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Cite as: [2017] EWHC 2685 (Admin)

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Neutral Citation Number: [2017] EWHC 2685 (Admin)
Case No: PTA/11/2016


Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

B e f o r e :


Secretary of State for the Home Department
- and -



Mr Watson and Mr Deakin (instructed by Government Legal Department) for the Applicant
Mr Squires QC and Ms O'Raghallaigh (instructed by Ahmed and Co.) for the Respondent
Mr Cory-Wright QC and Mr Goudie QC (instructed by Special Advocates' Support Office)

Hearing dates: 17 - 21 July 2017



Crown Copyright ©

    Mrs Justice Elisabeth Laing


  1. By a notice filed on 10 October 2016, the Secretary of State for the Home Department ('the Secretary of State') applied for permission to impose terrorism prevention and investigation measures ('TPIM') on the Respondent ('LF'), for LF to be anonymised, and for permission to withhold closed material from LF, because it would not be in the public interest for that material to be disclosed. Permission was granted, and the anonymity order was made, on 10 October 2016. I varied the anonymity order in the week before the hearing.
  2. The TPIM notice is addressed to LF. The notice says that by it, the Secretary of State imposes specified TPIM on LF. The 'basis' for that decision is set out in four sub-paragraphs which track the relevant statutory provisions (see paragraph 15, below). The first is that the Secretary of State 'is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that [LF is] or [has] been involved in terrorism-related activity'. The TPIM has many measures. They are listed in a Schedule to the notice, and appended to this judgment. As a whole, the measures are a significant interference with LF's private and family life and with the private and family lives of the members of his family who are affected by it. It is open to LF to apply for a variation of any of those measures.
  3. This is my open judgment on the review of the TPIM, pursuant to section 9 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 ('the 2011 Act'). Part of the hearing was open and part was closed. There was additional support in the closed material for the conclusions I have reached in this open judgment, but I make clear that the conclusions in this judgment are based wholly on the open material. I refer to further material in the closed judgment which supports my open conclusions.
  4. LF, who has made two witness statements, attended the open parts of the hearing, but did not give evidence. He was represented by Mr Squires QC and Ms O'Raghallaigh. The Secretary of State was represented by Mr Watson and Mr Deakin. Mr Cory-Wright QC and Mr Goudie QC acted as Special Advocates. I heard oral evidence in open and in closed from JB, a witness from the Security Service, and from Mr Daly, who is from the Home Office. Both witnesses were cross-examined. I found their evidence straightforward, and persuasive, where it was relevant to the issues which I have decided. I have used several Arabic words in this judgment. They are not all transcribed consistently in the source documents, and that may well be reflected in inconsistencies in this judgment.
  5. The statutory framework

  6. Section 1(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 ('the 2000 Act') provides that 'terrorism' means the use or threat of action which
  7. a. falls within section 1(2),
    b. the use or threat is designed
    i. to influence
    1. the government, or
    2. an international governmental organisation, or
    ii. to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and
    c. the use or threat is made for the purposes of advancing
    i. a political,
    ii. religious,
    iii. racial, or
    iv. ideological cause.
  8. Action falls within section 1(2) if it
  9. a. involves serious violence against the person,
    b. involves serious damage to property,
    c. endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action,
    d. creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or
    e. is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.
  10. Section 1 makes no distinction between the advancement of a religious cause and the advancement of other causes, such as political or ideological causes. Section 1 equates relevant threats with relevant actions, and it also equates the purpose of influencing governmental organisations with the purpose of intimidating the public, or sections of the public. The effect of section 1(3) is that the use or threat of action falling within section 1(2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not it is satisfies section 1(1)(b) (ie whether or not it is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of it).
  11. Section 1(4) deals with extra-territorial effect. 'Action' includes action outside the United Kingdom. References to any person or property are references to those wherever they are, a reference to 'the public' includes a reference to the public of a country other than the United Kingdom, and 'the government' refers to any government. Section 1(5) provides that 'In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation'.
  12. Section 3(1) of the 2000 Act provides that an organisation is proscribed if it is listed in Schedule 2 or operates under the same name as such an organisation. Section 3(2) gives the Secretary of State a power, by order, to add an organisation to Schedule 2. The Secretary of State may only exercise that power if she believes that the organisation is 'concerned in terrorism' (section 2(4)). For the purposes of section 2(4), an organisation is concerned in terrorism if it commits or participates in acts of terrorism, prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise concerned in terrorism (section 2(5)).
  13. Section 3 of the 2000 Act was amended by the Terrorism Act 2006 ('the 2006 Act'), which inserted subsections (5A) and (5B). These amendments coincided with the enactment of the offence created by section 1 of the 2006 Act and echo the language of that provision. Section 3(5A) provides that promoting or encouraging terrorism for the purposes of section 3(5)(c) includes any case in which the activities of the organisation 'include unlawful glorification of the commission or preparation…of acts of terrorism, or are carried out in a manner which ensures that the organisation is associated with statements containing any such glorification'. Section 3(5B) provides that the glorification of any conduct is unlawful for the purposes of subsection (5A) if there are persons who may become aware of it who could reasonably be expected to draw the inferences about it which are described in section 3(5B)(a) and (b). 'Glorification' and 'statement' are further explained in section 3(5C) (cf, in relation to 'glorification', the same explanation in section 20(2) of the 2006 Act).
  14. Section 11 creates the offence of belonging or professing to belong to a proscribed organisation, and section 12(1), an offence of inviting support for a proscribed organisation (other than the provision of money or other property (within the meaning of section 15)). Section 12(2) creates an offence of arranging, managing (or assisting those acts in relation to) a meeting which is known to support a proscribed organisation, to further the activities of a proscribed organisation, or to be addressed by a person who belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organisation. A person also commits an offence if he addresses a meeting and the purpose of his address is to encourage support for a proscribed organisation or to further its activities (section 12(3)).
  15. Sections 15-17 create offences in connection with fund-raising, the use and possession of property, and funding arrangements 'for the purposes of terrorism'. I have already referred to the explanation of 'for the purposes of terrorism' given in section 1(5) of the 2000 Act (such action includes 'action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation').
  16. In R (Gul) Mohammed [2013] UKSC 54, the Supreme Court decided that the definition in section 1 of the 2000 Act was wide enough to include any or all military attacks by a non-state armed group against any or all state or inter-governmental organisation armed forces in the context of non-international armed conflict.
  17. TPIMs were introduced by the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 ('the 2011 Act'). Section 1 of the 2011 Act abolished control orders. Section 2(1) of the 2011 Act gives the Secretary of State power to issue a notice imposing TPIM on a person if five conditions are met. TPIM are defined in section 2(2) as requirements which may be made in relation to a person by virtue of Schedule 1 to the 2011 Act.
  18. The five conditions are in section 3 of the 2011 Act.
  19. i Condition A is that the Secretary of State is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the person is, or has been involved in terrorism-related activity ('the relevant activity') ('TRA'). The age of past TRA may be relevant to the necessity and proportionality of any TPIM (Secretary of State for the Home Department v BM [2012] 1 WLR 2734 at paragraph 17 per Collins J).
    ii Condition B is that some or all of the relevant activity is new terrorism-related activity. 'New terrorism-related activity' is defined in section 3(6)). TRA is 'new' in the case of a person who has not previously been issued with a notice, if it occurred at any time, before or after the commencement of the 2011 Act. If one notice has already been issued to a person, it is TRA occurring after the issue of that notice, and if two or more have been issued, it is TRA occurring after the coming into force of the most recent notice. See also section 30(3).
    iii Condition C is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism for TPIMs to be imposed on the person. The Court of Appeal in MB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1140 (paragraph 63) said that necessity invokes a proportionality test. The measures it is necessary to impose may depend on what the Secretary of State is satisfied the respondent has been doing, and may depend on the Secretary of State's resources and the demands on those. They may depend on whether surveillance can be put in place. Those observations were made about control orders, but apply to TPIM since the statutory language is the same.
    iv Condition D is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the person's involvement in terrorism-related activity, for the specified measure to be imposed on the person.
    v Condition E is that a TPIM cannot be imposed unless the court gives permission. The threshold for the grant of permission is low: the court must be satisfied that the application is not 'obviously flawed' (section 6(3)).
  20. 'Terrorism-related activity' ('TRA') is defined for the purposes of the 2011 Act in section 4(1). It is 'any one or more of'
  21. a. the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism,
    b. conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation, or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so,
    c. conduct which gives encouragement to the commission, preparation, or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so,
    d. conduct which gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or believed by the individual to concerned to be involved in conduct falling within (a).

    Section 4(1) is a more elaborate provision than section 3(5) of the 2000 Act (see above), but there is significant common ground between them, in particular because section 3(5) contains a sweep-up category, that is, being 'otherwise concerned in terrorism'.

  22. Section 4(1) also provides that it is immaterial whether the acts of terrorism are specific acts of terrorism, or terrorism in general. By section 4(2) it is also immaterial for the purposes of the 2011 Act whether a person's involvement in TRA happens before or after the commencement of the 2011 Act (section 6(2)). Section 30(1) of the 2011 Act provides that 'terrorism' has the same meaning as in the 2000 Act (see section 1(1)-(4)) of that Act). Section 30(1) also provides that 'act of terrorism' includes anything constituting an action taken for the purposes of terrorism, within the meaning of the 2000 Act. Section 1(5) of the 2000 Act is referred to. Section 1(5) of the 2000 Act, as I have said, provides that a reference to an action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation.
  23. The effect of section 30(4) is that measures in a TPIM notice are not required to be measures which only restrict TRA of a kind the Secretary of State is satisfied that the respondent personally is, or has been, involved in (see Secretary of State for the Home Department v LG [2017] EWHC 2529 (Admin), paragraph 10, per Nicol J).
  24. Section 9 of the 2011 Act provides for review hearings. The function of the court on such a hearing is to review the decisions of the Secretary of State that the relevant conditions were met and continue to be met (section 9(1)). 'The relevant conditions' are conditions A-D (section 9(8)). The court must apply the principles which apply on an application for judicial review (section 9(2)). The court's powers are limited to (a) quashing the notice, (b) quashing measures specified in the notice, or (c) giving directions to the Secretary of State for, or in relation to, the revocation of the notice or the variation of the measures specified in the notice (section 1(5). If the court does not exercise those powers, the court must decide that the TPIM continues in force (section 9(6)). If the court quashes measures specified in the TPIM or varies them, the court must decide that the TPIM continues in force, subject to those modifications (section 9(7)).
  25. I have already referred to LG v Secretary of State for the Home Department. This is Nicol J's open judgment on a review of TPIM notices served on LG, IM and JM. Their cases have a similar background to LF's. In particular, the Secretary of State alleged that they were senior leaders of Al-Muhajiroun ('ALM'). The Secretary of State makes the same allegation about LF. I am not bound by Nicol J's relevant conclusions. But since they are based on the same statutory scheme and on similar facts, and were reached after argument from even more counsel than argued LF's case, I consider that I should follow them, unless I am confident that they are wrong. I will now summarise those relevant conclusions.
  26. Nicol J decided, at paragraph 10.c., that it was not necessary for the Secretary of State to be satisfied, at the time of the review hearing, that the respondent was still engaged in TRA.
  27. The parties made submissions about whether or not the court has to be satisfied, on a review in relation to Condition A, that the respondent is or was involved in TRA. Having reviewed the authorities, Nicol J decided at paragraphs 42 and 44 (pragmatically, it seems to me) to make up his own mind whether the respondent had, on the balance of probabilities, been involved in TRA. I will take the same approach, but will also indicate whether, in my judgment, the Secretary of State was and is entitled to be satisfied that condition A is met. That is the approach which the Secretary of State invites me to adopt, although I did not understand that she was necessarily endorsing that as the correct approach.
  28. At paragraph 53, Nicol J considered several arguments about the significance of the failure of the respondents to give live evidence. He decided that their witness statements were admissible even if they were not called. If they were not called, however, that could affect the weight to be given to their evidence, but it could not positively add weight to the Secretary of State's case. He considered the impact of the privilege against self-incrimination. If the respondents had given evidence, they could have exercised that privilege in order not to answer a question. But, he held, the possibility that a witness might incriminate himself while giving evidence could not excuse his failure to give evidence (paragraph 53.e.).
  29. At paragraphs 54-56 he considered the relevance of previous convictions and of the fact that the respondents had not been prosecuted for the TRA which was the subject of the TPIM notices. He held that he could not infer from a failure to prosecute the respondents that the actions alleged against the respondents must be assumed, either, not to be criminal, or to be lawful (see paragraph 56).
  30. At paragraphs 57-73, he considered an argument that the Secretary of State's purpose in serving the TPIM notices, and, in particular, in moving the respondents away from their home areas, was improper. That purpose in part at least was to deter others from taking senior leadership roles in ALM. He held that it was not an improper purpose to use the TPIM to disrupt the functioning of ALM or to deter others (paragraphs 57-73). Disrupting an individual's, and the group's, TRA were two sides of the same coin if there was a connection between the existence of the group and the risk that a respondent will engage in TRA, but a general deterrent effect was not enough on its own. This did not have the consequence that TPIMs became criminal measures (paragraph 72).
  31. Nicol J considered what significance should be attributed to the interests of respondent's children in paragraphs 74-80. He reviewed the relevant authorities. He noted that no measure incorporates the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in the TPIM regime. The interests of a respondent's child are relevant because of article 8. He concluded that 'A primary consideration' means 'a consideration of substantial importance'.
  32. LF

  33. I will not say too much about LF's history, so as to guard against the risk that its details might undermine the effectiveness of the anonymity order. LF explains in his first witness statement that he was born outside the United Kingdom and came here when he was a child. His brothers and sisters live here. He grew up in the United Kingdom, did A Levels here and qualified after an apprenticeship. He worked in the field in which he qualified for a time until he stopped in 2011 because of his health. He then claimed benefits. He worked for a few months in 2012, until difficulties led to the end of that employment.
  34. His family was 'moderately religious'. He 'connected with' his religion in 2009. He became more observant, through visiting a mosque, and heard about an Islamic Centre in Lewisham (he describes this in the talk transcribed at Document 2/1, below, and says that he first encountered Anjem Choudary at this Centre, rather than later at talks in East London). He started going to courses, to learn Arabic and to recite the Koran. He also learnt about fiqh (jurisprudence). He was invited to go to dawah stalls (a method of proselytising). He would see some of the people who are named in the TPIM notice at these stalls. He was once asked, in 2011, if he was ALM. He had never heard of 'this organisation' and asked his interlocutor what he meant.
  35. He started going to talks on Friday nights in East London. Talks were given by various people named in the TPIM notice, such as Anjem Choudary and Shahid Janjua. ALM was mentioned at these talks in passing 'on a handful of occasions'. 'It appeared to be used as a term of abuse'. LF then started to recognise 'ALM' in the media and became aware of its history, and that 'some of the brothers I saw at talks and dawah stalls had once been members of this organisation which was now proscribed'. He was referred to Paltalk talks given by 'Sheikh Omar Bakri' (that is, Omar Bakri Mohammed ('OBM')). Some of the brothers spoke about OBM as their teacher and to his activities in the United Kingdom when he lived here. LF listened to some of OBM's Paltalk talks.
  36. In about 2012, LF started to give sermons. He considered that doing dawah was a way to earn reward in his religion. He set up a YouTube channel. He also used Twitter to spread dawah. Nobody encouraged him to do this. All and sundry use them to promote their cause, so it would be surprising if LF had not used them to propagate Islam.
  37. He met and married his wife in the same year. They have two young children. They live in a housing association flat which they moved to in order to be near LF's wife's family. His wife is a full-time mother.
  38. LF denies that he is a senior leader, or member of, ALM. He made clear in one of his talks, transcribed at Document 7, that he is not a member of any organisation. He said the same thing in a tweet in December 2015 (witness statement, paragraph 34). Islam teaches that acts done collectively earn more reward than those done alone. It is better, therefore, to do dawah with others. He did his dawah with friends, some of whom he had met through the Mosque or the Islamic Centre. He also socialised with these friends. If they happened to be members of ALM, he did not know that. No Muslim he knows ever identified himself with ALM or with any other group.
  39. He denies that he has ever encouraged anyone to travel to ISIL-controlled territory, or facilitated their travel there. He is not a supporter of ISIL or of 'their self-declared Caliphate'. He has not espoused their ideology. He does not know about ALM's supposed allegiance to ISIL or to the 'so-called Caliphate'. He heard that Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman were being prosecuted for an oath of allegiance to ISIL, but knew nothing about the oath before that. He has not helped to create an extremist environment. His aim is to propagate Islam, which is a religious duty. He has never been prosecuted for his preaching. He has no role in ALM's communications or logistics.
  40. He accepts that he has 'orthodox religious views which I espouse in my talks and lectures, which may seem extremist and unpalatable to some. However I deny that I have radicalised British Muslims and vulnerable individuals'.
  41. He has never seen document 17 before (see further, below). He does not recognise the handwriting on it. He does not know how it came to be in his flat. He could have picked it up with other papers after a talk or other event, perhaps with other leaflets from a dawah stall or after tidying up at the Ilm Centre (witness statement, paragraph 35). He recognises some of the names from dawah and has met some at talks. Some he does not recognise. He can only assume that the person who made the list was listing people who did dawah. He does not believe it is anything to do with any organisation. His name is higher up the list than Anjem Choudary's or Mizanur Rahman's; but he is sure that the Secretary of State is not suggesting he was more senior to them as they were the alleged leaders of ALM.
  42. He was not arrested with the nine who were arrested for offences linked to ALM. This suggests that the police did not think he was in any way associated with ALM even though 'I was very active in the dawah by this time'.
  43. He used to go to dawah stalls every couple of weeks. He did not draft the leaflet which, he accepts, has his telephone number on it. He does not recall being asked if his number could be put on the leaflet and does not recognise the other phone number. He did not mind his number being on the leaflet, as he 'would relish being contacted by anyone who wanted to discuss the issues in the leaflets further'. He denies that the events listed in the first national security statement ('NSS1') were ALM events, but accepts that he was present.
  44. The Ilm Centre offered Islamic study classes and was also used like a community centre for weddings and so on, and as a conference centre for Islamic talks. Many, including LF, gave Islamic talks there. He posted his talks on YouTube. Though some may regard his videos as extremist 'to me they espouse an orthodox point of view'. He denies that they would radicalise people, and says that there is far more extremist material readily available on social media which would 'genuinely have a radicalising effect'.
  45. He refers to OBM as 'Sheikh' because he understands that OBM spent several years studying Islam. He does not understand how the Secretary of State has decided that LF's role increased after September 2014 as he was heavily involved in dawah before that, and his activities have not changed since then. Others whose names are mentioned in his TPIM have been very active on YouTube, but no action has been taken against them. There is no basis for the allegation that he is a senior leader of ALM.
  46. Tweeting talks is part of his dawah. It does not mean that he agrees with the contents of the talks, but rather that he considered that the recipient would be interested in the talk. He did not have a role in communications or logistics. His own talks may 'appear extremist to some, but they follow orthodox Islam and therefore it is likely that there will be some overlap with "ISIL ideology". Just because there is an overlap, for example covering up for women, prohibition of interest or alcohol, this does not mean that I agree with all the views and actions of ISIL. There are many things that, if true, I would condemn, such as the brutality of the executions carried out by ISIL'. Leaders, including Muslim leaders, should be held to account ('Evidences for the permissibility of demonstrations').
  47. His understanding of 'Khawaarij' is that it refers to Muslims who are extreme in their devotion and known for saying that other Muslims are apostates 'for committing sins which do not actually take Muslims out of the fold of Islam'. A declaration of apostasy is extremely serious as the prescribed punishment is death on conviction. He refers to a declaration by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi about ISIL's attitude to takfir. In his talk (transcribed at Document 8) he was 'rehearsing intellectual arguments about whether the khilafah or Al Baghdadi in those circumstances could be labelled as Khawaarij. This is not indicative of my support for ISIL or Baghdadi, merely of my conclusion using correct Islamic jurisprudence'.
  48. He made it clear in the talk he was not a spokesman, and had not been ordered to give the talk. He was just a student of Islam, laying out the different interpretations. He dislikes the term 'yahoody agent', because it is used lazily by Muslims who look for conspiracy theories which have no basis. He would expect an imam to be more careful, but was not defending Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.
  49. In paragraph 61 of his first witness statement he comments on his statement that ISIL were ruling by the book of Allah. He says that it seemed that ISIL were implementing only Sharia law and were saying so, but 'Of course, it is impossible to verify'. He was not saying that ISIL's interpretation of Sharia was completely accurate. ISIL 'from the limited evidence available… seemed to have all the requirements …for the functioning of a Caliphate. I, as a student of Islamic knowledge, was commenting on the facts as they appeared. That does not equate to support for ISIL or encouraging others to support it or to encourage others to travel there'.
  50. His reference to Hijrah was part of a theoretical discussion. He did not equate this Islamic teaching to the position of Muslims in the United Kingdom or suggest that there was any requirement for them to travel to ISIL controlled territory, which he did not mention. LF does not believe that conditions exist in the United Kingdom which would provide a basis for hijrah. Muslims can practice their religion freely. The Secretary of State is making 'unreasonable and unsupportable connections between issues I have spoken about in different lectures at different times to suit its narrative'.
  51. LF does not believe that his talks are 'radicalising'. The way he delivers his talks is no different from the ways in which many other people talk. As for apostasy, the hadith is clear. His comments have been taken out of context. The accusation must be verified, and the accused found guilty in a Sharia court. The accused would also be given an opportunity to repent. Many scholars hold this view. Giving a talk is not the same as encouraging such action. Many Muslim countries, many of them allies of the United Kingdom, have this punishment.
  52. His views on Islam are conservative and orthodox, 'in line with many Muslims'. They are not radicalising in nature. 'They are no different from many views expressed on social media and are in fact moderate compared to much that is available. They may not be palatable to the general public but I make no excuse for this. I am seeking to exercise my freedom of speech and religion'. His reference to the miners' strike gave a factual account to an audience who might not have been familiar with it since it happened before many were born. His speech was about using demonstrations to make views heard. It is a great leap to suggest that he was advocating violence at demonstrations. There was no violence at any demonstration to which he or his 'radicalised' audience went. His reference to 'jihad of the tongue' was to speaking out.
  53. LF denies that he has been involved in any terrorism-related activity or that a TPIM is necessary to protect the public from the risk of terrorism. All his dawah is completely controlled by him. His activities are sometimes supported by like-minded people or friends, 'but we co-ordinate between ourselves'. They are not directed by anyone. He is not and has never been a member of ALM, but any oath of allegiance given by Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman could not, in any event, bind other people.
  54. His religion obliges him to proselytise. He is merely exercising his freedom to practise his religion. His views are orthodox, not radical. The Secretary of State has selectively arranged quotations from a very few of his many sermons, out of their contexts, to give an incorrect impression of what he was saying.
  55. The activities used to justify the re-location measure in the TPIM are not terrorism-related activities. All he is doing is to propagate Islam. The TPIM is designed to stop him doing that. There is no risk that he will abscond. He has strong roots in the United Kingdom, where he grew up. He has a wife and young children, parents, sisters and brothers. His wife's family all live here too. He has been on bail before and has not absconded. He has not travelled abroad for many years and has no reason to do so now.
  56. LF describes the impact of the TPIM in paragraphs 77-97 of his first witness statement. It has taken him away from his family, in particular his young children, at a crucial time of their lives. He fears that this estrangement will mean that he cannot form strong bonds with them. He has been very much a 'hands-on' father since the birth of his children. He has spent a lot of time with them. The elder child misses LF desperately and is upset when they part. The children do not understand the reasons for the separation but LF fears that they may have feelings of abandonment.
  57. His wife does not have a driving licence and relies on LF. Her parents had been very ill (her father died in January 2017). She is more isolated from her family without LF. It is not feasible for her to move to location B with LF. LF does not want his wife and children to live under the restrictions to which he is subject. She is close to her family and relies on them for support. LF would not force her to move so far from them, and to give up their home for something that will be temporary.
  58. LF has not been able to support his wife at this difficult time. At times she cried down the phone to him and he felt full of remorse that he could not help her as he is so far away. He was only able to see her for a short time after her father's funeral. He was not willing to visit the family home with two police contact officers.
  59. LF's does not sleep very well. He wakes several times a night and has begun to have nightmares. He has decided to see a GP.
  60. He is forbidden to contact people. He does not know all the names listed in the TPIM but has been shown photographs and recognises their faces. He had little or nothing to do with them, as his ignorance of their names confirms. Some he has known for years and are good friends. He cannot have a meeting with anyone unless he tells the Home Office two days beforehand. He has to end any chance conversation in the street immediately. He has to give the Secretary of State two days' notice of any meeting he goes to, and a list of those who will be present. He finds these restrictions difficult to cope with.
  61. He wanted his wife's nephews to drive her to visit him but the Secretary of State immediately put them on a list of people LF could not associate with in case LF radicalised them or helped them to abscond. One nephew did drive her to location B, but LF could not meet him or offer him refreshments which makes it harder for his wife to visit. The TPIM has had a very isolating effect. He has very little contact with his family and none with friends. The restrictions mean that he cannot make new friends in location B. He does not want to put anyone in the position of being scrutinised by the Security Service. His wife has visited him twice. In fact it is clear that by the time of Dr Deeley's report (see below) that, LF's wife and family had also visited him for two weeks at Easter.
  62. His parents are both ill and have not visited him. He used to visit his mother once a week, and his father (who is separated from her) once or twice a week. His siblings are too busy with their own lives to visit him. He feels the TPIM has made him into a pariah. The length of the curfew period interferes with his ability to offer all his prayers at the Mosque, as the times of the prayers vary with the length of daylight. By the summer time, he will not be able to do three out of five daily prayers at the Mosque.
  63. He is not allowed to go into shops or cafés with internet access, such as Debenhams or even McDonalds. One of his children loves happy meals, so this is an issue, as he will not be able to give the child a treat if he visits location B. The restrictions on using electronic devices are a real issue. This is why he has not asked for permission to install the internet at location B; the restriction requires him to get advance permission to visit a website for the first time, so that he cannot click on links freely. The Secretary of State is also able to modify any computer and he is worried that this will affect the warranty.
  64. These restrictions also affect his ability to look for jobs, even with a recruitment consultant. All jobs are now advertised on-line. He is destitute in location B and has been refused JSA because he has an interest in the house in which his brother and family live. His wife is also on benefits and has very little money. The internet restrictions also affect his wife and children when they visit. His wife has to step outside to use the phone and his child cannot play on the child's tablet computer, which might make the child more reluctant to visit.
  65. In his second witness statement, LF comments on the second national security statement ('NSS2') (I say more about this below). He explains that he was on bail with strict conditions for about 15 months in relation to a charge of fraud. After about eight months, he breached his conditions once when he was home 30 minutes later than he should have been, because he lost track of the time. The police arrested him at 4 am, but he was given bail again by the court later that morning.
  66. His dawah was intended to wake interest in Islam, in Muslims and non-Muslims. It was not the first stage in recruitment and did not lead to a more extreme message at a later stage. If others were encouraging others to become involved in terrorism or to travel to Syria in private meetings, he was not aware of that. There was no push for people to attend other events. Halaqas are small intimate study groups of five or six people. There is no question of discussions taking place on the side lines in even smaller groups. He has never seen document 8 (see below) before. The fact that Muslims express concerns about security does not necessarily mean that they are operating outside the law. 'Muslims generally feel unfairly targeted when carrying out legitimate activities. They feel spied upon in schools, workplaces and neighbourhoods'.
  67. The Ilm Centre was run as a charity on people's donations. The Talktalk business account related to 'its' [ie the Ilm Centre's?] telephone, not ALM's. Paying the telephone bill for a short time was LF's donation to the Ilm Centre. LF does not know who wrote the account number on document 17 (see below). Assisting the Ilm Centre as a volunteer was part of LF's charitable work. The Centre was used for various community events. Friday prayers were held there. LF went and sometimes gave a sermon. Occasionally the media were invited to talks and discussions. The rent was paid through donations which were collected during the week or month. The rent was paid in cash. Sometimes LF would pay it and sometimes another volunteer would.
  68. It made sense for LF's number to be on the leaflet in case people who took leaflets from the stall wanted to speak about the issues in the leaflet. Or the leaflet might have been taken from the stall, copied, and distributed elsewhere. The presence of his phone number on the leaflet had nothing to do with seniority.
  69. The phrase 'fill the vacuum' in Mizanur Rahman's letter has to be taken in the context of the letter. He had been referring at length to LF's previous work in dawah. It is an acknowledgement of LF's work before the arrests in September 2014. As LF understands it, the reference to 'filling the vacuum' is a reference to proselytising. He finds the idea that Anjem Choudary would give allegiance to ISIL 'ridiculous'. He did not tell his audience that they did not need to tell everything to their parents in order to encourage them not to tell the truth, but to avoid distress to parents, because in the current climate they might worry about their children going to demonstrations.
  70. 'Jihad of the tongue' means holding tyrant rulers to account, not radicalising people as a legitimate means of jihad. His reference to himself as a hate preacher was a mocking, light-hearted reference to the media describing 'people who preach Islam as hate preachers'. It was not meant to be taken literally. He only recognises seven of the names mentioned in paragraph 50 of NSS2 and only knows one, Omar Brooks, well.
  71. He did not know Khuram Butt. Demonstrations were advertised on social media and anyone could turn up. No-one had any control over who turned up and 'it did not make people who turned up at events part of the same group'. Sometimes people at a demonstration would break off for their prayers and word of this would get around.
  72. He does not have a television in location B and heard about the Borough Market attack on the radio. He was appalled at the news as 'such attacks are impermissible in Islam'. He did not register who Khuram Butt was. He saw his picture when he passed a television at the fish and chip shop, thought he looked familiar, but still could not place him. It was only when he saw pictures of Khuram Butt at the demonstration in the new national security material disclosed in this case that he realised that Khuram Butt had been to the demonstration. He does not recall speaking to him and the documentary video and still bear that out. LF says that it is shocking that someone whose company he had been in 'albeit fleetingly' was 'capable of such an atrocity'. LF does not comment on the significance or otherwise of the black flag with white Arabic writing which is pictured in one of the stills of Regent's Park in which he and Khuram Butt feature. They are standing next to each other in a line of six people, and in front of them is a seventh person holding that flag.
  73. LF had never seen Al Adnani's declaration about the Covenant of Security until he saw the material served with NSS2. Now he has read he recognises some of the words from the media. LF believes in the Covenant of Security. Al Adnani's call for attacks in the West is contrary to that belief. It means that LF could never pledge allegiance to 'the ISIL-declared Caliphate' and he has not done so. Many Muslims have felt persecuted since 9/11 and that the state has not protected them. He gives examples. Nonetheless, this has not been an excuse to break the Covenant in the past and is not one now. Nor does the United Kingdom's involvement in wars where they have attacked Muslims break the Covenant in the United Kingdom. Under Islamic law, even where a legitimate Caliphate has declared war against a country so that there is no Covenant between that country and the Caliphate, Muslims in that country are still bound by their individual covenant.
  74. LF's wife

  75. LF's wife also made a witness statement. Since the birth of one of their children, she has suffered from back pain which she intends to consult her GP about. This makes it difficult for her to look after their children. It is hard to go out with them as she does not drive, and it is hard for her to use public transport for journeys as she has to look after them and carry any luggage. She used to rely on LF and now goes out much less.
  76. The effect the TPIM has had on her children has been 'heartbreaking'. LF's absence made her father's illness and death particularly difficult to cope with. She saw LF briefly at the hospital just before her father died and again at the burial. She has been deprived of her husband's comfort and support just when she needed it most. Speaking on the phone is not the same. She is not prepared to move to location B as she needs to be near her own family at the moment. She does not want to go in the longer term because she finally has found housing near her own family, and she needs their support. She is settled and one child goes to a local school. Two years is a long time, but a move would be too disruptive. She knows no-one in location B and it is culturally unfamiliar. The restrictions would mean that they could not lead a normal life. The children love to be with their father but get bored easily as they are used to using the internet for entertainment.
  77. The experts

  78. There are two experts' reports: an independent social work report from Ms Brown, and a medico-legal report from Dr Deeley.
  79. Ms Brown's report

  80. Ms Brown's report is somewhat difficult to follow in places (for example, paragraph 5.8 is rather opaque). Nonetheless, the overall point is clear. The children are apparently experiencing 'some level of trauma' as a result of their separation from LF. Their needs would be best served if they could see more of their father. Ideally he should return home. Otherwise, ideally, he should have contact with them two or three times a week. It is particularly important for younger children to be form a bond with their father. Ms Brown also says that she is concerned about the effect of the separation on LF's wife, at a time of crisis for her. This could have serious consequences for the marriage.
  81. Dr Deeley's report

  82. Dr Deeley is consultant psychiatrist. Dr Deeley sets out his letter of instruction. That includes the suggestion that the TPIM has made tensions between LF's and his wife's families worse. Relations were strained when LF moved his wife and family from his father's house to set up on their own. Relations have completely broken down since the TPIM notice was served as LF's wife is very unhappy that LF's family have not visited him in location B. It has led to strains in the relationship between LF and his wife, too.
  83. LF has two nightmares. First, he is in a big house being approached by a group of people, each with a different weapon. He shuts himself in a bedroom, thinking about how to stop the people, and then wakes up. Second, he is in court. He is going to be extradited to America. The police near him laugh about how he will be taken to Guantanamo Bay and tortured. He is frightened. He is then at an airfield, thinking about how to stop the extradition. He then wakes up. In conversation with Dr Deeley, however, LF said he had had 'two bad nightmares since moving to [location B] but this was not a regular occurrence'.
  84. He also suffers from sleeplessness, waking suddenly because he thinks that the doorbell has just rung. He eventually got a prescription for an effective anti-depressant and sleeping tablet (in April 2017) but is worried that the medication is addictive.
  85. Dr Deeley's conclusion was that LF was suffering from a moderate depressive episode in April 2017 which improved to a mild depressive episode with medication. His 'very distressing' nightmares are 'most likely' linked to increased anxiety, but Dr Deeley did not code them separately because of their association with LF's depression. Dr Deeley describes the effects of depression on page 16 of his report. Dr Deeley advises that LF should gradually stop taking the sleeping pills, as otherwise he might develop a tolerance of them. The dose of anti-depressant could be increased under the supervision of his GP. LF would benefit from weekly meetings with a counsellor. Dr Deeley opines that the imposition and maintenance of the TPIM have been factors in causing and continuing the episode of depression and anxiety. The main causal factor is the residence requirement. His symptoms would significantly improve if he were surrounded by his family and friends.
  86. The case against LF

  87. The case against LF is in national security statements that relate to his case, and in statements dealing with ALM, the first two of which were also used in the TPIM review hearings in the cases of LG, IM and JM. Since LF's alleged role in ALM is a key part of the case against him, it is logical to start with a summary of the material in the ALM statements.
  88. The ALM Statements

  89. There is a Security Service Statement on the threat posed by ALM dated 16 May 2016 ('the ALM Statement'). It gives the Security Service's assessment of the threat posed by ALM. Paragraph 2 is echoed in the language of paragraph 5 of NSS1. Paragraph 3 describes the measures used, or proposed to be used, against ALM. The strategy of serving TPIMs at the same time is designed to disrupt individuals' TRA, to negate ALM's leadership, and, in turn, the group as a whole, and to degrade ALM's brand to ensure its disruption in the long term. The action seeks to stem recruitment by ALM in London and elsewhere.
  90. ALM was formed in 1996 by OBM, its founder and spiritual leader. He was expelled from Saudi Arabia and came to the United Kingdom in 1984. ALM's aim was and is the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate ruled by Sharia law. OBM publicly disbanded ALM in 2004, but it has continued under various guises since then. OBM went to Lebanon in 2005. On 12 August 2005, the Secretary of State cancelled OBM's indefinite leave to remain on the grounds that his presence in the United Kingdom was not conducive to the public good and excluded him from the United Kingdom. Anjem Choudary then became ALM's leader in the United Kingdom. OBM continued to be its worldwide spiritual leader.
  91. ALM (in its then guise) was proscribed under section 3 of the 2000 Act in July 2006. Further orders in 2010 proscribed later descriptions of ALM. Further descriptions were proscribed in 2011 and in 2014. ALM was proscribed because its activities were judged to promote and encourage terrorism (section 3(5A) of the 2000 Act is referred to).
  92. On 25 September 2014, because of the severity of the threat which ALM was assessed to pose, nine people were arrested under sections 11 and 12 of the 2000 Act and section 1 of the 2006 Act, for offences linked to ALM. Another person was arrested the next day. Those arrested are listed in paragraph 15 of the ALM Statement. They include Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman (also known as Abu Bara). They were then given stringent bail conditions. Those conditions were gradually relaxed and in August 2015 some were told no further action would be taken against them. Two others were told that on 15 September 2015. On 5 August 2015, Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman were charged with offences under section 12 of the 2000 Act in relation to inviting support for ISIL. They were initially remanded in custody but were later given bail. They were tried and convicted and were given sentences of five and a half years' imprisonment on 6 September 2016.
  93. Two members of ALM, Brooks and Keeler, were detained by the Hungarian authorities on 14 November 2015. They were trying to cross the border to Romania illegally. They had no travel documents. They were extradited to the United Kingdom and sentenced to two years' imprisonment for breaching orders made under the 2000 Act. Since 2013, the Royal Prerogative has been used to cancel the passports of people who are assessed to be members of ALM, including LG.
  94. Since its creation, ALM's members have engaged in public protests and demonstrations calling for the implementation of Sharia law, and in support of various other causes. They have used dawah stalls to spread the message of Islam, to recruit members and to persuade them to adopt their particular view of Islam.
  95. ISIL was proscribed in its own right in June 2014, after Al Quaeda senior leaders issued a statement in February 2014 severing ties with ISIL. ISIL was proscribed because it was said to adhere to an extreme interpretation of Islam which is anti-Western and promotes sectarian violence. It is said to aim to set up an Islamic state ruled by Sharia law in the region and to impose its rule by violence and extortion. On 29 June 2014, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi declared that he was 'Caliph' and the creation of a Caliphate in the areas under his control.
  96. The Security Service assesses that ALM has pledged allegiance to ISIL, to its leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi and to its self-declared Caliphate. Mizanur Rahman's phone was seized when he was arrested on 25 September 2014. It showed that he had a Whatsapp discussion with Anjem Choudary about the Caliphate on 29 June 2014. There is further information about the discussions among senior ALM leaders about this declaration in a document behind the update to the ALM statement dated 1 March 2017.
  97. On 7 July 2014, a document entitled '[ALM] pledge allegiance to the Islamic State' was posted on an Indonesian website hosted by 'M Fachry' (who is assessed to be Mohammed Fachry, a senior leader of ALM Indonesia). This document declares that Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi's Caliphate is a legitimate Caliphate and proclaims ALM's allegiance to it. The pledge 'instructs' all Muslims living in non-Muslim lands who cannot apply Islamic rules to leave and migrate to the Caliphate. It says that it is an 'obligation of every Muslim …to pledge their allegiance to the Islamic Caliphate'. This pledge is assessed to show ALM's position towards the Caliphate. It is also assessed that ALM will promote that point of view to people whom they seek to recruit and influence, while being careful not to promote that message too publicly, for fear of repercussions from the authorities.
  98. The pledge was signed by Abu Yaha (Spokesman of ALM), Abu Bara (Student of OBM) and Abu Luqman (Naqib - Lawyer of OBM). These are the kunyas, respectively, of Mohammed Fachry, Mizanur Rahman and Anjem Choudary. It was also signed by OBM (Amir of ALM). This pledge is assessed to have been a logical step for ALM.
  99. Since its declaration of a Caliphate, ISIL's influence has been shown through an unprecedented number of attacks round the world. In 2015, there were 509 ISIL-linked attacks. 55 were ISIL 'core' attacks and 454 were ISIL branch attacks. They included
  100. i the murder of 38 people (30 of them British) on a beach near Souasse, Tunisia, in an attack claimed by ISIL; a tourist area was specifically targeted;
    ii on 31 October 2015, flight 9268 from Sharm el-Sheikh to St Petersburg crashed in North Sinai as a result of an improvised explosive device ('IED'), killing 224 passengers and crew; that attacked was claimed by IS-Sinai and reported to have been helped by an insider who put the IED in the plane's luggage compartment;
    iii on 13 November 2015, six different parts of Paris suffered terrorist attacks in a complex and co-ordinated operation; 130 people were killed and 351 hurt; ISIL claimed responsibility on 14 November 2015 and celebrated it in the twelfth edition of its English language magazine, Dabiq.
  101. The number and scale of attacks show the extent of the threat posed by ISIL to the United Kingdom and to British citizens (here and abroad). As well as external attacks, in 2014 ISIL murdered several Western hostages who had been kidnapped in Syria, including Alan Henning and David Haines. It still holds John Cantlie. It beheaded its captives and burnt to death a Jordanian pilot, Muadh al-Kasabeh, after his plane crashed in Syria on 24 December 2014.
  102. ISIL's prominent media profile and propaganda lead the Security Service to assess that those who go to Syria of their own accord or who encourage others to, must have views which are aligned with those of ISIL, and are showing their support for ISIL's ideas. At the moment ISIL are trying to inspire, enable, and direct attacks in Western countries. The Security Service assesses that people who join, or who encourage others to join, ISIL, know enough about what ISIL does and aims to do to know that they are supporting a brutal extreme Islamist regime which has murdered several British Citizens and conducted significant terrorist attacks abroad.
  103. ISIL's spokesman, Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani, has released several speeches in which he has called for attacks against the West, the first on 21 September 2014 ('Indeed Your Lord is Ever Watchful' ('Indeed…')), which calls for attacks against disbelievers, civilian and military. He said, '…If you are not able to find an IED or bullet…smash his head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with a car, or throw him down from a high place, or choke him, or poison him'. The Security Service's assessment is that 'Indeed…' was designed to encourage people to do unsophisticated attacks in their home countries, and therefore, that those who encourage ISIL's views and aims are 'by extension' also encouraging terrorist attacks against the United Kingdom.
  104. On 1 July 2014, police recovered material from Mizanur Rahman's phone which showed that Siddhartha Dhar sent 'Indeed…' to Mizanur Rahman and Anjem Choudary, among others. Anjem Choudary confirmed that he had read it, but told Dhar to be cautious about forwarding it as it 'could be trouble'.
  105. OBM is still ALM's spiritual leader. In September 2013, Mizanur Rahman became a leader of ALM along with Anjem Choudary. The Security Service assesses that since the pledge of allegiance to ISIL, it is likely that Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi is seen as ALM's ultimate Emir. The Security Service assesses that, apart from these figures, ALM's structure is fluid. People move towards and away from prominence from time to time. When Mizanur Rahman's phone was seized in September 2014, a photograph of a hand-written organogram of 'the cultural committee' was found on it. It records various responsibilities, including 'books' and 'stall material', and a 'core team'. The Security Service assesses that the 'cultural committee' is the same as ALM as all those listed on the organogram are ALM members. The 'core' section includes Anjem Choudary, Mizanur Rahman, Brookes, Keeler, and Maher Zein. The fact that they are shown in the 'core' section shows that, when the organogram was written, they were senior members of ALM. LF's name is not listed specifically on the organogram, although 'Others' are referred to in the same column as 'Stall Material'. This suggests there are other ALM members whose names are not listed on the organogram.
  106. The arrests of Anjem Choudary and of Mizanur Rahman on 5 August 2015 and the restrictions later imposed by the conditions of their bail left a vacuum at the top of ALM. ALM nonetheless continued to function during this period. Since their arrest, no one person has emerged as leader of ALM; instead, various people have filled different roles. The assessment of the Security Service is that no one person has the skills required to make him an effective leader, and that ALM members do not agree about who should lead it.
  107. The assessment of the Security Service is that ALM wants to impose an Islamic Caliphate, ruled by Sharia. ALM has always used dawah stalls to spread its interpretation of Islam to the public, and used the stalls as a way of recruiting members for ALM and, to use the Security Service's word, 'radicalising' them. ALM members have appeared on the television, and ALM are prolific users of social media (in particular YouTube, Paltalk and Twitter). This ensures that ALM's extreme views reach a wide audience.
  108. ALM's use of dawah stalls was shown in a Channel 4 documentary called 'the Women of ISIS'. An undercover journalist went to a dawah stall where two women referred her to a senior member of ALM. She was invited to a 'sisters' circle' which supported ISIL. The Security Service's assessment is that the sisters' circle is linked to ALM.
  109. The assessment of the Security Service is that ALM poses two types of threat. The first is the risk of the recruitment and 'radicalisation' of people, particularly those who are young and vulnerable. The second is said to be the 'environment created' by senior ALM leaders which leads to people travelling to ISIL controlled areas, or carrying out attacks in the United Kingdom.
  110. It is the assessment of the Security Service that people linked with ALM have travelled to, or tried to travel to Syria, mostly to join ISIL. Its assessment is that everyone who travels to ISIL controlled areas is a security concern. Once there, those people have openly called for attacks in the United Kingdom. The ALM statement dated 16 May 2016 describes the activities of three ALM members who travelled to Syria in 2014, including Siddhartha Dhar, who has been identified in the media as a masked person in an ISIL propaganda video released on 3 January 2016, which shows the murder of five people and which calls for attacks on the United Kingdom. Another, Hussain, has a significant on-line presence. He has openly defended beheadings and called on British Muslims to 'rise up' against the United Kingdom. The Security Service's assessment is that he is calling for attacks in the United Kingdom.
  111. Analysis of Mizanur Rahman's phone showed four audio clips sent to him by LG. These messages focus on Hijrah, and support for the Caliphate. They were recorded by Hussain to encourage British Muslims to travel to the Caliphate. The messages were sent by Hussain to Yousaf Syed who sent them to LG, who sent them to Mizanur Rahman. This shows the direct links between ISIL and ALM senior leaders.
  112. Three ALM members have tried, and failed, to travel to Syria: Coe, Keeler and Small.
  113. The assessment of the Security Service is also that ALM senior leaders have influenced, encouraged or given tacit approval to attack plans. Four are described, as examples, in the ALM statement dated 16 June 2017: those of Ziamani, Syed (Nadir Ali and Yousaf) Khalil and Hamayoon, S (a fifteen-year old) (who had significant contacts with LG), and Junead Khan. Although by the time they carried out their attack on Fusilier Lee Rigby, they had left ALM, Adebolajo and Adebowale were first exposed to extreme ideas by their contact with ALM members.
  114. A further, more recent example, is Khuram Butt, one of the people who carried out the London Bridge attack on 3 June 2017 in which eight people were killed and 48 were hurt (third update to the NSS on ALM dated 30 June 2017). The assessment of the Security Service is that Butt and LF were members of ALM at the same time, and that it is likely that they knew one another. Butt's attack is said to be 'indicative of the type of attack that the environment created by and the rhetoric engendered by ALM can engender'. Its assessment also is that recent Islamist terrorist attacks might inspire other members of ALM to do terrorist extremist attacks in the United Kingdom.
  115. The Security Service considers that TPIMs against ALM's senior leaders will disrupt those leaders' terrorism-related activity, disrupt the national leadership of ALM, and thus the group as a whole, and degrade ALM's brand to ensure that the disruption is long-term. Those three aims are further explained in the ALM statement dated 16 May 2016.
  116. Such disruption will also help 'to safeguard vulnerable individuals and communities' by protecting them from 'highly influential and effective radicalisers'. TPIM notices are needed against senior leaders to disrupt the media and on-line presence of ALM's senior leaders, and thus, their national influence, and their ability to recruit nationally. The activities of those who, in the assessment of the Security Service, are also senior leaders of ALM, have been disrupted by their imprisonment or by the terms of their bail conditions.
  117. In September 2014, ten senior members of ALM were arrested for terrorism offences, and given stringent bail conditions, including forbidding contact with other arrestees. This made life more difficult for ALM. Dhar is thought to have left the United Kingdom after his arrest and is in ISIL-controlled territory. During this period the Security Service assesses that LF's standing in ALM rose, to the extent that he is now considered to be a senior leader. He was not arrested in September 2014 and was thus free to contact others. Despite his bail conditions, Anjem Choudary is thought to have met Coe on 21 November 2015. Restrictions imposed by the court and/or bail conditions failed to stop Keeler and Brookes from travelling to Hungary, where they were arrested on 25 November 2015. They were extradited to the United Kingdom and sentenced to two years' imprisonment.
  118. An up-date on the ALM statement dated 1 March 2017 deals with ALM's stance on the Covenant of Security. This up-date explains that the Covenant of Security is that, by entering a non-Muslim country or by dealing with its non-Muslim citizens, a Muslim enters into a contract of mutual security and cannot attack his non-Muslim hosts. The contract can be broken, however if a Muslim considers that he has been persecuted by his non-Muslim host or the host has failed to protect another Muslim or Muslims generally. People who adhere to an extreme strand of Islam can easily decide that they are being persecuted in by the United Kingdom and that attacks on the United Kingdom are therefore allowed. If people decide that the Covenant of Security no longer applies, the risk of domestic attacks increases. There have been a number of attacks since 2014 in which ALM members have been involved to some extent, which suggests that some people consider that the Covenant of Security no longer applies. The assessment of the Security Service is that there is a significant risk to national security in that more ALM members will try to do attacks in the United Kingdom.
  119. On 22 September 2014 it appears from an exchange of messages that Dhar and Mizanur Rahman considered that the Covenant still applied. By January 2016, Dhar, who had fled from the United Kingdom, was calling for attacks on the United Kingdom, suggesting that he had changed his mind on that topic by then. The Security Service assesses that some members of ALM interpret the pledge of allegiance to ISIL as a rejection of the Covenant of Security (because ISIL has called for attacks on the West). ALM's pledge to ISIL is arguably incompatible with the Covenant of Security. The assessment is that the pledge of allegiance includes advocating attacks in the United Kingdom.
  120. The ALM statement describes 'disruptions' to ALM's leaders since June 2016. In particular, on 20 June, LG, IM and JM were served with TPIM notices. In June 2016, LF received an eight-month sentence of imprisonment for fraud. On 28 July Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman were convicted of offences under the 2000 Act and on 6 September 2016, they were sentenced to five and half years' imprisonment each. LF was released from prison on 31 October 2016 and immediately served with a TPIM notice. Paragraph 6 of this statement lists the ALM members who have been the subject of further disruptions, such as being arrested, and remanded in custody or on bail, or being the subject of a search warrant. Convictions are listed in paragraph 6j.-l. of this statement.
  121. The Security Service considers that there is a significant risk of attacks linked to ALM in the United Kingdom. If the TPIM against LF were lifted, the Security Service assesses that he could 'play a key role in re-energising the group and would be likely to return to his role in ALM enabling them to espouse their extreme Islamist extremist views and encourage individuals to engage in Islamist extremist activity'.
  122. The first National Security Statement dated 6 October 2016

  123. In the first national security statement ('NSS1') the Secretary of State asserted that the five statutory conditions for making a TPIM were met. She relied on three core allegations in support of her application for a TPIM.
  124. i LF was a member and senior leader of 'the proscribed terrorist group known as [ALM]' which has pledged it allegiance to [ISIL]. MI5 assessed that he had a leading role in communications and logistics for ALM.
    ii He encouraged, and (through radicalisation) facilitated the travel of others to join ISIL in ISIL controlled territory. LF was said to be a supporter and advocate of the proscribed organisation ISIL and its self-declared caliphate in Syria and Iraq. ISIL is a terrorist organisation responsible for directing and inspiring 509 terrorist attacks worldwide in 2015, including against UK interests. Through his public profile, LF encourages others to adopt ISIL's ideology. Through radicalisation and rhetoric, he has created an environment which would prompt others to travel to the Caliphate to join ISIL.
    iii Conduct amounting to radicalisation: it is assessed that LF gives talks and lectures which are of a radicalising nature, some of which are posted on-line on YouTube. It is further assessed that LF's videos on YouTube have a radicalising effect on British Muslim and vulnerable individuals.
  125. 'Radicalisation' is not a word which is used in the 2011 Act. The Security Service's definition appears in the glossary to NSS1: 'The Security Service defines radicalisation as the process by which people come to support violent extremism, and, in some cases, join terrorist groups. Non-violent radicalisation is not included in this definition as this form of radicalisation falls outside the scope of Security Service investigations'. 'Radicaliser' is defined as 'an individual who influences others to engage in, maintain and deepen their involvement in violent extremist and terrorist activity. Radicalisers are not necessarily manipulative or exploitative, but they can often display positive behaviours which make them more appealing'.
  126. Paragraph 5 of NSS1 says that the Secretary of State's assessment is that senior ALM leaders have created an environment in which ALM members, particularly those who are young and vulnerable or do not have a firm grasp of Islamic theology, are being radicalised by Islamist extremist propaganda. ALM's senior leaders have influenced, encouraged, facilitated and given tacit approval to individuals seeking to travel to ISIL-controlled territory, where they subsequently pose a threat to UK national security. 'In addition we assess that this strong radicalising influence has driven some individuals to the point of carrying out terrorist attacks in the UK. We assess that ALM's tacit encouragement of others to carry out attacks constitutes a significant change in the group's stance, and is a development in ALM's thinking since early to mid-2014, in line with the rise of and the group's allegiance to, ISIL and the so-called Caliphate. We assess that ALM's allegiance to ISIL and its aims means that the group now poses a significant radicalising threat in the UK'.
  127. Paragraph 6 of NSS1 says that LF's activities have helped to create this extreme environment that facilitates the commission, preparation and instigation of terrorist acts, whether in the UK, Syria or elsewhere. His ALM role in communications and logistics enabled the group to remain organised and to 'perpetuate'. In addition, the extremist messages he delivers through his talks and lectures run the risk of radicalising individuals and encouraging them to commit or instigate acts of terrorism.
  128. Importantly, in my view, paragraph 7 of the NSS1 categorises LF's involvement in TRA by saying that LF's TRA satisfies two conditions for the purposes of section 4 of the 2011 Act. They are
  129. i 4(b) conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation, or instigation of [TRA], or which is intended to do so;
    ii 4(c) conduct which gives encouragement to the commission, preparation, or instigation of [TRA] or which is intended to do so.

    Here the Secretary of State makes an explicit link between her allegations against LF and the language of the 2011 Act.

  130. NSS1 then sets out, in chronological order, the matters relied on in support of the positive case for the TPIM. The second National Security Statement ('NSS2') dated 16 June 2017 responds to LF's first witness statement and brings the case up to date. It says that the Secretary of State continues to rely on the assessments in NSS1.
  131. Paragraph 10 of NSS1 refers to the assessment that LF is a prominent member and senior leader of the proscribed group known as ALM. Paragraph 10 refers to the ALM Statement. On 8 December 2015, LF was arrested for mortgage fraud (he was in due course convicted and sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment). His home was searched, and a document was found ('document 17'). On one side was a list of names, including his and those of the people who were arrested in September 2014 for offences of membership of and support for, a proscribed organisation. The Security Service assesses that this is likely to be a document about the administration of ALM, and that it indicates that LF is a member of ALM. Names of prominent members of ALM are near the top: LF, Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman. On the other side of the paper is a list of names written in an apparently different hand, in two columns, and at right angles to those columns, a hand written 0800 telephone number (which is written twice, with 'customer service' next to the second entry) a bank account number, two further numbers which look like telephone numbers and '£11.99 ends 31/4/2016 30 March reference. 15770509'.
  132. LF featured in a Channel 4 documentary 'ISIS: the British Woman Supporters Unveiled'. He is seen at a demonstration with other 'known ALM affiliates' including senior members of ALM. The assessment of the Security Service is that the fact that LF was shown in the documentary indicates his relationship with other ALM members. LF has been to many ALM events and has been seen with prominent members of ALM many times. Examples are given in paragraph 13 of NSS1. A flyer handed out at a Dawah stall in Stratford on 28 February 2015 gave two contact numbers for recipients to ring if they had any questions: Anjem Choudary's and LF's. A further example is that LF introduced the speaker, Anjem Choudary at an Islamic meeting on 14 July 2015 at which Anjem Choudary gave a talk on the duty of Muslims to take part in jihad. These are said to support an assessment that LF is a member and senior leader of ALM.
  133. Until December 2015 ALM met regularly for talks at the Ilm Centre at 11 Hessel Street, London E1. LF is assessed to have given talks there, some of which have been posted on YouTube. He also has a public YouTube channel on which he posts lectures. I say more about these, below. The Security Service assessment is that material in these is 'extremist in nature and…would have a radicalising effect on individuals'.
  134. NSS1 notes that in his talks, LF refers to 'Sheikh Omar'; assessed to be OBM. It is assessed that 'Sheikh' indicates that LF considers OBM a leader (that is, the leader of ALM), and that LF is thus indicating his support for ALM through his support for OBM. LF is assessed to be a close associate of many leading members of ALM, including Anjem Choudary, and to hold a senior leadership position. It is accepted that LF is not named on the organogram found on Mizanur Rahman's phone, but the assessment is that LF's became more important after the arrests in September 2014, as he was not a banned associate of any of those ALM members, and thus free to meet them. Since the arrests of Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman, no single person has emerged as leader of ALM; various people have run it between them.
  135. LF's role in communications and logistics is set out in paragraphs 19-20 of NSS1. This involves the use of various Twitter accounts to advertise Paltalks in the 'UK Dawah' room, which are assessed to be linked to ALM. His advertising of ALM talks is assessed to show his leading role in communications and logistics for ALM.
  136. Section D of NSS1 is headed, 'Encouraging and (through radicalisation) facilitating the travel of others to join ISIL in ISIL controlled territory'. The assessment of the Security Service is that LF encourages support for the 'Caliphate' in Syria, and that his propaganda has 'helped to create an environment that could prompt others to adopt ISIL's ideology and/or to travel to ISIL-controlled territory.' Any person going there shows 'a commitment to a brutal Islamist extremist regime which advocates violence against the West and therefore has an extremist mindset'. It is the view of the Security Service that anyone who is prepared, 'through rhetoric or otherwise, to promote travel to ISIL-controlled territory is demonstrating a level of commitment and support to terrorism similar to those who have travelled'.
  137. In paragraph 22, NSS1 refers to talks in which it is assessed that LF has expressed support for Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi and thus for ISIL. In paragraph 23, NSS1 describes the Security Service's assessment that LF has publicly encouraged travel to ISIL-controlled territory, by reference to an article in the Daily Express, and an associated video. In the video, LF says that many people are choosing to go to Islamic State because many people there really understand Islam and it is the only place in the world that is fully, 100%, implementing the law of Allah. He makes the same point in the talk transcribed at Document 8; 'Muslims in the Caliphate, they are the only ones on the face of this earth on a state level, they are the ones ruling by the book of Allah'.
  138. In a later talk, transcribed at Document 13, he said that, 'If you cannot worship Allah and fear him and stick to his commands in one place, go somewhere else, where you won't be forced to disobey Allah'. The Security Service assess that these public statements encourage others to travel to ISIL-controlled territory, and that these statements would have a powerful impact on vulnerable people and would, in fact, encourage them to travel there.
  139. Section E of NSS1 is headed 'Conduct amounting to radicalisation'. LF's talks appeal to people's emotions by showing anger towards the British Government and the treatment of British Muslims in the United Kingdom, and the pride they would feel in being part of this struggle. He comes across as accessible and down-to-earth. He relates 'ideology' to current affairs and popular culture. He uses these methods to engage with various audiences on-line and in person, to influence them to adopt his 'Islamist extremist views'. NSS1 then gives examples from LF's talks of references to capital punishment for apostasy (ie changing one's religion from Islam to another religion such as Christianity). His belief that it is justifiable to kill a person for leaving Islam is 'indicative of his Islamist extremist views'. It is assessed that the video is likely to have a 'radicalising effect on vulnerable individuals'. Taking two talks together (transcribed at Document 8 and at Document 11) is said to yield the conclusion that LF is expressing support for the killing of Muslims who do not take offence at the depiction of Mohammed in a cartoon.
  140. Paragraph 28 of NSS1 refers to the use of inflammatory language throughout, to encourage the separation of Muslims from non-Muslims. This language could have a 'radicalising effect on vulnerable individuals'. Examples are given. Paragraph 29 refers to 'Evidences for the permissibility of demonstrations' which is said to show support for violence at demonstrations, and thus encourage others to hold that view. LF refers to jihad through the tongue, which is assessed to mean 'radicalising and encouraging others to hold Islamist extremist viewpoints as legitimate ways of doing jihad'.
  141. NSS1 then deals in section F with the future risk posed by LF and the necessity of the TPIM. The assessment of the Security Service is that LF has been involved in TRA and that a TPIM is necessary to prevent the public from the risk of terrorism. He is a senior leader of a group which, since early to mid-2014, has posed an increased threat to national security in line with the rise of, and the group's allegiance to, ISIL. The Security Service's assessment is that LF has adopted ISIL's 'ideology' and is an advocate of the 'Caliphate'. ISIL's role in directing terrorist attacks is described again. The Security Service assesses that LF is a longstanding extremist member of a proscribed organisation, ALM, and that since 2014, he has been a prominent member. If not subject to a TPIM notice, it is assessed that LF would continue to engage in TRA which is inspired or directed by ISIL. He would have freedom to continue his activities and to stay in contact with his extremist associates in the United Kingdom and overseas.
  142. It is considered that a TPIM with a relocation requirement is the best way of disrupting LF's extremist activities. It would prevent him from being a leader of ALM, reduce his ability to shape and direct ALM as a group by organising meetings and events, 'mitigate his ability to radicalise others' and prevent him from creating an environment which encourages others to travel to ISIL and engage in terrorism.
  143. Paragraph 37 refers to ALM's creation of an environment in which ALM members 'particularly those who are young and vulnerable or who do not have a firm grasp of Islamic theology are being radicalised by Islamist extremist propaganda'. ALM's senior leaders have 'influenced, encouraged, facilitated and given tacit approval to individuals seeking to travel to ISIL-controlled territory, where they pose a threat to national security'. This strong 'radicalising influence has driven some individuals to…carrying out terrorist attacks in the UK'.
  144. Paragraphs 39-47 explain the justification for the measure requiring LF to stay overnight in a place which is not his home. Paragraphs 48-51 deal with article 8 factors. An attached nine-page schedule gives details of each of the measures and of the justification for each.
  145. The second national security statement ('NSS2') is dated 16 June 2017. The Secretary of State continues to rely on the assessments in NSS1, and still considers that a TPIM is necessary to manage the risk posed by LF.
  146. The Security Service do not accept LF's assertions that ALM has ceased to exist, or that he did not know that his friends were members of ALM. LF is still assessed to be one of the senior leaders of ALM. It is not only people who have been appointed as Emir who are in that category. The three most senior people are OBM, Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman. The Security Service assesses that LF would have known about the document by which ALM pledged allegiance to ISIL and that he would have known about that pledge.
  147. Paragraph 17 gives further examples of ALM events attended by LF.
  148. The Security Service does not accept LF's assertion in in the talk transcribed at Document 7 or in his witness statement that he does not belong to any group. This is a public misdirection. It is accepted that some of LF's contact with members of ALM may be social, but the relationships are not purely social and reflect a 'sharing of ALM's Islamist extremist ideology'. Some talks, and some dawah stalls focus on 'legitimate Islamic political or religious preaching'. But the Security Service assesses that ALM uses dawah stalls as a first stage in a process of recruitment and radicalisation. The approach is designed not to intimidate people or to attract attention from the authorities, but to attract people to whom a more extreme message can then be given. As JB put it in his evidence, the aim is to find people with whom the initial message 'resonates'. JB referred more than once in his evidence to the 'layering' of the message.
  149. It is accepted that the Ilm Centre is to some extent used for legitimate activities. 'Halaqas' are study circles. They are an important part of ALM's process of recruitment and radicalisation. It is assessed that 'Islamist extremist discussions may take place an event in smaller groups on the side-lines of a main event.
  150. Paragraph 23 describes a handwritten note seized when an ALM member was arrested. Its title is 'How to build contacts' and 'recruitment process' ('document 8'). It summarises a sophisticated process, which is assessed to form 'ALM's recruitment and radicalisation process'. It describes the halaqa system as part of the five stages of recruiting 'Jammah'. It refers to ALM's possible targets, including university students. Safe topics are discussed until a person is trusted. Number 2 in the document says 'Study him for security concerns'.
  151. Paragraph 30 refers to LF's bank statements which were seized when he was arrested. There are transactions between May and September 2015 which are described as 'Talktalk business'. The account number is the same as the account number written on document 17. The Security Service assesses that it is likely that LF has seen document 17 (though he says in his first witness statement that he has never seen it before). The Security Service assesses that this business account relates to an account for ALM and that the bank statement is evidence of LF's financial role for ALM. Financial documents were also seized from LF's home, including invoices and receipts for the Ilm Centre from December 2014 to December 2015. Sums up to £3000 were paid in cash. The Security Service assesses that LF was involved in paying the rent for the Ilm Centre, showing that he had a leading financial role in ALM.
  152. In support of its assessment that LF was a senior leader of ALM after the nine arrests in September 2014 and the charging of Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman on 5 August 2015, the Security Service relies on a letter seized from LF's house on 6 December 2015. It was dated 2 September 2015 and written to LF by Mizanur Rahman from Belmarsh Prison where he was on remand (document 2). In document 2, Mizanur Rahman says, 'News of your dawah and steps to fill the vacuum have reached me'. This indicates LF's increasing prominence in ALM after the arrests and charges, and that LF is a senior leader in ALM. I note that Mizanur Rahman says in the letter that the news has reached him in letters he has received all the way from America.
  153. The Security Service continues to rely on its assessments in section D of NSS1. NSS2 notes that LF does not condemn ISIL's actions. The assessment is that in the talk transcribed at Document 8 LF was defending Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi against potential criticism, and that this indicates his support for Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi and for ISIL. The Security Service also interprets the reference to a yahoody agent in in the talk transcribed at Document 7 as a defence of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, which indicates LF's allegiance to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. The Security Service stands by its assessment that LF has encouraged travel to ISIL-controlled territory. LF deliberately avoids explicit support for ISIL in his videos, but 'the message and rhetoric that he espouses promotes an Islamist extremist ideology which encourages support for ISIL'. He chooses his words carefully to avoid prosecution. The Security Service continues to rely on its assessment that LF, as a senior leader of ALM, is 'an influential Islamist extremist'. His talks influence people to adopt his ideology. He uses public fora to draw people in and then seeks to cement the relationship in person in more private settings. The Security Service accepts that some of his videos are not extremist. Some reflect his awareness of security.
  154. Overall, the assessment is that LF is an Islamist extremist who has been involved in TRA, and the TPIM is necessary to protect the public from the risk of terrorism. If LF is moved away from London, there is less chance that ALM will be an effective organisation when LF returns. Strategies to disrupt ALM will be more effective if LF is not present and ALM is more likely to be damaged. There is a risk that LF's views will be reinforced by the TPIM. But the TPIM has removed him from like-minded people. The Security Service assesses that LF was 'heavily influenced' by his extremist associates with whom he surrounded himself, and that this supports the relocation measure.
  155. The Security Service notes the changes in ALM leadership during 2016, including the service of the TPIM notices on LG, IM and JM, the imprisonment of Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman, the service of the TPIM notice on LF and the recall to prison of Brookes, and other disruptions experienced by ALM members. The assessment of the Security Service is that the service of the TPIM notices and the convictions of Choudary, Rahman and Brookes will send a strong message that the authorities will not tolerate the activities of ALM's senior leaders and of ALM. People will be less likely to engage with ALM as a result.
  156. Were the TPIM revoked, LF could play a role in 're-energising' ALM. Relocation is necessary for the effective management and successful implementation of the TPIM. LF lived near other ALM figures. In November 2015 Choudary breached his bail conditions by meeting Coe. The breach was easier to commit because many ALM members live close to one another.
  157. The Secretary of State served an addendum to NSS2 on 16 June 2017. This referred to the attack at London Bridge. Stills from two television documentaries show Khuram Butt, one of the London Bridge attackers, at a demonstration outside Regent's Park Mosque on 31 July 2015. LF was also there. The stills show that LF and Khuram Butt then went to Regent's Park in a group of seven people. They were filmed there with a black flag with white Arabic script written on it. The Security Service's assessment is that LF and Khuram Butt were both members of ALM at the time, and that it is likely that they knew one another.
  158. LF's talks

  159. LF's talks were given to live audiences, recorded, and then put on YouTube. JB's evidence was that LF gave at least 41 talks over the course of about a year. JB said that LF is very careful about his choice of words ('he seeks to avoid the law' and has 'arms' length deniability which he hides behind'), and that part of the purpose of the talks is to make certain messages public in order to 'resonate with' and attract receptive listeners to engage further with ALM in private. The purpose is to identify such people, as they are the potential recruits. It is a sophisticated radicalising environment in which people are indoctrinated in such a way as to feel that they have reached their own conclusions. Equally, some people would be repelled, and not engage further. ALM are absolutely deliberate in what they do. If you read all the talks, JB said, you cannot conclude otherwise than that Britain is not a suitable place for Muslims to live, and that ISIL-controlled territory is.
  160. JB said that LF adopts a layered approach in the talks. The talks promote ideas which make people more likely to decide to go to Syria or to engage in terrorism themselves. LF has not expressly encouraged anyone to engage in terrorism in the United Kingdom but he knows absolutely that some people will – see the five attacks by people linked to ALM which had been stopped. The talks have to be understood as a whole, and it is not implausible to read two together, even if they were given six weeks apart. When LF refers to living under Sharia, he is not talking about this as an abstract idea, but he means living under Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi's Caliphate. JB said that LF's ideas are 'powerful and dangerous', and there was a risk that young and vulnerable people would be influenced by them. 'Hijra', a term used to mean 'migration', is the exact term used by ISIL to mean travel to ISIL-controlled territory. LF does not use that word in in the talk transcribed at Document 13, but that is what he is talking about. I note that in paragraph 24 of his first witness statement, LF uses the word 'Hijra' in this context. JB said that LF was careful not to use the word 'Syria' in that talk, nor did he say 'not Syria'. ISIL is the most violent extremist group on the planet. You cannot support ISIL and not, also, support violence. You cannot support ISIL as a legitimate Caliphate and not also support violence. If you support ISIL publicly, your support for violence is 'absolutely clear'.
  161. ALM has to recruit new members and dawah stalls are part of that recruitment. Any dawah done by LF was done for ALM. Dawah is a mainstream Islamic concept, but is also a critical part of ALM's method.
  162. LF's standing as a senior leader is significant; people see his influence in the group; he is aware of his own influence and uses it. He studied under OBM and has links to the other figures in ALM. He leads the halaqas. A range of factors play into and give weight to his words. JB listed several factors in his evidence, which, he said, supported the assessment that LF had engaged in radicalisation in private meetings. The Channel Four documentary about the Women of ISIS showed how the process of radicalisation works. The process may take some time. People look to LF for advice; LF must know the harm that people will come to if they follow his advice, he knew he was addressing young and vulnerable people, and that they might interpret his comments as support for ISIL. In short, none of this is accidental. The logical conclusion some will draw from LF's talks is that some will travel to Syria. The videos are of halaqas and what cannot be seen is conversations before and after the talks, and the dynamic in the room. Document 8 shows that it is a gentle process and that is why it is so successful. It would be ludicrous to expect ALM, in the flyer, which is the first stage of recruitment, to show their underlying objective (support for ISIL). The flyer was produced at a time when ALM had to be particularly careful.
  163. JB's assessment was that while some legitimate events happened in the Ilm Centre, it was not open to the community at large. ALM had control over it, based on the payment of the phone bill and rent. Any event there would happen with the approval of the senior leaders. ALM could show its legitimacy and increase its influence by controlling the Centre. The halaqas for women shown in the Women of ISIS were in the Ilm Centre and were hosted by the wives of senior ALM leaders.
  164. The talks are a significant part of the Secretary of State's case against LF, and I therefore consider that I should examine them in some detail. They are relevant both to whether the Secretary of State was entitled to serve and maintain the notice and to my decision whether, on the balance of probabilities, LF has engaged in TRA.
  165. LF gave a talk about demonstrations which was published on 5 September 2015. His conclusion was that they are permissible in Islam. He refers to 'jihad of the tongue' which is to speak out against an oppressive ruler. The worst that can happen is that a person might be put in a cell for a night. Just because the kuffar do demonstrations does not make them haram. The word 'rings haram bells in people's heads because democracy allows demonstrations and this equates to haram'. He observes that 'the UK democracy allows freedom of religion. But if that stopped, 'we' would not stop practising religion. 'We' do not do it because democracy or David Cameron says so, but because Allah says so. 'We face a lot of oppression'. One lesson from the hadith is patience. He suggests putting the word 'demonstration' on one side and instead talking about commanding good and forbidding evil. In three separate places in the speech he advises his audience, if they do not know what to do, to 'ask people of knowledge' such as scholars and teachers.
  166. He refers to the burning (alive) of the Jordanian pilot and suggests that there is 'rare fiqh' which 'we' have studied which gives some support to this. If in doubt, the audience should ask the people of knowledge, rather than making a snap judgment. He suggests it is important to draw attention to a demonstration as people will not notice unless 'it is a bit out of control'. He refers to the miners' strikes and says 'the press only took an interest when things turned violent and got out of control'. He criticises Mr Cameron for his lack of Islamic knowledge and for trying to get 'us' to follow an Islam he says is good and not to account him (ie call him to account).
  167. A further talk of LF's, transcribed at Document 7, was published on 6 September 2015. This talk begins with an invocation of Allah. 'We testify' to various things. Allah is the only lawmaker. Anyone who makes law in competition with Allah is committing shirk, as is anyone who votes for that person. The Jews and Christians are kafir, as is anyone who calls them believers. 'Interfaith' is a belief of the kufar (believing all religions are the same). They are not: 'the Muslim is superior and no-one is higher than him'. Democracy is a shirk 'it is a satanic system which violates the sanctity of Allah…'
  168. He eventually moves to his main subject. He considers various supposed pre-conditions for a valid caliphate and whether any applies to invalidate the 'khilafa that's been announced in Sham, parts of Syria and Iraq'. He wants to see if there is 'really any basis, any evidence behind them'. He says he is not part of any group or organisation. What is legal and illegal under British man-made law is 'Complete opposite' from Allah's laws. He gives as examples worshipping an idol, drinking alcohol, marrying two wives, a website for adulterers and loans with interest. The issue is to be decided by the Koran and the Sunnah taken together. He emphasises this important principle more than once. The issue cannot be decided by kuffar laws; which is why 'we' cannot take our disputes to kuffar courts.
  169. Any condition not found in the Koran or the Sunnah is void. He says that 'you cannot lay down a condition that has no evidence behind it from the Koran or the Sunnah, or else you'll end up invalidating peoples' good deeds'. He draws on various examples of beliefs which have no foundation in the Koran or the Sunnah. Things have conditions in Islam and they have to be met for things to be valid. The Caliphate has conditions like anything else. And similarly, people can lay down conditions which are invalid. A current problem is that many people invalidate the good deeds of Muslims because of a lack of understanding and evidence. He then describes a conversation with a local Imam, who said in his sermon that no-one supported 'those people in Syria'. LF asked him if he meant Islamic State; he said yes. The first thing he said when asked for his view on Islamic State was that Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was 'a yahoody agent'. LF describes his reaction. 'you wouldn't believe, subhan'allah, my jaw dropped…I tell you, by Allah, I was going to punch him in the face'. The Imam had no evidence for this. LF says that this is an indication of someone who has a grudge. He refers to Sheikh Anjem, and then says that 'his' (ie Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi's) 'actions is opposite to someone who would be a yahoody agent': they don't declare a caliphate, implement sharia, do jihad against the taraweed and break Muslims out of prisons'.
  170. The Imam then said that they kill innocent Muslims. LF asked which innocent Muslims and the Imam referred to the Jordanian pilot. LF asks rhetorically several times if he was innocent: he used to drop bombs on the heads of Muslim men, women and children. The Imam then criticised the way the pilot was killed. LF ultimately justifies this as condign punishment for a person who had killed Muslims by burning them, but seems to distance himself from that conclusion by describing it as a 'legitimate opinion' held 'even by some scholars'.
  171. The Imam then said it can't be because there is no jihad today. LF refers to a hadith which indicates that there will always be jihad somewhere in the world. Imams like this are misguided and they misguide others, because they do not study Islam properly. He assumes his audience have not been taught these things; because people have never studied Islam 'comprehensively'. The conversation sounded as though the Imam was a classic indication of a person who has a grudge. This leads to not giving people the benefit of the doubt, looking for negative evidence, and rejecting positive evidence. Many people have a grudge against 'the people there' (ie Islamic State) 'and when they announced the khilafah they'll reject it even though they know from the signs of the conditions that the khilafah is valid'. Many have been working themselves for a caliphate, and because the one that has been announced is not theirs, will not accept it. That shows the dangers of grudges.
  172. The Imam then objected that he had never heard of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, so he could not be a caliph. That did not mean he was not legitimate. LF gives an example from everyday life. There is no evidence in the Koran and the Sunnah for any such condition. Some conditions people lay down are laughable and ridiculous. LF then considers in turn, and dismisses, other 'worries' people have brought up about Islamic State. It is ever expanding and has security and control over territory. Anyone who denies this 'maybe someone is not aware of the reality of what's taking place'. He refers again to the Jordanian pilot. It is clear from an aside in which he mentions the time in the United Kingdom that he thinks, or wishes his audience to think, that at least part of his audience is abroad. Anyone who says that they are Khawaarij is maybe someone who hates them and said so because he has a grudge against them. No-one ever said a caliphate had to have nuclear weapons to be valid: 'All this, implementing shariah and everything, you're going to throw all out of the water because they don't have nuclear weapons?' There is no evidence for that condition.
  173. As an aside he reminds his audience that they should expect Muslims to be violated outside of dar al-Islam: 'what do you expect when the kafir is in authority? They will violate you, and dishonour you and torture you'.
  174. Having described more than one of the supposed conditions as 'ridiculous' or 'ludicrous', he concludes by saying that Muslims should not lay down conditions for which there is no evidence 'or you will end up invalidating all kinds of stuff'. He repeats that you can invalidate people's good deeds in that way. Muslims should be careful and base everything, bring it back to the Koran and the Sunnah and to the 'evidences'. Muslim should study and ask. The more they do so, 'the more you'll come out of this ignorance and stop laying down conditions which has no evidence'. He hopes his audience had benefitted.
  175. It is notable that he rejects some of the supposed conditions on the grounds, among others, that they are posited by people who have or must have a grudge; in other words, by people who lack objectivity. He repeatedly stresses that there must be 'evidence' for any condition (ie evidence in the Koran and the Sunnah). Some of the reasoning he advances in support of the Caliphate seems sophistical; for example, his reasoning about the presence of the Mufti. He invites further inquiry from those who are interested. He does not in any way criticise the Caliphate or its actions. Rather, the clear purpose of this talk is to allay people's 'worries' that the Caliphate might not be valid, by examining a range of arguments used to attack its validity (some of them obvious Aunt Sallies, such as the supposed requirement that the Caliphate have nuclear weapons) and categorically refuting each of them.
  176. A further talk, transcribed at Document 8, was published on 12 October 2015. LF begins by stressing how important the talk is, that he does not want anyone to take notes, and that it will be available on YouTube at a later date. He is not a spokesperson for the Caliphate. He makes clear that by the Caliphate he means the Caliphate that has been announced in parts of what used to be Syria and Iraq, until 'Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi and the Muslims with him took the authority from those regimes. 'They' have their own spokespeople. LF is 'just a Muslim, just a student of Islam'. The Caliphate have been labelled as khawaarij (ie fanatics) and 'so very few people are speaking about this topic, especially in English. LF says 'he hates to hear batil (falsehood) being spoken or any Muslim being slandered'. He refers to Hadiths which stress the gravity of cursing a Muslim. He points out that accusations can destroy reputations; listeners 'should be very careful of accusing others of sins', and guard their tongues.
  177. The Khawaarij are a deviant sect. 'We don't want to be part of one of' those. He explicitly links this talk with the last one he gave, about verification. The best way to verify is to speak to the accused person directly (in this case, that must mean the Caliphate). It is simply an accusation. He says everyone should watch a debate on YouTube between Abu Barra (Mizanur Rahman) and Abdul Hassan in which Abu Barra reads a statement by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, which, he says, is enough to 'prove' that Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi is not Khawaarij. Anyone who 'continues to label him is slanderous… Woe to every slanderer and backbiter'. He lists 'sincere' Muslims who have been called Khawaarij: Al-Awlaki, 'Sheikh Osama', and Said Qutub. If LF were Caliph and his brother were guilty of adultery, LF would order him to be stoned to death. A lot of haters want Islam to be destroyed; they will spread lies and propaganda about Muslims, which can cause disunity unless people verify information. He refers to, and criticises a local Imam; someone who has a grudge will try to make a hadith specific to a particular person. But you can't say that for certain. He says that 'the Muslims in the Khalifa are the only ones at state level ruling by the book of Allah'. No other state does so. It is another false accusation to say that 'they only call to the book of Allah'.
  178. No-one is fighting more against the Mushriqun than the Khalifa, 'no-one is more harsh to the Mushriqun'. Rising against a leader does not make a person Khawaarij. It is wrong to say that the Caliphate have no scholars. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi is a scholar of Islam and used to teach in a university. He introduces the topic of the Jordanian pilot and laughs. He effectively makes light of the burning (alive) of the Jordanian pilot, describing debate about this as 'always popping up' and being a 'hoo hah'. He was not killed for apostasy but as retaliation. He describes, with apparent approval, the Caliphate's adoption of retaliatory capital punishments.
  179. No-one has proved to LF that the Caliphate have the beliefs of the Khawaarij. He does not believe that anyone can. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi made it clear that his beliefs are not those of the Khawaarij. Some people 'sadly' still say this of the Caliphate so that they can kill them. But the Caliphate have shown the whole world that they are not. People are deliberately calling the Caliphate Khawaarij because they have a 'grudge' against them. This grudge is 'so dangerous'. He refers to the 'dodgy' Imam. Even if he feels under pressure from the kuffar to speak ill of the Caliphate, because the kuffar don't like them and think they are terrorists and extremists, the Imam is a coward. He impugns the motives of the Imam for saying that the Caliphate is Khawaarij when he knows that they are not; he is afraid that his Mosque will be shut and he will lose his funding. That is another reason why people make false accusations against the Muslims in the Caliphate. LF sees more of the Khawaarij in those who make that accusation than in the Caliphate. People need to guard their tongues and be careful about what they say. The audience should watch their tongues and check and verify. They should assume good of Muslims.
  180. In a speech published on 2 November 2015, he said that every Muslim believes in the complete domination of the world by Islam. He refers to the persecution of Muslims in Europe. They are fed up, and thinking, 'I'm leaving'. Muslims feel under persecution, they feel people don't like them and don't accept them. Many people are choosing to go to Islamic State. They look round the world to see who is implementing the law of Allah, fully, 100%, and they see only one place, and they are going with their whole families, including their children, because they want to live a proper Islamic way of life. Persecution of Muslims is dissolving weak bonds like nationalism and they are coming back to Islam.
  181. The talk transcribed at Document 11 was published on 21 November 2015. LF says that Muslims believe that taking part in general elections is shirk. Legislating, and voting for a legislator are both shirk. This issue is controversial as many Muslims vote, for various reasons. This is sinful. Even if half the Muslims in East London vote, if no excuse can be found for them, 'we have to call them kafir'. The numbers committing shirk do not mean that they are not kafir. There are only two types of people in the world: believers and kafir or disbelievers. The believers will treat their own in a certain way and will treat disbelievers in a different way. 'We' have animosity towards disbelievers. The Muslim is superior to the kafir.
  182. He talks about punishments in Islam. Any Muslim who changes his religion gets capital punishment under Islamic law. If a Muslim insists he wants to be a Christian tomorrow, he 'won't be around for much longer'. If someone transforms himself from a Muslim into being a kafir, 'we' must recognise that change. But before making Takfeer on someone, it is necessary to check for preventions of Takfeer, such as a slip of the tongue, or duress. Someone accused of working for Prevent and allied with the Kafir against the Muslims might be under duress.
  183. The blood and life of the kafir has no sanctity unless 'we' have some kind of a covenant with them. Anyone who does not belong in the Muslim camp of believers must be ejected from it. They must give up their belief and come to Islam or they will end up in the hellfire. The Takfeer is important to keep those camps pure. He refers to the opinion of Majid Nawaz, who thinks that people who draw cartoons of the prophet are entitled to express their views. Muslims would be insulted. This and many other reasons mean this man is a Kafir and an Apostate and 'we' must make Takfeer on him. Once a person has left the fold of Islam, 'we do not hold back'. If someone is outside the fold 'it can have grave consequences. It could be the difference between life and death. …If someone has become an Apostate, he could fall under the knife'. If he is asked to repent and does not, 'Capital Punishment'.
  184. On 16 November 2015, the talk transcribed at Document 12 was published. Many communities have a 'dodgy' understanding of Islam. He discusses Muhammed al-Wahhab, who revived many aspects of Islam when people were falling into all kinds of innovation. Many people built up a hatred towards him. People use the term 'wahhabi' from this scholar. 'Even the kuffar media have used this term when they speak about 'so-called terrorists' [makes a quote mark with his fingers]. If you say that the greatest jihad is to fight with your body physically, 'they' will say 'this man is a wahhabi'. Allah bestowed this scholar with a good understanding of Islam'.
  185. He then refers to the importance of giving children good names. Muslim youth take Western names; this is what happen when you mix in a melting pot with the kuffar. You will end up diluting your own deen and taking from the deen of the kuffar. Do not change your name because 'Bob' can't pronounce it. That is his problem.
  186. The highest negation of Islam is associating partners with Allah. He is the lawmaker and that is why voting is shirk. Shirk is not just worshipping idols. He gives an example of Abu Baraa (Mizanur Rahman) asking Sheikh Omar (OBM) for advice when the police stopped him from doing dawah. The Sheikh replied that if he obeyed 'them', he would become a mushriq. A brother at a dawah stall in Stratford told a Christian and his son that the crime of worshipping Jesus is far worse than that of a paedophile. That was correct. The innocence or guilt of a Christian aid worker is defined by Allah. Christians and Jews are all criminals because they commit shirk. 'How could anyone come up with a concept… look these people are innocent'? The audience should get that idea out of their heads.
  187. LF then considers each negation of Islam in turn. The third negation is 'very controversial these days. It is, in effect, to show tolerance for other religions. To do that is to become a kafir. A person who believes that British values are better than Sharia law has become a kafir. We love every aspect of Sharia and accept it fully: 'the stoning of the adulterer, chopping the hands of the thief, charging the jizia, we love it all…the crucifixion'. 'Sheik Anjem' was talking to a journalist about crucifixion (he refers again to Sheik Anjem later in the talk). A passing Muslim said that if it was in the Koran he accepted it. Some Muslims brought up in this Western society agree that Islamic punishments are harsh and barbaric. The Koran is like an instruction manual. The fifth negation of Islam is to think that any part of it is 'barbaric, oppressive or backwards'. Obviously the kufar they hate Islam otherwise they would be Muslim.
  188. The eighth negation is to ally with the disbelievers against Muslims, by being in the army of the kufar, the police, or spying for them.
  189. The ninth negation of Islam is claiming either not to be bound by sharia to be able to follow another deen. Democracy, British values and rule of law are part of the deen of the kuffar. LF 'smiles and says: 'Which other ones do I have to list to become an extremist? Apparently, if you are against democracy, British values, the rule of law and if you don't respect other faiths, you are deemed as an extremist.' LF smiles and shrugs and says 'What can I say? Obviously I don't call myself an extremist…look, okay, you don't like me for what I believe…you want to call me extremist, call me radical, whatever…but I'm not breaking any law…I don't have to like your democracy…I think democracy is rubbish, I think democracy is evil, I don't respect the one who insults Allah and say that Allah has a son. How can I respect a person like that? Impossible.'
  190. He ends the talk by saying that 'Sheikh Omar' ('OBM') used to say to learn how to become a kafir so that you don't become one.
  191. The talk at Document 13 was published on 28 November 2015. We see people all around us violating Allah's right to be worshipped alone. That is the greatest oppression. We see in the parliaments, people violating the rights of Allah. If someone oppresses us we don't oppress back. But there is a concept of retaliation, provided Allah's limits are not exceeded. You cannot kill someone for stealing from you. If Muslims are oppressed they must stop the oppression. He refers to verses 77-79 of the Koran when the angels ask people who complain that they were oppressed on earth, 'Was not the earth of Allah wide enough for you to migrate?' 'Leave, the door is already open'. He repeats this motif. 'Could you not flee from this oppression? They did not reply back because they knew the answer.' They did not try to flee, so had no one to blame but themselves. They oppressed themselves.
  192. LF then says he will give an analogy if it is still not making sense. He compares this with a person who has phone contract with a provider whose service is very poor, yet every year the contract is renewed. 'It doesn't make sense, you would go to another company…you move somewhere else', and don't blame anyone else.
  193. He refers to the person who killed 99 people. He reminds his audience to ask 'the knowledgeable person'. The advice was that he should leave the village he was in which was full of sinful people: the environment was causing him to disobey Allah. He was advised to go 'to this other place where the people there are pious people'. He made an intention to go to a better place and Allah showed mercy to him. 'That's why the migration for the sake of Allah is one of the things that will expiate all the sins. And obviously Allah forgave him. Because he did something about his situation. He did something about his situation'.
  194. LF then refers to oppression of Muslims all around the world, in particular in France. Women feel obliged to disobey Allah by taking off the niqab. They say they are oppressed. But as is mentioned in the verse, 'the earth of Allah is wide, the earth of Allah is wide. If you cannot worship Allah and stick to his commands in one place, go somewhere else where you won't be forced to disobey Allah…So my dear brothers, any land that you are in, any place where this environment is causing you to disobey Allah, it becomes widely upon you to leave that place and go to another place where you won't be forced and compelled to disobey Allah. Where you can practise your deen without fear and without oppression'.
  195. On 28 November 2015, the talk at Document 14 was published. This issue keeps coming up, and it will keep coming up. There is a lot of ignorance in the community about this, even among men of knowledge. Takfeer is a necessity when someone has committed kafir and there is no prevention of takfeer. Because the kuffar do not have the same rights as Muslims, it is very serious to call someone takfeer if he does not deserve it. But takfeer is compulsory if you are a Muslim. We have love wallah and friendship with the believers and hatred and animosity towards the disbelievers and their kuffar.
  196. He refers to a brother who used to work for the police, but some brothers told him it was not allowed and he stopped and repented. He reminds his audience that things are not always as they seem; we can have poor judgment. He warns of the need for caution before making takfeer. It can lead to serious consequences. Someone could even be given the death penalty. He gives two examples of people 'executed' for takfeer who did not deserve it. He then refers to a brother who is working for Prevent, helping the kuffar to fight against Islam and the Muslim. Maybe he had just come out of prison and has been told to work with Prevent or go back to prison. He is under duress. LF has never been to the Prevent centre 'because obviously I am not radical'. He refers to Abu Bara (Mizanur Rahman) whose deradicalisation was to play pool; 'obviously it didn't work. He just became a better pool player'.
  197. Disbelievers must be clearly identified and put in their camp. 'We are not brothers. We are not united together. You are over there. I am over here'. He mentions Anjem Choudhary again. It should be clear that this man does not believe in democracy, in equal rights between men and women, or freedom of speech. The dawa must be clear, not 'wishy washy'. He describes the propaganda of the British media. He makes sure his relatives don't watch the news. People think the BBC are trustworthy and would not speak badly about Muslims and Islam. 'Because that propaganda of anti-Islam, it will pump around. They'll watch it and think, 'oh this happened, that's so bad. See, but they do not have the concept, the awareness of the propaganda that is happening against Islam and Muslims. So be careful what you see and what you hear about the media.'
  198. He says that all Kuffar are untrustworthy. It is very easy to 'verify and check things' by ringing people, or going on Twitter. But some people don't want to verify because they want gossip or news to be true. That is a sign of a grudge. If a fasi person comes to you with news, verify it. It is important to understand which actions take people out of the fold of Islam and which do not. Drinking alcohol does not. This is the distinction between kuffar asbar (which does not) and kuffar akbar (which does). Taking interest on a loan, having insurance, and killing an innocent person are 'obviously great crimes but it's not kuffar asbar'. LF says he keeps 'going back to that dodgy Imam' and LF's conversation with him about the Jordanian pilot. He tells his audience that he told 'Ok, let's say they killed him wrongly, are you saying now they all become kafir because of that?' The imam was 'stumbling on that issue'. People should not involve passions and emotions in takfeer. LF says here that the people who killed the Jordanian pilot (ie ISIL) are not kafir or kuffar because of that.
  199. He describes three types of takfeer. If someone declares takfeer there must be no doubt. You must be 100% sure. 'The reality is you walk in the court, you've got a beard and a hat and you're friends with Anjem Choudary, you're guilty. It needs to be like that, beyond doubt. But if you have a firm conviction, you must make takfeer. That person needs to 'exit our camp'. Your whole life will be confused if you sit on the fence.
  200. LF considers then some preventions of takfeer, such as insanity, immaturity, possession by a jinn, or acting under duress. A person is not an adult until they reach puberty. 'Kuffar don't follow this understanding'. He spends some time considering duress and the story of al-Mad ibn Yasser. He then gives the modern example of a person in prison. If LF were in prison and wrote to Muslim prisoners saying that David Cameron was fantastic, we need to obey the Queen, I got it all wrong, and democracy is the best thing since sliced bread, 'would you accept that? And they release me tomorrow [laughs]. This man, ex-radical, is now a changed man. You can't accept that from me because if I'm in the prison, I'm under duress. That's why we don't fatwa from people in prison'. Duress is a prevention of takfeer.
  201. A mistake, or slip of the tongue can also be a prevention of takfeer. LF gives an example from the hadith. But 'we don't give excuse to the Christian who says I didn't know Jesus wasn't God.' There is no excuse for the beliefs of Christians. He then refers to something Abu Barra said in a talk. Abu Barra is the kunya of Mizanur Rahman.
  202. Voting in the election is kuffar akbar. But it doesn't follow that everyone who voted is kuffar abkbar. He might be ignorant of the reality of voting. That is not the same as excusing the Jews and the Christians for what they are doing. It is an act of kuffar akbar to ally with the kuffar against the Muslims, such as handing information about Muslims to the police. There is some kind of excuse for a new Muslim who lives far away from other Muslims, for example in prison, if he does not know how to pray. Don't rush to call a person kafir without verifying and checking. You may not know the 'actual reality'. We need to study and we need to learn, and we need to know how to verify and to check. The point the audience needs to take from the talk is the need to look for preventions of takfeer.
  203. On 6 September 2015, the talk transcribed at Document 2/1 was published. LF starts with a story known as 'the companions of the ditch' or 'the boy and the king'. The king had a sorcerer to put fear into the people and to control them. The king is nobody if he doesn't have people around him to support him and he doesn't have armies and police forces. The king is just a person, the Queen is just a lady, without her army, her police force, navy and spies, at the end of the day what is she, just a lady. The tyrant is weak. Faroon was the most powerful tyrant who ever walked the earth but Allah destroyed his power and his kingdom. The tyrant, the soldiers and Faroon are weak compared to the believers as they have Allah on their side. As Muslims they must remember that the plots of Satan are weak. If Allah is with the Muslims they can overcome anything.
  204. He then refers to a visit from a person from MI5 who wanted to have a chat with him outside his home. He said he had nothing to say and began filming him with his phone as he was leaving. MI5 visit brothers to put fear into them and shake them. They may shave their beards, throw in the towel and stop. As he was filming MI5 they started running for their lives. Allah put the fear into them, 'these people are supposed to be MI5, they are going to get you and they are watching everybody'.
  205. Today we have the tyrant called Cameron; but without his MI5, his M16, his army and police force, his SO15 and GCHQ who is he apart from another human being? The reason he mentions this is that people pledge to Allah but are working in the armies and police of the Faroon. There are Muslims working for the police and MI5 and when you speak to them they think they are doing nothing wrong. He gives many examples of Muslims working in various capacities for the Faroon. They are working for the wrong team, on the wrong side of the fence. They do not understand their deen.
  206. LF says that the prophet forbade you to be in the army, the police force or a tax inspector. It is forbidden to work as a police officer, as a soldier, a judge or spy in MI5 or MI6, work for SO15 or community support prevent officers. They are all forbidden. People are wrong to say that to rule and judge by man-made laws is just a sin but does not take you outside the fold of Islam. That is why stones are about to rain down on you from the sky. This story should not be seen as a story from a long time ago which does not apply to them.
  207. It is the consensus of all Muslims that whoever legalises to follow other than the religion of Muslims or the Shia of Mohammed is a kuffar. Whoever makes halal what is haram and vice versa is a Kuffar. He quotes scholars to this effect. He then refers to black magic. It is completely forbidden and shirk. In Sharia the punishment for this – and seeing some of the tweets from dawlah [a name for ISIL] they are executing people for it. These people ruin society and it is a big problem and that the Sharia is a big solution to this type of problem.
  208. He describes his visit to Lewisham mosque five or six years ago 'which is now notorious as they openly pour the shirk for elections'. He had only just started practising. In short, he was not impressed by the 'magician' in the Mosque. He met a brother who invited him to visit a new Islamic centre. He went in and felt that there was a refreshing message. It wasn't like the old ones who read from a book. He was invited to talk to Sheikh Anjem. Back then he did not know who he was, but he was 'really impressed with how he was talking about fresh and current affairs with a fresh message'. He continues, 'At a peak time like this you are supposed to fire up and wake up the Muslims and this is the problem with local Masjids there are four walls and you go and pray and then come out void of any guidance'. The first time he met Sheikh Anjem he 'felt really inclined and it really appealed to him and at the time he was talking about the Muslims around the world unlike this magician who was talking about extending the Masjid and ignoring other issues'.
  209. The reference to his own initial experiences with his local mosque, and with the 'magician' in charge, conveys the message that guidance for the current problems will not be given in such mosques, but by people such as (Sheikh) Anjem Choudary, Mizanur Rahman (Abu Bara), and others. That message is designed to make his audience distrust and feel contempt for not only a strand of Islamic teaching (and for those who teach it), but for emanations of the British state, and those Muslims who co-operate with the British state. The message endorses the views of Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman, and by mentioning them frequently, LF appears to intend to create, in the mind of his audience, a close association between him and them. He refers to Anjem Choudary as 'the cleric Anjem Choudary' and 'Sheikh Anjem'. He increases the potency of his message by referring to the evil behaviour of the sorcerer, who, for example, threatens to thrash, and thrashes, the boy for speaking to the monk. There is an obvious parallel between the 'magician' at Lewisham Mosque and the sorcerer. LF says, 'and they need to narrate how it affects them today'. The implication is that the audience should avoid the sorcerers in their local mosques, and be taught and guided, instead, by Anjem Choudary, Mizanur Rahman, and LF.
  210. He refers to the king's blind assistant whose blindness was cured by Allah. When the king asked the assistant who had cured him, he said his lord. He corrected the king's assumption that this meant the king; it was not the king, but Allah, even though he had only just started believing in Allah. LF continues that 'today they are in the UK with the kuffar with their own belief system and British values. Anjem Choudary grew up in the UK, and he says that democracy is a system of shirk. British values are not great. They are 'backwards'. The only solution for the UK is Sharia, which is why they have started preaching this message.
  211. He draws a parallel between the tyrannical king and David Cameron, who has realised that the UK cannot have Muslims who 'stand firm'. They are trying to 'enforce' Muslims to take up British values and 'you can no longer be in our country and society and have a different culture and that Muslims must give them up'. They cannot believe that Muslims are believers and that Islam is the superior religion. Muslims are no longer allowed to say that homosexuality is a sin and a crime against Allah, that they can no longer preach that a Muslim is higher than everybody and they must adopt equality. The message here is that the British state is opposed to all practice and teaching of Islam. He refers to the carrot and stick mentality. British values are the carrot. Muslims have realised they don't like the carrot - man-made laws (which he equates with gambling, homosexuality and prostitution). The Government will 'now use the stick and beat you into accepting that the carrot is the best thing…Muslims are being beaten into acceptance'.
  212. In this context, he refers a Masjid down the road which has said that any homophobe is not allowed to enter. If you say homosexuality is wrong you are automatically a homophobe. People out of fear of being classed as extreme are afraid to say that they don't agree with homosexuality.
  213. There are many strands in this talk. An example is warning the audience to distrust the BBC, CNN and the Sun when they say that Anjem Choudary has told his people to support ISIL. 'The brothers know that this is media propaganda and… rubbish'. LF returns to this theme (and has already mentioned it, in the talk at Document 14).
  214. An important aspect of the talk is that LF weaves connections between an old (and to some at least of his audience, familiar) story and the activities of Anjem Choudary and Abu Bara (Mizanur Rahman). The clear message is that, like the monk, they are teaching the word of Allah, standing up for Islam against the tyrannical British state, and are being made to suffer for their stance. It is an inaccurate and emotive comparison, because neither has been tortured or killed (as the monk was). There is also an implicit link between LF's audience and the boy, who continued to learn about Islam by deceiving the sorcerer. He also advises young people not to tell their parents that they are going to a demonstration outside the American Embassy with Anjem Choudary. He does not tell his own parents what he is doing. 'Bear in mind that you don't need to tell them everything'. He tells the audience to note that 'the Sheikh is elevating his student and is not arrogant and that a good teacher would encourage students like this and would know that the boy would be put on trial'. There is an ambiguity about which 'Sheikh' he is referring to.
  215. LF makes this link between the old story and current events explicit when, after describing how the monk and the king's assistant were cut in half, alive, for not abandoning Islam, the boy was told to abandon his religion. Before he continues, LF says that he wants the Muslims in the room to think about why the king is killing all three, and that 'the purpose is to eliminate the threat of the boy, the monk and the assistant from spreading the word that there is another Lord other than the King… the same way today, Muslims have come to the shores of the UK with a new ideology, that sovereignty is not for the Queen it is only for Allah, that the right of legislation is not for the people in Parliament it is for Allah to make the law'
  216. Sharia is the solution for mankind. He refers to those who have been deported, or who have left the UK and been prevented from returning (he mentions 'their own Sheikh Mohammed' specifically) because they are seen by the British Government as a threat. [OBM] was told he was not conducive to the public good which meant he was not toeing the line. Abu Bara (Mizanur Rahman) and 'Sheikh Anjem' are in prison on remand as they are not willing to become sell-outs and 'one day they [ie the authorities] will come for them [he must mean his audience] as they are the students'. He then reads a 'very emotional' letter from Abu Bara in Belmarsh Prison to a brother. Bara asked that all his public lectures and speeches not be lost 'that all the hard work continues to persevered and that no knowledge which has been learnt from Abu Bara is hidden'. Bara said that knowledge is a burden on your neck until you convey it to others. LF says that some of the things he conveys to the brothers he has learnt from Bara and Anjem is a burden until they wake up others and continue to teach students. That is why LF keeps teaching. He cannot keep the knowledge to himself. If this is not done, the knowledge will die with Anjem and Bara; that is how the kuffar win, they arrest people and think it's over, but the students keep teaching people and that is what they must do.
  217. LF says that this is how the king wanted to eliminate the threat of the new belief that will spread among the people, by always going for the teacher, close the centres where they teach the people, much like they are trying to close this one down where they do a lot of filming, they try to remove YouTube videos, suspend Twitter accounts to stop you spreading this message. They even suspended LF's Twitter account. He returns to the story of the king. The king told some guards to throw the boy from the top of a mountain if he did not abandon his religion. The mountain started shaking and the boy lived. The boy went back to the king and Allah protected him. 'Imagine the British Government doing the same thing, and that if they did, they would go on the run they would not return to the king'. I am satisfied that some at least of the audience would understand this to be reference to migrating to ISIL-controlled territory.
  218. They try to put fear into people with arrests and the threat of prison. The king told the guards to drown the boy in the sea if he did not give up his religion. Again Allah saved him. The boy went back to the king and told him that. The king hoped to change the boy and make him give up. '…in the same way in the UK, they raid houses, they take passports away, take away children to put pressure on them to stop preaching the message of Sharia and that democracy is kuffar. They threaten you with community service and threaten with what they can to stop them.' The boy gathered all the people to witness his death at the king's hand. '… this sounds like suicide…but the boy is smart and has gathered all the people. They witnessed this and proclaimed that they believed in the name of the boy and …in Allah'.
  219. This is 'mass Dawah'. That is why the boy gathered everyone to witness the event, 'the same way that they gather the media and proclaim the message that democracy is hypocrisy and that freedom of speech does not exist as the British Government has given false belief'. With the arrest of Anjem and Barah, the freedom of speech was exposed. After this, what Anjem Choudary is saying is right and that is why more and more people are embracing Islam and the plots of the kuffar are backfiring.
  220. The king killed the monk and the boy to stop the spread of the message but this backfired. LF believes that the arrests of Barah and Choudary will make more and more people wake up and listen to the lectures. The plots will backfire. More and more Muslims will embrace Islam and drop British values. The king created ditches and filled them with fire. He said anyone who does not abandon his religion will be thrown in the fire. LF says that this is the same when they are threatened to give up their beliefs as Muslims and embrace voting and their British values and you refuse to compromise, you will be threatened with having your passport taken and being thrown in Belmarsh Prison. All the people were thrown in the fire as they refused to give up their deen. A woman with a new-born baby was reluctant, out of love for her baby. By a miracle of Allah the baby spoke to the mother, and she threw herself in the fire.
  221. Many lessons can be learnt from this. They must be patient and be willing to sacrifice their life, their wealth and time to earn paradise. The kuffar will be in hellfire for eternal punishment. This story was told when the companions of Mohammed were 'going through great trials and suffering facing beatings, torture, starvation, humiliation and murder', for not embracing a different life and saying that the only one to worship is Allah. The road to paradise is a hard road, just like the ones who were burnt alive and never gave up. The Prophet was using this story to prepare the Muslims for this test. The people who were burnt alive believed and their life was not a waste. Many will narrate the same story as the Muslims will face hardship as long as the Kuffar are in charge. The message is never to compromise and to be patient.
  222. The talk at Document 2/6 was published in January 2016. LF describes the topic as 'why the Muslims are losing their identity in the UK'. Muslims are bound by their religion, wherever they were born, whatever the colour of their skin, and whatever their language. They are unique in their commitment to their religion, unlike the Kuffar, who all compromise their religion by not taking it seriously. Muslims are elevated above all others through implementing their religion in their daily lives. LF explains that he has adopted this talk from one given by Sheikh OBM. When OBM was in the UK 30 years ago he had been shocked at the state of Muslim integration into UK society and started to push for Muslims to reclaim their identity. Since the lecture was originally given there has been a significant revival of Islamic belief and culture, particularly in the UK and especially among the youth. This is visibly evident on the streets, through dress, beards and abstention from nightclubs and alcohol. The UK is not really a Christian country, despite David Cameron's claims. If it were, the laws of the Bible would be implemented and followed. Many empires from the past have disappeared and been outlasted by the Muslim empire, which still exists today.
  223. Part of the reason for loss of Muslim identity in the past was that children who should follow Islam were educated by the Kuffar for seven hours a day. Everywhere it is possible to see people losing their Islamic identity. Some parents did not pass it on. LF's parents did not 'teach Islam comprehensively'; that is, the need to make Islam dominant from the East to the West, or the need to live differently from non-believers in whose society they had settled.
  224. Some people did come from good practising families, who had settled in the UK to make a better life for themselves. This was due to the Kuffar bombing the living daylights out of their own country. Now they have come the UK, maybe to take back some of the wealth that has been robbed from them. In the past many Muslims possibly visiting the UK as students, gave in to various temptations. This slowly influenced their attitude, changing their beards from long to short and dropping Arabic for British colloquial language. Many Muslims, including him, were not always committed and were 'lost'. LF describes the dress and appearance of Kuffar to show the difference between them and Muslims. Muslims can bear many losses, material goods, loved ones, limbs, but not the loss of their faith. If they lose Islam they have lost everything. He gives the example of a son who becomes a doctor, but loses his faith through non-believer friends.
  225. Many Muslims are afraid or embarrassed to show they follow their religion. This is against the teaching of Islam. It is wrong to integrate into the society of the Kuffar. The Muslims should stand out from the society where they live. Someone should be able to pick out a Muslim as someone who does not believe in democracy or British values. Muslims are afraid to stand out in society for fear of being attacked. This is a dodgy fatwa and an excuse for not fully committing to the religion. If fear of attack is really a fear, then the individual should move to somewhere where he is able to practise Islam. Again, I am satisfied that some of LF's audience would understand this as a reference to ISIL-controlled territory.
  226. He then gives various examples of reasons why Muslims have been losing their identity. Muslims should feel embarrassed if people cannot identify them as Muslims. He refers to some brothers discussing the attack in Leytonstone. One of the brothers said he would never attack a Muslim. LF asks rhetorically how the brother would be able to identify a Muslim who did not dress to distinguish themselves from the Kuffar. He does not condemn that attack.
  227. Muslims have become content with living between the Kuffar. There are only two reasons why the Muslim should live among the Kuffar. They are for the purpose of dawah or jihad. Even then you should live among Muslims or in Muslim-populated suburbs. Muslims should seek to change the environment around them into an Islamic environment rather than integrate in a non-Muslim environment.
  228. He then refers to the 'Sheikh' (presumably OBM) who described 'Bitana' as the inside lining of your jacket. It means having close Kuffar friends and treating them better than Muslims, rallying behind their banners of human rights, socialism, equality and democracy and eventually adopting British values, abandoning their deen and losing their identity. They should stay away from the celebrations of the Kuffar such as Christmas, birthdays, Valentine's day, including shopkeepers stocking paraphernalia.
  229. Some Muslims admire the civilisations of the Kuffar, looking up to the British ever since they colonised them. Many see the Kuffar as superior because of their science and technology and feel belittled by their living standards. Despite putting a man in space, the Kuffar have not mastered cleaning themselves after visiting the toilet.
  230. It is important to understand the difference between the two types of people in the world, Muslims and the Kuffar. Muslim are a brotherhood with a unique and special relationship between one another. Kuffar are the opposite and should not be treated the same. Muslims should not greet the Kuffar as they greet Muslims. Muslims should not join the police as they are joining the oppressors. He quotes verse 88-89 from Soran Nissur '…If they [the Kuffar] turn back, take hold of them and kill them wherever you find them and take no …nor help from them'.
  231. If Muslims feel they are being restricted from wearing clothing and adopting a lifestyle which reflects their beliefs they should consider going elsewhere to find a place where they can continue to practice Islam. He raises the issue of car insurance. Such a contract is forbidden under Islam. Many Muslims protest that they need their car and therefore must have insurance. LF suggests alternatives such as driving without insurance, hiring a car, using public transport, and finally if none of this is possible, LF suggests moving to 'some other city' where it is possible to get about without having insurance'. This must mean another city in a different country, where there are no laws requiring car insurance. Again, I am satisfied that some of LF's audience would understand this passage as an encouragement to go to ISIL-controlled territory
  232. The talk at Document 2/7 was published on 14 February 2016. After invoking Allah, LF says that the notes for this talk were 'actually handed down to me by one of the students ['of' seems to be missing] Sheikh Uhmad Bakhir Mohammed'. This seems to me to be a mistranscription of 'OBM', as LF then refers to this person's imprisonment in Lebanon. OBM recently had a heart operation and LF has not heard any news of how that went. LF says that we ask Allah to give OBM good health, and to release him. OBM was obviously in the United Kingdom for many decades trying to educate Muslims. One of his students gathered these notes from a talk which he delivered himself, 'the Sheikh'.
  233. LF stresses to all good Muslims who are studying Islam the importance of taking good notes, as one day you might have to pass the knowledge on, even if you cannot deliver it yourself. LF refers again to 'Sheikh Uhmad'. In context, this must be 'OBM'. He has been calling for Khilafah for many decades. There has been a period of darkness for mankind for over 90 years. Allah's law was absent because nowhere was Sharia implemented 'in its totality'. In a Khilafah there is one head of state, who implements Sharia. 'The people give him something called the pledge of allegiance to listen and obey as long as he implements Sharia'.
  234. One of the first things LF reads in the notes is that at the time OBM gave the talk, many years ago, there was no Khilafah. Today, 'we have Khilafah announced'. Without the Khilafah and without the implementation of Sharia, there are many aspects of Islam we 'just simply' cannot practise as Muslims. '…we cannot fully worship Allah …and live by his commands if the Sharia is not implemented on a state level'. He gives the jisia as an example. So-called Muslim countries do not take the jisia from the kuffar. Nor can the zakat be paid to Caliph if there is no head of state. There are many problems without Sharia. People will go instead to 'man-made law, to the kuffar courts'. Without Sharia, Muslim men will marry women from other religions, which is 'completely rejected'. The absence of Sharia affects every aspect of our lives.
  235. The Sharia needs to be implemented. Allah did not intend Islam to be equal to any other way of life. Allah sent it to 'supersede all'. The notes refer to this: for a Muslim needs to be in the bowl of Sharia just as a fish needs to be in a bowl of water. As OBM's notes say, it is not normal for a Muslim to live under man-made laws, under Kuffar. Islam is a complete way of life which must be implemented. None of the so-called Muslim countries implements Sharia in its entirety. For example, Saudi Arabia does not do 'offensive jihad'. When did 'Saudi ever do offensive jihad to annex, you know, the land of the kuffar?' Some Muslim countries are far worse and allow gambling and alcohol. Islam is not just a personal belief system for Muslims at home or in the Mosque. It can govern society in every aspect of life. LF then sets out 20 points of advice for relationships between husbands and wives.
  236. The main legal arguments

  237. I will summarise what seem to me to be the main points in LF's argument. LF submits that the phrase 'conduct which gives encouragement to the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism' in section 4(1)(c) of the 2011 Act must be understood as unlawful conduct and, 'therefore', to be conduct which amounts (on the balance of probabilities) to the criminal offence created by section1 of the 2006 Act (headed 'Encouragement of terrorism'). I note, in passing, that the language of section 4(1)(c) of the 2011 Act is not the same as the language of section 1 of the 2006 Act.
  238. The allegations against LF, it is said, focus on things he has said in the lawful exercise of his rights to speak freely on political and religious topics. The argument is that it is necessary, in order to comply with the legal certainty requirement of the European Convention on Human Rights, to read section 4(1)(c) (in accordance with section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998) so that it applies only to conduct which is also an offence under section 1 of the 2006 Act. I accept the submission that the 2011 Act should be read with the legislation which creates offences connected with terrorism. But terrorism offences are created by the 2000 Act as well as by the 2006 Act. It seems to me, therefore, that these two Acts are to be read together with the 2011 Act. That point is supported by the amendments made to section 3 of the 2000 Act (the insertion of section 3(5A) and 3(5B)) which coincided with the enactment of the offence created by section 1 of the 2006 Act, and clearly refer to it. These show that Parliament was conscious of the kinship between the 2000 Act and the 2011 Act, and wanted to clarify the relationship between the matters which would justify proscription of an organisation and the matters which would amount to the commission of the offence created by section 1 of the 2006 Act.
  239. For the purposes of the proscription of an organisation, 'encouragement of terrorism' includes acts which would amount to the offence created by section 1 of the 2006 Act; but clearly does not equate to such acts. In other words, for the purpose of proscription, 'encouragement' is a wider category than doing acts which would amount to the commission of the offence created by section 1 of the 2006 Act. In my judgment, it would be incongruous if 'encouragement' had a wider meaning in section 3 of the 2000 Act, which is a foundation for the proscription regime (and thus for all the criminal offences which flow from proscription), than it does in section 4(1)(c) of the 2011 Act. Moreover, where the draftsman of the 2011 Act wishes to incorporate definitions from other legislation he does so expressly (twice in section 30(1) of the 2011 Act). This technique is also used in section 3(5A) and (5B) of the 2000 Act. The absence of an express incorporation of section 1 of the 2006 Act, coupled with an express incorporation of a definition from another Act in section 30(1) is inconsistent with any view that the draftsman of the 2011 Act intended 'conduct which gives encouragement to the commission etc of acts of terrorism' to have the meaning for which LF contends.
  240. The 2000 Act creates a wide range of offences targeting membership of a proscribed organisation, and (broadly) acts done 'for the purposes of terrorism' (which include 'action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation': see section 1(5)). Thus many different acts connected with proscribed organisations are also criminal offences. I do not consider that there is any hint in section 4(1) of the 2011 Act that a person cannot engage in TRA unless he also commits a criminal offence. But even if I am wrong about that, given the nexus between the allegations against LF and two proscribed organisations, ALM and ISIL, I do not consider that there is any relevant legal uncertainty here. LF would have known (if he did do them), that when he did the acts alleged against him, he was committing offences under the 2000 Act. The language of section 4(1) of the 2011 Act, like the language of section 3 of the 2000 Act, is intentionally wide.
  241. I add that TRA is deliberately defined in wide terms. If the definition of TRA in section 4(1)(c) is met on the facts, and the other conditions for making a TPIM are also met, then a TPIM may be imposed, whether or not some or all of the 'encouraging' statements on which it is based are in fact and law, or are arguably, exercises of a person's rights to free speech and freedom of religion. Both those Convention rights are qualified. In this context I adopt, but do not repeat, Ouseley J's analysis of the Strasbourg cases on the relationship between articles 9 and 10 and the expression of views which are antithetical to the values of the European Convention on Human Rights in paragraphs 142-160 of Butt v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWHC 1930 (Admin). The TPIM regime, which applies the definition of 'terrorism' and 'acts done for the purposes of terrorism' in section 1 of the 2000 Act, deliberately encroaches on those freedoms (see the causes referred to in section 1(1)(c) of the 2000 Act). That interference, at a general level, is plainly justified by the legitimate legislative aim of suppressing terrorism.
  242. I also agree, in this context, with Nicol J's reasons for holding in LG (at paragraphs 54-56) that no useful inference about the nature of LF's activities can be drawn from the fact that he has not been prosecuted for any offences contrary to the 2000 Act or to the 2006 Act.
  243. LF is on more apparently more promising ground in submitting that the Secretary of State has misdirected herself in classifying LF's conduct as 'facilitating' terrorism. I accept the submission that section 4(1) distinguishes between conduct which facilitates, and conduct which encourages, the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. Those two words, in their ordinary meanings, refer to different types of conduct; on the one hand, the taking of practical steps which make something easier, and, on the other, the use of words to persuade people to do those acts. Stripped of the unhelpful and legally meaningless references to 'radicalisation', 'extremism' and the 'creation of an environment', the Secretary of State's allegations against LF are allegations, in substance, that he encouraged, rather than facilitated, acts of terrorism. I reject Mr Watson's ambitious submission that the Secretary of State was not using the word 'facilitate' in the sense in which that word is used in section 4 of the 2011 Act. That submission is contradicted by the explicit reference in paragraph 7 of NSS1 to section 4 of the 2011 Act. I will return later in this judgment to the consequences of this misdirection.
  244. LF says that there is a breach of article 6 if the measures are based on closed material and that is not disclosed to him (skeleton argument, paragraphs 26-28). This was a theme of LF submissions on various aspects of the case. I consider it in my closed judgment.
  245. Discussion

    LF's links, if any, with ALM

  246. I start by considering the Secretary of State's core allegations about LF. When I refer to 'ALM' I do not mean a formal organisation with a rigid hierarchy or constitution. When I refer to a 'member' of ALM I mean a person who associates himself with ALM's world view and aims, and with others who share those things, and who, to a greater or lesser extent, acts to further those things. The Secretary of State does not contend that ALM has a formal leadership structure or process for choosing leaders, but that some members take more of a leading role than others. That is the sense in which I use the word 'leader'.
  247. I consider, first, whether, on the balance of probabilities, the Secretary of State was entitled (and right) to conclude that ALM still exists. I consider that she was. I have referred to the material at some length, and will only mention a few points.
  248. i OBM founded ALM and then publicly disbanded it. ALM's aim is the establishment of a Caliphate and of rule by Sharia.
    ii Since OBM's departure from the United Kingdom, Anjem Choudary and others have continued to associate with each other, to refer to OBM, and to continue ALM's activities (such as dawah and demonstrations).
    iii The organogram suggests a continuing organisation, and features the names of leading members of ALM feature on it (such as Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman).
    iv Document 17, found in LF's flat when he was arrested, also suggests a continuing organisation and the same names occur in both documents.
    v There was significant traffic between some of these associates in relation to the meaning of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi's declaration of a Caliphate in Syria.
    vi In June 2014, ALM issued a pledge of allegiance to ISIL signed by OBM (ALM's founder and spiritual leader), Mohammed Fachry, Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman.
    vii There is evidence that ALM's leaders have considered their stance on the Covenant of Security.
    viii The handwritten note about recruitment (document 8) suggests a sophisticated recruitment strategy.
  249. The next question is whether the Secretary of State was entitled, and right, to conclude that LF is a member of ALM. I consider that she was. Again, I mention a few points.
  250. i As he accepts, LF has associated, at least socially, and for some time, with many of the people the Secretary of State considers to be members (and indeed leaders) of ALM. He recognises the names, or the faces, of many of those listed in the TPIM notice.
    ii He accepts that he has done dawah with many of them, again, for some time.
    iii LF refers in the talk at Document 2/1 to the formative influence Anjem Choudary, one of ALM's British leaders, had on him.
    iv He refers frequently in his talks to Anjem Choudary and to Mizanur Rahman; see, in particular, the talk at Document 2/1.
    v He refers repeatedly in his talks to 'Sheikh' OBM, apparently acknowledging both OBM's didactic influence, and his loyalty to OBM.
    vi While the organogram does not name LF, it is, expressly, not an exhaustive list of members ('others' are referred to), nor does it purport to list ALM's members, but rather the 'Cultural Committee'.
    vii LF's name is on document 17, which was found in LF's flat. An account number into which payments have been made from LF's account is written on the back of document 17. LF's explanation that he has not seen this document is, in those circumstances, implausible. I give it no weight, since he has not been cross-examined on it. I accept, on the balance of probabilities, that this document is a list of ALM members. It is also highly significant that it was found, not on a bus, but in LF's flat.
    viii LF's explanation that he may have picked the document up at a dawah stall or tidying up at the Ilm Centre is interesting because it suggests a link either in LF's mind, or in reality, between the dawah LF has been doing/the Ilm Centre, and ALM.
  251. The third ALM issue is whether the Secretary of State was entitled, and right, to conclude that LF is a senior leader of ALM. I consider that she was.
  252. i The situation is not the same as it was in 2014, when the oganogram was found. Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman, ALM's leaders, were, first, remanded in custody, then subjected to strict bail conditions, and then imprisoned. Other senior leaders were also subjected to measures which disrupted their activities.
    ii The leaflet handed out at the dawah stall on 28 February 2015 gives two phone numbers, Anjem Choudary's and LF's. I do not consider it likely that this is a coincidence, or that this association is insignificant.
    iii I accept on the balance of probabilities that no one person is now leader of ALM.
    iv I have considered, and rejected, LF's explanation of the reference in Mizanur Rahman's letter to 'filling the vacuum'. Mizanur Rahman meant 'filling the leadership vacuum caused by his imprisonment and that of Anjem Choudary'.
    v I consider it likely, on the balance of probabilities, that the Ilm Centre was used by ALM for its activities, and that LF was actively involved in ensuring, by paying the phone bill with his money, that it had an internet connection, and by ensuring, by paying the rent in cash, that ALM continued to be able to use it.
    vi I also consider it likely that, by referring frequently in his talks to Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman, LF was signalling to his audience that he occupies a similar role. This is especially clear in the talk at Document 2/1, to which I have already referred extensively. He also refers frequently to OBM. He says more than once that he is using OBM's notes, or adopting a talk of his (the talk at Document 2/6, the talk at Document 2/7), thus emphasising to his audience his link with OBM, the continuity of LF's message with OBM's, and the similarity in the two men's positions
    vii In that role, and with the authority conferred by that role, LF has given several talks which are plainly intended to influence the thinking of the immediate, and on-line, audience in support of ALM's aims: its wish that a Caliphate be established to implement Sharia law, and its linked declaration of allegiance to ISIL, and to its Caliphate.
    viii He has also clearly supported travel to ISIL-controlled territory and because he has expressly assumed the mantle of OBM, and of Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman, signalled ALM's support for that, also.
    ix He has published those talks on-line and used Twitter to advertise those and other talks which support ALM's aims. He expressly refers to the importance of 'spreading the message' by YouTube and Twitter (he means ALM's message) in the talk at Document 2/1 and to the authorities' attempts to stop this. The 'teaching' in which LF engages so enthusiastically and to which LF refers in the talk at Document 2/1, expressly the teaching of Anjem Choudary and of Mizanur Rahman, is also ALM's.
  253. Mr Squires made the point that LF cannot be fixed with 'corporate responsibility' for acts done by ALM or for acts done by other ALM members. This point only goes so far. ALM is a proscribed organisation. It is a proscribed organisation because the Secretary of State considers that it is 'concerned in terrorism'. I consider that there is ample evidence that ALM is, indeed, concerned in terrorism (as defined). As is clear from the sentencing remarks in the bundle, several judges have been sure, on the evidence they heard in various trials, that ALM members have been involved in terrorist attacks and plots in the United Kingdom, and in encouraging others to commit such acts. It is also clear that several members of ALM have either gone to Syria, to join ISIL, or, or tried to do so. Moreover, I am satisfied on the evidence on the balance of probabilities, and the Secretary of State was entitled to be satisfied, that Khuram Butt was a member of ALM. As I have held, the Secretary of State was also entitled, and right, in her assessment that LF was a member and senior leader of ALM, and carried out significant roles for ALM.
  254. The next issue is whether the 'core allegations' made against LF are made out, and, if they are, whether they amount to TRA.
  255. Condition A: are the 'core allegations' made out, and was the Secretary of State entitled (or right) to conclude that LF had engaged in TRA?

  256. It follows from what I have said already, that the Secretary of State was entitled, and right, to consider that LF is a member and senior leader of ALM, which has pledged its allegiance to ISIL and that he has a leading role in communications and logistics for ALM.
  257. I also consider that, when read together, LF's speeches were intended, and would reasonably be understood by at least some of his audience, to signal his, and ALM's, endorsement of the Caliphate, and of travel to ISIL-controlled territory. I bear in mind that LF and other ALM members are conscious of the scrutiny they are under. LF refers in one of his talks to an encounter with MI5. LF and his audience would not understand his various disclaimers (he does not belong to an organisation; what he says is under his own control, and so on) literally. He and they would understand that they are necessary misdirections. He makes ironic asides about being a hate preacher, and about extremism. Some of his audience may take these remarks literally, but others will understand the irony.
  258. I have carefully considered LF's argument that the Secretary of State has taken a few adverse quotations out of context and has not taken into account the moderate things LF has said. Only two examples, I think, were relied on in cross-examination and submissions: LF's statement recognising that there is freedom of religion in the United Kingdom, and his statement that Muslims should not meet oppression with oppression. I consider that these are isolated statements taken out of context, as I shall explain.
  259. It is clear from the talks that LF does not endorse freedom of religion or of conscience (there is only one religion, as far as he is concerned; and he is explicit in the talk at Document 12 that the third negation of Islam is to show tolerance for other religions). LF continues that a person who believes that British values are better than Sharia law has become a kafir (with all that that entails). He also says that he cannot respect a person who believes in [the Trinity]. In the talk at Document 14 he says that Muslims and disbelievers belong in two distinct camps. In many talks (for example, the talk at Document 14), LF gives a divisive message which encourages his audience to see Muslims as superior to people of other religions, to hate them, to despise, and be revolted by, their beliefs and practices (I note the reference in the talk at Document 2/6 to the Kuffars' inability to clean themselves after going to the lavatory, and his express endorsement in the talk at Document 12 of the statement that the crime of worshipping Jesus is far worse than paedophilia). He says that Muslims must set themselves apart from the kuffar, and not take part in kafir institutions such as representative democracy (including voting), Prevent, the army, or the police force (in the talk at Document 12 he says that the eighth negation of Islam is to ally with disbelievers against Muslims by joining such organisations). LF is reported by a newspaper as having told Muslims (on Twitter) not to wear a poppy as it would make them an apostate from Islam. The tweet is in the bundle of supporting documents. In the talk at Document 2/1 he compares David Cameron with Faroon, the greatest tyrant who ever lived, and says that Muslims who work for the Faroon are on the wrong team, because the prophet has forbidden this. This takes people outside the fold of Islam and is why stones are about to rain down on them from the sky.
  260. In the talk transcribed at Document 13 LF's reference to not meeting oppression with oppression is followed closely by a reference to the legitimacy of appropriate retaliation ('qisas'). LF's apparently moderate comments are few, and are heavily outweighed by comments which are not moderate. I do not consider that the Secretary of State has been unfairly selective in the extracts from the talks which she has relied on. On the contrary, I consider that they are a representative sample of the views LF has expressed in his talks.
  261. I have also carefully considered LF's explanation of such speeches as the speech transcribed at Document 7 and the speech transcribed at Document 8. I do not accept that he intended, or that a significant part of his immediate or on-line audience would have understood him, merely to rehearse 'intellectual arguments'. Neither talk is an arid theoretical debate. Each is intended to be an endorsement of ISIL's Caliphate and a rejection of criticisms which have been made of it, in particular, by Muslim critics. In the speech transcribed at Document 7 he clearly implies that the deeds of the Caliphate are good deeds of Muslims. He very strongly defends Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi against the accusation, made by an Imam, that he is a 'yahoody agent'. He says, more than once, that people who suggest that the Caliphate is not legitimate are not making an objective judgment based on Koranic evidence, but do so because they have a grudge. LF refers in more than one talk to the burning of the Jordanian pilot, an act which he does not condemn, and debate about which he describes as a 'hoo hah'. Instead, he asks rhetorically if the pilot was 'innocent'. His conclusion is, in my judgment, an elliptical endorsement of this act as condign punishment. In the speech transcribed at Document 8 he treats the burning of the pilot as something of a tired joke. He appears to endorse this act. In the talk at Document 14 he tells his audience that the dodgy Imam was wrong to stumble on the question whether those who killed the Jordanian pilot (ie ISIL) committed kuffar akbar (the clear implication is that they did not). In the talk at Document 2/7 he clearly says, 'Now we have Khilafah announced'. He means the Caliphate.
  262. In the speech transcribed at Document 8 he encourages his audience to think of the label 'Khawaarij' as false when applied to the Caliphate. He encourages contact with the Caliphate to 'verify'. Anyone who says that Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi is Khawaarij slanders him. He compares this slander with similar slander of 'sincere Muslims' such as [Anwar] Al-Awlaki and 'Sheikh Osama' (which I take to be a reference to Osama Bin Laden). He implies that those who criticise the caliphate do so from malicious motives: 'A lot of haters want Islam to be destroyed' and spread lies and propaganda about Muslims. They also have a grudge and are not objective. This is a theme to which he returns in other talks. He explicitly identifies the Muslims in the Caliphate as the only ones at a state level ruling by the book of Allah. The Caliphate fight the polytheists more than anyone else. The Caliphate have scholars.
  263. The context LF has created, principally by the talk transcribed at Document 7 and by the talk at Document 14, is that the Caliphate is the one place on earth where Muslims can practise their religion freely. In the Daily Express video, LF explicitly endorses the Caliphate again, and also endorses travel by entire Muslim families, including children, to ISIL-controlled territory. He returns to this theme in the talk transcribed at Document 13. The clear message is that Muslims in Britain are oppressed, and or under pressure to disobey Allah, and that they and should migrate; the implication is equally clear, which is that they should migrate to the 'Caliphate'. He makes a down-to-earth, and persuasive, analogy with a phone provider which is not providing a good service: the solution lies in the hands of his audience. He supports this with the powerful message that such a move will expiate a person's sins, however bad they are; even the mass murderer who has killed 99 people can be forgiven. In the talk at Document 2/6 he says that if people are really afraid of being attacked for looking like Muslims, they should move somewhere else where they can practise Islam. Some of his audience would be in no doubt, in the narrative context LF has created, that he is suggesting going to ISIL-controlled territory. He returns to this topic in the talk at Document 2/6 where he says that if Muslims feel restricted in following Islam here, they should find a place where they can continue to practise; again, he means the Caliphate.
  264. Many of the talks explicitly invite further engagement by the audience; if they have any questions, they should ask those who know. A linked theme is LF's frequent advice to Muslims to verify and check. These repeated, express, invitations, and the recruitment document, support the Secretary of State's view that ALM and its members, including LF, seek to create opportunities to engage one-to-one with potential recruits. The Secretary of State was entitled, and right, to conclude that in giving his talks, LF was playing an important part in that strategy, which is further evidenced by the recruitment document, and by the documentary about the women supporters of ISIL.
  265. He alludes in the talk at Document 14 to the Covenant of Security. Against the background of the publication of 'Indeed your Lord…', I concur with the Secretary of State's assessment that some members of ALM now interpret ALM's pledge of allegiance to ISIL as a rejection of the Covenant of Security. That assessment is supported by the acts of terrorism and attempted acts of terrorism by ALM members in the United Kingdom after those publications. In my judgment, LF is hinting that this is a topic on which he might have more to say in private. He appears to endorse the idea that Majid Nawaz is a Kafir and an apostate and 'could fall under the knife' for saying that people who draw cartoons of the Prophet are entitled to express their views. 'Once a person has left the fold of Islam, it can have grave consequences. If he is asked to repent and does not, 'Capital Punishment''. I have considered whether LF intends the qualification 'but only if we were living under Sharia law'. I do not think that he does.
  266. In the talk at Document 12 LF refers to the media's use of 'Wahhabi' to describe 'so-called terrorists'. Two implications of that passage are that terrorists are only terrorists 'so-called' and that they have a good understanding of Islam. He says in the talk at Document 14 that killing an innocent person is a great crime, but does not put a person outside the fold of Islam. He also explicitly says in the talk at Document 12 that Christianity is worse than paedophilia. Such people, he says, are not 'innocent'. The ninth negation of Islam is claiming not to be bound by Sharia or to follow another faith, such as democracy and British values. LF is clearly signalling to his audience at this point in this talk that he is, indeed, an 'extremist', but, equally, that he is astute not to break the law. Democracy is 'evil'. He gives a similarly knowing signal to his audience in the talk at Document 14: obviously LF has not been to a Prevent Centre because he is not a radical; he also signals his association with Mizanur Rahman, and that Mizanur Rahman has not been 'deradicalised'.
  267. LF has been careful not explicitly to advocate attacks in the United Kingdom in his published talks. But there are hints in passages in the talk at Document 12 and in his reference to Majid Nawaz in the talk at Document 14. In the talk at Document 2/6, referring to the Leytonstone attack, he says it is not acceptable to attack another Muslim. A possible implication left hanging is that it is acceptable to attack a disbeliever. He goes on in that talk to say that Muslims should only be in a non-Muslim country either for dawah or jihad. Later on in that talk he quotes a verse, 'If they [the Kuffar] hold you back, take hold of them and kill them wherever you find them…'
  268. Understood together, as LF intended that they should be, his talks encourage those who listen to them to engage in acts of terrorism (as defined in the legislation). That is because, in short, they encourage listeners to travel to ISIL-controlled territory to join ISIL. ISIL is a proscribed organisation, and the talks thus encourage the audience to do an act for the benefit of a proscribed organisation. LF has done that in three broad ways: by comprehensively rebutting doctrinal criticisms of ISIL made by Muslims, by suggesting that it is an Islamic duty to go to ISIL-controlled territory (the only place where Sharia is fully implemented and where Muslims are free to practise their religion), and by positively advocating travel there.
  269. LF's encouragement of that course gains great potency from the religious context in which LF sets all of his talks, addressing, as he does, 'My dear Muslims'. LF is not merely expressing 'extremist' political opinions, but telling his audience, 'My dear Muslims', that it is their religious duty to travel to the Caliphate, which is a legitimate Caliphate and the only place on earth where Muslims can practise their religion freely. His message is especially potent because it is an overtly religious one, not a political one. It is therefore impervious to logic or to 'British values'. It can only be refuted – if at all – by 'evidences' in the Koran and the Sunnah. He has, in many of the talks, carefully undermined other potential sources of Islamic guidance: the various dodgy Imams he refers to, the Mosque which only cares about its funding, the Mosque where prayers are recited but no guidance given, and the dangerous grudges which cause some Muslims to deny the legitimacy of the Caliphate.
  270. Mr Squires submitted that the Secretary of State had never alleged that LF had done acts 'for the benefit of ALM'. That was a section 4(1)(a) allegation. LF had been deprived of the opportunity to respond to such an allegation. An act done 'for the benefit of' a proscribed organisation must, in the context of the legislation as whole, mean, primarily, financial acts, such as fund-raising (see section 15 of the 2000 Act). Whether such an act had been done was a question of fact; it was not at all clear that inviting a person to an event, tweeting, or publicising talks, were acts done for the benefit of a proscribed organisation. It is true that the phrase 'for the benefit of a proscribed organisation' is not used in NSS1 or in NSS2; but the shorthand phrase 'TRA' is. Further, section C of NSS1 refers to ALM as a proscribed organisation (as does paragraph 4(a)) and it makes extensive factual allegations about LF's role in ALM, which he has had the opportunity to answer. I do not accept the submission that 'for the benefit of' is confined to financial help. But even if it were, the allegations in NSS2 do include giving financial support to ALM (paying its phone bill and the rent of the Ilm Centre).
  271. I have no doubt that the factual allegations on which the Secretary of State relies do show that LF has taken steps for the benefit of ALM, a proscribed organisation. He has carried out various roles for ALM; being a senior leader, paying the rent and phone bill for the Ilm Centre, and propagating ALM's message enthusiastically and articulately. Those actions might be characterised as 'the commission… of acts for the purposes of terrorism (ie acts for the benefit of ALM, a proscribed organisation), although the Secretary of State does not classify them in that way. They could also be characterised as conduct which facilitates the commission of acts for the purposes of ALM, a proscribed organisation, because what LF has done is to make it easier for ALM to continue to exist, to function, and to propagate its message, at dawah stalls, in talks given in the Ilm Centre, and by spreading ALM's message on the internet (for which, as JB mentioned in cross-examination, the phone connection is essential); in other words, LF's acts for ALM have made it easier for other ALM members to do acts for the benefit of ALM.
  272. I have carefully considered whether the Secretary of State's misdirection (in effect, that LF's acts in encouraging travel to ISIL-controlled territory also facilitate that travel) undermine her view that LF engaged in TRA. It is a potentially significant misdirection, because it could be said that facilitating travel is more serious than encouraging it. On balance, I do not consider this misdirection is material to this issue, for two reasons. First, the Secretary of State was entitled, and right, to consider that the encouragement which LF has given to that course of action is TRA. Second, it is clear from the factual allegations on which the Secretary of State relies in LF's case that what she labelled as 'facilitation' is a species of 'encouragement'. I therefore consider that the Secretary of State's error, such as it was, was to put the wrong label on LF's conduct, rather than to misunderstand the factual nature of that conduct, or whether it was TRA, or its gravity. I also note that the Secretary of State could also have relied on other TRA, that is, a section 4(1)(a) allegation, and that the factual foundation for such an allegation is clearly set out in her case. The overall question, it seems to me, is not whether the Secretary of State has attached the correct label to the TRA in question by reference to section 4(1)(a), (b) or (c), but whether the factual allegations on which she relies, and to which LF has had an opportunity to respond, show that LF has engaged in TRA of a kind defined in section 4.
  273. My conclusion is that the Secretary of State was entitled, and right, to decide that LF had engaged in TRA.
  274. Condition B

  275. The parties agree that condition B is satisfied. I say no more about it.
  276. Condition C

  277. The next question is whether the Secretary of State could 'reasonably consider' that it is necessary (and proportionate) to impose a TPIM on LF in order to protect the public from a risk of terrorism, and whether she was entitled to take that view.
  278. I bear in mind that the risk is a risk of terrorism, not of TRA, and that the 'terrorism' concerned is not necessarily terrorism by the subject of the TPIM. I have already observed that ALM is a proscribed organisation, and that there is ample support for the view that ALM is 'concerned in terrorism'. In the light of the obvious danger posed by ALM, LF's enthusiastic support for ALM's purposes, and the help he has given ALM to achieve those, I have no doubt that the Secretary of State was entitled, and right, to decide that a TPIM was a necessary and proportionate means of managing that risk. I consider the impact on LF's article 8 rights, and those of his family, including his children's best interests, when I consider the overnight residence requirement, below.
  279. Condition D

  280. I consider, next, whether the Secretary of State reasonably considered and was right to consider, that the particular measures imposed by the TPIM notice are necessary (and proportionate) for purposes connected with preventing or restricting LF's involvement in TRA. I accept Mr Squires' submission that I must balance the adverse impact of each measure against its marginal utility, and that while I should give the Secretary of State's assessment some deference, I must also (because the measures interfere with Convention rights) give each measure intense scrutiny, applying the test most recently articulated in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2013] UKSC 39; [2014] AC 700 (paragraphs 20 and 74 of the judgments on the substantive appeal).
  281. The principal focus of Mr Squires' argument on this aspect of the case was the measure which requires LF to live in location B, many miles away from his family. I have summarised the evidence of LF and of his wife and of his experts about the effect of the TPIM. I acknowledge that it appears to have caused him to suffer from anxiety and depression (which he has not suffered from before), that he is isolated in location B and hindered by the TPIM from meeting people, and I recognise the anguish and upset, and the practical difficulties, which it causes for him, for her, and for their children. I take into account the children's interests as a consideration of substantial importance. I do not underestimate the adverse effects of separation from an affectionate and 'hands-on' father.
  282. I consider, nonetheless, that it was necessary for this measure to be imposed for its stated purpose. In particular, it is necessary and proportionate for LF to be separated from location A, which is close to the geographical focus of ALM's activities, and near where many of its members live. JB's evidence was that LF has sought influence: see LF's talks, and the presence of his phone number on the leaflet. He is seen as a leader (see Mizanur Rahman's letter). He does dawah, gives talks in person, tweets and posts talks on YouTube. If he were not moved, it would leave that influence (which is significant even if he is moved somewhere else) present in location A. LF supports the Caliphate and supports people joining it. JB said that it is 'absolutely necessary' to protect the public by removing LF from his position of influence in location A. The influence he has sought is part of the threat he poses to young and vulnerable people.
  283. As JB pointed out in his evidence, strict bail conditions were not enough to stop Anjem Choudary meeting a prohibited associate (Coe), and there is a risk that such conditions would not prevent LF from doing the same. It is much harder for LF to associate with other ALM members and leaders if he is physically separated from them, and correspondingly easier to monitor compliance, if he is required to live at some distance from location A. Individual deterrence (whether of the TPIM subject or of others) is not a legitimate purpose of a TPIM, but disruption of ALM is (see paragraph 71 of Nicol J's judgment in LG). That purpose, which both reduces the Condition C and the Condition D risk, will be promoted by the residence condition.
  284. I do not need to decide whether or not Mr Squires is right to submit that the Secretary of State did not take 'properly' into account, when serving the notice, the effect that moving LF would have on him and his family. First, it is self-evident that a measure which separates a man from his wife and young children will have a serious effect on him and on them. Quite how that impact is scientifically to be measured, and its weight compared with that of a second incommensurable is a separate question. Second, in any event, it is well established that the question is not whether the Secretary of State took into account those rights when making the decision, but whether the measures substantively breach article 8 rights. If the Secretary of State did not factor those rights into her decision, that would affect the extent of deference which I should give that decision. It does not, of itself, make the decision unlawful. Whatever level of deference may be apposite (and, indeed, even if none were), I agree with the Secretary of State's assessment that this measure was necessary when it was imposed.
  285. Mr Squires submitted that I also consider that whatever the position when it was imposed, this measure is not now necessary, as there is a 'vanishingly small' risk that LF would now continue to make public statements of the kind he has made. It may be that if LF were back in location A he would be very careful not to make public statements. But that is not the only TRA in which LF has engaged. If LF were back in location A, he would be close to many of ALM's members. The size and population of location A, and the proximity both of many ALM members, and of those whom they seek to influence, would make it much harder and much costlier to police LF's activities. It is a truism that many people are deterred from doing things they should not do, not by rules, but by their perception of the likelihood that they will be found out. I am not persuaded that there is now, a minimal risk that LF will engage in TRA and that the Secretary of State is entitled, and right, to conclude that this measure (and others) was and is still necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting his involvement in TRA. I take into account in assessing the risk LF now poses the fact that, in his witness statements, he has given an explanation of document 17 which I consider implausible, and that I have rejected his explanations for his talks. I consider that he is attempting to minimise his actions, and that that sheds light on his current state of mind. I also consider that what he says about duress in 'the Talk at Document 11' and in 'the talk at Document 14' reduces the confidence which I can have in the truthfulness of statements he makes in his current situation, when he is anxious to do what he can to have the TPIM quashed.
  286. Mr Squires also submitted that the package of measures imposed on LF was disproportionate to any risk he posed. That could be managed simply by association measures, perhaps combined with some reporting and monitoring, and limits on the use of electronic devices or online activities. I reject that submission, subject to what I say below about the reporting measure. The Secretary of State was entitled to make, and right in, her assessment that LF is a member and senior leader of ALM and that he has carried out significant functions for ALM. I am persuaded by the evidence that each element of the package of measures (apart from the reporting measure in its current form) is necessary to manage the Condition C and Condition D risks.
  287. The reporting measure is expressed in the TPIM notice in general terms. The requirement to report five days a week has been separately notified to LF. The justification for this measure is expressed in footnote 37 to NSS2. It is that this requirement gives regular assurance about LF's whereabouts, reduces his ability to engage in TRA, and reduces the risk of absconding. Mr Daly said that LF lives about 10 minutes' walk away from the police station, he had a good rapport with the police officers, and had not suggested that the reporting measure was a problem. In LG, the reporting measures, like the measure which applies to LF, required the respondents to report five days a week. Mr Squires submitted that Nicol J quashed those and replaced them with measures requiring reporting three days a week. JB said in his evidence that LF had not asked for this measure to be varied. The Secretary of State has reconsidered the measure and concluded that it had little impact on LF. The position was the same with JM, but Nicol J still varied the measure. Mr Squires submitted that there was no open evidence to justify the assertion that the measure was necessary to manage LF's risk of absconding and that that, alone, should lead to the quashing of the measure.
  288. Mr Watson submitted that this was an issue which should be decided on the facts of LF's case and that I was not bound to follow Nicol J's approach in LG. There are differences between the cases, but a common factor, which reduces the risk of absconding in all four cases, is the presence in the United Kingdom of a wife and children (and in LF's case, of his own parents and siblings). On the basis of the open evidence I am not persuaded that there is any reason why LF should be required to report five days a week, rather than three. He is not required to report at weekends, as things stand. The fact that he has not complained is neither here nor there. I vary the requirement that he report five days a week to a requirement that he report on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays and that on Tuesdays and Thursdays he rings the monitoring company within a prescribed time frame.
  289. I consider now the main criticisms which are made of some specific measures. Mr Daly, who gave evidence for the Secretary of State, explained that the TPIM was discussed in detail by the TPIM Liaison Group. Once imposed, the TPIM is reviewed every three months at TPIM Review Group ('TRG') meetings. If necessary, ad hoc meetings are also held (one such meeting has been held in this case). He explained what steps were taken by Home Office to facilitate LF's family life. A house was chosen which was big enough to accommodate LF's wife and children. Some money was provided to help them travel. Mr Daly explained how, the Secretary of State had accommodated various requests by LF to enable him, for example, to see his mother in a neutral venue, to visit his father in law in hospital and to go to his funeral.
  290. LF's interest in a house meant that he was not eligible for JSA. Since April 2017 Home Office had been providing him with financial help as he had been certified unfit for work. LF had been given permission in November 2016 to visit an employment consultant who was able to search the internet for work for him. Some TPIM subjects do have internet at their homes: LF chooses not to. He has been allowed to buy a television and two DVD players. His substantial unpaid fines had been paid by the Home Office. LF had indicated that he was unhappy with his Intervention Provider ('IP'), the Home Office considered that, only to be told by LF in his second witness statement that, after all, he felt that he was engaging well with the IP. Mr Daly said that the Home Office are now considering that. LF's wife could have moved, with the children, into the house in location B right away, but chose not to.
  291. JB gave evidence about the measure which requires LF to give notice of visits. It was necessary for LF to give two days' notice of visits by friends in order to enable Home Office to check who they were. Home Office had permitted visits when the identity of the visitor had been notified in that way JB's evidence was that the association measure was necessary: his assessment was that LF's purpose was to recruit and radicalise people so that they would support ISIL. The measure was necessary to prevent him forming relationships with people in order to do this. JB's view was that LF's explanations of the list found in his flat, which JB did not accept, showed that the risk LF posed had not lessened. LF was unable to accept the simplest allegation put to him. I accept this reasoning.
  292. The religious association measure was challenged during the proceedings. The parties have now agreed a replacement measure. Subject to the parties' contrary views, I consider that I should vary that measure and replace it with the text of the agreed measure.
  293. Mr Squires also challenged the measure which prevents LF going into cafés or restaurants which provide access to the internet for their customers. This would stop LF from buying his children a ready meal in McDonalds. It would obviously be difficult to monitor or control LF's access to the internet in such a place. Unfettered access to the internet is vital to ALM's activities and to LF's activities for ALM (not just tweeting and publishing talks), because it is a gateway to many different forms of communication. This measure is plainly necessary and proportionate. Similar arguments apply to the measure, which Mr Squires also challenged, which requires LF to get permission before he visits any new website on the internet. It does make internet browsing and research harder, because it prevents LF from clicking on links at will. There was no serious challenge to the other measures and I am satisfied that they are a necessary and proportionate response to the risks which LF poses.
  294. Conclusion

  295. The TPIM continues in force, subject to the variation of the reporting measure and of the religious association measure to, in the case of the former, the measure I describe in paragraph 262, above, and, in the case of the latter, to the measure agreed by the parties. I invite the parties to agree the exact terms of the new reporting measure.

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