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URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2012/1169.html
Cite as: [2012] EWHC 1169 (Admin)

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Neutral Citation Number: [2012] EWHC 1169 (Admin)
CO/4528/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
19 March 2012

B e f o r e :

STUART CATCHPOLE, QC
(Sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)

____________________

Between:
THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF SHAKEEL Claimant
v
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT Defendant

____________________

Computer-Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of
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____________________

Mr P Turner (instructed by Farani Taylor) appeared on behalf of the Claimant
Mr D Edwards (instructed by Treasury Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the Defendant

____________________

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

  1. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: In the present proceedings the claimant seeks to challenge the defendant's decisions of 4 February 2010 and 10 April 2010, refusing to treat her further submissions on her asylum claim as giving rise to a fresh claim for asylum under paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules. The legal principles are relatively straightforward. Paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules is familiar to all of those who practise in this jurisdiction. It provides as follows, as amended:
  2. "353. When a human rights or asylum claim has been refused or withdrawn or treated as withdrawn under paragraph 333C of these Rules and any appeal relating to that claim is no longer pending, the decision maker will consider any further submissions and, if rejected, will then determine whether they amount to a fresh claim. The submissions will amount to a fresh claim if they are significantly different from the material that has previously been considered. The submissions will only be significantly different if the content:
    (i) had not already been considered; and
    (ii) taken together with the previously considered material, created a realistic prospect of success, notwithstanding its rejection."

    This paragraph does not apply to claims made from overseas.

  3. The case of WM (DRC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] has been drawn to my attention by the claimant. It sets out the test that the Secretary of State and the courts have to apply. In that decision, Buxton LJ said as follows:
  4. "6. There was broad agreement as to the Secretary of State's task under Rule 353. He has to consider the new material together with the old and make two judgements. First, whether the new material is significantly different from that already submitted, on the basis of which the asylum claim has failed, that to be judged under Rule 353(i) according to whether the content of the material has already been considered. If the material is not 'significantly different' the Secretary of State has to go no further. Second, if the material is significantly different, the Secretary of State has to consider whether it, taken together with the material previously considered, creates a realistic prospect of success in a further asylum claim. That second judgement will involve not only judging the reliability of the new material, but also judging the outcome of tribunal proceedings based on that material. To set aside one point that was said to be a matter of some concern, the Secretary of State, in assessing the reliability of new material, can of course have in mind both how the material relates to other material already found by an adjudicator to be reliable, and also have in mind, where that is relevantly probative, any finding as to the honesty or reliability of the applicant that was made by the previous adjudicator. However, he must also bear in mind that the latter may be of little relevance when, as is alleged in both of the particular cases before us, the new material does not emanate from the applicant himself, and thus cannot be said to be automatically suspect because it comes from a tainted source.
    7. The Rule only imposes a somewhat modest test that the application has to meet before it becomes a fresh claim. First, the question is whether there is a realistic prospect of success in an application before an adjudicator, but not more than that. Second, as Mr Nicol QC pertinently pointed out, the adjudicator himself does not have to achieve certainty, but only to think that there is a real risk of the applicant being persecuted on return. Third, and importantly, since asylum is in issue the consideration of all the decision-makers, the Secretary of State, the adjudicator and the court, must be informed by the anxious scrutiny of the material that is axiomatic in decisions that if made incorrectly may lead to the applicant's exposure to persecution. If authority is needed for that proposition, see per Lord Bridge of Harwich in Bugdaycay v SSHD [1987] AC 514 at p 531F."
  5. Buxton LJ went on to say that from the court's perspective, there are two relevant questions to be addressed. First of all, has the Secretary of State asked herself the correct question, ie whether the new material gives rise to a realistic prospect of success before an immigration judge, and that is a realistic prospect of the immigration judge concluding that there is a real risk of persecution on return. The second test is, has the Secretary of State satisfied the requirement of anxious scrutiny. I accept that it is axiomatic that the ordinary Wednesbury test applies: it is for the Secretary of State to consider the material and not for this court to substitute its judgment in place of that of the Secretary of State.
  6. Further authorities that were cited to me do not need me to say anything in detail. They set out what I would regard as self-evident namely that, in certain appropriate circumstances, even where an applicant or a claimant has been disbelieved by an immigration judge, there may be material that comes to light which shows that the account that that person was giving was in fact true and that may be sufficient to amount to a fresh claim for asylum. Equally, there may be cases, and it may that be they are the majority of cases, where a claimant has been comprehensively disbelieved but produces new material which effectively parrots the same story which does not take matters any further forward. I have been referred to ex parte Senkoy, R (on the application of) v Secretary Of State For Home Department [2001] EWCA CIV 328 and then the more recent case of Collins J in R (Rahimi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWHC 2838. The other matter that came out of Rahimi was the approach adopted by Collins J where he was faced with new material. In effect what he was saying was that on the facts of that case he accepted that the documents that had been produced after a finding of a lack of credibility by an adjudicator were not intrinsically incredible and it was possible that they could be genuine. He went on to say in paragraph 19:
  7. "19. Of course, if it is intrinsically incredible, or if when one looks at the whole of the case, it is possible to say that no person could reasonably believe this evidence, it should be rejected. If it is, on the face of it, credible and if, despite the feeling that it might be disbelieved, it is not possible to say that it could not reasonably be believed, then, as it seems to me, the decision ought to be based upon that state of affairs. The Secretary of State would be wrong to say 'I don't believe it and therefore I am not going to regard this as a fresh claim'."

    In other words, if the Secretary of State believes or concludes within Wednesbury paramaters that the material could be believed or accepted by a judge and may give rise to a realistic prospect of success, the Secretary of State ought to allow the claimant, even if they reject the claim for asylum, in effect, the right of appeal.

  8. The claimant is a national of Pakistan. She arrived in this country on a visitors visa in May 2008. She claimed asylum on 18 September 2008 and was refused fairly promptly on 9 October 2008. She appealed against that decision on asylum and human rights grounds. The essence of her claim for asylum was that she was in fear of persecution as a woman from her husband who, as it will become apparent from the passages of the tribunal's decision, she maintained was authoritative and would abuse her physically in ways which were obviously unacceptable. The appeal was dismissed on 1 December 2008. The immigration judge summarised the grounds of appeal in the following way:
  9. "8. The appellant's position is that she had been persecuted on account of her membership of a social group as a woman in Pakistan. She entered into an arranged marriage on 21 January 1995 in Pakistan. Her life then changed when she found that her new husband was a strict Muslim and a control freak. Her life was miserable. She was not allowed to visit her family or friends. There were many arguments and he would raise his hand to her for raising her voice. Her two sons were not allowed to play outside or go out either. At the age of four, they were sent to the Madrassa. The appellant became ill with TB and had a liver problem. She was still being beaten and saw her children suffer as she did. She needed to see a specialist for her condition, but if the doctor was a man, the appellant's husband would not let the appellant have treatment, until she was close to death. In this ill condition she gave birth to three daughters. The appellant then expected another child and was four months pregnant when there was another argument and her husband beat her. She lost her child on 21 April 2007. She reported the matter to the police on 22 April 2007. Her husband was arrested and through the police, a reconciliation was organised.
    9. Her husband then arranged visas for the whole family and they came to the UK as a gesture of happiness and making a new beginning. They arrived on 16 May 2008. The appellant's husband considered there was too much freedom and so the applicant was only allowed out wearing a full niqab. One day they all went to the park and it was very hot so the appellant had to remove her veil for a few minutes to get some air to let her breathe. Her husband took a photo. When the photos were developed, he kicked up a fuss as she was not wearing the veil. He beat the appellant and the children and threatened them. He stormed out of the house. The appellant and children were scared for their lives. He returned the next day. The appellant feared he had returned to Pakistan."
  10. It is fair to say that this is a case where the immigration judge comprehensively disbelieved the claimant. In concluding, the judge said this:
  11. "29. I consider that the appellant has fabricated her account. There are a number of documents before me from Pakistan but they have not been sent to the respondent in original form for verification. It is well-known that documents are easy to forge in Pakistan and so without verification, I am not prepared to rely upon them. I consider the whole account is a fabrication. The lease for a year of a property does not make sense if they were only coming for two to three months. If the appellant's husband was so determined to harm the appellant, he knew where she was for some weeks after he apparently left the house and yet he did not return. There is no indication that he is either in Pakistan or the UK. His location is completely unknown, but he has not done anything since leaving to cause the appellant any harm. The appellant's account of the incident with the photographs being taken without the veil does not stand up to close scrutiny as the appellant's husband was the photographer. I do not accept that he would wait until later before he would castigate the appellant.
    30. In all, I find the appellant's account is not reliable and in the circumstances, I do not find it to be credible. I do not find she is a person who has been mistreated in Pakistan or indeed in the UK. I note the considerable body of objective evidence concerning the situation for women in Pakistan. However, I do not accept that the appellant's husband is in fact a person with whom she is genuinely in fear. I do not consider that the appellant would suffer any real risk of persecution on return to Pakistan. She can return home and live there as normal by obtaining the key from her neighbour. If the appellant's documents are to be accepted at face value, then she has been able to do what many women in Pakistan have not been able to do, namely obtain the protection of the authorities. In the circumstances, if the documents are genuine, there is no reason why she cannot obtain such state protection once again. Internal relocation is not in fact an issue in case as the appellant can return home."
  12. The appellant appealed to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, which included arguments that the immigration judge erred in law in her treatment of the documentary evidence that was relied on and in particular those grounds set out in paragraph 4 and 6 of the appeal. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal had no difficulty in rejecting the application for leave to appeal and said the following:
  13. "The judge found on the facts for the full reasons which he gave, the appellant's account was untrue. If she was entitled in law to do so the appeal could not succeed. On the proposed grounds for review ...
    4. It was for the appellant and her representatives to put evidence before the judge in acceptable form, not to wait and see if the Home Office asked him to do so."
  14. In relation to the ground of appeal saying the Home Office had to prove that things were a forgery, the response was:
  15. "It was not a question of the Home Office alleging forgery, but of the appellant failing to persuade the judge that the documents were reasonably likely to be genuine or their contents true."

    I have read those passages because, as will become apparent in due course, the key to the present challenge is in the treatment of further information that was put to the Secretary of State. I note at this stage that the claimant was on notice, expressly: first of all (obviously) that she had been comprehensively disbelieved in the past; secondly, they had not believed the documents she produced to be genuine; thirdly, that the onus was on her to produce evidence that was satisfactory and supported her case; and fourthly that the onus was very much on her to persuade whoever the decision-maker may be that the documents that she relied on were reasonably likely to be genuine or their contents true.

    On 8 October 2009, the claimant's then solicitors made further submissions to the Secretary of State. They sent further documentation to the Secretary of State, including a letter to a friend a Miss Rani, which is a manuscript undated letter, albeit it is correctly pointed out that there is an envelope showing a delivery date. It says:

    "Our client's friend told her that the situation for her return is not feasible at this moment. She told her that Ms Shakeel should not return and save her life avoiding her return to Pakistan. She further told her friend that our client's father and brother were recently assaulted upon by her in laws and her family had disowned Ms Shakeel. Our client maintains that her friend met with her father who told that he is extremely against our client because they face problems at the hands of her in laws.
    Our client's friend informed her that her in laws are still behind our client and they have recently trespassed into her parent's house and injured her father and handicapped brother."

    I will come back to that in a moment. Those representations were rejected by the Secretary of State on 16 October 2009 and in doing so the Secretary of State said this. That this is one of the letters that is challenged by the claimant in the present proceedings under the heading 'Material Previously Submitted':

    "You submit that:
    •Your client will be tortured and killed by her in-laws, who recently assaulted her father and brother. In support of this, you have submitted the following documents: [the documents are then identified]...
    •Your client will not be able to rely on the Pakistani authorities for protection, and will find it difficult to survive in Pakistan as a woman and no family support. [Then there are summarised the human rights grounds which are relied on]...
    Your submission that your client will be tortured and killed by her in-laws, who recently assaulted her father and brother, is not new material..."

    I interpose: objection is taken to this and other statements to similar effect on the grounds that the documentary evidence clearly was new and on the basis of the authority the Secretary of State has misdirected herself. The letter goes on:

    "...This is because it is on the same factual basis as your client's claim that she cannot return to Pakistan because her husband will beat and kill her, ie your client claims to be at risk from her in-laws solely because of the argument with her husband. Her claim to have had an argument with her husband which led to her husband threatening to beat and kill her has already been fully considered in the refusal letter and the appeal determination in which the Immigration Judge rejects your client's account of her argument with her husband..."

    It then sets out passage I have just read, at least a summary of it, saying that the account had been fabricated.

    "...In relation to the documents that you have submitted in support of your client's claim, while it is acknowledged that they are previously unseen documents, these too are predicated on the same factual basis as your client's claim that she cannot return to Pakistan because her husband will beat and kill her. As such they are not new material."

    It then sets out the case of Tanveer Ahmed saying a document should not be viewed in isolation. The decision-maker on a fresh claim should look at the evidence as a whole. It refers to paragraphs 29 to 30 of the original refusal letter, although I believe that should refer to the determination because it says that the immigration judge accepts it is well known that documents are easy to forge in Pakistan:

    "The documents you have submitted in support of your client's claim have been carefully considered. However, in considering your client's claim as a whole, in line with the principles stated, in the case of Tanveer Ahmed, little weight is placed on your client's documents".

    The point is then reiterated that the immigration judge accepted that the claimant, if the original documents she put forward were true, could avail herself of protection in Pakistan as she had done before.

    Further submissions were then made on 21 December 2009. Unfortunately no copy of the letter containing the submissions is available, although the attachments are and I will have to turn to those to look at them in slightly more detail in a moment. The Secretary of State replied on 4 February 2010. Ostensibly this is the main letter that is challenged, although it does refer back to the October decision. The Secretary of State in paragraph 6 sets out paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules accurately and then in paragraphs 9 and 10 says:

    "9. In consideration of your client's representations, the key question is whether, when these issues are taken together with the previously considered material, they create a realistic prospect of success. The question is it not whether the Secretary of State thinks that the new claim is a good one, or should succeed, but whether there is a realistic prospect that an Immigration Judge, when applying the rule of anxious scrutiny, would conclude that your client is at real risk of persecution or serious harm, or would breach her rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
    10. Furthermore, the Secretary of State can and indeed should treat his own view of the merits as a starting point for the enquiry. It is also clear that the Secretary of State, when addressing that question, in respect of the evaluation of the facts, and in respect of the legal conclusions to be drawn from those facts, must also satisfy the requirements of anxious scrutiny."

    I accept the submission of the Secretary of State that that accurately and unimpeachably sets out the legal test that had to be applied. The question in this case essentially boils down to whether or not it was properly applied.

    The Secretary of State then sets out the factual material and effectively repeats from the claimant's case what was the same error in paragraph 12 onwards, the Secretary of State said as follows:

    "12. You submit that your client fears being killed by her husband or his family if returned to Pakistan and you recount your client's claim that her husband and his family attacked your client's father and brother, resulting in your client's brother's death.
    13. Your submission that your client would be killed by her husband's family, who recently assaulted her father and brother, is not new material. This is because it is on the same factual basis as your client's claim that she cannot return to Pakistan because her husband will beat her and kill her, ie your client claims to be at risk from her husband's family solely because of the argument with her husband. Her claim to have had an argument with her husband, which led to her husband threatening to beat and kill her, has already been fully considered in the refusal letter and the appeal determination, in which the Immigration Judge rejects your client's account of her argument with her husband ... [it then sets out the passage dealing with the fabrication]...
    15. In relation to the documents you have submitted in support of your client's claim, while it is acknowledged that they are previously unseen documents, these two are predicated on the same factual basis as your client's claim that she cannot return to Pakistan because her husband will beat and kill her. As such they are not new material [It then sets out the principles of Tanveer Ahmed]...
    17. Notwithstanding the findings as noted in paragraph 9 to 13 above, it is noted that the documents your client has submitted are not the originals. It appears that the documents are faxed versions of photocopied documents and as such the quality of the print is extremely poor and difficult to read, it is not possible to read certain handwritten dates on the documents. It is noted that no explanation has been provided as to how your client has obtained the aforementioned documents or when they were received. It is also noted that documents relating to the incident between your client's husband and your client's family were submitted with your client's previous further representations, dated 8 October 2009, and were considered in the Secretary of State's letter dated 16 October 2009. These are all matters that another Immigration Judge, applying the rule of anxious scrutiny, would take into consideration.
    18. Furthermore, the Immigration Judge commented on the previous document submitted for her perusal and on the prevalence of fraudulent documents in Pakistan in her determination, stating:
    '...There are a number of documents before me from Pakistan but they have not been sent to the respondent in their original form for verification. It is well-known that documents are easy to forge in Pakistan and so without verification I am not prepared to rely upon them'.
    19. The Senior Immigration Judge also commented on this matter in his reconsideration determination, stating:
    'It was for the appellant and her representatives to put before the judge in acceptable form, not to wait and see if the Home Office asked them to do so.'
    20. With regards to the submission in your letter that your client could not obtain protection from the state, the Immigration Judge also commented on this matter, stating: [It then sets out the fact that she had previously had protection from the state] ...
    21. Your letter submits your client's family have not been offered protection, but it has been shown that your client has been able to obtain protection before, if her documents are accepted at face value. It is therefore considered that another Immigration Judge, applying the rule of anxious scrutiny, would consider that your client would be able to obtain state protection in the future as she successfully obtained state protection in the past.
    22. For these reasons and when considering the new material in view of the previous negative credibility findings of the Immigration Judge and in line with the principles set out in Tanveer Ahmed, it is considered that another Immigration Judge, applying the rule of anxious scrutiny, would not find that your client has well-founded fear of persecution, faces a real risk of suffering serious harm on return from the UK or would have her obligations under the ECHR breached on being removed from the UK, based on the production of the documents enclosed with your letter of 21 December.
    23. Therefore, it is considered that there would not be a realistic prospect of success before another Immigration Judge, applying the rule of anxious scrutiny, reversing the decision of the Immigration Judge based on the production of the documents enclosed with your letter of 21 December 2009."

    In very short summary, what the claimant says is that there was no real anxious scrutiny of the documents by the Secretary of State in this letter. All that it is said she has done is to misdirect herself by, in effect, saying the immigration judge did not believe the claimant and really that is the end of the matter, rather than actually looking to see or explain why the documents in question were not ones which could be accepted.

    The documents which are relied on, it is right to say, are very poor photocopies. The first one was an application form for death registration. This, as I understand it, is the document on which the claimant relies to suggest that her brother had been killed. It is not entirely clear that the deceased's name is in fact the same name as her brother, but in any event, the date of birth on this application form is said to have been 14 April 1897, which seems improbable given that the mother's age was only 56. Assuming that should have been 1987, the date of death is 5 November 2008 and the date of burial is 6 November 2008 on one reading of the document, or 5 November 2009 and 6 November 2009 upon another reading of the document, a more favourable one for the claimant. Either way, those dates are different to the dates which are alleged in the other documents for the date of the brother's death: as the translation of the alleged report to the police puts it, "Unfortunately my son expired due to injuries on 10 September 2009". I will come back to that in a moment. The document is, as I have indicated, an application form for death registration. It contains some sort of stamp at the bottom, but it is not clear what that is. It is not signed by anyone official, least of all by the registrar of deaths. It does not seem to me that it would prove anything.

    The second document is a document from the claimant's father. Again, it is not particularly clear when or to whom it has been issued: it is apparently to the police station, but it is not a judicial document. It says:

    "Respected Sir,
    With due respect, I undersigned [and it gives the name of the father's address] beg to state that I have given an application before you but I have no yet found the Justice, I have filed an FIR crime [and gives a number] on 0710 Hours against the accused persons [and identifies them] who all Seriously Injured my Son namely [gives the name of the son] with the help of Axes and Lathis (Sticks), my son expired due to injuries on 10-09-2009, the F.I.R was lodged at the time of injuries."

    The difficulty with that is that the date of death is about 15 days before the date of the alleged incident in which the father and son were said to have been attacked as set out in the document to which I will refer in a moment (ie 25 September 2009), and as I have said, it is not entirely clear what the document is: it is certainly not one that appears to be an official document.

    There is then a document which has got a date on it which is illegible, simply recording the fact that an advocate had been appointed to act on behalf of the claimants's father. Then there is a document which, again, is very difficult to read, but is apparently dated 5 December 2009, which is the one that must be referred to in the Secretary of State's letter which I have already set out, which sets out that on 25 September 2009, the accused beat the father and the brother and that they went for medical treatment. That was 15 days after the son is alleged to have died according to the report to the police.

    All of that is exceptionally thin evidence. It must be viewed against the background where the claimant has already been found to have fabricated her evidence and where a tribunal judge has not accepted documents from Pakistan as being genuine. That should, at the very least, have put the claimant on notice that documents have to be consistent and have to be explained properly. Further, if one is alleging that your brother was murdered by your former husband, one would expect there to be rather more than inconsistent and incomplete documents including a document actually recording his death as opposed to an application form that anyone could have filled in.

    It is not for me to decide what weight to attach to the new material, but I think it will be fairly evident that I do not think that the documents are of any probative value. When one applies the Wednesbury test to the facts of this particular case and looks at what the Secretary of State said in her letter it seems to me that the reasoning is unimpeachable. She goes through the legal test in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the decision letter of 4 February. It is correct. The point that is at the heart of this is that the story itself has not changed, it is exactly the same essential story, it has been roundly rejected by all relevant decision-makers in the past. For my part, I think the Secretary of State is perfectly entitled to start with that proposition.

    What then happens as one goes through the letter is that having made it plain that the claimant was on notice that documents would have to be produced or other evidence produced that would properly support her claim, the Secretary of State treats the test by looking at what conclusion she thinks an immigration judge could come to. That is entirely the right test. She looks at it against the background of the previous decisions of the immigration judge, looks at the comments both of the judge and the President on the potential appeal up the line, and concludes that, given the risk of fabrication, the thinness of the evidence and the fact that this had already been covered in some considerable detail before the immigration judge, there was no prospect that another immigration judge would find it was a real risk that this claimant would suffer persecution. That, to my mind, is very much what is being said in the Secretary of State's paragraph 17 where the Secretary of State very accurately sets out they are not originals, they are very poor copies of photocopied documents which are difficult to read and sometimes impossible to understand, no explanation as to how they came into the possession of the claimant, that they effectively cover much the same ground as had been previously submitted (namely that the family was at risk of attacks from her husband) and that story had been rejected.

    It then goes on to say that very little weight would be put on documents of this type because of the risk of fraud and that had already been drawn to the claimant's attention, I think that conclusion was inevitable when one sees the inconsistencies in the documents themselves, and takes account of a subsidiary point which was not really challenged before me that even if you had taken the original documents that were before the immigration judge at face value, this claimant was entitled and would get protection from the Pakistani authorities if she was returned. In those circumstances, I do not see any basis on which the Secretary of State's decision can be impugned and I would dismiss this application.

  16. MR EDWARDS: I am grateful, my Lord. If I could just take instructions for a minute. (Pause)
  17. I have just learned that the claimant is not legally aided and I am instructed to seek my costs so the order would be that the claim is dismissed and the claimant pay the Secretary of State's costs to be assessed if not otherwise agreed.
  18. MR TURNER: My Lord, at first blush if I can say again something to that. She is not legally aided, I am instructed she is receiving charity from people that are supporting her. She has five children that she is hoping to bring up or support. I say that little would be gained by her being made to pay the Secretary of State's costs, but in this case, in particular, having regard to the fact that it is not disputed that she has the five children, I would invite no order as to costs.
  19. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: I make an order that the Secretary of State's costs be paid in any event by the claimant and they are to be assessed on the standard basis. I have no doubt that the Secretary of State will take into account any representations that are made. It is a matter for them what they agree (Inaudible) entitled to. Can I say before we rise, I want to say to the court staff, I am very grateful to them because they do not get reward in any sense for sitting late, but when you have deputies sitting it is invaluable to have staff who are prepared to sit late in order that we can make sure we get through the cases so I am very grateful I am sure to the court staff.
  20. MR EDWARDS: Indeed, my Lord. Just the matter that the claim should have been brought in Scotland on the information that we have.
  21. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: I should have mentioned that. I certainly should add as a rider, it seems clear that at all material times the claimant was actually resident in Glasgow. The appeal against the original decision was to a tribunal based in Scotland. Strictly, the claim should have been brought in Scotland, there is no doubt about that. Very sensibly given the point was not picked up at an earlier stage it was agreed that I would continue to consider the matter and that costs would not be wasted by this matter being dismissed here and would have to be restarted in Scotland. But it would be helpful in future if people could have due regard to where their clients are actually living.


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