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England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions
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Cite as:  EWHC 468 (QB)
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
(Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the Queen's Bench Division)
| MARTIN GLENN
|- and -
The Defendant did not appear and was not represented
Hearing date: 9 February 2021
Crown Copyright ©
Covid-19 Protocol: This judgment was handed down remotely by circulation to the parties' representatives by way of e-mail and by release to BAILII. The date and time for hand down will be deemed to be 10:30am on Friday, 5 March 2021
Richard Spearman Q.C.:
Introduction and nature of the hearing
"When I first commenced these proceedings, I limited the amount claimed on the Claim Form to £25,000. The motivation for these proceedings has never been financial and so I elected to keep the relevant Court fee at a lower level despite the fact I was aware that the level of damages might be considerably higher. However, since the Claim Form was issued, Mr Kline has continued to exhibit contempt for my rights and feelings, and an unwillingness to cease his actions. I have therefore come to the conclusion that it is important that the damages award is sufficiently substantial in order to mark the gravity of the wrong done to me and properly to vindicate my reputation, as well as to compensate me for damage to my reputation and feelings. I need to be able to point to the size of the damages award should I ever need to explain the matter in future, as indicating that these serious allegations were without any foundation. I therefore respectfully ask the Court to grant me permission to amend my Claim Form to increase the damages claimed to £100,000. If permission is granted, I will undertake to pay the additional court fee appropriate to the sum claimed."
"1. The Claimant used his role as a key regulator in football actively to protect, facilitate and cover up fraud and money laundering within football, which was carried out by organised crime networks using football recruitment networks.
2. The Claimant is aware of fraud and criminal activity in the football industry, but rather than attempting to stop it actively facilitates that criminal activity.
3. The Claimant:a. corruptly facilitated and enabled criminal activity within football; and
b. sought to protect crime rings and to punish whistleblowers including the Defendant; specifically, when the Defendant had rightly denounced him as a criminal, the Claimant had tried to silence the Defendant with threats of legal action; and
c. only resigned from being CEO of The FA in order to avoid the Defendant exposing his (the Claimant's) guilt to investigators looking into his corrupt activities.
4. The Claimant is part of an international criminal conspiracy that permits organised crime to run English football, and to cover up child abuse, racism, fraud, money laundering, misogyny and fraudulent science; and that he delayed his departure date from The FA in order to ensure that his corruption was covered up.
5. The Claimant is a criminal who has enabled fraud and has negotiated a corrupt deal to pay players large bonuses.
6. The Claimant helped to facilitate criminal money laundering by Will Salthouse, a football agent representing Harry Kane.
7. The Claimant protects or covers up fraud and money laundering in football and, in order to protect this criminal activity, ensures that investigations into racism and child abuse in football are shut down.8. The Claimant:
a. ensures that paedophile rings and racists can freely operate within football, by using his position actively to protect them; and/or
b. is a criminal who accepts bribes from other criminals to cover up fraud, child endangerment, racism, money laundering and corruption; and has also accepted a bribe to sell off Wembley Stadium to criminals at half-price; and/or
c. conspired and worked closely with money launderers within football; and/or
d. for years stopped the Defendant reporting on his (the Claimant's) criminal activities; and/or
e. resigned the day after the Defendant had a meeting with The FA in order to prevent the truth as to his (the Claimant's) criminal activities coming out; and/or
f. instructed his solicitors to threaten the Defendant with baseless legal action in order to prevent the Defendant revealing the truth about him; and/or
g. has made these threats against the Defendant despite knowing that he (the Claimant) will never in fact sue because he does not want a court to investigate his criminal activities.
9. The Claimant is a proven criminal who:a. protects and covers up paedophile rings operating within the upper circles of the management of football;
b. pushed through a fraudulent sale of Wembley stadium;
c. conspired with organised crime groups to promote corruption, health science fraud, racism, child abuse, paedophilia, and violence in football;
d. deliberately silenced whistleblowers, including the Defendant, who might have revealed his involvement in criminal activities; and
e. as a result of his paedophile sympathies, is not a safe person to work with children.
10. The Claimant has used his solicitors to try to gag the Defendant and prevent him from disclosing the Claimant's fraudulent deal involving Wembley stadium.
11. The Claimant was involved in a conspiracy with the members of the Department of Culture, Media and Sport to facilitate criminal activities."
"(3) Where a party does not attend and the court gives judgment or makes an order against him, the party who failed to attend may apply for the judgment or order to be set aside.
(4) An application under paragraph (2) or paragraph (3) must be supported by evidence.
(5) Where an application is made under paragraph … (3) by a party who failed to attend the trial, the court may grant the application only if the applicant –
(a) acted promptly when he found out that the court had exercised its power to strike out or to enter judgment or make an order against him;(b) had a good reason for not attending the trial; and(c) has a reasonable prospect of success at the trial."
"If the person against whom the application for relief is made ("the respondent") is neither present nor represented, no such relief is to be granted unless the court is satisfied –
(a) that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent; or(b) that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified."
"I took a two-stage approach, considering (1) whether the defendant had received proper notice of the hearing and the matters to be considered at the hearing; (2) if so, whether the available evidence as to the reasons for the litigant's non-appearance supplied a reason for adjourning the hearing. I considered it necessary to bear in mind that the effect of s.12(2) is to prohibit the Court from granting relief that 'if granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression' unless the respondent is present or represented or the Court is satisfied that '(a) the applicant has taken all reasonable steps to notify the respondent; or (b) that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified'."
"How many days in a row do I need to publicly state that Martin Glenn is a criminal who intentionally enables child abuse?
I told nearly every reported (sic) in uk yesterday. Will you pedophile protectors sue yet?
I'll continue telling every major reporter in western world. I'll tell dan roan when we speak today.
How can I get you guys to sue me?
I'll send you an email later today with me simply reminding western press that Martin Glenn enables crime and covers up child sex abuse matters…"
i) corruptly facilitated, and accepted bribes to cover-up and protect, fraud and money-laundering within football which was carried out by organised crime networks;
ii) was part of an international criminal conspiracy that permits organised crime to run English football and covered up the sexual abuse of children, racism, fraud, money-laundering and misogyny;
iii) had pushed through a fraudulent sale of Wembley stadium;
iv) sought to punish, bully and silence whistle-blowers like the Defendant to avoid exposure of his corrupt activities; and
v) had delayed his departure from the FA to ensure that his corruption was covered up.
Amendment of the Claim Form
The publications complained of – part 1
The claim for harassment alone
"54. Damages for harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 are to compensate a claimant for distress and injury to feelings, see ZAM v CFW & Anor  EMLR 27 . As I have noted, an award under this head overlaps with that element of compensation that is a constituent part of an award for libel damages.
55. So far as assessment of harassment damages is concerned there are established guidelines taken from employment discrimination cases, see Barkhuysen v Hamilton  QB 1015 :
'Guidelines for damages in harassment were given by the Court of Appeal in Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Vento (No2)  ICR 318. The court identified three broad bands for compensation for injured feelings: a top band for very serious cases, a middle band for moderately serious cases and a third band for less serious cases, such as isolated or one-off occurrences. Only in the most exceptional cases, it was said, would it be appropriate to award more than the top band and awards of less than £500 were to be avoided as they risked appearing derisory. Again, adjustment for inflation is required. The former adjustment was made by the Employment Appeal tribunal in 2009 in Da'Bell v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children  IRLR 19. Inflation since then has been some 20%, leading to a range in band 3 of up to £7,200, a middle band from £7,200 to £21,600 and a top band from £21,600 to £36,000. A Simmons v Castle adjustment is also required.'
56. The Vento bands, as they are called, have since been increased again: see paragraph 10 of The Employment Tribunal's Presidential Guidance of 5 September 2017:
'A lower band of £800 to £8,400 (the less serious cases), a middle band of £8,400 to £25,200 (cases that do not merit an award in the upper band) and an upper band of £25,200 to £42,000 (the most serious cases), with the most exceptional cases capable of exceeding £42,000.'"
"I consider that the following particular elements of the harassment, separate from the harassing element in the defamatory nature of the publications themselves, have an impact on the seriousness of the harassment and to the assessment of damages:
a. The campaign was clearly and deliberately targeted by the Defendant at the Claimant via Facebook. The foreseeable response to it was vicious and frightening; it was calculated to (and did) whip up hatred for the Claimant and to put her in fear for her safety.b. The campaign was relentless over a period of three to four weeks and I am satisfied, on the evidence, that has had a lasting adverse effect on the Claimant.c. The use of a Facebook group was deliberately to recruit others to 'gang up' on the Claimant, whilst the Defendant and some of the commentators who chose to post comments on the page hid behind online anonymity. This is a hallmark of 'cyber bullying'. It is a particularly pernicious form of harassment because the victim may well feel constantly under siege and powerless to stop it."
The publications complained of – part 2
"I would like to discuss with you Martin Glenn's criminal career- how it is specifically that he protects and works with organized crime in football to further corruption, health science fraud, racism, child abuse, pedophilia, violence in the sport, etc.
Please get back to me willing to discuss my allegations and the proof that l have. Martin Glenn is still working with an organized crime network - most specifically on pushing the Wembley sale to faciliate an NFL move to London- but also to protected organized crime figures and pedophiles who opearte in the upper circles of football.
I am probably one of the only former executives in UK football who has (1)worked at a high level as an executive in football and (2) has brought allegation, to your organization, regarding child abuse, pedophilia, money laundering, corruption, bribes, and the like in football. Please don't ignore me your organization has made a very dubious decision to hire Martin Glenn: it will not last, this decision will come under review, I am aware of where various investigations currently stand. Please respond and do not hide from allegations that you have hired a person who protects pedophilia & money laundering rings."
"I write to you today because I see the Football Foundation has hired Martin Glenn. He is a criminal who protects child abuse networks - every exec or owner I worked with our knew in football operate under a 'no reporting anything' protocol because they know that any serious investigation into football clubs due to child abuse or racism will also reveal major crime and -critically- will end the specific money laundering network … that the major owners have used over the past several decades for laundering & bribes. Can't clean up child abuse academies and racist coaches, scouts & execs without stumbling across the major fraud & money laundering networks in football: so no one is cleaning up the clubs.
Martin Glenn very specifically tries to silence whistleblowers. He did so with … myself and many others. When I was trying to tell the FA council about the money laundering/child abuse ring pushing for the Wembley sale 'so they could benefit kids,' Martin Glenn threatened to sue me if continued speaking out. I knew that none of these criminals would risk court so I continued to speak out. He announced his resignation the very first day that I met with FA investigators to look into Glenn's crime. However, FA investigators refused to meet with me after that 1 day discussion (we had scheduled 3 days), & then shut down the investigation.
Now Martin Glenn has been hired by the Football Foundation- which has control and access to children. He will still be prioritizing crime, money laundering, & protecting organized crime in football: while kids, minorities, etc suffer. He is a cover up artist who operates as part of the organized crime network in football. But who can an exec even report to? … Would you please get back to me and let me know how I can get a proper investigation? … I am not naïve enough to think the House of Lords doesn't realize that it is allowing child abuse, racism, health science fraud, money laundering, pedophile rings, etc to dominate football without making a serious investigation: all at the House of Lords surely know that they have so far done almost nothing to help clean up the sport.
Please be responsive, I have evidence - l just need good faith regulators to stop engaging in covering up money laundering & pedophile rings."
"I witnessed the FA take bribe money from criminals to set up the Wembley deal and to quash my reporting. From 2015-2017, [various persons] directed money, or promised funds, to Martin Glenn [and others], in exchange for their cooperation in criminal schemes. The money directed to Glenn was simply the purchase money for Wembley, which Glenn has a free hand to distribute (through the Football Foundation, which he now runs). Please note that one day after I met with investigator Mark Davison to explain the fraud I saw, Martin Glenn announced his resignation the very next day and refused to meet with me again (despite having rented a room for 3 days and having arranged 3 days of meetings with me). Glenn then moved over to the Football Foundation, where he is now positioned to hand out the Wembley funds if the deal goes through (it is still on in the background, the FA will only sell to an NFL owner). [Various persons] had set up the Wembley deal to be purchased at half price. I was privy to the real valuations of Wembley which is 1.6 billion. But various bribe schemes were set up, including how the Wembley proceeds would be paid out, such that the FA and other parties were chomping at the bit to sell Wembley at half price. Martin Glenn at the FA was the main criminal operating this scheme, however other FA officials also got involved in different ways."
The claim for defamation
"20. The general principles were reviewed and re-stated by the Court of Appeal in John v MGN Ltd  QB 586. A jury had awarded Elton John compensatory damages of £75,000 and exemplary damages of £275,000 for libel in an article that suggested he had bulimia. The awards were held to be excessive and reduced to £25,000 and £50,000 respectively. Sir Thomas Bingham MR summarised the key principles at pages 607 – 608 in the following words:
'The successful plaintiff in a defamation action is entitled to recover, as general compensatory damages, such sum as will compensate him for the wrong he has suffered. That sum must  compensate him for the damage to his reputation;  vindicate his good name; and  take account of the distress, hurt and humiliation which the defamatory publication has caused. In assessing the appropriate damages for injury to reputation the most important factor is [a] the gravity of the libel; the more closely it touches the plaintiff's personal integrity, professional reputation, honour, courage, loyalty and the core attributes of his personality, the more serious it is likely to be. [b] The extent of publication is also very relevant: a libel published to millions has a greater potential to cause damage than a libel published to a handful of people. [c] A successful plaintiff may properly look to an award of damages to vindicate his reputation: but the significance of this is much greater in a case where the defendant asserts the truth of the libel and refuses any retraction or apology than in a case where the defendant acknowledges the falsity of what was published and publicly expresses regret that the libellous publication took place. It is well established that [d] compensatory damages may and should compensate for additional injury caused to the plaintiff's feelings by the defendant's conduct of the action, as when he persists in an unfounded assertion that the publication was true, or refuses to apologise, or cross-examines the plaintiff in a wounding or insulting way. Although the plaintiff has been referred to as "he" all this of course applies to women just as much as men.'
21. I have added the numbering in this passage, which identifies the three distinct functions performed by an award of damages for libel. I have added the lettering also to identify, for ease of reference, the factors listed by Sir Thomas Bingham. Some additional points may be made which are relevant in this case:
(1) The initial measure of damages is the amount that would restore the claimant to the position he would have enjoyed had he not been defamed: Steel and Morris v United Kingdom (2004) 41 EHRR , .
(2) The existence and scale of any harm to reputation may be established by evidence or inferred. Often, the process is one of inference, but evidence that tends to show that as a matter of fact a person was shunned, avoided, or taunted will be relevant. So may evidence that a person was treated as well or better by others after the libel than before it.
(3) The impact of a libel on a person's reputation can be affected by:
a) Their role in society. The libel of Esther Rantzen was more damaging because she was a prominent child protection campaigner.
b) The extent to which the publisher(s) of the defamatory imputation are authoritative and credible. The person making the allegations may be someone apparently well-placed to know the facts, or they may appear to be an unreliable source.
c) The identities of the publishees. Publication of a libel to family, friends or work colleagues may be more harmful and hurtful than if it is circulated amongst strangers. On the other hand, those close to a claimant may have knowledge or viewpoints that make them less likely to believe what is alleged.
d) The propensity of defamatory statements to percolate through underground channels and contaminate hidden springs, a problem made worse by the internet and social networking sites, particularly for claimants in the public eye: C v MGN Ltd (reported with Cairns v Modi at  1 WLR 1051) .
(4) It is often said that damages may be aggravated if the defendant acts maliciously. The harm for which compensation would be due in that event is injury to feelings.
(5) A person who has been libelled is compensated only for injury to the reputation they actually had at the time of publication. If it is shown that the person already had a bad reputation in the relevant sector of their life, that will reduce the harm, and therefore moderate any damages. But it is not permissible to seek, in mitigation of damages, to prove specific acts of misconduct by the claimant, or rumours or reports to the effect that he has done the things alleged in the libel complained of: Scott v Sampson (1882) QBD 491, on which I will expand a little. Attempts to achieve this may aggravate damages, in line with factor (d) in Sir Thomas Bingham's list.
(6) Factors other than bad reputation that may moderate or mitigate damages, on some of which I will also elaborate below, include the following:
a) "Directly relevant background context" within the meaning of Burstein v Times Newspapers Ltd  1 WLR 579 and subsequent authorities. This may qualify the rules at (5) above.
b) Publications by others to the same effect as the libel complained of if (but only if) the claimants have sued over these in another defamation claim, or if it is necessary to consider them in order to isolate the damage caused by the publication complained of.
c) An offer of amends pursuant to the Defamation Act 1996.
d) A reasoned judgment, though the impact of this will vary according to the facts and nature of the case.
(7) In arriving at a figure it is proper to have regard to (a) Jury awards approved by the Court of Appeal: Rantzen 694, John, 612; (b) the scale of damages awarded in personal injury actions: John, 615; (c) previous awards by a judge sitting without a jury: see John 608.
(8) Any award needs to be no more than is justified by the legitimate aim of protecting reputation, necessary in a democratic society in pursuit of that aim, and proportionate to that need: Rantzen v Mirror Group Newspapers (1986) Ltd  QB 670. This limit is nowadays statutory, via the Human Rights Act 1998."
Discussion and conclusion
(1) In Cairns v Modi  1 WLR 1015, the Court of Appeal upheld an award of £75,000 (plus a £15,000 uplift for the way in which the proceedings had been conducted on the defendant's behalf) to a claimant who was accused of match-fixing in a tweet sent to about 65 people (albeit "almost certainly" comprising a "specialist [readership], consisting of those with a particular interest in cricket" - see Lord Judge CJ at ).
(2) ZAM v CFW & TFW  EWHC 662 (QB);  EMLR 27, discussed above.
(3) In Barron & Healey v Vines  EWHC 1226 (QB), Warby J awarded damages of £40,000 each to two Members of Parliament who had been accused of standing by and doing nothing when aware of large-scale sexual abuse of children in their constituencies, and of failing to ensure that the perpetrators were brought to justice, in a live television broadcast which would have been viewed by hundreds of thousands, and which would have percolated more widely.
(4) In Monroe v Hopkins  4 WLR 68, Warby J awarded £24,000 to a claimant who was accused, in tweets which were posted to tens of thousands of publishees, of condoning and approving of scrawling on war memorials and monuments.
(5) In Doyle v Smith  EMLR 19, Warby J awarded damages in the sum of £30,000 in respect of an article published on a "village news" website which had 242 views, and which alleged that there was very good reason to believe that the claimant had been guilty of participation in an attempt to defraud members of a rugby club of many millions of pounds.
(6) In Fentiman v Marsh  EWHC 2099, I awarded damages of £55,000 (made up of a basic award of £45,000 and £10,000 for aggravation) in respect of allegations that the claimant was a computer-hacker responsible for illegal cyber-attacks on a company, made by blog posts read by about 500 people, which had deeply troubled people who were close to the claimant and who had previously trusted and admired him. In that case, the allegations were particularly harmful to the claimant in view of those to whom they were published, and there was actual evidence of specific harm.
The application under s12
"(1) Where a court gives judgment for the claimant in an action for defamation the court may order the defendant to publish a summary of the judgment.
(2) The wording of any summary and the time, manner, form and place of its publication are to be for the parties to agree.
(3) If the parties cannot agree on the wording, the wording is to be settled by the court.
(4) If the parties cannot agree on the time, manner, form or place of publication, the court may give such directions as to those matters as it considers reasonable and practicable in the circumstances.
(5) This section does not apply where the court gives judgment for the claimant under section 8(3) of the Defamation Act 1996 (summary disposal of claims)."
"239. The purpose of this section is to provide a remedy that will assist the claimant in repairing the damage to his reputation and obtaining vindication. Orders under the section are not to be made as any sort of punishment of the defendant.
240. Orders under s.12 are discretionary both as to whether to order the publication of a summary and (if the parties do not agree) in what terms and where. Exercising the power to require a defendant to publish a summary of the Court's judgment is an interference with the defendant's Article 10 right. As such, the interference must be justified. The interference may be capable of being justified in pursuit of the legitimate aim of "the protection of the reputation or rights of others". Whether an order under this section can achieve this aim will be a matter of fact in each case. If the interference represented by a s.12 order is justified, then the Court would then consider whether (if the parties agree) the terms of the summary to be published is proportionate. The Court should only make an order that the defendant publish a summary of the Court's judgment if there is a realistic prospect that one or other of these objectives will be realised and that the publication of a summary is necessary and proportionate to these objectives.
241. There is an obvious purpose, in an appropriate case, for ordering a newspaper to publish a summary of the judgment because there is a realistic basis on which to conclude that the published summary will come to the attention of at least some of those who read the original libel and others who may have learned about the allegation via the "grapevine" effect. In a smaller scale publication, where it is possible for the original publishees (or at least a substantial number of them) to be identified, again an order requiring the publication to them of a summary of the judgment may well help realise the objectives underpinning s.12. Each case will depend upon its own facts. If the defendant has already published a retraction and apology then, depending upon its terms, that may mean that an order under s.12 is not justifiable or required. The claimant will be able to point to that to assist in his vindication or repair to his reputation."