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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions >> Saunderson & Ors v Sonae Industria (UK) Ltd [2015] EWHC 2264 (QB) (30 July 2015) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2015/2264.html Cite as: [2015] EWHC 2264 (QB) |
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Neutral Citation Number: [2015] EWHC 2264 (QB)
Case No: 2MA90124
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
MANCHESTER DISTRICT REGISTRY
“SONAE GROUP LITIGATION”
Liverpool Civil and Family Court
35 Vernon Street
Liverpool L2 2BX
Date: 30/07/2015
Before:
MR JUSTICE JAY
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Between:
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MRS SUSAN SAUNDERSON & OTHERS |
Claimants |
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SONAE INDUSTRIA (UK) LTD |
Defendant |
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Mr Michael Redfern QC, Mr Pepin Aslett and Miss Alice Dobbie (instructed by Camps Solicitors) for the Claimants
Mr Michael Kent QC and Mr Michael Jones (instructed by Clyde & Co Claims LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 3rd – 5th, 8th – 12th, 15th – 19th, 22nd – 26th June 2015
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Judgment
Mr Justice Jay:
INTRODUCTION
1. This group litigation involves numerous similar claims for damages for personal injuries, in the torts of negligence and public nuisance, brought by 16,626 Claimants arising out of a major fire at the Defendant’s particle board manufacturing plant at Knowsley Industrial Park, Kirkby commencing on Thursday 9th June 2011, at approximately 17:30. The seat of the fire was bunker no. 1 in the Woodyard building at the plant, but the fire spread to all six bunkers in the building, causing a very substantial plume of smoke, fumes, associated chemicals, and particulate matter to issue forth into the surrounding area. In due course, most of the flammable contents of the building were consumed in the fire. The Claimants, all of whom either lived or worked in the neighbouring area or near the plant, say that they were exposed to quantities of smoke sufficient to cause them personal injuries: in particular, a range of symptoms variously involving the respiratory tract, the eye, and the skin; and in some cases headache and more general debility. Fortunately, no one has alleged symptoms of any permanence, and it is accepted that these are low-value claims.
2. Since a Group Litigation Order was made in this case by Hamblen J on 12th July 2012, the issues between the parties have narrowed considerably. By its Group Defence filed on 25th January 2013, the Defendant admitted breach of duty in respect of those who might foreseeably suffer injury in consequence of exposure to the smoke. This admission has removed a layer of evidential exploration, and concomitant potential complexity, from the scope of the litigation. Both the existence and causation of actionable injury remain hotly disputed.
“1. When did the fire start and how did it spread?
2. What part of the site in addition to the Woodyard Building was affected by the fire?
3. What was the quantity of recycled wood in the Woodyard Building and any other part of the site affected by the fire when the fire started?
4. What was the composition of such recycled wood when the fire started?
5. What other materials were in the Woodyard Building and any other part of the site affected by the fire when the fire started?
6. For how long did the fire burn/smoulder?
7. When did the recycled wood/other materials burn in the fire?
8. What was the heat output of the fire over time?
9. What were the meteorological conditions during the fire?
10. What was the geographical spread of the smoke plume during the various stages of the fire?
11. What was the chemical composition and concentration of the smoke, in the geographical area in which exposure is alleged, during the various stages of the fire?
12. What air quality or equivalent standards apply to exposure to the smoke?
13. What, if any, air quality or equivalent standards apply to short term exposure to the smoke?
14. What is the relevance of such air quality or equivalent standards that exist to short term exposure?
15. Does Rylands v Fletcher apply?
16. What are the findings from the 40 test cases and how should those findings apply to the issues in the individual cases, including:
(i) the extent of the Claimants’ smoke exposure.
(ii) the nature of any injury suffered by the Claimants.
(iii) the diagnostic criteria for any such injury.
(iv) the duration of symptoms attributable to any injury suffered by the Claimants.
(v) the cause of any such injury.
(vi) whether such injury was foreseeable.
(vii) whether such injury was actionable in law.
(viii) the relevance of pre-existing medical conditions.
(ix) the relevance of other environmental factors such as cigarette smoke.
(x) Damages (if any)”
THE DEFENDANT’S PLANT AND MODUS OPERANDI
A labelled photograph appearing below shows the external configuration of the plant more naturalistically, although the position and layout of the woodyard building is less clearly depicted. This photograph will be better seen on an electronic version of this judgment.
Each bunker was 25m in length, 12m wide and 12m high. Each silo was 50m long and was split into two by means of a 400mm thick dividing wall, made of reinforced concrete. Along the base of each bunker were “letterbox” or slot openings each 970mm deep.
The legend explains the position but further explanation is required. The ultrasound level detector (the existence of which was revealed to the Claimants only very late in this litigation) was designed to measure the distance between the conveyor and the level of woodchip directly underneath. When the sensor detected that the level had attained a pre-set value, the conveyor moved along the bunker to another position before further deposits were effected. In this way the bunkers were filled, but not in such a manner that the woodchips were ever horizontally aligned within the plane formed by the tops of bunkers. The woodchips formed peaks and troughs. Had an experiment been carried out to ascertain the maximum capacity of the bunkers through this filling system, one would culminate with a pile of woodchips describing a “Toblerone” shape, with the peak at a level which matched the pre-set value on the sensor. Subject to some doubt as to the angle of incline of this tent shape, the maximum tonnage of each bunker calculated on this basis would have been in the region of 3,600 Te (the Claimant proposes 3,696 Te). However, this theoretical perfection could never be attained in practice, for several reasons. First, operational reasons within the plant would dictate the state of the bunkers, and there was no need for the bunkers to be as full as possible: as the operators all told me, they needed to be “healthy”. Secondly, it is apparent from the schematic at paragraph 12 as above that the system was not designed to create a uniform, even peak – hence the troughs to which a number of witnesses referred. Lastly, the process was dynamic in the sense that the bunkers were constantly being emptied via separate conveyors to enable the woodchips to enter the next stage in the process.
A SYNOPSIS OF THE COURSE OF THE FIRE
15. It has been estimated that the fire started at approximately 17:30 on Thursday 9th June in bunker no. 1. The initial activation of the “fire-fly” detection system occurred at 18:57, but the processes were not shut down until just before 19:35. Employees smelled smoke, which slightly later was seen to rise from an area towards the south-western corner of the bunker, and attempts were made to douse the nascent fire using a hose. The Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service (“MFRS”) was telephoned at 20:03, and fire-fighting personnel soon arrived at the plant. Apart from spraying water into the bunker, the strategy adopted was to remove as much woodchip material from the bunker as possible in order to reduce the actual and potential fire load. At approximately 03:40 on Friday 10th June a flame was seen to rise, or shoot, from the south-western corner of bunker no. 1, fanning in all directions. The flame was dark in appearance, and was lacking oxygen. Within a rapid space of time flames were shooting out of the top of the bunker, and a MFRS evacuation whistle was blown.
16. Thereafter, the development of the fire was sudden. The amount of smoke increased and the fire was soon spreading along the conveyors at a high level in the building. The senior fire officer within the woodyard building described the event as a “conflagration”. By 04:00, although the timings cannot be altogether precise, it seems from the evidence of the fire-fighting professionals on the ground that the fire had spread throughout the whole of the woodyard building. By 06:05, all six bunkers were recorded as being on fire, although it is possible that the ferocity of the fire had already encompassed these structures. At that stage the fire was a raging inferno and thick, black smoke was spewing from the roof of the woodyard building in substantial quantities.
18. It is common ground that the fire went through three distinct stages or phases. The first stage started at about 17:30 on 9th June (the precise time matters not) and entailed a smouldering fire propagating slowly outwards from the origin, creating a “nest” of burnt and smouldering material. During this stage the heat that was generated by the process of combustion was sufficient to pre-heat woodchips in the vicinity, but insufficient to ignite the resulting pyrolysis products and cause flame. The first stage concluded between 03:35 and 03:40 on Friday 10th June. The transition between the first and the second stages occupied a number of minutes, and the second stage commenced at about 04:00. This was the fully developed, substantial fire involving in due course all six bunkers and other combustible materials within the woodyard building. Amongst the characteristics of this second stage were flame and black smoke. The fire transitioned into the third stage when the appearance and quantity of smoke reduced, and the residue materials were gradually consumed in a smouldering process characterised by “reverse propagation”. The parties are not in agreement as to the timing of this transition (which on any view must be somewhat imprecise), the Defendant averring that it occurred by about 10:00 on 10th June, the Claimants by 14:30. Thereafter, the fire diminished in intensity as the residue within the bunkers was gradually consumed within the smoulder, with the MFRS permitting it to burn out in a controlled manner and not declaring the incident officially “closed” until 7th July 2011. By that point, there was very little left in the bunkers except for ash and similar residue. Despite the extent and intensity of the fire, only the woodyard building was involved.
THE ISSUES ARISING FROM OR TOUCHING ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE FIRE
(1) the quantity of woodchips in the bunkers.
(2) the remaining fire load, in terms of its constituents and its quantities.
(3) the timing of the transition between stages 2 and 3.
(4) the heat release rates for the three stages.
(5) the emission factors which should be applied to this fire.
(6) ash and dust generation.
20. The relevance of the fourth and fifth issues needs to be explained. In order to achieve indicative values for the levels of exposure of the Test Claimants to relevant chemicals and particles at various times, the plume modellers require a range of data and information, including the relevant heat release rates and emission factors. The concept of a heat release rate is self-explanatory – other things being equal, the greater the rate, the higher the smoke plume travels and the more widely it disperses. The concept of an emission factor is less straightforward, and a full explanation appears under paragraph 92 below. The basic point is that these variables are fed into the computer programme used by the plume modellers. They also need to know the wind speeds and directions at all material times (these are agreed), and finally they factor into their model other variables such as exit velocities, temperature, diameter and number of buildings (all of which variables are now also agreed). The parties are agreed that emission factors constitute the most important scientific issue in this litigation because they are so far apart in relation to it.
23. I have mentioned expert evidence in a number of disciplines, and at this stage I should explain the position in slightly more detail. The Defendant has filed and served three reports and one letter from an expert in mechanical and fire engineering, Dr Alan Mitcheson. His evidence bears on the issues of the transition between stages 2 and 3, heat release rates and deposition of dust and ash. At a pre-trial review which took place on 5th May 2015, the Claimants sought my permission to file and serve comparable evidence from Dr Phylaktou (I understand that he would also have assisted me on the issue of emission factors), but I refused permission and relief from sanctions, on the ground that it was far too late to adduce such evidence, and the smooth running of the trial would be seriously prejudiced. My detailed reasons appear in a separate transcript. Accordingly, the Claimants have no expert evidence addressing these issues, although they do rely on their modelling expert, Dr David Carruthers of Cambridge Environmental Research Consultants Ltd, to address emission factors and the issue of radiative heat loss away from the smoke plume (if a valid point, this would reduce the relevant heat release rates accordingly). Issues arise as to Dr Carruthers’ qualifications to deal with some of these issues. The Defendant has its own modelling expert, Mrs Angela Spanton of Envirobods, and the parties have experts in meteorology (as I have said, their evidence is agreed) and toxicology. In relation to this last discipline, the Claimants rely on the evidence of Professor Alastair Hay, who is an international authority in his subject, whereas the Defendant has called Mr David Shillito, who is not a toxicologist but a chemical engineer with, amongst other things, an environmental background. Mr Michael Redfern QC for the Claimants did not object to Mr Shillito’s contributions in this regard, nor did he object to him assisting the court on the issue of emission factors – a matter on which he is qualified to opine, although it might be said that the Defendant has exceeded its permitted quota of one engineer.
The Quantity of Woodchips in the Bunkers
“Bunker 1 I estimate 200-250 tonnes a.t.o.f. [at time of fire] (i.e. about ½ full)
2 been out of use – prob[lem]s with screw ∴ ~ 100 tonne
(sawdust) ~ 200 T
(purchased chips) ~ 300-350 T
Recycled wood 1 (S) ~ 350 T
Recycled wood 2 (N) ~ 350 T”
50. At this stage, it is convenient to address Mr Redfern’s submission that I should draw inferences adverse to the Defendant regarding the contents of the bunkers because it has lost or withheld relevant information, namely the records from the SCADA system relating to the data sent back by the sensors. He relied on the well-known case of Armory v Delamerie [1722] 1 Strange 505 which has recently been considered by Mann J in Gulati and others v MGN Ltd [2015] 1482 (Ch). In that case Mann J was considering breach of privacy claims by victims of phone-hacking. He decided that the Armory principle was relevant to his judicial task because on the facts of the case before him it was germane to the scope of the Defendant’s wrongdoing, which was itself relevant to the scope of the invasion of privacy, and concomitantly relevant to damages [91]. Further, at [96] Mann J explained that Armory encapsulated an evidential principle relating to how the court should assess and find facts when that process has been obstructed by the acts of one of the parties.
56. Mr Redfern advanced a separate submission on the drawing of adverse inferences based on a case extremely familiar to him, Wisniewski v Central Manchester HA [1998] PIQR 324, 340. He submitted that I should draw inferences adverse to the Defendant flowing from its failure to call relevant witnesses, namely Mr Sharkey and Mr Mitchell. I cannot conclude that these men could have given me no relevant evidence, but I do conclude that their evidence could not have assisted me significantly. Mr Mitchell could have spoken to the capacity of the bunkers, but this issue is no longer in dispute, pace Dr Mitcheson’s arithmetical error in this second report. As I have already said, Mr Sharkey could not improve on Mr Pybis’ evidence, particularly in circumstances where the shift managers’ logs are no longer available.
The Remaining Fire Load
61. Dr Mitcheson has calculated the remaining fire load in the woodyard building. In his estimation, there was approximately 20 Te of conveyor belting, 16 Te of foam insulation and 4.5 Te (or 5,000 litres) of hydraulic oil. The combustion of these materials created dense black smoke. In addition, there were unquantified accumulations of woodchip and associated dust outside the bunkers which would not have materially contributed to the fire load but would have accelerated the spread of the conflagration at or shortly before 04:00 on 10th June. Finally, Dr Mitcheson refers to electric cabling with small amounts of plastic insulation, hydraulic hoses, miscellaneous painted surfaces and other similar combustible materials. Again, these did not contribute materially to the overall fire load.
The Transition from Stage 2 to Stage 3
65. Stage 2 of the fire was characterised by very considerable quantities of thick, black smoke billowing forth from the roof of the woodyard building. There are photographs and spectacular video footage which illustrate this quite well, allowances being made for photograph quality, the play of light sources across the lenses, and (at least in some cases) some doubt as to the exact timing of certain, publicly available video footage. The black smoke was the result of an oxygen-deprived fire, burning rich, producing incomplete products of combustion. Dr Mitcheson agreed in cross-examination that the space both immediately above and within the bunkers was heavily smoke-logged during stage 2, and that the richer the burn, the greater the pollutant content. Dr Jowett was asked about smoke-logging, and in his view what mattered was not the clogging smoke above the bunkers but within them. In my judgment, nothing really turns on this nuance.
66. In Dr Mitcheson’s opinion, the transition from stage 2 to stage 3 occurred at approximately 10:00 on Friday 10th June, although he accepted that placing an exact timing on what was essentially a process rather than an event was somewhat arbitrary. Dr Mitcheson based his opinion on the MFRS log and what he considered to be reliable lay evidence (appended to his first report), and on the photographic and video record. I have reviewed the log very carefully but I am far from convinced that it provides much positive support for Dr Mitcheson’s argument. Certainly by later on that afternoon there is reasonably clear evidence of a significant reduction in the overall quantities of smoke, and the Claimants propose a later time for the transition, namely approximately 14:30 on Friday 10th June.
67. There are two features of the evidence which require closer examination. First, what may be described as the highlights of the photographic and video evidence were considered by Dr Mitcheson, both in chief and in cross-examination. I should add that when opening his case to me Mr Redfern presented a 40 minute montage of the available evidence, and Dr Mitcheson confirmed that he had seen it. A video available on Youtube, which is untimed but Dr Mitcheson surmises was taken at around 10:00, shows lesser quantities of smoke issuing from the plant, and a possible change in colour – blending from white grey to a darker shade of grey. Photographic images taken at 10:28 and 10:29 that morning, showing the west and northwest aspects of the woodyard building, appear to depict smoke of a light grey colour tinged with yellow. There was some suggestion that the yellow might be a refraction or reflection of light from the sun, but I doubt that. Dr Mitcheson agreed in cross-examination that the yellow smoke was probably the product of something other than wood. However, it remains unclear what this was or might have been, and ultimately smoke of this hue does not really assist me in timing the transition from stage 2 to stage 3. Another image timed at 11:04, but taken from a different angle, shows what I would describe as grey, but not black, smoke. A further photograph taken at 11:17 shows a significantly reduced amount of smoke.
68. Dr Mitcheson agreed that the position changed at approximately 13:24 on the Friday afternoon when there is a body of photographic and video footage showing thick black smoke. By 14:49 the quantity had reduced but the colour was still fairly black. Dr Mitcheson’s contention is that this represents the combustion of approximately 2,500 litres or 2.25 Te of hydraulic oil which had entered the immediate zone of the fire. There is some support for this explanation from a MFRS log entry timed at 13:29 – it erroneously refers to “approximately 1,500 litres of hydraulic fuel” having entered the area of the fire, but nothing turns on this quantitative error, or the mis-description of the substance.
69. On the other hand, the Claimants contend with some conviction that it is not easy to understand how 2,500 litres of hydraulic oil could have accounted for densely copious quantities of black smoke which endured for at least 85 minutes. Interestingly, Mr Callaghan put the duration of this black smoke as being only 10-15 minutes, which in my view is incorrect. I see the common sense force of the Claimants’ point, but Dr Mitcheson explained in cross-examination that the oil could have pooled on the ground. Dr Mitcheson did not accept the force of the point that one would have expected both oil tanks to enter the fire zone more or less simultaneously. In this regard he received some support from the evidence of Mark Callaghan to the effect that the oil tanks were 8-10 metres apart.
72. Nor did Mr Redfern take issue with another calculation which appears at paragraph 69 of Dr Mitcheson’s first report. There, Dr Mitcheson explains that by 13th June the MFRS photographs show that the bunkers contained ash and smouldering woodchips to a depth equivalent to about three-quarters of each slot height, i.e. about 0.75 metres. This equates to a volume of about 225m³ in each bunker, suggesting an unburnt mass of about 22 Te per bunker and a total mass of about 120 Te. Accordingly, the majority of the woodchips remaining at the commencement of stage 3 were consumed by about midday on 13th June. Subsequently, it is obvious that there was much less left to burn, and Dr Mitcheson calculates that by 7th July only about 10 Te remained. Put another way, by midday on 13th June there was much less left to burn, much less smoke, and many fewer emissions of pollutants.
“I returned to the site on Saturday 11th and Sunday 12th June 2011. During these days, I walked around and liaised with demolition contractors and the fire brigade. On a number of occasions I was inside the woodyard building. I was able to see clearly and did not experience any breathing difficulties. The fire fighters were not wearing any breathing apparatus as we walked around the site or were inside the woodyard building …
During the remaining period of the fire, I continued to be on site during my normal working hours. By approximately Monday, the smoke from the fire had decreased significantly and from then onwards, the smoke gradually decreased.”
75. Best of all from the Defendant’s perspective was the evidence of Dr Jowett. Back in June 2011 he had no interest in matters such as the quantity, thickness and colour of the smoke; these were wholly outside the ambit of his concerns. As I have said, he went to the plant on 14th June in order to undertake a preliminary inspection. His photographs taken at the time do not show copious quantities of smoke, and when he inspected the woodyard building that afternoon there was very little smoke at ground floor level. The position was the same the following day. Dr Jowett returned to the site on 23rd June and carried out a risk assessment for his own purposes. This assessment made provision for wearing a personal gas monitor should the need arise, but according to paragraph 22 of his witness statement the alarm levels on the monitor were triggered at no point during his inspection. On that occasion, Dr Jowett took what he called an “inspection movie” (his exhibit ‘PAJ-5’, lasting 40 minutes) which shows little smoulder or smoke emanating from the bunkers by that stage.
76. Finally in this regard, there is an illuminating photograph published in a national newspaper showing the scene at 17:21 on 14th June. From the woodyard building emerge relatively modest quantities of grey-white smoke. The wind direction is towards the photographer. And between the photographer and the plant we see a mother and child, apparently oblivious to the smoke or its immediate consequences. True, one possible inference is that the woman in question was acting in reckless disregard of her own and her child’s health. My preferred inference, having considered all the available evidence, is that the smoke was not causing any obvious, immediate ill-health effects.
Heat Release Rates
80. Dr Mitcheson has computed heat release rates for the various stages of the fire, as follows:
· Stage 1, from about 17:30 on 9th June to about 03:35 on 10th June: q¹ = 0.01 x t² MW (t being measured in hours).
· Stage 2, from about 04:00 to 10:00 on 10th June: q¹ = 330 MW (for the woodchips), + 28 MW between 04:00 and 06:00 (for the conveyor belts) + 12.5 MW between 06:00 and 07:00 (for the hydraulic oil).
· Stage 3A, from about 10:00 on 10th June to about 12:00 on 13th June: q¹ = 64 x exp (-0.65 x t) MW (where t is the time in days after reverse smouldering became predominant, on 10th June, at which time t = 0).
· Stage 3B, from about 12:00 on 13th June to 7th July: q¹ = 1.4 x exp {-0.1 x (t-3)} MW (where t is the time in days after reverse smouldering became predominant, on 10th June, at which time t = 0).
82. On my understanding of his cross-examination, Mr Redfern sought to undermine one of the assumptions made by Dr Mitcheson, namely that “the combustion of the woodchips in the bunkers would be expected to resemble that of an under-ventilated, close packed crib within an enclosure” (see paragraph 63 of his first report). Shortly after lunch on the day Dr Mitcheson was giving evidence (Friday 5th June), Mr Redfern cross-examined him at length on the quantity of oxygen likely to reach the fire on account of the degree of smoke-logging within and above the bunkers. Mr Redfern’s objective was to ensnare the witness into a debate about emission factors, not heat release rates, but Dr Mitcheson was unwilling to express a view about these. I suspect that he might have been qualified to do so, but it was clear that he had performed neither the calculations nor the degree of deep cogitation required to express a properly tutored view. Mr Redfern made some headway on this topic, in the sense that he was able to persuade me that certainly during the earlier hours of stage 2 there were very considerable quantities of black smoke and this fire was severely under-ventilated. However, I need to store this evidence away for use at a slightly later stage in this judgment, under the rubric of emission factors.
“The mid-heights of the slots were about 0.5m above the base of the bunkers and the openings measured approximately 25m x 1m each side, giving an area of 50m² per bunker. On this basis, the mass consumption rate is predicted to have been about 4.25 kg/s per bunker. However, this ignores the open top through which air would have entered and products would have escaped, both of which would increase the burning rate. For this exercise I have estimated that the burning rate during stage 2 would have been about 6 kg/s per bunker, or 33 kg/s overall.”
84. No one has spotted the arithmetical, or more likely typographical, error in the final line of the foregoing quotation, and I have not redone the heat release rate calculation to fathom this issue. Given the ubiquity of dense black smoke and consequent under-ventilation of the fire during certainly the early hours of stage 2, I suspect that Dr Mitcheson has increased the burning rate by too high a factor in all the circumstances of this case. A slightly lower burning rate, and a concomitantly depressed heat release rate, might make a relatively small difference to the plume modelling, no doubt in the Claimants’ favour – the higher the heat release rate, the higher the apex and range of dispersal of the plume. However, Dr Mitcheson’s evidence has not been contradicted, it is not obviously illogical or implausible, and I have simply no evidential basis on which to reduce his estimated burning rate during stage 2.
85. A separate issue arises as to whether a deduction should be made for loss through heat radiation outwards from the smoke plume. Dr David Carruthers, the Claimants’ modelling expert, assumed that 30% of the convective heat would have been lost through radiation. In his evidence in chief, he explained that it was “pretty standard in fire models to account for loss due to radiation - it is heat lost through the buoyancy of the plume”. I appreciate that this is Dr Carruthers’ standard practice, but his expertise in this area is questionable. Although he has a doctorate in atmospheric physics, he is not a fire engineer. Even so, I am prepared to accept that Dr Carruthers is qualified to speak in broad terms about the natural propensity of a hot body to lose heat to a cooler surface. That is basic physics.
86. Mrs Angela Spanton of Envirobods did not make any allowance for heat loss through radiation. Her evidence on this topic was not altogether clear, but she appeared to be saying that the ADMS fire document takes radiative loss into account, the radiative heat would have been retained or entrained within the smoke, and in any event “the smoke would absorb some heat, but not 30%”. I fail to understand her reference to absorption of heat within the smoke: the issue is whether heat would have radiated away from the smoke plume. Mr David Shillito, the Defendant’s chemical engineer, was qualified to comment on this issue, but was not particularly helpful in giving me a figure upon which I could proceed. He refused to accept that 30% might be lost through radiation; he accepted that some might be dissipated that way, but he would not quantify it.
Emission Factors
89. This was the most hotly contested scientific issue in this case, and by far the most difficult. The expert antagonists were Dr David Carruthers for the Claimants and Mr David Shillito for the Defendant. Dr Carruthers was involved in the development of the ADMS plume model which both parties’ experts have used to provide the court with an indication of the locations and wanderings of the smoke plume over the relevant period. I have already alluded to the fact that he is not an engineer, and emission factors fall within the discipline of chemical engineering. Mr David Shillito brings precisely that expertise to the forensic table. However, Mr Kent did not object to Dr Carruthers expressing opinions on this issue. He was quite right not to do so. Dr Carruthers’ scientific background as a physicist, and his vast experience in the use of emission factors in numerous situations, enables him to speak authoritatively on the matter.
92. In very general terms, the endeavour is to quantify the generation rate of any chemical or particle of interest over any given period of time. It is this metric, the emission rate properly so called, which is factored into the plume model. The smoke plume contained a cocktail or soup of chemicals and particles, and their individual emission factors varied. Beyond this general explanation, it is possible to be more precise. Strictly speaking, an emission rate is the product of the emission factor for any given chemical or particle and what Dr Carruthers called the “burning rate” (i.e. Dr Mitcheson’s heat of consumption, not the same as his heat release rate) for the remaining fire load at the material time. Confusingly, Mrs Spanton’s preferred terminology is not “burning rate” or “heat of consumption”, but “heat output”. In ordinary parlance, a rate is, of course, time related, whereas a factor a fraction. On this approach, an emission factor is measured in terms of the mass of the chemical or particle of interest per equivalent mass of the available combustible material (usually, g/kg); the burning rate (a.k.a. heat of consumption or heat output) is measured in MJ/kg (see paragraph 79 above); and the resultant product, the emission rate, is measured in g/s/MW.
96. The smoke plume contained hundreds if not thousands of chemicals and particles of potential interest. The expert reports range over a vast array of chemicals and toxins, but in the events which have occurred I may short-circuit some of the debate. The present case is concerned with chemicals which possess irritant qualities and with micro-particles. The possible relationship between the two will be discussed in my section on toxicology. The chemicals with irritant properties are primarily the aldehydes, but there were others too within the fire plume that have not been quantified in any meaningful way, whether in terms of their emission factors, the toxicology or the plume modelling. The parties agree that the most important of the aldehydes for present purposes is acrolein. Apart from the irritant chemicals, the parties have been focussing on particulate matter which is less than 10 micro-metres in diameter (the PM10) and the further sub-set of particulate matter which is less than 2.5 micro-metres in diameter (the PM2.5).
“1.9.2 Fireplace emissions, caused mainly incomplete combustion, include particulate matter, mainly PM10s … significant quantities of unburnt combustibles are produced because fireplaces are inefficient combustion devices, with high uncontrolled excess air rates and without any sort of secondary combustion. The latter is especially important in wood burning because of its high volatile matter content, typically 80% by dry weight.
…
Fireplace emissions are highly variable and are a function of many wood characteristics and operating practices. In general, conditions which promote a fast burn rate and a higher flame intensity enhance secondary combustion and thereby lower emissions. Conversely, higher emissions will result from a slow burn rate and a lower flame intensity. Such generalisations apply particularly to the earlier stages of the burning cycle, when significant quantities of combustible volatile matter are being driven out of the wood. Later in the burning cycle, when all volatile matter has been driven out of the wood, the charcoal that remains burns with relatively few emissions.”
102. The centrepiece of the Claimants’ case on this issue was the document co-authored by Larson and Koenig, A Summary of the Emissions Characterisation and Non-cancer Respiratory Effects of Wood Smoke, a version of which was also published in the Annual Review of Public Health in 1994. Table 1 of the Summary gives the PM10 emission factors for “conventional wood stove” and “conventional fireplace” at, respectively, 7-30 and 15-32 g/kg of wood. The narrative section of this paper reads, insofar as is material, as follows:
“The large variability in emission rates for a given appliance is due to a number of factors including stove design, wood moisture content and burn rate … In conventional stoves, increasing burn rate increases combustion temperatures and efficiencies, but in catalytic and non-catalytic devices the higher burn rates actually decrease combustion efficiency by decreasing the times in the secondary combustion rate …
Compared to wood stoves, we know little about fireplace emissions. Here we distinguish fireplaces from conventional fireplace inserts. Inserts are a home-heating device with emissions similar to conventional wood stoves. Standard open fireplaces can be a net home cooling device because of the large amounts of air they draw from outside during maximum burn rates. In general, conventional fireplaces emit comparable amounts of particulate matter and less carbon monoxide per kg wood burned compared to conventional wood stoves. However, fireplaces usually operate at higher wood burn rates and for shorter time periods than most wood heating devices.”
108. According to paragraph 2.1.1.4 of the report:
“Smaller biomass boilers are generally not fitted with any pollution abatement devises as these are generally not required to meet current CAA requirements for emissions. However, most larger new automatic boilers are fitted with some form of flue gas cleaning device to remove particle (dust) from the flue gas before release to the atmosphere.”
111. On the other hand, I agree with Mr Kent that Dr Carruthers’ final position was that he accepted that he had used an emission factor throughout which was based on stage 2 when there was thick smoke with poor visibility. He said, “I think we modelled the phase 2 fire. So we were looking at when the fire was clearly very thick with smoke”. He also accepted that his modelling was on a worst case basis.
112. Dr Carruthers’ basic objection to the wood-burning biomass boiler is that it is designed to achieve an automatic, controlled process, in other words an efficient burn, where the emission factors would inevitably be low. The presence of thick clouds of black smoke during stage 2 is completely inconsistent with the controlled process within Mr Shillito’s presumed contemplation. Furthermore, a biomass boiler would have to be compliant with the Clean Air Act 1993, where stage 2 of the fire plainly was not. Dr Carruthers also sought to draw inferences from certain photographs relating to how far one could see through the smoke, but this evidence was too subjective and impressionistic for my palate.
“The fire was efficient in stage 3. It had plenty of oxygen in stage 3. My emission factors were designed for stage 3.
Q. It was reverse smoulder. That's not efficient oxygen, is it?
A. I think you will find it was quite efficient.
Q. You can't say that stage 3 was an efficient burn, can you?
A. It's rather like a coke brazier.
Q. The fire is burning back on itself. That's reverse smouldering, isn't it? It's inefficient.
A. The oxidation is happening at the surface. The heat is penetrating downwards. As the top fuel burns away, the fuel below comes alight.
Q. It's only the top –
A. If you measure the carbon monoxide from a coke brazier, you will find there is some, but the burning combustion efficiency is quite effective. It's like the barbecue after the main thing is alight. It's a coke brazier.”
“The fire, I think, is -- if you start at the top of the page, that fireplaces are primarily used for aesthetic effects and secondarily as supplemental heating. The fire is designed to be pretty, to show a nice red flame. The red flames in themselves produce carbon black. The redness of the flame is in fact carbon black glowing in the flame. So the fire is designed to produce soot which burns in the flame. The volatiles, which contain the irritant substances, will burn preferentially in the flame to the carbon. So as I see it, a nice red flame will produce black soot, but probably low volatile contents, and that's one part of it. The volatile material escaping from the fire will depend obviously on the way that the fire is arranged. But to my mind, the black soot from the open fire is contributed by the loss of heat to the outside environment, reducing the -- this is radiation loss from the visible fire, and effectively quenching the red flames. This is the soot in the basic wood fire chimney.”
122. As for the first objection, I consider that there is an evidential basis for a higher value, namely the Larson and Koenig report. Mr Shillito was taken to it, and I cannot accept his reasons for rejecting the simile (see paragraphs 115-117 above) – at least as regards stage 2 of the fire. I am entitled to draw inferences from all the available evidence, including Mr Shillito’s answers. Although common sense can be a dangerous guide in relation to scientific matters, I have reached the clear conclusion that for stage 2 the instant case must fall towards the upper end of the fireplace model, and of the spread of values proffered by Larson and Koenig. Stage 2 of the fire was characterised by voluminous quantities of dense black smoke engendered in a significantly under-ventilated environment. During its early stages, the “letterbox” slots were blocked. Moreover, Mr Shillito has not included the hydraulic oil, the foam and the conveyor belting in his emission factors for the micro-particles, nor has CERC modelled these (I understand that CERC has modelled the 0.8% contamination, using the parallel of household waste). Although these have not been quantified, the presence of these items (which on my findings were wholly consumed within stage 2) gives me further confidence in moving towards the upper end of the bracket.
126. The transition from stage 2 to stage 3 was not instantaneous, but in my judgment by a fairly early juncture within the longitudinal course of stage 3 the emission factors for the micro-particles had fallen significantly. As the authors of the US EPA study explain, later on in the burning cycle the volatiles burn out, charcoal remains, and the emission factors decline. This tends to chime with aspects of Mr Shillito’s evidence. On the other hand, Dr Mitcheson proceeds on the basis that at the commencement of stage 3 there were still approximately 850 Te of woodchips left to burn. Although many of the surfaces of the individual woodchips were charred and most were “cooked”, I do no accept that there was charring tout court. Accordingly, further volatilisation was a probable phenomenon. Yet, it is indisputable that the predominant characteristic of stage 3 was smoke which was between whitish and light grey in colour. Furthermore, I accept Mr Shillito’s evidence that the fire during stage 3 had become more efficient in consequence of the enhanced ventilation - both through the slots and from above.
Ash and Dust Deposition
“If ash and dust were produced and transported from the fireground, the most likely time would have been during the intense combustion that occurred during stage 2.”
In other words, Dr Mitcheson rejects out of hand the possibility that ash and dust might have been generated during stage 3, and I understand his reasons for doing so.
“The larger volume of fly ash estimated above released during stage 2 of the fire would therefore have formed an average covering over this area of less than about 0.35 microns, i.e. about one third of one thousandth of one millimetre.”
TOXICOLOGY
“On the basis of what is known about the Sonae fire, the photographic evidence of smoke from the fire, modelling of the fallout of pollutants generated by the fire and the topography of the area, it is more probable than not that many thousands of people would have been affected by the pollutant emissions.”
“The injury following exposure to an irritant gas depends upon the chemical involved, its concentration, the exposure duration and its solubility. However, the initial effect of exposure to these irritant gases is likely to be sensory irritation. Irritation of the eyes will cause pain and stinging of the eyes, initiation of a blinking reflex and lacrimation … An additional characteristic sign of exposure to irritant gases is a burning sensation of the mucous membranes of the upper respiratory tract, including the nose, mouth and throat. Pulmonary irritation will commonly occur following sensory irritation, due to inhalation of the irritant gas into the lungs. The irritation of the lungs gives rise to bronchoconstriction, coughing and breathing difficulties.”
139. Professor Hay stated in cross-examination that there is nothing in the literature linking dermatological problems to smoke exposure.
(i) eye irritation resulting from exposure to acrolein has been observed at concentrations as low as c.146 μg/m³ (my emphasis), nasal irritation at c.356 μg/m³, and respiratory symptoms at c.572 μg/m³ (I note that Mr Kent’s arithmetic is slightly different). Like Mr Kent, I assume that these values must be for healthy subjects. There is no evidence as to what they might be for vulnerable individuals, and I cannot accept Mr Kent’s thesis that healthy people will be more sensitive to an irritant.
(ii) concentrations of acrolein in the region of 1,100 μg/m³ to 11,000 μg/m³ have been shown to cause the onset of lacrimation and eye irritation in human beings within a 10-minute exposure period.
(iii) acrolein at 2,640 μg/m³ has been reported to cause lacrimation in human beings within 5 seconds of exposure.
143. In his plume modelling Dr Carruthers has used an odour threshold for acrolein of 0.38 μg/m³. Mr Shillito’s explanation for this figure is that it represents the threshold at which 50% of the population will recognise the smell (but would not be able to name it as acrolein). On my understanding of his evidence, Professor Hay felt that this was far too low - he suggested something in the region of 460 μg/m³ - but this may have been a complaint threshold rather than an odour recognition threshold. For present purposes I consider that it is helpful to proceed on the basis of the 0.38 μg/m³ value, not in any way as a health threshold (pace Dr Carruthers’ view that it is a “good surrogate as a sort of envelope of the fire impact”), but as indicative of being the sort of level at which many people would have been able to smell the smoke plume.
144. Aside from acrolein, Mr Shillito has also advised the court as to an appropriate health threshold or trigger value for “total aldehydes”, and has alighted on a value of 500 μg/m³. As I have already said, Professor Hay did not perform a similar exercise for the purposes of his reports, but when I asked him at the very end of his evidence about Mr Shillito’s figure, he told me that his recent calculations were not “far off”. Much later, I had a colloquy with Mr Kent about the significance of this value. I had found it difficult to understand why the threshold for “all aldehydes” was higher than that for acrolein. The supposition must be that there is some sort of dilution effect, which I can understand in an experimental setting where relative concentrations may be in play; but in the context of a given smoke plume with a number of chemicals of the aldehyde family, one would have thought that the act of placing more of these under the microscope would serve to increase, rather than reduce, the irritancy potential. Mr Kent did not really advance a persuasive rebuttal of this, but overall it matters not. There is no evidential basis, or evidence-based methodology, which might enable me to reduce the acrolein threshold below 146, 356 or 572 μg/m³ to reflect the aggregation of aldehydes.
145. The HPA report also contains helpful narrative exposition under the rubric “smoke behaviour” (page 35):
“The exposure to individuals to the fire effluent in the zone outside the immediate fire zone (zone 2) would be expected to be of most concern to public health … The major immediate hazard to public health in zone 2 is therefore, expected to be exposure to irritants and particulates generated in the effluent. Low concentrations of the irritant gases may cause significant irritation of the eyes and respiratory tract, which may affect a large number of people who are not directly exposed to the fire plume. The adverse effects resulting from exposure to these irritants are likely to be completely resolved following removal from the exposure, with no long term sequelae. However, the generation of more complex products such as PAHs, dioxins, dibenzofurans and particulate matter are of concern, but are likely to present a significantly greater hazard from long term or repeated exposure than following a large single acute exposure.”
147. The first issue concerns the nature and mechanism of any irritant effect of the micro-particles. On my understanding of his evidence, Mr Shillito does not consider that the PM10s and the PM2.5s have any independent or free-standing irritant effect. Professor Hay, on the other hand, believes that the role of these micro-particles is primarily, albeit not solely, as “porters” for irritant chemicals which become adsorbed onto them. Put in these terms, the divergence of view between the experts is minor. In any event, in the circumstances of the present case I do not consider that this slight parting of the ways really matters, save perhaps in one respect. Whether or not the PM10s and the PM2.5s could in theory have any independent irritant effect, it must be obvious that virtually all of them operating in this smoke plume were vigorous and prolific carriers of no doubt numerous chemicals which were dispersed into the environs. I am prepared to accept that particularly the smaller fraction could have had a free-standing irritant effect, but it does not matter. The only point one should not lose sight of is that the quantities of acrolein, for example, have been separately modelled. This modelling includes all the acrolein, whether travelling on its own, or aided by a micro-particle. The possibility of double counting must be resisted.
151. As with the irritant chemicals, the issue arises as to the appropriate threshold levels to take. The experts are agreed that the most authoritative domestic source is the report by the Committee on the Medical Effects of Air Pollutants (“COMEAP”), Review of the UK Air Quality Index. Although this report is concerned not with the effects of smoke but with ambient air quality in general, it provides considerable assistance with the issues I have to resolve. The authors observe that at low concentrations of particles the thresholds have an element of arbitrariness about them, and that it remains uncertain whether any “safe” level exists. This is a matter which Mr Redfern explored with Professor Hay in evidence. However, the authors also state:
“While we recognise the possibility that there is no threshold of the health effects of pollutants, nonetheless we consider that AQI can be developed that provides useful information on the possible effects on health at different pollutant levels in the short-term, and identifies individuals likely to be most susceptible.
…
The health response to increases in outdoor air pollution varies between individuals and sub-groups of the population … Individual susceptibility may affect the level at which health effects are noticed and the rate of increase in symptoms as air concentrations increase.”
· PM10s: 51 μg/m³ for vulnerable persons, 76 μg/m³ for the non-vulnerable.
· PM2.5s: 36 μg/m³ for vulnerable persons, 55 μg/m³ for the non-vulnerable.
As before, this betokens a liberal approach, namely one favourable to the Claimants.
155. The COMEAP review also contains the following illuminating expository passages:
“Short-term effects of air pollution on health
Air pollution has a range of effects on health. However, air pollution in the UK does not rise to levels at which people need to make major changes to their habits to avoid exposure; nobody need fear going outdoors.
Adults and children with lung or heart conditions. It is well known that, when levels of air pollutants rise, adults suffering from heart conditions, and adults and children with lung conditions, are at increased risk of becoming ill and needing treatment. Only a minority of those who suffer from these conditions are likely to be affected and it is not possible to predict in advance who will be affected …
Older people are more likely to suffer from heart and lung conditions than young people and so it makes good sense for them to be aware of current air pollution concerns.
General Population At very high levels of air pollution, some people may experience a sore or dry throat, sore eyes or, in some cases, a tickly cough – even healthy individuals … [page 90]
…
There has been very little work conducted on timescales of less than 24 hours and most knowledge of the acute effects upon health is based on day-to-day changes in air pollutant concentrations.
The acute effects of particle exposure include increases in hospital admissions and premature death of the old and sick due to diseases of the respiratory and cardiovascular systems. The evidence is that both PM2.5s and PM10s cause additional hospital admissions and deaths on high pollution days. There are also less severe effects of short-term particle exposure during pollution episodes, such as worsening of asthma symptoms and even a general feeling of being unwell leading to a lower level of activity … [page 114]”
156. The final point which arises in the context of the COMEAP review is the salience of ambient background levels to the health threshold levels I have specified. This is a point which meshes with the plume modelling evidence, and may be expressed in these terms. If, for example, the ambient background level (i.e. the level untrammelled by the smoke plume) is X μg/m³ of PM10s for any given period and location, and the modelled concentration of PM10s is Y μg/m³ (ignoring the background level) for the same period and location, which value should be calibrated against the relevant health threshold level for these micro-particles? In my judgment, the answer is X + Y, applying the straightforward tortious principle of material contribution to the damage. There are average hourly background data from the Briery Hey monitoring station, some 1,250 m away from the Sonae plant. I assume for present purposes that the background levels do not vary much over the whole area under consideration, although they may be higher nearer the M57. Accordingly, these data will be used in conjunction with the 24-hourly mean concentrations of PM10s (see paragraph 152 above) as evaluated for a limited number of Test Claimants (see paragraph 171 below).
158. The final point which falls to be addressed on Professor Hay’s evidence is the approach to be taken to what Mr Redfern described as “sub-threshold” levels of exposure. Perhaps anticipating that very few of his clients could demonstrate on the science that they suffered an “above-threshold” exposure, Mr Redfern was astute to draw out of Professor Hay evidence which might prove the Claimants’ case on the balance of probabilities. Whereas it is quite true that many of the Claimants were exposed on the plume modelling evidence to the odour of acrolein, that is far from demonstrating that any of them suffered actionable personal injury. Indeed, if anything it is a point which tells against the Claimants owing to the impact of human suggestibility. If Claimant X smelt absolutely nothing, then s/he would probably have to be dishonest to bring a claim. No one is suggesting that the smoke plume contained odourless or occult properties akin to carbon monoxide. If the Claimants smelt something, they might believe that they were exposed to a chemical which might have injured them in some way. I will be reverting to this point subsequently.
160. Professor Hay was not asked to comment on a paper authored by Larrieu et al, Are the Short-Term Effects of Air Pollution Restricted to Cardiorespiratory Diseases?, published in the American Journal of Epidemiology in 2009. There, the authors examined over a six year period the possible effects of 10 μg/m³ increases in the ambient PM10 levels in relation to complaints of upper and lower respiratory tract diseases, headache and asthenia, skin rashes and conjunctivitis. Strictly speaking, therefore this study was not about the effects of smoke, but one might have thought that these would be a fortiori. The study found that there were relatively modest increases in complaints to GPs, ranging from 1.5% (for the respiratory tract) to 3.5% (for skin rashes, including dermatitis). However, it should be noted that the association for skin rashes was said to be “close to statistical significance” and not above it. Interestingly, Dr Larrieu’s group pointed out that asthma was not associated with any of the indicators considered.
THE METEOROLOGICAL EVIDENCE
“On the basis of the ‘best estimate’ winds the following are dates and approximate times on which the wind would have been blowing from the Sonae factory towards at least part of the residential area or very close to it:
9th June: 22:45 – midnight
10th June: 00:00 – 08:30
12th June: 04:00 – midnight
13th June: 03:00 – 05:00
14th June: 06:45 – 09:15 and 14:30 – 20:30
15th June: 01:00 – 13:30
16th June: 02:00 – 05:15
17th June: most of the day
18th June: 00:00 – 01:15
20th June: 05:45 – 07:30
21st June: 00:00 – 01:45
22nd June: 00:00 – 06:00
24th June: 19:30 – midnight
25th June: 00:00 – 05:30
26th June: 01:00 – midnight
27th June: 00:00 – 11:00
These are similar to the findings in our reports.
…
There were 6 days on which winds did not blow from the Sonae factory towards any residential area at any time. These were 11th, 19th, 23rd, 28th, 29th and 30th.
There was only one day, the 12th, during which winds of any strength were blowing directly from the Sonae factory towards residential areas for an extended period of time.”
THE PLUME MODELLING
167. I have already discussed aspects of the evidence of Dr David Carruthers in relation to emission factors and the overall methodology of plume modelling. In my view, he was a compelling and beguiling expert who had the knack of explaining quite complex concepts clearly, elegantly and with appropriate enthusiasm. I was not so appreciative of Mrs Angela Spanton, who gave the impression of lacking a degree of confidence and authority. I fully recognise and understand that it was always the Defendant’s intention to call Dr Hall to speak to the reports of Envirobods, but unfortunately he died in February 2015. However, I do not accept the point that Mr Redfern made in cross-examination that Mrs Spanton must be incorrect in her assertion, based on extant modelling, that only 30% or thereabouts of all 16,000 plus Claimants were meaningfully exposed to the smoke plume at all. Looking at the location of the majority of the Claimants in relation to the A580 East Lancs road and the M57, it does appear that about 70% of the total cohort, some of whom were represented within the constituency of Test Claimants, were exposed only to minimal levels. Surpassing the acrolein odour recognition threshold for short periods comes nowhere close to being able to prove an adverse health impact. Dr Carruthers accepted in cross-examination that his modelling showed the same general picture.
170. What is now available from the Claimants’ side is the following:
· tables (showing the original 40 Test Claimants) examining the emission rates for PM2.5s and PM10s using the residential fireplace model for emission factors and the COMEAP trigger values of 74 and 107 μg/m³. Unhelpfully, the tables contain two sets of meteorological data, but helpfully they depict the number of hours of exceedances.
· tables (as before) examining the “total aldehydes” on the basis of the two emission rates (described by him as factors) originally proposed by Mr Shillito (although he is now content to proceed on the basis of the higher rates of 600 mg/s/MW) and a health threshold of 500 μg/m³.
· a similar table for acrolein based on Mr Shillito’s emission rate of 114 mg/s/MW and the odour recognition threshold of 0.38 μg/m³.
· three separate tables focusing on the three highest exposed Claimants: these examine predicted hourly concentrations of PM10s on alternative emission factors, and include the Briery Hey background values.
· standardised histograms for each of the 20 Test Claimants comparing their exposures hour by hour against five separate thresholds (the PM10 threshold has not been included).
· various contour plots examining different chemical/particles and emission factors.
171. The landscape has of course changed in the light of my findings. Shortly after the close of the trial, I invited CERC to undertake further modelling of the smoke plume limited to the 20 Test Claimants now under scrutiny, using agreed data where appropriate and the specific bases set out below, presented and/or tabulated as follows:
· a contour map showing the number of hours exceeding the acrolein odour recognition threshold of 0.38 μg/m³.
· a contour map showing the number of hours exceeding the lowest recorded health threshold for acrolein of 146 μg/m³.
· a contour map showing the number of hours exceeding the health threshold for “total aldehydes” of 500 μg/m³.
· a contour map showing the number of hours exceeding the PM10 trigger value of 107 μg/m³ (based on an emission factor of 27.5 g/kg for stage 2 and an emission factor of 12.5 g/kg for stage 3). I appreciate that when interpreting this contour map I will need to take into account the point that COMEAP requires two consecutive hours.
· a similar contour map for the PM2.5 particles based on a trigger value of 74 μg/m³, and emission factors of 22.6 g/kg for stage 2 and 10.25 g/kg for stage 3.
· a table (showing only the 20 Test Claimants and the agreed meteorological data) examining exposures to PM10s using my emission factors for stages 2 and 3 (viz. 27.5 g/kg and 12.5 g/kg) and the COMEAP trigger value of 107 μg/m³. As before, the table will show the numbers of hours of exceedances above this trigger value.
· a table (showing only the 20 Test Claimants and the agreed meteorological data) examining exposures to PM2.5s using my emission factors for stages 2 and 3 (viz. 22.6 g/kg and 10.25 g/kg) and the COMEAP trigger value of 74 μg/m³. As before, the table will show the numbers of hours of exceedances above this trigger value.
· a table examining the “total aldehydes” on the basis of an emission rate of 600 mg/s/MW and a health threshold of 500 μg/m³. As before, the table will show the numbers of hours of exceedances above this trigger value.
· a similar table for acrolein based on Mr Shillito’s emission rate of 114 mg/s/MW and a lowest recorded health threshold for acrolein of 146 μg/m³.
· a similar table for acrolein based on Mr Shillito’s emission factor of 114 mg/s/MW and the odour recognition threshold of 0.38 μg/m³.
· separate tables for Test Claimants numbered 24 (10th and 12th June), 30 (10th, 11th and 27th June), 33 (work) (11th, 15th and 20th June), 37 (10th, 12th and 17th June) and 39 (10th, 12th and 17th June), using my emission factors and rates, and the agreed meteorological data, setting out the hourly concentrations of PM10s and the Briery Hey background data for those dates.
· one set of standardised histograms for each of the 20 Test Claimants comparing their exposures hour by hour against the following separate threshold values: the odour recognition value for acrolein; the lowest recorded health value for acrolein, and total aldehydes (all based on the previously stated emission factors and threshold values).
· one set of standardised histograms for each of the 20 Test Claimants comparing their exposures hour by hour to the PM2.5s and PM10s, using the previously stated emission factors and rates, against the trigger threshold values of 74 and 107 μg/m³ respectively.
175. Before leaving this section, I have to observe that there are features of the plume modelling which are not wholly satisfactory. One specific matter which concerns me is the ability of the model to provide a “handle” on subtle changes in wind direction and of temperature, and the possible ability of smoke to linger and seep. The model cannot account for the peripatetic nature of human behaviour, and in many cases it is difficult to know the exact position of any Test Claimant during daylight hours. On the other hand, the plume model fixes on external exposures, and people remaining indoors will have been exposed to less. Further, it is unlikely that most individuals’ natural daily movements would have brought them closer to the Sonae plant; common sense would suggest that they would have moved in the opposite direction. Mrs Spanton referred to the “margin for error” within the model, but its nature and extent was not explored. Many of the sociological points set out above were made during the course of the trial, but the inherent lack of precision of the plume model was not quantified. These concerns aside, the plume modelling is the best evidence the present state of human ingenuity can presently provide.
GOVERNING LAW
178. First, it is common ground that the Claimants cannot recover damages for personal injuries unless they establish on the balance of probabilities that they sustained what the law regards as “actionable injury”. It is insufficient for them to prove, without more, inconvenience and distress. I examined the relevant jurisprudence on this issue in my recent decision in Greenway and others v Johnson Matthey Plc [2014] EWHC 3957 (QB). Although, at the time of writing, I am aware that my decision is en route to the Court of Appeal, I am confident that my coverage of the general principles (as opposed to their application to the cases then under consideration) is uncontroversial. The leading authorities are Cartledge v Jopling [1963] AC 758 (HL) and Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co Limited (2008) 1 AC 281 (HL). At paragraph 26 of my judgment in Greenway, I said this:
“On my understanding of its reasoning, the House of Lords in Rothwell did not seek to reinterpret its earlier decision in Cartledge, although – as has been pointed out in the parties’ written submissions – their Lordships’ individual formulations of the legal test varied slightly. For Lord Hoffmann the test (in tort claims generally) involved the “abstract concept of being worse off, physically or economically, so that compensation is an appropriate remedy” (at 289D). For Lord Hope, the test was whether there was “real damage, as distinct from damage which is purely minimal” (at 297E). For Lord Rodger, the test was “material damage” (at 311F). It might be argued that some of the formulations tend to circularity. What may be more valuable is to consider how the test was applied to the facts of both Cartledge and Rothwell itself.”
183. In the present case we have one tortfeasor and, putting to one side for the time being questions of pre-existing vulnerability and background air pollution, one package of potentially causative agents. The issue is whether that package of chemicals and particles caused or materially contributed to the Claimants’ alleged personal injuries. The Claimants do not have to prove sole cause, but they do have to prove material cause. It is conceptually and legally incoherent in a case such as the present to speak in terms of the smoke plume making it more probable that the Claimants might have suffered personal injuries, or (to put the same point in another way) that their risk of suffering personal injuries was increased. The issue is a binary one: either, on the balance of probabilities, they sustained an injury in consequence of tortious exposure, or they did not.
185. I reviewed most of the relevant jurisprudence in Heneghan v Manchester Dry Docks Ltd and others [2014] 4190 (QB), another case en route to the Court of Appeal, but where my same general observation applies (see paragraph 178 above). The locus classicus remains McGhee v NCB [1973] 1 WLR 1. In “innocent” and “guilty” dust cases, the law does not require strict probabilistic proof applying the “but for” test. Mr Redfern drew my attention to the earlier decision of the House of Lords in Gardiner v Motherwell Machinery and Scrap Co Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 1424, another case where the first opinion was given by Lord Reid. Mr Gardiner claimed damages at common law for exposing him to conditions liable to cause dermatitis, and in failing to provide proper washing facilities. Lord Reid explained the basis for the plaintiff’s recovery of damages for breach of duty in this way:
“I can now sum up my view in this way. The appellant never suffered dermatitis before he was exposed during his employment by the respondents to conditions liable to cause that disease. His original symptom – an outbreak on the back of his hand – is admittedly typical of industrial dermatitis …
In my opinion, when a man who has not previously suffered from a disease contracts that disease after being subjected to conditions likely to cause it, and when he shows that it starts in a way typical of disease caused in such conditions, he establishes a prima facie presumption that his disease was caused by those conditions. That presumption could be displaced …”
Other members of the Appellate Committee analysed the case on the basis that the appellant had proved his case on all the available medical evidence. Thus, Lord Reid’s approach, albeit immensely authoritative, should be regarded as evidencing a minority view. This is the same minority view that Lord Wilberforce espoused in McGhee (see 7E), and in my judgment should be regarded as apart from the mainstream.
188. The third legal issue which arises avails the Claimants, and there is no dispute about it. Given that a Claimant does not have to prove more than that the smoke plume materially contributed to his or her personal injury, success is achieved either if it is shown that exposure exacerbated a pre-existing condition (even if a person without that condition would not have sustained any injury), or if exposure, added to background levels of pollutant, took that Claimant above a relevant threshold (even if the background level was sub-threshold).
189. The fourth legal issue which arises is the difference between the legal and scientific standard of proof. The Court of Appeal has stated on a number of occasions that there is a difference between these two standards (see, for example, the judgment of Smith LJ in MoD v Wood [2011] EWCA Civ 792), but what is more difficult is to specify exactly what it is. Without attempting an academic or jurisprudential analysis in a case already bristling with difficult issues, it seems to me that the relevant points may be made in this way. First, a scientist would tend to discount retrospective accounts given some considerable time after the events in question. A lawyer might treat such accounts with condign appreciation, depending on their overall reliability, credibility and consistency, because the approach of the common law has always been more inclusively flexible than a purely scientific approach. So, the fact that the lay evidence in the present case would not get past the front door of any reputable scientific journal is not quite the point. Secondly, the evidence supporting the various health threshold levels in the toxicological literature may have been filtered through more robust and stringent filters than those which would be required by a lawyer applying probabilistic standards (on the other hand, I repeat the point that many of the COMEAP levels are precautionary). Thirdly, there are respects in which the science is inherently uncertain, notwithstanding its claim to precision. I have in mind the plume modelling evidence. A scientist would say that if the modelling fails to prove the case, that must be the end of the matter. A common lawyer would say that there remains room for flexibility and reasonable latitude, and that the whole picture must be held in mind. How much room, though, needs very carefully to be considered.
190. Mr Redfern drew attention to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Armstrong v First York Ltd [2005] 1 WLR 2751. In that case, the claimants alleged that they suffered soft-tissue injuries to their spines in consequence of a relatively low-impact road traffic accident. The parties relied on accident reconstruction evidence based on second-hand information about the damage the vehicles had sustained. This evidence directly contradicted the claimants’ evidence and stated that they could not have sustained injuries as they alleged. The trial judge found the expert evidence to be convincing and the claimants to be blameless and honest witnesses. The judge preferred their account. The issue which arose on appeal was whether the trial judge could have rejected the expert evidence without finding any flaw in it. The Court of Appeal held that he could: he had weighed up all the evidence in the case, and was entitled to conclude that the claimants were not lying and that there had to be some inaccuracy in the expert’s evidence.
191. At paragraphs 26 and 29 of his judgment, Brooke LJ said this:
“In my judgment, in this very difficult case the judge directed himself correctly as a matter of law. He was entitled to consider the evidence he had been given by the Claimant extremely carefully, directing himself about the dangers of witnesses who may seem to be plausible but in fact are telling a pack of lies, and directing himself to consider very carefully the evidence given on behalf of the defendant. He formed the view that he could not be satisfied that these witnesses were telling a pack of lies. He was very impressed by their evidence, and he concluded, when he had to balance the evidence of each side, that there must be - although he accepted fully that he could not say what it was – something that was not accurate in Mr Child’s evidence in that particular case.
…
In my judgment, if we dismiss this appeal in this case we are not opening the door to a whole lot of dishonest claimants to recover just because there may be cases in which the honesty and force of a claimant’s evidence impresses a trial judge in the way the evidence of these claimants did on this particular occasion. In very many cases the evidence of a witness like Mr Childs may well be sufficient to tip the balance strongly in the defendant’s favour.”
“There is no rule of law or practice in such a situation requiring the judge to favour or accept the evidence of the expert or the evidence of a witness of fact. The judge must consider whether he can reconcile the evidence of the expert witness with that of the witness of fact. If he cannot do so, he must consider whether there may be an explanation for the conflict of evidence or for a possible error by either witness, and in the light of all the circumstances make a considered choice which evidence to accept. The circumstances may be such as to require the judge to reach only one conclusion.”
THE EVIDENCE FROM THE CLINICIANS
199. In a powerful and sustained piece of oral evidence, Dr Hardy explained why he considered that the Test Claimants he saw were likely to have been victims of exposure to the smoke plume, causing symptoms to the lower respiratory tract. In his view, the cases tended to follow a clear pattern. Many of the people were aware of the fire, owing to its terrible smell and taste, which were new. Some of them described a very large black cloud crossing their homes and gardens. At least one person showed the doctors a photograph on his phone of the cloud in relation to his garden. All decided to batten-down their houses, but the smell and taste persisted. Generally, within a day or two, the Test Claimants developed symptoms. The first thing they tended to describe was itchy eyes, of varying degrees of severity. Nasal symptoms were described by virtually everyone: their noses were either very blocked or very runny. Sore throats were very prominent. Virtually all of them would say that their throats were very dry at night, and that they needed a glass of water by their beds to keep their throats moist. Claimants also complained of a severe cough with tenacious sputum, sometimes with breathlessness and wheeziness, and some had skin symptoms.
201. Dr Hardy addressed the possibility that some, many or all of the Test Claimants might have suffered from a coincidental viral infection. He agreed that there was a significant overlap between the presenting signs and symptoms of viral illnesses, and the Claimants’ complaints of smoke exposure. Dr Hardy drew to my attention the inherent implausibility of so many people suffering from a viral illness (one might add, in the early summer), and he also referred to the very similar time period of onset and what he called the constellation of symptoms.
202. Dr Hardy explained that when exposure finishes, it will take time for the patient to recover. Smoke irritated and inflamed the mucosa, the lining of the respiratory tract, and ultimately the airways with the development of bronchitis. When the exposure ceases, the glands producing sputum will not turn off like a tap, as he put it.
203. Dr Hardy therefore felt that on the balance of probabilities, if a Claimant had been exposed to the smoke plume, and developed exactly the same symptoms as the others, then those symptoms were due to the Sonae fire.
207. Dr Charles Hind said that there was considerable common ground between him and Dr Hardy. The reaction of the lungs to an insult will depend on its severity. The irritant effects occur within seconds, or at the most minutes, of exposure. The noci-ceptors in the upper respiratory tract detect the presence of irritants and operate like “smoke detectors”. The mucosal linings will become moist, and in due course the goblet cells will secrete mucous, producing mild physiological effects such as coughing, phlegm and tightness of the chest. Dr Hind stated that more severe and prolonged exposure may result in acute inflammation of the lining of the respiratory tract, which could cause symptoms such as a persistent cough, difficulties in breathing and bronchospasm. Even in these cases the recovery period is likely to be short.
210. In cross-examination, Dr Hind agreed that there were many vulnerable groups who might require a lower dose before experiencing symptoms. In general terms, he agreed that there was considerable individual variation, and that such variation was also seen between asthmatics (Dr Hardy had told me that asthmatics can vary in reactions to particular irritants by a factor of 40). He did not agree that smokers formed such a group. He said that if the evidence did not show significant or above threshold exposures to the smoke plume, one would need to examine alternative explanations for these complaints.
211. Dr Hind agreed with Dr Hardy that smoke exposure had the potential to lead to an infection because the microphages might be overwhelmed. However, I interpreted his evidence as suggesting that this might arise only if the body has already shown an inflammatory response to the irritant chemical. This chimed with Dr Hardy’s evidence that there would need to be “a lot” of inflammation. It is very difficult to see how milder responses might induce infections.
212. I have set out the evidence of Dr Hardy and Dr Hind in some detail because (a) there is little between them, and (b) the generic points they make were mirrored in the evidence given by other clinicians. To my mind, four points of general application need to be emphasised. First, the difference between irritation and inflammation is likely to be one of degree, particularly at the margins. Secondly, human variability occupies a significant range. Thirdly, the strength of Dr Hardy’s mini-foray into epidemiology must depend at the very least on the quality of the evidence, including the histories, elicited from all the Test Claimants. Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, much of these experts’ clinical opinion depended on their chosen point of departure. If the starting-point is exposure to smoke at levels which may have been sufficient to yield symptoms, then Dr Hardy’s patterns and constellations become a compelling explanation for the phenomenon under scrutiny; and, moreover, evidential weaknesses in an individual Test Claimant’s case became less important, because they may benefit from the similarities within the herd. If, on the other hand, the starting-point is exposure to smoke at levels insufficient to yield symptoms, then certainly the medical scientist would say that the quest for alternative explanations is necessitated. At the very least, a close examination of the individual circumstances of the Test Claimants becomes more important.
“Well, it depends upon how much irritant there is. If there is a significant irritant, then there will be an [immediate] irritant response. If there is more irritant, then it will turn into an inflammatory response, which is a pathological step change. Essentially, your Lordship, an inflammatory response is a final common pathway that the body has in relation to potentially injurious incidents, one of which is an irritant up the nose.”
“Q. So given the understanding, perhaps with the benefit of Mr Redfern's description of the fire, of what the claimants you examined experienced, would you have expected any of them, once the irritant was removed, to have spent as much as a week or two weeks or three weeks symptomatically?
A. I would say on the balance of probability, not. If the alleged exposure was for a period of a few days -- a period of a few weeks, then it's conceivable that there has been inflammatory change in the nose during that time because the exposure has been continuing.
Q. So are you contemplating a consistent level of concentration of the irritant?
A. The injurious agent would have to be present in the air in sufficient and significant dose for me to endorse that concept.”
220. Under cross-examination, Mr Parker conceded that Claimants might have sustained an inflammatory reaction if sufficient exposure to the smoke went on long enough. In that sense, he was conceding very little: this is a truism. He did not accept that constant sub-threshold exposures could have had an additive component, but he fairly said that “there might be a range of opinion on that”. I will bear this in mind in due course, but in terms of the science of toxicology I have already said that I consider that possible additive and cumulative effects are addressed within COMEAP, and that unless the science is ignored, qualified or rewritten for the purposes of this judgment, one really should not go any further. Mr Parker’s final view on this aspect emerged after questioning by me:
“MR JUSTICE JAY: But I think what is being put is each time you go in there will be a sub-threshold exposure, but it will happen often enough and in sufficient temporal proximity. In other words it's ongoing, but ebbing and flowing always below sub-threshold. There will come a point at which, bang, you start to get symptoms, not because you're sensitised, but because there's a sort of build-up. I just want to know what your reaction is to that.
A. My reaction is, on the balance of probability, I wouldn't expect that. There would have to be sufficient exposure to maintain a continued inflammatory reaction.”
“If the claimant has not been exposed as alleged then any symptoms that they report cannot be arising as a result of the alleged index incident. On this basis they will be unrelated to it and arising as a result of other mechanisms.”
223. These experts made the same general points as did colleagues elsewhere. They were in agreement that there is no literature bearing on the question of possible contact dermatitis through smoke irritation. I have examined the Larrieu paper at paragraph 160 above. Dr August pointed out that the difficulty and cost of obtaining such evidence heavily militate against it, although he was compelled to accept that skin symptoms were not mentioned in the Californian Wildfires paper.
“Well, we talked about irritant contact dermatitis, and irritants you can divide into absolute irritants and relative irritants. Absolute irritants will cause damage to the skin with one or two exposures. So, for example, hydrofluoric acid, if you pour that on your skin, is going to drill a hole in your skin. That's an absolute irritant, whereas relative irritants work by damaging the lipid cell surface membranes within the skin, causing damage to the integrity of the barrier function of the skin cumulatively over a period of time. So irritants are anything which dries the skin, degreases the skin, chemically attacks the skin over a period of time. So in practice exposure to irritants usually requires months or years of repeated exposure to damage the barrier level of the skin to cause problems, to break through the threshold of the actual barrier function of the skin to actually cause dermatitis. Now, most dermatitis will occur from cumulative damage unless that individual has had repeated exposure over a period of time just beneath the threshold and then the final insult will take them through the threshold. But in practice you need months or years of repeated exposure to develop irritant dermatitis, and that irritant dermatitis has to occur on areas which are susceptible. So hands from a wear and tear point of view, or if you're talking about an airborne irritant, the first place to get affected will be the eyelids, around the eyes and on the face. Yet none of the people that we examined had problems on their eyelids. So from irritation, I think it pretty well rules that out as a possibility. If it's an airborne thing, it's got to affect the areas exposed to the skin. Airborne irritants, airborne allergens where people become allergic to chemicals, affect the skin that is exposed to the air and not on covered sites. Yet a lot of the individuals we examined had problems on covered sites as well.”
230. The only generic issue on the dermatological evidence which I need resolve at this stage is whether exposure to smoke is capable of causing contact dermatitis. Professor Hay has advised me that there is no evidence that it can, and I have already discussed the Larrieu et al paper. In my judgment, the evidence base in support of the proposition that exposure to smoke at relatively low levels (i.e, at the sort of levels suggested by the plume modelling evidence) can cause dermatological problems must be regarded as extremely sparse, based on little more than clinical impression alone.
232. All the Test Claimants the ophthalmologists examined had symptoms of tear film instability due to underlying meibomian gland dysfunction. These glands reside in the lid of the eye and are involved in the production of tears and mucin. Tear film instability may result when the external environment of the eye becomes abnormal in some way, causing tears to evaporate or become otherwise dysfunctional and the tear film to break down. In Mr Clearkin’s view, exposure to the smoke has brought forward symptoms of tear film instability by 3-5 years. He put the point rather compellingly in this way:
“I work on the Wirral. It's a very different area. Very refreshing to meet the good folk of Kirkby. You know, solid people, gave a proper account of themselves, pleasure to meet some of them, pleasure to meet all of them to a degree. As I say, I've never been to Rodney Street before. It was a life changing experience in many ways, but certainly it was a good gig in terms of dealing with patients. This was a very straightforward experience.
Q. I wasn't asking about your pleasure.
A. I do apologise.
Q. I was asking how you found the group as far as the presentation of their conditions.
A. It made me wish I worked in Kirkby and had much more straightforward people to deal with than on the Wirral. But I hope nobody has written that down. But they're very straightforward people. They struck me as no side to them, gave an account that I found, with one exception, one minor exception, entirely straightforward. They told me a story that fitted in with their clinical signs. I hear this story half a dozen times at clinic in terms of symptomatic tear film instability.
Q. Due to exposure to smoke?
A. No, due to a variety -- it's a common final pathway disease. Many things can precipitate symptomatology.
Q. Smoke is one of them?
A. Smoke is one of them. Sunburn, for example. A particularly dry day. A particularly cold day. It doesn't take much. It's a complex mechanism. It's very, very robust. When it goes, it goes.”
233. Under cross-examination, Mr Clearkin agreed that he was making an implied assumption about the levels of smoke exposure being sufficient. He said that an irritant chemical, for example the sulphur compounds produced by an onion, might provoke tears, which might wash away the tear film components, which might then precipitate chronic symptomatology. Ultimately, however, Mr Clearkin’s evidence was that the posited environmental trigger is the final insult in the causative chain, the metaphorical straw which breaks the camel’s back.
234. Mr Ian Marsh did not disagree with the general principle of tear film instability; his dispute with Mr Clearkin was as regards its causes, and as to the reliability of the Test Claimants’ accounts. Unlike Mr Clearkin, he deferred to me on this last aspect. Mr Marsh emphasised that we have no antecedent examination of these individuals before the alleged exposure; all we have is what may now be observed four years after the relevant events. Mr Marsh did not accept the possibility of cumulative effects: if those were a real phenomenon, one would have expected a predominance of patients coming to ophthalmic clinics with the signs and symptoms of this dysfunction, having sustained only small doses of an irritant. Mr Marsh did not disagree with the general principle of one final insult pushing a patient over the edge as regards meibomian gland dysfunction, but could not endorse the proposition that the acceleration might have been by as much as 3-5 years. Nor did he accept that it was other than speculation that smoke should have accelerated a chronic condition.
235. Under cross-examination, Mr Marsh told me that there were some similarities, and also some differences, as to the various Test Claimants’ symptoms and their onset. He agreed that by and large they presented with the symptoms that one would expect from exposure to large quantities of smoke.
236. I found Mr Marsh to be a somewhat dour witness who appeared to have been discomfited by the forensic process and Mr Clearkin’s no doubt well-intentioned jibes about his consulting rooms. I cannot accept his contention that because the Test Claimants’ evidence is “subjective” it cannot carry any weight. Rather, it is a factor to be weighed in the overall evidential mix. Even so, I have no hesitation in preferring his evidence over Mr Clearkin’s at least as regards the sole generic issue that I am choosing to resolve at this juncture. I cannot accept the assertion that exposure to smoke could have accelerated symptoms by anything like 3-5 years. The notion that smoke might advance symptoms is theoretically possible in extreme cases, but is not really supported by other than somewhat speculative, assertive evidence. These Claimants are all likely to have had pre-existing tear film instability which ebbed and flowed in the ordinary course of the condition. I accept the possibility that a few developed this dysfunction after the fire, but it is no more than guesswork to postulate that exposure to the smoke might have accelerated the process. Although Mr Clearkin did not advance the argument in this manner, I accept that it is possible that smoke exacerbated eye symptoms in previously vulnerable individuals, including those suffering from meibomian gland dysfunction, during the course of exposure to it and a recovery period thereafter. Whether the exposure to this smoke plume caused such an exacerbation is entirely case-specific and must be resolved on all the available evidence.
237. To my mind, the following matters of general application arising out of the clinical evidence from the eight experts I heard may be made at this stage. First, in all four disciplines the experts spoke of a gradation between mild irritation on the one end of the spectrum and severe inflammation at the other. Issues plainly arise in the grey area in the middle, but generally speaking I consider that it is valid to think in terms of irritation being transient, self-limiting and a normal physiological response, and inflammation being pathological and, albeit in all these cases non-permanent, probably over the line and into the realm of personal injury and actionable damage. This interlaces with my analysis of actionable damage in my section on the “Governing Law” (see paragraphs 178-181 above). Secondly, I accept Dr Hind’s evidence, read in conjunction with my interpretation of Professor Hay’s, that the lowest health thresholds for a chemical such as acrolein are probably designed to indicate the sort of concentrations where certain individuals may be expected to experience an irritant, rather than an inflammatory response. Thirdly, and as a heavy caveat on the previous point, it should continue to be recognised that there is considerable variability, vulnerability and range of tolerance thresholds over any given population. Fourthly, it is common ground between the experts that timing of onset of symptoms matters. In my judgment, the irritant response will be immediate, and in relation to an incident of this nature most people will be likely to know within a short space of time what is causing that response. It is the Claimants’ case, after all, that the smoke had a nasty, pungent smell. On the other hand, I agree with Mr Redfern that one might expect considerable variability as regards the timing of onset and offset of any inflammatory response. Finally, and to reiterate a previous conclusion of mine, I do not accept Mr Redfern’s submission that the medical evidence, viewed as a whole, supports the possibility of an additive, in the sense of a cumulative, response to sub-threshold exposures. The Claimants can do no better than rely on the trigger values (based on two, consecutive hourly means) and 24-hour means set out in the COMEAP report.
THE TEST CLAIMANTS
Mr Gary Mangan
248. Mr Mangan was born on 5th April 1985 and at the material time lived 0.53km from the Sonae plant. In 2011 he was working as a retail supervisor, but he is now employed in a very responsible role as a submarine engineer in the Royal Navy. Mr Mangan does not smoke but he had a history of upper respiratory tract infections, including one incident of shortness of breath in 2008. At about 16:00 on Friday 10th June he went home and could see black or dark grey smoke from the factory. There was an unpleasant burning smell and a lot of smoke. Mr Mangan went running on the Friday evening, and again on the Saturday, modifying his route on account of the smoke plume. He felt a bit chesty when running, and his chest was “quite tight” that Saturday evening (he denied any symptoms on the Friday). He did not go running on the Sunday, but remained at home all day. On Monday he went to his GP, without a prior appointment, where he was diagnosed with an upper respiratory tract infection for which antibiotics were prescribed. He had symptoms of a tight chest, a cough, and phlegm. These symptoms, including those of low energy and disturbed sleep, lasted for about 10 weeks, and he remembered returning to his doctor some weeks later.
249. Under cross-examination, Mr Mangan said that he had no difficulty obtaining an off-the-street consultation with his GP. Paragraph 9 of his witness statement, which stated that he “decided to make an appointment to see his GP”, was incorrect. In my judgment, it is difficult to understand why so elementary a mistake was made, if it was indeed made. The GP noted the presence of ulcers on the right side of the palate by the right tonsil. Mr Mangan explained that he did not mention the smoke to his GP on this occasion because he just attended “for my health”, and obviously everyone was aware in the area what was going on. He had made the connection between his symptoms and the fire.
251. Dr Hind felt that Mr Mangan is likely to have suffered a coincidental upper respiratory tract infection. Dr Hardy, taking into account the absence of a temperature, the ineffectiveness of the antibiotics, and the fact that an ulcerated palate is not commonly associated with infection, originally concluded on the balance of probabilities that this Claimant did suffer from the effects of smoke inhalation. However, in cross-examination it was pointed out to Dr Hardy that Mr Mangan claimed to develop symptoms before 12th June (i.e. before the date of any significant exposure to the smoke), and Mr Kent pressed him on the GP record. Dr Hardy then said, “possibly he had an infection; it is likely at that stage he had an infection”. He agreed that in his report he could equally have said that Mr Mangan’s account was consistent with smoke exposure.
252. In my judgment, Mr Mangan was no better than a reasonable witness who, like many others, could not remember much of the fine detail of what happened. In such circumstances, I cannot conclude that his account was particularly reliable. Not without some hesitation, I do not find that on Friday 10th June he had already booked an appointment to see his GP on the following Monday (had I made such a finding, it would ineluctably have followed that he was suffering from an upper respiratory tract infection before he was aware of any of the effects of smoke inhalation). Even so, on the balance of probabilities I conclude that Mr Mangan was probably suffering from a coincidental throat infection. His symptoms started before there was any significant exposure to the smoke plume, and Dr Hardy agreed in cross-examination that it was likely that this Claimant had an infection.
Mrs Tracey Beatham
256. Mrs Beatham is a moderate smoker and in February 2010 was suffering from a persistent cough.
257. According to paragraph 5 of her witness statement:
“I was not aware of the fire until the following morning when I got up to get ready for work. I noticed a terrible smell of burning. When I looked out of the window, I could see that the whole area was covered with smoke. In particular, I noticed that my garden was covered in dust and ash. The smoke was extremely thick and dark and was blowing towards my house and into my estate. I cannot recall the plume being particularly high at the time of seeing it.”
This was at about 06:15, when the wind was blowing eastwards from the plant. Mrs Beatham also noticed considerable quantities of ash and dust which lasted for weeks, as did the pungent smell. She could not hang her washing outside. Many other Claimants gave evidence to similar effect.
“Upper Respiratory Tract Infection NOS 1/52 tired, sore throat, cough, running nose. o/e throat red nil pus chest clear advice given. Delayed script”
262. Dr Hardy accepted in evidence that if the symptoms did not begin until one week after the fire, as the GP note recorded and other evidence suggested, then it is less likely that her symptoms were caused by the smoke: the more probable explanation is viral infection.
Ms Jessica Alexander
271. There is no medical evidence supporting Ms Alexander’s other claimed symptoms. Given her unreliability as a witness, I do not accept that she has proved her case in these respects. Her elevated temperature, for example, is highly unlikely to have had a toxicological origin. Her eye and skin problems were pre-existing, and in her case there is nothing to cause me to wish to depart from the advice of Professor Hay regarding the absence of evidence linking dermatological symptoms to smoke. I cannot exclude the possibility that smoke exposure exacerbated Ms Alexander’s pre-existing eye condition, but the resolution of that issue depends mainly on the plume modelling evidence. Otherwise, Ms Alexander’s case is in the same category as Mrs Beatham’s.
Ms Kelly Colebourne
273. Ms Colebourne told me that she awoke at about 05:40 on Friday 10th June to see a thick black cloud of smoke crossing the clear blue sky. By 14:45, when she returned from work, it was “just smoggy, foggy, cloudy – like smog”. The smokiness and dustiness continued that weekend, and Ms Colebourne described a “char-grilled smell, acid-y at the back of the throat”. She said that her breathing felt a bit funny. After about one week of the fire, according to her questionnaire, Ms Colebourne experienced severe respiratory symptoms, and a deep and chesty cough, which was very uncomfortable. She also suffered sore, itchy and runny eyes, which became red and bloodshot. Her eye symptoms lasted for about 4 weeks. These symptoms also caused low energy and a general feeling of being increasingly worn down.
“I was absolutely fine before the fire, and only started to suffer these horrible symptoms after it started. As I mentioned above, I had no history of asthma at all before this, and I was not exposed to any other irritants that could have induced it, so it seems obvious that the fire was to blame. ”
278. On 5th July the history as recorded by the OOH service was as follows:
“… since yesterday has had problems with chest since November, not formerly diagnosed with asthma but given a ventolin inhaler. Non smoker. Since yesterday has been coughing phlegm and struggling to clear chest. Feels SOB and has used ventolin 4 + times today. On the phone able to speak in long full sentences but sounds congested …”
280. I was not impressed by Dr Hardy’s evidence in relation to this Claimant. He attributed her symptoms to the fire because of the temporal association, and because she had a life-threatening attack after the fire. However, even a cursory examination of the contemporaneous medical records does not bear this out. I much prefer Dr Hind’s evidence on this issue. Nor can I remotely accept Dr Hardy’s attempt to attribute six months’ of symptoms to smoke inhalation.
Ms Dawn Bunting
283. Ms Bunting was born on 13th January 1974 and lives 0.44km from the Sonae plant. As the crow flies, she is the closest of all the Claimants to the original source of the smoke plume. However, that does not mean that her exposures were likely to have been the greatest.
284. Ms Bunting is a moderate smoker and in the past suffered from rosacea at times of stress.
289. Dr August was asked about the opinions expressed in his report:
“Past History Rosacea. This has been present for the last 5-6 years beginning in 2008-2009 when it was severe for 3 months. This became worse after the fire, particularly on the cheeks and around the eyes where the skin became lumpy and cracked. This seemed to be bad for about 2 months and then settled back to its pre-fire severity.
…
Opinion She seems to have had redding [sic] of the face which was worse than before. The rash was certainly confined to the face only. The overall impression is that of rosacea exacerbated by the fire for a period of 3 weeks, possibly longer.”
290. Dr August agreed that the evidence in Ms Bunting’s case was “complicated” because she has not given a consistent account. On any view, her skin problems were not mentioned to her GP on 20th June. There is sparse evidence linking dermatological conditions to smoke exposure, but in any event I am not satisfied on her oral evidence that the case is made out.
Mr Terence Dunn
298. Provisionally impressed as I was by Mr Dunn’s reliability as a witness, I asked him to describe the colour of the smoke plume to me in more detail. He said this:
“From the first time I saw, it was black, very black.
MR JUSTICE JAY: Very black, yes.
A. And then over a period, it would go blackish grey, if you was looking over that way, but we didn't tend to a lot, and then it would sometimes go a bit white. That was the colours I seen when I looked.
MR JUSTICE JAY: After about a week or so, was it still going black?
A. No.
MR JUSTICE JAY: Was it –
A. It had changed colour, my Lord, after a week. It wasn't black anymore.
MR JUSTICE JAY: In terms of the quantities of smoke, can you give me an idea of that?
A. First few days, my Lord, was really bad. Really bad, and then it just started to settle down. Just keep -- you know, there was smoke coming from it all the time, rising, but never as serious as the first few days, in my opinion.
MR JUSTICE JAY: Yes. I know it's difficult to describe, but after the first few days, just give me a picture of the quantities of smoke.
A. It's very difficult to, you know -- because, as you say, it had changed colour. So it was not as though you could look over and see something black all the time. You know, you'd notice all the time, wouldn't you? But there were a change in colour. Sometimes it would go very easy and then sometimes it would flare up again and you'd see a white plume or a grey plume. But that's only if you was out looking over all the time.”
299. Entirely credible as a witness though Mr Dunn was, this seam of evidence demonstrates how witnesses can be unreliable when it comes to the detail of describing events that happened years before. The memory can pick out the worst features of the event (in some people, the memory can blot these out completely), and in Mr Dunn’s case he has unwittingly prolonged the period of the black smoke well beyond its proper confines of the afternoon of Friday 10th June – as vouched by all the expert and photographic evidence.
Ms Julie Carney
“Can you explain why these very serious symptoms are described in this witness statement, when it seems that's not your recollection of the symptoms that you have?
A. It's human error, isn't it? It's a misprint on that -- that bit. I'd said -- when I've described my symptoms to the lady who was writing it down, I said my nose was congested and my chest felt heavy and I found it difficult to breathe.
Q. When you were answering questions from my learned friend Mr Redfern, he asked you whether you went to your GP and you said you didn't, and the reason you wouldn't go to your GP was because you had a little cough. You wouldn't trouble a GP with a little cough.
A. I don't trouble the GP with anything.
Q. I haven't asked you the question yet. What you're describing in this witness statement could not fairly be described as a little cough, could it?
A. I just got on with it. I've got five kids. I'm on my own looking after them. So I haven't got time to sit in the doctor's to be told: it's stress and I can't give you antibiotics.”
307. Ms Carney went to see her GP on 13th September 2011. She was advised that her rash and cough were down to stress. Ms Carney now feels that they are down to both. However, she agreed in cross-examination she had not made the link with the fire. Given the smell that she described (akin to a hamster cage – not implausible in itself), and the quantities of “billowing” smoke that she witnessed, it is very difficult to accept that she did not make the connection – on the premise, that is, that her descriptions are correct.
“Q. What I suggest, Ms Carney, is that you have no idea if any symptoms you have had since June 2011 are related to this fire, do you?
A. I'm not a specialist, am I?
Q. No. So you've no idea?
A. No, because the doctor hasn't turned round to me and said: this is all down to the Sonae factory fire. He said it's down to stress. But in the area people have got the exact same symptoms and had the same problems.
Q. So you think because other people might have symptoms that they say are caused, you say yours might be caused?
A. There's got to be a link somewhere, hasn't there?
Q. In fact, in 2013, when you went to that shopping centre in Kirkby, you jumped on a passing bandwagon, didn't you?
A. No, I was asked a question and I answered.
Q. What was the question?
A. If I'd suffered anything -- any of these conditions. It was chest, any chest symptoms from the fire, and I said yes, I had. And then they said, would you like to come along and talk to us, and I said yes, because I don't want something like that in the area where my kids are. My kids have got to live here, haven't they? It's not jumping on a bandwagon. It's looking after your family, isn't it?”
Ms Karen Court
313. In her oral evidence, Ms Court described a big white cloud of smoke coming towards her house. The smell was “a little bit like rubber”. There were “loads and loads” of debris. Like many other witnesses, Ms Court was unable to hang out her washing. Her oral evidence was to the effect that her itchy eyes lasted for four months, and her cough for approximately four months. In my judgment, it was clear that she was exaggerating the length of any symptoms, which calls into question her characterisations of the extent of any ash and dust.
“No, you asked me, when did you first become aware of something; right? And I remember seeing that and thinking -- first thing I thought, I'll be honest, is we were at risk. That fire means that we were at risk. I'd forgotten about it because no one come to the house and said you need to be screened, you could have been at risk, you might have got respiratory whatever.
Q. You had forgotten about the fire?
A. When I seen that I thought, oh, there's been fault with Sonae. There's a claim. Where there's claim, there's blame. And I thought: hang on a minute, my itchy skin and everything, what have I been exposed to?
Q. So that was the first time you'd made a connection between your itchy skin?
A. Yes.
Q. I think you said that was two years later?
A. Yes.
….
Q. Let me ask you a narrower question. You'd forgotten about the fire; yes? That's your evidence?
A. Yes.
Q. You're walking through Kirkby centre. You see the unit and it says that Sonae is at fault, I think, is the phrase you used a moment ago. Had you not seen that sort of material saying Sonae is at fault, one, you probably would have forgotten about the fire still.
A. I didn't forget about the fire. I'd forgotten about Sonae itself, if you know what I mean.”
315. Ms Court was convinced that she first saw thick smoke after 20:00 on the evening of 9th June. She must be mistaken about that. Notwithstanding her first questionnaire, she claimed that she first experienced symptoms immediately, in other words, that night. Her feeling at the time was that her symptoms would be a temporary inconvenience, but her prolonged dermatitis suggested otherwise.
Mrs Annette Farrell
320. She is a light smoker and had pre-existing problems with bronchitis and shingles.
322. In her oral evidence Mrs Farrell described the colour and quality of the smoke, in particular its horrible, chemical smell – “a bit like glue”. She said that it burnt the back of her throat, went inside her nose and made her eyes water. The gritty atmosphere, which was similar to the morning after bonfire night, lasted for two to three days.
328. Mr Swift also had this to say about Mrs Farrell’s case, which I considered to be illuminating:
“There is also -- it's not necessarily the person that's trying to tell mistruths. It may be their perception of things. So you find that if someone suffers from, say, anxiety and depression, which are quite common disorders, certainly in the rhinology field, their perception of having a stuffy nose will be much greater than someone who is happy with life. I'll quite often sit in clinic, trying to work out why they've come to see me, because my nose is generally much worse than theirs, and that is an honest opinion on that.”
Mr James Reece
333. Under cross-examination, Mr Reece said that he was sure that he saw the fire before 04:00 on 10th June, when he went outside for a smoke during the course of his employment. He must be mistaken about that. He made an appointment to see his GP on 22nd June but did not attend. He told me that he wasn’t thinking straight, although the appointment was probably arranged for his symptoms. On 5th December 2011 he attended his GP complaining off a cough which had lasted for two months. The GP records show that asthma was not diagnosed until 19th October 2012.
334. Dr Hardy’s report ascribes conjunctivitis and rhinitis to smoke inhalation, and also a severe acute bronchitis which became chronic. Dr Hardy is unclear about the aetiology of Mr Reece’s asthma. Dr Hind defers to my view of Mr Reece’s credibility and the plume modelling. In my judgment, Mr Reece was an entirely unconvincing witness, and I would be unwilling to attribute any symptoms to smoke inhalation unless the plume modelling evidence and/or a constellation of symptoms effect is available to support him.
Mr Edmund Kenny
337. Mr Kenny was at home at the time of the fire. He told me that he was aware of it during the evening of 9th June. By the morning, the smoke was a grey/white colour. At lunchtime, it went black. There was loads of it; it was like the smoke coming off the top of a volcano. Mr Kenny also described an awful, glue-like smell with chemical overtones.
339. Mr Kenny also told me about “an awful lot” of dust and ash in the smoke. It was grey, and got everywhere. It was completely different from “Sahara sand dust”. He had to clean and wash more often, and try to keep the windows closed. He placed masking tape on the gap over the double-glazing. A sense of the duration of this phenomenon did not clearly emerge from Mr Kenny’s evidence in chief, but he told Dr Hardy that he had to keep the windows and doors closed for 2-3 days. Under cross-examination, he said that the dust etc lasted for at least a week.
340. On 20th June 2011, Mr Kenny saw his GP, Dr Mohammed Khan. The computer records reads:
“H/O; asthma. Flare up after recent Sonic factory fire. Speaking full sentences. Resp sys – b/l air entry equal. b/l scattered wheeze+. RR-18/min. Was more worse over w/e, it seems. P]- Oral steroids. Continue inhalers …”
342. Mr Kenny was asked about Dr Khan’s note, “was worse over weekend”, which he agreed was accurate. He said that it was still musty and foggy over the weekend on 18th/19th June. He was not sure whether there was still smoke and dust. Mr Kenny made no mention to his GP of any nose and eye symptoms. He agreed that his cough was getting better by then.
Mr Paul McLoughlin
349. Mr McLoughlin told me that he was at home when the fire started. He saw grey, dark soot-coloured smoke and experienced the “very unpleasant smell” of burning wood and creosote. He also said that there were substantial quantities of ash and dust, which meant that he and his family had to keep the windows and doors closed.
“C/O – cough had cough for a few weeks now, has been taking OTC medication, chest seems clear. Advised to continue with meds and come back in 2 weeks if no better.”
“MR KENT: It sounds as though this is quite difficult retrospectively to diagnose.
DR AUGUST: Yes. It's inspired guesswork, really. It's a hunch, what do you think is the best fit.”
355. I have found Mr McLoughlin to be one of the most difficult witnesses to assess. He came across as a reliable person, pleasant and understated. I have little doubt that some key features of this experience have remained in his mind: the smoke; the unpleasant smell; the quantities of ash; the cough; the itchiness. However, as with other witnesses, I was left without a clear impression of timing, duration and severity.
Mr Peter Shaw
357. Mr Shaw is a non-smoker who had no chest symptoms of any note for a number of years.
359. Mr Shaw normally works Monday-Fridays. His work pattern was and remains such that he is at the depot for approximately 80-90 minutes a day; otherwise, he is on the road. Mr Shaw arrived at work at approximately 06:50 on Friday 10th June. He saw fire engines and a lot of black/grey smoke. He started to suffer from a cough the day after the fire started and while he was at work. Over the weekend, he began to suffer from itchy eyes. He found it difficult to breathe and his work and sleep were affected.
360. Mr Shaw told Dr Hardy that he was “probably” working on Saturday 11th June, and Mr Clearkin that he was working on that date. Since then, his payslips have been obtained, and these contradict his account. His explanation is that he “may have been mistaken”. It was put to Mr Shaw that he well knew that his case would be enhanced if he could show that he was exposed to the smoke plume on that date, and that in effect he has sought deliberately to misrepresent the position. Not without some hesitation, I acquit Mr Shaw of that aspersion. He was not a particularly impressive witness, but I do not conclude that he would so brazenly have attempted to mislead.
361. A clear issue arises as to the timing of the onset of Mr Shaw’s cough. Under cross-examination he said that his sore throat developed over the Friday afternoon, and the sore eyes, cough and phlegm over the weekend. On 13th June he saw his GP who recorded “cough one week” and prescribed amoxicillin. At that stage, Mr Shaw said that he had not made a link in his mind between the smoke and his cough. However, he contested the accuracy of the note. On 20th June he re-attended: he was still “bunged up”, and the GP prescribed a short course of steroids. Mr Shaw told me that on that occasion he did not mention the fire. It was only “maybe a week or two after” that he began to make that connection.
363. In my judgment, Mr Shaw’s case faces problems whichever way the evidence is interpreted. If the medical record is correct, which in my view it probably is, then his cough was not due to the fire. The possibility that the fire exacerbated his symptoms cannot be excluded, but cannot be substantiated on the balance of probabilities on the basis of Mr Shaw’s account alone. If the cough in fact developed on Saturday, when Mr Shaw as at home far away from the scope of the smoke, Dr Hardy conceded that “it’s not due to the smoke, I guess”.
Mrs Teri O’Brien
367. Mrs O’Brien was asked about the timing of the onset and offset of the smoke and accompanying acrid, chemical smell. She said this:
“That day it was quite intense, for the first few days leading off, and then obviously towards the end of that week it petered out a bit.”
368. In answer to my questions, Mrs O’Brien said that she saw black smoke at around 13:30 on Friday 10th June, when it was close to her house, although she could not say how far away. Given that the wind had been blowing from the west for the past five hours, at the very least Mrs O’Brien’s timings must be incorrect. On subsequent days, she said that the atmosphere was smoggy and murky.
Mr Francis Glascott
“1. Cold called on doorstep by young man regarding fire at Sonae factory in Kirkby.
2. Was asked had it affected me and although I said no, I was persuaded to give my details and answer some questions (including health questions).
3. As I had breathing difficulties (and told him so) I decided to go ahead and sign the, what I thought, the questionnaire.
3. Was subsequently phoned by GT Law about signing a statement of truth.
4. Had been diagnosed that my breathing problem was mild emphysema caused by my long-term smoking so I informed GT Law that I did not wish to proceed and I did not believe that the Sonae fire had any bearing on my current health problem.
5. Was told that I couldn’t withdraw my claim as the 7 day cooling off period from the date of the cold caller visit had expired.
6. I told them I did not wish to proceed with what would then be a fraudulent claim and was informed that if I withdrew I would have to pay their costs.
7. Subsequently received enclosed letter reiterating their claim for costs …”
Mr Leon Swift
383. Mr Swift arrived at work at about 08:45 on Friday 10th June. Whilst driving to work along the East Lancs road he could see a large cloud of pale-coloured smoke. Nearer the office, it was smoggy and foggy. From closer-up, the smoke was in a vast quantity and a lightish/dark grey. The smell was strange and different from normal. It did not appear to impact on his breathing at that point.
385. On Monday 13th June the atmosphere was not as foggy as on the Friday, but there was “definitely” still a large cloud above the factory. Although there was less ash on his car, his symptoms had deteriorated. He had a slight headache, and his eye and sinus problems continued. Mr Swift told me that he tends not to visit his GP, and so he self-medicated. He bought stronger anti-histamines than he ordinarily used, but these did not really work. It took him 2-3 months to recover completely.
“When did your symptoms reach a stage when you informed your employer or GP?
Unfortunately I did not as I believed the headaches related to working at a computer. It is only now that it has been brought to my attention that I have linked the symptoms to the fire.”
393. On 22nd February 2013, Mr Swift was involved in the following conversation on Twitter:
“Leon Swift either of you’s jumped on this sonae claim bandwagon?
TC been all over the radio
MC residents living close going to solicitors due to harmful emissions from the plant
MC looks like everyone’s doing it now because it’s shut down
Leon Swift they’ve admitted liability so anyone living or working in the area at the time of the fire can claim
MC get on it ken/tom
MC not for me #too honest
Leon Swift too honest ya, good one matt. I’m getting involved I reckon, pays for the summer holiday if it goes thru
TC ha ha you’re a bad man Leon
MC he’s a fraud Tom
Leon Swift takes a fraud to know a fraud Matthew. Mr ‘I was in that car that crashed ye’ #showmethemoney
MC my neck was sore when Dave crashed #thetruth
Leon Swift Asking for trouble driving in flip flops
MC if you crash give us a shout #whiplashclaim
…
MC I’m sure you was fine that time Dave had a crash
Leon Swift least I was in the car though Matthew
MC so was I”
“Q. If you were able positively to make a link, you would have made that link when the fire was burning, not later?
A. Yes.
Q. You have just said "yes". Are you agreeing with that proposition?
A. No. Like it is difficult to remember exactly when you do make the association of the two. As I said previously, a lot of symptoms that I did experience are very similar symptoms to what I experienced on a regular basis. So it is difficult to differentiate between the two.
Q. Exactly. Mr Swift, what happened is this. You would have great difficulty differentiating between symptoms you had anyway and symptoms from the fire, which is why you didn't make any association in those two months or so that you've said occurred before you made an association.
A. Yes, but that's not to say that there wasn't necessarily an association between the two sets.
Q. That's a separate question. The question is whether you can say there's an association. What I suggest is it was only a very significant period later, whether months or in fact I suggest early 2013, that you saw advertising literature, and you thought: well, I can say that those symptoms -- I'm not sure how they were caused -- were caused by that fire and I can get some money; do you accept that?
A. That may have been the trigger that made me think about it again, but it wasn't the financial thing that I was thinking about in terms of making a claim. It was just I realised that the nuisance it had caused at the time, that I basically wanted to bring the claim.
Q. The nuisance it had caused? What do you mean by the nuisance it had caused?
A. Basically, if you're sitting in an office and you've got itchy eyes and tickly cough and sore nose, it's just -- it's inconvenience that you could do without when you're trying to work, isn't it?
Q. But those are symptoms that are so similar to the symptoms you had anyway at the time of the year each year that you couldn't positively link those symptoms to the smoke, could you?
A. As I said, though, those symptoms were heightened considerably. For example, I take Cetirizine, and that controls my hay fever. Things like that. I don't need to take anything additional during the time of the fire, I had to then go and purchase additional in order to try and appease the symptoms that I was referring to.
Q. If that was true, Mr Swift, you would have made the link there and then, wouldn't you? You would have thought: why is any normal medication that always resolves my problems not resolving my problems?
A. You would think so, yes.”
398. Finally, I note that in his report Dr Hardy fairly stated that Mr Swift developed no chest symptoms whatsoever in consequence of smoke inhalation, but then felt able to say that he probably suffered from conjunctivitis, rhinitis and acute bronchitis (cough) for “up to six months”. My only observation is that his sort of expression of opinion discloses the dangers of leading with the chin.
Mr Shaun West
402. In his oral evidence Mr West said that when he came home from work on the evening of Thursday 9th June he was aware of the fire almost immediately. He had a clear view from the hallway window of his home. Between 20:00 and 21:00 that evening, he could see flames and smoke; he was very confident of that (his confidence was misplaced). The next day, in the morning, the fire was really bad and the smoke was starting to billow. It was relentless, and a very dark colour. He could smell and taste it - Mr West, in common with others, described a “chemically” smell. By the time he returned home at around 16:00 to 17:00, the smoke “still looked incredibly bad”. Once he was in the house, he shut all the windows.
403. Mr West said that it was very likely that he remained at home that weekend. There was no real respite from the smoke. He figured that everyone was in the same position, and that his GP would not be able to change his environment.
404. In terms of the evolution of the smoke plume, Mr West said this:
“But I'd say a couple of days in, after the immediate fire getting very severe, there was one or two days when it would be a lot worse in terms of maybe the smoke being lower. The house, I was always surrounded by it, and to be honest, I constantly had the curtain shut.”
and subsequently:
“Q. One final question. What was the atmosphere outside the house like in the period of the fire and the period immediately following it? The air quality, if you like.
A. Very poor. It felt like I was trapped in the house. Any instance where I would have normally walked to the shop to get, you know, even bread and milk, I would have drove to a garage in (inaudible) because I didn't really want to go walking down the road.
Q. That's what you did as a result of it, but what was the air quality like? Can you describe it?
A. I would cough immediately.
Q. That's a consequence.
A. A consequence.
Q. What was the air quality like?
A. Okay. Sorry, could you rephrase that?
Q. Yes. When you walked outside, was it a nice clear day or what?
A. It obviously got worse on some days. So some days I couldn't see across the fields because of the direction the smoke was going in and I live very close to the fields. It was constantly smelling of the smoke and the fire and whatever else. God knows what was in there. But it was pretty horrid, to be honest.”
Mrs Kathleen Tully
412. On 16th June 2011 Mrs Tully went to see her GP. His computerised records reads as follows:
“Diagnosis Ganglion of wrist right-sided, noticed a few weeks ago, some constant discomfort, able to use hand normally, no pins/needles. O/E – ganglion, radial – N, sensation – N. Explained and reassured.
Symptom Has a sore throat last 3 days, no fever, feels achy all over, able to eat and drink a little, some diarrhoea, foul smelling, no blood. O/E -well hydrated, systemically well, throat – tonsils inflamed, pus bilate[ral] explained bacterial tonsillitis …”
415. In Dr Hardy and Dr Hind’s opinion, Mrs Tully suffered from severe bacterial tonsillitis which was unrelated to the fire. Mr Swift’s contrary conclusion that there was a causal relationship with smoke inhalation was based only on clinical judgment and the temporal association. He said that the GP must have failed to investigate the matter with sufficient care. Given the signs on examination, the clear presentation of a severe bacterial infection, and his own expert judgment that such infections are not the result of smoke inhalation, in my view Mr Swift’s approach rather demonstrates the dangers of relying on ex post facto clinical judgments in this sort of situation. Nor can I accept Mr Clearkin’s diagnosis of tear-film instability. The clinical findings, Mr Marsh’s sound opinion, and Occam’s Razor all point strongly in favour of an unrelated bacterial conjunctivitis.
Master Bradley Woods
419. Mrs Woods does not have other than a vague recollection of conditions in the days following the fire, although she spoke of light grey smoke and “ashy” conditions outdoors.
422. Bradley clearly did suffer from a coincidental viral infection which was properly diagnosed on 14th June. It is of course possible that smoke inhalation might have aggravated his symptoms from this, but I would only be prepared to reach such a conclusion on the back of, at the very least, compelling plume modelling evidence supporting an above threshold exposure.
Mr Steven Woolvine
“Q. Why didn't you go to the GP before 8 July, if you had the symptoms you've talked about?
A. Because the symptoms that I had, I felt were manageable. I don't want to go to the GP about every little thing, because I obviously go quite a lot with regards to my depression and anxiety. I don't want to bombard him with every little thing.
Q. No. So your cough never got so bad that you thought, well, I really need to go and see a doctor?
A. No.
Q. Nor your shortness of breath?
A. No. Because at that time my shortness of breath, initially I put it down to smoking, until it carried on for a couple of weeks, and then, because of the other symptoms I got, I related it to the fire.
Q. It's just it was suggested at one point in the papers [the account given by Mr Woolvine to Dr Hardy] that at one point you got so breathless you had to sit down on a wall when you got to the church because you were too breathless; is that right or not?
A. Yes. That's correct.
Q. If you really had that symptom at this time, you would have gone to the GP, wouldn't you?
A. No, because, as I say, initially, I did put it down to smoking and I did try and cut down at that stage, and after the two weeks it did ease off.
Q. So when you cut down the cigarettes, the symptoms reduced?
A. Yes, but I've never had problems -- I've smoked for 10, 12 years, on and off, so I've never experienced problems like that before, and it was just a bit coincidental that that happened at that period.
Q. The association you made between your symptoms and the fire came very much later, didn't it? The association in your mind that the fire may have caused problems came much later?
A. When I properly thought about it, yes.”
431. In my judgment, Mr Woolvine grossly exaggerated his symptoms to Dr Hardy, and he has also given an exaggerated account to me. I entirely accept that this conclusion does not rule out the possibility of less severe symptoms resulting from exposure to the smoke plume, which symptoms may have crossed the threshold of actionable injury. However, as with other Test Claimants in his position, Mr Woolvine’s difficulty is that he has to invoke something other than his oral evidence to persuade me of that proposition.
THE REMODELLING BY THE PLUME MODELLERS: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
FINAL ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS
449. A related point is that the available evidence fails to demonstrate any dose-related response. Listening as I did to all the Test Claimants give their evidence, the accounts they gave of the smoke plume and of the nature and severity of their symptoms bore no relationship with their modelled exposures. The smell and duration of the smoke was described in more or less exactly the same way irrespective of location. Indeed, I might be forgiven for thinking that some of the Test Claimants who in fact lived the furthest away from the plant were almost adjacent to it. Overall, the claimed symptoms appeared to be independent of exposure and dose. It was as if the Test Claimants had experienced a monolithic phenomenon. I appreciate that human beings differ, but I would expected to have heard accounts which varied according to the now ascertained doses.
451. In my judgment, the lay evidence viewed as a whole was unimpressive. It was vague, impressionistic, imprecise, sometimes inconsistent with the known behaviour of the smoke plume, and often internally inconsistent. Only three of the Test Claimants gave evidence which impressed me as being potentially reliable. Given that no one appears to have kept a contemporaneous record of his or her experiences, this generic failure to provide a coherent, consistent account of what occurred is hardly surprising, but in my judgment cannot be a factor in the Claimants’ favour.
“In approximately January 2012, I was at work when I received a telephone call from my partner, Greg Taft. Greg told me that a lady had visited our home in Tower Hill who had told him that she was acting on behalf of GT Law solicitors who was dealing with claims against Sonae relating to smoke inhalation from the fire in June 2011. She said that Sonae had accepted liability and that compensation had already been paid out to claimants. The lady was attempting to encourage Greg to sign up in order to put forward a claim against Sonae for symptoms relating to smoke inhalation. Greg told her that he was not interested in making a claim and asked her to leave.”
Ms Wilson was not cross-examined about this evidence, which is admittedly hearsay. However, there is no reason to doubt its accuracy. The information Mr Taft was given was inaccurate – there had been no admission of liability, and no money had been paid. Misleading information of this sort had the obvious tendency to encourage the bringing of claims, on the basis that the Defendant was a soft target and this was easy money. That this information was understood in exactly this way is revealed by the terms of the Facebook posts referred to at paragraphs 9, 10 and 12 of Ms Wilson’s witness statement, as well as by the evidence in Leon Swift’s case. I strongly deprecate this sort of practice. Not merely does it sail close to the wind in terms of its professional propriety, it is severely counter-productive as and when the case comes to trial.
463. Where does the truth lie in all of this? It is not my function to say what the truth is; my role is limited to deciding whether these claims succeed or fail, applying standard legal methods. However, out of fairness to the Claimants my conclusions about what happened in June 2011 are as follows. There is no unified field theory or overarching explanation. The majority of Claimants experienced an extremely nasty, unusual smell and some may have been concerned about the possible consequences, albeit not so concerned to seek medical advice. Many Claimants - it is not clear to me how many – suffered some symptoms of shortness of breath, lacrimation and soreness of the throat. These symptoms were short-lived, as were any significant quantities of smoke. For the majority of the time, the smoke was blowing away from the plant. The better view on all the available evidence is that these symptoms did not exceed the hurdle the law sets for actionable personal injury, because they were symptoms of irritation rather than of inflammation. It is difficult to say for how long the smoke and these mild symptoms lasted, but I have in mind a maximum period of about one week. Many months later – it is unclear exactly how and why - lawyers arrived on the scene and sensed the opening of a business opportunity. It proved not very difficult to recruit willing Claimants to the group, not least because there was a lot of ill-feeling in the neighbourhood directed towards Sonae, and many people genuinely believed that they must have been harmed in some way. The legal process preyed on human susceptibility and vulnerability, and the rest is history.
468. These claims must all be dismissed, and judgment must be entered for the Defendant.
APPENDIX 1
CLAIMANT NUMBER |
CLAIMANT NAME |
POSTCODE |
DISTANCE FROM SONAE (KM) |
2 |
JESSICA ALEXANDER |
L32 8TX |
1.56 |
2 |
JESSICA ALEXANDER COLLEGE |
L33 8XF |
1.42 |
3 |
TRACEY BEATHAM |
L33 2DE |
1.96 |
7 |
DAWN BUNTING |
L33 6XB |
0.44 |
10 |
JULIE CARNEY |
L32 9PQ |
1.94 |
13 |
KELLY COLEBOURN |
L32 7PZ |
2.16 |
14 |
KAREN COURT |
L33 4DH |
2.27 |
17 |
TERENCE DUNN |
L33 4DP |
2.31 |
18 |
ANNETTE FARRELL |
L33 1UW |
1.81 |
18 |
ANNETTE FARRELL WORK |
L32 9PP |
2.27 |
20 |
FRANCIS GLASCOTT |
L32 9QD |
2.1 |
23 |
EDMUND KENNY |
L33 1YF |
1.8 |
24 |
GARY MANGAN |
L33 9XF |
0.53 |
25 |
PAUL MCLOUGHLIN |
L33 1WD |
1.61 |
27 |
TERI O’BRIEN |
L32 2AR |
2.63 |
28 |
JAMES REECE |
L32 4SP |
3.01 |
28 |
JAMES REECE WORK |
L32 9HN |
2.87 |
30 |
PETER SHAW WORK |
L33 7TJ |
0.55 |
33 |
LEON SWIFT |
L33 7UY |
0.88 |
35 |
KATHLEEN TULLY |
L33 1UG |
1.53 |
37 |
SHAUN WEST |
L33 9UJ |
0.58 |
39 |
BRADLEY WOODS |
L33 1RF |
1.09 |
40 |
STEVEN WOOLVINE |
L32 7RP |
2.59 |
40 |
STEVEN WOOLVINE WORK |
L33 7RX |
1.65 |
APPENDIX 2
Sonae GLO: Further Modelling
Contents
Following the instructions of Mr Justice Jay further modelling by CERC is presented in the accompanying seven documents. As specified by Mr Justice Jay, the modelling is based on:
Based on this model set-up, specified by Mr Justice Jay and outstanding elements agreed between the dispersion modelling experts, the following outputs are provided:
Sonae GLO: Further Modelling
This document presents the following contour maps of modelled number of hours for which hourly average concentrations exceed specified threshold values:
· Acrolein concentrations exceeding the odour recognition threshold of 0.38 µg/m³
· PM10 concentrations, including background concentrations using measured data from the Briery Hey monitoring site, exceeding the COMEAP High trigger value of 107 µg/m³.
o Two plots are presented for PM10: the first is based on 100 m resolution model output for an output area of 9.4 km x 6.6 km; and the second is based on 50 m resolution model output for an output area of 5 km x 4 km, producing better resolution of the modelled exceedence area.
· PM2.5 concentrations, including background concentrations using measured data from the Briery Hey monitoring site, exceeding the COMEAP High trigger value of 74 µg/m³.
o Two plots are presented for PM2.5: the first is based on 100 m resolution model output for an output area of 9.4 km x 6.6 km; and the second is based on 50 m resolution model output for an output area of 5 km x 4 km, producing better resolution of the modelled exceedence area.
Contour maps for the acrolein health threshold of 146 µg/m³ and the total aldehydes threshold of 500 µg/m³ have not been produced because these thresholds are not exceeded beyond the boundary of the Sonae factory.
The maximum modelled acrolein concentration across the output area is 95.6 µg/m³, below the health threshold, therefore a contour map cannot be produced since there are no exceedences of the threshold across the model output area.[1]
The maximum modelled total aldehydes concentration across the output area is 502.6 µg/m³, just above the threshold of 500 µg/m³. This maximum concentration is modelled with the 50 m resolution output and is the only point across the output area above the threshold value. This output point is located within the boundary of the Sonae factory.
To minimise differences in the appearance of contour plots due to contouring methodology, CERC and Envirobods agreed to use Golden Software’s Surfer package for contour plotting, using the Inverse Distance Weighting interpolation method.
Sonae GLO: Further Modelling
Table 1 lists the locations of 20 Test Claimants. Two tables then follow presenting the model outputs for the locations of the 20 Test Claimants:
Table 2 presents the number of hours exceeding the COMEAP High trigger values for PM10 and PM2.5 and the maximum predicted hourly concentrations for these pollutants. The number of exceedences and maximum hourly concentrations include the modelled contribution from the fire and background concentrations using measured data from the Briery Hey monitoring site.
Table 3 presents the number of hours exceeding acrolein thresholds for odour (0.38 µg/m³) and health (146 µg/m³), and the health threshold for total aldehydes (500 µg/m³).
Table 1: Locations of the 20 Test Claimants
ID |
Name |
Postcode |
Coordinates of location (Ordnance Survey British National Grid) |
|
Eastings (m) |
Northings (m) |
|||
2 |
Jessica Alexander |
L32 8TX |
341941 |
397952 |
3 |
Tracey Beatham |
L33 2DE |
340940 |
399888 |
7 |
Dawn Bunting |
L33 6XB |
342398 |
399215 |
10 |
Julie Ann Carney |
L32 9PQ |
341428 |
397883 |
13 |
Kelly Colebourn |
L32 7PZ |
341955 |
397276 |
14 |
Karen Court |
L33 4DH |
341351 |
401049 |
17 |
Terence Dunn |
L33 4DP |
341193 |
400972 |
18H |
Annette Farrell (home) |
L33 1UW |
341158 |
400143 |
18W |
Annette Farrell (workplace) |
L32 9PP |
340868 |
397737 |
20 |
Francis Glascott |
L32 9QD |
341311 |
397760 |
23 |
Edmund Kenny |
L33 1YF |
341130 |
399991 |
24 |
Gary Mangan |
L33 9XF |
342431 |
399666 |
25 |
Paul McLoughlin |
L33 1WD |
341259 |
399931 |
27 |
Teri O’Brien |
L32 2AR |
340096 |
399491 |
28H |
James Reece (home) |
L32 4SP |
339918 |
398434 |
28W |
James Reece (workplace) |
L34 9HN |
343241 |
396479 |
30 |
Peter Shaw |
L33 7TJ |
343172 |
398968 |
33 |
Leon Swift |
L33 7UY |
343654 |
399545 |
35 |
Kathleen Tully |
L33 1UG |
341606 |
400205 |
37 |
Shaun West |
L33 9UJ |
342477 |
399612 |
39 |
Bradley Woods |
L33 1RF |
342181 |
400231 |
40H |
Steven Woolvine (home) |
L32 7RP |
341239 |
397200 |
40W |
Steven Woolvine (workplace) |
L33 7RX |
342549 |
397466 |
Table 2: Number of hours exceeding COMEAP High trigger values for PM10 and PM2.5, together with modelled maximum concentrations, at the test case locations. Modelled concentrations include background concentrations from the Briery Hey monitoring site.
ID |
PM10 (including background concentration) |
PM2.5 (including background concentration) |
|||
Number of hours exceeding COMEAP High trigger value (107 µg/m³) |
Maximum hourly concentration (µg/m³) |
Number of hours exceeding COMEAP High trigger value (74 µg/m³) |
Maximum hourly concentration (µg/m³) |
||
2 |
0 |
100.0 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
3 |
0 |
100.0 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
7 |
0 |
100.0 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
10 |
0 |
100.0 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
13 |
0 |
100.0 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
14 |
0 |
100.5 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
17 |
0 |
100.3 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
18H |
0 |
100.0 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
18W |
0 |
100.0 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
20 |
0 |
100.0 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
23 |
0 |
100.0 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
24 |
2 |
114.8 |
2 |
79.9 |
|
25 |
0 |
100.0 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
27 |
0 |
100.0 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
28H |
0 |
100.0 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
28W |
0 |
100.0 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
30 |
1 |
140.1 |
1 |
112.2 |
|
33 |
0 |
100.0 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
35 |
0 |
100.1 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
37 |
5 |
135.8 |
6 |
96.4 |
|
39 |
0 |
101.0 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
40H |
0 |
100.0 |
0 |
66.0 |
|
40W |
0 |
100.0 |
0 |
66.0 |
Table 3: Number of hours exceeding odour and health thresholds for acrolein, and health threshold for total aldehydes at the test case locations. Modelled maximum concentrations for these pollutants are also presented.
ID |
Acrolein |
Total aldehydes |
|||
Number of hours exceeding threshold value |
Maximum hourly concentration (µg/m³) |
Number of hours exceeding health threshold (500 µg/m³) |
Maximum hourly concentration (µg/m³) |
||
Odour (0.38 µg/m³) |
Health (146 µg/m³) |
||||
2 |
6 |
0 |
0.74 |
0 |
3.9 |
3 |
16 |
0 |
1.37 |
0 |
7.2 |
7 |
10 |
0 |
1.40 |
0 |
7.4 |
10 |
10 |
0 |
1.05 |
0 |
5.5 |
13 |
2 |
0 |
0.59 |
0 |
3.1 |
14 |
3 |
0 |
0.82 |
0 |
4.3 |
17 |
4 |
0 |
1.17 |
0 |
6.2 |
18H |
14 |
0 |
1.29 |
0 |
6.8 |
18W |
4 |
0 |
0.96 |
0 |
5.1 |
20 |
9 |
0 |
0.97 |
0 |
5.1 |
23 |
18 |
0 |
1.45 |
0 |
7.6 |
24 |
36 |
0 |
7.78 |
0 |
41.0 |
25 |
18 |
0 |
1.55 |
0 |
8.2 |
27 |
3 |
0 |
0.66 |
0 |
3.5 |
28H |
0 |
0 |
0.25 |
0 |
1.3 |
28W |
0 |
0 |
0.30 |
0 |
1.6 |
30 |
14 |
0 |
12.01 |
0 |
63.2 |
33 |
17 |
0 |
2.21 |
0 |
11.6 |
35 |
11 |
0 |
1.83 |
0 |
9.6 |
37 |
44 |
0 |
9.48 |
0 |
49.9 |
39 |
9 |
0 |
1.46 |
0 |
7.7 |
40H |
2 |
0 |
0.39 |
0 |
2.1 |
40W |
2 |
0 |
0.49 |
0 |
2.6 |
Sonae Group Litigation: Final Modelling
3. Tables of modelled hourly PM10 and PM2.5 concentrations for specific days and Test Claimants
This document presents tables of PM10 and PM2.5 concentrations for the day and Test Claimant combination specified in Table 1. Hourly concentrations and 24-hour mean concentrations are presented along with background concentrations from the Briery Hey monitoring site.
Table 4: Summary of daily PM10 and PM2.5 concentrations tables presented in this document
Test Claimant ID |
Day |
Table number |
24 |
10th June 2011 |
2 |
12th June 2011 |
3 |
|
30 |
10th June 2011 |
4 |
11th June 2011 |
5 |
|
27th June 2011 |
6 |
|
33 |
11th June 2011 |
7 |
15th June 2011 |
8 |
|
20th June 2011 |
9 |
|
37 |
10th June 2011 |
10 |
12th June 2011 |
11 |
|
17th June 2011 |
12 |
|
39 |
10th June 2011 |
13 |
12th June 2011 |
14 |
|
17th June 2011 |
15 |
Table 5: Modelled hourly PM10 and PM2.5 concentrations for Test Claimant 24, 10th June 2011
10/06/2011 |
Test Claimant 24 |
|||
Hour (hour ending BST) |
Modelled concentrations including background (µg/m³) |
Briery Hey background (µg/m³) |
||
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
|
1 |
18.3 |
6.9 |
16.0 |
5.0 |
2 |
16.0 |
10.0 |
16.0 |
10.0 |
3 |
18.0 |
1.0 |
18.0 |
1.0 |
4 |
32.6 |
20.8 |
17.0 |
8.0 |
5 |
20.0 |
5.0 |
20.0 |
5.0 |
6 |
31.5 |
9.4 |
31.0 |
9.0 |
7 |
22.0 |
8.0 |
22.0 |
8.0 |
8 |
30.0 |
6.0 |
30.0 |
6.0 |
9 |
26.0 |
1.0 |
26.0 |
1.0 |
10 |
28.0 |
11.0 |
28.0 |
11.0 |
11 |
13.6 |
7.1 |
11.0 |
5.0 |
12 |
12.0 |
8.0 |
12.0 |
8.0 |
13 |
15.0 |
6.8 |
15.0 |
6.8 |
14 |
6.0 |
2.7 |
6.0 |
2.7 |
15 |
17.0 |
7.7 |
17.0 |
7.7 |
16 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
17 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
18 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
19 |
3.0 |
1.4 |
3.0 |
1.4 |
20 |
7.0 |
3.2 |
7.0 |
3.2 |
21 |
13.0 |
5.9 |
13.0 |
5.9 |
22 |
9.0 |
4.1 |
9.0 |
4.1 |
23 |
5.0 |
2.3 |
5.0 |
2.3 |
24 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
24-hour mean concentration (µg/m³) |
17.5 |
6.8 |
16.6 |
6.1 |
24-hour mean concentration excluding background (µg/m³) |
0.9 |
0.7 |
Table 6: Modelled hourly PM10 and PM2.5 concentrations for Test Claimant 24, 12th June 2011
12/06/2011 |
Test Claimant 24 |
|||
Hour (hour ending BST) |
Modelled concentrations including background (µg/m³) |
Briery Hey background (µg/m³) |
||
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
|
1 |
16.0 |
7.2 |
16.0 |
7.2 |
2 |
21.0 |
9.5 |
21.0 |
9.5 |
3 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
4 |
18.0 |
8.1 |
18.0 |
8.1 |
5 |
21.0 |
9.5 |
21.0 |
9.5 |
6 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
7 |
32.9 |
16.9 |
27.0 |
12.2 |
8 |
64.4 |
28.2 |
36.0 |
5.0 |
9 |
42.9 |
17.9 |
32.0 |
9.0 |
10 |
103.6 |
68.4 |
26.0 |
5.0 |
11 |
114.8 |
79.2 |
30.0 |
10.0 |
12 |
101.9 |
71.9 |
15.0 |
1.0 |
13 |
49.2 |
42.2 |
11.0 |
11.0 |
14 |
68.1 |
47.8 |
23.0 |
11.0 |
15 |
32.0 |
20.4 |
18.0 |
9.0 |
16 |
35.3 |
28.4 |
14.0 |
11.0 |
17 |
22.1 |
6.0 |
16.0 |
1.0 |
18 |
75.3 |
46.8 |
18.0 |
0.0 |
19 |
82.7 |
63.1 |
14.0 |
7.0 |
20 |
87.9 |
65.4 |
20.0 |
10.0 |
21 |
95.5 |
71.3 |
18.0 |
8.0 |
22 |
109.2 |
79.9 |
26.0 |
12.0 |
23 |
59.0 |
45.1 |
16.0 |
10.0 |
24 |
10.4 |
7.3 |
10.0 |
7.0 |
24-hour mean concentration (µg/m³) |
54.3 |
35.8 |
20.2 |
8.0 |
24-hour mean concentration excluding background (µg/m³) |
34.1 |
27.8 |
Table 7: Modelled hourly PM10 and PM2.5 concentrations for Test Claimant 30, 10th June 2011
10/06/2011 |
Test Claimant 30 |
|||
Hour (hour ending BST) |
Modelled concentrations including background (µg/m³) |
Briery Hey background (µg/m³) |
||
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
|
1 |
16.0 |
5.0 |
16.0 |
5.0 |
2 |
16.0 |
10.0 |
16.0 |
10.0 |
3 |
18.0 |
1.0 |
18.0 |
1.0 |
4 |
17.0 |
8.0 |
17.0 |
8.0 |
5 |
20.0 |
5.0 |
20.0 |
5.0 |
6 |
31.0 |
9.0 |
31.0 |
9.0 |
7 |
22.0 |
8.0 |
22.0 |
8.0 |
8 |
30.0 |
6.0 |
30.0 |
6.0 |
9 |
26.0 |
1.0 |
26.0 |
1.0 |
10 |
28.0 |
11.0 |
28.0 |
11.0 |
11 |
11.0 |
5.0 |
11.0 |
5.0 |
12 |
23.3 |
17.2 |
12.0 |
8.0 |
13 |
33.5 |
21.9 |
15.0 |
6.8 |
14 |
140.1 |
112.2 |
6.0 |
2.7 |
15 |
90.2 |
67.4 |
17.0 |
7.6 |
16 |
19.6 |
9.1 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
17 |
53.4 |
36.3 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
18 |
25.5 |
13.9 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
19 |
14.0 |
10.3 |
3.0 |
1.3 |
20 |
7.1 |
3.3 |
7.0 |
3.2 |
21 |
17.8 |
9.8 |
13.0 |
5.9 |
22 |
9.2 |
4.2 |
9.0 |
4.1 |
23 |
5.2 |
2.4 |
5.0 |
2.3 |
24 |
20.5 |
9.8 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
24-hour mean concentration (µg/m³) |
28.9 |
16.1 |
16.6 |
6.1 |
24-hour mean concentration excluding background (µg/m³) |
12.3 |
10.1 |
Table 8: Modelled hourly PM10 and PM2.5 concentrations for Test Claimant 30, 11th June 2011
11/06/2011 |
Test Claimant 30 |
|||
Hour (hour ending BST) |
Modelled concentrations including background (µg/m³) |
Briery Hey background (µg/m³) |
||
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
|
1 |
17.0 |
7.7 |
17.0 |
7.7 |
2 |
8.0 |
3.6 |
8.0 |
3.6 |
3 |
11.0 |
5.0 |
11.0 |
4.9 |
4 |
18.1 |
8.2 |
18.0 |
8.1 |
5 |
18.0 |
8.1 |
18.0 |
8.1 |
6 |
15.0 |
6.8 |
15.0 |
6.7 |
7 |
19.1 |
8.6 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
8 |
26.0 |
12.1 |
25.0 |
11.2 |
9 |
28.1 |
12.7 |
28.0 |
12.6 |
10 |
19.6 |
9.0 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
11 |
15.0 |
7.8 |
12.0 |
5.4 |
12 |
20.1 |
9.1 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
13 |
20.6 |
9.5 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
14 |
22.1 |
12.2 |
16.0 |
7.2 |
15 |
12.6 |
5.9 |
12.0 |
5.4 |
16 |
26.8 |
15.6 |
17.0 |
7.6 |
17 |
16.3 |
8.1 |
14.0 |
6.3 |
18 |
12.2 |
5.5 |
12.0 |
5.4 |
19 |
28.5 |
19.6 |
10.0 |
4.5 |
20 |
17.2 |
8.5 |
15.0 |
6.8 |
21 |
15.5 |
8.3 |
12.0 |
5.4 |
22 |
16.1 |
9.1 |
11.0 |
5.0 |
23 |
11.0 |
5.0 |
11.0 |
5.0 |
24 |
12.0 |
5.4 |
12.0 |
5.4 |
24-hour mean concentration (µg/m³) |
17.7 |
8.8 |
15.5 |
7.0 |
24-hour mean concentration excluding background (µg/m³) |
2.2 |
1.8 |
Table 9: Modelled hourly PM10 and PM2.5 concentrations for Test Claimant 30, 27th June 2011
27/06/2011 |
Test Claimant 30 |
|||
Hour (hour ending BST) |
Modelled concentrations including background (µg/m³) |
Briery Hey background (µg/m³) |
||
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
|
1 |
37.1 |
32.1 |
37.0 |
32.0 |
2 |
26.0 |
18.0 |
26.0 |
18.0 |
3 |
36.0 |
28.0 |
36.0 |
28.0 |
4 |
29.0 |
21.0 |
29.0 |
21.0 |
5 |
29.0 |
18.0 |
29.0 |
18.0 |
6 |
37.3 |
21.3 |
37.0 |
21.0 |
7 |
43.2 |
35.1 |
32.0 |
26.0 |
8 |
35.0 |
14.0 |
35.0 |
14.0 |
9 |
33.0 |
10.0 |
33.0 |
10.0 |
10 |
35.0 |
7.0 |
35.0 |
7.0 |
11 |
31.0 |
14.0 |
31.0 |
14.0 |
12 |
45.0 |
32.0 |
45.0 |
32.0 |
13 |
41.1 |
37.1 |
41.0 |
37.0 |
14 |
37.0 |
14.0 |
37.0 |
14.0 |
15 |
29.1 |
5.0 |
29.0 |
5.0 |
16 |
27.3 |
15.2 |
27.0 |
15.0 |
17 |
21.5 |
7.4 |
21.0 |
7.0 |
18 |
19.3 |
15.2 |
19.0 |
15.0 |
19 |
22.3 |
7.3 |
22.0 |
7.0 |
20 |
17.0 |
18.0 |
17.0 |
18.0 |
21 |
23.5 |
5.4 |
23.0 |
5.0 |
22 |
17.0 |
9.0 |
17.0 |
9.0 |
23 |
25.0 |
15.0 |
25.0 |
15.0 |
24 |
21.1 |
4.1 |
21.0 |
4.0 |
24-hour mean concentration (µg/m³) |
29.9 |
16.8 |
29.3 |
16.3 |
24-hour mean concentration excluding background (µg/m³) |
0.6 |
0.5 |
Table 10: Modelled hourly PM10 and PM2.5 concentrations for Test Claimant 33, 11th June 2011
11/06/2011 |
Test Claimant 33 |
|||
Hour (hour ending BST) |
Modelled concentrations including background (µg/m³) |
Briery Hey background (µg/m³) |
||
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
|
1 |
17.0 |
7.7 |
17.0 |
7.7 |
2 |
8.0 |
3.6 |
8.0 |
3.6 |
3 |
11.0 |
5.0 |
11.0 |
4.9 |
4 |
18.0 |
8.1 |
18.0 |
8.1 |
5 |
31.2 |
18.9 |
18.0 |
8.1 |
6 |
15.0 |
6.8 |
15.0 |
6.7 |
7 |
19.1 |
8.6 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
8 |
25.1 |
11.3 |
25.0 |
11.2 |
9 |
29.8 |
14.1 |
28.0 |
12.6 |
10 |
19.8 |
9.2 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
11 |
12.4 |
5.8 |
12.0 |
5.4 |
12 |
36.5 |
22.5 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
13 |
24.7 |
12.8 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
14 |
16.1 |
7.3 |
16.0 |
7.2 |
15 |
13.0 |
6.2 |
12.0 |
5.4 |
16 |
17.0 |
7.7 |
17.0 |
7.7 |
17 |
14.4 |
6.6 |
14.0 |
6.3 |
18 |
14.6 |
7.6 |
12.0 |
5.4 |
19 |
10.0 |
4.5 |
10.0 |
4.5 |
20 |
15.0 |
6.8 |
15.0 |
6.8 |
21 |
12.0 |
5.4 |
12.0 |
5.4 |
22 |
11.0 |
5.0 |
11.0 |
4.9 |
23 |
11.0 |
5.0 |
11.0 |
4.9 |
24 |
12.0 |
5.4 |
12.0 |
5.4 |
24-hour mean concentration (µg/m³) |
17.2 |
8.4 |
15.5 |
7.0 |
24-hour mean concentration excluding background (µg/m³) |
1.7 |
1.4 |
Table 11: Modelled hourly PM10 and PM2.5 concentrations for Test Claimant 33, 15th June 2011
15/06/2011 |
Test Claimant 33 |
|||
Hour (hour ending BST) |
Modelled concentrations including background (µg/m³) |
Briery Hey background (µg/m³) |
||
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
|
1 |
19.0 |
9.0 |
19.0 |
9.0 |
2 |
19.0 |
13.0 |
19.0 |
13.0 |
3 |
40.0 |
28.0 |
40.0 |
28.0 |
4 |
33.0 |
17.0 |
33.0 |
17.0 |
5 |
21.0 |
14.0 |
21.0 |
14.0 |
6 |
22.0 |
12.0 |
22.0 |
12.0 |
7 |
26.0 |
18.0 |
26.0 |
18.0 |
8 |
22.0 |
10.0 |
22.0 |
10.0 |
9 |
19.0 |
13.0 |
19.0 |
13.0 |
10 |
17.0 |
8.0 |
17.0 |
8.0 |
11 |
22.0 |
9.0 |
22.0 |
9.0 |
12 |
17.0 |
15.0 |
17.0 |
15.0 |
13 |
8.3 |
5.9 |
6.0 |
4.0 |
14 |
7.0 |
3.0 |
7.0 |
3.0 |
15 |
9.0 |
7.0 |
9.0 |
7.0 |
16 |
25.1 |
13.1 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
17 |
12.7 |
7.6 |
12.0 |
7.0 |
18 |
12.9 |
8.7 |
12.0 |
8.0 |
19 |
18.5 |
7.0 |
16.0 |
5.0 |
20 |
10.0 |
4.0 |
10.0 |
4.0 |
21 |
19.2 |
9.7 |
11.0 |
3.0 |
22 |
26.8 |
9.0 |
17.0 |
1.0 |
23 |
23.8 |
8.9 |
19.0 |
5.0 |
24 |
30.2 |
12.1 |
24.0 |
7.0 |
24-hour mean concentration (µg/m³) |
20.0 |
10.9 |
18.3 |
9.5 |
24-hour mean concentration excluding background (µg/m³) |
1.7 |
1.4 |
Table 12: Modelled hourly PM10 and PM2.5 concentrations for Test Claimant 33, 20th June 2011
20/06/2011 |
Test Claimant 33 |
|||
Hour (hour ending BST) |
Modelled concentrations including background (µg/m³) |
Briery Hey background (µg/m³) |
||
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
|
1 |
43.7 |
30.2 |
19.0 |
10.0 |
2 |
44.0 |
28.6 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
3 |
22.0 |
18.0 |
22.0 |
18.0 |
4 |
21.8 |
9.1 |
18.0 |
6.0 |
5 |
17.7 |
9.6 |
17.0 |
9.0 |
6 |
21.3 |
8.3 |
21.0 |
8.0 |
7 |
21.0 |
15.0 |
21.0 |
15.0 |
8 |
41.0 |
2.0 |
41.0 |
2.0 |
9 |
32.0 |
5.0 |
32.0 |
5.0 |
10 |
18.6 |
7.5 |
18.0 |
7.0 |
11 |
26.1 |
5.1 |
26.0 |
5.0 |
12 |
21.7 |
6.6 |
21.0 |
6.0 |
13 |
16.4 |
9.3 |
16.0 |
9.0 |
14 |
21.8 |
10.7 |
21.0 |
10.0 |
15 |
21.4 |
25.2 |
20.0 |
24.0 |
16 |
19.2 |
16.0 |
18.0 |
15.0 |
17 |
12.0 |
5.0 |
12.0 |
5.0 |
18 |
15.0 |
13.0 |
15.0 |
13.0 |
19 |
17.0 |
16.0 |
17.0 |
16.0 |
20 |
21.0 |
10.0 |
21.0 |
10.0 |
21 |
19.0 |
19.0 |
19.0 |
19.0 |
22 |
31.0 |
15.0 |
31.0 |
15.0 |
23 |
25.0 |
17.0 |
25.0 |
17.0 |
24 |
32.0 |
22.0 |
32.0 |
22.0 |
24-hour mean concentration (µg/m³) |
24.2 |
13.5 |
21.8 |
11.5 |
24-hour mean concentration excluding background (µg/m³) |
2.4 |
2.0 |
Table 13: Modelled hourly PM10 and PM2.5 concentrations for Test Claimant 37, 10th June 2011
10/06/2011 |
Test Claimant 37 |
|||
Hour (hour ending BST) |
Modelled concentrations including background (µg/m³) |
Briery Hey background (µg/m³) |
||
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
|
1 |
17.9 |
6.6 |
16.0 |
5.0 |
2 |
16.0 |
10.0 |
16.0 |
10.0 |
3 |
18.0 |
1.0 |
18.0 |
1.0 |
4 |
43.3 |
29.5 |
17.0 |
8.0 |
5 |
20.0 |
5.0 |
20.0 |
5.0 |
6 |
31.3 |
9.3 |
31.0 |
9.0 |
7 |
22.0 |
8.0 |
22.0 |
8.0 |
8 |
30.0 |
6.0 |
30.0 |
6.0 |
9 |
26.0 |
1.0 |
26.0 |
1.0 |
10 |
28.0 |
11.0 |
28.0 |
11.0 |
11 |
13.2 |
6.8 |
11.0 |
5.0 |
12 |
12.0 |
8.0 |
12.0 |
8.0 |
13 |
15.0 |
6.8 |
15.0 |
6.8 |
14 |
6.0 |
2.7 |
6.0 |
2.7 |
15 |
17.0 |
7.7 |
17.0 |
7.7 |
16 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
17 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
18 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
19 |
3.0 |
1.4 |
3.0 |
1.4 |
20 |
7.0 |
3.2 |
7.0 |
3.2 |
21 |
13.0 |
5.9 |
13.0 |
5.9 |
22 |
9.0 |
4.1 |
9.0 |
4.1 |
23 |
5.0 |
2.3 |
5.0 |
2.3 |
24 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
24-hour mean concentration (µg/m³) |
17.9 |
7.1 |
16.6 |
6.1 |
24-hour mean concentration excluding background (µg/m³) |
1.3 |
1.0 |
Table 14: Modelled hourly PM10 and PM2.5 concentrations for Test Claimant 37, 12th June 2011
12/06/2011 |
Test Claimant 37 |
|||
Hour (hour ending BST) |
Modelled concentrations including background (µg/m³) |
Briery Hey background (µg/m³) |
||
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
|
1 |
16.0 |
7.2 |
16.0 |
7.2 |
2 |
21.0 |
9.5 |
21.0 |
9.5 |
3 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
4 |
18.0 |
8.1 |
18.0 |
8.1 |
5 |
21.0 |
9.5 |
21.0 |
9.5 |
6 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
7 |
41.6 |
24.1 |
27.0 |
12.2 |
8 |
87.3 |
46.9 |
36.0 |
5.0 |
9 |
54.7 |
27.5 |
32.0 |
9.0 |
10 |
128.3 |
88.5 |
26.0 |
5.0 |
11 |
135.8 |
96.4 |
30.0 |
10.0 |
12 |
119.9 |
86.6 |
15.0 |
1.0 |
13 |
72.2 |
60.9 |
11.0 |
11.0 |
14 |
89.5 |
65.3 |
23.0 |
11.0 |
15 |
44.4 |
30.5 |
18.0 |
9.0 |
16 |
51.8 |
41.8 |
14.0 |
11.0 |
17 |
29.9 |
12.3 |
16.0 |
1.0 |
18 |
94.8 |
62.7 |
18.0 |
0.0 |
19 |
94.9 |
73.0 |
14.0 |
7.0 |
20 |
104.7 |
79.1 |
20.0 |
10.0 |
21 |
111.6 |
84.4 |
18.0 |
8.0 |
22 |
122.3 |
90.6 |
26.0 |
12.0 |
23 |
64.8 |
49.8 |
16.0 |
10.0 |
24 |
10.2 |
7.2 |
10.0 |
7.0 |
24-hour mean concentration (µg/m³) |
65.6 |
45.0 |
20.3 |
8.0 |
24-hour mean concentration excluding background (µg/m³) |
45.4 |
37.0 |
Table 15: Modelled hourly PM10 and PM2.5 concentrations for Test Claimant 37, 17th June 2011
17/06/2011 |
Test Claimant 37 |
|||
Hour (hour ending BST) |
Modelled concentrations including background (µg/m³) |
Briery Hey background (µg/m³) |
||
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
|
1 |
26.0 |
10.0 |
26.0 |
10.0 |
2 |
22.0 |
18.0 |
22.0 |
18.0 |
3 |
20.0 |
10.0 |
20.0 |
10.0 |
4 |
24.0 |
7.0 |
24.0 |
7.0 |
5 |
24.0 |
12.0 |
24.0 |
12.0 |
6 |
27.0 |
12.0 |
27.0 |
12.0 |
7 |
31.0 |
11.3 |
27.0 |
8.0 |
8 |
23.5 |
7.2 |
22.0 |
6.0 |
9 |
31.2 |
17.9 |
24.0 |
12.0 |
10 |
41.1 |
17.9 |
40.0 |
17.0 |
11 |
32.7 |
13.2 |
30.0 |
11.0 |
12 |
85.6 |
11.3 |
84.0 |
10.0 |
13 |
44.0 |
12.8 |
43.0 |
12.0 |
14 |
81.7 |
15.2 |
79.0 |
13.0 |
15 |
64.7 |
6.4 |
63.0 |
5.0 |
16 |
100.9 |
13.7 |
100.0 |
13.0 |
17 |
27.5 |
6.0 |
25.0 |
4.0 |
18 |
21.5 |
8.3 |
20.0 |
7.0 |
19 |
17.8 |
2.6 |
17.0 |
2.0 |
20 |
18.3 |
12.7 |
15.0 |
10.0 |
21 |
28.0 |
13.1 |
18.0 |
5.0 |
22 |
27.3 |
13.6 |
18.0 |
6.0 |
23 |
31.6 |
21.8 |
22.0 |
14.0 |
24 |
31.6 |
32.8 |
22.0 |
25.0 |
24-hour mean concentration (µg/m³) |
36.8 |
12.8 |
33.8 |
10.4 |
24-hour mean concentration excluding background (µg/m³) |
3.0 |
2.4 |
Table 16: Modelled hourly PM10 and PM2.5 concentrations for Test Claimant 39, 10th June 2011
10/06/2011 |
Test Claimant 39 |
|||
Hour (hour ending BST) |
Modelled concentrations including background (µg/m³) |
Briery Hey background (µg/m³) |
||
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
|
1 |
16.0 |
5.0 |
16.0 |
5.0 |
2 |
16.0 |
10.0 |
16.0 |
10.0 |
3 |
18.0 |
1.0 |
18.0 |
1.0 |
4 |
17.0 |
8.0 |
17.0 |
8.0 |
5 |
20.0 |
5.0 |
20.0 |
5.0 |
6 |
35.5 |
12.7 |
31.0 |
9.0 |
7 |
22.0 |
8.0 |
22.0 |
8.0 |
8 |
30.1 |
6.1 |
30.0 |
6.0 |
9 |
26.4 |
1.3 |
26.0 |
1.0 |
10 |
28.0 |
11.0 |
28.0 |
11.0 |
11 |
19.0 |
11.5 |
11.0 |
5.0 |
12 |
12.0 |
8.0 |
12.0 |
8.0 |
13 |
15.0 |
6.8 |
15.0 |
6.8 |
14 |
6.0 |
2.7 |
6.0 |
2.7 |
15 |
17.0 |
7.7 |
17.0 |
7.7 |
16 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
17 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
18 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
19 |
3.0 |
1.4 |
3.0 |
1.4 |
20 |
7.0 |
3.2 |
7.0 |
3.2 |
21 |
13.0 |
5.9 |
13.0 |
5.9 |
22 |
9.0 |
4.1 |
9.0 |
4.1 |
23 |
5.0 |
2.3 |
5.0 |
2.3 |
24 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
19.0 |
8.6 |
24-hour mean concentration (µg/m³) |
17.2 |
6.5 |
16.6 |
6.1 |
24-hour mean concentration excluding background (µg/m³) |
0.5 |
0.4 |
Table 17: Modelled hourly PM10 and PM2.5 concentrations for Test Claimant 39, 12th June 2011
12/06/2011 |
Test Claimant 39 |
|||
Hour (hour ending BST) |
Modelled concentrations including background (µg/m³) |
Briery Hey background (µg/m³) |
||
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
|
1 |
16.0 |
7.2 |
16.0 |
7.2 |
2 |
21.0 |
9.5 |
21.0 |
9.5 |
3 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
4 |
18.0 |
8.1 |
18.0 |
8.1 |
5 |
21.0 |
9.5 |
21.0 |
9.5 |
6 |
21.2 |
10.0 |
20.0 |
9.0 |
7 |
27.0 |
12.2 |
27.0 |
12.1 |
8 |
36.0 |
5.0 |
36.0 |
5.0 |
9 |
32.0 |
9.0 |
32.0 |
9.0 |
10 |
27.0 |
5.8 |
26.0 |
5.0 |
11 |
31.8 |
11.5 |
30.0 |
10.0 |
12 |
19.5 |
4.7 |
15.0 |
1.0 |
13 |
11.1 |
11.1 |
11.0 |
11.0 |
14 |
23.3 |
11.2 |
23.0 |
11.0 |
15 |
18.0 |
9.0 |
18.0 |
9.0 |
16 |
14.0 |
11.0 |
14.0 |
11.0 |
17 |
16.0 |
1.0 |
16.0 |
1.0 |
18 |
18.7 |
0.5 |
18.0 |
0.0 |
19 |
20.9 |
12.6 |
14.0 |
7.0 |
20 |
21.2 |
11.0 |
20.0 |
10.0 |
21 |
20.1 |
9.7 |
18.0 |
8.0 |
22 |
29.7 |
15.0 |
26.0 |
12.0 |
23 |
32.3 |
23.3 |
16.0 |
10.0 |
24 |
24.5 |
18.9 |
10.0 |
7.0 |
24-hour mean concentration (µg/m³) |
22.5 |
9.8 |
20.2 |
8.0 |
24-hour mean concentration excluding background (µg/m³) |
2.3 |
1.9 |
Table 18: Modelled hourly PM10 and PM2.5 concentrations for Test Claimant 39, 17th June 2011
17/06/2011 |
Test Claimant 39 |
|||
Hour (hour ending BST) |
Modelled concentrations including background (µg/m³) |
Briery Hey background (µg/m³) |
||
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
PM10 |
PM2.5 |
|
1 |
26.0 |
10.0 |
26.0 |
10.0 |
2 |
22.0 |
18.0 |
22.0 |
18.0 |
3 |
25.0 |
14.1 |
20.0 |
10.0 |
4 |
24.1 |
7.1 |
24.0 |
7.0 |
5 |
24.0 |
12.0 |
24.0 |
12.0 |
6 |
27.3 |
12.3 |
27.0 |
12.0 |
7 |
28.8 |
9.5 |
27.0 |
8.0 |
8 |
23.6 |
7.3 |
22.0 |
6.0 |
9 |
24.2 |
12.2 |
24.0 |
12.0 |
10 |
41.1 |
17.9 |
40.0 |
17.0 |
11 |
31.0 |
11.8 |
30.0 |
11.0 |
12 |
85.0 |
10.9 |
84.0 |
10.0 |
13 |
44.0 |
12.8 |
43.0 |
12.0 |
14 |
80.0 |
13.8 |
79.0 |
13.0 |
15 |
64.0 |
5.8 |
63.0 |
5.0 |
16 |
101.0 |
13.8 |
100.0 |
13.0 |
17 |
26.0 |
4.8 |
25.0 |
4.0 |
18 |
21.3 |
8.1 |
20.0 |
7.0 |
19 |
18.5 |
3.2 |
17.0 |
2.0 |
20 |
16.5 |
11.2 |
15.0 |
10.0 |
21 |
18.2 |
5.2 |
18.0 |
5.0 |
22 |
18.6 |
6.5 |
18.0 |
6.0 |
23 |
22.1 |
14.1 |
22.0 |
14.0 |
24 |
22.2 |
25.2 |
22.0 |
25.0 |
24-hour mean concentration (µg/m³) |
34.8 |
11.2 |
33.8 |
10.4 |
24-hour mean concentration excluding background (µg/m³) |
0.9 |
0.8 |
Sonae GLO: Further Modelling
4. Histograms of modelled hourly concentrations for the 20 Test Claimants
i) Unit discharge concentrations with equivalent thresholds for acrolein and total aldehydes
This document presents time series of hourly average concentrations for a ‘unit discharge’ at the locations of the 20 Test Claimants.
The ‘unit discharge’ rate of 1 g/s is used for peak heat release rate of 358 MW, equivalent to an emission factor of 2.793 mg/s/MW. Since the emission factors for acrolein and total aldehydes are assumed to be constant throughout the lifetime of the fire, thresholds equivalent to the exceedence thresholds for these pollutants can be displayed on the unit discharge time series.
The equivalent thresholds are derived using the following formula:
unit discharge emission factor (2.793 mg/s/MW) |
x pollutant exceedence threshold (µg/m³) |
pollutant emission factor (mg/s/MW) |
The table below shows the equivalent thresholds for acrolein and total aldehydes based on emission factors of 114 mg/s/MW and 600 mg/s/MW, respectively. These equivalent threshold values are also shown in the following 23 time series histograms for the locations of the 20 Test Claimants.
Pollutant |
Emission Factor (mg/s/MW) |
Pollutant exceedence threshold (µg/m³) |
Equivalent threshold for unit discharge modelling (µg/m³) |
Acrolein |
114 |
0.38 (odour threshold) |
0.0093 |
146 (health threshold) |
3.577 |
||
Total aldehydes |
600 |
500 |
2.328 |
Sonae GLO: Further Modelling
4a. Histograms of modelled hourly concentrations for the 20 Test Claimants
ii) Unit discharge concentrations showing only the equivalent threshold for the acrolein odour threshold
This document presents time series of hourly average concentrations for a ‘unit discharge’ at the locations of the 20 Test Claimants.
Since the maximum modelled hourly unit discharge concentration across the Test Claimant locations is 0.29 µg/m³, the 23 histograms shown in Document 4 are presented again in this document with a larger scale on the ‘y’ axis (maximum concentration is set to 0.3 µg/m³). Consequently only the equivalent threshold for the acrolein odour threshold of 0.38 µg/m³ (equivalent to a unit discharge concentration of 0.0093 µg/m³) can be shown on these histograms.
Sonae GLO: Further Modelling
5. Histograms of modelled hourly concentrations for the 20 Test Claimants
iii) Modelled PM2.5 concentrations compared against the COMEAP High trigger value of 74 µg/m³
The 23 time series histograms in this document show modelled hourly average concentrations of PM2.5 at the locations of the 20 Test Claimants. Modelled concentrations include the modelled contribution from the fire and background concentrations using measurements from the Briery Hey monitoring site.
The PM2.5 measurements from Briery Hey contain a 43-hour period between the 10th June 2011 and 12th June 2011 where no PM2.5 data are recorded. For this period, PM2.5 concentrations have been estimated from PM10 concentrations assuming a PM2.5/PM10 ratio of 0.45. This ratio is based on the ratio of mean PM2.5 and PM10 concentrations over the period of the fire where both PM10 and PM2.5 concentrations are recorded at Briery Hey.
This methodology for estimating PM2.5 concentrations for the period of missing data was agreed between CERC and Envirobods
Sonae GLO: Further Modelling
Modelled PM10 concentrations compared against the COMEAP High trigger value of 107 µg/m³
The 23 time series histograms in this document show modelled hourly average concentrations of PM10 at the locations of the 20 Test Claimants. Modelled concentrations include the modelled contribution from the fire and background concentrations using measurements from the Briery Hey monitoring site.
[1] A contour map is produced interpolating changes in values in between the model output points. This calculation cannot be performed by the contouring software if all the output points are equal.