the courts or by Parliament. It is in our view offensive to public opinion, and rightly so, that a defamation plaintiff should recover damages for injury to reputation greater, perhaps by a significant factor, than if that same plaintiff had been rendered a helpless cripple or an insensate vegetable. The time has in our view come when judges, and counsel, should be free to draw the attention of juries to these comparisons.
46 This is the first time for many years that the Court of Appeal has had the opportunity to consider the appropriate level of compensation for injury to feelings in discrimination cases. Some decisions in the employment tribunal and in the appeal tribunal have resulted in awards of substantial sums for injury to feelings, sometimes supplemented by compensation for psychiatric damage and aggravated damages. Cases were cited to the court in which employment tribunals had, as in this case, awarded compensation for injury to feelings (plus aggravated damages) larger than the damages separately awarded for psychiatric injury, and totalling well in excess of £20,000. The court was shown the decision of an employment tribunal in a race discrimination case awarding the sum of £100,000 for injury to feelings, plus aggravated damages of £25,000: Virdi v Comr of Police of the Metropolis (8 December 2000, London (Central) Employment Tribunal, Case No: 2202774/98). (This pales into insignificance in comparison with the reported award in 1994 by a Californian jury of $7.1m to a legal secretary for sexual harassment, and even with the subsequent halving of that sum on appeal.)
47 Compensation of the magnitude of £125,000 for non-pecuniary damage creates concern as to whether some recent tribunal awards in discrimination cases are in line with general levels of compensation recovered in other cases of non-pecuniary loss, such as general damages for personal injuries, malicious prosecution and defamation. In the interests of justice (social and individual), and of predictability of outcome and consistency of treatment of like cases (an important ingredient of justice), this court should indicate to employment tribunals and practitioners general guidance on the proper level of award for injury to feelings and other forms of non-pecuniary damage. (See paragraphs 65–68 below.)
…
65 Employment tribunals and those who practise in them might find it helpful if this court were to identify three broad bands of compensation for injury to feelings, as distinct from compensation for psychiatric or similar personal injury. (i) The top band should normally be between £15,000 and £25,000. Sums in this range should be awarded in the most serious cases, such as where there has been a lengthy campaign of discriminatory harassment on the ground of sex or race. This case falls within that band. Only in the most exceptional case should an award of compensation for injury to feelings exceed £25,000. (ii) The middle band of between £5,000 and £15,000 should be used for serious cases, which do not merit an award in the highest band. (iii) Awards of between £500 and £5,000 are appropriate for less serious cases, such as where the act of discrimination is an isolated or one off occurrence. In general, awards of less than £500 are to be avoided altogether, as they risk being regarded as so low as not to be a proper recognition of injury to feelings.
66 There is, of course, within each band considerable flexibility, allowing tribunals to fix what is considered to be fair, reasonable and just compensation in the particular circumstances of the case.
Apart from the freedom of speech aspect of defamation, it can be said that there is in fact more reason to assist juries in actions for false imprisonment. Part of the claim can have, as in both of these appeals, a personal injury element which makes the experience in ordinary personal injury cases directly relevant. A difference in the awards for compensation for the same injury, ignoring any question of aggravation, cannot be justified because the award is by a jury in a small minority of cases (the false imprisonment cases) while in the majority of cases (the other personal injury cases) the award is by a judge. If this court would intervene in one situation it should do so in the other. There is no justification for two tariffs. Furthermore even where what is being calculated is the proper compensation for loss of liberty or the damaging effect of a malicious prosecution the analogy with personal injuries is closer than it is in the case of defamation. The compensation is for something which is akin to pain and suffering. There is also recognition today that the uncertainty produced by the lack of consistency as to the damages which will be awarded in cases of this sort results in increased costs.
Note on Multiple Injuries
The assessment of general damages in multiple injury cases can give rise to special difficulty, in particular in determining the extent to which there is any overlap between injuries and how this should be reflected in the award. An illustration of such difficulties, and guidance as to the approach to be taken, can be found in the Court of Appeal decision in Sadler v Filipiak [2011] EWCA Civ 1728. We can do no better than quote in full paragraph 34 of the judgment of Pitchford LJ in that case:
It is in my judgment always necessary to stand back from the compilation of individual figures, whether assistance has been derived from comparable cases or from the [Judicial College] guideline advice, to consider whether the award for pain, suffering and loss of amenity should be greater than the sum of the parts in order properly to reflect the combined effect of all the injuries upon the injured person's recovering quality of life or, on the contrary, should be smaller than the sum of the parts in order to remove an element of double-counting. In some cases, no doubt a minority, no adjustment will be necessary because the total will properly reflect the overall pain, suffering and loss of amenity endured. In others, and probably the majority, an adjustment and occasionally a significant adjustment may be necessary.
GROUND 3: The awards were disproportionate compared with awards by the Strasbourg Court
"If the court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the high contracting party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party."
"(4) In determining— (a) whether to award damages, or (b) the amount of an award, the court must take into account the principles applied by the European Court of Human Rights in relation to the award of compensation under article 41 of the Convention."
39…. First, at the present stage of the development of the remedy of damages under section 8 of the 1998 Act, courts should be guided, following the Greenfield case [2005] 1 WLR 673, primarily by any clear and consistent practice of the European court. Secondly, it should be borne in mind that awards by the European court reflect the real value of money in the country in question. The most reliable guidance as to the quantum of awards under section 8 will therefore be awards made by the European court in comparable cases brought by applicants from the UK or other countries with a similar cost of living. Thirdly, courts should resolve disputed issues of fact in the usual way even if the European court, in similar circumstances, would not do so.
i) Peck v UK (App No. 44647/98), where a CCTV recording of the applicant cutting his wrists was made public and the Strasbourg Court awarded €11,800.ii) Lustig-Prean v UK (2001) 31 EHRR 23, where the Strasbourg Court awarded only £19,000 to each applicant as compensation for non-pecuniary damage for especially grave interferences with their private life as a result of investigations by the Ministry of Defence into their sexual orientation.
iii) In Armoniené v Lithuania [2009] EMLR 7, the Strasbourg Court found that there had been an outrageous abuse of press freedom by publication of the applicants' HIV medical condition and a statement that the condition had been confirmed by employees of the Aids Centre. The Court held that the award in the domestic court was disproportionately low and awarded €6,500. This, submits Lord Pannick, is again a very low sum. The Grand Chamber held:
in a case of an outrageous abuse of press freedom, as in the present application, the court finds that the severe legislative limitations on judicial discretion in redressing the damage suffered by the victim and sufficiently deterring the recurrence of such abuses, failed to provide the Applicant with the protection that could have legitimately been expected under article 8 of the Convention.iv) In Avram v Moldova (2015) 61 EHRR 24, the Strasbourg Court awarded just satisfaction of €5,000, €6,000 and €4,000 respectively to the applicants.
[114] If a remedy in damages is to be an effective remedy, then the amount that the court may award must not be subject to too severe a limitation. Recent settlements in the much publicised phone hacking cases have been reported to be in sums far exceeding what in the past might have been thought to be available to be awarded by the courts. The sums awarded in the early cases such as Campbell were very low. But it can no longer be assumed that damages at those levels are the limit of the court's powers.
GROUND 4: Some elements of the awards were counted twice
Lady Justice Rafferty
Lord Justice Kitchin
Claimant |
Category of Damage |
Damages suggested by Claimant |
Damages suggested by Defendant |
Damages awarded by Judge
|
Alan Yentob |
Total
|
£125,000
|
c.£10,000
|
£85,000
(sum takes into account extent/nature of hacking, private investigators, distress and a small amount for aggravated damages).
|
|
||||
Lauren Alcorn |
Hacking
|
£35,000 |
Not provided |
£17, 500 |
Private Investigators/ Blagging |
£25,000 |
Not provided |
£3,000
|
|
Articles |
Article 1: £45,000 Article 2: £30,000 Article 3: £3,000 Article 4: £5,000 Article 5: £25,000 |
Not provided |
Article 1: £12,000 Article 2: £10,000 Article 3: £0 Article 4: £5,000 Article 5: £15,000 |
|
|
Not provided |
Not provided |
£10,000
|
|
Aggravated Damages
|
100% |
Not provided |
£0 |
|
Total |
£168,000
(before aggravated damages)
|
c. £15,000
|
£72,500
|
|
|
||||
Robert Ashworth |
Hacking
|
£30,000 |
Not provided |
£30,000 |
Private Investigators/ Blagging |
£25,000 |
Not provided |
£5,000
|
|
Articles |
Article 1: £3,500 Article 2: £20,000 Article 3: £2,500 Articles 4/5:£40,000 Article 6: £7,500 Article 7: £20,000 Article 8: £22,500 Article 9: £7,500 Article 10: £3,500 Article 11: £2,500 Article 12: £20,000 Article 13: £5,000 Articles 14/15: £75,000 Article 16: £25,000 Article 17: £2,500 Article 18: £10,000 Article 19: £5,000
|
Not provided |
Article 1: £1,000 Article 2: £15,000 Article 3: £1,000 Articles 4/5:£20,000 Article 6: £7,500 Article 7: £8,000 Article 8: £15,000 Article 9: £1,000 Article 10: £3,000 Article 11: £1,000 Article 12: £15,000 Article 13: £1,000 Articles 14/15: £40,000 Article 16: £12,000 Article 17: £0 Article 18: £750 Article 19: £1,500
|
|
|
Not provided |
Not provided |
£ 20,000
|
|
Aggravated Damages
|
100% |
Not provided |
£3,500 |
|
Total |
£327,000
(before aggravated damages)
|
c. £20,000
|
£201,250
|
|
|
||||
Lucy Taggart |
Hacking
|
£45,000 |
Not provided |
£40,000 |
Private Investigators/ Blagging
|
£40,000 |
Not provided |
£3,000
|
|
Articles
|
Article 1: £7,500 Article 2: £7,500 Article 3: £12,500 Article 4: £10,000 Article 5: £3,500 Article 6: £20,000 Article 7: £35,000 Article 8: £45,000 Articles 9/10/11: £22,500 Article 12: £25,000 Article 13: £5,000 Article 14: £7,500 Article 15: £5,000 Article 16: £5,000 Article 17: £5,000 Article 18: £10,000 Article 19: £15,000
|
Not provided |
Article 1: £2,000 Article 2: £750 Article 3: £4,500 Article 4: £5,000 Article 5: £750 Article 6: £10,000 Article 7: £20,000 Article 8: £10,000 Articles 9/10/11: £12,500 Article 12: £12,500 Article 13: £5,000 Article 14: £6,000 Article 15: £3,000 Article 16: £2,500 Article 17: £750 Article 18: £1,500 Article 19: £2,500
|
|
|
Not provided |
Not provided |
£15,000
|
|
Aggravated Damages
|
100% |
Not provided |
£0 |
|
Total |
£326,000
(before aggravated damages)
|
c. £25,000
|
£157,250
|
|
|
||||
Shobna Gulati |
Hacking
|
£40,000 |
Not provided |
£22,000 |
Private Investigators/ Blagging |
£30,000 |
Not provided |
£5,000
|
|
Articles |
Article 1: £35,000 Article 2: £35,000 Article 3: £45,000 Article 4: £25,000 Article 5: £20,000 Article 6: £20,000 Article 7: £2,500 Article 8: £7,500
|
Not provided |
Article 1: £12,500 Article 2: £12,500 Article 3: £10,000 Article 4: £10,000 Article 5: £20,000 Article 6: £7,500 Article 7: £0 Article 8: £3,000 |
|
|
Not provided |
Not provided |
£15,000
|
|
Aggravated Damages
|
100% |
Not provided |
£0 |
|
Total |
£260,000
(before aggravated damages)
|
c.£20,000
|
£117, 500
|
|
|
||||
Shane Roche |
Hacking
|
£55,000 |
Not provided |
£40,000 |
Private Investigators/ Blagging
|
£25,000 |
Not provided |
£5,000
|
|
Articles |
Article 1: £25,000 Article 2: £40,000 Article 3: £5,000 Article 4: £25,000 Article 5: £5,000 Article 6: £2,500 Article 7: £5,000 Article 8: £25,000 Article 9: £7,500 Article 10: £12,500 Article 11: £10,000 Article 12: £15,000 Article 13: £2,500 |
Not provided |
Article 1: £12,000 Article 2: £20,000 Article 3: £1,000 Article 4: £12,500 Article 5: £1,000 Article 6: £1,000 Article 7: £3,000 Article 8: £15,000 Article 9: £0 Article 10: £6,500 Article 11: £5,000 Article 12: £6,000 Article 13: £2,000
|
|
|
Not provided |
Not provided |
£25,000
|
|
Aggravated Damages
|
100% |
Not provided |
£0 |
|
Total |
£ 260,000
(before aggravated damages)
|
c.£20,000
|
£155,000
|
|
|
||||
Paul Gascoigne |
Hacking
|
£75,000 |
Not provided |
£50,000 |
Private Investigators/ Blagging
|
£35,000 |
Not provided |
£10,000
|
|
Articles |
Article 1: £35,000 Article 2: £20,000 Article 3/6/7/8/10: £155,000 Article 4: £7,500 Article 5: £15,000 Article 9: £7,500 Articles 11/13: £15,500 Articles 12/14: £10,000 Article 15: £15,000 Article 16: £25,000 Article 17: £7,500 Article 18: £10,000 |
Not provided |
Article 1: £7,500 Article 2: £7,500 Article 3/6/7/8/10: £30,000 Article 4: £10,000 Article 5: £8,500 Article 9: £4,000 Articles 11/13: £8,500 Articles 12/14: £10,000 Article 15: £7,500 Article 16: £7,500 Article 17: £750 Article 18: £6,500
|
|
|
Not provided |
Not provided |
£ 20,000
|
|
Aggravated Damages
|
100% |
Not provided |
£0 |
|
Total |
£433,000
(before aggravated damages)
|
c.£40,000
|
£188,250
|
|
|
||||
Sadie Frost |
Hacking
|
£45,000 |
Not provided |
£37,500 |
|
Private Investigators/ Blagging
|
£55,000 |
Not provided |
£10,000
|
|
Articles |
Article 1: £15,000 Article 2: £3,000 Article 3: £25,000 Article 4: £25,000 Articles 5/6: £40,000 Article 7: £15,000 Article 8: £7,500 Article 9: £30,000 Article 10: £10,000 Article 11: £25,000 Article 12: £10,000 Article 13: £25,000 Article 14: £22,000 Article 15: £7,500 Article 16: £5,000 Article 17: £3,500 Article 18: £15,000 Article 19: £15,000 Article 20: £2,500 Article 21: £2,500 Article 22: £5,000 Article 23: £7,500 Article 24: £5,000 Article 25: £5,000 Article 26: £5,000 Article 27: £30,000 Article 28: £60,000 Article 29: £3,500 Article 30: £2,500 Article 31: £2,500
|
Not provided |
Article 1: £6,000 Article 2: £1,500 Article 3: £25,000 Article 4: £10,000 Articles 5/6: £25,000 Article 7: £8,000 Article 8: £2,000 Article 9: £5,000 Article 10: £7,500 Article 11: £14,000 Article 12: £6,000 Article 13: £6,000 Article 14: £8,500 Article 15: £2,000 Article 16: £0 Article 17: £1,000 Article 18: £0 Article 19: £5,000 Article 20: £0 Article 21: £1,000 Article 22: £3,500 Article 23: £2,500 Article 24: £3,000 Article 25: £2,500 Article 26: £2,000 Article 27: £10,000 Article 28: £25,000 Article 29: £0 Article 30: £750 Article 31: £0 |
|
|
Not provided |
Not provided |
£30,000
|
|
Aggravated Damages
|
100% |
Not provided |
£0 |
|
Total |
£529,500
(before aggravated damages)
|
c.£30,000
|
£260,250
|