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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> English and Welsh Courts - Miscellaneous >> Birmingham City Council v Mondhlani [2015] EW Misc B41 (CC) (06 November 2015) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/Misc/2015/B41.html Cite as: [2015] EW Misc B41 (CC) |
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BIRMINGHAM
B e f o r e :
____________________
BIRMINGHAM CITY COUNCIL![]() |
Claimant |
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| - and - |
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MR C AND MRS S MONDHLANI![]() |
Defendants |
____________________
Birmingham City Council
Legal Department) for the Claimant
Mr Andrew Byles (instructed by The Community Law Partnership) for the Defendants
Hearing dates: 30th October 2015
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
District Judge Salmon :
Introduction
Birmingham City Council
who wants to transfer to the High Court the enforcement of many of its County Court residential possession orders. It has entered into contractual arrangements with Marston Group Limited who engages the services of High Court Enforcement Officers on behalf of their clients. Applications for transfer are made by
Birmingham City Council
itself but if transfer is granted the remaining steps including the obtaining of a writ of possession are handled by Malcolm Butler and Co a firm of solicitors who act for
Birmingham City Council
's agents, Marston Group Limited. Malcolm Butler and Cooperate from Marston Group Limited's premises in
Birmingham
.
Birmingham City Council
issues all its possession claims in the County Court. Whilst it is possible to issue such claims in the High Court, if a landlord does so it is not entitled to its costs (see section 110(3) of the Housing Act 1985). The enforcement of possession orders normally takes place in the County Court.
Birmingham
there is a serious backlog of cases and a limited number of bailiffs. This means that from the issue of a warrant of possession to the eviction being carried out can be up to 12 weeks. Counsel for the Defendants told me that for most other parts of the country the period is 2-3 weeks.
Birmingham City Council
believe that there would be substantial advantages to the management of its social housing stock if it were able to transfer proceedings to the High Court for enforcement and engage High Court Enforcement Officers to execute writs of possession. The key perceived advantage is that enforcement in the High Court makes the process of eviction quicker. There are also other significant advantages arising from the greater degree of flexibility available to
Birmingham City Council
if it is enforcing a possession order under a writ of possession and has engaged High Court Enforcement Officers.
Birmingham City Council
on 10th March 2015 that I assume endorsed the pilot scheme.
(a) If the time from warrant/writ to eviction is shorter then it reduces the potential for lost revenue and also allows for housing stock to be re let to tenants on the waiting list. The waiting list is over 13,000 and includes 2,200 homeless persons. The acuteness of the issue is illustrated by the fact thatBirmingham City Council
issues 1,500 applications for warrants of possession each year and anticipates this number is likely to rise given changes to welfare benefits brought in by this and the previous government.
(b) Writs of possession do not expire after 12 months.
(c) A High Court Enforcement Officer, on instructions fromBirmingham City Council
, can agree to postpone enforcement on terms. A bailiff will only cancel an eviction of their own accord if all of the rent arrears are paid.
Birmingham City Council
can instruct the bailiff not to enforce the possession order. If it does so because it is prepared to accept an agreement in respect of arrears and, having cancelled the eviction, that agreement is broken, it has to apply again for a warrant with another delay of 12 weeks. If there was a writ of possession and its execution had been postponed for these reasons and the agreement was broken
Birmingham City Council
could instruct the High Court Enforcement Officer to enforce it.
This Case
Birmingham City Council
. Since 21st February 2005 they have been secure tenants at 66 Jiggins Lane,
Birmingham
("the property"). It is a 5-bedroom property. They live there with their 14 year old daughter.
Birmingham City Council
requested a warrant of possession as the terms of suspension had been broken. A warrant was issued that day and a date for eviction was fixed for 12th October 2011. An application was made by the Defendants to suspend the warrant of possession on 3rd October 2011. District Judge Sheldrake on 7th October 2011 adjourned the application for suspension until 7th December 2011 and suspended the warrant until that hearing. On 7th December 2011 District Judge Dowding (as she then was) adjourned the application again and suspended the warrant to the next hearing. The reason behind this adjournment related to housing benefit issues. On 30th January 2012 District Judge Bull (at a hearing the Defendants did not attend) dismissed their application to suspend the warrant. The judge's notes of this hearing show he was told that the Defendants were failing to make payments in respect of a non dependent adult child who then lived in the property and were not cooperating with Housing Officers of the
Council
.
Birmingham City Council
applied to re issue the warrant of possession and a date for eviction was set for 26th March 2012. On 22nd March 2012 the Defendants made an application to suspend the warrant. Deputy District Judge Hammersley suspended the warrant of possession on terms that the arrears - which were at that hearing £692.36 - be paid off at £5 per week in addition to the current rent. The terms of suspending the warrant were not complied with. A fresh application was made for a warrant of possession with an eviction date of 17th March 2014. On 12th March 2014 the First Defendant applied to suspend that warrant of possession. On 13th March 2014 District Judge Maughan suspended the warrant of possession on terms that the arrears of £1,601.40 be paid off by a lump sum payment of £500 and the remaining arrears be thereafter paid off at £62.85 per month in addition to the current rent. On 15th September 2014
Birmingham City Council
made a request to the Court to re issue a warrant of possession as the terms suspending the operation of the warrant had been breached. The warrant was re issued and a notice of eviction sent to the Defendants with a date of 1st October 2014. On 30th September 2014 District Judge Bull suspended the warrant of possession on terms that the arrears of £1,669.44 were paid at £23.22 per week in addition to current rent. This warrant of possession cannot now be re issued as warrants of possession in the County Court have a 12 month shelf-life (see CPR83.3(3)).
Birmingham City Council
did not, as they could have done, request a re issue of a warrant of possession. Instead in accordance with their pilot scheme, it issued an application on 21st July 2015 asking the Court to make an order pursuant to section 42 of the County Courts Act 1984 to transfer the proceedings to the High Court for the purpose of enforcement. Perhaps surprisingly the application notice asked the judge to deal with the application without service of the application and without a hearing. The application was referred to District Judge Bull by the Court staff. He ordered that it be listed for a hearing on 4th September 2015 and ordered
Birmingham City Council
to file a skeleton argument setting down the principles the Court should apply in considering the application. The First Defendant says he received the application around the week of 17th or 24th August 2015.
Birmingham City Council
(limited to obtaining a surveyor's report).
Birmingham City Council
's skeleton argument a copy of which was provided to Mr Bains.
Birmingham City Council
withdrew all their other applications for transfer to the High Court save for three cases. I adjourned two of these applications, as it transpired that the tenants not been served with the applications. This left the Defendants case and one other.
Birmingham City Council
to adjourn the matter to be heard by the Designated Civil Judge and adjourned the hearing of the Claimant's application to transfer and the other case to Friday 30th October 2015. Unfortunately neither Counsel who appeared for the Defendants that day nor I made any reference to the application to add a counterclaim which had not been served.
Birmingham City Council
's solicitor giving oral evidence in respect of any factual matters relied upon by them in opposition to the application.
Birmingham City Council
along with the Defendant's application dated 12th October 2015 and also oral evidence by Miss Bello a solicitor from
Birmingham City Council
in response to the application. During the course of the hearing an issue arose in respect of the procedures adopted by the
Council
in other cases that fellow judges have transferred to the High Court. I heard some additional oral evidence in respect of those cases and also on what the position of the
Council
would be if this case were transferred to the High Court. I allowed Counsel for the Defendants to cross- examine Miss Bello. I became clear that her understanding about matters in respect of other cases was based on what she had been told by others and was somewhat vague. As is set out later in this judgment, what has been occurring in other cases is of wider significance and so I had the fullest picture I ordered that
Birmingham City Council
provide the Court with a witness statement with regard to this. I received a statement from Mr David Fearn dated 2nd November 2015.
The Application to add a Counterclaim
(a) In June 2014 a radiator in one of the bedrooms was removed by theCouncil
in order to carry out some repairs. It is said that it has not been replaced despite repeated requests to the
Council
.
(b) There is mould and dampness in another bedroom and this was reported to theCouncil
in January 2015 by telephone. The 1st Defendant cannot remember to whom he spoke. Although in relation to the radiator the First Defendant made repeated complaints despite no one coming out to investigate the mould and dampness he does not allege he ever repeated this complaint.
(c) It is alleged that the back door needs replacing as it has become warped due to unspecified water damage. It is said it has been damaged for 2-3 years and has been reported to theCouncil
over the telephone claims line. It is acknowledged that the
Council
have attempted to repair the door but it is alleged the repairs were insufficient.
(a) A job was raised in April 2014 that included the need to remove the radiator. Following the completion of those works (I was not given a precise date) on four occasions from 11th July 2014 to 28th August 2014, unsuccessful attempts were made to gain access to the property. A note on the computer system shows that on 24th December 2014 theCouncil
noted that the radiator still needed to be replaced and the system shows it was replaced on 29th January 2015.
(b) There were reports to theCouncil
in September 2012 logged as condensation dampness affecting a number of rooms including a front bedroom and the bathroom. On 8th October 2012 an extractor fan was fitted in the bathroom. There are no other logged reports concerning mould or dampness.
(c) (c) There was a report of water damage to an external door on 7th October 2009 and that was fixed on 8th October 2009. There are no other logged reports in respect of external doors. The computer records do however show that due to a failure by the Defendants to be present at the property so that the mandatory yearly gas inspection could take place theCouncil
have on 3 occasions had to force entry to the property to carry out the inspections.
(d) The computerised records, that a member of the Housing Team interrogated to give her the above information, do record telephone complaints made in respect of disrepair and that those receiving telephone complaints are required to log them.
(a) The application notice should be filed together with a copy of the proposed additional claim (see paragraph 1.2 of PD20).
(b) Where delay has been a factor contributing to the need to apply for permission then an explanation of the delay should be given in evidence (see paragraph 2.2 of PD20).
(a) The Defendants have experienced solicitors acting for them. Following amendments made to the overriding objective since the Jackson reforms, dealing with cases justly and at proportionate cost includes so far as is practicable enforcing compliance with Court practice directions.
(b) The failure to provide the proposed pleading is fundamental. In particular in this case the potentially most serious allegation of damp and mould is not supported by any evidence as to why this would be actionable under the implied repairing covenant under section 11 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985. Mould and dampness can arise due to disrepair in the structure of a building (and any damp or mould present may itself cause damage to the structure) but equally mould and dampness not giving rise to structural damage can arise from non-actionable causes such as condensation.
(c) The application was made in October 2015 when the alleged causes of action arose some time ago. No explanation for the delay has been provided.
(d) The merits of the proposed Counterclaim are poor. TheCouncil
's computer records are detailed and do not support the Defendants' case on notice or in respect of the alleged missing radiator. The application was not supported by an expert surveyor's report. Counsel asked me to infer that in effect the application was an abusive tactical move by the Defendants to prevent transfer to the High Court and/or eviction.
(a) The material provided in support of the application raised an arguable claim for damages for disrepair,
(b) The potential damages would be in the region of £1,000 to £1,500 and would substantially extinguish the rent arrears.
(c) I should take judicial notice of the fact that the reason that an application for a Counterclaim had not been made earlier was because the Defendants had been acting in person without the benefit of legal advice.
(d) That I should exercise my discretion under CPR20.4 and permit a Counterclaim to be brought despite the procedural deficiencies in the application as to do so would be just and proportionate and in accordance with the overriding objective and that delay of itself was not the determinative factor where a fair trial of the Counterclaim could take place,
v
- Sterling Credit [2001] 1 WLR 496 and a decision of His Honour Judge Grant in Midland Heart Limited -
v
- Makkedah Idawah (unreported but available via Westlaw) in July 2014.
"..The real question is whether the action is at an end, so that there are no longer any proceedings by the claimant to which the defendant can respond with a Counterclaim. This action is not at an end. Mr Rahman and his wife are still living in the property. Sterling continues to accept monthly instalments. Sterling has not yet obtained possession of the property. It cannot do so without a further application to the Court for a warrant of execution, the existing one having expired at the end of 12 months and more than six years has elapsed since the possession order was made: CCR Ord 26, r 5(i)(a) and Hackney London BoroughCouncil
![]()
v
White (1995) 28 HLR 219. Although judgment for possession has been obtained, it has not been satisfied and it cannot be satisfied without a further application to the Court for a warrant of execution. Such an application would be proceedings to enforce the security relating to the credit bargain within the meaning of section 139(1)(b)...."
"...As for delay in raising the Counterclaim I would not regard this alone as a reason for refusing permission ...."
Birmingham
). District Judge Williams on 6th February 2014 heard an application to suspend the warrant of possession and an application dated 20th January 2014 to add a Counterclaim. Prior to the issue of the application the tenant's solicitors had intimated a claim in January 2013 supported by an expert report from Mr Wheeler dated 28th November 2012.
Discussion
Birmingham City Council
that as the practical effect of allowing a Counterclaim was that the claim would remain in the County Court the bringing of the application in the circumstances of this case was merely a device to thwart the
Council
and therefore an abuse of the process of the Court. In my judgment the bringing of this application in the circumstances of this case cannot be said to be such a manipulation of the Court process so as to be abusive in its own right and meaning that I should dismiss the application on this ground alone (see commentary in White Book 3.4.3).
Council
about disrepair and, I assume, hoping that it would be rectified and (c) the Defendants could not afford to bring proceedings without the assistance of legal aid.
Birmingham City Council
continuing to seek to enforce their possession order and money judgment. No issue of set off arises in circumstances such as these, as a set off has to be pleaded in a defence to a claim for rent arrears. This is of course no longer possible, there having been judgment in favour of
Birmingham City Council
(see CPR 16.6 and the discussion paragraphs 11 to 16 of His Honour Judge Grant's judgment in Mitchell).
Council
can apply for a warrant straightaway.
(a) I heard extensive argument in this case from experienced Counsel.
(b) In the course of argument it became apparent thatBirmingham City Council
's practice in other cases where judges have granted permission to transfer to the High Court was flawed.
(c) It may be that my fellow District Judges inBirmingham
will find this part of my judgment of assistance to them when they face, in other cases, applications by
Birmingham City Council
to transfer to the High Court for enforcement.
Transfer to the High Court
(a) in respect of cases for transfer to the High Court for the purposes of enforcement of possession orders made in respect of secure tenancies under the Housing Act 1985; and
(b) in respect of the differences between enforcement of possession orders in the County Court and High Court.
v
- Jeetan Shah and Lawrence Dubash [2015] EWCA Civ 1018 paragraphs 34 to 38). Such an order should of course contain a statement that any party affected may apply to set the order aside.
"....(a) the financial value of the claim and the amount in dispute, if different;
(b) whether it would be more convenient or fair for hearings (including the trial) to be held in some other Court;
(c) the availability of a judge specialising in the type of claim in question and in particular the availability of a specialist judge sitting in an appropriate regional specialist Court;
(d) whether the facts, legal issues, remedies or procedures involved are simple or complex;
(e) the importance of the outcome of the claim to the public in general;
(f) the facilities available to the Court at which the claim is being dealt with, particularly in relation to -
(i) any disabilities of a party or potential witness;
(ii) any special measures needed for potential witnesses; or
(iii) security;
(g) whether the making of a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 has arisen or may arise;
(h) in the case of civil proceedings by or against the Crown, as defined in rule 66.1(2), the location of the relevant government department or officers of the Crown and, where appropriate, any relevant public interest that the matter should be tried in London...."
(a) the financial value of the claim
(b) whether it would be more convenient or fair for hearings to be held at some other Court.
(c) whether the facts, legal issues, remedies or procedures involved are simple or complex.
The County Court
The High Court
Birmingham City Council
recently appeared before Mrs Justice Rose in the unreported case of Nicholas -
v
- Secretary of State, August 24th2015. I have been shown a note of the case prepared by Counsel in Eflash number 609, Arden Chambers. The facts were as follows. Mrs Nicholas lived in a flat owned by the Ministry of Defence. Her husband was a serving member of the RAF. The Ministry of Defence had granted him a licence to occupy the flat for the better performance of his service with the Crown. They divorced and Mr Nicholas left the property. The Ministry of Defence served notice and sought possession. Mrs Nicholas defended the proceedings. Her Defence was rejected by the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal ordered Mrs Nicholas to give possession by 31st March 2015. The Secretary of State for Defence applied without notice to Mrs Nicholas to the High Court for permission to enforce the possession order. A Deputy Master gave permission. Mrs Justice Rose found that CPR83.13(8) requires notice of the application for a writ of possession must be given to every occupant and therefore notice of the application should have been given to Mrs Nicholas. In any event she found that the evidence supporting the application was incomplete because the Deputy Master had not been told that the Supreme Court had extended time for any application to them for permission to appeal (the Court of Appeal having refused permission) to 28 days from a final decision by the Legal Aid Agency on whether public funding should be extended.
City Council
-
v
- Aldwinckle (1991] 24 HLR 40 where under the old Supreme Court Rules phrased in a similar way Lord Justice Neill said that permission on notice was required to issue a writ of possession in the High Court when contrasting the position in the High Court with the old County Court Rules.
The factors the Court should take account of in respect of a transfer
(a) One would normally expect County Court orders to be enforced in the County Court. I do not find section 110 Housing Act 1985 of much assistance. The fact that there is a bar on the recovery of costs if proceedings are started in the High Court does not mean that the Court should not in appropriate cases transfer cases to the High Court for enforcement. If it meant that it would have said that. The power to transfer is itself provided by the County Courts Act 1984 and nothing in section 110 Housing Act 1985 in my judgment stops the Court from transferring residential housing cases to the High Court for enforcement.
(b) I do however agree that given that County Court orders are normally enforced in the County Court the burden is on an applicant for a transfer to show why the case should be transferred. They would normally do this by pointing to some significant advantage to the applicant by transferring the case to the High Court. This is likely to involve showing that a transfer has advantages for the applicant in the carrying out of its social landlord functions. This could be in terms of speed, cost to the applicant or the other advantages of having a writ of possession. Counsel for the Defendant argued that, rather than allow transfer of cases from the County Court inBirmingham
, the answer lay with HMCTS. He said HMCTS should provide more resources to allow evictions to take place quicker. I agree that more bailiffs would reduce the delays. However, that is no answer to a social landlord.
(c) I agree it is important to ensure that a transfer to the High Court by virtue of the different procedures does not unfairly prejudice tenants. I agree withBirmingham City Council
that the fact the process is quicker does not of itself amount to prejudice. It is procedural unfair prejudice one is concerned with and the fact it is quicker is irrelevant provided that the tenant has had an opportunity to seek to set the writ of possession aside.
(d) The Court must consider the impact of any transfer on the Courts resources and the impact on other cases.
(e) I also accept that the likelihood that any warrant or writ of possession - if issued - might be suspended by a Court, is a factor relevant to transfer as the advantages of transfer might be minimal if in fact a Court would probably suspend the warrant in any event. Thus the level of arrears and the history of the case are relevant considerations.
The Advantages to
Birmingham City Council
of transfer
Birmingham City Council
first thought in the manner cases are currently coming before the Courts. It now accepts that, after transfer it cannot simply apply for and obtain a writ of possession administratively. The process of making an application to the High Court takes time and Court resources. It seems to me that the extra step must add in delay. The statement of Ms Sania that "High Court bailiffs are able to ensure warrants of possession are issued and executed within 3 weeks" is wrong. It seems to be based on writs of possession being wrongly obtained on
Birmingham City Council
's behalf without the making of an application for permission. It follows that the potential revenue savings are not as claimed. However, I do accept that a saving of time might be achieved and in a case where full rent is not being paid there is a rental saving. I accept that any time saving also reduces the time before a property can be re let.
Birmingham City Council
has control over the process. It can postpone the execution of a warrant for example on terms agreed with the tenant and if those terms are broken that particular writ of possession can be enforced. By contrast, if a warrant of possession is withdrawn because of an agreement and that agreement broken,
Birmingham City Council
has to re issue the warrant and the 12 week process starts again.
The prejudice to a tenant of transfer
(a) any greater costs of the High Court process being passed onto him;
(b) The potential that after a writ of possession is issued it will be enforced with no or minimal notice;
(c) He will not get a copy of the writ of possession and more importantly he does not get the information contained on the N54 that tells tenants facing eviction how they can apply to the Court to suspend the warrant of possession.
Birmingham City Council
took after a writ of possession was issued. I received confusing information from Miss Bello in oral evidence before me. The clearest evidence of the current practice comes from a document provided to the Defendants under a freedom of information request. It indicates that the High Court Enforcement Officer carries out a pre eviction "health and safety check" up to 2 weeks prior to the eviction and that the purpose of this visit was to provide "clear and concise information to the tenant which notifies them of the eviction date. This assists the tenant in planning their future following eviction, allows them to seek advice on their housing options and also a final chance to try and re pay the debt." Implicit in this report is that tenants are not told of their ability to apply to the High Court to suspend the writ of possession or to the County Court, if they seek to set aside, vary or quash the judgment of the County Court.
Birmingham City Council
would provide the Defendants and any occupiers of the property with:-
(a) at least 2 weeks notice of any eviction date by letter as well as a visit by the High Court Enforcement Officer and
(b) information in writing like that contained on the N54 (suitably modified as the proceedings would be in the High Court).
I know from experience of another case that
Birmingham City Council
also does not seek to charge the tenant who is evicted using High Court enforcement officers any greater sum that would be charged if County Court bailiffs were employed.
Birmingham City Council
in connection with the obtaining of writs of possession at present and the way in which the requirements of CPR83.13(2) have been side-stepped. Further I have been concerned about the deliberate policy of
Birmingham City Council
not to inform tenants of their ability to seek to suspend the writ of possession. I was also alarmed at the practice (albeit now stopped) of seeking permission to issue writs of possession in the Huddersfield District Registry. However, I accept that this process has been something of a learning curve for
Birmingham City Council
and that they would comply with orders of the Court or if asked give suitable undertakings to judges.
Birmingham
and be conditional upon any application for a writ of possession being applied for in that District Registry. Further a Court should give consideration as to whether costs should be limited to the costs of using County Court bailiffs.
Birmingham City Council
case, to consider what other safeguards need to be put in place will be at the hearing for permission to issue the writ. If this is a separate hearing (as it would have to be on the facts of this case) the judge concerned will be in a better position to consider any procedural unfairness. For example the tenant may attend that hearing. The particular facts might demonstrate that no additional measures are necessary. The tenant may well understand their ability to apply to suspend the writ of possession. How much notice of an eviction date that should be given might vary from case to case.
Birmingham City Council
if permission were given to issue a writ of possession: -
(a) Written communication to the tenant informing him of the date of any eviction together with a copy of the writ of possession. Information akin to that contained within the N54 being provided in writing so that a tenant is aware of how he can apply to suspend the writ of possession and the fact he might be eligible for fee exemption.
(b) A date of eviction that provides sufficient time for the tenant to make an application, for example to suspend the writ of possession. This length of time may vary and may depend upon whether the tenant attends the hearing for permission to issue the writ of possession. In the course of submissionsBirmingham City Council
indicated that they now provide 14 days notice of eviction. That seems reasonable and mirrors the position in most County Courts.
The Impact on Court Resources
Birmingham City Council
to issue writs of possession in the High Court meant that a transfer was not an efficient use of Court resources. He adopted my observation in the course of argument that if there are 1,500 applications made a year for permission to issue writs of possession with a 5 minute time estimate that is the equivalent of 25 District Judge sitting days.
Birmingham City Council
making lots of applications cannot be a reason for depriving
Birmingham City Council
of a transfer if the Court is satisfied it is appropriate in an individual case. To do so would deprive
Birmingham City Council
of the possibility of enforcement based simply on its size.
The chances that if a warrant /writ is issued it will be suspended.
Summary
Addendum to this judgment
Birmingham City Council
in respect of cases that they have already obtained permission to transfer to the High Court. This Court has become aware that having obtained permission from a District Judge in this Court to transfer the proceedings to the High Court for enforcement in other cases
Birmingham City Council
have, through their agent's solicitors Malcolm Butler and Co, been obtaining writs of possession in the Huddersfield District Registry of the High Court. I was concerned as to how this was being done as on the face of the procedure it did not appear to be in compliance with CPR 83.13(2). I asked
Birmingham City Council
to provide a witness statement setting out the procedure. I received on 2nd November 2015 a witness statement from Mr Fearn. I have spoken to staff at
Birmingham
and was shown one case where after transfer an application was made for a writ of possession. It seems that under contractual arrangements, the details of which I do not have,
Birmingham City Council
do not themselves get involved in the obtaining of the writs of possession. This is left to Marston Group Limited as the
council
's agent who in turn instruct solicitors Malcolm Butler and Co. After an order for transfer to the High Court is obtained these solicitors write to the Court enclosing an N293A - Combined Certificate of Judgment and transfer up, a writ Form 66, a copy of the possession order and a cheque for £60. All High Court writs of possession must be in the form of writ Form 66 or 66A (see CPR PD83 para 3.1).
Birmingham
District Registry and Huddersfield District Registry of the High Court in any cases where writs have been issued despite non compliance with CPR83.13 without permission being granted by a judge,
Birmingham City Council
must make immediate steps as is necessary to ensure High Court Enforcement Officers do not seek to enforce writs of possession that have not been validly issued.
Birmingham City Council with regard to these observations.
District Judge Salmon
10th November 2015.