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England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions >> O'Connell v Viridian Housing [2012] EWHC 1389 (QB) (25 May 2012) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2012/1389.html Cite as: [2012] EWHC 1389 (QB) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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Susannah O'Connell |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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Viridian Housing |
Defendant |
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Jon Holbrook (instructed by Viridian Housing) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 18 May 2012
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Tugendhat :
"7… the Defendant's date of birth is 29 May 1996. She is partially sighted and suffers from depression. The Defendant's mother died in around 2005 and the Defendant inherited a property at … London SW11. The Defendant was given a three year grace period by Housing Benefit to move into that property which she has failed to do. As a result, her Housing Benefit claim was stopped on 3 June 2011.
8. The Claimant is asking the court to take the following financial or other information into account when making its decision whether or not to grant an order for possession: the Claimant is a charity and requires rental income to further its objectives to provide social housing".
"I am satisfied that Ms O'Connell has, in relation to her impaired sight a physical impairment; and I am also satisfied that as a result of her mental problems, the evidence about which I have summarised, she also has a mental impairment. The combination of both her seriously impaired eyesight, and her impaired ability to organise her thoughts, plan a course of action and carry it out, affects her ability to carry out normal day to day activities. Her impairments are of long term effects. I am satisfied that as a result there is a substantial and long term adverse effect on Ms O'Connell's ability to carry out normal day to day activities. I find she is 'a person who has a disability for the purposes of the 1995 Act".
"I am satisfied that in this case Ms O'Connell's rent arrears … were and are not related to Ms O'Connell's disability. I find as fact that there was no causal link between her rent arrears and her disability, and I further find that there was no relationship between her arrears and her disability which could probably lead to the conclusion that [Viridian Housing] 'discriminated' against her for the purposes of the 1995 Act. On the contrary, they have treated her generously. Her rent arrears developed because her Housing Benefit stopped. The decision to stop paying her Housing Benefit was taken by the Department when and because they found out that she owned a house. It is true, that she was at that time, as she had been for many years, suffering from physical and mental impairments which together constituted a disability for the purposes of the 1995 Act. But there was neither a causal link nor a relationship between her arrears and her disability".
"there are issues in this case which relate to public law and Article 8 issues which I do not feel able to present myself which is why I asked for an adjournment".
Having read the letters the Judge asked for a copy of the consent order, but it was not available.
"3. It seems (and I have to deliberately stress the word 'seems') that Ms O'Connell was allowed to continue to occupy the property by virtue of some consent order entered into in February 2009. The difficulty from my point of view is that I have not had sight of that consent order and I do not know, therefore, with any degree of clarity the terms upon which the order would have been set aside. Nonetheless, it now appears that Ms O'Connell is in substantial rent arrears again and in circumstances in which the claim for possession has now been issued on the basis of grounds 8, 10 and 11 of Schedule 2…
4. On the face of it, I have seen a copy of the up to date rent account. There can be no doubt that ground 8 is made out. Both as at the date of notice seeking possession and as of today's date there are at least eight weeks arrears of rent. …
7. It is now urged upon me on behalf of Ms O'Connell that there are human rights issues at play in this case. I have no doubt that Ms O'Connell will wish to rely again on her disability and the same matters that were raised before Mr Recorder Clover during the course of the hearing in front of him. That is a matter that was dealt with by Mr Recorder Clover in I repeat what is an extremely full judgment which was handed down, as I understand it, in relation to the earlier proceedings. Part of that judgment reads as follows: [and she quotes para 26].
8. So it is that I have come to the same conclusion. This is a case in which the landlords have extended latitude for a long period of time in circumstances which it appears that the consent order to set aside was based on a period of grace to allow Ms O'Connell either to enable that other property to be adapted for her own use or to sell the property. She has done neither it seems, and in circumstances in which she is now appealing to the court to say that there should be an adjournment to still allow housing benefit to be sorted out. I am clear in my own mind that there are no such Human Rights Act issues at play here. This is a defendant who has had an abundance of latitude shown to her already. There are no exceptional circumstances such as to justify a further adjournment.
9. Under those circumstances, I say that ground 8 is made out. It is a mandatory ground and I am going to make an outright order for possession".
"We hold that the power to adjourn a hearing date for the purpose of enabling a tenant to reduce the arrears to below the ground 8 threshold may only be exercised in exceptional circumstances. Cases such as those to which we have referred in para 31 above might fall into this category. But the fact that the arrears are attributable to maladministration on the part of the housing benefit authority is not an exceptional circumstance. It is a sad feature of contemporary life that housing benefit problems are widespread. To a substantial extent, these are no doubt the product of lack of resources. But we do not consider that the non-receipt of housing benefit can, of itself, amount to exceptional circumstances which would justify the exercise of the power to adjourn so as to enable the tenant to defeat the claim."
"29. Following the death of my mother I am advised that I became the sole owner of the property by survivorship. In any event my mother left a will leaving everything to me. The property is derelict but I believe it to be worth six figures even in its present condition.
30. My depression leaves me with feelings of hopelessness and feelings of lack of point about everything. This leads to a lack of motivation and I struggle to do basic tasks over and above receiving my benefit and obtaining food.
31. I have a problem following matters through. For instance, I have been taking steps for the last two to three months to getting a bank account and so far I have only been to the bank and got details of what they require despite being constantly nagged by my solicitor. I am unable to bring myself to do things which my brain tells me is the right thing to do but my heart does not.
32. Dr Potter stated my 'main ongoing difficulties include depressive ideation, intermittent ideas of self harm, lack of motivation and difficulty carrying out basic activities of daily living. Her self care is poor and her flat is in some state of disrepair'.
33. He also stated: 'She had difficulties in carrying out basic tasks of daily living, for example, self care, tidying of the flat, paying bills. She is consistently presented with difficulties of motivation and organisation. Her difficulties have been compounded by her visual impairment and social isolation."
"(1) A person (A) discriminates against a disabled person (B) if—
(a) A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of B's disability, and
(b) A cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if A shows that A did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that B had the disability".