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The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Decisions
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Cite as:  UKPC 23
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 UKPC 23
Privy Council Appeal No 0060 of 2014
Bimini Blue Coalition Limited (Appellant) v The Prime Minister of The Bahamas and others (Respondents)
From the Court of Appeal of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas
JUDGMENT DELIVERED BY
24 July 2014
Heard on 16 June 2014
(Instructed by Sheridans)
|First, Second & Third Respondents
Peter Knox QC
(Instructed by Charles Russell LLP)
|Fourth, Fifth, Sixth & Seventh Respondents
Richard Gordon QC
(Instructed by Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP)
"We undertake that when we have all the approvals or permits required to commence dredging we shall give notice of this fact and provide copies of such approvals and permits to BBC before commencing dredging".
"As it is, because we differ from the majority of the Court of Appeal as to the strength of the applicants' case on the substantive legal point as to the applicability of the 1997 Act, because of our concerns over this very last minute permit, and because we think that refusing the injunction may undermine the JR proceedings, we think the right order to make is to grant the injunction. However, acknowledging the force of the respondents' arguments to the contrary, we are only prepared to do so on terms which enable the respondents to apply to discharge the injunction on very short notice and very quickly if and when they are able to establish that they are able to rely on the permit granted on the 22 May 2014. They may choose to wait and apply to the Court of Appeal on the 4 June or at any time thereafter as the Court of Appeal directs or thinks is appropriate, or they may be in a position to apply earlier, in which case, subject to what counsel have to say, we would have thought the right thing for them to do was to apply to the Supreme Court, but not to us.
We are anxious not to stand in the way of the Supreme Court's power to grant or refuse or discharge any injunction. We are equally anxious not to stand in the way of the Court of Appeal. We have had to consider this matter on short notice. They are the primary courts carrying out the functions of granting and refusing or discharging any injunctions. And therefore what we have had to say on the merits of the case should not be taken as written in stone, bearing in mind the very short time the parties have had to prepare for this appeal and the time that we have had to absorb the facts."
"That may come at the trial. But this is not a trial and it is not necessary to make findings of fact which will be inappropriate on this application. All it seems to me that the respondents have to do is to adduce sufficient evidence to establish prima facie that there is an arguable case that the permit is one on which they can rely. A permit that they can rely upon is simply one that is regular on its face and which has been issued by the proper authorities with conditions that have been complied with in the opinion of the decision-maker."
"An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders."