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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Jersey Unreported Judgments >> Bisson -v- JPCA [2017] JCA 192 (13 November 2017) URL: http://www.bailii.org/je/cases/UR/2017/2017_192.html Cite as: [2017] JCA 192 |
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Appeal - leave sought by the Appellant to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council against the decision of the Court of Appeal.
Before : |
James W. McNeill, Q.C., President; George Bompas, Q.C., and David Anderson, Q.C. |
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Between |
Roger William Bisson |
Appellant |
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And |
Jersey Police Complaints Authority |
Respondent |
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IN THE MATTER OF AN APPEAL AGAINST THE REFUSAL EX PARTE OF LEAVE TO COMMENCE JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE JERSEY POLICE COMPLAINTS AUTHORITY
Mr Bisson appeared on his own behalf.
judgment
anderson ja:
1. By judgment of 26 September 2017 (Bisson-v-JPCA [2017] JCA 156), this Court dismissed Mr Bisson's appeal against the refusal of Commissioner Michael Beloff QC, in his judgment of 12 June 2017 (Bisson-v-JPCA [2017] JRC 087), to grant leave to apply for judicial review against the Jersey Police Complaints Authority ("JPCA"). By written application dated 30 October 2017, Mr Bisson seeks leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council against our judgment.
2. Though we have not heard argument on the point (the JPCA having not been called upon to participate in these proceedings to date), we are prepared to assume in favour of Mr Bisson that the Privy Council has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against a dismissal by the Court of Appeal of a refusal of leave to apply for judicial review: cf. R v London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham ex p Burkitt [2002] UKHL 23, per Lord Slynn at [7] and Lord Steyn at [13].
3. The Privy Council grants leave to appeal:-
(Privy Council Practice Direction 3, para 3.3.3(a)).
4. The modern approach of the Court of Appeal to applications for permission to appeal to the Privy Council was set out in Boru Hatlari Ile Petrol Taşima AŞ and others v Tepe inşaat Sanayii AŞ [2016] JCA 199D, paras [23]-[30]. The Court of Appeal cited (at [18]) the comment of Lord Reed in the United Kingdom Supreme Court in the case of in Uprichard v Scottish Ministers [2013] UKSC 21, 2013 SC (UKSC) 219 at [59], in which he described the practice of the Courts of Appeal of England and Wales and of Northern Ireland in the following terms:-
5. The Court of Appeal continued:-
6. Following that approach, it is the practice of this Court to grant leave in a case such as this only if it can be sure that there is (i) an arguable point of law, (ii) of general public importance, (iii) that needs to be determined by the Privy Council at the present time. This Court may be well placed to judge the general public importance (for Jersey) of a point of Jersey law: I v J [2017] JCA 045B, para 3. But the third test - that the point needs to be determined by the Privy Council at the present time - is one which this Court will normally be slow to find satisfied, given the many competing claims on the time of the Privy Council, and the unique ability of the Appeal Panel to assess their relative importance and immediacy.
7. Mr Bisson's application for leave to appeal identifies no fewer than 28 "specific grounds of appeal", which are further developed in the context of a number of broader themes. The application does not, in our judgement, come close to satisfying the exacting standard identified above.
8. The majority of the grounds identified are criticisms of the judgment of the Royal Court in Bisson v Rabet and Roberts [2012] JRC 021 ("the 2012 judgment"). As we noted in our judgment of 26 September, the appropriate means for challenging that judgment was to appeal it: a course of action which Mr Bisson chose not to take. The issue in these proceedings for leave to apply for judicial review is whether Mr Bisson in his application of January 2017 put forward an arguable case, with a reasonable prospect of success, that the JCPA breached one or more of its public law duties in issuing its Statement of Satisfaction with DCI Williamson's investigation of DI Burmingham's investigation of the complaint lodged by Mr Bisson in September 2012 and elaborated upon in January 2014. An appeal to the Privy Council cannot be used as a vehicle either for challenging the 2012 judgment or for supplementing a complaint that was lodged more than five years ago and has long since been determined.
9. The remainder of the grounds are essentially repetitive of those that were developed before us and ruled upon in our judgment of 26 September. We find them no more persuasive now than we did then, and see no need to revisit or elaborate upon the reasons that we gave in our judgment. In short, having considered the application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council, we have failed to identify any arguable point of law in it, let alone a point of general public importance that it would be appropriate for the Privy Council to consider at this time.
10. We therefore refuse to grant leave to appeal to the Privy Council.