![]() |
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | |
United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal >> HH & others (Mogadishu: armed conflict: risk) Somalia CG [2008] UKAIT 00022 (28 January 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKIAT/2008/00022.html Cite as: [2008] UKAIT 22, [2008] UKAIT 00022 |
[New search]
[Context]
[View without highlighting]
[Printable RTF version]
[Help]
HH & others (Mogadishu: armed conflict: risk) Somalia CG [2008] UKAIT 00022
Date of hearing: 19 to 22 November 2007
Date Determination notified: 28 January 2008
HH & others |
APPELLANT |
and |
|
Secretary of State for the Home Department | RESPONDENT |
(1) In deciding whether an international or internal armed conflict exists for the purposes of paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules and the Qualification Directive (but not for any wider purpose outwith the jurisdiction of the Tribunal), the Tribunal will pay particular regard to the definitions to be found in the judgments of international tribunals concerned with international humanitarian law (such as the Tadic jurisdictional judgment). Those definitions are necessarily imprecise and the identification of a relevant armed conflict is predominantly a question of fact.
(2) It will in general be very difficult for a person to succeed in a claim to humanitarian protection solely by reference to paragraph 339C(iv) of the Immigration Rules and article 15(c) of the Directive, ie. without showing a real risk of ECHR article 2 or article 3 harm.
(3) Applying the definitions drawn from the Tadic jurisdictional judgment, for the purposes of paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules and the Qualification Directive, on the evidence before us, an internal armed conflict exists in Mogadishu. The zone of conflict is confined to the city and international humanitarian law applies to the area controlled by the combatants, which comprises the city, its immediate environs and the TFG/Ethiopian supply base of Baidoa.
(4) A person is not at real risk of serious harm as defined in paragraph 339C by reason only of his or her presence in that zone or area.
(5) Neither the TFG/Ethiopians nor the Union of Islamic Courts and its associates are targeting clans or groups for serious harm. Whilst both sides in the conflict have acted from time to time in such a way as to cause harm to civilians, they are not in general engaging in indiscriminate violence.
(6) Clan support networks in Mogadishu, though strained, have not collapsed. A person from a majority clan or whose background discloses a significant degree of assimilation with or acceptance by a majority clan will in general be able to rely on that clan for support and assistance, including at times of displacement as a result of security operations, etc. Majority clans continue to have access to arms, albeit that their militias no longer control the city.
(7) A member of a minority clan or group who has no identifiable home area where majority clan support can be found will in general be at real risk of serious harm of being targeted by criminal elements, both in any area of former residence and in the event (which is reasonably likely) of being displaced as described in sub-paragraph (6) above. That risk is directly attributable to the person's ethnicity and is a sufficient differential feature to engage the Refugee Convention, as well as article 3 of the ECHR and paragraph 339C/article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive (but for the first sub-paragraph (ii) of paragraph 339C).
(8) The evidence discloses no other relevant differentiating feature for the purposes of those Conventions and the Directive.
(9) The issue of whether a person from a minority clan or group falls within sub-paragraph (7) above will often need specific and detailed consideration. The evidence suggests that certain minority groups may be accepted by the majority clan of the area in question, so as to be able to call on protection from that clan. On the current evidence, it may therefore not be appropriate to assume that a finding of minority group status in southern Somalia is itself sufficient to entitle a person to international protection, particularly where a person's credibility is otherwise lacking.
(10) Subject to sub-paragraph (9) above, outside Mogadishu and its immediate environs, the position in southern Somalia is not significantly different from that analysed in NM and Others (Lone women-Ashraf) Somalia CG [2005] UKIAT 00076
(11) Air travel to and from Mogadishu has not been significantly interrupted; nor has the mobile telephone network in southern Somalia.
(12) Subject to what is said above, NM continues to be country guidance. However, FK (Shekal Ghandershe) Somalia CG [UKIAT 00127 is not to be relied on as authority for the proposition that all members of the Sheikhal Jasira or the Sheikhal Ghandershe are as such entitled to international protection as unprotected minorities. The evidence on which the Tribunal in AA (Risk-Geledi-Benadiri Clan) Somalia [2002] UKIAT 05720 reached its conclusions is also now materially out of date and unreliable and should no longer be followed.
..
Notes: (1) "R" or "A" followed by a number refers to the ring binder of documents produced by the respondent or the appellants, as the case may be.
(2) For ease of reference certain spellings have been standardised, including in passages directly quoted.
Introduction
"1. The Appellant is a citizen of Somalia, whose date of birth is given as 10 April 1976. She claims to have experienced being persecuted and other serious harm in the past in Somalia and to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted and of other serious harm in Somalia, should she be returned there, together with her dependent child, by reason of her membership of the minority Sheikhal Jasira clan, at the hands of members of majority clans, from whom the authorities are unable to protect her and her child. On 31 May 2005 the Respondent refused to grant leave to enter or remain in the UK on refugee or human rights grounds.
2. The Appellant appealed. Immigration Judge Goldfarb dismissed the Appellant's appeal in a determination issued in October 2005. The Appellant then sought and obtained an order for reconsideration from Senior Immigration Judge Lane which is dated 28 October 2005. It was found to be arguable that the Immigration Judge had erred in law in
- her approach to the expert report of Dr Luling
- failing to have any regard to the explanation given by the Appellant for not attending for a language test
- misapplying evidence as to the Sheikhal Loboge sub-clan
- concluding that the Appellant was a dependent of her uncle in Saudi Arabia
- concluding that the Appellant was not telling the truth regarding her raising of funds to travel.
3. Mr R Young of Sheikh and Co. appeared on behalf of the Appellant. He relied upon the grounds. Although the expert had stated that the Appellant's knowledge of her clan was 'scrappy', the Immigration Judge had completely failed to take into account that she also found it to be accurate and that it was likely that the Appellant is a member of the Sheikhal Jasira. There had been consideration of extracts from the report only and the evidence had not been considered in the round. There had been failure to note that the Appellant appears to speak the Af Reer Hamar dialect which is the dialect of the Benadiri.
4. As to the language test, the Immigration Judge had clearly failed to take into account the fact that the Appellant had explained that she did not know what was required of her in relation to a language test. It appears that the Respondent and the Immigration Judge have misapplied the evidence about the Sheikhal Loboge, mistakenly, it seems, believing that the Appellant was in some way claiming something that she was not, and wrongly holding that against her. The Appellant had clearly stated that her clan is not affiliated to the other clans known as Sheikhal, including the Loobogey (i.e.Loboge). Dr Luling in her expert report makes clear that the Sheikhal of Jasira and the Gandershe are ethnically distinct from other groups such as the Sheikhal Loboge. The Immigration Judge had been referred to two decisions of the Tribunal in which preference had been given to the evidence of Dr Luling as opposed to that in the Joint British Danish, Dutch Fact Finding Mission to Nairobi.
5. There was nothing implausible, Mr Young submitted, in the Appellant having been able to buy jewellery. Her husband was said to have been working illegally and he could have bought it for her. It was not implausible that the jewels were sold to fund the travel.
6. The Immigration Judge was wrong to conclude that the Appellant had lived without difficulties from 1991 until 1995 as this was not her evidence (see paragraph 33). Further, this finding contradicts paragraph 37 where the Immigration Judge herself notes the difficulties that the Appellant had referred to. Without more from the Judge than her finding that the Appellant did not experience 'the level of difficulty that one would have expected' , it was impossible to know what level of difficulty the Judge had in mind, and therefore impossible to know what impact the Appellant's evidence would have had, had the Judge taken it into account. As the matter turns upon the findings as to credibility, these are said to be material matters rendering the determination unsafe and unsustainable.
7. Mr Peter Deller, Senior Presenting Officer, submitted that the ground relating to the non-participation in the language test would not make a significant difference as not much turns upon it. As to the funds for the journey, it was possible that the husband could have saved money, but it was not central. However, so many points were not clear. No strong reason was given for rejecting the expert evidence of Dr Luling. The reference simply to the 'scrappy' point was not a proper approach by the Immigration Judge. Mr Deller accepted that the determination was inadequately reasoned. Paragraph 30 was very troubling. It was difficult to see the stage at which the expert evidence was considered as the Judge simply seems to recite the Respondent's letter of refusal. Nor was the reasoning adequate in relation to what was said to have happened to the Appellant between 1991 and 1995.
8. Mr Deller submitted that he could not seek to argue that the determination be upheld, but neither did he have instructions to concede the clan membership. It was, however, accepted by the Respondent that the Appellant is a Somali national.
9. In all the circumstances, I find, for all the reasons advanced by both parties, as summarized above, that the Immigration Judge did fall into material error of law and that the way forward in this case is for there to be a full second stage reconsideration hearing, before an Immigration Judge or Judges other than Immigration Judge Goldfarb, when all issues will be at large, save that it is accepted by the Respondent that the Appellant is a Somali national."
"13. No such removal directions have so far been given and it is accepted that such a direction must be given before the appellant's return to Somalia could be effected. It is also accepted that such a removal direction may, as a matter of law, be open to challenge before a court or tribunal
15. In cases involving Somalia it would be unrealistic for the Secretary of State to make firm plans for the appellant's removal to Somalia as long ago as 22 January 2004. A week is not only a long time in politics but it is also a long time in the life of a country as sad and war torn as Somalia. It follows, so it seems to me, that a tribunal or court asked to resolve issues under the Refugee Convention or under the Human Rights Convention will have to approach the matter on the basis that precise directions will only be given after the appellate routes have been exhausted."
"30. I had thought at first that the respondent should be invited to give the necessary undertakings and that, in the absence of any undertakings, the appeal might well have to be allowed. I have concluded that undertakings are not necessary. If and when the respondent makes a removal direction for the appellant, the respondent must take into account, if the circumstances in Mogadishu have not changed much to the better, that an unannounced deposit would put the appellant at real risk, absent special factors. The respondent must also take into account that the appellant must be given an opportunity to make arrangements for protection at the airport and on his way home. That means that the appellant must be told, in advance of his removal, at which airport or landing strip it is intended to leave him. Ms Webber rightly reminded us of the strong criticisms of the practice of giving insufficient notice to proposed returnees: see e.g. R (on the application of Karas and Another) v. SSHD [2006] EWHC 747 (Admin). I endorse those criticisms.
31. Why then do I take the view that undertakings are not necessary? It seems to me that given the volatility of the situation in Somalia, it would be wrong to require undertakings which might be inappropriate in a changed situation. The downside is that, in the absence of undertakings, there is a risk of further litigation at the point of removal. However the length of time between the decision to remove and a decision to effect removal in Somalia cases, coupled with the volatility of the situation in Somalia means that it might be difficult to shut out any chance of further litigation at some uncertain point in what may be a long time in the future.
32. I have reached the conclusion that it is impossible for Immigration judges in cases of this kind (involving the safety of arrival at an airport and of a journey into Mogadishu) to deal with all the eventualities at the time of the hearing. The judge may have to make it clear what has to be done by the respondent so that an enforced returnee to Somalia does not face a real risk of article 3 ill-treatment at the point of his return. The judge is then entitled to assume, for the purposes of the hearing before him or her, that what is required will be done."
"96. Partly because of the different nuances to be found in the major sources of objective evidence, we regard it as important to consider the two issues of risks to returnees and risk to lone women returnees in the context set out by Professor Lewis and Dr Luling in their reports written for this hearing. Both experts, each of whom has a close familiarity with the most recent background materials relating to Somalia, seemed to us to agree that, whilst there are significant dangers for returnees and lone women returnees in particular, these can be significantly reduced in certain cases: those who, as majority clan members, can avail themselves of the protection of a majority clan, or as a minority, the protection of a clan patron, and also those who will be accepted back into Somaliland and Puntland. The former two groups may be able to arrange in advance for militia protection from the airport onwards, through close relatives or fellow clan members. The latter group may not need to do so if returned directly to Somaliland or Puntland.
97. We do not seek to suggest that all of Professor Lewis' formulations when giving evidence showed that majority clan protection of this type was always available or adequate. He made very plain throughout that he thought Somali society generally was in a parlous state. But he was asked numerous direct questions on the issue of overall risk to returnees, lone women returnees in particular and was quite adamant in reply that majority clan protection of this type made a significant and material difference to the level of risk. Dr Luling's report likewise indicated that the existence of majority clan militia protection made an important difference.
98. Professor Lewis emphasised that for persons with close family members in Somalia the latter would feel under a strong duty to take steps to ensure a safe reception and onward travel. For those here who would have less close links with fellow clan members, payment may be required, but we do not understand from anything we have read that the amounts involved would be prohibitive. Allied to this, we note that although both Professor Lewis and Dr Luling mention examples of returnees, male and female, who have fallen foul of banditry by clan militias on return, neither they nor any of the other reports before us sufficiently evidence that such incidents are occurring routinely where militia protection is provided. "
"102. These appeals do not raise specifically the discrete question of the safety for persons in IDP camps. However, we would observe in passing that, on the strength of the background evidence and the oral evidence of Professor Lewis, we would consider any person at real risk on return of being compelled to live in one of these camps as having little difficulty in making out a claim under article 3, if not under the Refugee Convention also."
"93. The further paragraphs on IFA emphasise that in the Somalia context "place of origin" should not necessarily be equated with "place of birth" and that "the determining factor in defining where a person originates from is where the person has effective clan and family ties, and where clan protection is thus available" (emphasis added). They also deal in discrete terms with the specific situation in Somaliland and Puntland."
116. We have given particular weight to the evidence of Professor Lewis and Dr Luling. What they said is consistent with the picture emerging from the 2004 materials both UNHCR and the JMR [Joint Mission report of 2004], which was strongly influenced by UNHCR. Their evidence is significant for its development of a particular point, practicality of safe movement and the potential availability of majority clan militia escort, which is foreshadowed in certain parts of the background but not brought out as clearly as they brought it out.
117. The starting point is that male and female members of minority clans from the south will, in general, be at risk of breaches of their article 3 rights, and will be refugees, in the absence of evidence that they have a clan or personal patron and the means to access that area of safety without a real risk. Were such evidence to exist, which at present would be unusual, their return would involve no breach of either Convention. We recognise that there may be minority clans who are, at least locally, integrated with majority clans, and other groups who may not be a minority clan at all, being closer to a caste. Those will require specific consideration. We also recognise that a division between minority and majority does not represent a bright line on one or other side of which every clan must fall, because there are some which could be considered to be intermediate. But those issues do not arise here.
118. Those issues should be addressed where the evidence permits. There is obviously a greater risk for lone females both in the place of safety and in access, both in terms of degree of risk of occurrence and degree of severity of ill-treatment. Their position would call for particular care.
119. However, where the claimant, male or female, from southern Somalia, is not found to be a minority clan member or equivalent equally at risk, different considerations apply. First, there is likely to be a location in southern Somalia in which the majority clan is able to afford protection sufficiently for neither Convention to apply. It is important not to over-generalise; individual factors and locations will be relevant, as will the past history and individual or family connections. Likewise, lone females will be at a greater risk than males but they will not be able to show that, simply as lone female returnees from the United Kingdom, they have no place of clan majority safety.
120. Second, the question of risk in accessing any such safe place will arise, the more strongly for females than males. We accept that, where positive findings have been made as to what is the home area of a claimant, the prospects of being able to travel safely within Somalia to that area (or if that is unsafe, to an alternative area) is a crucial issue, certainly in cases involving southern Somalia. It will be relevant to the issue of return to a person's home area or, where appropriate, relocation to another area. That is because of the fact that many of the main road routes in this portion of the country have military checkpoints or roadblocks. In this context, the issue as to how claimants will get from the point of arrival to their home area or to an area where they have clan connections, is a real one.
122. A majority clan can be characterised as one which has its own militia. The strongly clan and family based nature of Somali society makes it reasonably likely, though not certain, that a militia escort could sufficiently protect a returnee from Mogadishu through the roadblocks and en route banditry, to the clan home area. This would have to be pre-arranged. Any unwillingness on the part of a claimant to make such arrangements is irrelevant. The telephone connections to Mogadishu are good. We do not know anything of their availability to other towns. The mere unannounced deposit, even of a majority clan member, and especially a female, at Mogadishu airport would be likely to put them at a real risk, in the absence of special factors.
123. There are problems with those whose case has been so disbelieved that it is not known what their clan or place of origin is. It is difficult to see that such a person could succeed; he or she would be a majority clan member who was in effect declining to demonstrate, even to the low standard of proof that they were at risk on return because unable to arrange for clan militia escorts from Mogadishu or wherever else they might be returned to.
125. We do not accept that the general conditions of life or circumstances in Somalia engage the obligations of the Refugee Convention for all returnees or all female returnees, in the light of Adan [1997] IWLR 1107, [1998] Imm AR 338 A "differential impact" has to be shown. We have recognised the scope for differential impacts in our analysis above. Being a single woman returnee is not of itself a sufficient differentiator, although the risks they face are greater and call for careful individualised consideration on the material which is accepted. Nor do we consider that those general conditions or circumstances engage article 3, without more, again as we have discussed.
126. Returnees or lone women returnees claiming protection under the Refugee Convention or under the Human Rights Convention who are found to be former residents of Somaliland or Puntland or persons having a connection with a clan or sub clan based in either of these regions, would not in general face a real risk of serious harm, whether or not they could arrange in advance for clan militia protection to meet them at the airport and escort them thereafter, provided that they were returned directly to those areas and not via Mogadishu. If they were to be returned via Mogadishu, we do not know whether a majority clan militia escort could be arranged for them.
127. The same may well apply in the case of returnees or lone women returnees returned directly to the Bay and Bakool region. We did not hear submissions on this issue, but in the light of references in the reports before us to the dominance in that region of various sub clans of the Rahanweyn, it may be that access by air into that region for persons formerly resident or having local clan connections there, might give rise to a similar outcome, with the same reservations about return via Mogadishu.
128. Internal relocation is not in general a viable option for members of minority clans except where they may be able to obtain majority clan protection in a secure area. In respect of majority clan members, this may be a viable option for those whose majority clans have a secure location elsewhere within southern Somalia than where the claimant came from, if the home area were not or had ceased to be one where the majority clan was sufficiently strong to provide protection. Here, however, there would need to be an assessment of whether clan militia escort protection could be obtained. As regards the question of whether returnees could relocate to Somaliland or Puntland (or the Bay and Bakool regions), we have affirmed that the findings made in AJH remain valid, subject to a possible addition in relation to young men returning to Puntland."
Evidence of appellant S
Evidence of appellant A
Expert evidence
Professor Lewis
"More generally, and without implying any common clan identity, the term 'Sheikhal' is used to designated any lineage of religious specialists and does not mean that those so designated are all members of the same clan."
"a period of some six months of peace and civil progress in Mogadishu and southern Somalia as a grass roots movement (the "Islamic Courts"), led by Muslim clerics, chased the pernicious 'warlords' out of the region and established a brief period of tranquillity and normal life".
"The other Sheikhal groups on the other hand belong to the majority (dark skinned) population. The Sheikhal Loboge for instance formed part of the Hawiye, being adopted into the Herab section; Lewis says they are 'a good example of a religious group or community firmly assimilated to the clan of adoption' (Lewis 1998 p17). They are therefore also known as Martiile "the guests" (Mohammed Abdi Mohammed vol.II p371). They were at one point allied with Awdid and the Habar Gidir. This is not the case with the Jasira and the Gandershe Sheikhal.
Hence the answer to the question whether the Sheikhal are a minority clan is, I believe, that some groups are and some are not. The Sheikhal of the area around Jasira and Gendershe are part of the Benadiri minority. They are recognised as such by the other Benadiri and often included in lists of the Reer Hamar (of Mogadishu) and the Benadiri of Marka. They will be found in the list prepared by "Somali Benadir Global Unity" (printout from their website attached)."
"Ironically, the end result of the seismic changes of 2006 is to some extent a return to the status quo ante bellum. Somalia in early 2007 looks very much like Somalia of 2005, featuring a weak and unpopular TFG facing resistance from a loose coalition of clans, Islamists, and other interests in Mogadishu, in a context of de facto state collapse".
"12. The Transitional Federal Government, with the support of Ethiopian forces, launched operations to disarm insurgents in Mogadishu on 21 March. However, this was met with stiff resistance from remnants of the Union of Islamic Courts and militiamen from the various sub-clans of Mogadishu's Hawiye clan. Heavy fighting ensued and lasted until 27 April, when government and Ethiopian troops captured insurgent strongholds in North Mogadishu. Heavy weapons were used and large numbers of casualties occurred as a result of the hostilities. The month-long fighting in Mogadishu was unusually fierce, also involving heavy weapons. The death toll numbered in the hundreds, including many civilians. Hundreds of thousands of residents were displaced and Mogadishu's few hospitals were overwhelmed with the injured, as were the hospitals in nearby towns. In late April the government claimed a victory over the insurgents in Mogadishu and invited displaced residents to return, indicating that military operations had then ended. For the first time since their arrival in March, troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom) began patrolling the streets of Mogadishu and provided medical assistance to those injured in the hostilities".
"62. Allegations have been made that serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law took place during the last few months of serious fighting. Non-military targets, such as hospitals and schools, had been attacked. It was also reported that some of the wounded were prevented from receiving medical treatment and protection and that urgent deliveries of food aid were hampered or blocked. Whilst there is no independent and official account, local human rights organisations based in Mogadishu report that over 1,000 civilians were killed in this period, several thousand people were injured and sixty percent of the dead and wounded were elderly, women and children. A joint statement made on 28 April by twelve mandate-holders expressing deep concern at the latest round of fierce fighting in Mogadishu was welcomed by many local actors and drew the attention of the media and the international community to human rights and humanitarian issues".
Professor Lewis also either accepted or did not dissent from what was said in the BIA's report of the Information Gathering Mission of 27-30 April 2007 (17 May 2007 (R3, page 1119):-
"3.02 The source [a UN security officer] said that there had been no fighting since 26 April. The recent fighting had taken place inside Mogadishu, but there had been mortar attacks on the airport and there had also been roadside bombs and suicide attacks on the road between Mogadishu and Afgoye.
..
4.01 The source [a security advisor to NGOs operating in Somalia] explained that the function of his organisation was to provide advice to about 200 NGOs on safety and security in Somalia. When asked about the current situation in Mogadishu, he said it is quiet at the moment. It is "Mogadishu quiet", which means that there are still occasional gunshots or roadside bombs. He said that the recent spell of fighting has finished, and the anti-government elements have been dispersed. But although the opposition forces have been dealt a very serious blow, they have not been defeated; they would regroup and continue using "terrorist-style" tactics.
..
6.01 The source [a Senior Advisor on Somalia to a Western Government (not UK)] said that with the exception of Kismayo, fighting was confined to Mogadishu. He considered that it was not possible at the time we spoke to say which parts of Mogadishu were or were not safe. The territorial battle is now largely over, with the TFG and Ethiopians controlling strategic points in the city although they do not exert day to day control over individual neighbourhoods and there have been widespread reports of looting and violent crime across the city. The source did not think there had been any disarmament since the fighting stopped. Around 1/4 to 1/3 of the city was badly damaged or destroyed by shelling or bombing; much of the area long the industrial road was reduced to rubble. The government gave broadly accurate warnings to civilians to leave certain areas of the city to avoid the violence, although the source was in no doubt that bombardment within these areas was indiscriminate.
6.02. The likelihood is that Mogadishu will remain relatively peaceful now for a short period while everyone takes stock, but that fighting may resume in the near future. If so, the next phase is likely to be "asymmetrical warfare", similar to that of January and February 2007, characterised by increased use of terrorist-style attacks. Although much of the population of Mogadishu had been prepared to give the TFG 'the benefit of the doubt', recent actions by Ethiopian and TFG forces are likely to leave a legacy of fear, anger and resentment."
"53. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of mid-May [2007] some 90,000 people had returned to Mogadishu. However, specific protection concerns have arisen as returnees have reportedly been prevented from returning to their homes. Tension is also rising over the fate of some public buildings that until recently were occupied by urban internally displaced persons and are now being claimed by the Transitional Federal Government without providing the necessary displaced persons with an alternative durable solution for their resettlement" (R1, page 268).
"4.01 A journalist from an international news agency stressed to the delegation that Mogadishu is in effect 'the centre of the [security] problem' as it is the city in which the majority of fighting had taken place and where the TFG continues to focus its efforts. He stressed that the current conflict (post the heavy fighting during March-April 2007) is the worst time that the country has faced for sixteen years. This is due to the sheer volume of hostility and mistrust among officials and civilians alike.
4.02 Seven sources stressed the unpredictability and volatility of the security situation in Mogadishu. Three sources explained that north of the city is more dangerous than other parts of Mogadishu. A relevant department of the UN stated that although the north of the city is more volatile and dangerous than the south, in both areas a degree of relative normality has returned, more so in the south, but even in the areas in the north which are most unstable. An executive of an internationally recognised NGO said further that the north was disrupted by TFG cordoning-off and house to house searches; however this has not occurred in the southern parts of the city. One source explained that most of the fighting has taken place around Thirtieth Street (the main road in Mogadishu), particularly north of the street and central areas to it. When asked what the situation was like on this street the source said that the road is very hostile, with few people residing there and with little still functioning. The source explained that he had recently been in Mogadishu and travelled through this area at his own will. He did not encounter any hostilities towards him. OCHA, in its situation report dated 6 July 2007, noted that house to house weapon search operations have intensified since 4 July, coinciding with the increased security incidents.
4.03 Six sources agreed that most of the violence in Mogadishu has become more sophisticated and more political in nature, precisely targeting TFG and Ethiopian forces, high profile political targets, law enforcement agencies, Ethiopian troops and occasionally at African Union forces. On 11 July 2007, Shabelle Media Network reported that the Bondhere District Commissioner was wounded in Mogadishu after unknown gunmen shot him on his way home from work. An embassy official added UN staff and their personnel and westerners, specifically white people, to the above list of possible targets. However, this contrasted with the information provided by one source who claimed that the TFG and Ethiopian troops were attacking anyone and any visible target that they perceived to be a threat to them. He told the delegation that 'anyone who is remotely perceived to be anti-TFG, and anyone who is perceived to be Arabic, anyone who is perceived to be a radical Islamist (to give just three examples), are targets'.
4.04 Three sources stress that there were virtually always civilian casualties either from the insurgent blast itself or from gunfire and retaliatory action by the targeted forces. A relevant department of the UN explained that the rate of such incidents, except in roadside and suicide bombs, has remained broadly steady since the TFG announced victory on 26 April 2007.
4.05 An advisor to an EU institution explained that Shabaad is damaged but has become more targeted in its attacks. There are suicide bombers, and more being trained. A relevant department of the UN stressed that the insurgents are now making a comeback with almost daily attacks in the city. Terrorism Focus, in its weekly journal dated June 19 2007, noted that 'The recently established Mujahideen Youth Movement has emerged as the most potent military group [in Somalia].' The group emerged in April claiming to have attempted to assassinate two prominent Somali officials. The report also claims that the Mujahideen youth movement were responsible for the attack on Prime Minister Ghedi on June 3 2007.
4.06. A relevant department of the UN claimed that clan militias were now regrouping around powerful individuals or factions and that: 'most clans had some network in operation in Mogadishu, though most people were now playing on personal rather than clan connections'. There is also evidence that the armed opposition groups both inside and outside Somalia are 'coalescing'. This could greatly increase the resources available to the armed opposition groups operating in Somalia, although there is also a suggestion that the Shabaab have signalled frictions with exiled opposition groups.
4.07 However an internationally recognised NGO claimed that violence had reduced to 'Mogadishu normal' and the group thought that the Ethiopians' more powerful weaponry was responsible for the previous higher level of violence. An adviser to an EU institution stated that the streets felt 'quite safer' inasmuch as there was a large military presence.
4.08 A relevant department of the UN explained that since the TFG's raid on Bakhara Market in early June, which hitherto had been traditionally held as a key neutral point, where all clans were able to trade and give protection to trade, there has been disagreements (sic) along clan lines. Since then the Bakhara has also become a target of grenade attacks by alleged insurgents. Shabelle Media Network reported an attack on Bakhara market which took place on 11 July 2007. The attack was targeted at Somali Police in the area, however three civilians were wounded in the blast.
4.09 A journalist from an international news agency summed up the current security situation as a vicious circle because every time the TFG managed to effect some level of peace and security, this peace spurred the insurgents to attack as it is their aim to prove to the wider world that Mogadishu is not safe/controlled and that the TFG is ineffective with no support fro Somali citizens."
"4.17 One source detailed that many Somalis considered that the TFG had done 'a good job in cleansing the city' and there was a hope that this would have an effect outside the city. However, there were conflicting reports as to whether the TFG has been able to effect disarmament. One source said that there are no weapons apparent on the street as most had been hidden, another source detailed that there were 'few visible weapons' on the streets and another that 'there was no formal ban on carrying weapons and disarmament attempts were ineffective'. One source said that the government is trying to take away people's weapons but the problem is that Somalis 'do not know who has the guns any more'.
"Checkpoints
4.27 An advisor to an EU institution told the delegation that the six main checkpoints in Mogadishu were not permanently operated but rather utilised in periods of high tension. A journalist from an international news agency explained that the TFG have cleared the city of all checkpoints that are not Ethiopian/TFG, with the effect of enforcing a 'general' level of security in a period of great insecurity. He explained that the number of checkpoints in the city can be an indicator as to the level of hostilities at any one time, i.e. when it is feared that there are an increased number of insurgents, there will be an increased number of checkpoints with the aim of regaining some form of control over the city. An example is in 2004, when there was a high level of uncertainty in Somalia, and there were a reported 54 checkpoints from Mogadishu to Afgoye.
..
Security Situation Ordinary Somalis and Returnees
4.28 The fact-finding team received semi-conflicting information regarding the security situation for ordinary Somalis. One source told the delegation that although the security situation in Mogadishu is unpredictable, it is rare for an ordinary Somali to be randomly targeted in the shooting. A Somali researcher said in his opinion, except for attacks on TFG and associated forces, and the often over-zealous retaliatory action on the part of those forces, in which civilians are often victims of cross-fire, levels of violence in Mogadishu are currently fairly low. But there is still general insecurity and high levels of crime, so although people can and do move around, on the whole they tend to stay in their home area. An NGO working in Somalia claimed that there is also the risk of arrest to ordinary Somalis as after a suspected insurgent attack, the security forces would arrest anybody near the scene, and also arrest ordinary citizens for extortion purposes as well, with random demands sent by phone. A native Somali researcher told the fact-finding team that 'if you are not from the Abgal (the Prime Minister's sub-clan) or from the Magerten (the President's sub-clan) then you are not immune from TFG attacks, and then if you are in any way associated with the TFG, you are also not immune from the insurgent attacks'.
5.08 Within Mogadishu itself, the north of the city is more volatile and dangerous than the south, but in both cases a degree of relative normality has returned, more so in the south, but even in the areas in the north which are most unstable. There are security incidents in Mogadishu every day but these are precisely targeted at government forces or suspected insurgents. However, this does mean there is some risk to civilians either in the original attack or in retaliatory action. The rate of such incidents, excepting roadside and suicide bombs, has remained broadly steady since the TFG announced victory on 26 April 2007.
5.09 There has been a 'remarkable reduction in checkpoints, with fewer bandit checkpoints, and less interest in clan affiliation. Only occasional TFG/Ethiopian checkpoints exist, typically only one on a long road. When asked about why ordinary Somalis would not be targeted, the source explained that it is a politically targeted risk now, not aimed at ordinary Somalis. The distribution of clans throughout Mogadishu is more or less the same as it was 4 to 5 years ago'."
"The latest ongoing violence of October/November 2007 is held by published news sources as the worst violence since December 2006/January 2007. In the period 2-11 October, reports allege incidences of violence including: the death of one individual in the fire following reported violence between government and insurgent forces on 3 October in Bakhara Market, Mogadishu; and the murder of a Somali General and two other women by insurgents on 6 October in Mogadishu; attacks by insurgents against government targets on 8 October in Mogadishu resulting in the death of over four officials and a car bomb incident on 11 October when two Ethiopian soldiers were killed in Baidoa by insurgents. News sources suggest that Regional Administrators are particularly targeted for assassination by insurgents, no group of insurgents is identifiable. It is impossible to corroborate these reports."
"Nearly 90,000 Mogadishu residents fled during the past weekend following the most intense fighting in months. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and local partners indicate that a huge wave of more than 70,000 people left the capital in the three-day period between 27 to 29 October, whilst some 17,000 are estimated to be displaced within the city. The movement of people was also triggered by an announcement advising those living in districts surrounding Bakhara Market to vacate the area due to security operations. In addition to causing fear and panic among the city residents, the busiest market in Somalia was essentially closed between 26-30 October, cutting off access to livelihoods and basic necessities. Currently, Bakhara is open and business is gradually picking up."
"13. On 29 October, Prime Minister Gedi tendered his resignation, which was accepted by President Yusuf. Deputy Prime Minister Salim Aliyo Ibrow was appointed acting Prime Minister pending parliament's election of a permanent replacement. President Yusuf has since initiated consultations with clans and political leaders to appoint a new Prime Minister".
"I [the Secretary General] welcome the amiable resolution of the divisions between President Yusuf and Prime Minister Gedi and the consolatory spirit of the statements issued by both on the latter's resignation. I call upon the Transitional Federal Government to continue to seek peaceful solutions to its internal differences so as to focus its efforts on national reconciliation".
Evidence of Dr Luling
"I do not think [it] likely that she is a Somali from the diaspora who has learnt this;
I believe she is from Jasira as she says."
"The Sheikhal are the main inhabitants of this small place, so that is prima facie evidence that she is Sheikhal."
"As far as I could tell, she was speaking in the Af Hamar dialect. I have not been able to verify this with a native speaker of the dialect, because of pressure of time."
"The most relevant minority in this context are the group of people who have become known as "Benadiri", as they live (or used to live) along the "Benadir" coast from Mogadishu to Brava and in the inland towns from Afgoye along the Shabelle river. They are partly Arab and Persian descent, going back to the 11th century; this accounts for their complexion, which is typically much lighter than that of the majority Somalia. (However it is not safe to rely on this for identification, as there are exceptions both ways and plenty of people who from their appearance could be either). Unlike the most of the Somali (sic) they were never nomadic pastoralists or warriors, but were a peaceful trading community".
"The Sheikhal of Jasira and Gandershe are ethnically distinct from the other groups of the Sheikhal Loboge. Jasira and Gandershe are both small towns on the coast between Mogadishu and Merca; in recent times many of the Sheikhal originating from these two places came to live in Mogadishu, but went on calling themselves after their home towns. The Sheikhal Jasira also call themselves Ba Hassan (often pronounced Ba Wassan) because they trace their descent from Hassan, son of Faqi Omar, while the Sheikhal of Gandershe trace descent from son of Faqi Omar, known as Aw Garweyne (Big Beard). Both groups belong to a 'light skinned' 'Benadiri' population, and are very similar and close to each other. They are an urban population who are generally shopkeepers and businessmen. They are especially noted for salt making from sea water. The Gendershe and the Jasira Sheikhal are noted as entrepreneurs, and have made an impact out of proportion to their numbers (about 1,500). They used to live in a relation of alliance and symbiosis with the Somali groups of that area, providing them with religious services. Since 1991 however they have largely been 'ethnically cleansed'. They are among the groups who have been robbed and been made the victims of atrocities, as they are a minority with no means of self-defence".
The remainder of this passage is set out at paragraph 62 above.
"The word [Sheikhal] is simply the plural of 'Sheikh' and signifies a lineage who have an inherited religious status. They all trace descent in legendary terms from the same ancestor I have here added italics to my original statement to emphasise that this common descent is not to be taken literally, and indeed is an invention intended to fit a number of groups of diverse origins into a genealogical framework However, the joint British, Danish and Dutch Fact-Finding Missions 'report on Minority Groups in Somalia' 2000, followed by the Home Office, swallows the genealogical fiction and refers to the Sheikhal as 'a clan'."
"At the same time, Mogadishu and the country generally have not returned to the pre-2006 situation of separate clan-based enclaves, each under its own 'warlord'; instead the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is in nominal control, and there have been efforts to set up an administration and clean up the city of Mogadishu, but at the same time violence by anti-government forces has only intensified, as have reprisals by the TFG forces and their backers."
"Here is my report on this client.
I have said in it that I am sure that he is a Somali national from Mogadishu. However, I have said nothing about his clan, as I do not believe that he is Reer Hamar Morshe. This is mainly because he knows very little about them, and his names are not the sort of names used by the Reer Hamar, as they are Somali words, not the Arabic Muslim words that the Reer Hamar used.
May I point out that the date of his refusal was September 2002, before the regulations changed in October. Hence as a Somali national he arguably should get ELR.
If you need any modifications to the report please let me know."
"34. However, rather disconcertingly, in her covering letter [Dr Luling] volunteers, 'I do not believe he is Reer Hamar Morshe. This is mainly because he knows very little about them and his names are not the sort of names used by the Reer Hamar because they are Somali words, not the Arabic Muslim names the Reer Hamar use'.
35. It is not entirely clear from this covering letter the extent to which Dr Luling was instructed to consider whether or not the appellant was a member of the Morshe sub-clan and what questions she had asked for the purpose of establishing her conclusions. In that letter she invited modifications to her report if needed."
"The town is about 20km (now) south-west of Mogadishu City limits, along the coast. It has been close to areas of the outward growth of Mogadishu, such as Afgoye and Madina, as the centre has been abandoned with the population fleeing to the outskirts of the city.
Before the collapse of Somalia as a state, the town was a beach resort and described by many sources as 'the former resort of Gzira Beach'.
The beach at Gzira was the scene of a massacre of political opponents to President Barre by government troops variously dated 14 July or 16 July 1989".
"The current political situation (as of late August 2007) in Mogadishu and its immediate environs is a matter of perspective. There are evidently significant sections of the population who did not support the TFG Government; there are regular and often successful assassination attempts against TFG officials of all ranks. Buildings, businesses and installations associated with TFG are targeted by mortars on daily basis. The TFG and Ethiopian forces conduct wide-ranging 'security' operations against groups or individuals perceived to be actively resisting the government. Both sides can be accused of acting indiscriminately against their perceived opponents. The inauguration of the much delayed National Reconciliation Conference in Mogadishu on 15 July has brought still greater levels of violence".
"20.14 The Danish Refugee Council and the Danish Immigration Service, in their Joint Fact Finding Mission report on Human Rights and Security in Central and southern Somalia, published August 2007 noted:
'Hibo Yassin, Regional Co-ordinator Cooperatione per lo Sviluppo dei Paesi Emergenti (COSPE) explained that minority populations in Somalia, i.e. members of ethnic minority groups and members of clans being in a minority position are no longer victims of targeted looting and other targeted human rights violations. However, it was added that any person in Somalia who does not enjoy strong clan protection because he or she is from a weak clan or minority group has to keep a low profile. Such a person should never be outspoken or express political opinion openly or he or she will have to go into hiding or conceal his/her identity. During the period of UIC control members of minority populations were in a much better position and some were even able to reclaim property, however today this is no longer so. Everyone is now under threat and many are afraid, not least members of minority groups Regarding blood-compensation (diya) Yassin explained that minority groups cannot expect to obtain compensation from major clans such as the Hawiye or the Darod and to obtain compensation from the Abgal clan is also very difficult since this clan is dispersed over a large area. However, if blood-compensation is being negotiated on a lower sub-sub clan level it is very likely that compensation may take place. Even the Reer Hamar, Sheikhal and other minority groups today have profiled elders who can negotiate blood compensation'.
20.15 The report notes the OCHA and the NOVIB continue to regard minorities in Somalia as vulnerable and targeted. The report continues:
'Jabirel Ibrahim Abdulle, Director, Centre for Research and Dialogue Somalia (CRD Somalia) explained that 'social capital' in Somalia is not for members of minorities. The minority groups are vulnerable, but on the other hand as they do not have access to the same resources as the rest of the population they are often not involved in direct conflicts. However, Abdulle acknowledged that members of minority groups and clans are often victims of human rights violations'.
"2.06 The Danish Refugee Council and the Danish Immigration Service, in their Joint Fact Finding Mission report on Human Rights and Security in Central and southern Somalia published August 2007 noted a difference in opinion regarding clan protection:
'An international organisation (A) explained that individual persecution per se does not take place in Somalia. Any Somali has the opportunity to obtain security within his or her own clan. This is even applicable if a person does not have any close relatives in the country. As long as a person is living inside the traditional area of the clan he or she enjoys the protection of that clan.'
'2.07 An international organisation (C) stated that it is too broad to say that everyone upon return to Somalia from abroad will have access to protection from his or her clan in Somalia. The clan may try to assist and protect the person at the initial stage but not in the long term.'
'2.08 Lazzarini explained that in general clan protection is better in northern Somalia than in the south. In central and southern Somalia the situation is very complex when it comes to clan protection. In these areas there is no guarantee that a person will enjoy protection form his or her own clan. Many clans are rather dispersed and the mixture of clans is much more blurred. Lazzarini, however, acknowledged that in principle one could expect to be protected by one's own clan if he or she is living among clan members. Lazzarini emphasised that it is not possible to say something reasonable as to whether a person will be certain to enjoy clan protection in central and southern Somalia. It was added that many Somalis living abroad or as IDPs would not be able to return safely to central and southern Somalia. The IDPs experience no clan protection and accordingly there is no negotiation or compensation if an IDP is the victim of a crime.'
'Yassin considered that 'clanism' is generally no longer an issue in Somalia. This has been the situation during the last three to four years. No one is being persecuted or targeted solely because of their clan affiliation and in principle anyone can expect to enjoy protection by his or her own clan'."
"10. In the recent waves of IDPs, the minorities have not been particularly discriminated against. The source said that the Bantus were not noticeably discriminated against either. The source explained that IDPs go back to wherever they feel secure, in most cases back to clan areas, with 'the first safety net is the sub-clan'. In this sense, the clan maps are still valid, as people go back to clan areas. He added that it was very difficult for outcasts. The source said that the clan assisted female-headed households, unlike the treatment of widows in other African scenarios."
Evidence of Dr Mullen
"The social support system available to Somali clan members is legendary for its breadth and generosity. However, it does presuppose a degree of stability in which there is a certain equilibrium of demands and capacity to respond. The disintegration of societal stability, even in the case of majority clans, since the beginning of this year, with the occupation of the Ethiopian Army and its Transitional Federal Government (TFG) allies, droughts and floods has given rise to a situation where human existence itself is even in question and the support system has effectively collapsed. An excerpt from a report delivered by an NGO on the ground, to the international community describes the situation in graphic terms:
'The TFG in Mogadishu appears increasingly as an Abgal venture; and the opposition increasingly dominated by Habir Gedir. The danger of a new clan civil war increases, but remains not inevitable. That said, leaders from both clan groupings don't want a new civil war, but they are largely not on the ground, and nor are their families. The level of desperation on the ground is increasing. Individuals, families, sub-clans and clans are having to mobilise and arm themselves for survival. The existential survival imperative is increasingly dominating and the political decisions or desires by transitional or political leaders are increasingly meaningless. Civil war is not inevitable, but more precursors for a new war for basic survival continue to manifest themselves.'
The population in Mogadishu is more mobile with people fleeing from one district to another to avoid the ubiquitous bombing. My NGO informant in Mogadishu writing on 5/11/07 stated that 'there are Reer Hamari people residing outside Shangani and Hamar Weyne districts. They are currently residing in Shidis, Bondhere, Hamir Jajjab and Abdulaziz Districts".
"Risks are proportionate to the historical situation of security or conflict on the grounds at a given period in time. Risk is associated with the degree of danger associated with a given operation or course of action. In terms of forecasting the impact of a particular line of action, risk may be subdivided into high risk; high moderate risk; moderate risk; low moderate risk and low risk. The risk calculus would then be premised upon the situation that the degree of danger or harm associated with the repatriation of different groups of persons to Somalia at a given moment in time. Minority rights group international have classified Somalia as having the most hostile environment for minorities in the world, ahead of Afghanistan,Iraq
and Burma. Overall Somalia is a risk-prone society and among development practitioner organisations, it is viewed as perhaps the most dangerous country in the world. In the context of Somalia, security is both fluid and is location specific and this affects the level of risk permeating the politico-economic environment. Levels of risk perception are also, to a degree, subjective".
"6. Regarding movement in the city, there are minibuses moving freely. There has been a 'remarkable' reduction in checkpoints, with fewer bandit checkpoints, and less interest in clan affiliation. Only occasional TFG/Ethiopian checkpoints, typically only one on a long road. Returning Somalis can move around, and not be targeted as insurgents. But it is better if they can hire a car. When asked about why ordinary Somalis would not be targeted, the source explained that it is a politically targeted risk now and not aimed at ordinary Somalis."
"12. For IDPs, there are areas in which they cannot go, particularly after the public building evictions. However the group [executives of an internationally recognised NGO] impressed the need to understand 'normal life' in a Mogadishu sense, where there is an acceptance of a mobile type of life created by displacement. In this current conflict, there had been many displacements within the city of Mogadishu, with 68 per cent of the city's population affected."
"17. The Transitional Federal Government and the Ethiopian forces continued to concentrate on securing Mogadishu and seeking to apprehend and disarm insurgent elements. Limited progress has been made to date, with targeted attacks by insurgents continuing on a regular basis. Such attacks include the use of roadside bombs, rocket-propelled grenades, mortar and hand grenade attacks against Transitional Federal Government personnel and Ethiopian forces. In addition, there had been frequent gun battles between the Transitional Federal Government's security forces and insurgent elements lasting several hours. On 27 October, local insurgents and Ethiopian troops engaged in some of the heaviest fighting in Mogadishu in months.
18. Most checkpoints are now being manned by militias loyal to the Transitional Federal Government, many of which appear to lack a proper command structure and training
20. Civilians have been caught in the line of fire as insurgents continue to stage targeted assassinations and suicide bombings. Furthermore, Transitional Federal Government forces and Ethiopian troops have, at times, opened fire indiscriminately, causing many civilian casualties ."
Submissions on general issues and credibility
Mr Collins for appellant H
"For all the apparent ease of the winning the war against the Islamic courts, winning the peace in Mogadishu proved difficult for combined Ethiopian-TFG forces. Within the first few months of the TFG's arrival in Mogadishu a visitor characterised the TFG as "in residence, but not in power". Large parts of the powerful political and business elite of Mogadishu (mostly Hawiye based) regarded the TFG with deep suspicion. Many saw it as an alien occupying force since it was a predominantly Darod backed entity closely associated with Ethiopia and indirectly with the United States.
The first three months of 2007 saw a steady deterioration in security in Mogadishu. The tardy and partial deployment of African Union Peacekeeping Force 'AMISON' of only 1,700 Ugandan troops of a promised 8,000 strong force had little success in keeping the peace. ... From late March to May 2007 military engagements were the worst Mogadishu had seen for a decade or more at the height of the fighting in Mogadishu it was estimated by various agencies that up to 40,000 people may have been displaced.
both sides can be accused of acting indiscriminately against their perceived opponents. The inauguration of the much delayed National Reconciliation Conference in Mogadishu on 15 July has brought still greater levels of violence.
The TFG Government has struggled to maintain its unity; the government is in a constant state of flux, full of personal rivalries and unreliable alliances. The insurgency also involves a number of disparate and often uncoordinated factions fighting for different ends and with different means. Glib comparisons in the media with the insurgency inIraq have become common. Prime Minister Gedi recently announced that the TFG will try and create a Baghdad style 'Green Zone' for the safety of government officials and foreign visitors. Overall, the current level of conflict would seem unsustainable even by the very low standards of Mogadishu.
Despite the polarised political climate in Mogadishu, there is no doubt that abuse of human rights it at its worst for quite some years. Neither side of the current conflict in Mogadishu is blameless. In current conditions suspicion of association with 'terrorists' or 'insurgents', or suspicion of collaboration or identification with the TFG, makes almost any person at risk of human rights abuse, up to and including harassment, persecution, imprisonment, kidnap, physical violence or assassination.
For the last six months there has been an increase in general criminality in Mogadishu and surrounding areas. The disruption to Mogadishu's economy has led to an increase in freelance militias, the re-appearance of illegal checkpoints, and regular instances of extortion and robbery. Kidnapping and ransom demands are increasing. Sexual violence is also endemic. Most reporting has come from Mogadishu, but it is clear there are considerable instances of human rights abuse in other areas of southern Somalia, such as the second city of Kismayo.
A recent report based on extensive field work across the Somaliland during 2006 stated:
'Generally, the fundamental human rights in Somalia for women, children, minorities, other vulnerable groups and IDPs are not guaranteed'.
It should be noted that though the situation for some individuals and groups is certainly better than others, and some regions are more secure than others notably Somaliland nevertheless it remains true that universal respect for fundamental human rights is not certain in any part of Somalia.
In terms of the population as a whole, women and children are especially vulnerable to abuse of their basic human rights. In present day Somalia women feel that they "carry the greatest burdens of insecurity and survival". In general, sexual and gender based violence is endemic in all the Somali lands, although more widespread in some areas than others.
Rights of children are equally weak in all regions of the Somali lands. A recent report by the United Nations Security General, Ban Ki-Moon, estimated that a third of fatalities due to conflict in Somalia during 2006 were children, and that the ongoing violence in southern and South-Central Somalia was characterised by 'grave child rights violations'. "
"The civil war and the continuing collapse of the central State in Somalia made large civilian populations subject to serious violations of internationally accepted humanitarian norms and human rights laws. A common and continuing response of civilian populations to insecurity whether due to man-made conflict or natural disasters such as famine or flooding was to move either within or outside Somalia. Within Somalia there has been massive displacement of civilian populations, often several times over, particularly in the South-Central regions.
The security of Mogadishu, and specifically the risk of ordinary individuals returning to Mogadishu and travelling between the airport and their final destinations, is subject to almost daily changes. Nevertheless, return to Mogadishu is evidently possible since flights are arriving and departing from at least two airports serving the city.
It is the case that the physical act of return to Somalia will not in itself be a risk of breach of human rights unless the individual is suspected of involvement with the opposition to the TFG. However, anecdotal information suggests that many with the wherewithal to leave i.e. businessmen and professionals, have chosen to leave Somalia in the last month because of the declining security situation, especially the risk of kidnap for ransom purposes.
The possibility of returning failed asylum seekers to Somalia should be judged against the prevailing security conditions that all ordinary Somalis face in Somalia. At the present moment and for the last two months security conditions have deteriorated. Recent communications from Mogadishu have noted that there is an increase in freelance militias, illegal checkpoints, and generalised harassment and persecution of civilians especially on roads leading out of the capital. Violence against women and girls is also rising. More worryingly in a recent interview, the Mayor of Mogadishu, an ex-warlord Mohamed 'Dheere,' stated that 'terrorists' were hiding in the camps for displaced peoples and said 'we will go after them wherever they are for the sake of security of the region'. As in the past, any large scale further security operations will entail civilian casualties."
"Between January and March 2007 insurgent attacks took several forms: assassinations of government officials; attacks on military convoys; and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) or mortar attacks on police stations, TFG and Ethiopian military bases, or other locations or individuals deemed by the insurgency to be political or military targets. For instance, several hotels known to accommodate TFG officials, such as the Ambassador Global, and Lafweyne hotels, were repeatedly hit with RPGs and mortar rounds and were the site of the attempted assassinations of TFG officials.
The insurgency was mobile, often using hit-and-run tactics in its attacks or setting up and launching mortar rounds in minutes, then melting back into the civilian population. After an insurgent attack on a convoy or other mobile target, Ethiopian and TFG forces typically sealed off the area and conducted house to house searches of the area. The Ethiopian and TFG response to mortar attacks increasingly included the return firing of mortars and rockets in the direction of origin of insurgency fire."
"International humanitarian law (the laws of war) imposes upon parties to an armed conflict legal obligations to reduce unnecessary suffering and to protect civilians and other non-combatants. It is applicable to all situations of armed conflict, without regard to whether the conflict itself is legal or illegal under international or domestic law, and whether those fighting are regular armies or non-state armed groups. All armed groups involved in a conflict must abide by international humanitarian law, and any individuals who violate humanitarian law with criminal intent can be prosecuted in domestic or international courts for war crimes.
International humanitarian law does not regulate whether states and armed groups can engage in hostilities, but rather how states and armed groups engage in hostilities. Insurgency itself is not a violation of international humanitarian law. The laws of war do not prohibit the existence of insurgent groups or their attacks on legitimate military targets. Rather, they restrict the means and method of warfare and impose upon insurgent forces and regular armies alike a duty to protect civilians and other non-combatants and minimize harm to civilians during military operations."
"During the week, a serious fire broke out at the Bakhara Market, the main trading centre for the South Central Region of Somalia, which will have a decidedly negative impact on economic activities of the country. The market was forced to close earlier this year due to the widespread conflict in the capital, with negative consequences on trade and prices. Somali citizens are already reeling from basic food cost increases due to increased transport expenses linked to checkpoints and ad hoc 'taxis' and spiralling inflation. Many casual labourers at the market have lost their only source of income and reduced food supplies to the rest of the country will increase demand hence weakening the purchasing power of the already stretched communities.
Meanwhile, persistent insecurity in Mogadishu continues to restrict movement for residents. For example, the area surrounding the market was sealed by the TFG following the fire to prevent looting. Neighbourhoods are frequently sealed by the authorities during searches for weapons, preventing people from leaving their homes and earning a living. Many Mogadishu residents who have not fled the city have moved from the northern part of the city to join family members in the relative calm of South Mogadishu, burdening already impoverished families.
According to media reports, the TFG this week announced that it would deploy more soldiers in the city, intensifying arms search in an effort to restore peace and order. Targeting and killing of government officials and police continued in the capital unabated, with a District Commissioner assassinated, three roadside bombs and four hand grenade attacks on police during the week, with civilians caught in the crossfire. In Mogadishu's Madina hospital, records indicate that in August and September, 305 people were admitted with wounds caused by gunshots or shelling. One journalist held in prison for one week in Deletweyne was released and Radio Shabelle finally went back on air on 2 October after fifteen days of closure following being sprayed by gunfire from government troops."
"This week, Mogadishu saw one of its worst fighting between government troops and anti-government elements. Reportedly, over 30 people were injured and an unknown number killed due to the crossfire. This follows the intensification of firearms searches by the TFG to rid the city of insurgents. As the targeting of government officials by unknown groups continues, for the third time this year, a Yaqshid District Commissioner was assassinated. The continuing clashes in Mogadishu further aggravated the daily lives of the neediest people, as they have not been able to meet their basic social needs on a regular basis since February".
As far as the UNHCR was concerned, its February 2007 note on Somalia described the situation in Mogadishu as 'very unstable and insecure with deadly incidents being reported on a daily basis'. The UNHCR had requested the TFG 'to appoint focal points regarding voluntary return to Mogadishu and, generally, South/Central Somalia'. As at the date of the report, however, there was no contact person with whom UNHCR had been able to discuss the issue. The TFG had initiated a very basic immigration service at Mogadishu Airport but it is now unclear whether this would continue to operate. The TFG had indicated to the UN that the former did not have the capacity and resources to receive people and requested UNHCR support to inform European countries accordingly. With the constant insecurity, IDPs and marginalised groups were said neither to be able to protect themselves from violence nor to expect any remedy for human rights violations committed against them (A2, page 17). The most recent (2 November 2007) OCHA report (A2, page1) referred to the flight of 90,000 Mogadishu residents during the past weekend following the most intense fighting in months. Those living in districts surround Bakhara Market were warned to leave, pending security operations but although the market was closed between 26 and 30 October, it was subsequently opened 'and business is gradually picking up'. UNHCR and the Population Monitoring Tracking (PMT) Network reported that:
" the 90,000 people displaced from and in Mogadishu came largely from the four districts of Hodan, Hawl Wadaaq, Wardhigley and Haliwaa. Some 17,000 had moved to relatively safer areas within the city while 56,000 went to Lower Shebelle, including the 46,000 to Afgoye. An additional 8,000 people went to Middle Shebelle and some 5,600 to Baidoa (Bay)".
Mr Young for appellant S
"Waves of IDPs will go back to wherever they feel secure, in most cases back to clan areas, where 'the first safety net is the sub-clan'. On the question of whether clans were disrupted by such movement, one source said this was not the case, adding that people moved as clans, and were received as families with the sub, sub-clans structure. However, two security advisors on Somalia said that clan maps cannot be used any longer even as a guideline, because groups had been displaced and were not disputing who is the original occupant of various lands".
Mr Maka for appellant A
"131. We considered that the determination of the Adjudicator who dealt with the first claimant was legally flawed. We have taken account of the recent materials placed before us and in particular the oral evidence we heard. Professor Lewis's evidence made clear that the Ashraf were a minority clan which was especially vulnerable to targeting by majority clan militias and that for members of the clan there would be three particular problems afflicting any travel within Somalia. Firstly, most Ashraf could be picked out by their appearance, being relatively light-skinned. Secondly, the Ashraf had no clan militia and so would be particularly at risk from militias manning checkpoints both at any airport in southern Somalia they might land at and along any route they might take by land to the Hamar Wayne area of Mogadishu or to any other part of southern Somalia such as Gedo or Afgoye. Thirdly, lack of clan militia meant that there was no area of southern Somalia which would be a safe destination for Ashraf, including Gedo. The latter region had been unsafe for Ashraf for a number of years. This is in line with what the Tribunal has routinely held.
133. For those reasons, this claimant's appeal is allowed outright. There is no evidence that she has any majority clan patronage."
"148.The court would further take issue with the national authority's assessment that the treatment to which the applicant fell victim was meted out arbitrarily. It appears from the appellant's account that he and his family were targeted because they belonged to a minority and for that reason it was known that they had had no means of protection; they were easy prey, as were the other three Ashraf families living in the same village The court would add that, in its opinion, it cannot be required of the applicant that he establishes that further special distinguishing features, concerning him personally exist in order to show that he was, and continues to be, personally at risk. In this context, it is true that a mere possibility of ill-treatment is insufficient to give a rise to a breach of article 3. Such a situation arose in the case of Vilvarajah and Others v the United Kingdom where the court found that the possibility of detention and ill treatment existed in respect of young male Tamils returning to Sri Lanka. The court then insisted the applicants show that special distinguishing features exist in their case that could or ought to have enabled the United Kingdom authorities to foresee that they would be treated in a manner incompatible with article 3 However, in the present case, the court considers, on the basis of the applicant's account and the information about the situation in "the relatively unsafe" areas of Somalia insofar as members of the Ashraf minority are concerned, that it is foreseeable that on his return the applicant will be exposed to treatment in breach of article 3. It might render the protection offered by that provision illusory if, in addition to the fact that he belongs to the Ashraf which the government have not disputed the applicant be required to show the existence of further distinguishing features".
"Under the Courts' administration, public security improved dramatically throughout the capital. The Islamists disarmed clan militias, rid the city of warlords and criminal gangs, re-opened the seaport and airport, and made the streets safe. Not surprisingly, they earned widespread respect and support among locals and in the diaspora. That respect began to fray, however, once hard-line elements in the Courts promoted strict interpretations of Shari'a, restricted the rights of women, the media and civil society, and began mobilising for irredentist Jihad against Ethiopia. Somalis were torn between their desire to support a movement that brought calm to the capital for the first time in 15 years, and feared that the same movement was beginning to replicate many of the authoritarian tendencies at home and ill-considered clashes with Ethiopia that had proved so disastrous under the Said Barre regime".
Mr Swift for the respondent
"8.05.He said that the current war marked a new development because clans which were normally hostile to each other had joined forces against a common enemy the Ethiopians and Darods. Another new development was the intensity of the conflict. Clan disputes were normally characterised by posturing, brief flare-ups and then withdrawal but the intensity of this war had been sustained.
8.06. Mr Khaire commented that people saw the period when the Islamic courts were in control as one of relative peace and tranquillity when things functioned reasonably well. This had promoted greater contact between different clans and more social interactions.
8.07. We asked about general safety in areas in Central and South Somalia outside Mogadishu and its immediate environs. Mr Carey said that the provinces had been relatively unaffected by the main fighting, and that life there remained much the same as it had always been, with little impact from IDPs most of whom remained on the outskirts of Mogadishu. He thought that other areas would be increasingly affected if the war carried on.
8.08. He said that in the provinces there continued to be local disputes between local clans and militias, often about water rights (he thought that the provision of reliable water supplies would see the end of inter-clan conflict in Somalia). But this was 'normal life' Somalia style. Although not comparable to the western standards, the local administration and justice administered by local clans was reasonably fair. However, even without the current war, Somalia remained a dangerous place. Mr Carey did not think that it would be appropriate for anyone to be returned to any part of Somalia and said this was likely to be the case for another ten-fifteen years".
Mr Collins's reply to the respondent's submissions
Mr Maka's reply to the respondent's submissions
Submissions on article 15(c) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC and paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules serious and individual threat to civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict
The legal background
"(1) A common policy on asylum, including a common European asylum system, is a constituent part of the European Union's objective of progressively establishing an area of freedom, security and justice open to those who, forced by circumstances, legitimately seek protection in the Community.
(2) The European Council at its special meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999 agreed to work towards establishing a Common European Asylum System, based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 (Geneva Convention), as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967 (Protocol), thus affirming the principle of non-refoulement and ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution.
(3) The Geneva Convention and Protocol provide the cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees.
(4) The Tampere conclusions provide that a Common European Asylum should include, in the short term, the approximation of rules on the recognition of refugees in the content of refugee status.
(5) The Tampere conclusions also provide that rules providing refugee status should be complemented by measures on subsidiary forms of protection, offering an appropriate status to a person in need of protection.
(6) The main objective of this Directive is, on the one hand, to ensure that Member States apply a common criteria for the identification of persons genuinely in need of international protection, and, on the other hand, to ensure that a minimum level of benefits is available for these persons in all Member States.
(8) It is in the very nature of minimum standards that Member States should have the power to introduce or maintain more favourable provisions for third country nationals or stateless persons who request international protection from a Member State, where such a request is understood to be on the grounds that the person concerned is either a refugee within the meaning of article 1(A) of the Geneva Convention, or a person who otherwise needs international protection.
(9) Those third country nationals or stateless persons, who are allowed to remain in the territories of the Member States for reasons not due to a need for international protection but on a discretionary basis on compassionate or humanitarian grounds, full outside the scope of this Directive.
(11) With respect to the treatment of persons falling within the scope of this Directive, Member States are bound by obligations under instruments of international law to which they are a party and which prohibit discrimination.
(24) Minimum standards for the definition of content of subsidiary protection status should also be laid down. Subsidiary protection should be complimentary and additional to the refugee protection enshrined in the Geneva Convention.
(25) It is necessary to introduce criteria on the basis of which applicants for international protection are to be recognised as eligible for subsidiary protection. Those criteria should be drawn from international obligations under human rights instruments and practices existing in Member States.
(26) Risks to which a population of a country or a section of the population is generally exposed do normally create in themselves an individual threat which would qualify a serious harm."
"339C. A person will be granted humanitarian protection in the United Kingdom if the Secretary of State is satisfied that:
(i) he is in the United Kingdom or has arrived at a port of entry in the United Kingdom;
(ii) he does not qualify as a refugee as defined in regulation 2 of the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006;
(iii) substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if he returned to a country of return, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm and is unable, or owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; and
(iv) he is not excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection.
Serious harm consists of:
(i) the death penalty or execution;
(ii) unlawful killing;
(iii) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of a person in the country of return; or
(iv) serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict."
"ARTICLE 3
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed "hors de combat" by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by civilised people.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the parties to the conflict.
The parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provision shall not affect the legal status of the parties to the conflict".
"A. 'Cases of Armed Conflict' what is meant by 'armed conflict not of an international character'?
That was burning question which arose again and again at the Diplomatic Conference. The expression was so general, so vague, that many of the delegations feared that it might be taken to cover any act committed by force of arms any form of anarchy, rebellion, or even plain banditry. For example, if a handful of individuals were to rise in rebellion against the state and attack a police station, would that suffice to bring into being an armed conflict within the meaning of the article? In order to reply to questions of this sort, it was suggested that the term "conflict" should be defined or and this would come to the same thing that a list should be given of a certain number of conditions on which the application of the Convention would depend. The idea was finally abandoned wisely, we think. Nevertheless, these different conditions, although in no way obligatory, constitute convenient criteria, and we therefore think it well to give a list drawn from the various amendments discussed; they are as follows:
1. That the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses an organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate territory and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention.
2. That the legal Government is obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces against insurgents organised as military and in possession of a part of the national territory.
3. (a) That the de jure Government has recognized the insurgents as belligerents; or
(b) That it has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; or
(c) That it has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for the purposes only of the present Convention; or
(d) That the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to international peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.
4. (a) That the insurgents have an organisation purporting to have the characteristics of a State.
(b) That the insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over persons within a determinate portion of the national territory.
(c) That the armed forces act under the direction of an organised authority and are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war.
(d) That the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the provisions of the Convention.
The above criteria are useful as a means of distinguishing a genuine armed conflict from a mere act of banditry or an unorganised and short-lived insurrection.
Does this mean that article 3 is not applicable in cases where armed strife breaks out in a country, but does not fulfil any of the above conditions (which are not obligatory and are only mentioned as an indication)? We do not subscribe to this view. We think, on the contrary, that the scope of application of the article must be as wide as possible."
"Neither the Geneva Conventions nor Additional Protocol I contain any definition of the expression 'armed conflict' but the following guidance has been given:
(a) 'any difference arising between States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict';
(b) an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups within a State'.
These definitions do not deal with the threshold for an armed conflict. Whether any particular intervention crosses the threshold so as to become an armed conflict will depend on all the surround circumstances."
The authority for paragraph (a) is Pictet; that for paragraph (b) is Prosecutor v Tadic (Jurisdiction) (1995) 105 ILR 419. In that judgment, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, a body established by the United Nations, held:-
"An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached or, in the case of internal armed conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that time, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the cases of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there" (paragraph 70).
The Tribunal accordingly found that there had therefore been an armed conflict in the Prijedor region of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time the offences were alleged to have been committed, even though the accused had argued that there had been no fighting in that region and that the Bosnian Serbs had 'assumed power' there without encountering opposition. The head note to the judgment (summarising paragraphs 96 to 127 thereof) states that:
(5) Internal armed conflicts were subject to an extensive body of customary international law which extended beyond the rules codified in common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. This customary law included rules relating to the conduct of combat, such as rules on weaponry and what constituted a legitimate target. They included, but were not limited to, many of the rules set down in Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Convention. Although many of these rules were similar to those applicable in international armed conflicts, only a number of the rules of the law of international armed conflicts had been extended to conflicts of an internal character. Moreover, it was the general essence of those rules, rather than their detailed regulation, which had become applicable to internal armed conflicts."
"For Additional Protocol II to apply, there must be an armed conflict of an internal nature between the forces of the state party to the Protocol and dissident armed forces or other organised armed groups under responsible command. The dissident forces are required to have a territorial base and to exercise such control over a part of the State's territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement the Protocol."
"Spectrum of Conflict
The application of the Law of Armed Conflict to internal hostilities thus depends on a number of factors. In the first place, it does not apply at all unless an armed conflict exists. If an armed conflict exists, the provisions of common article 3 apply. Should the dissidents achieve a degree of success and exercise the necessary control over a part of the territory, the provisions of Additional Protocol II come into force. Finally, if a conflict is recognised as a conflict within Additional Protocol I, article 1(4) it becomes subject to the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I".
"International humanitarian law applies different rules depending on whether an armed conflict is international or internal in nature. Commentators agree that the distinction is 'arbitrary', 'undesirable', 'difficult to justify', and that it 'frustrates the humanitarian purpose of the law of war in most of the instances in which war now occurs'. The views are not new. In 1948 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) presented a report recommending that the Geneva Conventions apply the full extent of international humanitarian law "in all cases of armed conflict which are not of an international character, especially cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion, which may occur in the territory of one or more of the High Contracting Parties". In 1971, it submitted a draft to the Conference of Government Experts recommending a further proposition that was intended to make the whole body of international humanitarian law applicable to a civilian war if foreign troops intervened. The ICRC put forward a more subtle proposal along the same lines the following year. Finally in 1978 a Norwegian delegation of experts to the same conference proposed that the two categories of armed conflict be dropped in favour of a single law for all kinds of armed conflict, again without success. Somewhat surprisingly, calls for a unified body of international humanitarian law have since died out, even though 'the manifold expressions of dissatisfaction with a dichotomy between international and internal armed conflicts' persist."
"70. Traditionally, international humanitarian law has sought to regulate the conduct of and damage caused by conflict between rather than within States. The distinction was based on the premise that internal armed violence raises questions of sovereign governance and not international regulations. On that basis, the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions respecting the laws and customs of war on land apply solely to international warfare.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 continue to very heavily favour regulation of inter-state rather then domestic warfare, the vast majority of the substantive provisions contained in the Geneva Convention 1949 applying solely to:
' all cases of declared war of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance'. [article 2]
Although the scope of the article was more restrictive than some would have hoped, the wording marked an important departure from earlier Conventions that have required more formalistic declarations of war. From the perspective of internationalized armed conflicts, which are often characterised by covert rather than direct military action, the change was critical.
In addition, the international communities' experience of the Spanish Civil War, which was in fact heavily internationalised, and the mass of atrocities committed against minority groups within individual nations during the Second World War, contributed to a political willingness to at least superficially regulate some aspects of civil war. After considerable disagreement in giving that willingness form, article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 extended the most rudimentary principles of humanitarian protection to those persons taking no active part in hostilities and placed hors de combat. The problematic issue of defining internal armed conflict was circumvented by a negative definition that rendered common article 3 applicable in 'armed conflicts not of international character' even if 'one of the most assured things that might be said about the words 'not of an international character' is that no one can say with assurance precisely what they were intended to convey'. Although the substance of common article 3 defines principles of the Conventions and stipulates certain imperative rules, the article does not contain specific provisions. In addition, the scant principles enumerated in it apply only where the intensity of hostilities reaches the level of 'protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such armed groups'.
The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions continue the distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts 'leaving unresolved the troublesome question of the law to be applied to armed conflicts in which there are both international non-international elements'. Additional Protocol I sought to reaffirm and develop the rules affecting victims of international armed conflicts, specifically indicating in article 1 that 'this Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims, shall apply in the situations referred to in article 2 common to those Conventions'. Tellingly in relation to internationalised armed conflicts, article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I also explicitly provides that ' armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination' automatically qualifies international armed conflict for the purposes of the Protocol. Although the subject of some considerable criticism, the inclusion of such conflicts within the scope of article 1(4) confirms that the dichotomy between international and non-international conflict is far from strict or principled: international armed conflict is not a synonym for inter-state warfare, nor does the full extent of international humanitarian law presuppose that the collective belligerents must be States.
The more limited development of the law applicable in non-international armed conflicts was continued by Additional Protocol II, which sought to develop and supplement article 3, until the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. While providing greater clarity to the broad principles identified in common article 3, Additional Protocol II set a significantly higher threshold for its own application, limiting its scope:
'to all armed conflicts which are not covered by article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organised armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this protocol'.
Therefore, unlike common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II will not apply to conflicts between two warring dissident groups. It will also only apply in conflicts that in fact approximate to traditional conceptions of inter-state warfare, namely where an organised dissident armed force exercises military control over a part of a territory of State Party.
In the context of internationalised armed conflicts, which by definition contain both international and internal elements, determining which set of rules applies and to what aspects of the conflict is critically important".
"Superficially, the difference between substantive regulation of international armed conflicts and the laws applicable in non-international armed conflicts is striking. As a reflection of the historical bias in international humanitarian law towards the regulation of inter-state warfare, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols contain close to 600 articles, of which only article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 28 articles of additional Protocol II apply to internal conflict. In addition and as previously mentioned, the law of the Hague addressing methods and means of combat and conduct of armies in the field is not applicable in internal armed conflicts.
"Yet somewhat ironically given the staunch opposition to explicitly assimilating the laws of war applicable in internal and international armed conflict, there is now extensive literature that suggests that customary international law has developed to a point where the gap between the two regimes is less marked." [footnote 48 refers to a number of academic articles in support of that proposition] The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadic Jurisdiction Appeal held that customary rules governing internal conflicts include:
"Protection of civilians from hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate attacks, protection of civilian objects, in particular cultural property, protection of all those who do not (or no longer) take active part in hostilities, as well as prohibition of means of warfare proscribed in international armed conflicts and ban of certain methods of conducting hostilities" (paragraph 127 of the judgment).
"126. The emergence of the aforementioned general rules on internal armed conflicts does not imply that internal strife is regulated by general international law in all its aspects. Two particular limitations may be noted: (i) only a number of rules and principles governing international armed conflicts have gradually been extended to apply to internal conflict; and (ii) this extension has not taken place in the form of a full and mechanical transplant of those rules to internal conflict; rather, the general essence of those rules, and not the detailed regulation they may contain, has become applicable to internal conflicts".
"127.Notwithstanding these limitations, it cannot be denied that the customary rules developed to govern internal strife. These rules, as specifically identified in the preceding discussion, cover such areas as protection of civilians from hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate attacks, protection of civilian objects, in particular cultural property, protection of all those who do not (or no longer) take active part in hostilities, as well as prohibition of means of warfare proscribed in international armed conflicts and ban of certain methods of conducting hostilities".
"83. The requirement that the conflict be international for the grave breaches .. to operate pursuant to article 2 of the statute has not been contested by the parties.
84. It is indisputable that an armed conflict is international if it takes place between two or more States. In addition, in the case of an internal armed conflict breaking out on the territory of the State, it may become international (or, depending upon the circumstances, be international in character alongside an internal armed conflict) if (i) another state intervenes in that conflict through its troops or alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other state.
85. In the instant case, the Prosecution claims that at all relevant times, the conflict was an international armed conflict between two States, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina ("BH") on the one hand and the FRY on the other. Judge McDonald, in her dissent, also found the conflict to be international at all relevant times.
86. The Trial Chamber found the conflict to be an international armed conflict between BH and FRY until 19 May 1992, when the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the Trial Chamber did not explicitly state what the nature of the conflict was after 19 May 1992. As the prosecution points out "the Trial Chamber made no express finding on the classification of the armed conflict between the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) and the BH after the VRS was established in May 1992". Nevertheless it may be held that the Trial Chamber at least simplicity considered that after 19 May 1992 the conflict became internal in nature.
87. In the instant case, there is sufficient evidence to justify the Trial Chamber's finding of fact that the conflict prior to 19 May 1992 was international in character. The question whether after 19 May 1992 it continued to be international or became instead exclusively internal turns on the issue of whether Bosnian Serb forces in his hands the Bosnian victims in this case found themselves could be considered as de jure or de facto organs of a foreign power, namely the FRY." ([1999] ICTY 2)
The submissions
"third-country nationals or stateless persons who have had to leave their country or region of origin, or have been evacuated, in particular in response to an appeal by international organisations, and are unable to return in safe and durable conditions because of the situation prevailing in that country, and who may fall within the scope of Article 1A of the Geneva Convention or other international or national instruments giving international protection, in particular:
(i) persons who have fled areas of armed conflict or endemic violence:
(ii) persons at serious risk of, or who have been the victims of, systematic or generalised violations of their human rights;"
The existence of a "mass influx of displaced persons" is to be established by a Council Decision adopted by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission (article 5(1)). This, the respondent contends, demonstrates that the level of armed conflict envisaged in article 15(c) "is armed conflict of a scale that induces people to flee the relevant area".
"40. Finally, it is a matter of great legal and practical importance that any decision on whether there is, or is not, armed conflict in any part of Somalia is by reference to that term as defined for the purposes of article 15(c) alone. The Tribunal is respectfully requested to make clear in its judgment that its decision has no wider ramifications in terms of whether, as a matter of international law (including international humanitarian law), there is any such armed conflict. For the reasons set out above, it is submitted that it is entirely appropriate to recognise that article 15(c) contains the use of the term 'armed conflict' that is autonomous from these other areas of international law. Such an approach best serves the purpose underlying article 15(c). Nevertheless, any characterisation by the English courts of broader application would be to stray into highly sensitive areas that are matters for foreign policy and military determination".
"2. The Tribunal raised the possibility of inconsistent decisions, i.e. a prior decision of an International Tribunal such as the ICTFY, or of the Security Council, and a subsequent decision of the AIT taken in applying different criteria. In these circumstances, however, the AIT (and all parties) would have the previous decision firmly in mind in coming to any determination.
3. Of very real concern to the SSHD is a situation where the AIT would have made a determination strictly applying international humanitarian law, e.g. that there is no armed conflict in State A, but then (i) the FCO or MoD come to a different conclusion on the materials and intelligence before them or (ii) there is a subsequent Security Council resolution mandating the use of force that is predicated on the existence of an international or non-international armed conflict. One point is that the determination of whether or not armed violence is [such an armed conflict is] of huge importance including in terms of targeting decisions (of particular importance where UK troops are involved in some form). See eg. The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict at 15.6 [respondent's authorities bundle, tab 41, page 387]: a distinction is to be drawn between those who are taking a direct part in hostilities and may be attacked ".
..
5. The SSHD is certainly alive to the concerns expressed by the Tribunal as to a consistent approach to the Directive across Member States. But that concern is met if the Tribunal decides that it wants to look at or even largely borrow from international humanitarian law definitions (insofar as these exist). It is indeed correct that the SSHD does not object to 'mining of the quarry', although it has separately made the point that there is an absence of rich seams to be found. As demonstrated in the passage from the Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict at 3.3.1, the definitions derived from Tadic 'do not deal with the threshold for an armed conflict' and it later states in terms (at 15.3.1) that: attempts to define the term "armed conflict" have proved unsuccessful ".
6. It is also to be noted that the SSHD's concerns are not rooted in comity. (The starting point of the submissions advanced, but rejected in Krotov). Even the concern that a judicial characterisation of a situation as an armed conflict as a matter of international humanitarian law may lead to escalation is rooted in foreign policy, not an unwillingness to see matters determined that should be left to other States. The concern is that foreign policy decisions of the FCO (including the application of Security Council resolutions), and military and strategic decisions of the MoD, should be made unhindered by the existence of AIT adjudications on whether as a matter of international humanitarian law there is an armed conflict in a given State".
"18. There have been various uses made in the instant case of the metaphor of "mining the quarry of international humanitarian law". The Secretary of State's initial position (and still clearly preferred one) is that the Tribunal should not even enter the quarry. Under examination from the Tribunal that position has now shifted to the extent that the Tribunal can now mine at the quarry, i.e. 'look at or even largely borrow from international humanitarian law definitions'. It is difficult to reconcile the Tribunal being able to 'look at' or 'borrow' from humanitarian law definitions but not strictly apply international humanitarian law "
The Tribunal's assessment of the expert evidence
Evidence of Professor Lewis
Evidence of Dr Luling
Evidence of Dr Mullen
The Tribunal's analysis of the current situation
The position of clans and groups in Mogadishu: attitudes and behaviour of the combatants
Majority clans
Minority clans and groups
The general security position in Mogadishu and the relevance of clan areas and support networks
"9.03 The source said that his airline had not cancelled a flight to Mogadishu since 1991 He explained that the airline works with whoever is in control on the ground in Mogadishu to ensure the safe operation of the flights, be that the UIC as before, or the TFG now.
9.05 He explained that the airline has 'special status' in Somalia and that it would be in no-one's interests to harm the flights. He said that any fighting around the airports stops during the times the flights arrive. When questioned on this, he explained that it is quite likely that all sides will have their own people on the flight. Also, because the current conflict is political rather than clan based, the clans do not want to kill members of another clan which would lead to retributive attacks.
9.06 Asked about travel from Mogadishu International Airport to Mogadishu, the source said that there were no difficulties. He contrasted this with the previous situation, under the warlords, when flights had been to Bale Dogle airport, around 90kms from Mogadishu. From there, he said, it had been necessary for people to arrange militia escorts because there were so many roadblocks but that did not apply from Mogadishu International. He said that his airline had never had a passenger ambushed.
9.07 The source said that he did not know what the current position was following the US airstrikes on 26 April, but before the airstrikes there were always lines of taxis queuing up outside Mogadishu International. There was no problem for anyone to take a taxi into Mogadishu and there were no roadblocks or checkpoints to impede their 12km journey. When asked about the situation for those who wished to travel elsewhere in Somalia he thought that, distance aside, this was no more difficult than travelling into Mogadishu." (R3, pages 1143 and 1144)
In the July 2007 report, the airline executive told the delegation:
"1. The source said that flights continue to operate between Nairobi and Mogadishu International Airport via Aden and Berera. Traffic is now building up again after the conflict. Numbers have been thin on the flight into Mogadishu, but the source did not consider that this was because of the security situation. Normal turnaround for the flights in Mogadishu is 45 minutes to 1 hour, and they remain in Mogadishu for a maximum of four hours. No flight has ever been cancelled for security reasons.
2. The airline operates its own minibus to transport its staff from Mogadishu International Airport into and around Mogadishu city, including the airline's three offices in North, South and Central Mogadishu. Although not technically for airline passengers' use, on the infrequent occasions when regular public transport has been interrupted, the airline's minibus has been used to transfer passengers into the city. The airline had not encountered any difficulties in operating this service and at no time had its staff or passengers come to any harm. In addition to the airline's own transport, the source informed the delegation that there were regular minibus services from the airport into the city and taxis were freely available.
3. To illustrate the ease with which travel from the airport to and within Mogadishu could be undertaken, the source invited a member of the delegation to speak on the telephone with a member of his staff who was based in and lived in Mogadishu. The source called the member of staff on his mobile telephone, explained why the delegation wished to speak to him , and told him to answer honestly any questions he was asked. The staff member in Mogadishu told the delegate that the had driven in his private motor car from Mogadishu International Airport to his home in the Halanie district, on the opposite side of Mogadishu, two hours previously. He makes this journey every working day and, apart from routine checks at TFG operated checkpoints, has never encountered any difficulty. Nor had he ever heard of any airline passenger being mistreated en route from the airport into the city, and seemed surprised at the question." (R2, page 624)
Although this evidence is in some respects qualified or contradicted by other sources to whom the Mission spoke, its provenance is, in our view, such that it cannot lightly be discounted. It also chimes with the evidence regarding Somalis travelling back and forth between Somalia and the United Kingdom and with the UN source (R2, page 617), who said that passengers "arriving at MIA or K50 airports should generally not have any difficulty travelling into Mogadishu or anywhere else" and that a passenger bound for Mogadishu "would not need a protective escort".
Women
The Ashraf and other minority groups
The position outside Mogadishu
The Tribunal's findings on the legal issues regarding article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive
(a) Meaning of international or internal armed conflict
"an armed conflict exists wherever there is a resort to armed force between states or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a state" (paragraph 70 of the jurisdiction judgment).
The Appeals Chamber specifically recognised (at paragraph 67) that "the definition of armed conflict" varies depending on whether the hostilities are international or internal. That, no doubt, is the reason for its use in paragraph 70 of the criterion of "protracted" in connection with internal armed conflict.
(b) The Tribunal's conclusions on the meaning of international or internal armed conflict
(a) any difference between States leads to the intervention of members of the armed forces (Pictet, Commentary, volume 3, 23); or
(b) whenever there is a resort to armed force between States (Tadic jurisdictional judgment, paragraph 70); or
(c) whenever there is protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State (ibid).
"[In the] case of an internal armed conflict breaking out on the territory of a State, it may become international (or, depending upon the circumstances, be international in character alongside an internal armed conflict) if (i) another State intervenes in that conflict through its troops, or alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other State."
(c) The temporal and geographic extent of an armed conflict
(d) " serious and individual "
(e) " threat to a civilian's life or person "
(f) "indiscriminate violence"
Armed conflict in Mogadishu
The Tribunal's assessment of the appellants' cases
Appellant H
Appellant S
Appellant A
General findings and conclusions
(1) In deciding whether an international or internal armed conflict exists for the purposes of paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules and the Qualification Directive (but not for any wider purpose see paragraph 312 above), the Tribunal will pay particular regard to the definitions to be found in the judgments of international tribunals concerned with international humanitarian law (such as the Tadic jurisdictional judgment). Those definitions are necessarily imprecise and the identification of a relevant armed conflict is predominantly a question of fact.
(2) It will in general be very difficult for a person to succeed in a claim to humanitarian protection solely by reference to paragraph 339C(iv) of the Immigration Rules and article 15(c) of the Directive, ie. without showing a real risk of ECHR article 2 or article 3 harm.
(3) Applying the definitions drawn from the Tadic jurisdictional judgment, for the purposes of paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules and the Qualification Directive, on the evidence before us, an internal armed conflict exists in Mogadishu. The zone of conflict is confined to the city and international humanitarian law applies to the area controlled by the combatants, which comprises the city, its immediate environs and the TFG/Ethiopian supply base of Baidoa.
(4) A person is not at real risk of serious harm as defined in paragraph 339C by reason only of his or her presence in that zone or area.
(5) Neither the TFG/Ethiopians nor the UIC and its associates are targeting clans or groups for serious harm. Whilst both sides in the conflict have acted from time to time in such a way as to cause harm to civilians, they are not in general engaging in indiscriminate violence.
(6) Clan support networks in Mogadishu, though strained, have not collapsed. A person from a majority clan or whose background discloses a significant degree of assimilation with or acceptance by a majority clan will in general be able to rely on that clan for support and assistance, including at times of displacement as a result of security operations, etc. Majority clans continue to have access to arms, albeit that their militias no longer control the city.
(7) A member of a minority clan or group who has no identifiable home area where such support as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (6) above can be found will in general be at real risk of serious harm of being targeted by criminal elements, both in any area of former residence and in the event (which is reasonably likely) of being displaced as described in sub-paragraph (6) above. That risk is directly attributable to the person's ethnicity and is a sufficient differential feature to engage the Refugee Convention, as well as article 3 of the ECHR and paragraph 339C/article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive (but for the first sub-paragraph (ii) of paragraph 339C).
(8) The evidence discloses no other relevant differentiating feature for the purposes of those Conventions and the Directive.
(9) The issue of whether a person from a minority clan or group falls within sub-paragraph (7) above will often need specific and detailed consideration.
(10) Subject to sub-paragraph (9) above, outside Mogadishu and its immediate environs, the position in southern Somalia is not significantly different from that analysed in NM.
(11) Air travel to and from Mogadishu has not been significantly interrupted; nor has the mobile telephone network in southern Somalia.
Signed Date: 22 January 2008
Senior Immigration Judge P R Lane
APPENDIX
Various dates |
|
UN Security Council resolutions on Somalia |
Various dates |
|
Miscellaneous Hansard Extracts |
October 1999 |
|
Tampere European Council Conclusions |
1 March 2000 |
|
US State Department: Somalia: profile of asylum claims and country conditions |
July 2000 |
|
Journal of Humanitarian Assistance: International Law and internal armed conflict – clarifying the interplay between human rights and humanitarian protection, Mark Freeman |
1 December 2000 |
|
Joint British, Danish and Dutch Fact Finding Mission to Nairobi, Kenya: Report on minority groups in Somalia |
June 2002 |
|
International Committee of the Red Cross: The Law of Armed Conflict, Basic Knowledge. |
25 July 2002 |
|
Joint British, Danish and Dutch fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Baidoa and Belet Weyne Somalia: Report on political, security and human rights development in Southern and Central Somalia, including South West of Somalia, and Puntland State of Somalia |
1 August 2002 |
|
Full OCHA report of 1 Aug 2002 |
30 June 2003 |
|
International Review of the Red Cross: Towards a single definition of armed conflict in International Humanitarian law. A critique of Internationalised armed conflict No. 850, p313-350, James G. Stewart |
20 January 2004 |
|
UNHCR: position on the Return of Rejected Asylum Seekers to Somalia |
25 February 2004 |
|
US State Department: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2003: Somalia |
17 March 2004 |
|
Joint Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and British fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya: Human rights and Security in Central and Southern Somalia |
May 2004 |
|
Home Office Immigration and Nationality Directorate: Operational Guidance Note: Somalia |
13 May 2004 |
|
IRIN News: Death toll mounts as fighting in Mogadishu continues |
16-22 May 2004
1 July 2004 |
|
United Kingdom Ministry OCHA: Somalia - Humanitarian Update
United Kingdom Ministry of Defence: The Manual of Armed Conflict |
8 July 2004 |
|
Medicins Sans Frontiers UK: Not safe to return – MSF attacks Home Office’s forcible return of failed asylum seekers to Mogadishu |
9 August 2004 |
|
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Somalia: The Situation of minority groups and their members |
October 2004 |
|
Home Office Immigration and Nationality Directorate: Somali Country Report, October 2004, UK |
24 November 2004 |
|
IDP Project, Norwegian Refugee Council: Internally displaced Somalis face uncertain future after years of state collapse |
May 2005 |
|
Refugee Studies Centre: Revised version of paper presented at the Conference “How much freedom, security and justice? Developments in Eu Ayslum and Immigration Law ”Dr Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo |
30 June 2005 |
|
IBID: Operational Guidance Note: Somalia |
November 2005 |
|
UNHCR: UNHCR Advisory on the Return of Somali Nationals to Somalia |
21 November 2005 |
|
IBID: Operational Guidance Note: Somalia |
5 May 2006 |
|
Border and Immigration Agency: Operational Guidance Note: Somalia |
29 June 2006 |
|
US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations: Joint Hearing: Somalia: Expanding Crisis in the Horn of Africa |
13 September 2006 |
|
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Report of the Independent Expert, Mr Ghanim Alnajjar, on the situation of human rights in Somalia |
October 2006 – September 2007 |
|
SAACID – Light Weapon Prices – Mogadishu |
27 October 2006 |
|
Border and Immigration Agency: Operational Guidance Note: Somalia |
19 December 2006 |
|
Reuters: UN reports growing food insecurity |
21 December 2006 |
|
BBC News: Somali town on the brink of war |
23 December 2006 |
|
BBC News: Somalia Islamists call for help |
25 December 2006 |
|
BBC News: Ethiopia attacks Somalia airports |
1 January 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somalia’s sudden shift in power |
2 January 2007 |
|
BBC News: Ethiopians to stay on in Somalia |
2 January 2007 |
|
BBC News: Fragile peace fuels Somalia fears |
9 January 2007 |
|
BBC News: US ‘targets al-Qaeda’ in Somalia |
13 January 2007 |
|
BBC News: Martial Law declared in Somalia |
11 January 2007 |
|
BBC News: Fears stalk Somalia’s capital once again |
11 January 2007 |
|
ICRC calls for respect for Intl Humanitarian law |
12 January 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: children, women most affected by fighting |
17 January 2007 |
|
Border and Immigration Agency: Freedom of Information Request: Somali removals |
17 January 2007 |
|
Power and Interest News Reports: Somalia’s political future appears to be its Pre-Courts past |
18 January 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: UN calls for immediate re-engagement |
23 January 2007 |
|
BBC News: Ethiopia starts Somalia pull out |
24 January 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somali airport comes under fire |
26 January 2007 |
|
BBC News: Five killed in Mogadishu attacks |
26 January 2007 |
|
International Crisis Group: Somalia: the tough part is ahead |
28 January 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somali conflict leaves region unstable |
2 February 2007 |
|
BBC News: Mortar attacks in Somali capital |
2 February 2007 |
|
IBID: Somalia enters a devolutionary cycle |
6 February 2007 |
|
US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Exploring a Comprehensive Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Counter Terrorism Strategy for Somalia |
9 February 2007 |
|
BBC News: Peacekeeping protests in Somalia |
13 February 2007 |
|
BBC News: Residents flee Mogadishu blast |
15 February 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: Mogadishu residents back to living in constant danger |
19 February 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: violence out of control, say Mogadishu residents |
21 February 2007 |
|
Society for Threatened Peoples: African peace force will not bring any peace to Somalia |
22 February 2007 |
|
BBC News: Airport attack in Somali capital |
23 February 2007 |
|
Power and Interest News Reports: Somalia reverts to political fragmentation |
26 February 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: ICRC counts cost to civilians |
28 February 2007 |
|
BBC News: More attacks in Somalia’s capital |
28 February 2007 |
|
UN: Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia |
1 March 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: “AU mission will not impose peace – Museveni” |
1 March 2007 |
|
BBC News: Ugandan force ‘not peacekeepers’ |
2 March 2007 |
|
Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Country Profile on Somalia |
6 March 2007 |
|
BBC News: African force attacked in Somalia |
6 March 2007 |
|
US State Department: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006: Somalia |
8 March 2007 |
|
BBC News: African force ambushed in Somalia |
9 March 2007 |
|
BBC News: AU troops ‘may spark Somalia war’ |
12 March 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somalia MPs back Mogadishu move |
15 March 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: up to 40,000 civilians flee Mogadishu |
19 March 2007 |
|
Power and Interest News Reports: Somalia’s drama: can the TFG do it? |
20 March 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somali tops minority threat list |
20 March 2007 |
|
Minority Groups International: Somalia tops list of countries where minorities most under threat |
21 March 2007 |
|
BBC News: Heavy fighting in Somali capital |
22 March 2007 |
|
Amnesty International: Somalia: Amnesty International denounces abuses in escalating Mogadishu conflict and killing of human rights defender |
22 March 2007 |
|
BBC News: Battles resume in Somali capital |
22 March 2007 |
|
House of Commons: Immigrants: Somalia |
23 March 2007 |
|
BBC News: Plane ‘shot down’ in Somali city |
23 March 2007 |
|
OCHA: Somalia - Humanitarian Update |
29 March 2007 |
|
BBC News: Helicopters fire on Somali market |
31 March 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somalis cower as fighting rages |
31 March 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somali violence ‘worst in years’ |
1 April 2007 |
|
BBC News: Fighting rages in Somali capital |
4 April 2007 |
|
Amnesty International: Somalia: fears of resumption of conflict in Mogadishu 400 civilians killed and thousands fleeing |
2 April 2007 |
|
BBC News: Extra troops enter Somali battle |
2 April 2007 |
|
BBC News: Thousands flee Somalia fighting |
27 April 2007 |
|
HJT Research: Somalia becomes the world’s worst refugee crisis as clan divisions, ‘war on terror’ fuel the conflict |
4 April 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: UN decries deaths in Mogadishu |
4 April 2007 |
|
Border and Immigration Agency: Operational Guidance Note: Somalia |
10 April 2007 |
|
BBC News: Mogadishu clashes ‘killed 1,000’ |
12 April 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: fighting threatens peace efforts in Mogadishu |
12 April 2007 |
|
Power and Interest News Reports: Somalia seized with stasis |
13 April 2007 |
|
BBC News: Ethiopia in Somali ‘genocide’ row |
18 April 2007 |
|
BBC News: Fresh fatalities in Somali clash |
19 April 2007 |
|
BBC News: Heavy shelling in Somali capital |
20 April 2007 |
|
BBC News: Fierce Somali clashes ‘kill 113’ |
20 April 2007 |
|
Somali.net: Punthiopians shell Children’s hospital in Mogadishu |
22 April 2007 |
|
BBC News: Scores killed in Somalia clashes |
23 April 2007 |
|
BBC News: Family’s nightmare escape from Mogadishu |
23 April 2007 |
|
Kavkaz Center: Govt loses Kismayo, fighting in Mogadishu continues |
24 April 2007 |
|
Amnesty International: Somalia: protection of civilians must be priority |
24 April 2007 |
|
BBC News: Ethiopian tanks pound Mogadishu |
25 April 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somalia at edge of the grave |
26 April 2007 |
|
BBC News: Premier claims Somali ‘victory’ |
26 April 2007 |
|
BBC News: Clan divisions behind Somali violence |
26 April 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somali woman leader’s peace call |
27 April 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somali is ‘worst refugee crisis’ |
3 May 2007 |
|
Power and Interest News Reports: Somalia falls into political collapse |
7 May 2007 |
|
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Somalia: the situation of women |
7 May 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: Bintow Hassas: “I don’t see any future here” |
9 May 2007 |
|
Freedom House: The Worst of the Worst: the world’s most repressive societies 2007 |
10 May 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: Habibo Muhammad: “no one could survive Mogadishu” |
14 May 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somalia – ‘a depressing prospect’ |
14 May 2007 |
|
BBC News: UN to probe Somali human rights |
14 May 2007 |
|
BBC News: Mogadishu seeks a makeover |
15 May 2007 |
|
BBC News: Ethiopia warned on Somali pullout |
16 May 2007 |
|
BBC News: AU peacekeepers killed in Somalia |
17 May 2007 |
|
Border and Immigration Agency: Report of the Information Gathering Mission to Somalia |
22 May 2007 |
|
BBC News: UN in row over crisis in Somalia |
23 May 2007 |
|
Amnesty International Report 2007: Somalia |
24 May 2007 |
|
IBID: Somalia: the dynamics of post-intervention political Failure |
6 June 2007 |
|
BBC News: Ethiopia PM makes Somali promise |
14 June 2007 |
|
Power and Interest News Reports: Somalia continues its political collapse |
15 June 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: one third of conflict victims were children – UN |
18 June 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somalia in the eye of the storm |
19 June 2007 |
|
BBC News: Amnesty for Somalia’s Islamists |
20 June 2007 |
|
BBC News: Police stations raided in Somalia |
20 June 2007 |
|
UN: Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia. |
25 June 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: insecurity restricting aid operations |
25 June 2007 |
|
United Nations: Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Somalia |
26 June 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: returnees killed waiting for food distribution |
29 June 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somali PM wants UN peacekeepers |
4 July 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: violence forcing residents out of the capital again |
6 July 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somali children die in mine blast |
11 July 2007 |
|
BBC News: Plotters’ links with East Africa |
12 July 2007 |
|
BBC News: Heavy shelling in Somali capital |
19 July 2007 |
|
Border and Immigration Agency: Letter to Sheikh and Co |
19 July 2007 |
|
Power and Interest News Reports: Somalia’s compromised National Reconciliation Conference |
20 July 2007 |
|
Border and Immigration Agency: Report of Fact Finding Mission to Somalia |
23 July 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somalis flee as attacks escalate |
23 July 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: IDPs in dire need as more flee violence |
26 July 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Ethiopia-Somalia: new camp opened for Somali refugees |
27 July 2007 |
|
BBC News: Eritrea ‘arming’ Somali militia |
31 July 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somali gunmen attack Ethiopians |
1 August 2007 |
|
Danish Immigration Service: Human rights and security in central and southern Somalia |
3 August 2007 |
|
UNICEF: Calls for protection of Somalia’s children, warns of unexploded ordnance |
9 August 2007 |
|
9th European Country of Origin Info Seminar, Dr Cedric Barnes, SOAS |
9 August 2007 |
|
Dr Cedric Barnes: Country Report – Somalia |
10 August 2007 |
|
BBC News: Fierce fighting rocks Mogadishu |
22 August 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: displaced people branded ‘terrorists’ by Mogadishu Mayor |
13 August 2007 |
|
BBC News: War crimes ‘rampant’ in Somalia |
14 August 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: policemen killed as bloodshed in Mogadishu continues |
15 August 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somalia plans for a ‘green zone’ |
15 August 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: “life in Mogadishu is so bad we’ll risk our lives to escape” |
21 August 2007 |
|
BBC News: UN extends AU’s Somalia mission |
3 September 2007 |
|
Voice of America News: 18,000 flee Mogadishu in August 50,000 since June |
5 September 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: Zahra Aldille, an IDP in Merka: ‘Every day we heard explosions’ |
7 September 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia-Kenya: women bear the brunt of the Somali conflict |
10 September 2007 |
|
Voice of America News: Terror finds a home in Mogadishu |
12 September 2007 |
|
BBC News: New Somali alliance threatens war |
12 September 2007 |
|
UNICEF: warns of critical levels of malnutrition amongst Somali children |
13 September 2007 |
|
Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Travel Advice on Somalia |
13 September 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: call to help neglected IDP’s |
14 September 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somali insurgents attack police |
17 September 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somali clan unity deal rejected |
17 September 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: ‘what have we done to deserve this?’ |
17 September 2007 |
|
UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Humanitarian Situation in Somalia: Monthly Analysis August 2007 |
19 September 2007 |
|
Power and Interest News Reports: The Failure of ‘Reconciliation’ and ‘Reconstruction’ opens up a Political Vacuum in Somalia |
21 September 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: hundreds of thousands need urgent aid, says Government |
24 September 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: Nadifo Gedi: ‘I have never begged but I am close to it now’ |
27 September 2007 |
|
United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights: Following his mission to Somalia expert deeply concerned about continued deterioration in human rights situation |
October 2007 |
|
Human Rights Watch to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: The Human Rights and Humanitarian Situation in the Horn of Africa”, October 2007 |
October 2007 |
|
Letter from UNHCR, London, October 2007 and Representation on Somalia (15 February 2007) |
3 October 2007 |
|
BBC News: Fire engulfs main Somali market |
5 October 2007 |
|
UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Somalia: Situation Report – 5 October 2007 |
8 October 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: families flee escalating violence |
9 October 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: Nearly seven people including four soldiers wounded |
9 October 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: Fresh fire fight takes place in Mogadishu |
9 October 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: Families flee escalating violence |
10 October 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: IDPs cause overcrowding in Galgadud towns |
12 October 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somalia’s political swords are drawn |
12 October 2007 |
|
Border and Immigration Agency: Operational Guidance Note |
16 October 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: Somalia – a women beheaded a B/Weyn town in central Somalia |
16 October 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: Fresh clashes and mortar attacks injure over 30 people in Mogadishu |
16 October 2007 |
|
BBC News: Battle erupts in Somali capital |
17 October 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: Four people died in dreadful combat overnight in the capital Mogadishu |
17 October 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: 3 civilians killed in Mogadishu |
18 October 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: Explosions rock the capital |
19 October 2007 |
|
IBID: Humanitarian Situation in Somalia – Monthly Analysis |
19 October 2007 |
|
UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Somalia: Situation Report – 19 October 2007 |
22 October 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: thousands flee homes in disputed region fearing renewed clashes |
23 October 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: Urgent assistance plea for 10,000 displaced Mogadishu families |
23 October 2007 |
|
UN: Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Somalia |
24 October 2007 |
|
BBC News: Peacekeeping attacked in Somalia |
25 October 2007 |
|
United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights: Displaced women tell tales of rape and fear in Somalia |
26 October 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: UN agencies team up to help rape victims |
26 October 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: Women plagued by rape as crime rules collapsed state |
26 October 2007 |
|
Voice of America News: Somalia faces major humanitarian crisis |
27 October 2007 |
|
BBC News: Heavy fighting in Somali capital |
28 October 2007
28 October 2007 |
|
BBC News: Mogadishu hit by fresh fighting
UN: Report of the Secretary General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict |
29 October 2007 |
|
BBC News: Profile: Ali Mohamed Ghedi |
29 October 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: prime minister quits; violence rocks Mogadishu |
30 October 2007 |
|
UN: Somalia: Mogadishu violence sets off new wave of displacement |
31 October 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: Almost 88,000 displaced during weekend violence in Mogadishu |
31 October 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: Peace bid a ‘nightmare’ |
31 October 2007 |
|
Somalia NGO Consortium: International NGO’s cannot adequately respond to the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia |
31 October 2007 |
|
UN: Latest figures show 90,000 flee fighting in Mogadishu |
1 November 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: CARE warns of potential famine unless humanitarian access is provided to Somalia |
1 November 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: Kenya should help out of mess |
1 November 2007 |
|
BBC News Articles: Warning of Somali Catastrophe |
1 November 2007 |
|
BBC News: Warning of Somali ‘catastrophe’ |
1 November 2007 |
|
Reuters: Mogadishu violence displaces 88,000 people |
2 November 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: Catholic, other agencies overwhelmed by humanitarian crisis |
2 November 2007 |
|
BBC News Articles: Heavy battles in Somali capital |
2 November 2007 |
|
BBC News: Heavy battles in Somali capital |
2 November 2007 |
|
UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Situation Report No.58 – 2 November 2007 |
3 November 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: Fresh skirmishes flare up in Mogadishu |
3 November 207 |
|
Reuters: Life claimed combat at Bakool region in south overnight |
4 November 2007 |
|
Reuters: Ethiopia reinforces troops in Somalia |
5 November 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: Fresh clashes break out in country’s capital |
5 November 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: thousands more leave capital as troops converge |
5 November 2007 |
|
Speech by Jonathan Evans, Head of MI5: Terrorism is ‘product of extremist ideology’ |
5 November 2007 |
|
The Independent: Fresh violence and ‘climate of fear’ pushes Somalia towards breaking point |
6 November 2007 |
|
Inter Press Service News Agency: Politics – Somalia: ‘Humpty Dumpty has fallen off the wall’ |
6 November 2007 |
|
United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights: Somalia: inter agency UN team finds displaced living in extremely harsh conditions |
7 November 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): ‘Somalia: Mogadishu residents trapped by violence – MSF’ 7/11/2007 |
7 November 2007
7 November 2007 |
|
IRIN: Somalia: Mogadishu residents trapped by violence –MSF
UN: Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Somalia |
|
|
|
7 November 2007 |
|
Medecins Sans Frontieres: Somalia: no place safe in Mogadishu |
8 November 2007 |
|
Reuters: UN peacekeeping force for Somalia not viable |
8 November 2007 |
|
Voice of America News: Mounting violence around Mogadishu displaces tens of thousands of Somali |
8 November 2007 |
|
Voice of America News: Transcript of VOA Somali service interview with Jendayi Frazer, Asst Secretary of State for African Affairs |
9 November 2007 |
|
All Africa.com: Mogadishu clashes devastating citizens |
9 November 2007 |
|
BBC News Articles: Dozens Die in Mogadishu reprisals |
9 November 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somalia peacekeepers not viable |
9 November 2007 |
|
Human Rights Watch: Somalia: Mogadishu Clashes Devastating Civilians, 9/11/2007 |
9 November 2007 |
|
Human Rights Watch: Somalia: Mogadishu clashes devastating civilians |
9 November 2007 |
|
OCHA Report 59 |
9 November 2007 |
|
Reuters: Dozens of corpses litter Mogadishu after battles |
9 November 2007 |
|
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): Somalia Situation Report, 9/11/2007 |
10 November 2007 |
|
BBC News Articles: Somalis flee Mogadishu fighting |
11 November 2007 |
|
Voice of America News: Somali capital empties as residents flee renewed violence |
12 November 2007 |
|
Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN): Somalia: Mounting bloodshed prompts pleas for help from Mogadishu, 12/11/2007 |
12 November 2007 |
|
OCHA – Oct 2007 |
13 November 2007 |
|
BBC News: Somalis asked to fight insurgents |
13 November 2007 |
|
BBC News: Displaced in Somalia – Yusuf |
14 November 2007 |
|
BBC News: Displaced in Somalia - Faduma |
14 November 2007 |
|
IRIN: UN Envoy calls for Intl Justice to stem violence |
14 November 2007 |
|
Voice of America: Somali Rights Activist charges all sides with war crimes |
15 November 2007 |
|
BBC News: Displaced in Somalia - Abdullahi |
15 November 207 |
|
HJT Country Database: European Parliament resolution of 15 November 2007 on Somalia |
16 November 2007 |
|
EU Parliament resolution on Somalia |
20 November 2007 |
|
BBC News (World, Africa): One million homeless in Somalia. |
20 November 2007 |
|
HJT Research: Situation in Somalia is worse in Africa as UN estimates a “staggering” one million displaced |
20 November 2007 |
|
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): Somalia: Number of displaced rises to one million |
20 November 2007 |
|
United Nations News: Concerned at conditions in Somalia, Security Council urges end to violence |
20 November 2007 |
|
United Nations News: Number of displaced in Somalia hits 1 million mark – UN Agency |
20 November 2007 |
|
Voice of America News: Tensions Grow in Somalia |
21 November 2007 |
|
Garowe Online: Roadblock militias attack governor’s convoy in central Somalia, 21/11/2007 |
21 November 2007 |
|
Garowe Online: Somalia mothers mourn as crisis grows, 21/11/2007 |
22 November 2007 |
|
The Independent: Somalia war-refugee crisis surpasses Darfur in its horror ( Steve Bloomfield) |