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England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Arriva the Shires Ltd v London Luton Airport Operations Ltd  EWHC 64 (Ch) (28 January 2014)
Cite as:  EWHC 64 (Ch)
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Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
| Arriva The Shires Ltd
|- and –
|London Luton Airport Operations Ltd
Tim Ward Q.C. & Colin West (instructed by King & Wood Mallesons LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 30 & 31 October and 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14 & 15 November 2013
Crown Copyright ©
|Luton Airport and the Bus Station||12|
|The current coach services run from the Bus Station||19|
|The Old and New Concessions for the Airport–Victoria route||24|
|The factual witnesses at trial||35|
|The expert witnesses at trial||41|
|Abuse of a dominant position generally||45|
|II. ALLEGED ABUSES ARISING FROM THE TENDER PROCESS||49|
|(i) Did Luton Operations unfairly rule ATS out of the running?||52|
|The website hyperlink incident||53|
|The internet sales dispute||57|
|(ii) Were ATS unfairly disadvantaged when devising their bid?||78|
|(iii) Was the process for identifying the winner fair?||86|
|(iv) Conclusions on the tender process||92|
|III. ALLEGED ABUSES ARISING FROM THE TERMS OF THE NEW CONCESSION||94|
|(i) The relevance of Luton Operations' lack of involvement in the downstream market||100|
|(ii) Distortion of competition created by the New Concession||102|
|(iii) Factors increasing the distortive effect of the New Concession||120|
|The extension of the exclusivity to the new Bus Station||121|
|The grant of first refusal||122|
|Discrimination in favour of easyBus||124|
|IV. OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION||131|
|(i) The test to be applied||132|
|(ii) Congestion at the Bus Station||136|
|Is there space for the 757 service in the Bus Station?||137|
|Use of areas in the CTA but outside the Bus Station||150|
|(iii) Are Luton Operations entitled to reserve space for a different service?||163|
|(iv) Conclusions on objective justification||165|
|V. OVERALL CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS||166|
Mrs Justice Rose :
i) grants National Express the exclusive right to run a coach service between the Airport and much of central London for the next seven years, subject to an exception for a service operated by easyBus using smaller vehicles;
ii) requires National Express to pay Luton Operations an annual concession fee calculated as a percentage of the revenue earned by National Express on the route;
iii) provides that that concession fee will be not less than a guaranteed annual minimum payment in each of the seven years covered by the contract; and
iv) grants National Express the right of first refusal over the operation of other services on routes between the Airport and other destinations in London.
"18 Abuse of dominant position
(1) Subject to section 19, any conduct on the part of one or more undertakings which amounts to the abuse of a dominant position in a market is prohibited if it may affect trade within the United Kingdom.
(2) Conduct may, in particular, constitute such an abuse if it consists in—
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of the contracts.
(3) In this section—
"dominant position" means a dominant position within the United Kingdom; and
"the United Kingdom" means the United Kingdom or any part of it.
(4) The prohibition imposed by subsection (1) is referred to in this Act as "the Chapter II prohibition"."
i) the trial would proceed on the assumption that Luton Operations hold a dominant position because they hold a 100 per cent share in the relevant market, namely the market for the supply of facilities at the Bus Station;
ii) the parts of the claim relating to an advertising hoarding in the arrivals hall of the Airport and some other matters would not be dealt with at the trial; and
iii) all issues relating to quantum of loss would be reserved to a further date in the event that ATS established that there had been an infringement of the Chapter II prohibition.
Luton Airport and the Bus Station
i) A meeting of the Development Control Committee of Luton Borough Council was held on 20 December 2013 at which the Council resolved to approve Luton Operations' planning application for Project Curium subject to (a) a number of conditions; (b) any calling in of the application by the Secretary of State; and (c) the conclusion of a section 106 agreement.
ii) There have been requests for the Secretary of State to call in the application from three local Members of Parliament and two neighbouring councils but it is not known how the Secretary of State will respond.
iii) It has been conceded by Luton Operations in the light of this that it is likely that the capacity constraints relied on as objective justification for the New Concession will have ended by 30 September 2017. ATS pointed to documents disclosed during the proceedings which indicated that the redevelopment of the Bus Station would be carried out as one of the early parts of the redevelopment project and might in fact be completed by the end of 2014.
Coach services operating from the Bus Station
• Service 230 Derby to Gatwick Airport
• Service 240 Bradford to Heathrow Airport
• Service 420 Wolverhampton to London
• Service 422 Burnley to London
• Service 707 Northampton to Gatwick Airport
• Service 737 Oxford to Stansted Airport
• Service 767 Nottingham to Stansted Airport
• Service 777 Birmingham to Stansted Airport
• Service 787 Cambridge to Heathrow Airport
The Old and New Concessions for the Airport – Victoria route
"6.5 The Operator will not price fares payable for the use of a Coach Service uncompetitively so as to discourage its use by passengers and will support LLAO's policy of encouraging travel to and from the Airport by public transport.
6.6 Subject to security considerations LLAO will, free of charge permit the Coach Service to use the interchange for the loading and unloading of Coaches, and for Coaches waiting to enter service imminently, but not otherwise for parking. In particular, LLAO will not permit the parking of vehicles at the Airport on layover or out of service."
i) There is a fee payable calculated as a percentage of turnover, being 20 per cent on the first £10 million turnover and a rising scale of percentage fees for each additional £1 million of turnover up to 25 per cent on any turnover in excess of £14 million.
ii) There is a minimum guaranteed sum of £1.4 million in the first accounting period, rising by £100,000 per year throughout the seven year life of the contract. The minimum guaranteed sum is paid in monthly instalments.
iii) The obligation to pay the minimum guaranteed sum is subject to a proviso that if the number of passengers in an accounting period is fewer than 9,600,000, the minimum guaranteed sum for that accounting period will be reduced by the same number of percentage points in excess of 10 as the percentage fall in the number of passengers. So, for example, an 11 per cent fall in the number of passengers in a given year compared to 9.6 million would result in a reduction of 1 per cent in the minimum guaranteed sum for that accounting period.
iv) Turnover is defined as the amount of gross revenue generated by the concession 'no matter where, how or by whom tickets are sold'.
v) Clause 8.4 provides that Luton Operations will allocate £260,000 per accounting year out of the minimum guaranteed sum for the purpose of constructing a canopy over the bus station to protect waiting bus passengers from the rain. I will consider the relevance of this provision later.
vi) National Express also pay Luton Operations a 'Facilities Charge' for the electricity, telephone, wi-fi, rubbish removal and other services provided to the sales unit in the Onward Travel Centre.
"2.4 Having regard to:
2.4.1. the need of LLAO to encourage the use of public transport to and from the Airport from as wide a range of destinations as possible; and
2.4.2 the limited capacity of the CTA [sc. the central terminal area]
LLAO confirms that for the duration of this Agreement it will not grant another concession for the operation of:
2.4.3 a coach service between Airport and any of the Authorised Stops: or
2.4.4. a coach service stopping in Finchley Road London or Edgware Road London; or
2.4.5 a coach service to Central London (meaning to any destination within Zone 1 of the London Underground)
2.4.6 services operated by easyBus with a maximum capacity of 19 seats per vehicle; and
2.4.7. a service between the Airport and Liverpool Street or any other destination in Central London east of St Pauls Cathedral commencing on or after 1 May 2014.
Right of first refusal for new London services
2.5 LLAO grants to the Concessionaire a right of first refusal to operate any new coach service that LLAO wishes to authorise (New Service) between the Airport and any destination within Zones 1 to 5 (inclusive) of the London Underground, other than any service to be operated by easyBus with a maximum capacity of 19 seats per vehicle.
2.6 LLAO will give written notice to the Concessionaire of its intention to authorise a New Service, and the Concessionaire will notify LLAO in writing within two months thereafter whether or not it wishes to operate the New Service.
2.7 If the Concessionaire wishes to operate the New Service, it is agreed that:
2.7.1 it will do so within the Concession and (thereafter) on the terms of this Agreement including the Concession Fee and [minimum guaranteed sum]; and
2.7.2 the definition of "Coach Service" will be amended so as to include the New Service, the definition of Authorised Stops will be amended as necessary and any other necessary consequential amendments to the wording of this Agreement will be made; and
2.7.3 the Concessionaire will start to operate the New Service within two months of its notification to LLAO that it wishes to operate the New Service, or on such other date as LLAO may agree to.
2.7.4 If the Concessionaire does not wish to operate the New Service, or if it fails to respond by clause 2.6, LLAO is free to offer the New Service to other operators to the exclusion of the Concessionaire subject to the provisions of clause 2.4, on whatever terms it thinks fit and without liability to the Concessionaire, and the terms of this Concession will remain unchanged. However, if LLAO has not awarded the concession for the New Service within 12 months of the date of the notice it gave under clause 2.6, and if that notice was given before 31 October 2017, LLAO will not then award the concession for the New Service without again giving the Concessionaire a right of first refusal on the terms of these clauses.
2.8 For the purposes of clause 2.7.4, the New Service is defined by its ultimate destination; intermediate stops are irrelevant."
The factual witnesses at trial
i) Mohammed Hanif is the Depot Traffic Manager for ATS at the Airport and reports indirectly to Mr Adcock. His evidence related primarily to the dispute about what was said at the meeting of 6 December 2012 he attended with Mr Adcock;
ii) Kevin Hawkins is the Commercial Director of ATS He attended a meeting with Kevin Midgley of Luton Operations on 16 January 2013. He was also involved in the preparation of the proposal submitted by ATS for the Airport-Victoria route. He also recorded what Mr Adcock had told him had happened at the meeting of 6 December 2012, although he was not at that meeting himself.
iii) Clive King is the Business Development Manager for ATS. His evidence dealt with a remark that was made to him by a person who had been involved in the bid for the Airport–Victoria concession submitted by another coach operator, Terravision.
iv) Jonathan Sweet is the Regional Risk Manager for ATS. He commented on the evidence of Simon Bown for Luton Operations about the potential effect on health and safety issues of using Bays 4 to 9 of the Bus Station to accommodate the 757 service.
v) Heath Williams is the Regional Managing Director for Arriva plc. Mr Adcock reports to him. His evidence also recorded what Mr Adcock had told him about what had happened at the 6 December 2012 meeting. In his witness statement he also contested Luton Operations' submission that exclusive concessions for the route to central London were usual in the industry.
i) Robert Bullock who is the Business Development Director of the parent company of Luton Operations. He is a member of ExCo, the committee which considered and approved Mr Lawrie's recommendation to award the New Concession to National Express in March 2013.
ii) Simon May who works for Luton Operations as the Commercial Manager of the Airport. He was brought in to conduct the post-bid negotiations with National Express to discuss and finalise the terms of the New Concession so that it could be presented to ExCo for approval.
iii) Simon Bown who is employed by Luton Operations as Senior Manager for Health, Safety and Environment at the Airport. His evidence dealt with the pedestrian safety issues said to arise from the proposal that the 757 service could operate from one of the middle bays in the Bus Station.
The expert witnesses at trial
Abuse of a dominant position generally
"140. According to settled case-law, the concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to methods different from those which condition normal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing on the market or the growth of that competition ….
141 Accordingly, the conduct of an undertaking in a dominant position may be regarded as an abuse within the meaning of Article [102 TFEU] even in the absence of any fault …."
"144. The effect referred to … does not necessarily relate to the actual effect of the abusive conduct complained of. For the purposes of establishing an infringement of Article [102 TFEU], it is sufficient to show that the abusive conduct of the undertaking in a dominant position tends to restrict competition or, in other words, that the conduct is capable of having that effect."
"132. In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law on the application of Article [102 TFEU], whilst the finding that a dominant position exists does not in itself imply any reproach to the undertaking concerned, it has a special responsibility, irrespective of the causes of that position, not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market …. Similarly, whilst the fact that an undertaking is in a dominant position cannot deprive it of its entitlement to protect its own commercial interests when they are attacked, and whilst such an undertaking must be allowed the right to take such reasonable steps as it deems appropriate to protect those interests, such behaviour cannot be allowed if its purpose is to strengthen that dominant position and thereby abuse it ….
133. It therefore follows from the nature of the obligations imposed by Article [102 TFEU] that, in specific circumstances, undertakings in a dominant position may be deprived of the right to adopt a course of conduct or take measures which are not in themselves abuses and which would even be unobjectionable if adopted or taken by non-dominant undertakings ….
134. Consequently, the applicants may not invoke the rejection of [Clearstream's] request for access to Euroclear France in respect of all the French securities or the renegotiation of contractual relations with EB in order to justify their conduct. As an undertaking in a dominant position, [Clearstream] had a particular responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market."
"143. The specific prohibition of discrimination in subparagraph (c) of the second paragraph of Article [102 TFEU] forms part of the system for ensuring … that competition is not distorted in the internal market. The commercial behaviour of the undertaking in a dominant position may not distort competition on an upstream or a downstream market, in other words between suppliers or customers of that undertaking. Co-contractors of that undertaking must not be favoured or disfavoured in the area of the competition which they practise amongst themselves.
144. Therefore, in order for the conditions for applying subparagraph (c) of the second paragraph of Article [102 TFEU] to be met, there must be a finding not only that the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant market position is discriminatory, but also that it tends to distort that competitive relationship, in other words to hinder the competitive position of some of the business partners of that undertaking in relation to the others (see, to that effect, Suiker Unie, paragraphs 523 and 524).
145 In that respect, there is nothing to prevent discrimination between business partners who are in a relationship of competition from being regarded as being abusive as soon as the behaviour of the undertaking in a dominant position tends, having regard to the whole of the circumstances of the case, to lead to a distortion of competition between those business partners. In such a situation, it cannot be required in addition that proof be adduced of an actual quantifiable deterioration in the competitive position of the business partners taken individually."
II. ALLEGED ABUSES ARISING FROM THE TENDER PROCESS
(i) Did Luton Operations unfairly rule ATS out of the running?
The website hyperlink incident
"Remember you asked me to take off the links to websites as far as coach and bus companies are concerned? Well I think we've been rumbled… Would you like to reply to Linsey at Arriva?"
The internet sales dispute
"1.23.3 all amounts received or receivable from orders obtained or solicited at any place beyond the Airport (including by telephone or internet) but with collection at the Airport"
"Q. You recognise that the Airport's witnesses do not agree with your account as to how hostile or difficult the meeting was?
A. Well, you know, I have been in business now 20 years and I have told my colleagues when I got back to the depot, and I have told many a colleague since, that that was the worst meeting I have ever had in my working career. You know, it is not the sort of business meeting, especially when we deal with local authorities and people like that, that we are used to at Arriva."
"Hanif and I had a very difficult meeting with Luton Airport yesterday, it is clear that there are considerable negative feelings towards Green Line/Arriva currently.
As you are aware our concession to operate from the Airport expires in April 2013. It is vitally important that this concession becomes renewed.
We therefore need to ensure we don't do anything to antagonize them between now and the renewal which means we need to follow their rule book to the letter…"
Mr Hanif forwarded the email to his subordinates describing Luton Operations as having been 'not very co-operative' at the meeting and saying that it was vital that they did as suggested by Mr Adcock.
(ii) Were ATS unfairly disadvantaged when devising their bid?
"In view of the number of variables present to achieve this, I would welcome a further discussion with you as soon as possible to develop the proposal further and to bring more clarity to the minimum guarantee that we would be able to provide you."
(iii) Was the process for identifying the winner fair?
i) ATS submitted their proposal on 1 February 2013. This proposal expressly assumed an exclusive arrangement such that no other bus or coach service to London would be permitted to operate from the Airport (except the Earl's Court route then operating). The proposal stated that in view of the increased investment by ATS, they would need a minimum 10 year term though some of the elements in the agreement could be reviewable after the initial five year period. ATS offered 12.5 per cent commission on all revenues with the exception of income generated through the easyBus arrangements. They proposed a mechanism for calculating an annual minimum guaranteed sum with an initial guarantee for the first year based on 85 per cent of all revenues accrued on the route, again with the exception of income generated through the arrangement with easyBus. This minimum guaranteed sum would then be indexed annually by the percentage rise or fall of annual air passenger footfall through the Airport. In the proposal they set out a table as an illustration of how much the minimum guaranteed sum would be if footfall rose in line with Luton Operations' published plans and forecasts. The payment profile would be about £700,000 for the first year rising to £1.26 million in the 10th year.
ii) Terravision submitted their proposal on 25 January 2013. They offered a royalty of 15 per cent on all ticket sales over a seven year period. This was expressed to be on the premise that Terravision would be the exclusive provider on the Airport–Victoria route. The minimum guaranteed sum was about £700,000 for the remainder of 2013 and then an amount just over £1 million in 2014 rising to about £1.3 million in 2019, making a total over the contract period of £8.5 million.
iii) National Express submitted their proposal on 6 February 2013. They offered Luton Operations commission of 20 per cent on revenue up to £10 million and a slightly higher percentage on revenue over that amount. This would be payable on the Airport-Victoria route on all revenue arriving or departing from the Airport irrespective of the channel by which the ticket was purchased. Further, National Express offered a commission (at a lower rate) on tickets on other routes in their network sold from the Onward Travel Centre and ticket machines in the terminal building. National Express proposed a five year term with an exclusivity covering all locations within a five mile radius of the entire route. They also wanted to be given first refusal on setting up services from the Airport to alternative London destinations. The minimum guaranteed sum offered was £1.5 million in year 1 and for years 2 to 5 it would be based on 80 per cent of the commission paid in the prior year.
(iv) Conclusion on the tender process
III. ALLEGED ABUSES ARISING FROM THE TERMS OF THE NEW CONCESSION
(i) The relevance of Luton Operations' lack of involvement in the downstream market
"173. In that regard, it should be recalled that the concept of abuse is an objective concept and implies no intention to cause harm. Accordingly, the fact that ADP has no interest in distorting competition on a market on which it is not present, and indeed that it endeavoured to maintain competition, even if proved, is in any event irrelevant. It is not the arrival on the market in groundhandling services of another supplier that is in issue, but the fact that at the time of the adoption of the contested decision, the conditions applicable to the various suppliers of those services were considered by the Commission to be objectively discriminatory."
(ii) Distortion of competition created by the New Concession
"26. One example of such a foreclosure problem is in the exclusive sale of large packages of media right. The FAPL has so far sold exclusive live TV rights in packages that were comparatively large in relation to that which would be sold by an individual club and to the demand from many broadcasters on the market. This is likely to create barriers to entry on downstream television markets in the United Kingdom leading to access foreclosure in these markets. Advertising-funded TV and pay-TV are the most commercially important of the markets affected by the arrangements.
"27. Given the importance of football for pay TV and free TV services, a restriction of competition on an upstream market for the acquisition of media rights is likely to have significant effects on the corresponding downstream markets.
28. Other concerns could arise through the sale of all the Premier League live TV rights to a single buyer, given the likelihood that this would also lead to foreclosure on the downstream television markets, and through the existence of output restrictions in respect of various classes of rights"
"We're the only coach provider that takes you right to the airport door in the quickest time. Plus, unlike other services there are no changes or shuttle buses to disrupt your journey"
"Whether a duty to interline arises depends on the effects on competition of the refusal to interline; it would exist in particular when the refusal or withdrawal of interline facilities by a dominant airline is objectively likely to have a significant impact on the other airline's ability to start a new service or sustain an existing service on account of its effects on the other airline's costs and revenue in respect of the service in question, and when the dominant airline cannot give any objective commercial reason for its refusal (such as concerns about creditworthiness) other than its wish to avoid helping this particular competitor. …"
"The fact that British Midland has been able to continue operations notwithstanding the handicap imposed on it by Aer Lingus, is due in the first place to British Midland's determination to succeed in the face of unusual difficulties; it does not mean that the refusal had no effect on competition. There is no doubt that at the time the practice was implemented, the refusal to interline was intended and was likely to hinder the development of competition. The lawfulness of the refusal at the time when it occurred cannot depend on whether the competitor was later willing and able to remain on the route in spite of the disadvantages imposed on it."
"The General Court was correct to hold that the determination of a precise threshold of foreclosure of the market beyond which the practices at issue had to be regarded as abusive was not required for the purposes of applying Article 102 TFEU and, secondly, in the light of the findings made in paragraph 243 of the judgment under appeal [that is that two fifths of the market was foreclosed] it was, in any event, in the present case, proved to the requisite legal standard that the market had been closed to competition by the practices at issue."
(iii) Factors increasing the distortive effect of the New Concession
The extension of the exclusivity to the new Bus Station
The grant of first refusal
Discrimination in favour of easyBus
IV. OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION
(i) The test to be applied
"Clearly it applied the test to different facts, but just as the conduct which can constitute abuse is not to be limited to any particular categories of action, so the question whether the conduct in question is capable of being objectively justified must be applied differently in relation to different facts. Of course the courts must be careful not to allow the idea of objective justification to permit what are really anti-competitive practices (as in the Atlantic Container Line case) but subject to that the court must allow undertakings to take business decisions on normal commercial bases and in a normal way. I find Laddie J's application of the principle helpful in approaching the very different facts of the present case."
"235. The factor or factors relied on must therefore be justified in that sense – not merely that it is a solution to the relevant problem, but that it is the solution to the problem. If there are other solutions then the conduct is not justified. In paragraph 88 [of Flughafen] the Commission determined that:
"… FAG's decision not to authorise self-handling and not to admit independent handlers is not the result of an overriding need, but was a matter of choice of FAG, which did not take the measures which would have obviated the constraints imposed by the lack of space at the airport."
236 [Purple Parking] relied on this paragraph, and in particular the strong phrase "overriding need". For my part I would have thought that seems to put the matter a little high, but the essence is that there is no justification if there is another solution. …"
(ii) Congestion at the Bus Station
Is there space for the 757 service in the Bus Station?
Use of areas in the CTA but outside the Bus Station
(iii) Are Luton Operations entitled to reserve space for a different service?
(iv) Conclusions on objective justification
i) concerns about congestion at the Bus Station were not the reason why the New Concession granted exclusivity to National Express. Exclusivity was granted (together with the right of first refusal) with the intention of protecting National Express from competition in the downstream market in the expectation that this would maximise the fees that National Express was prepared to pay Luton Operations for the use of the rights.
ii) The 757 service could be accommodated at the Bus Station without disruption to other coach services; without requiring adjustments to be made to the facilities and without increasing risks to the health or safety of passengers.
iii) Luton Operations are not under any obligation to convert parts of the Central Terminal Area currently being used for other services into additional coach stop facilities.
iv) The suggestion that Luton Operations are keeping space available at the Bus Station to accommodate services to different destinations if such services are proposed at some point in the future is not made out on the facts.
V. OVERALL CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS
i) Luton Operations did not abuse that dominant position in the way in which they conducted the tender for awarding the New Concession;
ii) By entering into the New Concession agreement with National Express, Luton Operations did abuse their dominant position because those terms, by granting a seven year exclusivity period to National Express, giving National Express a right of first refusal on services to new destinations in London and discriminating in favour of easyBus seriously distort competition between coach operators wanting to provide services from the Bus Station and there is no objective justification for that distortion of competition.
Note 1 In these proceedings and in this judgment the terms ‘bus’ and ‘coach’ have in the main been used interchangeably. [Back] Note 2 That is, an agreement between the Council and Luton Operations pursuant to section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 whereby Luton Operations will undertake to pay certain sums or carry out additional work as part of the grant of planning permission. [Back] Note 3 I note that it is not entirely clear to me how clause 2.4.7 and 2.5 of the New Concession apply, that is whether post 1 May 2014, a proposed new route to Liverpool Street or east of St Paul’s Cathedral must first be offered to National Express. [Back]
Note 1 In these proceedings and in this judgment the terms ‘bus’ and ‘coach’ have in the main been used interchangeably. [Back]
Note 2 That is, an agreement between the Council and Luton Operations pursuant to section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 whereby Luton Operations will undertake to pay certain sums or carry out additional work as part of the grant of planning permission. [Back]
Note 3 I note that it is not entirely clear to me how clause 2.4.7 and 2.5 of the New Concession apply, that is whether post 1 May 2014, a proposed new route to Liverpool Street or east of St Paul’s Cathedral must first be offered to National Express. [Back]