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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> DD v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 1681 (Admin) (19 June 2015) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2015/1681.html Cite as: [2015] EWHC 1681 (Admin) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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DD |
Appellant |
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- and - |
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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT |
Respondent |
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Mr Jonathan Hall, QC and Ms Kate Grange (instructed by the Treasury Solicitors) for the Respondent
Special Advocates: Ms Helen Mountfield, QC and Mr Zubair Ahmad
Hearing dates: 21st April 2015 – 24th April 2015
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Collins:
"Condition C is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, for terrorism prevention and investigation measures to be imposed on the individual".
S.3(4) deals with Condition D and reads:-
"Condition D is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary for the purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individuals involvement in [TRA], for the specified [TPIM] to be imposed on the individual".
Condition E is not material for the purposes of this case.
"if the Secretary of State extends or revives a TPIM notice…..
(a) the individual to whom the TPIM notice relates may appeal to the court against the extension or revival, and
(b) the function of the court on such an appeal is to review the Secretary of State's decisions that Conditions A, C and D were met and continue to be met".
There may in addition be an appeal against a refusal by the Secretary of State to vary measures contained in a TPIM (s.16(3)). Section 16(6) requires the court to apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review. The court may quash an extension or revival of a TPIM or quash any measure contained in it (s.16(7)) if it decides that an appeal should succeed. In this case, I am asked to quash the notice or in the alternative to quash some of the measures contained in it.
"For the purposes of this Act, involvement in [TRA] is any one or more of the following –
(a) the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism;
(b) conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts;
(c) conduct which gives encouragement to the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so;
(d) conduct which gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or believed by the individuals by the individual concerned to be involved in conduct falling within the above paragraphs and for the purposes of this Act it is immaterial whether the acts of terrorism in question are specific acts of terrorism or acts of terrorism in general".
The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 s.20(2) amended paragraph (d) above with effect from 12 February 2015 so that it was limited to conduct falling within paragraph (a). That Al-Shabaab was at all material times a terrorist organisation cannot be and is not doubted. Thus any conduct by the appellant which fell within s.4 would have justified the imposition and maintenance of the TPIM, provided that until 12 February 2015 there was a reasonable belief and since then it is established on the balance of probabilities that he was involved in TRA within the meaning of s.4.
"You must not meet any other person (including at your residence or by attending any meeting or gathering) unless:
(a) (for a person) you have notified the Home Office of the name and address of the person and the time and location of the meeting at least two working days before the first time you meet them….."
There are exceptions for such as emergency services or healthcare persons, his legal representatives, his wife and family and for a child aged 11 or under.
"The Secretary of State may impose either or both of the following –
(a) restrictions on the individual's possession or use of electronic communication devices;
(b) requirements on the individual in relation to the possession or use of electronic communication devices by other persons in the individual's residence".
An individual must be allowed a telephone connected to a fixed line, a mobile phone which cannot access the internet and a computer which provides access to the internet by connection to a fixed line.
"You may permit another person to bring the following devices into the residence whilst you are in the residence, provided the devices are switched off (where applicable) and not used in any time whilst you are in the residence:
(a) mobile telephones and associated SIM cards;
(b) recordable disks; and
(c) models of the following devices which are not capable of connecting to the internet:
i. memory sticks;
ii. digital music players;
iii. digital cameras;
iv. dictating machines; and
v. pagers.
"68. Professor Fahy and Dr Deeley produced a joint report dated 3 October 2014. They agreed that DD had reported clinically significant PTSD symptoms from the events of 1991 and 2003, and at times had merited a diagnosis of PTSD. Professor Fahy, but not Dr Deeley, thought that they had reduced to the extent that such a diagnosis was not warranted, but could increase at times of stress. They agreed that DD had developed a psychotic illness with auditory hallucinations and paranoid beliefs, with symptoms evolving from 2007, but unreported to medical staff as DD attributed the symptoms to jinns or evil spirits. The difference in diagnostic labelling was agreed not to be significant for these purposes. The causes were multifactorial, in which the positive family history of mental disorder, and the series of stressors in Somalia and after his detention, were important.
69. They agreed that they had found no evidence that DD had deliberately exaggerated his psychiatric symptoms, partly because of his relatively good response to medication, the nature of the symptoms and previous reticence in disclosing symptoms lest he be labelled as mentally ill.
70. They agreed that appropriate treatment included medication for the foreseeable future, psycho-educational, practical and psychological support from a community mental health team of consultant psychiatrist, psychiatric nurse with specialist psychological help, if required.
71. The conditions of the TPIM were agreed to be stressful and burdensome, and likely to be more burdensome for someone with mental health problems; the TPIM was likely to exacerbate psychotic symptoms. The tag caused a specific exacerbating problem for someone with paranoid psychosis, and it had exacerbated DD's symptoms. Although Professor Fahy thought that the problem had reduced to an extent at the time of his interview, he accepted that, based on Dr Deeley's latest assessment, the tag had exacerbated the psychotic symptoms. The TPIM was a focus for anxiety and pessimism, with DD fearing that innocuous behaviour could lead to recall to prison, and his withdrawal from many social and religious activities, which did not help recovery from his mental illness.
72. They continued:
"We agree that the strain on DD's mental health could be eased by the removal of the electronic tag, reducing the restrictions on the amount of cash he can withdraw or hold, and by investigating measures that could provide the children with access to necessary educational use of computer equipment and internet access. Dr Deeley adds that removal of the condition of signing on at the police station would also be helpful, because this condition is associated with severe anticipatory anxiety and lowering of mood. In Professor Fahy's opinion, the removal of this condition is unlikely to make a substantial difference to DD's psychiatric symptoms. We make these comments on in [sic] a clinical capacity and we do not offer an opinion about the necessity for such restrictions in terms of security concerns.""
"85. The care which DD needed at the moment was in the community, but it was debateable whether the events of mid-September required admission, or daily visits at home. He needed an allocated psychiatrist, a psychiatric nurse, with regular appointments, perhaps with a psychologist. The frequency and level of care would be dictated by symptoms. If he remained on the TPIM, but received the full treatment in the community which he needed, that would provide more of a safety net in the event of a crisis; it could provide a sense of moral support, but his symptoms and the burden of the illness would remain the same, even if improved to some extent. However much the health services tried to help, the perpetuation of the conditions predisposing the mental illness would remain, so it would be unlikely or impossible to remove the mental illness. DD's mental state was at its worst now. The longer an episode of severe illness continued, the harder the prospect of full recovery. Removal of the tag would improve his symptoms, as it was particularly difficult for someone with paranoid psychosis to wear, due to its intrusiveness and its constant reminder of his perceived persecution."
"114. I accept that the fact of the TPIM, about which DD maintains the delusion that it is a punishment by the Security Service, and which risks a cycle of breach, custody, release, revival and breach again, leads to an understandable sense of hopelessness. I accept that four of the restrictions are identified as more significant than the others in their specific effects, with the tag being the most troubling to DD's mental state by a considerable margin. All of these effects are significantly more serious for DD than they would be for a person of normal mental health and insight."
"…..[This] may represent a psychological reaction under extreme stress that allows him to circumvent the Islamic prohibition on suicide increasing his risk of completed suicide. Consequently, he must be considered at a high risk of a serious suicide attempt in the context of his current deterioration in mental health".
Dr Deeley also expressed concern at the effect of his conduct on his wife and children.
"It is evident, based on my assessment of DD, that his condition has improved substantially since he started appropriate antipsychotic medication. At the time of the assessment he also expressed relief at his recent release from prison. It is likely that continued treatment will reduce some of the stressful effects of the TPIM measures (for example, persecutory ideation focused on the electronic monitoring tag has already reduced). The other inconvenience and stresses caused by the TPIM measures can be viewed as generic, and likely to cause a burden and stress for ordinary resilient individuals. This effect is somewhat exaggerated in DD's case owing to his mental illness, probably giving rise to a modest exacerbation of residual symptoms."
"63. Whether it is necessary to impose any particular obligation on an individual in order to protect the public from the risk of terrorism involves the customary test of proportionality. The object of the obligations is to control the activities of the individual so as to reduce the risk that he will take part in any terrorism related activity. The obligations that it is necessary to impose may depend upon the nature of the involvement in terrorism related activities of which he is suspect. They may also depend on the recourses available to the Secretary of State and the demands on those resources. They may depend on arrangements that are in place, or that can be put in place, for surveillance.
64. The Secretary of State is better placed that the Court to decide the measures that are necessary to protect the public against the activities of a terrorist suspect and, for this reason, a degree of deference must be paid to the decisions taken by the Secretary of State….
65. Notwithstanding such deference there will be scope for the Court to give intense scrutiny to the necessity for each of the obligations imposed on an individual under a control order, and it must do so….Some obligations may be particularly onerous or intrusive and, in such cases, the court should explore alternative means of achieving the result…"
"116. In the modern world States face very real difficulties in protecting their populations from terrorist violence. However, unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 § 2 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV; Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 95, ECHR 1999 V; and Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998-VIII, p. 3288, § 93). The Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the conduct of the person concerned (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, judgment cited above, § 79). The nature of the offence allegedly committed by the applicant is therefore irrelevant for the purposes of Article 3 (Indelicato v. Italy, no. 31143/96, § 30, 18 October 2001).
117. Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, for instance, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65, § 162). In assessing the evidence on which to base the decision whether there has been a violation of Article 3, the Court adopts the standard of proof "beyond reasonable doubt". However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact.
118. The Court has considered treatment to be "inhuman" because, inter alia, it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. It has deemed treatment to be "degrading" because it was such as to arouse in the victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them (see, among other authorities, Kudla v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 92, ECHR 2000-XI). In considering whether a punishment or treatment is "degrading" within the meaning of Article 3, the Court will have regard to whether its object is to humiliate and debase the person concerned and whether, as far as the consequences are concerned, it adversely affected his or her personality in a manner incompatible with Article 3 (see, among other authorities, Raninen v. Finland, judgment of 16 December 1997, Reports 1997-VIII, pp. 2821-2822, § 55). However, the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 (see, among other authorities, Peers v. Greece, no. 28524/95, § 74, ECHR 2001-III).
119. In order for a punishment or treatment associated with it to be "inhuman" or "degrading", the suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment (see, among other authorities, V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888/94, § 71, ECHR 1999-IX; Indelicato, cited above, § 32; Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, § 428, ECHR 2004-VII; and Lorsé and Others v. the Netherlands, no. 52750/99, § 62, 4 February 2003).
In that connection, the Court notes that measures depriving a person of his liberty may often involve such an element. Nevertheless, Article 3 requires the State to ensure that prisoners are detained in conditions that are compatible with respect for their human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject them to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, their health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kudla v. Poland cited above, § 94; and Kalashnikov v. Russia no. 47095/99, § 95, ECHR 2001-XI). The Court would add that the measures taken must also be necessary to attain the legitimate aim pursued.
Further, when assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of those conditions, as well as the specific allegations made by the applicant (Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907/98, § 46, ECHR 2001-II)."
"There are three particular elements to be considered in relation to the compatibility of the applicant's health with his stay in detention, (a) the medical condition of the prisoner, (b) the adequacy of the medical assistance and care provided in detention and (c) the advisability of maintaining the detention measures in view of the state of health of the applicant".
Mutatis mutandis, those considerations are material in this case.
"7.1 ….[Y]ou must not (directly or indirectly)….
(c) knowingly permit another person to bring into the residence any electronic communication device…unless the Home office has from you permission to do so….
7.3 You may permit another person to bring the following devices into the residence whilst you are in the residence provided the devices are switched off (where applicable) and not used at any time whilst you are in the residence".
One such device is a mobile phone, but other devices which can connect to the internet such as iPads and laptops are not permitted under 7.3.