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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> National Iranian Tanker Company & Ors v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2015] EWHC 282 (Admin) (09 February 2015) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2015/282.html Cite as: [2015] EWHC 282 (Admin) |
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Claimant in Case No.CO/569/2015 |
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY -and- GHOLAM HOSSEIN GOLPARVAR |
Claimant in Case No. CO/564/2015 Claimant in Case No.CO/569/2015 |
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- and – |
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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS |
Defendant |
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Jonathan Hall QC and Rosemary Davidson (instructed by The Treasury Solicitor) for the Defendant
JUDGMENT
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Crown Copyright ©
MR JUSTICE GREEN:
A. INTRODUCTION
"1. The Defendant's decision to propose, support or participate in (whether by positive vote or abstention) the redesignation ("the Decision") of the claimant is declared to be unlawful on an interim basis.
2. The Secretary of State be prohibited from taking any action giving effect to the Decision."
B. THE FACTS
(a) Legislative framework
"9. In accordance with the European Council declaration, it is appropriate to prohibit the supply, sale or transfer to Iran of further items, materials, equipment, goods and technology in addition to those determined by the Security Council or the Committee that could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related reprocessing or heavy water-related activities to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems or to the pursuit of activities related to other topics about which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has expressed concerns or identified as outstanding or to other weapons of mass destruction programmes. This prohibition should include dual-use goods and technology."
"24. The procedure for amending annexes I and II to this Decision should include providing to designated persons and entities the grounds for listing so as to give them an opportunity to present observations. Where observations are submitted or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council should review its decision in the light of those observations and inform the person or entity concerned accordingly.
25. This decision respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and notably the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, the right to property and the right to the protection of personal data. This decision should be applied in accordance with those rights and principles."
"1. All funds and economic resources which belong to, are owned, held or controlled directly or indirectly by the following shall be frozen".
And sub-paragraph (2) states:
"No funds or economic resources shall be made available directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of persons and entities referred to in paragraph 1."
(b) The listing of Mr Golparvar and NITC
"Former commercial manager of IRISL, deputy Managing Director and shareholder of the Rahbaran Omid Darya Shipmanagement Company, Executive Director and shareholder of the Sapid Shipping Company, a subsidiary of EU-sanctioned IRISL, deputy Managing Director and shareholder of HDSL, member of the board of directors of EU-sanctioned Irano-Hind Shipping Company."
"Effectively controlled by the Government of Iran. Provides financial support to the Government of Iran through its subsidiaries which maintain ties with the Government."
(c) The annulment decisions of the General Court
(d) The steps taken by the Council to re-list the applicants
"Mr Golparvar acts on behalf of IRISL and companies associated with it. He has been commercial director of IRISL as well as managing director and shareholder of the SAPID Shipping Company, non-executive director and shareholder of HDSL and shareholder of Rahbaran Omid Darya Ship Management Company, which are designated by the EU as acting on behalf of IRISL."
"The National Iranian Tanker Company provides financial support to the Government of Iran through its shareholders, the Iranian State Retirement Fund, the Iranian Social Security Organisation and the Oil Industry Employees Retirement and Savings Fund which are state-controlled entities. Moreover, NITC is one of the largest operators of crude oil carriers in the world and one of the main transporters of Iranian crude oil. Accordingly, NITC provides logistical support to the Government of Iran through the transport of Iranian oil."
(e) The role of the House of Lords European Union Committee
"Thank you for your letters of 9 and 15 January 2015 regarding the case of Mr Gholam Golparvar, which I put before the Sub-committee on External Affairs at its meeting on 15 January. While the committee does have a role to play in scrutinising the Government's position on EU restrictive measures, it does not have the capacity to take up cases with the Government on behalf of individuals. However, we do have concerns about the process of re-listing following a general court annulment, of which your client's case is but one example. In this instance, we have written to the Government requesting, among other things, clarification of whether the Council has taken into account the evidence he has submitted to the Council that he is fully retired from acting on behalf of any of the companies mentioned in the new statement of reasons.
Pending a response from the Minister, we have decided to retain the document under scrutiny. When the Minister responds, the committee will take a decision on whether to release the document or not. We will show you a copy of our letter and the Government's reply in due course."
"1. Subject to paragraph 5 below, no Minister of the Crown shall give agreement in the Council or the European Council in relation to any document subject to the scrutiny of the European Union Committee in accordance with its terms of reference while the document remains subject to scrutiny."
Paragraph 5 sets out a list of exceptions. It is in the following terms:
"5. The Minister concerned may give agreement in relation to a document which remains subject to scrutiny:
(a) if he considers it is confidential, routine or trivial or is substantially the same as a proposal on which scrutiny has been completed.
(b) if the European Union Committee has indicated that agreement need not be withheld pending completion of scrutiny or
(c) if the Minister decides that for special reasons agreement should be given but he must explain his reasons:-
(i) in every such case to the European Union Committee at the first opportunity after reaching his decision, and
(ii) if that committee has made a report for debate in the House, to the House at the opening of the debate on the report."
"(i) The need to avoid a legal vacuum which might arise if an existing measure were to expire without agreement to an extension or adoption of a successful measure.
(ii) The wish that a measure of benefit to the UK should come into operation as soon as possible.
(iii) The difficulty, particularly if the negotiations in the Community have themselves been difficult or protracted of putting a late reserve on a measure which is beneficial or neutral from the UK viewpoint.
(iv) To achieve an advantageous package deal with other measures.
(v) To prevent the adoption of a measure disadvantageous to the UK, i.e. in the case of a measure subject to majority voting, the risk that voting against would result in a less advantageous measure. The vote of other Member States would have to be secured in place of the UK's, and this might require changes contrary to our interest.
(vi) To secure negotiated improvement in the measures."
"In line with the broad sanctions approach outlined above, the purpose of the Iran sanctions regime is two-fold:
(a) To restrict or prevent Iran's nuclear proliferation-related activities by making it harder for the Government of Iran to access the materials, finance or logistical support needed for these activities; and
(b) Provide a deterrent and encourage the adoption of a different course to that of nuclear proliferation."
"22. Parliamentary scrutiny is the process by which the UK Parliament holds the Government to account for decisions taken in the EU, through examination of relevant EU documents presented to Parliament by the Government.
23. There are two scrutiny committees dealing with Brussels. The Commons European Scrutiny Committee and The Lords European Union Select Committee.
24. Most sanctions business does not go through the scrutiny committees before the measures are adopted. The measures are therefore scrutinised after they have been adopted at EU level. There are two main reasons for this. The first is because of the risk of asset flight (documents that go to the committees are published). This means new listings cannot be scrutinised before they are agreed. The second is because of timing. The scrutiny process takes a minimum of three weeks and sometimes longer (EU decisions usually need to be decided more quickly than this). As a result, at any point in the EU decision making process, Ministers are able to decide to override scrutiny and agree to an EU decision before parliamentary scrutiny has been cleared.
25. A Minister will not agree to an override unless there is a strong case to do so based on the urgency and importance of the item. Where an override is exercised, Ministers are answerable to Parliament.
26. There is no indication when the current parliamentary scrutiny process that applies to these two individuals will be concluded. The use of an override in these cases would be as a result of the real risk of damage to international relations and the nuclear negotiations set out below.
27. The UK continues to play a key role in the nuclear negotiations. In the event that an injunction was granted, which prevented the Minister from pursuing HMG's foreign policy objectives, namely the maintenance of pressure on Iran through sanctions, the UK's credibility on the nuclear issue will be damaged. More worryingly though, it would hinder efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. It would lend credence to the view that some in Iran hold that Iran does not need to negotiate seriously as the sanctions regime will eventually collapse.
28. Already, the delay in relisting both NITC and Mr Golparvar is cause for concern for the reasons set out above. Since the Council's pre-notification letters were sent out in October 2014, the UK has been under considerable pressure from EU partners, the Council legal service and the EEAS to progress these cases.
29. Maintaining economic pressure through sanctions has been critical to bring Iran to the negotiating table and to take the international community's concerns over its nuclear programme seriously.
30. NITC is regarded as a significant entity in sanctions pressure terms. While it only appears to have tenuous links with the UK (around £70,000 of frozen funds), it is an entity with international reach.
31. Like NITC, Mr Golparvar is a significant listing, given his association with IRISL and other companies associated with this key Iranian shipping company. I am not however aware of any direct links Mr Golparvar has with the UK, including any frozen funds.
32. In terms of impact, I am acutely aware of the effect this is having and will continue to have on the UK's relations with other Member States. If the UK is unable to support these listings, it could make it very difficult for the UK to pursue sanctions on the 30+ EU regimes. The reason for this is that other Member States may not be willing to support our proposals if we block these. The UK's foreign policy and a number of key priorities (e.g. IS, Syria, Russia, Al-Qaeda) is contingent upon our ability to drive sanctions policy, including through both supporting listings proposed by others and by proposing our own listings".
(f) The Minister's letter of 4 February 2015
"I understand from your letter that you have been made aware by Mr Golparvar's solicitor that he has provided documents to the Council explaining that the proposed reason for his re-listing is factually incorrect and that a link with the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) is out of date. The Council takes all material provided to them into consideration when determining the evidential basis supporting an individual's re-listing. When an individual is proposed for re-listing a pre-notification letter is sent to them. The Council usually provides some supporting documents to the individual at this time. If an individual asks for access to their file, all open-source evidence held by the Council will be provided to them upon their request in order that they may prepare their defence."
Fourthly, "Balance of convenience".
C. JURISDICTION AND TEST FOR INTERIM RELIEF
"Such approach renders the written hearing afforded by the Council an empty and futile process in breach of due process rights. There is no point in providing evidence and making submissions if the actual decision-makers, the constituent members of the Council, will and do ignore the responses, even apparently considering themselves obliged so to do."
"45. The limitation as expressed in Foto-Frost ... is on the power of a national court to declare a Community act invalid. It does not prevent a conclusion by a national court that a Community act is valid. The Foto-Frost principle is thus quite narrowly defined. It is not an assertion of some exclusive 'competence' in areas which may touch and concern the Community legal order. The more obviously does this apply where the CJEU, whatever its approach to the effect of arguably unlawful Community acts may be, did not suggest that any contributory domestic acts were subject to its exclusive power, nor did the UK Government seek to obtain such a protective ruling from it. It is not suggested that there is some wider principle to the effect that where the act impugned leads to or is undertaken as part of a Community act, it is immune from domestic legal remedy, and a remedy can only be sought in respect of the eventual Community act and only through the CJEU. The Foto-Frost principle does not prevent a national court ruling on domestic unlawfulness where that may also involve implied or express criticism of Community processes or acts.
46. Instead the asserted, limited approach to remedying wrongs articulated by the CJEU leaves the field open in the interests of justice to a challenge to what domestic authorities did en route to the enactment of Community decisions. The absence of judicial protection from the ECJ is not a shield behind which domestic courts are allowed by the European legal order to hide from domestic challenge. I accept that the European legal order ought to provide a remedy for its own unlawfulness, but that may not always be precisely coterminous with possible national unlawfulness, however closely related."
D. SERIOUS ISSUE/ARGUABILITY/PRIMA FACIE CASE
E. ADEQUACY OF DAMAGES
F. BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE/PUBLIC INTEREST
(a) The availability of the full gamut of remedies before the General Court
(b) The political dimension
"21. None of this means that the court is to take over the function of the decision-maker, least of all in a case like this one. As Maurice Kay LJ observed in the Court of Appeal, this case lies in the area of foreign policy and national security, which would once have been regarded as unsuitable for judicial scrutiny. The measures have been opened up to judicial scrutiny by the express terms of the Act because they may engage the rights of designated persons or others under the European Convention on Human Rights. Even so, any assessment of the rationality and proportionality of a schedule 7 direction must recognise that the nature of the issue requires the Treasury to be allowed a large margin of judgment. It is difficult to think of a public interest as important as nuclear non-proliferation. The potential consequences of nuclear proliferation are quite serious enough to justify a precautionary approach. In addition, the question whether some measure is apt to limit the risk posed for the national interest by nuclear proliferation in a foreign country depends on an experienced judgment of the international implications of a wide range of information, some of which may be secret. This is pre-eminently a matter for the executive. For my part, I wholly endorse the view of Lord Reed JSC that "the making of government and legislative policy cannot be turned into a judicial process"."
G. CONCLUSION