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England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Waghorn (Per Pro CPR Ablations PLC) v Director of Public Prosecutions & Ors  EWHC 2781 (Admin) (23 October 2020)
Cite as:  EWHC 2781 (Admin)
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
| DR DAVID ANTHONY WAGHORN
(PER PRO CPR ABLATIONS PLC)
|- and -
|DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
VERILY LIFE SCIENCES LLC
PLYMOUTH CITY COUNCIL
First Interested Party
Second Interested Party
Miss Beth Collett (instructed by Mewburn Ellis LLP) for the First Interested Party
Hearing date: 15 October 2020
Crown Copyright ©
The Hon. Mrs Justice Elisabeth Laing :
17. On 31 August 2018, R issued claim IL-2018-000164 in the IPEC against VLS. R objected to 'patent specification EP3145428A1'. R, 'a person with practical knowledge and experience of the kind of work in which the invention is intended to be used and skilled in the relevant art' objected to the 'patentability of the …invention pursuant to section 4A(1)(a) of the Patents Act 1977'.
Events since the GCRO
The VAT appeals
28. Judge Hellier explained in paragraphs 2-4 of his order why he had struck out R's appeal. R had complained of HMRC's failure to give him credit for input tax he had claimed in various VAT returns. R told Judge Hellier at the hearing that the input tax claim related to supplies made to a company which then provided those supplies to third parties. No supplies were made by him personally as a sole trader using the supplies made to the company. Section 24 of the VAT Act defines 'input tax' as VAT on the supply to a person of any goods or services …being goods or services used or to be used for the purposes of any business carried on or to be carried on by him'. The amounts claimed by R were not his 'input tax' since the goods or services were not supplied to him and not used by him in any business he carried on. The appeal had no prospects of success.
The order discharging R's bankruptcy
R's application notice dated 4 December 2019
47. Paragraph 17 of the draft notice of appeal says that MASL has never made a supply of educational or examination services. Dr Jooste provided private tuition as sole proprietor of Cosmetic Practitioner training network. He sometimes asked his pupils to pay MASL. MASL may not lawfully supply a cancer service in general. The cancer service is promoted via the internet and 'therefore the supply within the UK to the general public is assessable to VAT. The question whether the British Government is in breach of international law by deliberately taxing citizens for 'the life necessity' of 'the essential medical treatment to sustain life – contrary to article 6(c) of the Rome Statute …is now before the Lord Justices of Appeal (Criminal Division) – In determination of the fundamental legal question:- Can the State raise revenue from the People' fatal disease?'
61. On 27 February 2020, Andrews J made an order. The recitals referred to the proposed claims which R had sought permission to make. Those were the proceedings in CO/2991/2019, in the name of CAP, a claim in R's name in the IPEC against VLS (IL-2018-000164) and the VAT appeals. The recitals recorded 'that to the extent that it was possible to discern what the claims were…they were either fundamentally misconceived or otherwise totally without merit' and that there was evidence that once the GCRO expired, R was likely to persist in bringing claims that were totally without merit either in his own name or in the name of companies with which he had an association.
The application for judicial review in 'CO/587/2020'
The position of the CPS
R's skeleton argument
i. Has R persisted in making claims or applications which are TWM?
ii. Are the circumstances such that an ECRO would not be sufficient or appropriate?
Has R persisted in making claims or applications which are TWM?
i. claim 3
ii. application 1 (by which R sought to bring/renew three separate claims)
iii. the application for permission to appeal to the Judge against the Judge's decision on application 1 and
iv. the appeal against the Judge's decision on application 1.
Are the circumstances such that an ECRO would not be sufficient or appropriate?