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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Golam-Rassoude & Anor, R. v  EWCA Crim 704 (20 May 2020)
Cite as:  EWCA Crim 704
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London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
MR JUSTICE SPENCER
MR JUSTICE CHAMBERLAIN
|R E G I N A|
Epiq Europe Ltd, Lower Ground, 18-22 Furnival Street, London EC4A 1JS,
Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
Mr S Murphy appeared on behalf of the Applicant H Golam-Rassoude
Crown Copyright ©
i. "The rationale of the exceptions stated, by way of example in that proposition, appears to be that where an earlier acquittal is arguably attributable to some aspect of the evidence which is common to both trials and/or otherwise relevant to an issue in the second, evidence of the acquittal may be admissible in the later trial."
i. "... the issue in the present case is not whether the defendant is guilty of having raped the three other complainants. He is not being put on trial again for those offences. The only issue is whether he is guilty of this fresh allegation of rape. The guiding principle is that prima facie all evidence which is relevant to the question whether the accused is guilty or innocent of the offence charged is admissible."
i. "The principle ... is that of double jeopardy. It is obvious that this principle is infringed if the accused is put on trial again for the offence of which he has been acquitted. It is also infringed if any other steps are taken by the prosecutor which may result in the punishment of the accused on some other ground for the same offence. But it is not infringed if what the prosecutor seeks to do is to lead evidence which was led at the previous trial, not for the purpose of punishing the accused in any way for the offence of which he has been acquitted, but in order to prove that the defendant is guilty of a subsequent offence which was not before the court in the previous trial."
i. "The Court cannot but affirm the general rule stated in the Sekanina judgment that, following a final acquittal, even the voicing of suspicions regarding an accused's innocence is no longer admissible. The Court, thus, considers that once an acquittal has become final - be it an acquittal giving the accused the benefit of the doubt in accordance with Article 6(2) - the voicing of any suspicions of guilt, including those expressed in the reasons for the acquittal, is incompatible with the presumption of innocence."
i. "37. It is helpful to begin by distinguishing two discrete questions: firstly, the evidence of previous offending (or other bad character) given in an earlier trial which has resulted in an acquittal, and secondly admission in evidence of the acquittal itself. We are here principally concerned with the first issue.
ii. 38. We note, however, that where such evidence of previous offending is admitted as bad character evidence, the second issue will often arise ... In our view, where the evidence of a complainant was the essence of the case in the trial leading to an acquittal, and where accuracy or credibility was the critical question before the acquitting jury, it may be appropriate to adduce the acquittal, as well as the previous complainant's evidence, if the latter is to be admitted as bad character evidence in a subsequent trial. The second jury will necessarily hear that there was a first trial, and that the witness was the complainant in that trial. If they are not told of a conviction, they may in any event conclude there was an acquittal. Or they may wrongly infer there was a conviction, which would be a highly prejudicial matter..."
i. "Thus we submit that the Crown should limit its case in a retrial along the following lines:
(b) The Crown asserts that some or all of the boxes imported before 8 November 2016 must have contained unlawful cargo, namely Class A drugs [this is not disputed by the defence];
(c) The Crown does not suggest that the defendants were knowingly involved in the importation of any Class A drugs;
i. (ii) knew that any of the earlier boxes contained drugs.
(d) Each defendant must have suspected that the contents of some or all of the boxes contained some sort of criminal property."
i. "In this count you are not concerned with the events of the 8 November 2016 but the cash that had been received by the GRs [the applicants] before their time."
i. "The prosecution has suggested ... to each defendant that they knew that the incoming boxes ... contained drugs.
ii. If you were sure that the defendants did know that, it would obviously be strong evidence that they were aware that the money that they were dealing with represented the proceeds of crime. However, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that they did know about the true nature of the drugs because this is a case about the money. It is the knowledge or suspicion regarding the money that is central to the case, and of course neither defendant in this trial faces a charge in relation to the drugs."
LORD JUSTICE SINGH: May I just invite counsel to make any further submissions?
MR MURPHY: There is nothing from me. Thank you.
LORD JUSTICE SINGH: Mr Lyons?
MR LYONS: My Lord, no. Thank you.
LORD JUSTICE SINGH: Thank you both very much. Can I just check with my Lords if there is anything else they need to add.
MR JUSTICE SPENCER: No.
MR JUSTICE CHAMBERLAIN: No.
LORD JUSTICE SINGH: Thank you. I am grateful to the court staff as well for making the arrangements for this remote hearing.