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England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions >> A Local Authority v Mother & Ors (Radicalisation Fact Finding)  EWHC 2054 (Fam) (05 March 2018)
Cite as:  EWHC 2054 (Fam)
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Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
| A LOCAL AUTHORITY
|- and -
J (A Child)
(by her child's guardian)
|A LOCAL AUTHORITY v A MOTHER and OTHERS (RADICALISATION: FACT-FINDING)
Mr Nuvoloni QC and Ms Nouri for the First Respondent mother.
Ms Perry for the Third Respondent child.
The Second Respondent father did not appear and was not represented.
Hearing dates: 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 February 2018.
Crown Copyright ©
Mrs Justice Gwynneth Knowles:
"6. Every person in this jurisdiction has the inalienable right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion: the freedom to believe whatever one wishes, to be able to express those beliefs, to manifest them in every aspect of life, including to associate with others who hold similar beliefs; additionally, self-evidently, the right to bring up their children within those beliefs and the right not to be treated less favourably than others because of those beliefs. Those rights have long been recognised in our society and are enshrined in our law (Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights and enacted in the Human Rights Act of 1998). This case, in common with other similar ones, confronts not just behaviours but, as I recorded earlier, whether and in what circumstances the religiously motivated views of parents are so harmful to their children that the state should intervene to protect the child. All families are free to bring up their children as they see fit, provided of course, that within a wide ambit they do not cause them harm. But the question in this and in other cases is under what circumstances might the parents' religious views and activities result in harm to the children's physical and emotional health and well-being.
7. The Government's Prevent Strategy and the radicalisation of some parents and of their children has brought this issue very much to the fore; it challenges the tolerance and neutrality between different religions and perspectives, in particular denying the opportunity to individuals to prevent hatred (and thus extremism). It goes to the very roots of democratic and jealously guarded freedoms. Self-evidently the State cannot place limitations on beliefs that are held by a private individual. It can, however, place limitations on the manifestation of those beliefs if that limitation is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, which in these circumstances would be protecting public order, health, morals, freedoms or rights of others, generally or individually."
The tension between private beliefs and child protection lies at the very heart of this case.
Local Authority Involvement
History of the Proceedings
a) commits or participates in acts of terrorism;
b) prepares for terrorism
c) promotes or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful glorification of terrorism); or
d) is otherwise concerned in terrorism.
"Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also known as Dawlat al - 'Iraq al - Islamiyya, Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Dawlat al Islamiya fi Iraq wa al Sham (DAISh) and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham - Proscribed June 2014.
ISIL is a brutal Sunni Islamist terrorist group active in Iraq and Syria. The group adheres to a global jihadist ideology, following an extreme interpretation of Islam, which is anti-Western and promotes sectarian violence. ISIL aims to establish an Islamic State governed by Sharia law in the region and impose their rule on people using violence and extortion.
ISIL was previously proscribed as part of Al Qa'ida (AQ). However on 2 February 2014, AQ senior leadership issued a statement officially severing ties with ISIL. This prompted consideration of the case to proscribe ISIL in its own right.
ISIL not only poses a threat from within Syria but has made significant advances in Iraq. The threat from ISIL in Iraq and Syria is very serious and shows clearly the importance of taking a strong stand against the extremists.
We are aware that a number of British nationals have travelled to Syria and some of these will inevitably be fighting with ISIL. It appears that ISIL is treating Iraq and Syria as one theatre of conflict and its potential ability to operate across the border must be a cause of concern for the whole international community.
In April 2014, ISIL claimed responsibility for a series of blasts targeting a Shia election rally in Baghdad. These attacks are reported to have killed at least 31 people. Thousands of Iraqi civilians lost their lives to sectarian violence in 2013, and attacks carried out by ISIL will have accounted for a large proportion of these deaths.
ISIL has reportedly detained dozens of foreign journalists and aid workers. In September 2013, members of the group kidnapped and killed the commander of Ahrarash - Sham after he intervened to protect members of a Malaysian Islamic charity.
In January 2014, ISIL captured the Al-Anbar cities of Ramadi and Fallujah, and is engaged in ongoing fighting with the Iraqi security forces. The group also claimed responsibility for a car bomb attack that killed four people and wounded dozens in the southern Beirut suburb of Haret Hreik.
ISIL has a strong presence in northern and eastern Syria where it has instituted strict Sharia law in the towns under its control. The group is responsible for numerous attacks and a vast number of deaths. The group is believed to attract foreign fighters, including Westerners, to the region. The group has maintained control of various towns on the Syrian/Turkish border allowing the group to control who crosses and ISIL's presence there has interfered with the free flow of humanitarian aid.
Note: The Government laid an Order in August 2014 which provides that "Islamic State (Dawlat al Islamiya)" should be treated as another name for the organisation which is already proscribed as ISIL. The UK does not recognise ISIL's claims of a 'restored' Caliphate or a new Islamic State."
THE POLICE INVESTIGATION AND EVIDENCE
"[The mother] approached me via a phone call in relation to her ongoing issues with Social Services. She explained that she had returned from Syria and had had her daughter removed from her care. She said that Social Services had implied during the course of their interactions that she was radicalised and that this is one of the reasons for the removal. She expressed her concern around this and asked for support with how to manage and communicate with Social Services as she felt victimised. I would like to make clear that at no point during this phone conversation did she say she was radicalised and there was no indication that she is in fact radicalised. I have never met [the mother] and contact has only been over the phone."
On the basis of the above, the social worker expressed concern to me about the true nature of the mother's approach to this organisation. This appeared to be focused on dealing with the local authority's alleged victimisation of her rather than her acceptance that she had made a mistake in both travelling to Syria and having a baby during her time there.
The Local Authority
The Child's Guardian
"67. The fact that this case involves alleged risk of harm to a child consequent upon alleged risk of radicalisation, alleged extremist beliefs or alleged risk of removal to Syria does not change the fundamental legal principles that must be applied when determining the applications before the court. Those principles can be summarised as follows:i) The burden of proving the facts pleaded rests with the local authority. In cases of alleged extremist beliefs or ideology, alleged risk of radicalisation and alleged risk of removal to a war zone, it is for the local authority to establish these on the balance of probabilities. There is no requirement on a parent to prove the contrary. Where a respondent parent seeks to prove an alternative explanation for a given course of conduct but does not prove that alternative explanation, that failure does not, of itself, establish the local authority's case, which must still be proved to the requisite standard (see The Popi M, Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Fenton Insurance Co Ltd  1 WLR 948).
ii) The standard to which the local authority must satisfy the court is the simple balance of probabilities. The inherent probability or improbability of an event remains a matter to be taken into account when weighing the probabilities and deciding whether, on balance, the event occurred (Re B  UKHL 35 at ). Within this context, there is no room for a finding by the court that something might have happened. The court may decide that it did or that it did not (Re B  UKHL 35 at ). The legal concept of proof on the balance of probabilities must be applied with "common sense" (The Popi M, Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Fenton Insurance Co Ltd  1 WLR 948).
iii) Findings of fact must be based on evidence not on speculation. The decision on whether the facts in issue have been proved to the requisite standard must be based on all of the available evidence and should have regard to the wide context of social, emotional, ethical and moral factors (A County Council v A Mother, A Father and X,Y and Z  EWHC 31 (Fam)).
iv) In determining whether the local authority has discharged the burden upon it the court looks at what has been described as "the broad canvas" of the evidence before it. The court takes account of a wide range of matters including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and inferences that can be properly drawn from the evidence. The role of the court is to consider the evidence in its totality and to make findings on the balance of probabilities accordingly. Within this context, the court must consider each piece of evidence in the context of all of the other evidence (Re T  2 FLR 838 at ).
v) The evidence of the parents and carers is of utmost importance and it is essential that the court forms a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability. The court is likely to place considerable reliability and weight on the evidence and impression it forms of them (see Gestamin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd v Anor  EWHC 3560 (Comm) at  to  and Lancashire County Council v M and F  EWHC 3 (Fam)).
vi) As to the issue of lies, the court must always bear in mind that a witness may tell lies in the course of an investigation and the hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear and distress. The fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything (R v Lucas  QB 720).
vii) With respect to the welfare decision that is before the court, in the proceedings under Part IV of the Children Act 1989 before making a final order the court must be satisfied that the threshold criteria set out in section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 are made out and must have regard to the matters set out in section 1 of the 1989 Act, which matters include the stipulation that the child's welfare is the court's paramount consideration. In the proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, before making a final order the court must be satisfied that the order sought is in the child's best interests having regard to the child's welfare is the court's paramount consideration.
68. Whilst, as I have noted, the fact that this case involves alleged risk of harm to a child consequent upon alleged risk of radicalisation, alleged extremist beliefs or alleged risk of removal to Syria does not change the foregoing fundamental legal principles, it is important in cases of this nature to further emphasise the following matters.
69. Suspicion is not enough. In these difficult and emotive cases, suspicion perhaps finds an easier foothold than in other cases concerning harm to children. In the context of cases of this type, in Re X & Y (No 3)  EWHC 3651 (Fam) the President observed at  that "There are many matters on which I am suspicious, but suspicion is not enough, nor is surmise, speculation or assertion". This does not affect the standard of proof but rather recognises that, whatever the nature of the allegation, any findings of fact the court makes must be rooted in the totality of the empirical evidence before the court, and any inferences it is reasonable to draw therefrom.
70. Within this context, it is important to recognise that cases of this nature bring with them certain additional challenges when seeking to determine the issues before the court by means of considering the evidence in its totality. Specifically, and within the context of the history of certain members of the mother's family, PC Q was careful to make clear that whilst the police have provided disclosure in this case (say for certain material that was the subject of a successful public interest immunity application), she does not know whether further relevant information is held by other security agencies or whether other investigations may be continuing. In this regard, I bear in mind the cautionary words of Cobb J in Re C, D and E (Radicalisation: Fact Finding)  EWHC 3087 (Fam) that the court must not guess, or infer what the evidence might be, or have been. Once again, the court must determine the case on the basis of the empirical evidence before it together with any inferences it is reasonable to draw therefrom.
71. With respect to allegations of extremism, risk of radicalisation or involvement with terrorism, before determining whether such allegations are made out to the requisite standard, it is important to be clear what is meant by these concepts. Terrorism has a statutory definition, set out in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 as amended:"1 Terrorism: Interpretation.
(1) In this Act "terrorism means the use or threat of action where (a) the action falls within subsection (2),(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it --(a) involves serious violence against a person,(b) involves serious damage to property,(c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action,(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.
(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.
(4) In this section
(a) "action" includes action outside the United Kingdom,(b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated,(c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than the United Kingdom, and(d) "the government" means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom.
(5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation."
72. With respect to the concepts of "radicalisation" and "extremism", the Revised 'Prevent' Duty Guidance for England and Wales: Guidance for Specified Authorities in England and Wales on the Duty in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 defines 'radicalisation' as follows:"Radicalisation' refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups."
And 'extremism' as follows:" vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas."
73. The Revised 'Prevent' Duty Guidance for England and Wales: Guidance for Specific Authorities in England and Wales on the Duty in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 states as follows in respect of Islamist extremism:"Islamist extremists regard Western intervention in Muslim-majority countries as a 'war with Islam', creating a narrative of 'them' and 'us'. Their ideology includes the uncompromising belief that people cannot be both Muslim and British, and that Muslims living here should not participate in our democracy. Islamist extremists specifically attack the principles of civic participation and social cohesion. These extremists purport to identify grievances to which terrorist organisations then claim to have a solution."
74. In this context, it is also useful to consider the analysis (undertaken within the context of a plea of justification in a libel action) of Haddon-Cave J in the case of Begg v BBC  EWHC 2688 (QB) at  to  of positions that may be considered "extremist Islamic positions" in the context of Islam and Islamic doctrinal positions. In that case, Haddon-Cave J drew the following conclusions (footnotes excluded):" What is 'extreme' is, by definition, something which is not 'moderate'. Thus, 'extremist' Islamic positions can be seen in contradistinction to 'moderate' or 'mainstream' Islamic positions. Dr Wilkinson usefully defines moderate Islam as essentially those ideas, doctrines and worldviews consensually agreed by Sunni and Shia Islamic Law Muslim scholars, mainstream Salafi scholars and Muslims, generally to constitute the essential doctrines, teachings and spirit of Islam, according to Qur'an and Sunna, applied in such a way as to be suitable for the context of contemporary Britain. I agree with this as a general working definition.
Extremist Islamic positions
 In my view, the following constitute "extremist" Islamic positions (or indicia thereof).
 First, a 'Manichean' view of the world. A total, eternal 'Manichean' worldview is a central tenet of violent Islamic extremism. It divides the world strictly into 'Us' versus 'Them': those who are blessed or saved (i.e. the "right kind" of Muslim) on the one hand and those who are to be damned for eternity (i.e. the "wrong kind" of Muslim and everyone else) on the other. For violent Islamic extremists, the "wrong kind" of Muslim includes moderate Sunni Muslims, all Shia Muslims, and many others who are "mete for the sword" and can be killed, and anyone who associates or "collaborates" with them. Violent Islamic extremists divide the world strictly into the Abode of Islam (Dar al-Islam), the Abode of Unbelief (Dar al-Kufr) and the Abode of War (Dar al-Harb). The ultimate agenda of violent Islamic extremists is the overthrow of all democratic states, including Muslim democratic states, and the creation of a global Caliphate or Islamic State and the imposition of a primitive, literalist interpretation of Sharia Law by force (as exemplified by e.g. "ISIS"). The clearest exposition of this 'Manichean' philosophy is to be found in Sayyid Qutb's "Milestones" who called for a war against jahiliyyah (unbelief) (see further below).
 Second, the reduction of jihad (striving in God's cause) to qital (armed combat) ('the Lesser Jihad'). An interpretation of jihad that simply equiperates jihad with qital and ignores the numerous peaceable meanings of jihad ('the Greater Jihad') would a priori be extreme. Such an interpretation would give jihad an exclusively violent meaning which it does not have.
 Third, the ignoring or flouting of the conditions for the declaration of armed jihad (qital) i.e. the established Islamic doctrinal conditions for the declaration of armed combat (qital) set out above. Thus, terrorist insurgency, 'leaderless' jihadist attacks by groups or individuals against civilians, or the waging of aggressive war against another country or people, cannot properly constitute lawful qital under Islamic doctrine. Accordingly, encouragement of such actions would, therefore, be classified as "extremist" Islamic positions.
 Fourth, the ignoring or flouting of the strict regulations governing the conduct of armed jihad i.e. the stipulations in the Qu'ran and the Sunna for the ethics of conducting qital set out above. Thus, the use of excessive violence, attacks on civilians, indiscriminate 'suicide' violence and the torture or the murder of prisoners would constitute a violation of these regulations of jihad and, therefore, be classified as "extremist" Islamic positions.
 Fifth, advocating armed fighting in defence of Islam (qital) is a universal individual religious obligation (fard al 'ayn). Qital has been adjudicated from early to classical to modern times by the vast majority of Islamic scholars as being a collective religious obligation (fard al-kifaya) unless one is directly under attack. Thus, encouraging young Muslim men or women to believe that it was their individual religious duty to go off and "fight in the name of Allah" would be an "extremist" Islamic position.
 Sixth, any interpretation of Shari'a (i.e. religious law laid down by the Qu'ran and the Sunna) that required breaking the law of the land. Under Shari'a, Muslims are required to obey the law of the land, unless that law of the land explicitly required them to break the Shari'a.
 Seventh, the classification of all non-Muslims as unbelievers (kuffar). Extremist Islamists cite irreconcilable differences between belief (iman) and unbelief (kufr) and classify as all non-Muslims as unbelievers (kuffar). In mainstream Islam, however, 'People of the Book' i.e. Christians and Jews, are not classed as kuffar.
 Eighth, the extreme Salafist Islamism doctrine that the precepts of the Muslim faith negate and supersede all other natural ties, such as those of family, kinship and nation. This is redolent of the extreme Salafist Islamist outlook which cites absolute, irreconcilable differences between belief (iman) and unbelief (kufr) (see Sayyid Qutb below).
 Ninth, the citing with approval the fatwa (legal opinions) of Islamic scholars who espouse extremist views (e.g. the Salafi-Wahabi scholar, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz) or referring with approbation to notorious violent, extremist, Islamic ideologues (e.g. Sayyid Qutb and Abdullah Azzam).
 Tenth, any teaching which, expressly or implicitly, encourages Muslims to engage in, or support, terrorism or violence in the name of Allah."
75. Haddon-Cave J's analysis in Begg v BBC also records that Islam is a religion that forbids extremism and terrorism (see Begg v BBC at  to ).
76. Within the foregoing context, once the court has determined its findings of fact it is also important to recall the reminder given by the President in Re A  EWFC 11 at  that the conclusion argued for by the local authority must follow from the facts:"The second fundamentally important point is the need to link the facts relied upon by the local authority with its case on threshold, the need to demonstrate why, as the local authority asserts, facts A+B+C justify the conclusion that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, significant harm of types X, Y or Z. Sometimes the linkage will be obvious, as where the facts proved establish physical harm. But the linkage may be very much less obvious where the allegation is only that the child is at risk of suffering emotional harm or, as in the present case, at risk of suffering neglect. In the present case, as we shall see, an important element of the local authority's case was that the father "lacks honesty with professionals", "minimises matters of importance" and "is immature and lacks insight of issues of importance". May be. But how does this feed through into a conclusion that A is at risk of neglect? The conclusion does not follow naturally from the premise. The local authority's evidence and submissions must set out the argument and explain explicitly why it is said that, in the particular case, the conclusion indeed follows from the facts."
77. Finally, whilst counsel very helpfully provided me with a number of other reported decisions dealing with cases of alleged radicalisation, I bear in mind the cautionary words of the President in Re X (Children); Re Y (Children)  EWHC 2265 (Fam) that each case is decided on its own facts and that a comparison between the instant case on the facts and conclusions of another case is of limited value."
The Father's Beliefs and Actions
The Mother: Preliminary Observations
The Mother's Twitter Account
How the Mother and Father met
The Journey to Syria
Travel to Syria and Time in Syria
A. Background: parents' relationship and actions
a. The mother and father met in late 2014;
b. The mother and father undertook an Islamic marriage;
c. The mother and father travelled together from Gatwick in 2015;
d. The mother and father travelled to [redacted];
e. The mother and father travelled to Turkey;
f. From Turkey the mother and father entered Syria into territory controlled by ISIL;
g. The mother and father lived in territory controlled by ISIL, specifically Mosul and Raqqa;
h. The mother gave birth to J Syria in 2016;
i. The mother and father entered Turkey and presented in early 2017; and
j. The mother and J were deported from Turkey to UK in 2017.
B. Father's extremist beliefs and actions
a. The father had accessed ISIL propaganda featuring dead bodies, martyrs, glorifying armed combat and encouraging people to join ISIL. Numerous images found on the father's computer contained the ISIL flag. The father chose to use as his Skype picture an image of the ISIL flag which was a screen grab from an ISIL propaganda video;
b. The father's computer contained numerous images depicting fighters, weaponry and glorifying violence;
c. The father visited sites for and shared ISIL propaganda videos with X which displayed extreme acts of violence, including executions, and which encouraged terrorism.
a. He researched travel to Turkey prior to parents' departure;
b. In the course of Skype conversations the father confirmed his intention:
i. On 14th January 2015 at 18.05 " my sheikgs (sic) tellin me/bruv u go over there to the state/u roll around wiv whatever straps [guns] u want/NO ONE will say a thing/bruv response from X: So when you going fam hav a ak on ur shoulder/coz its sunnah/to have a weapon init response from X: Yeah its calm fam/once ive sort dis marriage ting "; and
ii. At 18.55 "even even if u die u win fam/coz u die/u meet allah/allahs rewards u with the best of rewards/fam u know the martyr/the shaheed the one that dies fighting/hes in paradise/highest level/with the prophets";
c. Shortly before departure the father wrote messages to X stating "ayo/im gone fam/ill try keep in contact".
a. He undertook research, whilst in the UK, into ISIL and a group associated with British ISIL fighters (namely, [redacted]) along with other groups involved in combat in Syria;
b. He viewed and shared propaganda encouraging terrorism;
c. A document called [redacted] was found on the father's computer. This is a piece of inspirational jihadist propaganda;
d. In a conversation with X commencing at 18.46 on 3rd January 2015 the father noted:
i. He had been running holding a pull up bar which is "a bit lighter than a rifle/but gives good experience/duckin n shit wiv it";
ii. "fam/u know that a mujahid/his sleep/is the same as u praying all night (Really) yea bruv he gets MAD rewards fam".
e. When travelling through Gatwick Airport, photographic evidence showed that the father chose to wear clothes as if going on holiday and appeared to have shaved his beard in order to avoid arousing suspicion;
f. X reported, in an email to the paternal grandfather, that "the last I spoke to [the father], was the day he left, he told me that he'd keep in contact when he could and that he'd be going through training when he first arrived he'd have to undergo training, and he wouldn't be able to contact me for about 2 months";
g. [Redacted] Other evidence indicating active involvement in fighting for ISIL whilst in Syria;
h. And the father has been charged in another jurisdiction in relation to terrorism offences.
C. The mother's Twitter account
a. It was identified as her account by X;
b. The activity on the account reflected the dates of the mother's travel:
i. The day before the mother's departure;
ii. Shortly before the mother's passage to Syria;
iii. There was a period of inactivity following her passage to Syria; and
iv. The activity on the account in mid 2015 coincided with the approximate time when the mother and father arrived in Raqqa;
c. A screen grab from the account was found on the father's computer.
a. Support for ISIL: the home Twitter banner was a picture of a number of females several of whom are carrying the ISIL associated black flag with white seal;
b. An interest in ISIL: 20th February 2015: "IS fighters "lure" muslim women with nutella & kittens Lol"; retweet of Moazzam Begg "No crime to belong to Islamic State, al-Qaida or IRA, says Green party leader";
c. Acknowledgement of ISIL's declared caliphate: 9th January 2015: "Muslim or non muslim the khilafah will rule over everyone";
d. Reflected an extremist mindset: reference to the kuffar (18th January 2015; 21st January 2015); Charlie Hebdo (retweet of a Channel 4 story regarding Charlie Hebdo protests; 18th January 2015 and liking a tweet stating "Charlie Hebdo you will pay the Muslims are on their way. Shariah for France!!...") and the oppression of Muslims (17th January 2015; 18th January 2015); and
e. Contact via Twitter with someone active in the Sisterhood associated with ALM (9th January 2015; 13th January 2015).
D. The mother's motivation for travelling to Syria
a. The mother was notably pious and devout in her observance of her faith and wore modest clothing, covering her face with a veil when she left the family home;
b. The mother married the father having formed an intention to marry in around January 2015 within about a week of being introduced to the father and chose to travel jointly with him to Syria;
c. The mother maintained her relationship with the father throughout their time in Syria;
d. It was inherently improbable that the mother was unaware of the father's ideology and activities and interests prior to their departure to join Islamic State;
e. In the alternative, her subsequent actions were consistent with her, in any event, sharing the same ideology and, in particular, taking no avoidant action to separate herself from the father;
f. As a consequence of their shared ideology, the mother did not accept that the father's behaviour or ideology were of concern or would pose a risk of harm. There remains a significant risk that she would seek to resume her relationship with him if the opportunity arose.
a. The mother's tweet found on the father's computer as a screen grab image reads "forever dreaming about the life that awaits us Bi'ithnillah";
b. On receiving the message "im gone fam" and "ill try to keep in contact" from the father shortly before his departure, X responded "no way fam" and later "May allah guide you and your wife fam, and forever watch over you my brother";
c. The mother altered her usual clothing when travelling through Gatwick Airport specifically choosing not to wear a headscarf or veil in order to avoid arousing suspicion;
d. The tweets sent by the mother from Raqqa did not suggest that the mother had arrived in Syria unexpectedly or against her will.
E. The mother's account to the Court
a. The mother's account which denied adherence to extremist views or support of ISIL was a lie;
b. The mother intentionally withheld the name of the "friend" who had introduced her to the father;
c. Contrary to the mother's statement, her brother-in-law, Z appears to have known, or met, the father at the early stage of the parents' relationship and seems to have brokered the marriage
d. The mother's account of the father's motivation for travelling to Syria was a lie and one that the father had never put forward;
e. The mother's actions prior to her departure were inconsistent with those of a person believing they were merely travelling to the country for benign reasons;
f. It was inherently improbable that the mother and father could enter ISIL controlled territory and assimilate themselves in the way that they did without being able to satisfy others of their shared values and aims;
g. In light of the above, it was more likely than not that the mother herself was motivated to travel to Syria to pursue and satisfy her own extremist ideology and that the narrative she constructed upon her return was a false one with the intent of hiding both her own and her husband's true beliefs and motivation;
a. The risk that the mother would radicalise her daughter and inculcate an extremist ideology;
b. The risk that the mother would seek to remove the child from the jurisdiction to an unsafe location in pursuit of her extremist ideology; and
c. The risk that the mother would behave in this jurisdiction in ways consistent with her extremist ideology.