Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
AMM and others (conflict; humanitarian crisis; returnees; FGM)
Somalia CG [2011] UKUT 00445 (IAC)
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Field House
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Determination Promulgated
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On 13 to 21 June and 15 July 2011
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…………………………………
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Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LATTER
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE P R LANE
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEKIĆ
Between
AMM
MW
ZF
FM
AF
Appellants
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES
Intervening
Representation:
For Appellants AMM: Ronan
Toal, instructed by South Manchester Law Centre
For Appellant MW: Harriet
Short, instructed by Avon & Bristol Community Law Centre
For Appellant ZF: Mark
Schwenk, instructed by Parker Rhodes Hickmotts, Solicitors
For Appellant FM: Mark
Symes, instructed by Wilson Solicitors LLP
For Appellant AF: Ronan
Toal, instructed by Wilson Solicitors LLP
For the Respondent: Tim Eicke QC and Christopher Staker, instructed by the Treasury Solicitor
For the UNHCR: Tom
Hickman, instructed by Baker & McKenzie LLP
Law
1) Whilst section 2 of
the Human Rights Act 1998 and its associated case law requires United Kingdom
tribunals in general to give effect to the jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights, including that Court’s guidance on how to approach evidence in
international protection cases, the weighing of evidence and the drawing of
conclusions as to the relative weight to be placed on items of evidence adduced
before a United Kingdom tribunal are ultimately matters for that tribunal.
Whilst the factual finding the Strasbourg Court has made as a result of
applying its own guidance is something to which the domestic tribunal must have
regard, pursuant to section 2, it is not bound to reach the same finding.
2) There is nothing
jurisprudentially problematic with the Strasbourg Court’s judgment in Sufi
& Elmi v the United Kingdom [2011] ECHR 1045, as regards Article 3 of
the ECHR. The Court’s finding, that the predominant cause of the humanitarian
crisis in southern and central Somalia was due to the current warring parties,
meant that the high threshold (identified, inter alia, in N v United Kingdom
[2008] ECHR 453) for finding an Article 3 violation in the case of naturally
occurring phenomena did not need to be met.
3) That high threshold is, however, still
capable of being crossed in cases of sufficient exceptionality. In deciding
what constitutes an exceptional case, regard must be had to all the factors,
including the actions of the parties to a conflict, albeit that those actions
are not the predominant cause of the humanitarian crisis.
4) Despite the suggestion in the judgment
in Sufi & Elmi that there is no difference in the scope of, on the
one hand, Article 3 of the ECHR (and, thus, Article 15(b) of the Qualification
Directive) and, on the other, Article 15(c) of the Directive, the binding
Luxembourg case law of Elgafaji [2009] EUECJ C-465/07 (as well as the
binding domestic authority of QD (Iraq) [2009] EWCA Civ 620) makes it
plain that Article 15(c) can be satisfied without there being such a level of
risk as is required for Article 3 in cases of generalised violence (having
regard to the high threshold identified in NA v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 616). The difference appears to involve the fact that, as the CJEU
found at [33] of Elgafaji, Article 15(c) covers a “more general risk of
harm” than does Article 3 of the ECHR; that Article 15(c) includes types of
harm that are less severe than those encompassed by Article 3; and that the
language indicating a requirement of exceptionality is invoked for different
purposes in NA v United Kingdom and Elgafaji respectively.
5) Article 10 of the Qualification
Directive requires the holding of some sort of belief, comprising a coherent
and genuinely held system of values, whether these be theistic, non-theistic or
atheistic, and is not satisfied in the case of a person who holds no such
belief. Social restrictions, such as bans on watching football or television,
do not comprise an interference with the right to religion, in the case of a
person whose religious etc beliefs do not require him or her to participate in
those activities. It is immaterial that a person may be permitted, according to
those beliefs, to participate in the activities concerned.
6) Even where the motivation for a law is
religious, the religious aspect will not, without more, lay the basis of a
claim to international protection in relation to anyone who might fall foul of
that law. However, the more such religiously motivated laws interfere with
someone’s ability to hold and practise their religious or other beliefs, the
more intense will be the scrutiny.
7) The necessary religious element to
satisfy Article 1(A) of the Refugee Convention is not satisfied solely by
reference to the persecutor; but that element can be satisfied if the
persecutor ascribes to the victim a perceived religious opinion.
8) There is no general legal principle
that, in determining a person’s entitlement to international protection, the
Tribunal must leave out of account any possibility of that person’s carrying
out an act in the country of proposed return, which – if carried out in the
United Kingdom – would constitute a criminal offence. A genuine conscientious
objection to complying with unjust laws or demands may, however, provide an
entitlement to such protection.
9) On the assumption that Al-Shabab’s
likely behaviour towards those who transgress its rules is as found in this
determination, the position is as “extreme” as the factual basis in RT (Zimbabwe) [2010] EWCA Civ 1285. In the light of RT, a person from an Al-Shabab
area who can show they do not genuinely adhere to Al-Shabab’s ethos will have a
good claim to Refugee Convention protection, once outside Somalia (subject to
internal relocation and exclusion clause issues), regardless of whether the
person could and would “play the game”, by adhering to Al-Shabab’s rules. As
can be seen from a comparison with Sufi & Elmi, the effect of RT
is, accordingly, to take the Refugee Convention beyond the comparable ambit of
Article 3 ECHR protection.
10) There is no legal burden on the
Secretary of State to prove that there is a part of the country of nationality
etc of an appellant, who has established a well-founded fear in their home
area, to which the appellant could reasonably be expected to go and live. The
appellant bears the legal burden of proving entitlement to international
protection; but what that entails will very much depend upon the circumstances
of the particular case. In practice, the issue of internal relocation needs to
be raised by the Secretary of State in the letter of refusal or (subject to
procedural fairness) during the appellate proceedings.
11) It will then be for the appellant to
make good an assertion that, notwithstanding the general conditions in the
proposed place of relocation, it would not be reasonable to relocate there. In
an Article 3 claim, a similar position pertains, in that, although the test of
reasonableness/undue harshness does not formally apply, unduly harsh living
conditions etc – albeit not themselves amounting to a breach of Article 3 – may
nevertheless be reasonably likely to lead to a person returning to their home
area, where such a breach is reasonably likely.
12) An appellant who pursues their appeal on
asylum and humanitarian protection grounds, following a grant of leave, is entitled
to have their appeal decided on the hypothetical basis (if the facts so
demonstrate) that family members would be reasonably likely to return with the
appellant and that potential harm to those family members would cause the
appellant to suffer persecution or Article 15(b) harm.
13) A person is not entitled to protection
under the Refugee Convention, the Qualification Directive or Article 3 of the
ECHR, on the basis of a risk of harm to another person, if that harm would be
willingly inflicted by the person seeking such protection.
14) Article 8(1) of the Qualification
Directive provides that Member States may determine that a person is not in
need of international protection “if in a part of the country of origin there
is no well-founded fear of being persecuted or no real risk of suffering
serious harm and the applicant can reasonably be expected to stay in that part
of the country. Article 8(3) states that Article 8(1) applies “notwithstanding
technical obstacles to return to the country of origin”. Although the Court of
Appeal in HH & Others [2010] EWCA Civ 426 found that Article 8 was
“to do principally with internal relocation”, there is nothing in that judgment
or in the Qualification Directive that demonstrates the Article is so confined,
and it would be illogical for it to be so. Accordingly, difficulties in
securing documentation to effect a return to a person’s home area may not
entitle that person to international protection, whether or not there are real
risks to that person in some other area of the country concerned.
15) In assessing the effect of an
appellant’s lies (whether to the Secretary of State or a judicial fact-finder),
it is unnecessary to construct a prescribed set of steps from the judgments of
the Supreme Court in MA (Somalia) [2010] UKSC 49, particularly if they
might lead to a “mechanistic” rather than a holistic approach. The significance
or “negative pull” of the lie will possibly depend not only on the strength of
the background evidence but on whether the lie – looked at in its own terms –
is about an issue that is central to the disposition of the appeal. Where a
person tells lies about issues which that person thinks are important to their
claim but which, because of the passage of time or otherwise, are not, it is open
to the Tribunal, given the earlier lies, to approach with caution the person’s
evidence regarding matters that are central to the current claim.
Country guidance
Mogadishu
1) Despite the
withdrawal in early August 2011 of Al-Shabab conventional forces from at least
most of Mogadishu, there remains in general a real risk of Article 15(c) harm
for the majority of those returning to that city after a significant period of
time abroad. Such a risk does not arise in the case of a person connected with
powerful actors or belonging to a category of middle class or professional
persons, who can live to a reasonable standard in circumstances where the
Article 15(c) risk, which exists for the great majority of the population, does
not apply. The significance of this category should not, however, be overstated
and, in particular, is not automatically to be assumed to exist, merely because
a person has told lies.
2) The armed
conflict in Mogadishu does not, however, pose a real risk of Article 3 harm in respect
of any person in that city, regardless of circumstances. The humanitarian
crisis in southern and central Somalia has led to a declaration of famine in
IDP camps in Mogadishu; but a returnee from the United Kingdom who is fit for
work or has family connections may be able to avoid having to live in such a
camp. A returnee may, nevertheless, face a real risk of Article 3 harm, by
reason of his or her vulnerability.
3) Except as
regards the issue of female genital mutilation (FGM), it is unlikely that a
proposed return to Mogadishu at the present time will raise Refugee Convention
issues.
Southern
and central Somalia, outside Mogadishu
4) Outside
Mogadishu, the fighting in southern and central Somalia is both sporadic and
localised and is not such as to place every civilian in that part of the
country at real risk of Article 15(c) harm. In individual cases, it will be
necessary to establish where a person comes from and what the background
information says is the present position in that place. If fighting is going
on, that will have to be taken into account in deciding whether Article 15(c)
is applicable. There is, likewise, no generalised current risk of Article 3
harm as a result of armed conflict.
5) In general, a
returnee with no recent experience of living in Somalia will be at real risk of
being subjected to treatment proscribed by Article 3 in an Al-Shabab controlled
area. “No recent experience” means that the person concerned left Somalia before the rise of Al-Shabab in 2008. Even if a person has such experience,
however, he or she will still be returning from the United Kingdom, with all
that is likely to entail, so far as Al-Shabab perceptions are concerned, but he
or she will be less likely to be readily identifiable as a returnee. Even if he
or she were to be so identified, the evidence may point to the person having
struck up some form of accommodation with Al-Shabab, whilst living under their
rule. On the other hand, although having family in the Al-Shabab area of return
may alleviate the risk, the rotating nature of Al-Shabab leadership and the
fact that punishments are meted out in apparent disregard of local
sensibilities mean that, in general, it cannot be said that the presence of
family is likely to mean the risk ceases to be a real one.
6) Al-Shabab’s
reasons for imposing its requirements and restrictions, such as regarding
manner of dress and spending of leisure time, are religious and those who
transgress are regarded as demonstrating that they remain in a state of kufr
(apostasy). The same is true of those returnees who are identified as coming
from the West. Accordingly, those at real risk of such Article 3 ill-treatment
from Al-Shabab will in general be refugees, since the persecutory harm is
likely to be inflicted on the basis of imputed religious opinion.
7) Although those
with recent experience of living under Al-Shabab may be able to “play the
game”, in the sense of conforming with Al-Shabab’s requirements and avoiding
suspicion of apostasy, the extreme nature of the consequences facing anyone who
might wish to refuse to conform (despite an ability to do so) is such as to
attract the principle in RT (Zimbabwe). The result is that such people
will also in general be at real risk of persecution by Al-Shabab for a Refugee
Convention reason.
8) The same
considerations apply to those who are reasonably likely to have to pass through
Al-Shabab areas.
9) For someone at
real risk in a home area in southern or central Somalia, an internal relocation
alternative to Mogadishu is in general unlikely to be available, given the risk
of indiscriminate violence in the city, together with the present humanitarian
situation. Relocation to an IDP camp in the Afgoye Corridor will, as a general
matter, likewise be unreasonable, unless there is evidence that the person
concerned would be able to achieve the lifestyle of those better-off
inhabitants of the Afgoye Corridor settlements.
10) Internal
relocation to an area controlled by Al-Shabab is not feasible for a person who
has had no history of living under Al-Shabab in that area (and is in general
unlikely to be a reasonable proposition for someone who has had such a history
- see above). Internal relocation to an area not controlled by Al-Shabab is in
general unlikely to be an option, if the place of proposed relocation is
stricken by famine or near famine.
11) Within the
context of these findings, family and/or clan connections may have an important
part to play in determining the reasonableness of a proposed place of
relocation. The importance of these connections is likely to grow, as the
nature of the present humanitarian crisis diminishes and if Al-Shabab continues
to lose territory.
12) Travel by land
across southern and central Somalia to a home area or proposed place of
relocation is an issue that falls to be addressed in the course of determining
claims to international protection. Such travel may well, in general, pose real
risks of serious harm, not only from Al-Shabab checkpoints but also as a result
of the present famine conditions. Women travelling without male friends or
relatives are in general likely to face a real risk of sexual violence.
13) An issue that
may have implications for future Somali appeals is the availability of air
travel within Somalia (including to Somaliland). Flying into Mogadishu International Airport is sufficiently safe. There is no evidence to indicate a real
risk to commercial aircraft flying to other airports in Somalia.
Somaliland and Puntland
14) The present
appeals were not designed to be vehicles for giving country guidance on the
position within Somaliland or Puntland. There is no evidential basis for
departing from the conclusion in NM and others, that Somaliland and
Puntland in general only accept back persons who were former residents of those
regions and were members of locally based clans or sub clans. In the context of
Somali immigration to the United Kingdom, there is a close connection with Somaliland.
15) A person from
Somaliland will not, in general, be able without real risk of serious harm to
travel overland from Mogadishu International Airport to a place where he or she
might be able to obtain an unofficial travel document for the purposes of gaining
entry to Somaliland, and then by land to Somaliland. This is particularly the
case if the person is female. A proposed return by air to Hargeisa, Somaliland
(whether or not via Mogadishu International Airport) will in general involve no
such risks.
Female
genital mutilation
16) The incidence
of FGM in Somalia is universally agreed to be over 90%. The predominant type of
FGM is the “pharaonic”, categorised by the World Health Organisation as Type
III. The societal requirement for any girl or woman to undergo FGM is strong.
In general, an uncircumcised, unmarried Somali woman, up to the age of 39, will
be at real risk of suffering FGM.
17) The risk will
be greatest in cases where both parents are in favour of FGM. Where both are
opposed, the question of whether the risk will reach the requisite level will
need to be determined by reference to the extent to which the parents are
likely to be able to withstand the strong societal pressures. Unless the
parents are from a socio-economic background that is likely to distance them
from mainstream social attitudes, or there is some other particular feature of
their case, the fact of parental opposition may well as a general matter be
incapable of eliminating the real risk to the daughter that others
(particularly relatives) will at some point inflict FGM on her.
This determination
is arranged as follows:
Paragraphs
A.
PRELIMINARY 1
- 4
B. THE FIVE
APPELLANTS 5 – 26
Appellant
AMM 5
– 8
Appellant
MW 9
– 14
Appellant
ZF 15
– 17
Appellant
FM 18
– 23
Appellant
AF 24
– 26
C. SOMALI
COUNTRY GUIDANCE CASES 27 – 43
NM and Others (lone women -
Ashraf 28 – 34
Somalia CG [2005] UKAIT 00076
HH (Mogadishu: armed conflict:
risk) 35
Somalia CG [2008] UKAIT 00022
AM & AM (Armed conflict: risk
categories) 36 – 43
Somalia CG [2008] UKAIT 00091
D. SCOPE OF THE
PRESENT APPEALS 44 – 54
AND COUNTRY
GUIDANCE
E. THE ECtHR
JUDGMENT IN SUFI & ELMI 55 – 133
AND ITS BEARING
ON THE PRESENT APPEALS
The applicants’
circumstances 57 – 63
Background on Somalia 64 – 69
Case
law 70
– 72
Relevant country
information 73 – 81
The ECtHR’s
assessment 82 – 96
Mogadishu 82
- 84
Southern and
central Somalia 85 – 96
(a) The
internal relocation alternative 85 – 86
(b) The risk
in transit or upon settling 87 – 92
elsewhere in
southern or central Somalia
(c)
Humanitarian conditions in refugee 93 – 96
and IDP
camps
The significance
of Sufi & Elmi to the 97 – 133
Present appeals
and country guidance
(a) Formal
status 97 – 123
(b) Article
3 and humanitarian conditions 124 – 133
F. THE UNITED
NATIONS HIGH 134 – 156
COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES
Submissions and
evidence 134 – 152
The Tribunal’s
assessment 153 – 156
G. UKBA’S SOMALIA – REPORT OF 157 – 168
FACT-FINDING MISSION TO NAIROBI
(8-15 SEPTEMBER
2010) AND WILSON
SOLICITORS’
EVIDENCE FROM NAIROBI
(14 – 21 MAY
2011)
H. FURTHER
LEGAL ISSUES 169 – 240
(1) Al-Shabab
and religion 170 – 199
The
Tribunal’s assessment 190 – 199
(2) No
requirement to act illegally? 200 – 206
(3) “Playing
the game” – RT (Zimbabwe) 207 – 217
(4) Internal
relocation and the burden 218 – 227
of proof
(5) Legal
issues arising from appellant 228 - 240
MW’s appeal
(a) Effect
of Beoku-Betts 228 – 237
(b) Refugee
protection for the persecutor? 238 – 240
I. ASSESSMENT
OF THE GENERAL EVIDENCE 241 – 587
Introduction
241 – 249
(1)
Mogadishu 250 – 371
Evidence and
submissions 250 - 326
The Tribunal’s
findings 327 - 371
(a) Article
15(c) 328 – 363
(b) Article 3
364 – 369
(c) Refugee
Convention 370 – 371
(2)
Southern and central 372 - 497
Somalia, outside Mogadishu
Evidence and
submissions 372 – 447
The Tribunal’s
findings 448 - 497
(a) Article
15(c) 448 – 450
(b) Article
3 451 – 490
- Armed
conflict 452
- Living
under Al-Shabab 453 –
473
- Humanitarian
situation 474 – 490
(c) Refugee
Convention 491 – 497
(3) Internal relocation
498 – 507
(a) To Mogadishu 499 – 500
(b) To an
IDP camp in the Afgoye 501
Corridor
(c) To an
area controlled by Al-Shabab 502
(d) To an
area not controlled by Al-Shabab 503 – 507
(4)
Travelling home or to another place of 508 - 524
safety
(5)
Somaliland and Puntland
525 – 546
(6)
Female genital mutilation
547 – 567
J. ASSESSING
THE NEGATIVE PULL 568 - 578
OF LIES: MA
(SOMALIA)
K. SUMMARY OF
LEGAL FINDINGS 579 - 593
L. COUNTRY
GUIDANCE ON SOMALIA 594 - 610
Mogadishu
594
– 596
Southern and
central Somalia, outside Mogadishu 597 – 606
Somaliland and Puntland
607 – 608
Female
genital mutilation 609 – 610
M. RE-MAKING
THE DECISIONS IN THE 611 - 665
APPEALS
Appellant
AMM 611
– 620
Appellant
MW 621
– 636
Appellant
ZF 637
– 644
Appellant
FM 645
– 658
Appellant
AF 659
– 665
--------------------------------
APPENDIX 1 –
Summary of oral evidence
APPENDIX 2 –
Background evidence
DETERMINATION AND REASONS
PART
A
PRELIMINARY
1. In this
determination the Tribunal gives country guidance on Somalia in the light of
matters arising after the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal gave its guidance on
that country in AM & AM (Armed conflict: risk categories) Somalia CG
[2008] UKAIT 00091. We do so also in the light of the recent decision of the
European Court of Human Rights (4th Section) in Sufi & Elmi v
the United Kingdom [2011] ECHR 1045. Although the country guidance touches
on matters concerning northern Somalia (that is to say, the semi-autonomous
entity of Puntland and the self-proclaimed but internationally unrecognised
state of Somaliland), it is primarily concerned with the situation pertaining
in central and southern Somalia, including Mogadishu. The major issues
concerning current risk on return to central and southern Somalia are the armed
conflict taking place between, on the one hand, the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and, on the
other, the militant Islamists known as Al-Shabab; the threat of harm posed by Al-Shabab
and (to a much lesser extent) the TFG to those living in their respective areas
of control; and the humanitarian crisis, amounting in large areas to famine,
occasioned by the most sustained drought in the region for many decades.
2. The Tribunal sat on
13 to 21 June and 15 July 2011. We heard oral evidence from the five
appellants, whose appeals are the basis of this determination. We heard oral
evidence from the partner of appellant MW and from two expert witnesses, Tony
Burns and Laura Hammond. The oral evidence is summarised in Appendix 1. The
Tribunal was provided with a very large amount of documentary material, which
is listed in Appendix 2. Throughout the determination, certain spellings have
been standardised.
3. The original background
evidence covered the position up to early July 2011 but, following the
withdrawal in early August 2011 of Al-Shabab from military positions in Mogadishu, further written evidence and submissions were submitted by the parties, pursuant
to directions from the Tribunal, covering the position up to late September
2011. Those directions included provision for the appellants to have until 10
October to provide a written response to the submissions and further evidence
of the respondent. In the event, the appellants’ submissions were received on
12 October and sought to adduce yet further written evidence, not contemplated
in the directions or identified at the hearing, and on which the respondent had
not had an opportunity to comment. We have not had regard to this further
evidence or the submissions relating to it, but we have taken into account the
remainder of the appellants’ submissions served on 12 October, and the
accompanying report of the UN Monitoring Group of July 2011, which was
identified during the hearing, together with all the other written and oral
submissions (including in skeleton arguments), in assessing the totality of the
oral and written evidence that was properly placed before us. After discussion
with the parties, we viewed two television programmes: a Channel 4 documentary
and a more recent BBC Panorama programme, each regarding Mogadishu. In the
event, neither had any material impact upon our findings.
4. These appeals have been
conspicuously well-argued by Counsel, and the evidence assembled with evident
industriousness by those instructing them. We are particularly grateful to the
experts who gave oral evidence. As will be apparent, the issues upon which
country guidance is necessary are multi-faceted and in several respects raise legal
issues, about which the parties made detailed submissions. This has resulted
in a very long determination; but, having regard to the observations of the
Court of Appeal at [6] and [52] of the judgments in PO (Nigeria) [2011] EWCA Civ 132, we have adopted a structure which sets out the full extent of the
country guidance and is generally intended to preclude the determination’s
length from adversely affecting the clarity of its exposition.
PART
B
THE
FIVE APPELLANTS
Appellant AMM
5. Appellant AMM was
born on 6 January 1977. He comes from Jowhar in southern Somalia. Although, as we shall see, a large amount of appellant AMM’s story of his experiences has
been legitimately disbelieved by those tasked with considering it, his home
area in Somalia is not in dispute. Nor is the fact that his journey to the
United Kingdom has been tortuous – not to say accidental – in that he was
rescued by a Danish merchant ship from a broken-down motorboat, somewhere in
the Mediterranean, and brought to a port in the United Kingdom, where he
claimed asylum, in June 2005. It is evident from the determination of
Immigration Judge Gladstone, who dismissed appellant AMM’s appeal against the
respondent’s refusal in 2005 to grant asylum, that the account given by appellant
AMM of how he came to be on the motorboat was not believed; in particular: the
alleged factors that caused appellant AMM to leave Somalia and whether and if
so how he had spent time in other countries.
6. Following the
dismissal of his appeal by Immigration Judge Gladstone, appellant AMM went to
the Republic of Ireland and claimed asylum. He was returned to the United Kingdom by the Irish authorities in February 2006, whereupon he made a further claim
for asylum. Following the refusal of that claim, appellant AMM came before
Immigration Judge Glossop, who dismissed the appeal in December 2006. Like the
previous Immigration Judge, Immigration Judge Glossop rejected appellant AMM’s
claim to be from a minority clan (the Bantu). Immigration Judge Glossop also
rejected appellant AMM’s assertions that his son in Somalia had been killed and
his wife and another child forced to flee to Ethiopia, following an attack upon
his farm in Somalia. Immigration Judge Glossop’s determination was not
successfully challenged by appellant AMM. For some reason, however, the
respondent decided to accept a further claim to asylum by appellant AMM. That
claim having been rejected, appellant AMM again appealed and his appeal was
heard by Immigration Judge Harris, who dismissed it, by means of a
determination sent on 18 February 2008. The grounds upon which appellant AMM
sought reconsideration under section 103A of the Nationality, Immigration and
Asylum Act 2002 of Immigration Judge Harris’s determination related to Articles
2 and 3 of the ECHR and Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive (risk to
life or person from indiscriminate violence in situation of internal armed
conflict). On 4 August 2008, the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal in effect set
aside the determination of Immigration Judge Harris, save as regards the
Immigration Judge’s findings of fact in relation to AMM’s history.
7. The reconsideration
of appellant AMM’s appeal was completed by the Tribunal at a hearing in October
2008, held jointly with that of another appellant, which resulted in the
country guidance determination of AM & AM. Appellant AMM’s appeal
was dismissed in that determination, in which the Tribunal considered his claim
to international protection by reference to Refugee Convention, ECHR and
Qualification Directive grounds. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal
was sought on the basis that the Tribunal had wrongly concluded that there was
uncertainty as to the “method of return” of appellant AMM to Somalia by the
respondent and that the Tribunal had accordingly materially erred in law in its
conclusion as to appellant AMM’s entitlement to refugee status or humanitarian
protection. Further challenges related to the alleged error in acquiring a
“differential impact” to be shown in relation to real risk of being persecuted
or suffering serious harm and in relation to the assessment of the situation in
central and southern Somalia, as regards persecution or other serious harm.
8. Permission to appeal
was granted by Sedley LJ on 18 December 2009 on all of the grounds advanced by
appellant AMM. On 23 April 2010 the Court of Appeal allowed appellant AMM’s
appeal and remitted the matter to the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum
Chamber).
Appellant MW
9. Appellant MW was
born on 26 June 1980. In August 2005 she applied at the British Embassy at Addis Ababa for entry clearance as the spouse of a British citizen of Somali origin,
resident in the United Kingdom. Appellant MW’s application was refused by an
Entry Clearance Officer but she was successful in her appeal to the Asylum and
Immigration Tribunal. As a result, she was issued with a two-year spouse visa
on 30 May 2006 and entered the United Kingdom the following month. MW’s
relationship with her husband had collapsed by May 2007, by which time she was
living with Mr Abdullahi, bearing him a son on 2 April 2008. Mr Abdullahi has since changed his name by deed poll to Osman Ali Omar. Appellant MW’s leave
to enter the United Kingdom came to an end on 30 May 2008. Appellant MW had been divorced from her husband on 16 November 2007.
10. Appellant MW claimed
asylum on 27 May 2008, which was refused in August 2008. She appealed against
that decision and her appeal was heard by Immigration Judge Woolley on 12 September 2008. The Immigration Judge found appellant MW to be a majority clan member
from Merka, in lower Shabele, south-west of Mogadishu. The judge found that
appellant MW had left Somalia in 1999 to live in Ethiopia with her aunt. The
Immigration Judge made no finding as to appellant MW’s claim that she and her
aunt lived in Ethiopia without immigration status and were supported by money
sent from Canada from a cousin. Nor was there any specific finding regarding
appellant MW’s assertion that her parents were dead and that she had no
brothers and sisters. Immigration Judge Woolley heard evidence from Mr Osman
(as he now is) but did not find him to be credible. The Immigration Judge
concluded that Mr Osman could return to live in Somalia with appellant MW and
their son.
11. In dismissing
appellant MW’s appeal on asylum grounds, the Immigration Judge had regard to
the background evidence regarding violence against women in Somalia, in particular in relation to those who had been displaced. On the basis that appellant MW
had been found to be from a majority clan, Immigration Judge Woolley found that
there was no “differential impact” of the kind required by the House of Lords
in Adan [1998] UKHL 15, over and above that faced by others caught up in
clan warfare. On the basis of the country guidance set out in HH &
Others (Mogadishu: armed conflict: risk) Somalia CG [2008] UKAIT 00022, the
Immigration Judge found that appellant MW had not demonstrated that she was
entitled to humanitarian protection by reference to Article 15(c) of the
Qualification Directive.
12. Reconsideration of
Immigration Judge Woolley’s decision was ordered under section 103A of the 2002
Act on 10 October 2008 and on 1 December 2009 the Asylum and Immigration
Tribunal found that the determination contained a material error of law. The
Immigration Judge had concluded that much of the background material adduced by
appellant MW referred back to country information considered by the Tribunal in
HH & Others, whereas the AIT found that this was “quite inaccurate
as a description of the materials before” the Immigration Judge. Those
materials were capable of giving rise to a different assessment of conditions
in Somalia, as could now be seen from the case of AM & AM. The
present proceedings accordingly constitute in effect the completion of the
reconsideration of appellant MW’s appeal.
13. Since the hearing
before Immigration Judge Woolley, two more children have been born to appellant
MW and Mr Omar. A son was born on 5 January 2010 and on 7 February 2011 appellant
MW gave birth to a daughter. In view of Mr Osman’s status, the children are
British citizens.
14. During the present
hearings, the respondent informed the Tribunal that a decision had been made to
grant appellant MW discretionary leave to remain, having regard to Article 8 of
the ECHR. Appellant MW has given notice under section 104(4B) of the 2002 Act
and rule 17A(c) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 that she
wished to pursue her appeal, in so far as it is brought on Refugee Convention
and humanitarian protection grounds.
Appellant ZF
15. Appellant ZF was born
on 1 January 1944. She arrived in the United Kingdom on 17 September 2009 and claimed asylum, asserting that she was a member of the Reer Hamar minority
clan, having been born in Mogadishu and lived there until fleeing to Afgoye.
In October 2009 the respondent refused appellant ZF’s application and appellant
ZF appealed to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. Immigration Judge Upson
heard her appeal on 18 March 2010. The Immigration Judge found appellant ZF
not to be a witness of truth. The Immigration Judge essentially found that
appellant ZF came from north-western Somalia, noting that the linguistic report
prepared by the respondent in respect of appellant ZF had found her “with
certainty” to come from that part of Somalia, on the basis of her speech and
vocabulary. The most the Immigration Judge was prepared to accept of her
account was that there was “a chance that she has lived in Mogadishu”. Her
story of living in southern Somalia with two nieces, being regularly beaten but
nevertheless raising $3,000 to pay agents for her passage to the United Kingdom was, likewise, rejected by the Immigration Judge. The Immigration Judge was
presented at the hearing with documents showing that appellant ZF suffered from
asthma, high blood pressure and rheumatism. She said she had been taking
paracetamol for these conditions.
16. On the basis of these
findings, the Immigration Judge concluded that appellant ZF had failed to
establish that she was a refugee or otherwise entitled to international
protection. Permission to appeal against the Immigration Judge’s determination
was refused by the First-tier Tribunal on 27 April 2010 but granted by Blake J,
President of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber, on 28 May 2010 on the basis
that:-
“The question of whether
[appellant ZF] can access effective internal protection if returned to
Mogadishu needs further consideration in light of the Court of Appeal’s
decision in HH (Somalia) [2010] EWCA Civ 426 April 2010 that indicates
that a safe route of return is not a matter for administrative decision as to
the time of removal but may require the grant of subsidiary protection status
unless and until safe access is identified.”
17. On 13 January 2011, Mr Kandola, a Presenting Officer, conceded on behalf of the respondent that there
was an error of law in the determination of Immigration Judge Upson and that
that determination should be set aside. Mr Schwenk, for appellant ZF conceded on
her behalf that the adverse credibility findings of the Immigration Judge
should nevertheless stand for the purpose of the present proceedings. It is
also necessary to observe at this stage that the reference to appellant ZF
coming from north-west Somalia is a reference to her coming from Somaliland.
Appellant FM
18. Appellant FM was born
in Mogadishu on 5 August 1987 and lived in the district of that city known as
Hamar JaabJab. He claimed to have left Somalia in February 2006 and gone to Kenya, where he lived and worked in Nairobi, before flying from Kenya to an Arab country on 3 July
2006 and then on to the United Kingdom, which he entered using forged
documentation. Appellant FM claimed asylum in Liverpool on 6 July 2006.
19. The respondent refused
that claim on 26 July 2006 and appellant FM appealed to the Asylum and
Immigration Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal on 6 October 2006. Appeal rights against that determination having become exhausted, appellant FM made further
submissions, which were treated as a fresh claim, generating a refusal from the
respondent on 2 October 2007. Further representations were refused by the
respondent on 18 April 2008. Eventually, the respondent made a further
decision that appellant FM should be removed by way of directions. This
decision was dated 11 June 2008 and appellant FM appealed against it.
Immigration Judge Blake dismissed that appeal on asylum and human rights
grounds, by means of a determination dated 13 September 2008. Reconsideration of that determination was ordered by the AIT on 1 October 2008. The reconsideration was completed by Immigration Judge Sweet on 26 January 2009, leading to a determination of 27 January 2009, dismissing appellant FM’s appeal.
That determination was, however, set aside by the Deputy President of the AIT
on 10 August 2009 on the basis that the determination had not engaged with the
country guidance case of AM & AM.
20. Accordingly, the
reconsideration of appellant FM’s appeal fell to Immigration Judge Courtney. In
a determination that followed a hearing on 27 November 2009, Immigration Judge Courtney dismissed appellant FM’s appeal on asylum, human rights and
humanitarian protection grounds.
21. Appellant FM claimed
he was a member of the minority Ashraf clan who had married a member of the
Hawiye clan, against the wishes of his wife’s family. That family had detained
appellant FM for four days until his aunt bribed a guard to have him released,
after which he left Somalia.
22. The Immigration Judge
did not find appellant FM or his witness to be credible, as regards appellant
FM’s claim to come from the Ashraf clan. The Immigration Judge nevertheless
accepted that appellant FM came from Hamar JaabJab in Mogadishu. Applying the
country guidance in AM & AM, the Immigration Judge concluded that
return to Mogadishu would cause appellant FM to face a real risk of serious
harm as defined in Article 15 of the Qualification Directive and treatment
contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR (paragraph 56 of the determination). The
Immigration Judge accordingly considered the issue of internal relocation. At
paragraph 65, she did not consider the situation in central and southern
Somalia had deteriorated since AM & AM was decided, to the point
that it reached the threshold where civilians per se or Somali civilian IDPs
per se faced a real risk of persecution or serious harm or treatment proscribed
by Article 3 ECHR. Appellant FM was 22 years old and able-bodied with no
reported health problems. On the other hand, he had been out of Somalia for nearly four years and might be “less adept than persons living there currently
at dealing with ongoing difficulties. It is also reasonably likely that it
will become known he has been in the UK and that as a consequence he may be
perceived as someone who has or has access to relative wealth” (paragraph 66).
Nevertheless, at paragraph 67, having considered “all relevant factors” the
Immigration Judge concluded that appellant FM had “a viable internal relocation
alternative. This would be so even if he is required to live in an IDP camp.”
23. On 1 July 2010 Sedley LJ ordered appellant FM to renew his application for permission to appeal in
court and on notice to the respondent. This was on the basis that Sedley LJ
found it “hard to see how such a finding [of internal relocation away from Mogadishu] can stand without some prior finding as to (a) where in Somalia A can be reasonably safe and (b) whether he can get there in reasonable safety”. Sedley LJ
also thought it presently arguable that “it may have been irrational to
conclude that a condition affecting up to half the population does not
represent a real risk for anyone without access to special protection”. On 27 October 2010 the Court of Appeal ordered that “the appeal against the determination of
the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal promulgated on 20 December 2009 be withdrawn on the basis that the appeal be remitted for a differently constituted Tribunal
to carry out a de novo second stage reconsideration of the applicant’s appeal”.
Appellant AF
24. Appellant AF was born
on 6 October 1957 in Merka, a city on the coast of southern Somalia, some 70kms south-west of Mogadishu. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 9 November 2001
and claimed asylum. Appellant AF’s application was refused on 29 January 2003 and he appealed to an Adjudicator, who dismissed his appeal on 10 October 2003. On 2 March 2006, appellant AF made a fresh claim for asylum, which was
refused on 13 March 2006. His subsequent appeal against that refusal was dismissed
by an Immigration Judge on 24 April 2006 but on 15 August 2006 the High Court
ordered reconsideration of that determination, pursuant to section 103A of the
2002 Act.
25. On 11 June 2007 the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal found a material error of law in the determination
and, following a re-hearing, a panel of two Immigration Judges dismissed
appellant AF’s appeal on 13 November 2007. Permission to appeal to the Court
of Appeal against that determination was granted by the AIT on 10 January 2008 and on 10 April 2008, by consent, the Court of Appeal remitted the appeal
to the AIT.
26. On 26 September 2008, the AIT (Senior Immigration Judge Freeman and Immigration Judge Monson) dismissed
appellant AF’s appeal. The panel, in its determination, rejected the
submission made by Mr Toal on behalf of appellant AF that they should consider
not only humanitarian protection but also revisit the earlier Tribunal findings
in respect of asylum and human rights. Applying the conclusion of the Tribunal
in HH & Others, the panel found that there needed to be shown a
“differential impact” in order for appellant AF to succeed by reference to
Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. The panel concluded that there
was no evidence to show that, in appellant AF’s case, such a differential
impact existed. On 24 August 2009 the Court of Appeal allowed appellant AF’s
appeal and remitted the appeal to the AIT for reconsideration. It is common
ground that appellant AF is a Midgan (Madhiban) who, despite coming from Merka,
had lived for significant periods of time in various areas of Mogadishu,
including Hamar Weyne and Hamar JaabJab, during periods of intense fighting in
the city, and that whilst there he suffered harm which judicial fact-finders
categorised as insufficient to constitute persecution.
PART
C
SOMALI
COUNTRY GUIDANCE CASES
27. From the start of the
civil war in Somalia in the early 1990s until the rise of the Union of Islamic
Courts and, more recently, Al-Shabab, the internal conflict in Somalia was primarily
clan-based, with majority clans using their militias to battle rival armed
clans and also to dominate minority clans, which lacked militias of their own
or majority clan patronage. A number of the earlier country guidance cases of
both the Immigration Appeal Tribunal and the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal
were, accordingly, intended to address the significance of membership of a
particular clan.
NM and Others (Lone women - Ashraf) Somalia CG [2005] UKAIT 00076
28. Immediately prior to
its demise in 2005, the Immigration Appeal Tribunal issued more general country
guidance in NM and Others. At [117] the Tribunal held that the starting
point in any assessment of risk was that
“Male and female members of
minority clans from the south will, in general, be at risk of breaches of their
Article 3 rights, and will be refugees, in the absence of any evidence that
they have a clan or personal patron and the means to access that area of safety
without a real risk. Were such evidence to exist, which at present would be
unusual, their return would involve no breach of either Convention. We
recognise that there may be minority clans who are, at least locally,
integrated with majority clans, and other groups who may not be a minority clan
at all, being closer to a caste. Those will require specific consideration.
We also recognise that a division between minority and majority does not
represent a bright line on one or other side of which every clan must fall,
because there are some which could be considered to be intermediate.”
29. At [118] the Tribunal
held that there was “obviously a greater risk for lone females both in the
place of safety and in access, both in terms of degree of risk of occurrence
and degree of severity of ill-treatment. Their position would call for
particular care.” On the other hand, a person of either gender who was not
found to be a minority clan member would be subject to different
considerations. There was likely to be a location in southern Somalia in which the majority clan would be able to afford protection sufficiently for
neither Convention to apply. It was, however, important not to over-generalise
[119]. The question of assessing risk in accessing places of safety would
arise more strongly for females than males. Many routes had checkpoints or
roadblocks. Majority clans, which will have their own militias, could be
expected to provide military escorts for returnees and such returnees would be
objectively able in most cases to prearrange such protection [122].
30. At [123] the Tribunal
said this:-
“123. There
are problems with those whose case has been so disbelieved that it is not known
what their clan or place of origin is. It is difficult to see that such a
person could succeed; he or she would be a majority clan member who was in
effect declining to demonstrate, even to the low standard of proof that they
were at risk on return because unable to arrange for clan militia escorts from
Mogadishu or wherever else they might be returned to.”
31. At [125] the Tribunal
did not accept that the general conditions of life or circumstances in Somalia engage the obligations of the Refugee Convention for all returnees or all female
returnees, in the light of Adan. Being a single woman returnee was not
in itself a sufficient “differential impact” in terms of Adan to engage
those obligations. Nor did the Tribunal consider that general conditions or
circumstances engaged Article 3.
32. At [126] the Tribunal
addressed the position of Somaliland and Puntland:-
“126. Returnees
or lone women returnees claiming protection under the Refugee Convention or
under the Human Rights Convention who are found to be former residents of
Somaliland or Puntland or persons having a connection with a clan or sub-clan
based in either of those regions, would not in general face a real risk of
serious harm, whether or not they could arrange in advance for clan militia
protection to meet them at the airport and escort them thereafter, provided
that they were returned directly to those areas and not via Mogadishu. If they
were to be returned via Mogadishu, we do not know whether a majority clan
militia escort could be arranged for them.”
33. As for internal
relocation, this was considered not in general to be a viable option for
members of minority clans except where they would be able to obtain majority
clan protection in a secure area [128]. For majority clan members, it might be
a viable option for those whose clan had a secure location elsewhere within
southern Somalia than where the claimant originated, if the claimant’s home
area was not or had ceased to be one where the majority clan was sufficiently
strong to provide protection.
34. In the present
appeals, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has exercised the
right of intervention, as recognised in rule 9(5) of the Tribunal Procedure
(Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. In the light of the submissions and evidence of
the UNHCR, to which we shall turn in due course, it is relevant to observe what
the IAT had to say in NM & Others about the position of the UNHCR
and the significance of its work to the Tribunal’s task of giving country
guidance:-
“108. The extensive reliance upon
UNHCR material makes a few observations germane. The value of the UNHCR
material is first that where it has observers on the ground, it is in a good
position to provide first hand information as to what in fact is happening.
The process then whereby its observations of what is happening become position
papers or recommendations is likely to increase the objectivity and soundness
of its observations in that respect. It has a special role in relation to the
Geneva Convention. It may also well be able to offer Governments advice on the
practical implications of the forced or mass return of people who are not refugees;
these implications may include infrastructure, economic conditions,
resettlement facilities and absorption capacity; a slower rate of return may
make the local government’s task or the UNHCR task as a reception body that
much easier to perform well.
109. But
their comments have their limitations and these need equally to be understood.
The UNHCR often speaks of inhibitions on the return, usually forced, of failed
asylum seekers, who have been rejected after a proper consideration of their
claims. It follows that the UNHCR is not then commenting on the return of
refugees at all; it is acknowledging that they would not face persecution for a
Convention reason and it is going beyond its special remit under the Geneva
Convention. This is not a question of picking up on loose language. The UNHCR
is perfectly capable of using language which shows that it is or is not dealing
with the risk of persecution for a Convention reason, and sometimes does so.
These are considered papers after all.
110. This
is illustrated by UNHCR position papers, such as the January 2004 one dealing
with Somalia, where UNHCR has responsibility for voluntary repatriation
programmes, currently confined to northern Somalia, and has evident
consequential concerns referred to in paragraph 3 of this report about “over-stretched
absorption capacity” even in the relatively stable northern part of Somalia. Reasons of this kind lead UNHCR to discourage signatory states from going ahead
with enforced returns of rejected asylum seekers. However, the only
issue arising on statutory appeals on asylum or asylum-related grounds before
Adjudicators and the Tribunal is whether the claimant is a refugee and if so,
whether to return a person to Somalia would breach the Geneva Convention or
constitute treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR or any other Article, where
engaged. The question of absorption problems that might flow from any United Kingdom government decision to enforce returns in numbers is not of itself the basis for showing that return would breach either Convention.
.111. The UNHCR, in such
circumstances and they arise very frequently, is pursuing what it sees as its
wider remit in respect of humanitarian and related practical considerations for
the return of people, particularly on a large scale. This is a common problem
where the country of refuge borders the country of past persecution or
strife. What it has to say about the practical problems on the ground will be
important where it has staff on the ground or familiar with the conditions
which a returnee would face.
.112. But the assessment of
whether someone can be returned in those circumstances is one which has to be
treated with real care, if it is sought to apply it to non Refugee Convention
international obligations, especially ECHR. The measure which the UNHCR uses
is unclear; indeed, realistically, it may be using no particular measure.
Instead, it is using its own language to convey its own sense of the severity
of the problem, the degree of risk faced and the quality of the evidence which
it has to underpin its assessment. It is often guarded and cautious rather
than assertive because of the frailties of its knowledge and the variability of
the circumstances.
.113. This is not to
advocate an unduly nuanced reading of its material, let alone an unduly
legalistic reading. It is to require that the material be read for what it
actually conveys about the level of risk, of what treatment and of what
severity and with what certainty as to the available evidence. But there may
be times when a lack of information or evidence permits or requires inferences
to be drawn as to its significance, which is for the decision-maker to draw.
There is often other relevant material as well.
.114. UNHCR’s language is
not framed by reference to the ECHR and to the high threshold of Article 3 as
elaborated in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court and of the United Kingdom. That is not a criticism – it is not an expert legal adviser to the United Kingdom courts and couches its papers in its own language. So its more general
humanitarian assessments of international protection needs should to be read
with care, so as to avoid giving them an authority in relation to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the ECHR which they do not claim. They may give part of
the picture, but the language and threshold of their assessments show that the
UNHCR quite often adopts a standard which is not that of the United Kingdom’s ECHR obligations.
.115. UNHCR papers are
often not the only ones which Adjudicators or the Tribunal has to consider.
Other organisations may have first-hand sources and differ from UNHCR; experts
may bring a further perspective. A considered UNHCR paper is therefore
entitled to weight but may well not be decisive.”
HH (Mogadishu: armed conflict: risk) Somalia CG [2008] UKAIT 00022
35. It fell to the AIT in
HH to consider the meaning and effect of Article 15(c) of the
Qualification Directive, under which serious harm consists, inter alia, of a
“serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of
indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed
conflict”. The Tribunal’s conclusion, that the existence of such a conflict
was to be determined by reference to international humanitarian law, was
disapproved by the Court of Appeal in QD (Iraq) [2009] EWCA Civ 620.
The Court’s conclusion, that the provision fell to be given an autonomous
meaning, was confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in Elgafaji
[2009] EUECJ C-465/07. It is, however, common ground between the present
parties that the Tribunal’s finding in HH, that an internal armed
conflict existed in Mogadishu and its immediate environs as at the end of 2007,
was correct. The fighting, which at that time was between the TFG and its
Ethiopian allies on the one hand and the Union of Islamic Courts on the other,
was found not to be clan-based. The finding of the Tribunal was that,
generally speaking, neither side was engaging in indiscriminate violence.
Although clan support mechanisms were under strain, they had not broken down
[301]. A person displaced from Mogadishu to a makeshift shelter along the road
to Afgoye or in an IDP camp “may well experience treatment that would be
proscribed by Article 3 of ECHR” [299]. Although there was no current evidence
that women were specifically targeted in Somalia at the present time [303]
there were risks for women who found themselves having to negotiate roadside
checkpoints alone. Neither air travel to and from Mogadishu nor the mobile
telephone network in southern Somalia had been significantly interrupted by the
conflict [370]. The indiscriminate violence generated by the armed conflict in
Mogadishu was not of such a level as to place the population of Mogadishu at risk of a consistent pattern of such violence [345].
AM & AM (Armed conflict: risk categories) Somalia CG [2008] UKAIT 00091
36. Examining the
evidence as at late October 2008, the AIT in AM & AM found that,
since HH
“The situation in Mogadishu has changed significantly, both in terms of the extent of population of
displacement away from the city, the intensity of the fighting and of the
security conditions there. On the present evidence we consider that Mogadishu is no longer safe as a place to live for the great majority of its citizens. We
do not rule out that notwithstanding the above there may be certain individuals
who on the facts may be considered to be able to live safely in the city, for
example if they are likely to have close connections with powerful actors in
Mogadishu, such as prominent businessmen or senior figures in the insurgency or
in powerful criminal gangs. However, barring cases of this kind, we consider
that in the cases of persons found to come from Mogadishu who are returnees
from the UK, they would face on return to live there a real risk of persecution
or serious harm and it is reasonably likely, if they tried staying there, that
they would soon be forced to leave or that they would decide not to try and
live there in the first place” [178]. The TFG, Ethiopian and AMISOM forces
were “pitted against insurgent forces around Bakara Market” so that “at least
33 civilians were killed in the exchanges” on 22 September 2008. The UN
Secretary General had spoken of “frequent attacks on civilians” which together
with “the incessant level of harassment and intimidation by all militarised
actors in the city is making living conditions for the civil population
intolerable” [176].
37. At [179] the Tribunal
held that, although Article 15(c) had “a protective scope additional to that
afforded by the Refugee Convention and Article 15(b) of the Qualification
Directive [and Article 3 of the ECHR], it is unnecessary on the facts of this
case to rely on such additional scope, since return to that city for the great
majority would amount to a real risk of persecution, serious harm and
ill-treatment”. Given these findings regarding return to Mogadishu, in order
for most Somali claimants from that city to succeed “they need only show that
they have no viable internal relocation alternative” [183].
38. At [144] the Tribunal
found that, since HH, the armed conflict in central and southern Somalia “had spread to many other areas”. Accordingly, it held that “a situation of
internal armed conflict now exists throughout central and southern Somalia”. Notwithstanding this and the deterioration in the humanitarian situation in
southern Somalia in HH, the Tribunal in AM & AM was not
persuaded that the situation in central and southern Somalia generally had
reached the threshold where civilians per se or Somali civilian IDPs per se
could be said to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm or treatment
proscribed by Article 3 ECHR [156]. Although the level of violence had
increased, the numbers of those killed and wounded were not of great
magnitude. Civilians per se did not face a real risk of denial of basic food
and shelter and other bare necessities of life. In reaching this conclusion,
the Tribunal had regard, inter alia, to the evidence which indicated that “even
though aid agencies can meet with obstruction and dangers in delivering aid to
IDPs in need … a significant percentage of those in need are reached” [157].
Furthermore, as regards those not so reached, evidence emanating from Nairobi indicated that “most people [in IDP camps] are helped by Somalis from the
Diaspora”. Accordingly, the assessment of the extent to which IDPs face
greater or lesser hardships, outside Mogadishu, would vary significantly:-
“depending on a number of
factors: e.g. IDPs from more influential clans or sub-clans appear to have a
better chance of being tolerated in the area to which they have fled …; IDPs
who have a traditional clan area they can travel to, especially if in that area
they have family, or friends, or close clan or sub-clan affiliations, appear to
have better prospects of finding safety and support, although not if the area
concerned is already saturated with fellow-IDPs …; those who lack recent
experience of living in Somalia appear more likely to have difficulties dealing
with the changed environment in which clan loyalties have to some extent
fractured …; persons returning to their home area from the UK may be perceived
as having relative wealth and be more susceptible to extortion, abduction and
the like …; those who live in areas not particularly affected by the fighting
and which are seen as not important strategically to any of the main parties to
the conflict would appear less subject to security problems; whether the IDPs
are female also appears a significant factor, given the evidence of the
additional risks women and girls face of abduction, rape and harassment. To
these factors, of course, one has to add the variables of age and state of
health. Also relevant will be the evidence about the prevailing economic
conditions in the area, bearing in mind the recent history of cruel droughts,
poor harvests and rising food prices.” [160]
39. At [182] the Tribunal
found that in relation to IDPs who had fled Mogadishu in recent times, their
plight was connected to what had happened to them there as a result of the
armed conflict and was “sufficient to meet the ‘by reason of’ test contained
within Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive”. Those originating from
outside Mogadishu who sought to rely on Article 15(c) would, however, need to
demonstrate that their particular area was experiencing a consistent pattern of
indiscriminate violence giving rise to a serious and individual threat, since
as a general matter central and southern Somalia (other than Mogadishu) was not
in such a state [184]. Even then, the person concerned would have to establish
that he or she had “no viable internal relocation alternative”.
40. As for internal
relocation, a person who would have to spend a substantial period of time in an
IDP camp, as a means of relocation, would generally be able to demonstrate that
such relocation alternative was unreasonable [190]. Each case would, however,
need to be considered individually.
41. As with HH,
the Tribunal’s analysis of internal armed conflict in AM & AM was
subsequently found to have wrongly drawn on international humanitarian law
concepts. Nevertheless, as with HH, the Tribunal’s conclusions
regarding Article 15(c) both as regards Mogadishu and elsewhere in central and
southern Somalia, were accepted by the parties to the present appeal as
constituting the appropriate starting point for the up-to-date evaluation that
this determination will undertake.
42. The one qualification
to this that we must record at this stage is that the appellants, led in this
regard by Mr Toal, queried the validity of the finding that an association with
“powerful actors” and the like was likely to be a significant factor. We shall
return to this in due course.
43. In AM & AM,
the Tribunal held that it was not “possible to say that matters relating to the
method of return are implicit in the immigration decision and on that basis it
does not fall within our jurisdiction to assess risk relating to it” [191].
That finding now has to be read in the light of the Court of Appeal judgments
in HH and others [2010] EWCA Civ 426. Nevertheless, the Tribunal went
on to make obiter findings regarding the security situation at Mogadishu International Airport and the road from it to Mogadishu [191]. The Tribunal concluded
that, despite the evidence of difficulties the overall evidence “does not
demonstrate that for travellers from MIA to Mogadishu there is a real risk en
route of persecution or serious harm” [195].
PART D
SCOPE OF THE PRESENT
APPEALS AND COUNTRY GUIDANCE
44. For the respondent,
Mr Eicke adopted the position that the Refugee Convention was not before the
Tribunal in the present proceedings. There were two basic strands to this
submission. First, as set out in the respondent’s original skeleton argument,
it was submitted that the stance of the appellants in seeking to demonstrate a
real risk on return of persecution from Al-Shabab on the basis of imputed
political opinion or religion, and appellant MW’s claim to face persecution as
a member of a political social group, namely women, were “new and extended
issues” that should not be entertained by the Tribunal. In support, the
respondent cited the following passage from [201] of AM & AM:-
“Of course in
the case of Somali claimants who are able to satisfy the respondent or the
Tribunal that they have given a credible account of the existence of a risk
personal to them, there will often be little difficulty in showing a Convention
ground based on race (clan) or religion (if pro- or anti-jihadist) or political
opinion (if perceived as pro- or anti-government or pro- or anti-insurgents).
However (excluding the fact that in the case of AM2 it is an accepted fact that
he is a member of the Sheikhal Logobe clan), our focus in these appeals is
confined to persons who have failed to show any personal risk characteristics
beyond their nationality and home area. Is it possible to identify any
Convention ground at this level of generality? We think not.”
45. The second strand,
advanced in Mr Eicke’s oral submissions, appeared to be that – at least in the
case of some of the appellants – the basis upon which their appeals came before
the present Tribunal was not such as to encompass the Refugee Convention.
46. We have no hesitation
in rejecting both of these submissions. All five of the appellants raised the
Refugee Convention as a ground of appeal against the respective immigration
decisions of the respondent. The present appeals have, as is common ground,
been set down in order, inter alia, for this Tribunal to give country guidance
which updates that in AM & AM. As can be seen from Part C of this
determination, both HH and AM & AM considered Refugee
Convention issues, as well as other forms of serious harm. Indeed, at
paragraph 366 of the respondent’s written submissions, reliance is placed by
her on passages in the determination in AM & AM which include this:-
“As Ms Laing herself put it
during her closing submissions, there are no ‘hermetic seals’ between this
issue [Article 15(c)] and the subject-matter covered by the refugee protection
and Article 3 grounds. It is apparent from the Tribunal cases of HH and
KH that the subject-matter of Article 15(c) protection is seen to
overlap heavily with the subject-matter of refugee protection and Article 3 protection”
[13].
In this regard, we
would add that the scheme of the Qualification Directive requires
decision-makers to give primacy to an assessment of refugee protection over
subsidiary protection.
47. On 12 November 2010,
the Tribunal gave directions, prior to the first of a number of case management
hearings in relation to the present appeals, in which the proposed new country
guidance was identified as “risk on return to Mogadishu; conditions in that
city and its environs for those who come from there or might be expected to
live there on return; conditions in other areas of Somalia; and safety en
route between the airport and those other areas; as well as risk to men and
women respectively”. Following discussion at the case management hearing on 13 January 2011, at which the respondent was represented, that proposed description of
country guidance was confirmed. At no point prior to the commencement of the
substantive hearing (and submission of the respondent’s initial skeleton
argument), was it suggested by the respondent that – contrary to the approach
adopted in HH and AM & AM – the Refugee Convention was not
expected by the respondent to play any part in the current appeals.
48. There is force in
what the appellants say regarding the fact that, in framing the instructions to
the expert witnesses, it would have been evident to the respondent that issues
relating to serious harm, capable of falling within the Refugee Convention,
were to be explored. This is particularly the case in relation to having to
live under the rule of Al-Shabab. Although that organisation was in existence
at the time of AM & AM and the determination in that case makes
reference to its attitude towards civilians within its control, one of the
important developments that has undoubtedly occurred since AM & AM
has been the widening of Al-Shabab’s sphere of influence, so as to encompass
most of southern Somalia. The evidence gathering exercise has also uncovered a
good deal about alleged Al-Shabab practices.
49. The directions issued
by the Tribunal on 8 March 2011 stated that the “parties are encouraged to
co-operate with each other in refining and supplementing [the proposed country
guidance issues], as may be necessary in the course of preparing the cases and
to inform the Tribunal in writing of the results (including any request for a
further direction that may be necessary, in the event of material
disagreement)”. Any concerns the respondent might have had in this regard
ought, therefore, to have been resolved through this process, rather than by
attempting to take the point at the substantive hearing.
50. Of course, regardless
of what has just been said, it would not be possible for this Tribunal to
engage substantively with Refugee Convention issues if, as a matter of law, it
was precluded from doing so; in particular, by the terms on which an appeal had
been remitted to it by the Court of Appeal. There is, however, no such
restriction in the Court of Appeal’s orders in respect of appellants AMM, FM
and AF (see Part B above). The same is true in relation to the means by which
the other two appellants’ appeals have reached us. Furthermore and in any
event, the respondent has not identified anything in the structure of the
appellate system under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the
Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 that might have the effect of
precluding the Tribunal from resolving a Refugee Convention issue that it finds
has properly arisen in respect of a pending appeal. In this regard, Mr Symes
was, we consider, right to rely upon R v Secretary of State for the Home
Department and Immigration Appeal Tribunal, exp Robinson [1997] Imm AR 568:-
“[37] It
follows from what we have said that it is the duty of the appellate authorities
to apply their knowledge of Convention jurisprudence to the facts as
established by them when they determine whether it would be a breach of the
Convention to refuse an asylum-seeker leave to enter as a refugee, and that
they are not limited in their consideration of the facts by the arguments
actually advanced by the asylum seeker or his representative.”
51. Mr Symes also relied
upon Article 18 (right to asylum) and Article 47 (right to an effective remedy
and to a fair trial) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, as well as Article 13 of the Qualification Directive (granting of
refugee status), under which Member States “shall grant refugee status to a
third country national or a stateless person, who qualifies as a refugee in
accordance with Chapters 2 and 3”. It may well be moot what part these
provisions might play, where the effect of our domestic law was such as to
prevent judicial adjudication of a Refugee Convention issue. The provisions
are, however, pointers towards the need to identify a clear and specific legal
restriction upon the Tribunal’s ability to adjudicate the issue. No such
provision has been identified in relation to any of these appeals.
52. So far as the
particular social group of women is concerned, Mr Eicke raised an objection to
the Tribunal giving country guidance on the issue of female genital mutilation
in Somalia. As will be seen from Part H of this determination, the respondent,
in her closing written submissions, has raised a legal issue as to the legal entitlement
of appellant MW to succeed in an international protection claim by reference to
the risk of FGM being performed on her daughter. Regardless of the resolution
of that issue, however, the fact is that appellant MW has, pursuant to the
Tribunal’s case management directions, put forward a large amount of detailed
evidence regarding FGM in Somalia. Ms Short, for appellant MW, was correct to
state that the AIT had been “poised to give country guidance on the risk of FGM
in Somalia in a case called SH (Somalia) Court Ref …” as set out in the
witness statement of James Elliot at page 78 of bundle MW1. That appeal was
required to be treated as abandoned after the respondent conceded the appeal
and granted the appellant refugee status, before the country guidance hearing
could take place.
53. In the event, we
heard a considerable amount of evidence and submissions from both the
appellants and the respondent on the issue of FGM. Both on this issue and in
relation to the Refugee Convention matters to which we have earlier made
reference, it was quite apparent that Mr Eicke QC and Mr Staker, on behalf of
the respondent, were in the event placed at no procedural disadvantage, so as
to give rise to any issue of procedural fairness and, indeed, no submission to
the contrary has been made.
54. Accordingly, the
issues in these appeals and the country guidance which arises therefrom,
encompass the Refugee Convention, Article 15(b) and (c) of the Qualification
Directive and Article 3 of the ECHR. The risks and related issues with which
we are concerned are risk from armed conflict, in Mogadishu and, separately,
elsewhere in southern and central Somalia; risks from Al-Shabab, as regards
that organisation’s religious and social practices, including punishments; risks
from allegedly lawless elements of the TFG/AMISOM; risks from other criminal
elements; internal displacement; the general humanitarian position; and the
practice of female genital mutilation. We approach the task of giving country
guidance by taking the existing relevant country guidance on Somalia as our starting point. There is no formal burden on a party to show there has been any
change in circumstances (see EM and Others (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG
[2011] UKUT 98 (IAC) 98).
PART E
THE ECtHR JUDGMENT IN SUFI
& ELMI AND ITS BEARING ON THE PRESENT APPEALS
55. On 28 June 2011 the
Fourth Section of the European Court of Human Rights gave judgment in the case
of Sufi & Elmi v the United Kingdom [2011] ECHR 1045. Both Sufi and
Elmi asserted that they risked being ill-treated or killed, if the Government
of the United Kingdom returned them to Mogadishu. The ECtHR granted interim
measures under rule 39 of the Rules of Court on 27 February and 14 March 2007
respectively, to prevent the removal of Sufi and Elmi to Mogadishu, prior to
the Court’s consideration of their applications. Some 214 similar cases are,
apparently, pending before the ECtHR.
56. The judgment
delivered on 28 June is not a final one. Each of the parties had three months,
from its delivery, in which to request that the case be referred to the Grand
Chamber of the Court. The respondent has informed us that such a request has
been made by the United Kingdom government. A panel of five judges will,
therefore, consider whether the judgment, or certain parts of it, deserves
further examination. If it does, the Grand Chamber will hear the case and
deliver a final judgment. Otherwise, the judgment becomes final.
The Applicants’ circumstances
57. Sufi, born in 1987,
entered the United Kingdom illegally in September 2003 and subsequently claimed
asylum on the basis that he was a member of a minority clan who had been
persecuted by majority clan militia, who had also killed members of his
immediate family. The Secretary of State rejected Sufi’s claim and his
subsequent appeal to an Adjudicator was dismissed, on the basis that Sufi’s
account of events in Somalia was not credible.
58. Just over three
months later, Sufi pleaded guilty to two offences of burglary, five offences of
dishonestly obtaining goods by deception and one offence of attempting to
dishonestly obtain goods by deception. He was sentenced to eighteen months’
imprisonment. On 14 February 2006 Sufi was convicted, amongst other things, of
threats to kill, for which he received a further six months sentence of
imprisonment. In October 2007 he was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment
for indecent exposure. In July 2009 Sufi received 32 months’ imprisonment for
five counts of burglary and theft and two counts of attempted burglary.
59. Given the seriousness
of these offences, the Secretary of State decided that Sufi should be deported
from the United Kingdom. Sufi’s appeal against that decision was dismissed by
an Immigration Judge in September 2006 and a subsequent judicial review was
refused in January 2007.
60. Elmi was born in 1969 in Hargeisa, now the capital of the self-declared state of Somaliland. It appears that, when he
was 2 years old, his family moved to Mogadishu and he did not subsequently
return to Somaliland. Elmi’s father became the Military Attaché at the Somali
Embassy in London in 1988 and Elmi joined him in this country later that year.
In April 1989 Elmi made an application for asylum based on his father’s
position in the Somali army and beginning of the civil war in Somalia. In October 1989 Elmi was recognised as a refugee and granted leave to remain until 31 October 1993. In January 1994 he was granted indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom.
61. Elmi was convicted of
a road traffic offence in June 1992. In March 1996 he received a sentence of
five and a half years’ imprisonment for handling stolen goods, obtaining
property by deception, robbery and possession of an imitation firearm for
committing an offence. On 30 November 2000 he was convicted of perverting the
course of justice for which he received a sentence of three months’
imprisonment. Also in 2000 he was convicted of further offences of theft, and
also road traffic offences. In March 2001 he was convicted of theft and placed
on a curfew. In June 2001 he was again convicted of theft and sentenced to
three months’ imprisonment. On 23 May 2002 he was convicted on eight counts of
supplying Class A drugs (cocaine and heroin) and in November 2002 he was
sentenced to 42 months’ imprisonment in respect of these offences. In June
2004 Elmi was sentenced to twelve months’ imprisonment for burglary and theft.
62. In June 2006 the
Secretary of State decided that Elmi should be deported, as a result of his
criminal behaviour. The Secretary of State considered that Elmi could be
returned to Somalia as he was a member of the Isaaq majority clan.
63. In October 2006
Elmi’s appeal against the deportation decision was dismissed by the AIT. The
Tribunal accepted that Elmi would not find support in relation to his drug
dependency in Somalia but considered that he would not be at risk, as a member
of a majority clan. There was also a real likelihood of Elmi reoffending.
That conclusion proved to be correct. After Elmi had been granted the benefit
of rule 39 of the ECtHR’s Rules of Court, he was convicted, in March 2008, of
possession of a Class A controlled drug with intent to supply, for which he
received eighteen months’ imprisonment.
Background on Somalia
64. Paragraphs 37 to 47
of the ECtHR’s judgment contained a useful description of the factual
background to the conflict in Somalia, which was agreed by the parties to the
applications. It can be summarised as follows.
65. Somalia comprises three autonomous areas: the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in the
north-west, the state of Puntland in the north-east and the remaining southern
and central regions. Somali society has traditionally been characterised by
clan membership, with clans being divided into sub-divisions. The four majority
clans are Darod, Hawiye, Isaaq, and Dir. There are also a number of minority
groups, also sub-divided, whilst the Digil and the Mirifle take “an
intermediate position between the majority clans and minority groups” [38].
66. There has been no
functioning central government in Somalia since President Barre was overthrown
by opposing clans in 1991. As those clans could not agree on a replacement,
lawlessness, civil conflict and clan warfare ensued. Mogadishu is fragmented
into rival, clan based factions. The Transitional Federal Government was
established in October 2004 but has failed to become a functioning government.
67. In June 2006 the
Union of Islamic Courts took control of Mogadishu and, later, control of most
of central and southern Somalia. In 2006, a United Nations Resolution
authorised a deployment of an African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on
Development force to protect the TFG. Ethiopian forces also moved into Somalia to support the TFG, with the result that by the end of 2006 the Union of Islamic Courts had
been ousted from Mogadishu and much of the rest of southern Somalia. However, the semblance of order in Mogadishu that had been established under the rule of
the UIC deteriorated, with a return to banditry and violence, as well as
attacks on the TFG and Ethiopian forces, with civilians caught up in the
fighting on a frequent basis. There was significant displacement of the
civilian population.
68. In 2007 Somali
Islamists and opposition leaders joined forces to fight the TFG/Ethiopians.
Although a ceasefire was signed in August 2008, Islamic insurgents were not
party to the agreement and, by late 2008, these insurgents, including
Al-Shabab, had regained control of most of southern Somalia.
69. Ethiopia removed its troops from Somalia in January 2009 and Al-Shabab took control of Baidoa,
formerly a government stronghold. In May 2009 insurgents launched an attack on
Mogadishu and by October of that year Al-Shabab had consolidated its position
as the most powerful insurgent group, driving its main rival, Hisbul Islam, out
of the southern city of Kismayo. Al-Shabab openly declared allegiance with
Al-Qaeda. In December 2010 Hisbul Islam and Al-Shabab merged.
Case law
70. The ECtHR had
specific regard to the Tribunal’s country guidance cases of NM & Others,
HH & Others and (most significantly, because it was the most recent)
AM & AM. The Court was also aware of the Court of Appeal judgments
in HH and others [2010] EWCA Civ 426, including the fact that, in
addition to HH, appellant AM number 1 in AM & AM had also appealed to the Court of Appeal and was dealt with in the judgments there, as well as
two other appellants including one known as MA. Appellant MA’s case is
described at paragraph 77 of the ECtHR judgment. However, it does not appear
that the ECtHR’s attention was drawn to the fact that the Secretary of State’s
subsequent appeal in MA’s case to the Supreme Court was successful (MA (Somalia) [2010] UKSC 49).
71. Two other cases were
noted by the Court. In AM (Evidence – route of return) Somalia [2011] UKUT 54 (IAC) the Upper Tribunal found that it would not be a breach of Article
3 for a person to travel from Mogadishu International Airport to Afgoye, noting
that travel took place with some degree of regularity along this route and
that, as the appellant had lived in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, he would be well
able to anticipate and comply with the requirements of Al-Shabab.
72. Finally, the Court
noted the judgment of 24 February 2011 of the Swedish Migration Court of Appeal
where the Swedish Court found that an internal armed conflict existed
throughout the whole of central and southern Somalia, which was sufficiently
serious to expose the Somali applicant in question to a risk of serious harm,
even though he could not demonstrate that he would be specifically targeted.
The Court considered that the situation in recent months “had become very
unstable and unpredictable” and that the presence of the United Nations and
other international organisations “had decreased and, as a consequence,
detailed updated information was hard to come by” [79]. Although safety in Somaliland and Puntland was acceptable, a Somali returnee could only gain admittance to
those areas if seen as belonging or having a connection to them.
Relevant country information
73. At [80] to [97], the
Court described, in some detail, the report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Nairobi of September 2010, which is also one of the sources of evidence before us. There
was general agreement that the TFG/AMISOM controlled the airport, seaport,
Villa Somalia and the road between the airport and Villa Somalia. The security situation in Mogadishu was described by sources as poor. Al-Shabab areas of
the city were at risk of shelling by AMISOM, and vice-versa. Both sides
carried out indiscriminate shelling and there was constant movement of IDPs in
and out of the city. One diplomatic source suggested, however, it would be
possible to live in non-conflict areas of the city, which were generally
considered to be safe. Al-Shabab violence had become more sophisticated over
the past year as some foreign fighters had been brought in.
74. There were regular
flights into Mogadishu International Airport and the position there was
generally safe, although there were reports of a failed attack on the airport
in September 2010. Certain sources considered that Diaspora returnees who
regularly travel to Mogadishu were well connected and anyone seeking to return
would need a lot of preparation to ensure they had contacts in Mogadishu.
75. There was no
consensus on which groups controlled other regions in central and southern Somalia, although it was agreed that Al-Shabab controlled most of the land south of the
line drawn between Beletweyne and Dhusarmareb. Militias aligned with the TFG
controlled pockets of land on the Ethiopian border. Hisbul Islam was nominally
in control of some small areas, but even here Al-Shabab’s influence was
significant. A region known as Galmudug was controlled by a local clan-based
administration acting under the umbrella of Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca [89]. Certain
sources considered areas controlled by Al-Shabab to be stable and safe for
Somalis who were able “to play the game”, contrasting with a view of an
international NGO that there were no safe areas in south central Somalia as
long as Al-Shabab and Hisbul Islam were present [92]. Nevertheless, sources
indicated that in Al-Shabab areas human rights were practically non-existent
because of the organisation’s interpretation of Sharia law and that this
particularly affected women [94].
76. The Court also had
regard to the UKBA’s Operational Guidance Note of 1 July 2010 which, amongst other things, noted the possibility of Somalis flying from Mogadishu International Airport directly to Hargeisa, Somaliland [103].
77. The Court had regard
to the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration Country of Origin Centre Somalia: Security and Conflict in the South report of 23 August 2010, which described the situation in southern Somalia and Mogadishu in particular as unstable, with areas of
control changing quickly. In spite of a certain amount of stability in parts
of the country, the civilian population was still the victim of indiscriminate
violence, albeit “to a slightly lesser extent than previously” [111]. In Mogadishu, there was a difference between the northern and southern parts of the capital.
Certain areas – Hodan, Hawl, Wadaag, Wardhingley, Yaqshiid, Bondheere, Shibis,
and Abdulaziz - were hardest hit; Medina, Dharkley, Hamar Weyne, Waaberi, and
Hamar JaabJab less so. The UNHCR figure of 370,000 displaced persons in
Mogadishu and 360,000 in the Afgoye Corridor were estimates, based on satellite
images and, according to a well-informed international aid worker, many houses
have been built “to mislead aid organisations” [119]. Outside Mogadishu, fighting was mostly localised around certain key areas and towns. The main
challenge for the population of southern Somalia was, however, humanitarian in
nature.
78. The Court had before
it various reports of the UN Secretary General, including one dated 28 April 2011, well after the time (October 2010) stated in paragraph 8 of the judgments
as when the last recorded observations of the applicants and the UK Government
were made. In the April 2011 report, the Secretary General noted a major
military offensive against Al-Shabab on 19 February 2011, by Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama and other groups allied with the TFG. Hostilities centred on Gedo, Bay and
Bakool regions. Reports of heavy casualties and intensified recruitment
methods on the part of Al-Shabab “suggested that the group’s capabilities might
have been reduced”, although it was still said to be receiving arms and
ammunition through southern Somali ports and acquiring financial resources from
extortion, illegal exports and taxation [127].
79. As well as the report
of an “independent expert” dated 16 September 2010, dealing mainly with the
humanitarian position and the behaviour of Al-Shabab, the Court noted the
UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs
of Asylum Seekers from Somalia of 5 May 2010. UNHCR concluded “that any person
returned to southern and central Somalia would, solely on account of his or her
presence there, face a real risk of serious harm. Moreover, UNHCR considered
that there was no internal flight alternative available inside southern and
central Somalia” [135]. The UNHCR identified three potential agents of
persecution: (i) Al-Shabab/Hisbul Islam, which had admitted using civilians as
human shields, intimidated and assassinated civilians working for or perceived
as collaborating with the TFG/AMISOM, as well as engaging in forced recruitment
and imposing social decrees of an extreme and abusive nature; (ii) criminal
elements in Mogadishu, who put at risk business persons and civil societies
there; and (iii) the TFG/AMISOM, who indiscriminately shelled civilian areas of
Mogadishu in reprisal for Al-Shabab mortar attacks.
80. The UNHCR Guidelines
considered that effective state protection was unavailable in southern and
central Somalia, given the situation of armed conflict and the inability of the
government to extend control over any territory outside a few districts in Mogadishu. Since 2007 clan protection had been undermined in Mogadishu and increasingly in
other regions, including as a result of Al-Shabab/Hisbul Islam interpretations
of Sharia law.
81. The Court also had
before it various Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch Reports,
including the latter’s “Harsh War, Harsh Peace”, which was relied on by the
appellants in the present appeals. In the HRW Report “Welcome to Kenya” of June 2010, details were given of what were said to be continuing abuses
perpetrated by the Kenyan authorities against Somali refugees and asylum
seekers. World Food Programme and Médicins Sans Frontières described the
humanitarian problems facing those in southern and central Somalia and, amongst the news reports referred to by the Court, was one from the Guardian of 3 February 2011, that Somalia “was once again facing a malnutrition crisis” [194].
The ECtHR’s Assessment
Mogadishu
82. At [241] to [250] the
Court assessed the then current security situation in Mogadishu. In doing so,
it in effect took as its starting point the country guidance conclusions of the
AIT in AM & AM, that the situation in Mogadishu was such “that
everyone except possibly prominent businessmen or senior figures in the
insurgency or in powerful criminal gangs would be at risk if returned there”.
The Court adopted the yardstick in AM & AM for assessing whether the
parties to a conflict were responsible for a situation of general violence of
such intensity as to pose a real risk to the life or person of any civilian in
the capital. The criteria were (1) whether the parties were employing methods
and tactics of warfare which increased the risk of civilian casualties or
directly targeting civilians; (2) whether the use of such methods and/or
tactics was widespread among the parties; (3) whether the fighting was
localised or widespread; and (4) the number of civilians killed, injured and
displaced as a result of the fighting. Although these criteria were not
exhaustive, the Court considered that they formed an appropriate yardstick by
which to assess the level of violence in Mogadishu.
83. Looking at post-AM
& AM events, the Court noted that the situation in Mogadishu had
improved in 2009 but that “The most recent reports indicate that all
significant parties to the conflict have continued to engage in indiscriminate
violence, conducting numerous mortar attacks against enemy forces in densely
populated areas of Mogadishu without regard to the civilian population” [244].
In particular, this involved firing mortars indiscriminately in the general
direction of opposition fire or bombarding areas such as Bakara Market,
considered to be opposition strongholds. Reports also indicated that the
security situation in Mogadishu deteriorated in 2010. For instance, statistics
from the Elman Peace Centre of Somalia recorded that 918 civilians had died in
the first seven months of 2010 and a further 2,555 were injured. There were
thus thousands of civilian casualties, to which had to be added the
displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Any changing tactics by
Al-Shabab as a result of recruiting foreign fighters had not in any way reduced
the risk to civilians; on the contrary one source told the Fact-Finding Mission
that new tactics included random attacks on civilians [246]. The Norwegian
Directorate’s report indicated that increasing professionalism on the part of
Al-Shabab had resulted in “greater brutality”. Whilst fighting in Mogadishu was more intense in some areas than others, the position on the ground was
capable of changing on a daily basis [247]. Accordingly, at [248], the Court concluded
that “The large quantity of objective information overwhelmingly indicates that
the level of violence in Mogadishu is of sufficient intensity to pose a real
risk of treatment reaching the Article 3 threshold to anyone in the capital”.
In reaching this conclusion the Court had regard to “indiscriminate
bombardments and military offensives carried out by all parties to the
conflict, the unacceptable number of civilian casualties, the substantial
number of persons displaced within and from the city, and the unpredictable and
widespread nature of the conflict”.
84. At [249] the Court
considered the exception identified by the AIT in AM & AM of certain
individuals “exceptionally well-connected to ‘powerful actors’ in Mogadishu [who] might be able to obtain protection and live safely in the city”. The ECtHR
noted it had not received any submissions specifically addressed to this issue
and the country reports on it were “largely silent”. Nevertheless, the Court
decided not to exclude the possibility that it might be shown in the case of an
individual applicant that he or she was “a well-connected individual” who
“would be protected in Mogadishu. However it considers it likely that this
would be rare. First in the light of the Tribunal decision it would appear
that only connections at the highest level would be in a position to afford
such protection” and it was not enough to show that an individual was merely a
member of a majority clan. Secondly the Court recalled that in HH and
others in the Court of Appeal that Court had found that “an applicant who
had not been to Somalia for some time was unlikely to have the contacts
necessary to afford him protection on return. It is therefore unlikely that a
contracting state could successfully raise such an argument unless the
individual had recently been in Somalia.”
Southern and central Somalia (outside Mogadishu)
(a) The internal
relocation alternative
85. Although the ECtHR
observed in Sufi & Elmi that the United Kingdom Government intended
to return the applicants to Mogadishu, the Court decided in the light of the
findings in AM & AM that it was necessary to consider whether the
applicants could relocate to a safer region in southern or central Somalia.
86. So far as Somaliland or Puntland were concerned, the Court found that Somali nationals would not be
able to gain admittance there unless they were born in the region in question
or had strong clan connections with it. The Court was not, however, aware of
the existence of any similar obstacles preventing Somali returnees from gaining
admittance in other parts of southern and central Somalia [267]. Nevertheless,
given the humanitarian crisis and resulting strain placed on individuals and
the traditional clan structure, the Court did not in practice consider a
returnee could find refuge or support in such an area of southern and central Somalia where he or she had no close family connections. Without such connections, or if
the returnee could not safely travel to an area where such connections existed,
then in both cases the Court considered “it reasonably likely that he would
have to seek refuge in an IDP settlement or refugee camp”.
(b) The risk in transit
or upon settling elsewhere in southern and central Somalia
87. At [268] the Court
observed that, although there were a number of airports in southern and central
Somalia “all applicants facing removal from the United Kingdom have been
issued with removal directions to Mogadishu International Airport”. We take it
this is a reference to the 216 applicants (including Sufi and Elmi) referred to
earlier in the judgment as being subject to rule 39 orders. The Court held
that the situation in the airport was not such as to give rise to a real risk
of ill-treatment to somebody arriving there. It also noted that certain
journeys to places in central and southern Somalia from the airport did not
involve having to go to Mogadishu.
88. Although there were
reports of fighting in various towns in central and southern Somalia, this fighting was categorised by the Court as sporadic and localised and that “other areas
have remained comparatively stable” [270]. It was therefore possible for a
returnee to travel from Mogadishu International Airport to another part of
central and southern Somalia “without being exposed to a real risk of treatment
proscribed by Article 3 solely on account of the situation of general
violence”. However this would “very much depend upon where a returnee’s home
area is. It is not possible for the Court to assess the level of general violence
in every part of southern and central Somalia and, even if it were to undertake
such an exercise, it is likely that its conclusions would become outdated very
quickly. Consequently, if the applicant’s home is one which has been affected
by the conflict, the conditions there will have to be assessed against the
requirements of Article 3 at the time of removal” [271].
89. However, general
violence was not the only problem facing such a traveller. The areas with the
lowest levels of generalised violence were those under the control of Al-Shabab
“which are also the areas reported to have the worst human rights conditions”.
Such a returnee might therefore still be exposed to a real risk of
ill-treatment on account of the human rights situation in the areas to which he
or she would need to travel.
90. In the areas of their
control, Al-Shabab was enforcing “a particularly draconian version of Sharia
law, which goes well beyond the traditional interpretation of Islam in
Somalia…and in fact amounts to a repressive form of social control” [273].
Al-Shabab were concerned “with every little detail of daily life, including
men’s and women’s style of dress, the length of men’s beards, the style of
music being listened to and the choice of mobile phone ringtone”. Women were
“particularly targeted” in that, in addition to strict dress codes, they were
not permitted by Al-Shabab to go out in public with men, even male relatives,
and had been ordered to close their shops. There were also reports of
systematic forced recruitment by Al-Shabab of adults and children.
91. These forms of
control by Al-Shabab applied not only to those living in the areas under its
control but also to those travelling through them, who would have to negotiate
Al-Shabab checkpoints. “Persons not obeying Al-Shabab’s rules could experience
difficulties at these checkpoints”.
92. At [275] the Court
assessed the evidence from a number of sources who had told the Fact-Finding
Mission “that areas controlled by Al-Shabab were generally safe for Somalis
provided that they were able to ‘play the game’ and avoid the attention of
Al-Shabab by obeying their rules”. Since, however, Al-Shabab only began
seizing parts of southern and central Somalia in late 2006, the Court
considered it unlikely that a Somali “with no recent experience of living in
Somalia would be adequately equipped to ‘play the game’ with a risk that he
would come to the attention of Al-Shabab, either while travelling through or
having settled in an Al-Shabab controlled area. The Court considers that this
risk would be even greater for Somalis who had been out of the country long
enough to become ‘westernised’ as certain attributes, such as a foreign accent,
would be impossible to disguise.” Again, it was not possible to predict the
fate of a returnee who came to the attention of Al-Shabab for failing to comply
with their rules. Evidence of punishments indicated that these could include
stoning, amputation, flogging and corporal punishment, all of which would fall
within Article 3. Although the Court accepted the likelihood that punishment
would depend upon the gravity of infringement, there was evidence that Somalis
had been beaten or flogged for relatively minor transgressions, such as playing
Scrabble, watching the World Cup or wearing inappropriate clothing.
Accordingly, the Court found that a returnee with no recent experience of
living in Somalia would be at real risk of being subjected to treatment
proscribed by Article 3 in an Al-Shabab controlled area.
(c) Humanitarian conditions
in refugee and IDP camps
93. So far in this précis
of the ECtHR’s findings in Sufi & Elmi, we have omitted the Court’s
discussion of various legal issues, since these are best dealt with separately,
later in this Part of the determination. In describing the Court’s findings
regarding the humanitarian conditions in refugee/IDP camps, however, it is
necessary at this point to say a little about the Court’s legal approach, not
least because the respondent in the present appeals took issue with it. In
essence, in apparent reliance on the recent ECtHR case of MSS v Belgium and
Greece [2011] ECHR 108, the Court concluded that, if the “dire humanitarian
conditions in Somalia were solely or even predominantly attributable to poverty
or to the state’s lack of resources to deal with a naturally occurring
phenomenon, such as drought, the test in N v the United Kingdom may well
have been considered to be the appropriate one. However, it is clear that
while drought has contributed to the humanitarian crisis, that crisis is
predominantly due to the direct and indirect actions of the parties to the
conflict. The reports indicate that all parties to the conflict have employed
indiscriminate methods of warfare in densely populated urban areas with no
regard to the safety of the civilian population… This fact alone has resulted
in widespread displacement and the breakdown of social, political and economic
infrastructures. Moreover, the situation has been gravely exacerbated by
Al-Shabab’s refusal to permit international aid agencies to operate in the
areas under its control” [282]. Accordingly, at [283], the Court rejected the N
v United Kingdom approach and preferred that in MSS v Belgium and Greece
“which requires it to have regard to an applicant’s ability to cater for his
most basic needs, such as food, hygiene and shelter, his vulnerability to
ill-treatment and the prospect of his situation improving within a reasonable
timeframe”.
94. Assessing the
position on this basis, the Court found that conditions for internally
displaced persons in southern and central Somalia were “dire”. Even before the
recent failure of the rains, over half of the population of Somalia was dependent on food aid; but, despite the humanitarian crisis, Al-Shabab continued to deny
international NGOs access to areas under its control [284]. Although it was
impossible to assess with any degree of accuracy how many IDPs were living in
the Afgoye Corridor, it could be as many as 410,000. Significant numbers of
these were being forced to return to Mogadishu in search of food and water.
IDPs were extremely vulnerable to exploitation and crime, as well as forced
recruitment to Al-Shabab. The increased urbanisation of the Afgoye Corridor,
as identified by the UK Government, was supported by a number of country
reports, but did not demonstrate that the conditions for the majority of IDPs
had improved. On the contrary, reports suggested IDPs were experiencing
difficulties in finding shelter in the Afgoye Corridor because landlords were
selling land that the IDPs could otherwise have lived on [286].
95. At [287] to [291],
the Court decided that it was appropriate to have regard to the evidence in the
Dadaab Camps in Kenya, to which the NGOs had direct access, and which were said
to be severely overcrowded, besides having high levels of theft and sexual
violence, exploitation by elements of the Kenyan authorities and risk of refoulement
to Somalia by the Kenyan authorities. Having regard to this situation, the
Court decided that “any returnee forced to seek refuge in either camp [Dadaab
or the Afgoye Corridor] would be at real risk of Article 3 ill-treatment on
account of the dire humanitarian conditions”. If anything, conditions in Somalia were likely to be worse.
96. The ECtHR accordingly
found that to remove Sufi or Elmi to Mogadishu would be a violation of their
Article 3 rights.
The Significance of Sufi
& Elmi to the present appeals and country guidance
(a) Formal status
97. It is common ground
that, as a matter of international law, the United Kingdom is bound to abide by
a final judgment of the ECtHR (Article 46(1) ECHR). As Mr Eicke pointed out,
however, this has no relevance to the present proceedings, since the duty only
relates to the actual ruling of the Court in any particular case which, in Sufi
& Elmi is, not to remove either of those individuals to Somalia and to pay their costs and expenses.
98. For our purposes, the
relevant legislative provision is section 2(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998,
which provides that a:
“court or tribunal
determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right
must take into account any-
(a) judgment,
decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human
Rights,
…
whenever made or given, so
far as, in the opinion of the court or tribunal, it is relevant to the
proceedings in which that question has arisen.”
99. In R (Alconbury
Developments Ltd.) v Environment Secretary [2003] 2 AC 295, Lord Slynn had
this to say about the duty in section 2:-
“Although the Human Rights
Act 1998 does not provide that a national court is bound by these decisions it
is obliged to take account of them so far as they are relevant. In the absence
of some special circumstances it seems to me that the court should follow any
clear and consistent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. If
it does not do so there is at least a possibility that the case will go to that
court which is likely in the ordinary case to follow its own constant
jurisprudence” [26].
100. In Ullah v Special
Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26, Lord Bingham approved that passage in Alconbury,
holding that it:-
“reflects the fact that the
Convention is an international instrument, the correct interpretation of which
can be authoritatively expounded only by the Strasbourg court. From this it
follows that a national court subject to a duty such as that imposed by section
2 should not without strong reason dilute or weaken the effect of the Strasbourg case law… The duty of national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time: no more, but certainly no less.”
101. The boundaries of that
duty are described in R v Horncastle et al [2009] UKSC 14, where the
Supreme Court held that:-
“There will, however, be
rare occasions where the domestic court has concerns as to whether a decision
of the Strasbourg court sufficiently appreciates or accommodates particular
aspects of our domestic process. In such circumstances it is open to the
domestic court to decline to follow the Strasbourg decision, giving reasons for
adopting this course. This is likely to give the Strasbourg court the
opportunity to reconsider the particular aspects of the decision that is in
issue, so that there takes place what may prove to be a valuable dialogue
between the domestic court and the Strasbourg Court.” [11]
102. This was developed in Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45:-
“This Court is not bound to
follow every decision of the EurCtHR. Not only would it be impractical to do so:
it would sometimes be inappropriate, as it would destroy the ability of the
Court to engage in the constructive dialogue with the EurCtHR which is of value
to the development of Convention law… Of course, we should usually follow a
clear and constant line of decisions by the EurCtHR: R (Ullah) v Special
Adjudicator … but we are not actually bound to do so or (in theory, at
least) to follow a decision of the Grand Chamber. Where, however, there is a
clear and constant line of decisions whose effect is not inconsistent with some
fundamental substantive or procedural aspects of our law, and whose reasoning
does not appear to overlook or misunderstand some argument or point of
principle, we consider that it would be wrong for this Court not to follow that
line.” [48]
103. As Mr Eicke submitted,
it is also plainly the case that where a judgment of the Court of Appeal or
Supreme Court is binding on the Upper Tribunal, we must, compatibly with the
rules of stare decisis, follow that judgment, even if it might be
considered by the Tribunal to be incompatible with the Strasbourg Court’s clear
and constant jurisprudence. As we shall shortly explain, Mr Eicke submitted
that there is an aspect of the judgment in Sufi & Elmi which falls
squarely within this principle. As we have already indicated, it relates to
the ECtHR’s assessment of the humanitarian position in southern and central Somalia.
104. Apart from that issue,
to which we shall need to turn in due course, there is no suggestion of the
Strasbourg Court in Sufi & Elmi not following its clear and
consistent jurisprudence on Article 3, as regards its analysis of the evidence
relating to the armed conflict in Mogadishu and elsewhere, and as to the
behaviour of Al-Shabab towards those in, or attempting to traverse, areas it
controls. The question for us, accordingly, is how, if at all, section 2 of
the 1998 Act and the domestic authorities we have cited require us to take
account of and follow the Court’s conclusions as to Article 3, by reference to
the evidence before it.
105. In this regard, the
appellants relied upon the judgments of the Court of Appeal in Batayav v
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 1489. In that
appeal, the IAT found that Batayav’s likely imprisonment in Russia would not violate his Article 3 rights, by reason of the conditions pertaining then in
Russian prisons. The IAT dismissed the appellant’s appeal without considering
the judgment of the ECtHR in Kalashnikov v Russia (2002) 36 EHRR 587,
which held that the conditions in which Kalashnikov, as well as most other
prisoners, were detained in Russia breached Article 3. At paragraph 25, the
Court concluded that “If the only basis for deciding whether the appellant
faced degrading treatment if returned to a Russian prison were Kalashnikov,
the decision of the Tribunal would have to be reversed”.
106. By the same token, the
present appellants submitted that the effect of the decision in Sufi &
Elmi is that “So far as the appellants’ circumstances are materially similar
to Sufi’s or Elmi’s, their removal from the UK would violate Art 3 of the ECHR
unless it is shown that the situation in Somalia has changed sufficiently since
it was examined by the Court to eliminate the identified risks”.
107. Of course, every
decision of the Strasbourg Court ultimately involves the application of the
jurisprudence relating to the ECHR to a particular set of facts, concerning a
particular applicant. As such, the decision of the Strasbourg Court is
unlikely to be automatically determinative of other cases, for the simple
reason that the facts of those cases are unlikely in all respects to be
materially the same as those of the Strasbourg case. However, as Batayav
demonstrates, there may be occasions when this is not so:-
“22. The
Secretary of State, whilst accepting that Kalashnikov is plainly
relevant, asserts that it is neither binding authority nor, says Mr Garnham,
does it provide definitive guidance on any of the issues of substance. The
judgment in Kalashnikov, he says, is a conclusion on the facts of a
particular case. No two cases alleging detention in conditions breaching
Article 3 will be identical, and the Court must look at the individual
circumstances of each case to decide if a violation has been established. The
appellant’s experience of prison in Russia was, he says, hugely different from
Kalashnikov’s and even on the evidence adduced by the appellant himself there
was nothing to show that he had been kept in conditions breaching Article 3.
23. I
cannot accept Mr Garnham’s submissions. As I have already said, the
appellant’s remaining claim to the protection of Article 3 is founded not on
his own particular circumstances but on the conditions faced generally by
persons, whether or not the victims of persecution, incarcerated in the Russian
prison system. To establish his case he does not need to refer to evidence
specific to his own circumstances but rather to the evidence bearing on the
class of which he is a member. In other words, in the circumstances of this case,
to the evidence showing the conditions faced generally by persons incarcerated
in the Russian prison system.
24. True
it is that the decision in Kalashnikov focused on the conditions in
which Kalashnikov himself had been detained, and addressed the question of
whether he had been subjected to degrading treatment. But the wider
significance of the case emerges from the Russian Federation’s admission that
conditions which the Federation accepted fell below the standard set by other
Member States of the Council of Europe, and which the Court held amounted to
degrading treatment constituting a breach of Article 3, applied to ‘most
detainees in Russia’.”
108. The Russian
Federation’s admission that conditions in Russian prisons fell below relevant
standards, as regards “most detainees in Russia” was, thus, highly
significant. Since Batayav was at risk of being imprisoned if returned to Russia, there was really little else that needed to be said. Indeed, it would be difficult
to see how a domestic court or tribunal in the United Kingdom could validly
have found that, notwithstanding what was in substance a concession, the
treatment faced by a prisoner in a Russian prison would not be contrary to
Article 3. Another case where the factual matrix was indistinguishable from
that in the relevant Strasbourg case was R (on the application of) EW v SSHD
[2009] EWHC 2957 (Admin).
109. But in a situation as
multi-faceted and complex as Mogadishu and central and southern Somalia, it is
doubtful whether a domestic court or tribunal, applying section 2 of the 1998
Act and the related jurisprudence, is necessarily obliged to draw
exactly the same conclusions as regards risk to returnees, as were reached by
the ECtHR in Sufi & Elmi, even where the raw evidence before the domestic
court or Tribunal is precisely the same as that which was before the ECtHR. In
United Kingdom law, at least, it is well-established that a fact-finding
tribunal is entitled (albeit within public law principles) to decide what
weight to give to each material element of the evidence before it. Indeed, as
we shall see, one of the areas of disagreement between the appellants and the
respondent in the present appeals centred on the weight (or, rather, lack of
weight) which the ECtHR saw fit to give to the respondent’s report of the
Fact-Finding Mission to Nairobi of September 2010. Whilst we are prepared to
accept that a domestic court or tribunal is still required by section 2 to
“have regard” to the weight which the ECtHR had seen fit to place upon the
particular piece of evidence, we do not consider that the House of Lords and
Supreme Court authorities, to which we have made reference, can be said to
compel the Tribunal to follow the Strasbourg Court, to the extent of placing
precisely the same weight on that evidence as the Strasbourg Court has seen fit
to do, in a case where the weighing of that evidence is something the domestic
court or tribunal is required to undertake. The references in the domestic
authorities to “jurisprudence” cannot properly be said to encompass the task of
attributing weight to evidence.
110. In so finding, we are
aware that the Strasbourg Court has, from time to time, seen fit to give
guidance on the approach to evidential materials in international protection
cases. Thus, in NA v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 616 the Court had this
to say about the use to be made of materials emanating from a Contracting State
and from “other reliable and objective sources”, such as other States, UN
agencies and reputable NGOs:-
120. In assessing such material, consideration must be
given to its source, in particular to its independence, reliability and
objectivity. In respect of reports, the authority and reputation of the author,
the seriousness of the investigations by means of which they were compiled, the
consistency of their conclusions and their corroboration by other sources are
all relevant considerations …
121. The Court also
recognises that consideration must be given to the presence and reporting
capacities of the author of the material in the country in question. In this
respect, the Court observes that States (whether the respondent State in a
particular case or any other Contracting or non-Contracting State) through
their diplomatic missions and their ability to gather information, will often
be able to provide material which may be highly relevant to the Court’s
assessment of the case before it. It finds that the same consideration must
apply, a fortiori, in respect of agencies of the United Nations, particularly
given their direct access to authorities of the country of destination as well
as their ability to carry out on-site inspections and assessments in a manner
which States and non-governmental organisations may not be able to do”.
111. We are also mindful of
what the AIT said in TK (Tamils – LP updated) Sri Lanka CG [2009] UKAIT 00049:-
“… By virtue of the
disagreement between the parties in NA as to the relative value of
particular sources, the December 2006 UNHCR Position paper in particular, the
Court also felt it necessary to articulate in greater detail than previously
its view of the relevant criteria that decision makers should apply to Country
of Origin Information (COI). In the latter respect, it seems to us that, at
least within the context of Article 3 jurisprudence, judges should now be
assessing COI by the standards set out by the Court at paras. 132-135 of NA
(which can be summarised as accuracy, independence, reliability, objectivity,
reputation, adequacy of methodology, consistency and corroboration). Indeed,
within the closely related context of asylum and humanitarian protection
claims, very much the same standards have now become, by virtue of EU
legislation, legal standards: see the Refugee Qualification Directive
(2004/83/EC), Article 4(1), 4(3)(a) and 4(5)(c) and the Procedures Directive
(2005/85/EC), Article 8(2)(a) and (b) and 8(3).” [5]
112. For our part, we do not
think that the provisions of the Directives cited by the AIT can be said to be
anything like as detailed and prescriptive as the ECtHR’s guidance and that, if
that guidance is regarded as being part of that Court’s settled jurisprudence,
which domestic courts are supposed to follow, there is no corresponding
requirement to do the same as regards the Refugee Convention and EU subsidiary protection.
Be that as it may, there is recent Court of Appeal authority for the
proposition that domestic tribunals are required to follow the guidance in NA.
This authority, however, clearly demarcates between the need to apply the
guidance and the ultimate duty of the tribunal to reach its own view on the
weight to be given to the totality of the evidence before it.
113. In MD (Ivory Coast)
[2011] EWCA Civ 989, the Court had to decide whether the Upper Tribunal had
erred in its treatment of information contained in a letter from a political
officer in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office regarding checkpoints. Sullivan
LJ said:
“Although the tribunal in
the present case did not refer to NA, in my judgment it adopted the
approach that is described in that case. It treated the political officer’s
letter not as expert evidence but as akin to other kinds of country
information. It considered whether it should attach weight to the fact that the
Embassy had vouchsafed that one of its staff had furnished the evidence in good
faith and concluded that it should. It considered the provenance [of] the
information and most importantly it concluded in the final sentence of
paragraph 242:
‘In the end, however, it is
a matter of judgment as to the weight that should be attached to the
material’”. [46]
114. Toulson LJ held that NA
and TK provided “authoritative guidance on the proper approach to
country information in the form of reports or letters provided by British
Embassies” [50]. Pill LJ considered that the “weight to be given to the
information will be for the tribunal to decide, as an expert fact finding
tribunal, in the circumstances of the particular case” [53].
115. It is therefore evident
that, whilst the Strasbourg Court’s guidance as to the general approach to
evidence is part of its jurisprudence, to be followed by United Kingdom courts
and tribunals to the extent demanded by the House of Lords and Supreme Court
authorities, the weighing of the evidence and the conclusions as to the
relative weight to be placed on the items of evidence are ultimately matters
for the tribunal. Whilst the factual finding the Strasbourg Court has made as a
result of applying its own guidance is something to which the domestic tribunal
must have regard, the tribunal is not bound to reach the same finding.
116. It is the case that,
as regards the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and
the Upper Tribunal, Practice Direction 12 of the Senior President of Tribunals’
Directions of 10 February 2010 requires both chambers to treat a country
guidance case of the Tribunals, and their predecessors, as authoritative, when
deciding an appeal, so far as that appeal:-
“(a) relates
to the country guidance issue in question; and
(b) depends
upon the same or similar evidence.”
117. The effect of Practice
Direction 12 is, accordingly, to require judicial fact-finders in those
Chambers in effect to accept the relative weight which the Tribunal giving the
country guidance has seen fit to place upon the various pieces of evidence. In
the context of domestic tribunals operating within the same jurisdiction,
according to what are broadly the same principles and procedures, such a
requirement makes sense. It by no means follows, however, that we should apply
the principle of Practice Direction 12, as some sort of “gloss” on section 2 of
the 1998 Act, so as to place the ECtHR in the position of supreme maker of
country guidance for the purposes of our tribunals.
118. Practice Direction
12.2 contains the exception that the FTT and the UT are not to regard country
guidance as authoritative if the country guidance case in question “is
inconsistent with other authority that is binding on the Tribunal”. For the
reasons we have given, we do not consider that, even if it becomes a final
judgment, Sufi & Elmi is binding on the relevant Chambers so far as
it concerns an assessment of facts.
119. So far, we have
considered the issue, on the assumption that the evidence that has been placed
before this Tribunal is the same as was put before the ECtHR. A glance at
Appendix 2 to this determination and at the synopsis of the Sufi & Elmi
evidence mentioned above at [82] to [95] shows this not to be the case.
Considerably more evidence was placed before us than was available to the ECtHR,
including the oral expert evidence of two witnesses, whose views were tested
under cross-examination.
120. In particular, we have
evidence of the position at a later date than that considered by the ECtHR.
Exactly what the last date was for the ECtHR is a matter of some debate.
Paragraph 8 of the judgment refers to further observations being submitted in
October 2010. Ms Short, for appellant MW, however, ascertained that further
submissions from the United Kingdom Government were made on 12 January 2011. At all events, the only material from 2011 which the Court appears to
have considered was the decision of the Upper Tribunal in AM (Evidence –
route of return), the judgment of the Swedish Migration Court of Appeal, the
report of the UN Secretary General of 28 April 2011 and two news reports from
February 2011, concerning the recent drought.
121. Mr Eicke submitted
that if this Tribunal had seen fit to justify its factual findings by reference
to evidence that we had seen fit to obtain for ourselves or which was, in any
event, not drawn to the attention of each of the parties, so as to obtain their
reaction, our determination would almost certainly be successfully challenged
on appeal. That may be so, although Ms Short’s researches indicate, amongst other
things, that in Strasbourg the parties have a duty to assist the ECtHR in the
gathering of relevant information, up to the time the decision is made. The
point which emerges from all this is not that the practices and procedures of a
particular domestic tribunal are better or worse than those of the Strasbourg
Court or, indeed of the courts and tribunals of other States subject to its
jurisdiction. Rather, the differences reinforce our conclusion that,
ultimately, a domestic fact-finding tribunal follows its domestic law, as
regards the admissibility of evidence, the testing of that evidence and the
ascribing of weight to it.
122. It is important to be
clear that, so far in this discussion, we have been talking about the
attributing of weight to evidence, so as to reach findings of fact. But, as
will already have become apparent, even once the facts have been found, there
will often be considerable scope for argument as to the application of the
relevant ECtHR legal principles to those facts. The Batayav case was,
perhaps, at least if not more concerned with applying a value judgment as to
whether prison conditions breached Article 3 as it was with the actual facts of
those conditions. In the case of a United Kingdom country guidance case,
Practice Direction 12 requires judicial fact-finders to regard as
authoritative, not only the primary fact-finding of the Country Guidance
Tribunal but also that Tribunal’s application of the relevant legal principles
or “tests”: eg is the treatment of a particular group such that members of that
group are, in general, at real risk of Article 3 ill-treatment?
123. It could be said that
what we have found to be the position will provide greater encouragement to
claimants to make use of the rule 39 procedure in Strasbourg. Indeed, the
appellants asserted it would be undesirable for us to risk “inconsistency with
the ECtHR in its response to patterns of country evidence that are similar to
those which confronted that Court” (closing submissions [39]). The existence
of the rule 39 procedure (based, as it often is, on limited information,
supplied on an ex parte basis) should not, however, in our view be seen
as having had a legal effect on the relationship between domestic courts and
tribunals and the Strasbourg Court, to the extent that would be entailed in
adopting a different approach to the one we have just set out. Even less
should we adopt a different approach, not through legal obligation, but merely
in order to eliminate the practical problems that inconsistency in fact-finding
with the ECtHR might involve. Indeed, in the context of country guidance, it
seems to us that – quite apart from what we consider to be our domestic legal
obligations - the concept of “valuable dialogue” between domestic courts and
tribunals and the ECtHR requires us to continue finding the facts as we see
them (albeit following any relevant general guidance and taking account of
Strasbourg’s actual approach to the same or similar evidence) and embodying our
conclusions in country guidance, whilst applying the Court’s clear and
consistent jurisprudence. The solution to any practical problems that this may
cause, in terms of rule 39, lies either with the ECtHR itself or in the
political realm.
(b) Article 3 and
humanitarian conditions
124. We must now return to
the matter highlighted earlier, regarding what might be described as the
correct threshold for Article 3 in the context of the humanitarian situation
which exists in southern and central Somalia, outside Mogadishu.
125. For the respondent, Mr
Eicke took great issue with the following paragraphs of the judgment in Sufi
& Elmi:-
“278. In Salah
Sheekh v. the Netherlands, cited above, the Court held that socio-economic
and humanitarian conditions in a country of return did not necessarily have a
bearing, and certainly not a decisive bearing, on the question whether the
persons concerned would face a real risk of ill-treatment within the meaning of
Article 3 in those areas... However, in N. v. the United Kingdom … the
Court held that although the Convention was essentially directed at the
protection of civil and political rights, the fundamental importance of Article
3 meant that it was necessary for the Court to retain a degree of flexibility
to prevent expulsion in very exceptional cases. It therefore held that
humanitarian conditions would give rise to a breach of Article 3 of the
Convention in very exceptional cases where the humanitarian grounds against
removal were ‘compelling’ ...
279. In
the recent case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece … the Court
stated that it had not excluded the possibility that the responsibility of the
State under Article 3 might be engaged in respect of treatment where an
applicant, who was wholly dependent on State support, found himself faced with
official indifference in a situation of serious deprivation or want
incompatible with human dignity (§ 253). In that case, the applicant had spent months living
in a state of the most extreme poverty, unable to cater for his most basic
needs: food, hygiene and a place to live. Added to that, the Court noted the
applicant’s ever-present fear of being attacked and robbed and the total lack
of any likelihood of his situation improving (§ 254). It held that the
conditions in which the applicant was living reached the Article 3 threshold
and found Greece in breach of that Article as it was the State directly
responsible for the applicant’s living conditions (§ 264). It also found
Belgium to be in breach of Article 3 because, inter alia, it had
transferred the applicant to Greece and thus knowingly exposed him to living
conditions which amounted to degrading treatment (§ 367).
280. In
the present case the Government submitted, albeit prior to the publication of
the Court’s decision in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, that the
appropriate test for assessing whether dire humanitarian conditions reached the
Article 3 threshold was that set out in N. v. the United Kingdom. Humanitarian
conditions would therefore only reach the Article 3 threshold in very
exceptional cases where the grounds against removal were ‘compelling’.
281. The
Court recalls that N. v. the United Kingdom concerned the removal of an
HIV-positive applicant to Uganda, where her lifespan was likely to be reduced
on account of the fact that the treatment facilities there were inferior to
those available in the United Kingdom. In reaching its conclusions, the Court
noted that the alleged future harm would emanate not from the intentional acts
or omission of public authorities or non-State bodies but from a naturally
occurring illness and the lack of sufficient resources to deal with it in the
receiving country. The Court therefore relied on the fact that neither the
applicant’s illness nor the inferior medical facilities were caused by any act
or omission of the receiving State or of any non-State actors within the
receiving State.
282. If
the dire humanitarian conditions in Somalia were solely or even predominantly
attributable to poverty or to the State’s lack of resources to deal with a
naturally occurring phenomenon, such as a drought, the test in N. v. the
United Kingdom may well have been considered to be the appropriate one. However,
it is clear that while drought has contributed to the humanitarian crisis, that
crisis is predominantly due to the direct and indirect actions of the parties
to the conflict. The reports indicate that all parties to the conflict have
employed indiscriminate methods of warfare in densely populated urban areas
with no regard to the safety of the civilian population ... This fact alone
has resulted in widespread displacement and the breakdown of social, political
and economic infrastructures. Moreover, the situation has been greatly
exacerbated by al-Shabab’s refusal to permit international aid agencies to
operate in the areas under its control, despite the fact that between a third
and a half of all Somalis are living in a situation of serious deprivation ...
283. Consequently,
the Court does not consider the approach adopted in N. v. the United Kingdom
to be appropriate in the circumstances of the present case. Rather, it
prefers the approach adopted in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece,
which requires it to have regard to an applicant’s ability to cater for his
most basic needs, such as food, hygiene and shelter, his vulnerability to
ill-treatment and the prospect of his situation improving within a reasonable
time-frame (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, § 254).”
126. Mr Eicke pointed out
that the United Kingdom Government had not been given an opportunity by the ECtHR
in Sufi and Elmi to comment upon the significance or otherwise of MSS
v Belgium and Greece. It was, he said, highly significant that the
receiving State, in which the asserted ill-treatment had taken place, was Greece, a signatory to the ECHR. If one examined MSS, there was no consideration in
that judgment of N v United Kingdom. This omission was significant,
given that in N, the Court had said:-
“42. …
The fact that the applicant’s circumstances, including his life expectancy,
would be significantly reduced if he were to be removed from the Contracting State is not sufficient in itself to give rise to breach of Article 3. The
decision to remove an alien who is suffering from a serious mental or physical
illness to a country where the facilities for the treatment of that illness are
inferior to those available in the Contracting State may raise an issue under
Article 3, but only in a very exceptional case, where the humanitarian grounds
against the removal are compelling. In the D. case the very exceptional
circumstances were that the applicant was critically ill and appeared to be
close to death, could not be guaranteed any nursing or medical care in his
country of origin and had no family there willing or able to care for him or
provide him with even a basic level of food, shelter or social support.
43. The
Court does not exclude that there may be other very exceptional cases where the
humanitarian considerations are equally compelling. However, it considers that
it should maintain the high threshold set in D v United Kingdom and
apply them in subsequent case-law which it regards as correct in principle,
given that in such cases the alleged future harm would emanate not from the
intentional acts or omissions of public authorities or non-State bodies, but
instead from a naturally occurring illness and the lack of sufficient resources
to deal with it in the receiving country.”
127. Whether or not due to
its failure to have regard to its own established case law, the Court in MSS
failed, according to Mr Eicke, to explain how it was able to move as it did
from paragraph 366 to the conclusion in paragraph 367:-
“366. In
the instant case the Court has already found the applicant’s conditions of
detention and living conditions in Greece degrading… It notes that these facts
were well known before the transfer of the applicant and were freely
ascertainable from a wide number of sources… It also wishes to emphasise that
it cannot be held against the applicant that he did not inform the Belgian
administrative authorities of the reasons why he did not wish to be transferred
to Greece. It is established that the procedure before the Aliens Office made
no provision for such explanations and that the Belgian authorities applied the
Dublin Regulation systematically…
367. Based
on these conclusions and the obligations incumbent on the States under Article
3 of the Convention in terms of expulsion, the Court considers that by
transferring the applicant to Greece the Belgian authorities knowingly exposed
him to conditions of detention and living conditions that amounted to degrading
treatment.”
128. When one probes the
judgment in MSS, however, the situation becomes somewhat clearer. The
reference to “detention” in [366] refers to the conclusion the Court had reached,
at [233], that the conditions of detention in Greece in which the applicant
found himself had violated Article 3. When he was not in detention, however,
the applicant appears to have faced unacceptable living conditions in Greece. At [262] the Court was “of the opinion that, had they examined the applicant’s
asylum request promptly, the Greek authorities could have substantially
alleviated his suffering” in this regard. The conclusion the Court reached on
this issue was as follows:-
“264. It follows that, through
the fault of the authorities, the applicant has found himself in a
situation incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention. Accordingly,
there has been a violation of that provision” (our emphasis).
129. Viewed in this light,
the finding at [282] of Sufi and Elmi makes jurisprudential sense. If
the predominant cause of the poor living conditions faced by a person is due to
human actions in the State in question, rather than to naturally occurring
phenomena, coupled with a lack of resources to deal with those phenomena, then
the high threshold set by N need not be reached. As we understood Mr
Eicke, however, the respondent considers this jurisprudence to be novel, rather
than “clear and consistent”. It would, he said, in effect be possible in many
cases to ascribe a State’s inability to tackle phenomena such as drought or HIV
illness as due to the inefficiency, incompetence or corruption of the
government of that State. To introduce such considerations would, therefore,
be to undermine the settled jurisprudence in N v United Kingdom. It
would, in any event, undermine the judgments of the House of Lords in N v
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 296, which were binding on this Tribunal, irrespective of what the ECtHR might subsequently have
held.
130. Whilst we note Mr
Eicke’s criticisms of the reasoning process and recognise that such an
important issue might have benefited from fuller consideration than that given
at [278] to [283] of Sufi and Elmi, we conclude that there is nothing in
that judgment on this point that is problematic from a jurisprudential point of
view. The requirement in [282] of predominant cause is such as at least
substantially to reduce, if not eliminate, the dangers to which Mr Eicke
referred. It would, for example, be difficult to hold that the prevalence of a
disease such as HIV/AIDS across sub-Saharan Africa is predominantly due to the
corruption or other misfeasance of the governments of the countries in that
part of Africa. On the other hand, whilst no one disputes that cholera is a
naturally occurring disease, there can be no doubt that a government which
imprisons people in conditions that are so insanitary as to allow cholera to
flourish, would be acting in violation of Article 3. The test of “predominant
cause”, upon analysis, seems to us to be part of the settled jurisprudence of
the ECtHR and underlies the approach in such cases as N vUK and Kalashnikov.
131. The real problem with
[282] of Sufi and Elmi, as we see it, is a factual one. Even on the
evidence available to the Court in that case, it is, with respect, difficult to
see how the actions of the “parties to the conflict” (which must mean the
TFG/AMISOM and Al-Shabab) can be said, by their indiscriminate methods of
warfare over a comparatively short period of time, to have caused a breakdown
of “social, political and economic infrastructures”. Anyone with experience of
Somali international protection cases over the past two decades will know that,
long before the arrival of these parties, there was precious little by way of
social, political and economic infrastructure to speak of in Somalia. Furthermore, the evidence points to the current drought being the most severe in the past
60 years, which would in any event have been bound to have brought about a very
serious humanitarian situation, regardless of the present conflict, for those
whose existence depends directly on agriculture. In any event, whilst having
due regard to the conclusion of the ECtHR in Sufi & Elmi that, on the
evidence before that Court, the humanitarian crisis of 2011 was predominantly
due to the actions of the parties, we have concluded, for the reasons given
above, that the issue of whether or not that is so on the evidence before us is
a matter for this Tribunal to determine, as a matter of fact, by reference to
that evidence, ascribing to each item of it such weight as we see fit.
132. We shall examine that
evidence in due course in this determination (paragraphs 376 – 384). It
may, however, be helpful at this point to state that, whilst not the
predominant cause of the present humanitarian crisis in central and southern
Somalia, the conflict between TFG/AMISOM and Al-Shabab, and the behaviour of
Al-Shabab in the areas which it controls, have been found by us to be
significant for two reasons. First, the fact that many of those fleeing the
consequences of the drought have seen fit to seek refuge in Mogadishu, at a
time when that city was the subject of ongoing armed conflict, is indicative of
the exceptional nature of the humanitarian crisis. Second, the nature and
actions of Al-Shabab, in particular denying aid from Western agencies (at
least, until very recently), has had a significant effect in aggravating an
already problematic situation. As a result, we have concluded that the
humanitarian position in southern and central Somalia is such that, as a
general matter, the case is properly to be viewed as an exceptional one,
which reaches the very high standard required in N v United Kingdom.
133. Sufi & Elmi
touches on two other issues of a general nature: the weight to be given to the
Fact-Finding Mission’s report of 2010 and the correct approach to the issue of
internal relocation. The first of these we have touched on already, in the
context of the relationship between the Strasbourg Court and domestic
tribunals, but it will be necessary in Part G to explain why we take a
different view from the ECtHR as to the weight to be attributed to that report.
The second issue we deal with in Part H.
PART
F
THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES
Submissions and evidence
134. The UNHCR exercised
its right to intervene in the case of the present appeals, as it had done in HM
(Iraq: Article 15(c)). The Tribunal received written submissions from Tom
Hickman, Counsel, and Adam Smith-Anthony (then Adam Smith) of Baker &
McKenzie, each acting pro bono; oral submissions from Mr Hickman,
written evidence from Janice Marshall, Deputy Director in the Division of
International Protection at the Office of the UNHCR in Geneva; a witness
statement on the subject of information gathering which, because of its nature,
was by agreement made the subject of an order under rule 14 of the Tribunal
Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008; the UNHCR’s Guidelines of July 2003 on
international protection: “Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative”; the UNHCR
Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of
Asylum-Seekers from Somalia (May 2010), with update to June 2011.
135. The basic purpose of
the UNHCR’s intervention in the present appeals was to explain why it was
considered that the UNHCR had submissions of value to make on the issue of
Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive and why the UNHCR was of the view
that, at the present time, no-one could be returned to Somalia from the United
Kingdom, compatibly with Article 15(c).
136. Having rehearsed the
background to the Qualification Directive, and Article 15(c) in particular, the
UNHCR’s submissions noted how the Court of Appeal in QD (Iraq) [2009] EWCA Civ 620 considered that the Directive not only gave effect to the 1951
Refugee Convention and non-refoulement obligations under the ECHR, but that
Article 15(c) gave legal force to:-
“…the humanitarian
practices adopted by many EU states, the UK included, towards individuals who
manifestly need protection but who do not necessarily qualify under either
Convention. Amongst these are people whose lives or safety, if returned to
their home area, would be imperilled by endemic violence”.
137. The UNHCR submitted
that the “Qualification Directive itself is poorly drafted…and should not be
given an overly legalistic interpretation”. What constituted a real risk of a
serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of
indiscriminate violence was not a question that was well-suited “to a
problematic assessment of casualty rates based on past events and inevitably
incomplete statistics (although such information is undoubtedly relevant), and
the ambiguity in the wording (e.g. ‘real risk’ of a ‘serious…threat’) reflects
this”. In Elgafaji, the CJEU considered that there would be a
sufficient individual threat where the indiscriminate violence “reaches such a
high level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian,
returned to the relevant country, or as the case may be, to the relevant
region” would face a real risk of being subject to a serious threat” [35].
138. The detailed
submissions of the UNHCR in relation to Article 15(c) are considered below
(Part I(1)(b) and (2)(b)). At this point, we shall concentrate on the UNHCR’s
submissions as to why the Eligibility Guidelines of 5 May 2010, together with their update of June 2011, should be followed by this Tribunal. The UNHCR
accepted that there had been occasions when Tribunals had expressed
reservations about UNHCR Reports; for example, NM (Somalia) CG [2005] UKIAT 00076, on the basis that the UNHCR referred generally to the situation in
a country or to the need for international protection without specifically
addressing governing international and domestic norms. There was also thought
to be a lack of corroboration or evidential basis for some statements; and a
number of cases where the thoroughness or cogency of UNHCR Reports had been
challenged by the parties (LP (Sri Lanka) CG [2007] UKAIT 00076).
139. As to its mandate and
functions, UNHCR submitted that it had no agenda other than the full exercise
of its legal duty pursuant to the mandate given to it by the international
community. That community charged UNHCR with the obligation to assist states
in the interpretation and application of the legal framework established for
the protection of refugees. UNHCR’s statute envisaged the UNHCR fulfilling its
mandate by “promoting the conclusion and ratification of international
conventions for the protection of refugees, supervising their application and
proposing amendments thereto” (§ 8(a)). Article 35 of the Refugee Convention
required contracting states to “undertake to cooperate with the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and to provide the UNHCR with
information and statistical data requested by the UNHCR, regarding the
condition of refugees, the implementation of the Convention and laws,
regulations and decrees relating to refugees”. Thus, the 1951 Convention
itself envisaged the UNHCR “would become a central repository of knowledge and
information on the condition of refugees” and that it would prepare reports to
that effect.
140. The fact that UNHCR
has been called upon by the international community to pronounce upon issues of
humanitarian protection going beyond persons fleeing persecution could be seen
from calls from the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Committee of
the UN, over the years, to the UNHCR to provide assistance to persons in need
of international protection. This called into play paragraph 9 of the UNHCR
Statute, whereby the High Commissioner is required to “engage in such
additional activities … as the General Assembly may determine, within the
limits of the resources placed at his disposal”. In practical terms, Mr
Hickman submitted that this had extended the UNHCR’s mandate to cover forced
displacement resulting from conflict, indiscriminate violence or disorder, in
relation to persons, whether or not they were refugees within the 1951
Convention. UNHCR accordingly considered “that serious (including
indiscriminate) threats to life, physical integrity or freedom resulting from
generalised violence or events seriously disturbing public order are valid
reasons for international protection under its mandate”. The significance of
that mandate could be seen from the weight placed by the High Court and the
Court of Appeal upon the reports of the UNHCR in, respectively, R (Saedi) v
SSHD [2010] EWHC 705 (Admin) and QD (Iraq).
141. The reliance placed on
UNHCR positions had, in its turn, made it incumbent on UNHCR “to articulate
clear, concise and timely guidance on issues relating to eligibility for
refugee status and associated issues of subsidiary protection”. This had led
to adjustments being made to the content and format of UNHCR country-related
papers. UNHCR Reports accordingly now “routinely and where appropriate address
directly specific international and regional norms”, as in the Somalia
Eligibility Guidance.
142. Since 2010, UNHCR has
organised its country-related papers in the following way, in order to
distinguish between the different purposes of the information:-
(i) Eligibility
Guidelines and updates: these contain factual descriptions of circumstances in
individual countries as objectively assessed and corroborated by UNHCR, setting
out UNHCR’s legal analysis and recommendations.
(ii) Safe third country
papers: these contain UNHCR positions on the availability of protection in
third countries.
(iii) Return advisories:
these provide guidance on the return of people not found to be in need of
international protection, following fair, efficient asylum procedures.
(iv) Country of origin
papers: these summarise background country of origin information and may be
externally commissioned by UNHCR, in which case that would be made clear. Such
papers do not contain legal analysis or recommendation.
143. In NA v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 616, the ECtHR recognised that States’ diplomatic missions
would often be able to provide material that would be highly relevant to the
Court’s assessment in the case before it, as regards conditions in a particular
country in which that mission was situated. But:-
“It finds that the same
consideration must apply, a fortiori, in respect of agencies of the
United Nations, particularly their direct access to the authorities of the
countries of destination as well as their ability to carry out on-site
inspections and assessments in a manner which States and non-governmental
organisations may not be able to do” [121].
144. Furthermore, greater
importance would be attached to reports “which consider the human rights
situation in the country of destination and directly addressed the grounds for
the alleged real risk of ill-treatment in the case before the Court”. Since
the Court’s own assessment of the human rights situation in a country was
carried out “only to determine whether there would be a violation of Article 3
if the applicant in the case before it were to be returned to that country”,
weight would be attached to independent assessments, depending “on the extent
to which those assessments are couched in terms similar to Article 3. Thus in
respect of the UNHCR, due weight has been given by the Court to the UNHCR’s own
assessment of an applicant’s claims when the Court determined the merits of her
complaint under Article 3 …. Conversely, where the UNHCR’s concerns were
focused on general socio-economic and humanitarian considerations, the Court has
been inclined to accord less weight to them, since such considerations do not
necessarily have a bearing on the question of a real risk for an individual
applicant of ill-treatment within the meaning of Article 3 (Salah Sheekh)”
[122].
145. The UNHCR’s
submissions then turned to the process of compiling Eligibility Guidelines. Ms
Marshall’s statement explained the methodology adopted in producing country
condition material, which included ensuring that every statement in the
Guidelines is “corroborated by a process of ‘triangulation’”, which:-
“means that all factual
statements made in Eligibility Guidelines (whether a footnote reference appears
or not) are assessed to be reliable and are corroborated. It also means that
the association of a factual statement in an Eligibility Guideline with a
public source by a footnote reference does not mean that this reference is the
only basis of that statement; in many cases it will represent a form of
corroboration for the statement.”
146. Quite apart from the
process of triangulation, the UNHCR also carried out an assessment of the
reliability of each piece of information relied upon, having regard to the
experience of the source of the information, their objectivity, observational
capacity and methodology. Risk levels were assessed by means of a process
“that ensures consistency between different countries and different reports.
It draws on UNHCR’s unrivalled global reach and experience as well as its local
experience.” Local and regional UNHCR offices are “not only staffed by people
who have direct and long-standing experience of a country, but also enable
UNHCR to draw on information obtained directly from displaced persons and UNHCR
partners in the country concerned”.
147. The Eligibility
Guidelines of May 2010 were before the ECtHR in Sufi & Elmi, and
were also before us. They noted that over the past three years there had been
a consistent failure by all parties to respect basic principles of basic
international humanitarian law, as regards the conflict in central and southern
Somalia. As a result, civilians were regularly caught in crossfire as well
as suffering from indiscriminate bombardments and grenade attacks in civilian
areas, together with roadside bombs. Hospital records indicated that there were
over 900 civilian casualties in Mogadishu in March and April 2010 and that
between 20 and 50 civilians were killed in Mogadishu each week. In addition to
all this, the report noted evidence that Somalis were fleeing due to fear of
persecution linked to the recent political and human rights situation in
Al-Shabab areas. As a result, UNHCR concluded that “any person returned to
central and southern Somalia would, solely on account of his or her presence
there, face a real risk of serious harm”.
148. The June 2011 update
report considered that developments since May 2010 had been “largely negative
in respect to the security of civilians in central and southern Somalia”. This reiterated the earlier recommendations that “in the European context – a
situation of indiscriminate violence in a situation of internal armed conflict
in the meaning of Article 15(c) of the EU Qualification Directive” existed
[2]. Amongst the “developments” were the continued displacement of people due
to the conflict, with 85,000 displacements recorded between July and September
2010, mainly from Mogadishu. There were currently 1.46 million IDPs in Somalia, displaced primarily due to insecurity. In Mogadishu, regular exchanges of mortar
and artillery fire were made from, within and into civilian districts,
resulting in civilian casualties. TFG forces had “poor command and control”,
which led to fighting within the TFG, resulting in civilian casualties. In May
2011 there was a dramatic increase in children under the age of 5 being
admitted to hospital in Mogadishu with weapons related injuries “representing
35% of all weapons related injuries in two hospitals”.
149. Outside Mogadishu there was a “regular cycle of offensives and counter offensives between Al-Shabab
and pro-TFG militias in Galgaduud and Hiran since the end of 2008”. Urban areas were targeted. In February 2011 the TFG launched a significant military
offensive against Al-Shabab on several fronts, including Mogadishu, Gedo, Lower Juba and the central regions. Both these attacks and Al-Shabab counterattacks “share
the same lack of respect for international humanitarian law which typifies the
fighting in Mogadishu”. For instance, an offensive to capture Belet Hawo in
Gedo involved the destruction of the market area, with thousands of civilians
displaced, whilst the town of Dobley was shelled in March 2011, again leading
to significant civilian displacement.
150. Al-Shabab’s already
harsh treatment of civilians in the areas under its control was being
exacerbated by military pressures on the organisation. There were forced
recruitment campaigns and the cessation in the movement of goods from Bay into
Gedo. Areas taken by pro-TFG militias were “far from stable” and Al-Shabab had
“reverted to guerrilla style attacks in territory taken” by pro-TFG militias.
151. In conclusion, the
update report stated that it “cannot be considered reasonable for any Somali,
regardless of whether the individual originates from southern and central Somalia, Somaliland or Puntland, to relocate within or to southern or central Somalia”.
152. At paragraph 7 of the
update, it was asserted that even if displaced persons were of the same clan as
members of the host community, it would still not be reasonable to expect
persons with a well-founded fear of persecution to relocate as economic
collapse and massive displacement had saturated the capacity for clan, social
and economic support in home clan areas. Thus, persons from Mogadishu who had
gone to their clan areas in Galgaduud had chosen to return to Mogadishu, with
interviewees reporting to UNHCR “that they had reached the level of desperation
so severe that they preferred the misery and insecurity in Mogadishu”.
Furthermore, all major urban centres under Al-Shabab control, including Merka and
Jowhar, were considered likely to be affected by the TFG offensive if that
offensive succeeded.
The Tribunal’s assessment
153. We are grateful to the
UNHCR for intervening in the present proceedings and providing evidence as to
the way in which the Eligibility Guidelines on Somalia have been prepared, as
well as explaining the background to the decision to concentrate in those
Guidelines upon subsidiary forms of protection, including Article 15(c) of the
Qualification Directive and the process whereby lawyers on the UNHCR’s staff
sift the evidence, in preparing the Guidelines. We accept the evidence of Ms
Marshall regarding the process of “triangulation” and the attempt to ensure
that the evidence used is, in addition, assessed by reference to reliability.
An examination of the footnotes to the May 2010 Guidelines reveals that many of
the sources cited, such as Human Rights Watch, feature in the evidence before
this Tribunal.
154. In his oral
submissions, Mr Hickman did not contend that we, or other Tribunals in the same
position, should automatically follow the UNHCR’s view, which, he said, was
that Article 15(c) currently precludes returns to central and southern Somalia. His submission was, rather, that we should have careful regard to the UNHCR’s
Guidelines. We have indeed done so. In his written submissions, however, he
said we should “accept the assessment” of the UNHCR in the Guidelines and their
update.
155. Both the evidence
cited in the Guidelines and the legal interpretation of that evidence,
particularly as regards Article 15(c), are highly significant to our tasks. At
the end of the day, however, it is our job, on the basis of all the evidence
and submissions, to reach a view as to whether the evidence, properly
interpreted, reaches the particular threshold, whether as regards a
well-founded fear of persecution or a fear of indiscriminate violence in the
context of Article 15(c). That is what Parliament requires us to do, in the
context of re-making decisions on appeals under the Nationality, Immigration
and Asylum Act 2002. The fact that UNHCR lawyers, on the basis of the evidence
before them, have reached a particular conclusion, whilst extremely helpful,
cannot be determinative.
156. The exercise
undertaken by the UNHCR lawyers is also significantly different from the
proceedings which have generated this determination. The parties have not only
respectively sought to place before us evidence which (compatibly with their
professional duties) points towards different legal outcomes; they have also
probed and tested each other’s evidence, not least that of the experts who gave
oral evidence. It is no criticism of the UNHCR Guidelines to observe that the
circumstances surrounding their compilation were very different. This is not to
trumpet the merits of an adversarial system of adjudication; one can detect the
same dialectic at work in the judgment in Sufi & Elmi. It is merely
to be aware of the points of difference between an assessment by a non-judicial
organisation tasked with pursuing humanitarian objectives and the
responsibilities of fact-finding courts and tribunals. Our more detailed
assessment of the Guidelines etc is set out in Part I of this determination
(paragraphs 359 to 362).
PART
G
THE
UKBA’S SOMALIA – REPORT OF FACT-FINDING MISSION TO NAIROBI (8-15 SEPTEMBER 2010
AND WILSON SOLICITORS’ EVIDENCE FROM NAIROBI (14-21 MAY 2011)
157. Two sources of
evidence from the parties call for special mention, as the significance of each
was challenged by the appellants and the respondent respectively. The UKBA’s
Country of Origin Information Service went on a Fact-Finding Mission to Nairobi in September 2010. The mission comprised Debbie Goodier, Senior Researcher in the
COIS, Eugenio Bosco, a Researcher in COIS, and Darren Forbes-Batey, First
Secretary (Migration) at the British High Commission, Nairobi. Fifteen persons
were interviewed, all except Captain Bulhan of the African Express Airways were
described in anonymous terms in the interview notes and report. The stated
purpose of the FFM was to obtain specific information on the then current
security and humanitarian situation in southern and central Somalia, seeking
information in particular on what groups controlled each area in southern and
central Somalia; how easy it was to travel between different areas there; the
security situation; the human rights situation and conditions in IDP camps.
158. Wilson Solicitors’
Fact-Finding Mission took place in May 2011 and comprised James Elliott, (a
Partner), Joanna Hunt and Anab Nour, (Solicitors) with the firm, together with
Mr Toal of Counsel attending “in an advisory capacity”. According to Mr
Elliot’s letter of 15 June 2011, the persons to whom the team spoke comprised
those working for international organisations, NGOs, charities, journalists and
recent arrivals from Somalia. Some were known through previous trips; others
were identified through web-based research. Eighteen people provided
statements. Except for Tanga Shumer of the Somalia NGO Consortium, the NGO
representatives were anonymised, as were the representative of the European
Union and a businessman. So too was the statement of a recent arrival from Mogadishu; but several other arrivals allowed their names to be published, as did a
journalist and a coordinator of the Gedo Peace Consortium.
159. The ECtHR at [230] to
[234] of its judgment in Sufi & Elmi considered the UKBA’s
fact-finding report. It noted that states through their diplomatic missions
would be able to gather information that could be highly relevant. It also
appreciated that there were “many difficulties faced by governments and NGOs
gathering information in dangerous and volatile situations” and that it would
therefore not always be possible to carry out investigations in the immediate
vicinity of a conflict. But:-
“233. That being said, where a
report is wholly reliant on information provided by sources, the authority and
reputation of those sources and the extent of their presence in the relevant
area will be relevant factors for the Court in assessing the weight to be
attributed to their evidence. The Court recognises that where there are
legitimate security concerns, sources may wish to remain anonymous. However,
in the absence of any information about the nature of the sources’ operations in
the relevant area, it will be virtually impossible for the Court to assess
their reliability. Consequently, the approach taken by the Court will depend
on the consistency of the sources’ conclusions with the remainder of the
available information. Where the sources’ conclusions are consistent with
other country information, their evidence may be of corroborative weight. However,
the Court will generally exercise caution when considering reports from
anonymous sources which are inconsistent with the remainder of the information
before it.
234. In
the present case the Court observes that the description of the sources relied
on by the fact-finding mission is vague. As indicated by the applicants, the
majority of sources have simply been described either as ‘an international NGO’,
‘a diplomatic source’, or ‘a security advisor’. Such descriptions give no
indication of the authority or reputation of the sources or of the extent of
their presence in southern and central Somalia. This is of particular concern
in the present case, where it is accepted that the presence of international
NGOs and diplomatic missions in southern and central Somalia is limited. It is
therefore impossible for the Court to carry out any assessment of the sources’
reliability and, as a consequence, where their information is unsupported or
contradictory, the Court is unable to attach substantial weight to it.”
160. In the present
proceedings, the appellants sought to rely upon those observations of the ECtHR
in order to persuade the Tribunal not to place significant weight on the FFM
Report.
161. Conversely, the
respondent urged us to treat the Wilson Solicitors’ FFM report with caution,
since, unlike the COIS and the FCO who conduct the FFM exercises on behalf of
UKBA, one of the core duties owed by solicitors engaged in the present
proceedings is “to act in the best interests of their clients; it was not clear
whether or to what extent the preparation of the witness statements followed a
‘similarly strict methodology to that (rightly) required and expected of an FFM
conducted by COIS and the FCO”; and as regards the private individuals
interviewed it was ‘impossible to ascertain whether they have or had a direct
interest in the evidence they gave to Wilson Solicitors in that they may
themselves have been seeking refugee status either in Kenya or been on their
way to seeking refugee status elsewhere”.
162. In the light of the
criticisms in Sufi & Elmi, the respondent submitted the April 2008
Review of COI Fact-Finding Mission Reports and Guidelines by Dr Alan Ingram of
University College London, together with UKBA’s response to that Review. She
also provided the EU Common Guidelines on Joint Fact-Finding Missions of
November 2010. As regards the Ingram report, Mr Symes submitted that Ingram
considered even 17 to 42 meetings/interviews as not necessarily providing a
comprehensive and adequate coverage of a particular matter, whereas in the
present case only 15 interviews were held. Ingram had also recommended the
introduction of “triangulation”, which had not been taken on board; nor was
there any indication that follow-up interviews had been used as a manner of
improving the contribution of interviewees. Mr Schwenk submitted that the UKBA
response had been “defensive” and attempted to justify its methodology. So far
as the EU Common Guidelines were concerned, Mr Symes submitted that these
indicated that as a general rule sources should be named in order to give
credibility and transparency to an FFM report although “the personal security
of the source should be of paramount” (sic) [5.1.8]. The EU Guidelines went on
to say that if it is “not possible to quote a source by name, it may be
possible to list only the organisation a person is representing. If a source
is to be listed anonymously this can be done in various ways. For example ‘a
doctor’, ‘a lawyer’, ‘a police officer’, ‘a human rights defender’, possibly
providing some further indication where they were located or the city they were
interviewed in. Or it may be appropriate to refer to them just as an
international NGO … Alternatively they could be listed as ‘a source who did not
wish to be named’ or even ‘source A’.”
163. In EM & Others
(Returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2011] UKUT 98 (IAC), the Tribunal addressed criticisms
of the UKBA’s FFM report on Zimbabwe [74] to [113]. The Tribunal in EM
found that the value of the Zimbabwe FFM report lay not in any summary or
analysis but solely in the views and opinions of the interviewees, as set out
in the approved records of interview. That is the approach we have adopted in
relation to the present UKBA FFM report and, indeed, to the Wilson Solicitors
report (which does not contain any summary or similar “gloss”).
164. So far as anonymity is
concerned, it does not appear that the ECtHR in Sufi & Elmi was
referred to paragraph 5.1.8 of the EU Common Guidelines. Had this happened, it
would have been apparent to the Court that the way in which the interviewees
were described in the UKBA’s FFM report follows the recommendations set out in
the Guidelines. Furthermore, it appears to us to be axiomatic that a
representative of “an international NGO”, for instance, who wished to remain
anonymous because of security concerns, would at least be very likely to be
giving a first-hand account of conditions encountered in the course of the
NGO’s activities in Somalia. As a result, and with respect to the ECtHR, we
have concluded that its assertion, that in the absence of information about the
nature of the source’s operations in Somalia, it will be “virtually impossible”
to assess reliability, is too sweeping. The important thing is not precisely
what a particular NGO is doing in Somalia, but what they observe about the
situation in that country whilst they are doing it. It is also noteworthy that Dr
Ingram’s approach to anonymity was not that a source should be discounted or
downplayed for wishing to be anonymous in the resulting report, but that
information obtained from people whose identity and organisational affiliation
could not be definitively ascertained by the researcher should not be included
in reports.
165. Mr Elliot’s letter of 15 June 2011 is pertinent in this regard:-
“A number of the statements
[in the Wilson Solicitors’ report] are anonymised. This is because the
representatives of NGO’s that we met were extremely concerned that if they were
identified then their staff working in Somalia could be at risk. I would ask
the Tribunal to note the UNHCR’s similar concerns.
I can say that most of the
organisations that we saw were large NGO’s the names of which will be known to
people in the UK. A number of people that we saw said that they had been seen
by the Home Office during previous Fact-Finding Missions. A number also said
that they had been approached by representatives of the Foreign Office who had
been making enquiries during the same week we were in Nairobi presumably to
assist the respondent in preparing their evidence.”
166. This touches on a
further criticism levelled by Mr Symes at the UKBA report; namely, that there
was “no sign of an audit trail of all contact with sources in the sense of a
scoping enquiry as to which sources were appropriate to present a comprehensive
picture”. It is true that the Tribunal has not seen any specific evidence from
the respondent in the present case regarding the reasons behind the choice of
interviewees in the September 2010 mission. Given the professional
responsibilities of those involved in the mission, however, and bearing in mind
past practice, it is fanciful to assume that those interviewed would have been
chosen on any other basis than that they had what was considered to be
genuinely important information and views to impart.
167. Accordingly, both as
regards the anonymous interviewees in the UKBA report and those representing
organisations in the Wilson Solicitors’ report, there is no legitimate reason
for limiting the weight placed on it, such as was done by the ECtHR at [234] of
Sufi & Elmi.
168. This leaves the
respondent’s submissions on the statements of the individuals who had fled Somalia for Kenya. We agree with the respondent that these statements need to be approached with
some degree of caution. The present and future intentions of the interviewees
are unclear. Unlike the representative of an NGO, there is an issue as to
whether such persons are telling the truth or motivated to paint a false
picture of their circumstances in Somalia, in order to aid a present or future
claim to refugee status. We have borne such considerations in mind when
assessing the evidence but, nevertheless, consider that the degree of detail in
at least some of the statements is such as to carry the ring of truth.
PART
H
FURTHER
LEGAL ISSUES
169. At this point, it is
probably convenient to examine a number of further general legal issues, raised
by the appeals, although, as will become clear, legal matters are by no means
confined to this Part of the determination. Several of these issues arise from
the evidence regarding the nature of Al-Shabab rule in the areas of south and
central Somalia that the organisation controls. The issues are to a
substantial extent inter-related, as will be seen from the analysis which
follows.
(1) Al-Shabab and religion
170. It is common ground
that, in some areas at least, Al-Shabab impose very significant restrictions on
what the inhabitants of those areas (and those passing through them) may or may
not do, and that these restrictions and requirements are driven by Al-Shabab’s
particular interpretation of the Islamic faith. Thus, there is evidence that
people are required to undertake prayers at mosques; that men are prohibited
from shaving and from wearing trousers longer than to their ankles; that
activities such as watching football, TV and films and listening to music are
prohibited; that women may be required to wear the thick and bulky abaya and
socks; and that there is social segregation of the sexes.
171. As can be seen from
Appendix 1 to this determination, the appellants asserted in evidence that,
although Muslims, they did not share Al-Shabab’s interpretation of that
religion. On their behalf, Mr Toal accordingly submitted that to return any of
the appellants to an Al-Shabab area would result in a real risk of persecution
by reason of religion, proscribed by the Refugee Convention.
172. Before going any
further, it is useful to remind ourselves of relevant provisions of the
Qualification Directive:
“Article 9
Acts of
persecution
1. Acts
of persecution within the meaning of article 1 A of the Geneva Convention
must:
(a)
be sufficiently serious by their nature or repetition as to constitute a
severe violation of basic human rights, in particular the rights from which
derogation cannot be made under Article 15(2) of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; or
(b)
be an accumulation of various measures, including violations of human
rights which is sufficiently severe as to affect an individual in a similar
manner as mentioned in (a).
2. Acts
of persecution as qualified in paragraph 1, can, inter alia, take the form
of:
(a)
acts of physical or mental violence, including acts of sexual violence;
(b)
legal, administrative, police, and/or judicial measures which are in
themselves discriminatory or which are implemented in a discriminatory manner;
(c)
prosecution or punishment, which is disproportionate or discriminatory;
(d)
denial of judicial redress resulting in a disproportionate or
discriminatory punishment;
(e)
prosecution or punishment for refusal to perform military service in a conflict,
where performing military service would include crimes or acts falling under
the exclusion clauses as set out in Article 12(2);
(f) acts
of a gender-specific or child-specific nature.
3. In
accordance with Article 2(c), there must be a connection between the
reasons mentioned in Article 10 and the acts of persecution as qualified
in paragraph 1.
Article
10
Reasons
for persecution
1. Member
States shall take the following elements into account when assessing the
reasons for persecution:
…
(b)
the concept of religion shall in particular include the holding of
theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, the participation in, or
abstention from, formal worship in private or in public, either alone or in
community with others, other religious acts or expressions of view, or forms of
personal or communal conduct based on or mandated by any religious belief;
…”
173. In relation to Article
9(1)(a), the rights from which derogation cannot be made under Article 15(2)
are those in Articles 3, 4(1) and 7.
174. Mr Toal referred us to
various international and domestic instruments and authorities, in support of
his submission that:-
“Unless an asylum seeker’s
present religious beliefs and practices accord with those of AS so that he or
she has to adopt practices that are not his or her own and would have to do so
in order to avoid being subject to persecution, the asylum seeker has [a] well
founded fear of being persecuted for reason of religion.”
175. Article 18 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that:-
“1. Everyone
shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his
choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice and teaching.
2. No-one
shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt
a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom
to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
…”
176. The Constitutional
Court of South Africa in S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg [1997] (4)
SA 1176 (CC) approved Dixon CJC in the case of R v Big Drug Mart Limited
as stating that “the essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right
to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses” but also that freedom
of religion “implies an absence of coercion or constraint and that freedom of
religion may be impaired by measures that force people to act or refrain from
acting in a manner contrary to their religious beliefs”.
177. In Kokkinakis v Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397 the ECtHR held that freedom of religion is “one of the most
vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their
conception of life” [31]. In the Law of Refugee Status, Professor Hathaway
opines that “an individual’s right to religion implies the ability to live in
accordance with a chosen belief, including participation in or abstention from
formal worship and other religious acts, expression of views, and the ordering
of personal behaviour”.
178. In HJ (Iran) v
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31 the House of
Lords held that a gay man had a well founded fear of being persecuted for
reason of his membership of a particular social group, if the evidence demonstrated
that he would suffer persecution unless he concealed his sexuality and that he
would in fact conceal his sexuality owing to that fear of persecution. Dyson
SCJ said:-
“[110] The
Convention must be construed in the light of its object and purpose, which is
to protect a person who ‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country’. If the price that a person must pay in order to avoid persecution is
that he must conceal his race, religion, nationality, membership of a social
group or political opinion, then he is being required to surrender the very
protection that the Convention intended to secure for him. The Convention
would be failing in its purpose if it were to mean that a gay man does not have
a well founded fear of persecution because he would conceal the fact that he is
a gay man in order to avoid persecution on return to his own country”
(original emphasis).
179. Citing Asylum Law
and Practice 2nd Edition, para 4.9, Mr Toal submitted that the
“religion” referred to in Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention could be
either that of the persecutor or of the persecuted.
180. For the respondent, Mr
Eicke submitted that the claimed Al-Shabab requirements for all men to wear
long beards and wear trousers above their ankles, together with the prohibitions
on chewing khat and playing football, were social norms directed at all members
of society living in areas controlled by Al-Shabab and were not requirements
targeted at particular social groups or requirements aimed at those holding
particular political or religious opinions. Only if a particular appellant
could establish that his or her religion prohibited them from wearing a beard,
or trousers above the ankles, or required them to chew khat or play football,
would Al-Shabab’s requirements have an impact on the exercise of the person’s
religious rights. Even then, however, it would not necessarily be the case
that such requirements or prohibitions amounted to persecution. Not every
restriction of general application to the population at large, which in
practice prevented a group from doing something in accordance with its
religious culture, would necessarily amount to a breach of human rights on
grounds of religious discrimination. Even if that were not so, a breach would
not necessarily amount to persecution within the meaning of the Refugee
Convention. The present appellants did not even meet the first of these
requirements, since the mere fact that their religion did not prohibit them
from watching football, for example, could not be said to mean that a
prohibition on watching football, applicable to the general population,
amounted to persecution on grounds of religion. All countries had laws
prescribing standards of public decency. Thus the fact that the authorities in
southern European countries required those entering churches and cathedrals to
dress appropriately, covering shoulders and possibly heads, did not mean that a
north European tourist was being persecuted or discriminated against on the
grounds of religion merely because he or she wanted to enter a church with head
and shoulders uncovered.
181. Likewise, different
countries had different standards of public decency and a visitor to such a
country by a person from a western country could not claim that the application
of the public decency laws to them amounted to discrimination. This was so
even if the stricter laws in the visited country ultimately derived from
religious requirements of the predominant religion in that country.
182. By the same token, a
law prohibiting blasphemy against a particular religion, which applied
generally to the whole population of a country, did not prevent persons from
other religions (including atheists) from practising their own religion, unless
their own religion required such persons to make the statements that were
considered blasphemous to the other religion.
183. The appellants’
objection to restrictions on watching football and shaving, did not put them in
a comparable situation to the appellants in HJ (Iran), where the issue
was whether it was appropriate to expect of individuals a “long-term deliberate
concealment” of an “immutable characteristic”.
184. As for the appellants’
asserted abhorrence of Al-Shabab practices, such as recruiting child soldiers
or forcing young girls to marry soldiers, the mere fact that a “governing
entity” engaged in practices that were offensive to the religion of one or more
of the governed could not amount to persecution of those individuals on grounds
of religion, especially where the individuals themselves were not at risk of
being subjected to such treatment. An example was given of a State which
indulges in capital punishment, which was offensive to a person’s religion.
The fact that that person lived in the country in question did not mean that he
or she was being persecuted on grounds of religion. That was so even if the
person concerned were convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to death.
185. As for Article 18 of
the ICCPR or “perhaps more relevantly, Article 9 ECHR”, such rights were, of
course, qualified in nature (Article 15 ECHR) and Mr Eicke relied on Mr Toal’s
oral statement, disavowing any suggestion that the appellants were submitting
that return to Somalia would involve a “flagrant denial” of their rights under
Article 9 ECHR.
186. In reply, the
appellants emphasised that Article 10(1)(b) of the Qualification Directive was
not limited to the applicant’s belief but covered “any religious belief”.
Al-Shabab’s reason for imposing its requirements and restrictions was a
Salafist or Takfiri jihadist version of Islam, as described in an International
Crisis Group report of 2010. The Takfiri doctrine contended that modern day
Muslims had lapsed into a state of apostasy, building on the Salafi doctrine
that such persons were in a state of jahiliaah (pre-Islamic age of ignorance).
Takfiri ideas were said to have a long pedigree in Somalia but beginning in
2009 a fanatic fringe had revived and instrumentalised such ideas in its
ideological war.
187. It was thus, in the
appellants’ view, incorrect to regard the restrictions and requirements in
question as merely “social norms”, since they were dictated by Al-Shabab in
accordance with its religious beliefs. Accordingly, if after return the
appellants would be reasonably likely to try to change their religion by
participating in or abstaining from formal worship in private or public (for
example, by praying at times and places not of their choosing but at
Al-Shabab’s dictation) or by adopting forms of personal communal conduct based
on or mandated by any religious belief, and their reason for so doing would be
a well-founded fear of being persecuted if they did not change their religion,
then they should be entitled to refugee status.
188. The appellants
accepted that if the reason for the change in religion was in response to an
order or to avoid a lawful and proportionate measure or penalty, rather than to
avoid being persecuted, then an appellant would not be entitled to refugee
status. Thus, returning to a country of origin might require a girl to cease
wearing a Muslim headscarf in school in order to avoid being expelled. In Aktas
v France (2009) (Appl No. 43568/08) the ECtHR had found that the French ban
on wearing such a headscarf interfered with an applicant’s freedom to manifest
her religion, protected by Article 9, but that the ban and consequent
exclusions from school in order to enforce it were proportionate measures,
“explained by the requirements of protecting the rights and freedoms of others
and public order”. By the same token, having to comply with particular
practices or customs regulating public decency, so long as these were lawful
and proportionate, might not amount to persecution.
189. However, the detailed
and coercive regulation of everyday life by a proscribed terrorist organisation
in order to advance its version of jihad was not, the appellants submitted,
comparable with measures taken by a legitimate democratic State neutrally
arbitrating between different religions in the interests of the rights and
freedom of others and of public order. It was submitted that, accordingly, the
interference with the right to freedom of religion occasioned by the headscarf
ban “would, no doubt, have been found to have breached [an applicant’s] Article
9 rights if they had been done by a terrorist organisation in the interests of
jihad rather than one of the legitimate interests identified in Article 9(2)”.
Even if Al-Shabab prayer times were not inconsistent with the times that the
appellants might wish to pray, nevertheless, it was submitted, to pray at the
times and in the places dictated by Al-Shabab because of fear of Al-Shabab
would be to submit to their will rather than to pray in accordance with God’s
will. The same was true of the other Al-Shabab requirements, which were
invested with religious significance or adopted through submission to Al-Shabab
rather than to the will of God.
The Tribunal’s
assessment
190. We are aware that the German Federal Administrative Court has made a preliminary reference to the CJEU regarding
the interpretation of Article 9 of the Qualification Directive in relation to
religious persecution. It is, however, clear from Article 10 of the Directive
that the concept of religion requires the holding of some sort of belief
comprising a coherent and genuinely held system of values, whether they be
theistic, non-theistic or atheistic, and is not satisfied in the case of a
person who holds no such belief. The reference in Article 10(1)(b) to
abstention from formal worship has to be read in the light of the words that
precede it. Notwithstanding that Article 10(1)(b) does not purport to be
comprehensive as to what is meant by the concept of religion, we do not
consider that it encompasses a person who does not, in reality, organise his or
her life to any extent whatsoever upon any recognisable such system.
191. We accordingly accept
the respondent’s submissions that social restrictions per se, such as bans on
watching football or television, do not comprise an interference with the right
to religion under the 1951 Convention in the case of a person whose religious
etc. beliefs do not require him to participate in those activities. The fact
that a person may be permitted, according to his or her religion or other
relevant beliefs, to participate in those activities is immaterial.
192. The question of what a
person’s religious etc. beliefs require them to do or not to do is one of
fact. Accordingly, in the case of the appellants, we make relevant findings of
fact in Part L of this determination.
193. In the case of Aktas
v France, the interference with what was undoubtedly an aspect of the
applicant’s religion was held to be proportionate. That was in the context of
the French authorities being motivated not by religious factors of their own
but, rather, out of a desire to be a “neutral and impartial organiser of the
exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs”. Even where the motivation
for a law is religious, such as with the laws of various states of the USA concerning sexual behaviour, or even the United Kingdom’s restrictions on Sunday trading, the
religious aspect plainly does not, without more, lay the basis of a claim to
international protection in relation to anyone who might fall foul of the law.
This would be true of an internationally recognised State, even one such as Iran, whose democratic and human rights credentials are highly debatable.
194. However, the more such
religiously motivated or inspired laws interfere with the ability of a person
to hold and practise his or her religious or other beliefs, the more intense
will be the scrutiny and the more important will become the issue of
proportionality.
195. It is important to
keep in mind Article 9 of the Qualification Directive. This sets a high
threshold for what constitutes an act of persecution. A violation of a basic
human right must be “severe”; in particular where, as in Article 9 of the ECHR
(right to religion), the right is a qualified one (QD, Article 9(1)(a)).
However, although religion is engaged for the purposes of Article 1A of the
1951 Convention, the violation under Article 9(1)(a) need not, of course, be a
violation of the right to religion. On the contrary, as the evidence regarding
Al-Shabab tends to indicate, the issue will often turn on whether the
punishment for the religiously motivated law is itself a violation of Article 3
of the ECHR; for example, whether punishment for adultery is stoning, as
opposed to the imposition of a fine, or where the punishment for violations of
the dress code is a beating.
196. We have to say that we
are somewhat doubtful whether the reason of religion under Article 1(A) is
necessarily engaged solely by reference to the persecutor, rather than the
persecuted, as Mr Toal submitted, relying upon a passage in Asylum Law and
Practice, 2nd Edition (Symes and Jorro). One of the cases cited
in support of the proposition in the passage, Omoruyi v Secretary of State
for the Home Department [2001] Imm AR 175, does not, upon analysis, appear
to support it. In that case a so-called “devil cult”, the Ogboni were said to
have become furiously antagonistic towards the appellant, as a result of his
refusal to surrender to them the body of his father, for a ritual burial that,
it appears, would have involved mutilation. The Christian appellant chose to bury
his father according to Christian rites. The Court of Appeal specifically
refused to accept that the Ogboni were acting from religious purposes.
Furthermore, the Court also considered that the Ogboni’s animosity towards the
appellant was due not to the latter’s Christianity but rather “stemmed from his
refusal to comply with their demands”.
197. The idea that the
necessary religious element can be found merely in the alleged persecutor,
rather than in the persecutor’s perception of the persecuted, appears to be at
variance with the other Convention grounds in Article 1A, particularly
political opinion. It is trite law that the political opinion in question is
that of the alleged victim, whether that opinion is actual or imputed. If that
ceased to be a requirement, it is likely that the scope of the Refugee
Convention would be significantly enlarged. The proposition that the religious
aspect need reside only in the alleged persecutor also seems to us to be
inconsistent with the underlying nature of the Refugee Convention as an
instrument designed to tackle serious forms of discrimination. The reason for
the persecution must be religion. By analogy with political opinion
persecution, it is trite law that persecution can be for the reason of
political opinion if the victim holds an opinion opposed to the persecutor or
is perceived by the latter to do so. We cannot see why a different approach
should apply to religious persecution. In both cases, it is not sufficient to
constitute Convention persecution that the persecutor is motivated by his or
her religious or political beliefs, if the persecution inflicted is indifferent
to the actual or perceived religious or political beliefs of the victim.
198. We would observe that
such an approach is consistent with the terminology of the prohibition on refoulement
in Article 33(1):-
“No Contracting State shall
expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of particular social
group or political opinion” (our emphasis).
199. Having said all this,
we consider that, in the particular circumstances of the cases before us, the
punishments meted out by Al-Shabab against transgressors are rooted in
Al-Shabab’s Takfiri doctrine, whereby Muslims who do not follow its rules are
regarded as apostates. There would, accordingly, be the required element of
religion in relation to the victim, albeit an imputed element. We shall return
to this issue in Part I, when assessing the general evidence.
(2) No Requirement to act
illegally?
200. In AM & AM
the Tribunal considered to be “untenable” the “contention that taking account
of the ability of returnees to pre-arrange armed militia escorts would be
contrary to [United Kingdom] orders in Council and UN law” [66]. That finding
was not challenged by the appellants in the present appeals. However, an issue
arose as to the consequences of the evidence that, in the areas it controls,
Al-Shabab demands from the civilian population payments in the form of
“taxes”. Mr Toal contended that in the light of the addition of Al-Shabab to
the list of proscribed organisations in Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000
(by the Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) Amendment Order 2010 SI
2010/611), anyone who, short of a defence of duress, paid such money to
Al-Shabab would be committing an offence under section 15(3) of the 2000 Act
(“a person commits an offence if he provides any money or other property and
knows or has reasonable cause to suppose that it will or may be used for the
purposes of terrorism”) or section 17 (entering an arrangement as a result of
which money or other property is made available, knowing or reasonably suspecting
it will or may be used for the purposes of terrorism). In addition, such
payments would be such as States are required by international law to prevent
(UN Security Council Resolution 1844 (2008) and Security Council SC/9904).
201. It is plainly not the case
that a person who can show a reasonable likelihood of having to pay such
“taxes” to Al-Shabab, assuming this to be a breach of the criminal law of the
United Kingdom or comparable international law norms, is thereby to be
treated as a refugee for the purposes of the 1951 Convention. The issue is,
rather, whether one must ignore the fact that a person in such a situation may
choose to pay taxes (and thus avoid possible ill-treatment), in determining
whether that person has made out a claim to international protection.
202. Even on this basis, we
very much doubt whether all forms of activity which, if committed in the United Kingdom, would be illegal fall to be so excluded. Indeed, the appellants in the
present appeals did not put their cases on this basis. For example, in many
parts of the world corrupt officials expect to be bribed.
203. The payments with
which we are concerned, however, are of a different order. Given that
Al-Shabab is fighting to impose its rule over Somalia, there must be a strong
likelihood that any money it demands of civilians is likely, at least in part,
to be used to fund its war against the internationally recognised government of
that country. Even here, however, we do not find that any likelihood a person
would make such payments must automatically be excluded from consideration in
assessing his or her international protection claim. Despite the scope of
section 63 of the 2000 Act, which provides that a person who acts outside the
United Kingdom in such a way as would have constituted an offence if done here,
shall be guilty of an offence, a foreign national who commits such an act
outside the United Kingdom and never submits to the jurisdiction of this
country will never be subject to its law. More particularly, as Mr Eicke
submitted, the consequence of taking such a stance towards Al-Shabab “taxes”
would suggest that (short of duress) anyone who had paid such taxes before
fleeing Somalia would be excluded from any form of international protection by
virtue of Article 12(2)(c) and Article 17(1)(c) of the Qualification Directive,
on the basis that there were grounds to suspect that they had committed acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
204. Perhaps in the light
of these problems, the appellants’ closing submissions adopted an approach
which aimed to ground itself more firmly in established Refugee Convention
jurisprudence. Mr Toal relied on Sepet v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2003] 1 WLR 856, which concerned the issue of whether a
conscientious objector might be entitled to be recognised as a refugee. At
[33] Lord Hoffman said:-
“While the demonstrator or
objector cannot be morally condemned, and may indeed be praised for following
the dictates of his conscience, it is not necessarily unjust for the State to
punish him in the same way as any other person who breaks the law. It will of
course be different if the law itself is unjust. The injustice of the law will
carry over into its enforcement.”
205. In the context of Al-Shabab,
Mr Toal submitted that the refusal to pay “tax” would not be “an objection to a
legitimate and lawful demand imposed by a legitimate state but a refusal to
commit a criminal act on behalf of a terrorist organisation”. Thus, in the
spirit of Sepet, little by way of evidence should be required to satisfy
the Tribunal that an appellant has a conscientious objection to paying such
money to Al-Shabab where the payment would be contrary to law; contrary to
considerations of common humanity and “contrary to the religious beliefs of the
overwhelming majority of Muslims”.
206. We agree with this
approach. A person who, on the facts, shows that they have a genuine
conscientious objection, whether or not rooted in religion, to paying such
taxes (if unjust) may well be able to demonstrate an entitlement to subsidiary
protection under the Qualification Directive or, if a Refugee Convention ground
is shown, under the 1951 Convention. Furthermore, as Mr Toal also submitted,
it may on the facts be shown that the objection to paying flows from a genuine
religious conviction. In such circumstances, the approach we have outlined
earlier will apply. It will, however, be necessary for us to return to the
issue of illegality, when considering the submissions on Somaliland and whether
Appellant ZF could be expected to produce an “unofficial” or “old green” Somali
passport (Part I, paragraphs 534 to 544).
(3) “Playing the game” – RT
(Zimbabwe)
207. At [87] of Sufi
& Elmi, the ECtHR noted the evidence of the UKBA’s Fact-Finding Mission
that “Al-Shabab checkpoints normally check that people were obeying their code
of behaviour and would therefore stop women travelling alone. Some individuals
operating these checkpoints would punish those who were not acting according to
Al-Shabab’s rules.” At [92] the Court noted that “a number of sources
considered the areas controlled by Al-Shabab to be stable and generally safe
for those Somalis who were able to ‘play the game’ and avoid the unnecessary
attention of Al-Shabab”.
208. At [273] the Court
held that Al-Shabab was enforcing a particularly draconian version of Sharia
law that went far beyond the traditional interpretation of Islam in Somalia, amounting to a repressive form of social control. Al-Shabab were concerned with
“every little detail of daily life”. Al-Shabab’s interest extended not only to
its inhabitants but also to those travelling through its areas [274]. At [275]
the Court recalled the evidence of a number of sources telling the Fact-Finding
Mission that areas controlled by Al-Shabab were generally safe for Somalis
provided they were able to “play the game” and avoid the attention of Al-Shabab
by obeying their rules. The Court, as we have seen, went on to hold that it
was unlikely a Somali with “no recent experience of living in Somalia would be
adequately equipped to ‘play the game’, with the risk that he would come to the
attention of Al-Shabab, either while travelling through or having settled in an
Al-Shabab controlled area”. The risk was even greater to Somalis who had been
out of the country long enough to become “westernised”. What punishment
transgressors would face was unpredictable but the evidence indicated that it
did not necessarily depend on the gravity of the infringement. The Court
accordingly concluded a returnee with no recent experience of living in Somalia would be at real risk of Article 3 harm in an Al-Shabab controlled area [277].
209. At this stage, it is
necessary to deal in some detail with a case which featured in the appellants’
submissions regarding Al-Shabab and religion: RT (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of
State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 1285. Like TM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 916, RT concerned
the working through of the consequences of the judgments of the Supreme Court
in HJ (Iran). At [25] and [27] the Court in RT appeared to have
had no difficulty in accepting that the HJ (Iran) “point”, that a gay
person should not be refused refugee status merely because he was likely to
hide his sexuality and/or act “discreetly” to avoid persecution, applied also
to a person “found to have genuine political beliefs”. The same must plainly
apply to someone who genuinely has religious beliefs, who (as we have explained
above) would suffer a flagrant denial of his right to such beliefs, if they
were required to be hidden.
210. At [28], however, the
Court of Appeal considered what it described as “the extended HJ (Iran) point”, which was that the same principle must apply, even if the person had no
genuine political opinions. The Zimbabwe appellants in RT contended
that, provided they were not in truth supporters of the Mugabe regime, the fact
that they might be able to profess loyalty, if challenged by ZANU-PF militias,
was immaterial, since they were not required, on HJ (Iran) principles, to lie in order to avoid persecution.
211. At [36] and [37]
Carnwath LJ said:-
“36. It
may be said that there is marked difference in seriousness between the impact
of having to lie on isolated occasions about political opinions which one does
not have, and the ‘long-term deliberate concealment’ of an ‘immutable
characteristic’, involving denial to the members of the group their ‘fundamental
right to be what they are’ (see per Lord Hope para 11, 21). We are not
persuaded, however, that this is a material distinction in this context. The
question is not the seriousness of the prospective maltreatment (which is not
in issue) but the reason for it. If the reason is political opinion, or
imputed political opinion, that is enough to bring it within the Convention. In
this case, we are concerned with the ‘imputed’ political opinions of those
concerned, not their actual opinions (see para 4 above). Accordingly, the
degree of their political commitment in fact, and whether political activity is
of central or marginal importance to their lives, are beside the point. The ‘core’
of the protected right is the right not to be persecuted for holding political
views which they do not have. There is nothing ‘marginal’ about the risk of
being stopped by militia and persecuted because of that. If they are forced to
lie about their absence of political beliefs, solely in order to avoid
persecution, that seems to us to be covered by the HJ(Iran) principle, and does not defeat their claims to asylum.
37. Accordingly
we accept the thrust of Mr Norton-Taylor's second submission, if not the
precise wording. It is not a question of what the claimant is ‘required’ to
do. However, if the Tribunal finds that he or she would be willing to lie
about political beliefs, or about the absence of political beliefs, but that
the reason for lying is to avoid persecution, that does not defeat the claim.”
212. Relying on RT
(Zimbabwe), the appellants in the present appeals contended that in terms
of the Refugee Convention, as opposed to Article 3 of the ECHR (which was the
form of international protection under consideration in Sufi & Elmi),
the appellants had no obligation at all to “play the game” in
Al-Shabab-controlled areas, regardless of their political and/or religious
beliefs, save only if those beliefs happened to correspond precisely with those
of Al-Shabab (in which case, of course, there would be no element of
obligation).
213. In the light of our
conclusions regarding the nature of persecution by reason of religion, the
appellants’ submission is plainly a powerful one, provided that Al-Shabab would
in practice (a) impose a punishment serious enough (whether on its own or
combined with other measures) to satisfy Article 9(1) of the Qualification
Directive; and (b) impose that punishment because of Al-Shabab’s perception of
the transgressor as a religious inferior. We shall consider those factual
questions as part of our assessment in Part I of this determination.
214. For the respondent,
however, Mr Eicke endeavoured to persuade us that the ratio of RT (Zimbabwe) was, in reality, much narrower and that the case was one of an “extreme”
category, unlike the present appeals. He relied on [53] of the judgment:-
“53. The
problems posed by these cases are extreme. None of the appellants is a
political refugee in the ordinary sense. In most contexts their claims to
asylum would be hopeless. However, conditions in Zimbabwe, as they are
described in RN are exceptional. The legality of these decisions must
be decided by reference to the guidance in that case. Any changes since the
period covered by that decision will be considered by the tribunal as part of
its review of the country guidance. Applying RN we are satisfied that
the appeals, except DM, should be allowed. Mr Norton-Taylor invited us
to substitute our own decision in all or at least some of them. For the
reasons given above, we agree in respect of RT, in which the claim to
asylum will be allowed. We are not persuaded that course is open to us in the
cases of SM and AM, where there were adverse findings of
credibility. We shall accordingly remit those cases to the Upper Tribunal.”
215. The extreme nature of
the RT (Zimbabwe) cases was, Mr Eicke submitted, explained in [8] and
[9] of the judgments, where the Court, adopting for this purpose the judgment
of Elias LJ in TM (Zimbabwe), took account of the country guidance in RN
“that those at risk on return to Zimbabwe on account of imputed political
opinion are no longer restricted to those who are perceived to be members or
supporters of the MDC but include anyone who is unable to demonstrate support
for or loyalty to the regime or ZANU-PF”. Thus “a person who was unable to
produce a ZANU-PF card might be asked to sing the latest ZANU-PF campaign
songs. An inability to do so would be taken as evidence of disloyalty to the
party and so as support for the opposition. Clearly, a person returning to Zimbabwe after some years living in the United Kingdom would be unlikely to be able to pass such a
test.”
216. In his closing
submissions, Mr Toal contended that the present appeals were equally “extreme”,
bearing in mind (i) what an individual would be required to do in order to
“play the game” and (ii) the gravity of the consequences if he or she failed to
do so.
217. There is a factual
issue about the extent to which Al-Shabab imposes and enforces by
disproportionate means, its requirements and restrictions over those within the
areas it controls. Again, we shall examine this in due course. But, assuming
the facts are as the appellants contend, then the position would, we consider,
be every bit as “extreme” as in RT (Zimbabwe). The consequences will
also be significant. Every person living under Al-Shabab control in central
and southern Somalia, who could show that they do not genuinely adhere to that
organisation’s ethos, would have a good claim to Refugee Convention protection,
once outside Somalia (subject to internal relocation and exclusion clause
issues). The effect of RT (Zimbabwe), in comparison with Sufi &
Elmi, is to take the Refugee Convention well beyond the comparable ambit of
Article 3 ECHR protection (and, we might add, of subsidiary protection under
the Qualification Directive). We understand that RT (Zimbabwe) is under appeal to the Supreme Court. It is possible that that Court will prefer the
more restricted application of HJ (Iran), as found in the obiter
remarks of Elias LJ in TM (Zimbabwe). But, be that as it may, RT (Zimbabwe) represents the law and is binding on this Tribunal.
(4) Internal relocation
and the burden of proof
218. The appellants, in
their opening skeleton argument on common issues, took issue with the finding
at [183] of AM & AM that “in order to succeed [the appellant] need
only show that they have no viable internal relocation alternative, if at risk
in Mogadishu”. The appellants contended that “insofar as the Tribunal there
imposed a burden on the appellants to show that they had no internal relocation
alternative, the Tribunal erred in law”. In so submitting, the appellants
cited Article 8 of the Qualification Directive:-
“Article 8
Internal
protection
1. As
part of the assessment of the application for international protection, Member
States may determine that an applicant is not in need of international
protection if in a part of the country of origin there is no well-founded fear
of being persecuted or no real risk of suffering serious harm and the applicant
can reasonably be expected to stay in that part of the country.
2. In
examining whether a part of the country of origin is in accordance with
paragraph 1, Member States shall at the time of taking the decision on the
application have regard to the general circumstances prevailing in that part of
the country and to the personal circumstances of the applicant.
3. Paragraph 1
may apply notwithstanding technical obstacles to return to the country of
origin.”
219. The appellants
submitted that in view of Article 8 “it is not for the asylum seeker to
establish that he or she has no internal relocation alternative. A claim must
succeed if the asylum seeker establishes the relevant risk unless the Tribunal
is satisfied by the evidence before it (a) that there is a part of the country
where there is no relevant risk and (b) that the asylum seeker can reasonably
be expected to stay there.”
220. Mr Eicke submitted
that Article 8 of the Qualification Directive does not make any statement as to
the procedural mechanisms by which the Member State “may determine” that there
is an internal relocation alternative. Procedural rules are separately
provided for under the Procedures Directive (2005/85) but no provision in
support of the appellants’ contention has been identified in that Directive.
Furthermore, it was a general principle of European Union law that, subject to
the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, Member States enjoy procedural
autonomy enabling them to lay down the detailed procedural rules applicable to
the enforcement of any EU law right.
221. That submission seems
to us to be plainly right. It does not, however, dispose of the appellants’
submissions on this issue, since they also relied upon domestic authority.
222. In Jasim v
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 342 Sedley LJ
said:-
“[16] The
possibility of internal relocation is relevant to refugee and human rights
claims because it may demonstrate that a fear of persecution or harm, though
warranted by the applicant's experience in his place of origin, is not
well-founded in relation to other parts of the state whose duty it is to
protect him. But while the two issues – fear and relocation - go ultimately to
the single question of safety, they cannot be decided in the same breath. Once
the judge of fact is satisfied that the applicant has a justified fear of
persecution or harm if returned to his home area, the claim will ordinarily be
made out unless the judge is satisfied that he can nevertheless be safely
returned to another part of his country of origin. Provided the second issue
has been flagged up, there may be no formal burden of proof on the Home
Secretary (see GH [2004] UKIAT 00248); but this does not mean that the judge of
fact can reject an otherwise well-founded claim unless the evidence satisfies
him that internal relocation is a safe and reasonable option.
[17] It
is necessary to stress both adjectives - safe and reasonable. It is well
established that relocation to a safe area is not an answer to a claim if it is
unreasonable to expect the applicant to settle there. There may be no work or
housing. He may not speak the language. Similarly, relocation to an area may
be perfectly reasonable by these standards but unsafe, for example because of
the risk of continued official harassment or - as in this case –
revenge-seeking.”
223. In AH (Sudan) v
Secretary of State [2007] UKHL 49, Lord Bingham referred to what he had
said in Januzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 5:-
“The decision-maker, taking
account of all relevant circumstances pertaining to the claimant and his
country of origin, must decide whether it is reasonable to expect the claimant
to relocate or whether it would be unduly harsh to expect him to do so… There
is, as Simon Brown LJ aptly observed in Svazas v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2001] 1 WLR 1891, para 55, a spectrum of cases. The
decision-maker must do his best to decide, on such material as is available,
where on the spectrum the particular case falls … or must depend on a fair
assessment of the relevant facts [5].”
224. In AA (Uganda) v
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 579 an
Immigration Judge, on the reconsideration of an appeal following an earlier
Immigration Judge’s determination, dismissed the appellant’s appeal because,
although she had a well-founded fear of persecution in a particular area of
Uganda, she had attended a particular church in the United Kingdom and the
Immigration Judge saw “no reason why she could not also turn to the church in
Uganda for similar support if the need arises”. That finding was categorised
as perverse, not being based on relevant (indeed) any evidence [12], [40] and
[54].
225. We do not consider
that the case law relied upon by the appellants comes close to establishing
that the respondent bears the legal burden of proving that there is a part of
the country of nationality of an appellant, who has established a well-founded
fear in one area thereof, to which the appellant could reasonably be expected
to go and live. The person who claims international protection bears the legal
burden of proving that he or she is entitled to it. What that burden entails
will, however, very much depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.
In practice, the issue of an internal relocation alternative needs to be raised
by the Secretary of State, either in the letter of refusal or (subject to
issues of procedural fairness) during the appellate proceedings. In many
cases, the respondent will point to evidence regarding the general conditions
in the proposed place of relocation. It will then be for the appellant to make
good an assertion that, notwithstanding those conditions, it would not be
reasonable to relocate there. Those reasons may often be ones about which only
the appellant could know; for example, whether there are people living in the
area of proposed relocation who might identify the appellant to those in his
home area whom he fears. The Secretary of State clearly cannot be expected to
lead evidence on such an issue.
226. Article 8 of the
Qualification Directive relates both to the Refugee Convention and subsidiary
protection under the Directive itself. What, though, is the position under
Article 3 of the ECHR? At para 266 of Sufi & Elmi, the ECtHR had
this to say:-
“266. In
the United Kingdom an application for asylum or for subsidiary protection will
fail if the decision maker considers that it would be reasonable – and not
unduly harsh – to expect the applicant to relocate (Januzi, Hamid, Gaafar and Mohammed
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 5 and AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2007] UKHL 49). The Court recalls that Article 3 does not,
as such, preclude Contracting States from placing reliance on the existence of
an internal flight alternative in their assessment of an individual’s claim
that a return to his country of origin would expose him to a real risk of being
subjected to treatment proscribed by that provision (Salah Sheekh v. the
Netherlands, no. 1948/04, § 141, ECHR 2007 I (extracts), Chahal v. the
United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, § 98, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1996 V and Hilal v. the United Kingdom,
no. 45276/99, §§ 67 – 68, ECHR 2001 II). However, the Court has held
that reliance on an internal flight alternative does not affect the
responsibility of the expelling Contracting State to ensure that the applicant
is not, as a result of its decision to expel, exposed to treatment contrary to
Article 3 of the Convention (Salah Sheekh …). Therefore, as a
precondition of relying on an internal flight alternative, certain guarantees
have to be in place: the person to be expelled must be able to travel to the
area concerned, gain admittance and settle there, failing which an issue under
Article 3 may arise, the more so if in the absence of such guarantees there is
a possibility of his ending up in a part of the country of origin where he may
be subjected to ill-treatment ….”
227. Although the language
of “guarantees” might at first sight suggest otherwise, we do not consider
that, as regards an Article 3 claim, an applicant in the United Kingdom has to
do any more or less than show that there is a real risk of suffering Article 3
harm if returned to the country of nationality etc. In this regard, what we
have just said about the role of the Secretary of State equally applies; in
other words, the issue of relocation needs to be put “in play” between the
parties. On the other hand, we do not consider that the test of
unreasonableness or undue harshness applies, when assessing conditions in the
place of proposed relocation. In Sufi & Elmi, the ECtHR made no
express reference to reasonableness or undue harshness. However, it may well
be that unreasonableness/undue harshness has a part to play, even in a pure
Article 3 assessment, in that, say, unduly harsh living conditions – albeit not
themselves amounting to a violation of Article 3 – may nevertheless be
reasonably likely to lead to the person concerned ending up back in his or her
home area, where such a violation is a real possibility.
(5) Legal issues
regarding appellant MW’s appeal
(a) Effect of Beoku-Betts
228. Although affecting
only appellant MW, there are further legal issues, which fall most conveniently
to be dealt with in this Part of the determination. The first concerns the
effect on the re-making of the decision in appellant MW’s appeal of the recent
grant to her of discretionary leave and of the daughter of the appellant MW
being a British citizen (see Part D above).
229. As is recorded in
Appendix 1, when Appellant MW was asked what she would do if she had to choose
between having her daughter subjected to FGM and “being called names”, she
replied that she would have her daughter circumcised.
230. In his closing
submissions, Mr Eicke asserted that, even if it were possible to establish that
the daughter would be entitled to international protection on the basis of the
risk to her of being subjected to FGM, that did not inevitably or necessarily
translate into refugee status for appellant MW where, by virtue of her British
citizenship, the daughter was not required to accompany her mother to Somalia,
so as to be exposed to risk, but could remain with the father in the United
Kingdom particularly since, on appellant MW’s own evidence, the latter was
likely to be the perpetrator of the very harm against which protection was
sought.
231. The respondent
submitted that the appeal of appellant MW was materially different from the
position in FM (FGM) Sudan CG [2007] UKAIT 00060, as in that case the
appellant and her children were citizens of Sudan who would all inevitably have
been returned to Sudan together and the risk of FGM to the daughters arose not
from the mother herself but from members of the extended family taking
advantage of any temporary absence of the mother to subject the daughters to
FGM. It was submitted that the case law “understandably relied on by
[appellant MW] in relation to Article 8 ECHR can have no bearing on this
question which, by definition, now arises solely in the context of the [status]
claim under the Refugee Convention or Article 15(b) of the Qualification
Directive”.
232. We remind ourselves
that that last submission relates to the giving of notice by appellant FM under
rule 17A of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, that she wished
to pursue her appeal under section 82 of the 2002 Act on Refugee Convention
grounds, as permitted by section 104(4D) of that Act. The respondent’s
acknowledgement that, in addition, appellant MW can pursue her appeal by
reference to the Qualification Directive (subsidiary protection) is in response
to the Court of Appeal judgments in FA (Iraq) [2010] EWCA Civ 696, which
concerned the directly comparable situation under section 83 of the 2002 Act.
233. For appellant MW, Ms
Short relied upon Beoku-Betts v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2008] UKHL 39 in support of her submission that, regardless of the daughter’s
citizenship and the grant of leave to appellant MW, the daughter’s own human
rights (Article 3) were directly engaged in MW’s continuing appeal. In Beoku-Betts,
the House of Lords found that, in an Article 8 appeal, the rights of the
appellant’s family members under that Article were justiciable in determining
the outcome of the appellant’s appeal.
234. We do not consider
that Beoku-Betts has any relevance in the circumstances in which
appellant MW finds herself. It is common ground that her appeal does not now
encompass any human rights ground under section 84(1)(g) of the 2002 Act. The
ratio of Beoku-Betts is clearly confined to Article 8 cases. In an
Article 8 case, family members who could not be removed with the appellant
would nevertheless be regarded as victims who, if the appellant were removed,
could bring separate proceedings under section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998,
alleging a breach of their Article 8 rights because of the appellant’s
removal. In the present case, however, there can be no possibility of the daughter
of appellant MW bringing any proceedings based on Article 3 of the ECHR,
regardless of whether appellant MW is removed.
235. Ms Short was, however,
on much stronger ground in relying on the Court of Appeal judgment in Saad
& Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 2008. In that case, the Court stressed the fact that “all asylum appeals under
section 69 of the 1999 Act … are hypothetical in the sense that they involve
the consideration of a hypothesis or assumption, which is reflected in the
wording of each of the subsections of section 8, namely that the applicant’s
removal or requirement to leave (as the case may be) ‘would be contrary
to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Convention’ [our emphasis]” [58].
236. The same hypothetical
element as was contained in section 69 can be found in section 84(1)(g) of the
2002 Act, which states that “removal of the appellant from the United Kingdom
in consequence of the immigration decision would breach the United Kingdom’s
obligations under the Refugee Convention …” The same hypothetical element is
also present in Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive, which refers to
“torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in
the country of origin” (our emphasis). The hypothetical presence of
the person concerned in the country in question is, admittedly, no more than
implicit in Article 15(a) and (c).
237. The hypothesis which a
tribunal is required to make, in determining the entitlement of a person to
refugee status or other international protection, is, however, not limited to
assuming the return to the country of origin only of the appellant. On the
contrary, on a daily basis, judicial fact-finders determine appeals by
reference to the hypothetical return along with the appellant of other persons,
whether or not these are British citizens. There is, accordingly, no
impediment to appellant MW pursuing her claim to be entitled to refugee status
or subsidiary protection, on the basis that, if compelled to return to Somalia,
it is reasonably likely that she would take her children, including her
daughter, and that she would suffer serious harm in the form of anguish, in the
event that her daughter was subjected to FGM.
(b) Refugee protection for the persecutor?
238. Whether appellant MW
would, in reality, take the daughter and whether appellant MW would, in fact,
suffer such anguish are questions of fact, to which we shall turn in due
course. But there is a final legal issue to address at this stage; namely,
whether appellant MW is entitled to international protection if, as the
evidence to which we have earlier referred suggests, she would be the person
who mutilates her daughter.
239. There is a range of
possibilities involved here. At one end, a person might be under imminent
threat of death or serious harm, if she does not carry out the procedure. At
the other, the decision to inflict FGM may be entirely voluntary. In between
are societal and familial pressures, of varying intensities.
240. We doubt very much
whether the States Parties to the Refugee Convention or the Member states of
the EU intended to create international protection regimes which confer
protection on potential persecutors or agents of serious harm on the very basis
of that potentiality, save in exceptional cases involving duress or which are
otherwise at the top end of the range we have just described. On the contrary,
the existence of exclusion provisions in both instruments strongly suggests
they did not. This is the basis upon which we shall, in due course, assess the
evidence of appellant MW, when we shall also need to expand upon our conclusion
that appellant MW is not entitled to refugee protection on this basis.
PART
I
ASSESSMENT
OF THE GENERAL EVIDENCE
Introduction
241. The recent history of Somalia is a catalogue of misery; a striking example of the human cost of a failed State.
The warlordism and clan-related violence that followed the fall of the Barre
regime in the early 1990s proved to be immune to international intervention and
was curbed only by the emergence of other forms of conflict involving,
variously, the Union of Islamic Courts and the Ethiopians, and, now, Al-Shabab
and AMISOM, with the Transitional Federal Government making its (often ineffectual)
mark. On top of all this, the climate in the Horn of Africa turned cruel, with
what is now recognised as the most serious drought for 60 years, leading to the
present famine conditions and resulting humanitarian crisis. One thing that
has apparently not changed in all this time is the keenness of Somalis to
inflict FGM on their daughters, with estimates of the prevalence of the
practice being well over 90%.
242. And yet, in the light
of all this, we have heard and read evidence that might be thought somewhat
surprising. Both international and domestic air travel continues using Mogadishu Airport on a daily basis, without significant disruptions. Minibuses travel
across southern and central Somalia, including to Kenya. All kinds of
electrical and technological goods are available in Bakara Market, Mogadishu. The mobile telephone system not only continues to function but provides an
instantaneous means of conveying money internationally, even to the remotest
areas. Businesspeople continue to operate in southern and central Somalia, in some cases with a degree of financial success which would be impressive
anywhere. As well as businesspeople flying in and out of Mogadishu International Airport, there are visitors, including Somalis from the Diaspora, coming for a
variety of purposes, including – grotesquely – for the purpose of having FGM
inflicted on their female children. Much of this evidence comes from the
appellants’ own witnesses, Laura Hammond and Tony Burns.
243. We should, at this
point, say something about our overall approach to the evidence of these two
experts, who gave oral evidence, and of Dr Mullen, whose family circumstances
made him unavailable to attend the hearing. Mr Eicke, relying on Practice
Direction 10 (expert evidence) submitted that the evidence of Drs Mullen and
Hammond “fell well short of the standards anticipated both in the Practice
Direction and the guidance given by the Tribunal”. Dr Mullen was said, in his
report, frequently to use language appropriate for an advocate, rather than
expert. Dr Hammond was said to have criticised the UKBA Fact-Finding Mission
for not following certain methodologies yet, as was apparent from
cross-examination, failed to follow those methodologies in relation to her own
evidence. She criticised the value of some United Nations sources, claiming
they had a “political agenda” whilst refusing to acknowledge the position might
be likewise in the case of various NGOs, upon whose views she relied. She also
failed to take into account, as required by the Practice Direction, evidence
tending to the opposite of the views expressed in her report.
244. Mr Burns, who leads a
major NGO in Somalia and, although based in Australia, frequently visits Mogadishu, was said by Mr Eicke to be the provider of “raw data” rather than analysis. In
some cases that data was based on anecdotes he heard from staff members.
245. The respondent’s
criticisms of Dr Mullen’s evidence are of marginal significance. Dr Mullen has
given oral evidence to the AIT on previous occasions (HH [301]), when
the Tribunal formed a “generally positive impression” of his evidence. The
fact that his expertise on Somalia has given him a certain viewpoint is
apparent but, we find, not such as seriously to affect the value of his
evidence to us.
246. We agree with the
criticisms made of Dr Hammond and also consider that it would have been helpful
had her report drawn upon the recent publication of the report “Cash and
Compassion: The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Relief, Development and Peace-Building”
(2011), of which she was the lead author and which painted a somewhat different
picture of Diaspora Somalis, both in relation to providing aid and returning to
Somalia to assist in that regard, than was evident from her report prepared for
these proceedings. We nevertheless have concluded that significant weight can
still be attached to her evidence.
247. As for Mr Burns, in
this jurisdiction there is long experience of hearing from persons in his
position, who are the providers of “raw data” and eyewitness observation,
rather than the kind of academic experts that Drs Mullen and Hammond are. We
have, accordingly, taken Mr Burns’s evidence for what it is.
248. In early August 2011,
after the conclusion of the eight days of hearing the appeals, the BBC and
other news organisations reported that Al-Shabab had withdrawn from its
military positions in Mogadishu. The Tribunal issued directions to the parties
to liaise with a view to placing before the Tribunal agreed proposals for the
production of written evidence regarding this issue and written submissions as
to the conclusions which the Tribunal was invited to draw from that evidence.
The parties have done so, although the timescale has proved to be slightly more
protracted than was originally envisaged. In the event, both the appellants and
the respondent have submitted evidence not just on the position in Mogadishu but on other issues, including the military and humanitarian situations in
central and southern Somalia, up to late September 2011. We have taken account
of all of the most recent admitted evidence and the accompanying submissions.
249. With these
introductory remarks, we turn to our assessment of the general evidence.
Although we have for this purpose separated Mogadishu from the rest of southern
and central Somalia, there is, as will be seen, some overlap in the issues
regarding each.
(1) Mogadishu
Evidence
and submissions
250. The starting point for
our assessment is the country guidance set out in AM & AM, which
was:-
“There is now an
internal armed conflict within the meaning of international humanitarian law
(IHL) and Article 15(c) of the Refugee Qualification Directive throughout
central and southern Somalia, not just in and around Mogadishu. The armed
conflict taking place in Mogadishu currently amounts to indiscriminate violence
at such a level of severity as to place the great majority of the population at
risk of a consistent pattern of indiscriminate violence. On the present
evidence Mogadishu is no longer safe as a place to live in for the great
majority of returnees whose home area is Mogadishu”.
251. It is common ground
that the identification of an internal armed conflict by reference to IHL law,
though subsequently found to be legally incorrect, did not vitiate the
Tribunal’s findings that such a conflict did exist at the relevant time. What
has happened since?
252. The UKBA Fact-Finding
Mission interviewees reported civilians as at risk of being caught in the
crossfire of the conflict in Mogadishu, rather than being targeted. Some of
the civilian deaths are due to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (United
Nations, September 2010), together with suicide bombings and other bombings
(such as an attack on a hotel in August 2010 and a vehicle bomb outside the TFG
police training facility in February 2010). There were also accounts of
civilians killed by landmine explosions (COIS 8.23). The Landinfo report of
August 2010 suggests that the accuracy of reporting casualty figures in Mogadishu has been quite good. This contrasts with Mr Burns evidence, that casualty
figures tend to be underestimated, a finding also contained in AM & AM
[143]. What is certainly the case is that many reports do not distinguish (or
accurately distinguish) between combatant casualties and civilian casualties
(OCHA Humanitarian Overview September 2010).
253. The respondent
submitted that the evidence indicated that the situation was no worse at the
present time than it was at the time of AM & AM; if anything, the
evidence, as reflected in a number of maps prepared by well-informed observers,
made it clear that it was inappropriate to consider Mogadishu as a single and
homogeneous entity when considering the security situation there.
254. According to the UNHCR
(British High Commission, Nairobi letter of 1 June 2011, figures for the whole
of Somalia indicated 1,286 killings in 2009 and 1,396 in 2010, with rapes
rising to 709 from 463 and other physical assaults rising to 2,046 from 1,597.
The COIS Report refers (again across Somalia) to 5,000 fatalities in 2010, of
whom 20% were children. Congressional Research Service estimated 22,000
civilian deaths in the two years prior to December 2010, whilst the US State
Department estimated 2,000 civilians killed across Somalia in 2010, of which
918 were in Mogadishu, together with 5,184 civilian injuries in Mogadishu alone. A Landinfo report of August 2010 referred to approximately 600 people
killed in Mogadishu in the first seven months of 2010 in fighting, suicide
attacks, roadside bombs and stray bullets, of which 250 were explicitly
described as civilians. Interpolating from the US State Department figure of
2,000 civilians killed and 6,000 injured in 2010, the respondent submitted that
this equated to only some 2.7% of all deaths in Somalia being civilian
casualties caused by the armed conflict. Moving to the first two months of
2011, and taking figures of the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Armed Conflict Database that at least 224 people were killed and another 227
wounded, with more than half those killed being civilians, the respondent
submitted that even if all the casualties were assumed to be civilians this
would amount to an annualised figure of 1,120 killed and 1,135 wounded, which
was lower than the figures referred to for 2010 or, indeed, the figures
referred to in AM & AM for 2008. Additionally, two major hospitals
in Mogadishu had recorded 1,756 conflict related injuries since January 2011
(OCHA Humanitarian Overview April 2011), which would give an annual figure of
5,258 injuries in Mogadishu and not confined to civilians.
255. It was the
respondent’s case that all these figures showed a trend, which was downwards.
Although Dr Hammond ascribed the decline to the reduction in the population of Mogadishu since 2008, the Elman Institute sought to explain them by reference to a change
of tactics by Al-Shabab. In addition, Dr Mullen asserted that 80% of the
deaths/injuries in Mogadishu were in Bakara Market. It was, therefore,
according to the respondent a “very significant development that AMISOM have
recently declared Bakara Market a no fire zone” (Agence France-Presse, 20 May 2011). The indiscriminate retaliatory shelling and mortar fire carried out by
AMISOM in the market area, in response to Al-Shabab attacks, could be regarded
as at an end, which must have a significant effect upon the level of
indiscriminate violence in Mogadishu. In addition, there was evidence from
COIS that AMISOM was exercising a greater degree of control over its soldiery.
256. On occasion Al-Shabab
distributed leaflets warning of attacks on specific areas, so that civilians
could leave in advance (UNSC September 2010). Since a suicide bombing at the
university in 2009, Al-Shabab was thought to have become more sensitive to the
effect of civilian casualties on its public support. There was also evidence
that fighting in Mogadishu was indeed generally occurring in districts where
there were few civilians (Landinfo, August 2010). Although the UN had stated
in April 2011 that Mogadishu “remains unstable and hostile”, it had recently
increased the numbers of its personnel operating on the ground, due to
increased security in the city (UNSC April 2011). A UKBA Fact-Finding Mission
interviewee said that one needs “to understand ‘normal life’ in a Mogadishu sense, where there is an acceptance of a mobile type of life created by
displacement”.
257. The respondent also
relied on evidence to the effect that Mogadishu had recently experienced an
increased influx of “drought-affected pastoralists” (COIS 21.15), in order to
access cheaper cereal prices and aid (Humanitarian Overview OCHA February
2011). By April 2011 UNHCR could report that Mogadishu sheltered some 372,000
displaced persons and of the 33,000 displaced by conflict since February, around
half were in Mogadishu (COIS 27.14). The greatest influx, according to the PMT
Mogadishu Dashboard, had been to areas which appeared at the time to be the
most disputed districts of Mogadishu, and which had been under Al-Shabab
control in February 2011 but, at the time of the report, were wholly or partly
under AMISOM/TFG control: Deynille, Hodan, Hawalwadag and Wardhigley.
258. Even those who left Mogadishu as IDPs returned regularly “to engage in petty trade, load trucks, drive taxis or
do whatever they can to bring in some income in order to survive”
(International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent, October 2010). Mr
Burns confirmed in oral evidence that men and women travelled from the Afgoye
Corridor into Mogadishu to buy food or to look for work and that businesses
were relocating to the Afgoye Corridor, following the closure of Bakara
Market. Indeed, there was evidence that the Afgoye Corridor was increasingly
urbanised and that recent IDPs there were experiencing difficulties caused by
an increase in land prices in the Corridor.
259. The respondent
submitted that a consistent strand of the evidence was to the effect that
TFG/AMISOM had for some time held in their control districts of Mogadishu in the south of the city, such as Hamar JaabJab and Hamar Weyne, as well as the
district of Waaberi, which contains Mogadishu International Airport. Although Bakara Market was at the time located in an Al-Shabab controlled district,
the OCHA map of Mogadishu identified some sixteen other markets around the city
and Mr Burns’ evidence was that some 30 markets existed there, albeit serving
local, largely food-based needs, rather than catering for the wide range of
goods found in Bakara Market.
260. According to COIS
2.44, Somalia was said to have maintained a “healthy informal economy, largely
based on livestock, remittance/money transfer companies, and
telecommunications” with agriculture being the most important sector. Hotels
continued to operate, albeit supported with private security militia. A mobile
phone company had invested US$10 million since 2000 and Somalia had better internet connectivity than several other African countries (COIS 2.07). This
evidence was supported by Mr Burns, who said that any IT found in the UK could also be found in Mogadishu. Dr Hammond’s Cash and Compassion report described the
significant contributions made by the Somali Diaspora in terms of cross-clan
support for IDPs, investment in schools, clinics, hospitals etc. Mr Burns
admitted in oral evidence that businesses continued to operate in Mogadishu, some moving from Bakara Market to the Afgoye Corridor and other parts of the
capital. He said the biggest businessmen in Somalia operated from out of the
country (that is to say, those with turnover of US$50 million to US$100
million), those with a turnover of US$1 million to US$10 million apparently
made visits to Somalia, whilst those worth US$50,000 to US$1 million continued
to be present in the country, paying taxes both to the TFG and, where
necessary, Al-Shabab. Dr Hammond confirmed that employment opportunities in
the informal sector existed in Mogadishu, such as at the port directly
accessible from Hamar JaabJab. Mr Burns considered that appellant FM could
work in some way, for example by selling fruit in that district. In general,
according to the British High Commission letter, many people in Somalia in one
way or another “do get by”, with many relying on small scale petty trade and
casual employment. Only children from the poorest households worked.
261. Dr Hammond’s “Cash and
Compassion” report described the excellence of telecoms in Somalia, which facilitated the Hawala system, whereby Somali Diaspora could send money to family
members displaced by war within a day or two of their dislocation, even to IDP
camps. This had led Al-Shabab to ban mobile phones receiving such remittances
because Al-Shabab could not get hold of the money themselves (Cash and
Compassion, page 42).
262. There was a good deal
of evidence to the effect that organisations were able to operate in Mogadishu, providing food and other humanitarian assistance (e.g. OCHA Somalia Weekly
Humanitarian Bulletin March/April 2011; Nairobi Evidence: Representatives of
INGO). The British High Commission letter set out a non-exhaustive list of
organisations providing such help. Thus, COIS 27.17 reported food assistance
continuing to sustain 250,000 people a month in Mogadishu.
263. However, SAACID –
Drought in Somalia (May 2011) reported that the city of Mogadishu had “little
capacity to cope with” new families arriving from the drought-stricken
countryside. A sample in January 2011 conducted in Mogadishu found that more
than 70% of the population have been displaced at least once in the past two
years, primarily from conflict. “Yet, communities in Mogadishu have opened
their hearts to the new rural families, who are perceived as being even more
desperate than families residing in Mogadishu.” Mr Burns confirmed that other
TFG-controlled districts had agreed to assist IDPs arriving “once the numbers
of new arrivals had grown too high in Hamar Weyne and Hamar JaabJab”.
264. SAACID’s reports
indicated that its project, which involved employing 1,100 people in ten
districts of Mogadishu to clear tonnes of rubbish from the area, ran in all districts
without security incidents in 2010/2011. The project was not targeted by
anyone. The respondent relied on this as an indication of the current security
situation in Mogadishu and the ability of people to move around the city.
265. The UN continued to
support the development of a professional and accountable Somali police force
(COIS 7.02), although the US State Department Report of 2010 described the
police as being “ineffective, underpaid and corrupt”. AMISOM troop strength
rose at the end of 2010 to 8,000 and was now 12,000. There were several
reports that TFG agents had committed arbitrary or unlawful killings (COIS
9.23), with the US State Department Report referring to “rogue TFG troops and
militia”. According to the USSD, however, there were in 2010 no reports of TFG
forces engaging in torture or of police raping women. This was to some extent
contradicted by the human rights organisation Coalition for Grassroots Women
Organisations.
266. Dr Hammond suggested
in oral evidence that areas under TFG/AMISOM control in Mogadishu were not
genuinely under such control and that Al-Shabab and other militias moved into
some areas at night. The respondent questioned this evidence. An ORBS poll of
November 2010 indicated that, of women in Mogadishu, just under half were
housewives and the other half comprised 2% business owners, 9% informal
employment, 9% working part-time, 6% working full-time, 13% students and 13%
unemployment. The majority of those working for Mr Burns’ SAACID organisation
were women and a thousand women were employed by the UN (UNSC April 2011). In Mogadishu and elsewhere, women who had lost male breadwinners as a result of the armed
conflict assumed an economically active role, which included setting up small
businesses (ICRC – Annual Report 2010 – Africa). According to Joakim Gundel,
based on working and interviews in Somalia and studies of the country from
outside it, there had been changes in the clan system in Mogadishu over the
past eight years, whereby the Reer Hamar community was no longer subject to the
kind of targeted violence by major warring clans, albeit that they were still
subject to some discrimination. Mr Burns did not suggest that members of
minorities encountered particular problems when migrating to Mogadishu. He
said that rural people travelled to Hamar Weyne and Hamar JaabJab, where most
had clan connections. Mr Burns used the minority/majority terminology in the
sense of whether particular clans were numerically in the majority or minority,
rather than by reference to noble clans and traditional minorities. Dr
Hammond’s evidence was to the effect that persons who had once been powerful
might not be powerful at the present time as the situation was “evolving”. The
respondent submitted, however, that this did not support a conclusion that clan
relations were no longer relevant.
267. The respondent
submitted that Mogadishu International Airport was safe. It catered for an
average of 2,000 a month (incoming) with a similar number leaving. The airport
was secured by AMISOM troops and Somali police and no flights have been
cancelled for security reasons since 1990.
268. Reintegration support
was available for failed asylum seekers who returned to Somalia from the United Kingdom voluntarily. The respondent relied on the finding at [178] of TK
(Tamils, LP updated) Sri Lanka (REV1) CG [2009] UKAIT 00049, where it
was held that there was “no basis for suggesting … that if required to return
the appellant would not seek to avail herself of such a package”. The expression
“voluntary” ought, therefore, to be read in that light and a finding made that,
if returned, the appellants would avail themselves of financial assistance,
including up to £1,500 in order to help the person concerned settle back in
their country, including – where appropriate – setting up a business.
Caseworkers were available to assist in contacting friends and family in the
country of return and planning onward travel (R/3/14/1520-1525).
269. Mr Toal submitted that
the Tribunal in AM & AM had decided to make findings on the risk to
civilians in the city of Mogadishu as a whole, even though it recognised that
there were “safer districts within the city”, which actually received IDPs,
that the affluent northern parts of the city had been relatively unaffected by
the fighting and that that fighting was mostly concentrated in only two
particular districts [173] to [178]. By the same token, the ECtHR in Sufi
& Elmi had declined to adopt a district by district approach to the
Article 3 risk faced by civilians in Mogadishu, despite evidence from the UKBA
Fact-Finding Mission and elsewhere, that it was supposedly possible to live in
non-conflict areas of the city, which were considered to be safe. The ECtHR
took this view because it considered that “the power balance in districts in
urban areas could change almost from day to day and, as a consequence,
information on area control could become out of date very quickly” [247].
270. So far as civilian
casualties were concerned, the appellants submitted that the evidence as to
casualties, relied on by the respondent to show an alleged decline since the
time of AM & AM, varied very considerably. The ECtHR in Sufi
& Elmi, in the face of evidence from the Elman Peace and Human Rights
Organisation, indicating a decline in civilian deaths between 2008 and 2009,
and acknowledging that the situation in Mogadishu appeared to have improved in
2009, nevertheless found that the parties to the conflict continue to engage in
indiscriminate violence and that, in fact, the situation in Mogadishu had
deteriorated in 2010 (Elman, citing 918 civilians dead and 255 injured in
January to July 2010, as a result of increased fighting and shelling).
271. The ECtHR concluded at
[246] that “whatever the precise figures, it is clear that since the beginning
of 2010 the ongoing fighting in Mogadishu has resulted in thousands of civilian
casualties and a displacement of hundreds of thousands of people”. We were
urged to adopt the same approach and to continue to recognise, as did the
Tribunal in AM & AM, that there was a likelihood of considerable
underreporting. This was because the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (August 2010) had stated that there was no systematic
gathering of data about conflict related deaths and injuries in Somalia; the
reporting by individuals and institutions, such as hospitals and the Mogadishu
Ambulance Service, upon which the data were based, necessarily had a limited
impartial reporting capacity, as could be seen from the evidence from Lifeline
Africa Ambulance Service’s spokesman that “many people are buried where they
die and many injured are looked after by relatives unable to get them to
hospital” (IRIN Report, December 2010); but in the nine months January to
September 2010, three Mogadishu hospitals reported 5,485 weapons-related
injuries (UN, September 2010); that any downward trend in casualty figures was
indeed due to the depopulation of Mogadishu, such that the figures by
themselves were not a reliable basis for assessing the intensity of violence
and the extent to which it gave rise to a risk of serious harm to people still
in the city; that a press statement of 31 May 2011 from the World Health
Organisation indicated that the main causes of death among under 5’s were burns,
chest injuries and internal haemorrhaging caused by blast injuries, shrapnel
and bullets; that of the 1,590 reported weapons-related injuries in May 2011,
46% related to children under the age of 5; and that a spokesman for Peaceline
told IRIN that numbers would be even higher, if one took into consideration
that many families were unable to access hospitals and therefore treated
children at home as best they could.
272. Mr Toal submitted that
the displacement of people from Mogadishu was, as well as casualty figures, an
important indicator of the level of risk posed by indiscriminate violence.
That was the approach taken in AM & AM [172, 178] and it should
likewise be the approach that we should take. Mr Toal submitted that [248] of Sufi
& Elmi also indicated that this was the approach adopted by the ECtHR.
273. UNHCR Population
Movement Tracking Monthly Reports of January to September 2010 disclosed that,
in the months respectively under consideration in those reports, tens of
thousands of displacements occurred, in the form either of people leaving Mogadishu or moving to another area within it. Looking at the period October 2010 to May
2011, the figures dipped below 10,000 in November, December and January 2011 but rose in February 2011 to just under 10,000, with 17,960 displacements in
March, 6,100 in April and 16,500 in May.
274. The appellants
described these figures as indicating “continuous, mass displacement from and
within Mogadishu as a result of the violence and insecurity there”. They were an
indicator of the nature and level of violence in Mogadishu. The UNHCR,
concerned about the possible exaggeration of IDP figures, utilised satellite
imagery and remote sensing techniques to reassess the IDP population of the Mogadishu periphery, as a result of which reassessment the figures were in fact revised
upwards, so far as those in the Afgoye Corridor were concerned.
275. The appellants
contended that, if anything, the evidence before us showed the risk to
civilians in Mogadishu had increased, compared with the evidence that was
before the ECtHR in Sufi & Elmi. The respondent acknowledged that
fighting in Mogadishu had intensified in 2011, with a major offensive by
TFG/AMISOM beginning in February. Moreover, the COIS Report of 27 May 2011
quoted sources stating that all parties in the conflict had engaged in
indiscriminate attacks, resulting in civilian casualties. This includes
Al-Shabab launching mortar attacks from hidden sites, using civilians as human
shields, which frequently destroyed civilian homes but rarely struck military
targets; TFG/AMISOM responses that sometimes resulted in shelling civilian
areas; and suicide bombings, landmines and IEDs.
276. The UKBA Fact-Finding Mission recorded informants as stating that most civilian casualties were attributed to
AMISOM shelling residential areas, including Hodan, Hawlwadag, Wardhigley,
Al-Ashabya, K-13, Bar Huba and Bakara Market [170f].
277. The appellants
strongly challenged the respondent’s assertion that there had been any
significant “change of tactics” by Al-Shabab, which might have reduced the
casualty figures. On the contrary, the evidence indicated that Al-Shabab
continued to use tactics that occasioned very significant civilian casualties,
including launching attacks behind civilian human shields, roadside bombs, IEDs
and suicide bombings. The ECtHR had noted in Sufi & Elmi that
“although there were reports that Al-Shabab’s tactics had become more
sophisticated following the recruitment of foreign fighters, none of the
reports suggested that the use of new tactics had in any way reduced the risk
to civilians” [246]. In fact, according to the Nigerian Directorate report,
these changes had resulted in Al-Shabab acting with “greater brutality”.
278. The closure of Bakara
Market, also relied on by the respondent, was not, according to the appellants,
of any material significance, since neither the TFG/AMISOM nor Al-Shabab had
defeated the other. Bakara Market remained an Al-Shabab-controlled part of Mogadishu at the time of the hearings. There was also “a real risk that the relocated
market will be a new locus of conflict”.
279. As for the declaration
by AMISOM of a “no-fire” zone in Bakara Market, the appellants submitted that
such declarations had been made in the past and plainly had no material effect
(report, bundle C, P266). The declaration of 2 December 2010 had not stopped Bakara Market being targeted by AMISOM artillery, with resulting civilian
deaths since that time.
280. The supposed
distinction, sought to be drawn by the respondent, between Al-Shabab targeted
and indiscriminate violence was, the appellants contended, unjustifiable in the
light of HM (Iraq) CG [2010] UKUT 331 (IAC), where the Upper Tribunal
rejected as unhelpful the proposal that a distinction should be drawn between a
real risk of targeted and of incidental killing of civilians during an armed
conflict. In any event, the appellants submitted, Al-Shabab had, in fact,
often used what were plainly indiscriminate methods in order to kill their
enemies, such as could be seen from the roadside bomb intended for a minister’s
car, which killed five other people (21 December 2009), the attack on the Muna
Hotel in Mogadishu on 24 October 2010 when, as well as those targeted, an 11
year old shoeshine boy and a woman selling tea were also killed; eight
civilians killed by a roadside bomb intended for AMISOM troops on 31 August
2010; at least 70 killed following a botched suicide bomb attack on government
facilities on 5 March 2011; and the bombing of the house of a police officer in
Wadajir district, which caused five deaths on 6 April 2011.
281. The appellant
submitted that there were, in fact, no properly identifiable safe areas in Mogadishu. As the ECtHR had held in Sufi & Elmi, the situation could change
from day to day and Dr Hammond in her evidence had reiterated that point.
Furthermore, even the so-called safer districts were, according to Mr Burns,
the subject of weekly mortar attacks. Examples of civilian casualties in areas
identified as “relatively untouched by the major conflict” included:-
(a) Daynile – civilians
killed and wounded on 16 and 24 November 2009, 21 July 2010, 67 wounded in
districts including Daynile on 26 March 2011 and ‘massive shelling’ of Daynile
on 9 April 2011, killing nine civilians and injuring 26;
(b) Hamar JaabJab –
woman and two children killed by a mortar on 20 December 2009; four civilians
killed and ten wounded on 13 January 2010; ten civilians wounded by heavy
artillery on 14 June 2010; eleven people, including civilians killed and 40
injured by suicide bombing on 21 February 2011; two boys killed after explosive
device with which they were playing blew up, 23 April 2011; one civilian killed
by crossfire on 31 May 2011; ten civilians wounded by fighting between TFG and
police on 13 June 2011;
(c) Waaberi – three
civilians killed by landmine on 18 April 2010; several civilians wounded by
retaliatory fire on 11 September 2010; civilians wounded during clash between
rival TFG soldiers on 13 March 2011; five killed and six wounded by similar
fighting on 26 April 2011; seventeen civilians killed and seventeen wounded by
mortar attack on 25 May 2011;
(d) Hamar Weyne – mortar
attack killing two civilians and injuring three on 20 May 2010; eleven people
including three children killed by a mortar attack on a hospital on 11
September 2010; roadside bomb intended for Finance Ministry official killing
five people, 4 July 2010; ten schoolchildren injured by mortar landing on their
school on 19 July 2010; Al-Shabab suicide bombing at Muna Hotel killing 31, 24
August 2010;
(e) Yaaqshid – three
civilians killed by artillery barrage on 27 March 2011; four civilians killed by bombardments on residential areas on 2 June 2011;
(f) Karaan – 22 killed
and 37 wounded in clashes on 24 October 2010; three killed and two injured on 28 October 2010 (it is unclear whether all or any of these were civilians);
(g) Wadajir/Medina (the
so-called ‘green zone’) – four civilians wounded by AMISOM firing on 25 January
2011; sixteen killed and 56 injured (mostly civilians) shopping at Benadir
Market as a result of fighting between TFG police and soldiers on 3 February
2011; five injured when a police officer’s house was bombed on 6 April 2011;
Medina Hospital hit by mortar rounds in April 2011; two civilians wounded when
TFG soldiers clashed among themselves on 26 June 2011.
282. The appellants took
issue with the submission that areas within TFG control were safe, from the TFG
forces themselves, despite the evidence regarding attempts to improve
discipline. Reference was made to various of the incidents just described,
involving fighting between TFG elements. In addition, two people were killed
and six injured when TFG soldiers turned on each other in Dharkanley in a
dispute over possession of a car on 7 March 2011; five were killed, including
civilians, when TFG soldiers clashed over money robbed or extorted from
passengers on civilian buses on 26 April 2011; two civilians killed by TFG
soldiers when they refused to pay “taxes” to soldiers in Dharkanley on 14 May
2011; ten civilians wounded by fighting between TFG police and troops in Hamar
JaabJab on 13 June 2011; and one woman killed and one injured when TFG soldiers
clashed over control of the central Mogadishu IDP camps on 28 June 2011. On
the same day businessmen were reported as complaining that they had been
ordered to pay money by TFG soldiers, or leave the area.
283. In addition, the
appellants relied on the evidence of Mr Burns that criminal violence was
pervasive, even in areas where the conflict was said to be relatively low, as a
result of the operation of freelance criminal militias. Mogadishu was, in
fact, incapable of supporting its current population, with unemployment
according to a recent SAACID survey standing at 70%, since the closure of Bakara
Market. At the same time there was increasing demand, as a result of the
arrival of large numbers displaced by the drought.
284. The appellants denied
that the increased number of AMISOM troops was indicative of a change for the
better in the security situation. The UN staff in the city were accommodated
in secure accommodation “within the AMISOM protected area at the Aden Adde International Airport”, according to the UN Secretary General on 24 April 2011.
This was consistent with Dr Hammond’s evidence of a “bunkerised presence” on
the part of TFG/AMISOM in Mogadishu. The airport base was in fact unique in
terms of security and it would be wrong to draw inferences about the security
position elsewhere in the city from the position at the airport.
285. In early August 2011,
most, if not all, of Al-Shabab’s conventional fighting forces left Mogadishu. The details are unclear; and there is debate as to the motivation behind the
withdrawal. What is, however, apparent is that there is no longer a “front-line”
in Mogadishu, separating the areas respectively controlled by Al-Shabab and the
TFG/AMISOM. Agence France Presse quoted the Somali President as stating that “Mogadishu has been fully liberated from the enemy”, whereas Al-Shabab were reported as describing
the measure as a change in military tactics. A dead Al-Shabab leader was said
to have had on his person documents advising Al-Shabab to “go back to their old
ways of hit and run insurgency and underground operations and to disband the
areas that they control” (The Nation, 7 September 2011).
286. The UN Secretary
General’s Special Representative said on 6 August that, whilst Al-Shabab’s
departure was a positive development, it was “important that we acknowledge
that real security risks, including from terrorist attacks, remain and must not
be underestimated”. There was a need “to avoid a vacuum in the areas vacated
by the insurgents” and law enforcement measures needed to be put in place as a
matter of urgency to avoid “warlords and their militias from taking advantage
of the situation”. The likelihood was that Al-Shabab would “employ
asymmetrical, hit-and-run terrorist tactics, such as suicide bombings.
Indications are that some of the insurgents simply ‘melted away’ by mingling
with the residents of Mogadishu. These remnants of the insurgency, therefore,
present a continuous challenge.”
287. The appellants’
evidence included the following instances of what was asserted to be continuing
armed conflict in the city, following the withdrawal of Al-Shabab. On 7 August 2011 five civilians were killed and eleven civilians wounded by heavy shelling as
government forces attempted to enter the district of Daynille. On 9 August
there were armed clashes between Al-Shabab and the TFG/AMISOM involving light
and heavy weaponry in northern parts of Mogadishu, involving at least three
civilians killed and five injured. Al-Shabab were said to have launched
hit-and-run attacks on bases that had been seized earlier in the day by the
TFG/AMISOM. On 16 August there were “heavy battles” in Yaqshid and Qaran,
involving four killed and dozens wounded and the following day AMISOM said
Al-Shabab were shelling populated areas. In return, AMISOM shelled Daynille
and Huriwa, killing three civilians and injuring seven. On 21 August in
Dharkanley, six people including three children were injured by grenades
thought to have been thrown by Al-Shabab. On 21 August 2011 it was reported by
Emergency Humanitarian Action, in its weekly highlights of 20 to 26 August,
that 455 casualties from weapon related injuries had been treated in three Mogadishu hospitals.
288. Further reports from
late August described heavy fighting involving an exchange of shelling on
Industrial Street after an Al-Shabab attack on an AMISOM base; further deaths
after Al-Shabab attacks on bases in Afgoye, Huriwaa and Daynille districts of
Mogadishu, with residents fleeing or lying on floors in fear of stray bullets;
two children killed after a bomb they were playing with exploded; a woman
killed by an Al-Shabab bomb near an IDP feeding centre, involving an attack on
an AMISOM convoy; and ten deaths and fifteen injuries involving attacks on
bases of AMISOM in Dharkanley, Karan, Fageh, Gubta, Towfik, Hamarweyne and
Waaberi districts. Six of the dead and ten of the wounded were civilians.
289. On 7 September, at
least six civilians were reported to have died as a result of mortar attacks in
the Karan district, with three people killed by shelling. Two days later four
people were killed and ten injured by an explosion in Yaqshid. On 17 September
at least two civilians were killed by an IED in Dharkanley. On 17 September,
two civilians were killed and four wounded when a mortar hit an IDP settlement
in the same district during fighting between Al-Shabab and the TFG/AMISOM. On
the same day a civilian was killed and two injured following a mortar attack in
Daynille.
290. According to Somalia
Report of 31 August, Al-Shabab are maintaining a covert presence in Mogadishu,
where they seek to rely on fear instilled by a policy of executing
“collaborators” in order to deter civilians from informing on them. The
organisation was attempting to compensate for reduced military and political
capacity by terrorising the civilian population. Thus, on 21 August, an Al-Shabab
leader issued a fatwa ordering the killing of anyone opposed to Al-Shabab,
including those loyal to the TFG. According to Somalia Report, the leader said
that anyone who asserted Al-Shabab was defeated would be “silenced (will be
shot in the head)” and that, whilst Al-Shabab used to protect civilians “from
now on we shall not spare them, whoever is supporting the infidels have the
right to die”. On 23 August three males were executed in Mogadishu, one being
accused of working for Kenyan intelligence and the others of working and spying
for the TFG. Two days later, a report on Shabelle.net described the
decapitated body of a Somali boy who had been abducted being left at the pasta
factory in north Mogadishu. The same day, there was a report that Al-Shabab
had kidnapped two men in Garasbaley and that the beheaded body of one of them
was found in what was described as the Al-Shabab controlled area of Suqaholaha,
where five other headless bodies had been found in recent days.
291. On 2 September 2011 it was reported that Al-Shabab had beheaded ten people in Huriwa and
Daynille districts over the past few days, including a woman accused of
spying. Those two districts were described by the District Commissioner as
having been transformed “into butcheries” by Al-Shabab. On 6 September two
decapitated bodies were found in Hiliwaa.
292. The appellants’ most
recent evidence contained a number of reports, said to relate to fighting
between different armed groups within or associated with the TFG. On 5 August 2011 at least four civilians were killed in Hamarweyne when forces clashed and on
the same day eleven were said to have been killed and twenty wounded as Somali
soldiers looted food at Badbado Camp for IDPs. On 20 August three were killed
and six were wounded as soldiers in Dharkanley fought amongst themselves and
the following day there was further fighting involving TFG military and police
in Wadajar. There were also reports of rape by TFG soldiers in IDP camps in Mogadishu, as well as further reports of looting. A Somalia Report of 29 August described
an increase in the number of checkpoints and roadblocks in Mogadishu, following
the withdrawal of Al-Shabab.
293. As for the
humanitarian situation in Mogadishu, on 20 July famine was declared in a number
of further areas of central and southern Somalia, including in the IDP camps of
Mogadishu (UN Secretary General’s Report). During July and August 100,000
IDPs fleeing from drought and famine arrived in Mogadishu, joining the 370,000
people already displaced to the city.
294. The respondent’s
latest evidence sought to emphasise what the appellants conceded had been a
decrease in levels of violence since the withdrawal of Al-Shabab. In
particular, Bakara Market was now in control of the TFG/AMISOM. As previously
noted, fighting in and around this market had been the cause of the highest
civilian casualties.
295. Even before the August
2011 withdrawal, the respondent contended that, as indicated in the earlier
evidence, the TFG/AMISOM had, in effect, gained the upper hand in Mogadishu and that Al-Shabab had been militarily defeated, rather than deciding
deliberately on a tactical withdrawal. Some 300 Al-Shabab reinforcements had
been sent to Mogadishu in the days before 28 July 2011, to no avail. The IASC Protection Cluster Update of 1 July 2011 had already indicated that clashes between the two sides had subsided “to be replaced by sporadic incidents
of mortar shelling”.
296. By 20 August 2011
TFG/AMISOM had fourteen-fifteen districts of Mogadishu firmly under control and
Al-Shabab resistance remained only in pockets near the pasta factory in the
north of Yaqshid district and Dharkanley. According to the UN Security
Council, TFG/AMISOM had established control of 90% of Mogadishu by 15 August.
By 13 September, they controlled every district except Daynille and Huriwa.
AMISOM was also securing the international airport and the seaport. On 23
September, the UN Special Representative said the TFG were in control of 96% of
the capital. The situation was, according to the representative, “something
that has never happened before in the past 20 years. Mogadishu was either in
the hands of warlords or the insurgents, the Al-Shabab” (Relief Web).
297. In an IASC update of 9
September, Sheikh Godane, described as the leader of Al-Shabab, was cited as
vowing that his fighters “will continue launching new attacks against the
TFG/AMISOM in Mogadishu”. The Protection Monitoring Partners Report suggested
that “The protection environment faced by residents of the capital has changed
little despite the Al-Shabab withdrawal in August. Insecurity remains a major
protection concern due to the high number of explosive devices planted in
vacated areas by Al-Shabab, including continued fighting between pockets of
Al-Shabab insurgents and the TFG/AMISOM troops.”
298. Professor Menkhaus in
August 2011 considered that “Shabab is splintering now. The famine has been a
source of tension within the organisation and the hope is that we’ll see some
breakaway wings again that would say ‘Our people are starving and we welcome
aid’. It would be very risky for those splinter groups, but desperate times
call for desperate measures.” Menkhaus speculated that Al-Shabab’s withdrawal
was linked with social pressure on the organisation from clans which were
“rebelling”. Famine had been disastrous for Al-Shabab in that by blocking food
aid and blocking people from getting out of the affected areas “they have just
shredded what little credibility they had left”.
299. Landinfo reported in August
2011 that, apart from the fighting, civilians had enjoyed greater safety in
areas of Mogadishu that had been controlled by Al-Shabab, compared with the
TFG. The higher crime experienced in TFG areas “is partly due to undisciplined
soldiers who commit robberies, rapes of women of all ages and from all clans,
and extortion. However it is difficult to say anything about the extent of
such abuses, and whether they are systematic.”
300. The respondent
contended that, whilst challenges still existed for TFG/AMISOM in terms of
providing security in the newly taken areas of Mogadishu, numerous sources
indicated that there had been an overall improvement since Al-Shabab’s
withdrawal. Thus, according to SMN on 2 September 2011, residents reportedly said that “The security crackdowns in the capital could help restore peace after
more than two decades of civil war and conflict”. A government minister said
the TFG were slowly regaining control of the city, although he accepted that
the government might not have moved as quickly as many people had wanted.
Nevertheless, the fact that people were returning to re-taken areas was
indicative that the transitional government was doing something about the
security situation. The minister said the TFG “are well aware that the job is
not yet done until we can comfortably say that Mogadishu is totally safe from
[Al-Shabab] and from opportunistic criminals”.
301. As regards that
matter, there were reports of militias dressed in government military uniforms
causing problems in Mogadishu.
302. The UNHCR visit to Mogadishu on 14 September was described as passing buildings destroyed by warfare or
damaged by weaponry. There was, however, “a lot of life on the streets and
many shops doing a brisk business – encouraging signs of a city attempting to
recover after years of conflict and chaos”. The UNHCR was concerned about the
spread of diseases such as cholera in the IDP settlements. The meeting
“expressed its deep sympathy to Somalia in the face of the severe drought and
famine afflicting the country”.
303. A Somalia Report of 25 September described life in Mogadishu as “slowly returning to normal following
the withdrawal of the militant group Al-Shabab”. TFG/AMISOM had “seemingly
succeeded in keeping the Islamist fighters at bay, at least for now”. A kiosk
owner in Mogadishu said that he was “receiving a good number of customers as
people can walk any time of the day through into the night. I can say this is
my new life after eight years of living in agony.” Landinfo reported that
electricity worked in cities for those who could pay and that “23% of the
residents of Mogadishu are online or worked daily”. The same organisation
reported that although random detention and harassment of civilians occurred in
government controlled areas, this was more limited than in 2007-2008. Amnesty
International’s briefing acknowledged that indiscriminate artillery attacks had
reduced. It was unclear whether AI’s figures for those treated in Mogadishu hospitals in August 2011 for weapons related injuries included combatants.
304. Mr Mahiga of the UN
commented on 24 September 2011 that front lines were no longer visible in Mogadishu and the situation was more complicated. What had been happening was conventional
warfare, interspersed with guerrilla and urban warfare: “but now that the
conventional part of it has been receding into the background, we believe, and
already there are signs that [Al-Shabab] will be resorting to bombs, improvised
explosive devices. There have been many examples since their withdrawal on 6
August, many cases of such. And some of the Shabab elements have melted into
the civilian population, they have been carrying out rear-guard actions.”
305. Nevertheless, the
respondent submitted that since post-withdrawal Al-Shabab attacks had been
centred on TFG/AMISOM positions, this reduced the indiscriminate nature of the
violence, so far as civilians were concerned.
306. An African Union
report of 13 September described the remaining pockets of insurgents in Mogadishu as having “resorted to asymmetrical warfare, including grenade, IED and other
forms of attacks targeting AMISOM positions and government installations. In
August, over 20 incidents involving grenade and IED attacks were registered in Mogadishu and the surrounding areas. The insurgents also carried out beheadings in some
parts of Mogadishu to intimidate a population suspected of supporting the TFG.”
307. The respondent
submitted that post-withdrawal evidence regarding IED etc. attacks did not
suggest any significant change in the situation as it had been up to July
2011. The evidence as to asymmetrical warfare did not contradict the general
conclusion that, overall, the situation had improved. It was certainly not any
worse. The respondent emphasised the evidence as to AMISOM’s internationally
recognised commitment to the application of international humanitarian law
principles to reduce civilian casualties and the real significance of the
capture of Bakara Market. There had been no shift in emphasis by Al-Shabab to
kidnappings, since there had been indications of such things in the earlier
evidence.
308. The loss to Al-Shabab
of Bakara Market was, according to the respondent, significant in that it had
been the “financial hub of the movement” ([48] of later submissions). The
second largest market in Mogadishu, Sukh Ba’ad in Yaqshid district, held for
the last two years by Al-Shabab, had been captured by AMISOM and was officially
reopened for business in early September. This market also had been “an important
revenue stream” for Al-Shabab (Somalia Report).
309. The UNOCHA PMT Monthly
Report for August 2011 stated that in July 2011 alone there had been 730
reported deportations from Saudi Arabia to Mogadishu “with no reports of
difficulties for those returnees”.
310. A report of 30 August
described a large number of infrastructure and other engineering projects
underway in Mogadishu and its environs, with “men and women clearing the rubble
and cleaning up the pathways. People now talk freely, as they hold public
debates on open grounds. This, analysts say, would be unheard of in the recent
past.”
311. The respondent stated
that there had been a dramatic increase in the number of IDP camps in districts
of Mogadishu between 28 July and 22 August 2011 “suggesting an increasing perception in Mogadishu as a safe place of refuge” [59]. There were, for
example, 12 new IDP camps in Hodan, 10 in Hamarjaabjab and five each in Hawl-Wadag and Wardhigley. A UNOSAT Report of 22 August stated that, as at that
date, “there were a total of 226 spatially distinct IDP shelter concentrations
located within the urban extent of Mogadishu”. There was also an increase in
the number of IDP camps in the north-east of Mogadishu, following Al-Shabab’s
retreat from those areas. According to IRIN on 9 September 2011, the UNHCR was “scaling up its presence in the capital and in the border regions”. The UAE
had food kitchens in and around Mogadishu, according to the Emirates News
Agency. There was no evidence that the TFG had deliberately tried to restrict
aid in Mogadishu, or anywhere else. Nor was there evidence that the TFG had
been taking “excessive cuts from aid deliveries at Mogadishu Airport”. TFG had denied charges that it was diverting food aid, according to a report of 15
August. TFG had, in fact, set up committees based on civil society groups in
order to deal with the humanitarian disaster. Although there were limitations
on the provision of aid in the capital and elsewhere, this was in part due to
limitations on the amount of international funding that had been made
available. Infrastructure problems were also hampering the delivery of aid to
affected areas. A report in August 2011 indicated that a lack of fuel at Mogadishu Airport was having an effect on aid distribution. According to a report in
Allafrica.com, as at 31 August 2011, some 23,000 IDP shelters had been
identified in Mogadishu, mostly in the city’s western districts, following
satellite surveillance on behalf of the UN Institute for Training and Research.
312. Whilst noting the
evidence regarding checkpoints and roadblocks in Mogadishu, following
Al-Shabab’s withdrawal, the respondent submitted that this did not indicate the
kinds of freelance criminal checkpoints referred to in the previous country guidance
decisions. There was no extortion, etc. by TFG groups on anything amounting to
a significant scale. The UNOCHA Mogadishu influx maps of 22 August 2011 demonstrated significant internal movement throughout the capital for IDPs, with one
resident being reported on 29 November as saying that “I leave for Hawlwadaag
district early in the morning to work and I am able to come back home in the
afternoon. That would have been a nightmare during the time of Al-Shabab.”
313. Laura Hammond provided
an addendum of 26 September 2011 to her main report, to which she had spoken in
evidence in July. Commenting on evidence to which we have earlier referred, Dr
Hammond speculated in her Addendum as to the reason for Al-Shabab’s withdrawal
but concluded that, whatever the reason, there had been a shift “to more
indiscriminate, less predictable bouts of violence”, including attacks on
civilians in areas under TFG control. The Globe and Mail of 16 September 2011, in an article entitled “Fear of Al-Shabab brings Mogadishu to a standstill”, stated that
“hardly anyone is declaring victory over the militia” and that many Somalis
feared the civil war had entered “a new phase in which an urban conflict with
demarcated frontlines was turned into one with none, filled by Al-Shabab
sympathisers who easily blend into the population”.
314. As at 26 September,
according to Dr Hammond, Bakara Market remained closed to civilians, even after
Al-Shabab’s withdrawal “reportedly so that AMISOM/TFG forces can ensure that
those traders remaining behind do not have any ties to Al-Shabab” (Washington
Post, 19 September). The Mayor of Mogadishu said Bakara would open once all
shopkeepers had been checked for weapons and for sympathies towards Al-Shabab.
“They don’t need to infiltrate. They are there in Bakara,” the Mayor said. Dr
Hammond confirmed that the second largest market, Sukh Ba’ad, had re-opened,
although the price of most staple foods there was significantly higher than
they had been during Al-Shabab’s control of Bakara.
315. Dr Hammond’s
conclusion, that the risk of indiscriminate violence “is as great, if not
greater because of their unpredictability, than it was before Al-Shabab’s
pullout” was challenged by the respondent in her latest submissions. Citing
the Globe and Mail article, Dr Hammond submitted that Islamist militants were
still active in the city and that there had been “occasional car bombs and
grenade attacks, and there have been a series of nearly a dozen mysterious
beheadings of ordinary civilians”. The beheadings had “terrified people here”,
according to the article. Many Somali exiles were holding back from returning,
fearing that the insurgents simply blended into the civilian population “spying
on the streets, identifying enemies and preparing for more attacks”.
316. According to the Henry
Jackson Society (accessed 26 September 2011), Al-Shabab still controlled
certain neighbourhoods in Mogadishu and the retreat “was not unanimous and
pockets of fighters stayed in areas such as Huriwa and Suuqa Hoolaaha.
317. The clashes between
the TFG and persons dressed in government military uniforms, already referred
to, were said by Dr Hammond to be seen by some as involving Al-Shabab’s having
obtained access to these disguises, so as to get closer to key TFG targets, as
well as to give the impression of divisions within the TFG. Alternatively, TFG
support was “splintering” and the uniformed militia were loyal to a particular
TFG leader. Whatever the reason “the result has been that no area is
considered safe, since even those areas supposedly under TFG control may be
infiltrated at any time”.
318. Dr Hammond also
thought there were indications that Al-Shabab “may be changing some of its
tactics to include kidnapping”. She referred to an article in Shabelle News of
25 August where a businessman on his way to Mogadishu disappeared after he had
failed to give Al-Shabab money. Reference was also made to the murder and
kidnap of British tourists in a Kenyan resort near the Somali border.
319. Dr Hammond concluded
that it was “too soon to know for sure what the significance of Al-Shabab’s
withdrawal from parts of Mogadishu will mean in the long term” and that there
have been “many false dawns in the past, occasions when analysts and policy
makers have had their hopes that the tide may finally be turning in Somalia
only to … be bitterly disappointed when the violence grew more, rather than
less, destructive. However, for the moment, the situation in Somalia remains precarious and from my perspective unsafe for those who return to Somalia, particularly if they lack armed protection.”
320. On 26 September 2011 Amnesty International released a briefing paper entitled “Somalia: The Humanitarian and Human Rights Catastrophe”. The first part of the Briefing
concerns what AI describe as the “desperate humanitarian situation. In July
and August this year, the United Nations declared famine in six areas of
southern and central Somalia: Bakool, Bay, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, the
Afgoye Corridor displaced persons settlement and the Mogadishu displaced
community.”
321. As regards the
humanitarian situation in Mogadishu, AI stated that since the beginning of 2011
civilians’ lives in Mogadishu have been threatened by a combination of
fighting, obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian aid and the deterioration
of the humanitarian situation. Although the “much publicised withdrawal of
Al-Shabab armed factions from Mogadishu on 6 August 2011 has raised hopes”, AI considered the humanitarian situation in the city to remain “dire.
Humanitarian operations are being scaled up in Mogadishu but aid does not reach
all those in need.” During August 2011, 3092 out of the 7109 cases of acute
watery diarrhoea in south and central Somalia occurred in the Banadir region of
Mogadishu. In September, the Banadir Hospital reported 296 cases, 60% of
which concerned children under 5 years. The following week, the same hospital
reported 274 cases, with 72% involving such children.
322. Humanitarian access in
Mogadishu was said to be hampered by several factors “including insecurity,
which hampers aid operations, concerns for the safety of international
humanitarian workers who are not able to move freely within the capital, the
sheer number of people in need of assistance; and regular movement of
populations in need within the city”. Both humanitarian aid workers and the
recipients of such aid “also remain at risk of being targeted in Mogadishu. There have been several incidents of violence and looting in camps for
internally displaced persons in Mogadishu, and in food distribution sites,
causing civilian casualties, in TFG held areas of Mogadishu.” Various specific
instances were given.
323. So far as concerns
violence in Mogadishu between armed factions, AI noted the UN Special
Representative of the Secretary-General as having “pointed out to the
likelihood that Al-Shabab would increasingly resort to asymmetrical warfare,
including hit-and-run attacks, suicide bombings and the detonation of
explosives in civilian-populated areas of Mogadishu”. On 13 August the
President of the TFG imposed a state of emergency on all areas of Mogadishu that had been vacated by Al-Shabab. “Both sides to the conflict have made
declarations that fighting will restart further underscoring the extreme
volatility and unpredictability of the situation.” Despite the announced
withdrawal, insecurity remained high for civilians with the World Health
Organisation recording 570 casualties from weapon-related injuries in three
hospitals in Mogadishu during August 2011. AI considered these statistics to
be “only indicative, as the number of deaths on site is not known”. Although
indiscriminate artillery attacks were said to have reduced, “pockets of
fighting between Al-Shabab fighters and the TFG and its allies still remain,
notably in the Darkhenley and Karan districts”. Various specific instances
were described, taken from the Protection Cluster Update of the Interagency
Standing Committee. On 4 September, mortars were fired near the Presidential
Palace, where the consultative meeting between Somali political actors and the
international community was taking place. Further mortar fire was reported on
7 September. Hand grenade incidents occurred on 22 August and on 27 August a
child was killed and two others injured when an IED detonated in Karan Market.
IEDs have been found by TFG forces in areas vacated by Al-Shabab.
324. Fighting between rival
TFG units was said to have occurred on 30 August, when seven people at least
were killed, including a civilian, and on 4 September, as TFG forces and
militias clashed over the dismantlement of checkpoints (Protection Cluster
Update).
325. AI noted the reports
of Al-Shabab executions in Mogadishu, including decapitations, as well as the
killing in Karan of a man and his mother.
326. A TFG military court
established in 2009 was said increasingly to be handing down death sentences,
with two TFG soldiers executed in Mogadishu on 22 August. AI was concerned
that the trials did not respect basic fair trial standards.
The Tribunal’s
findings
327. Although it is
conventional, in assessing an individual’s entitlement to international
protection, to begin with the Refugee Convention, moving on to consider
subsidiary protection under the Qualification Directive only if entitlement to
refugee protection is not found, we have decided that this would not be the
most appropriate method of presenting our findings on the general evidence. The
way in which the appeals were argued, the weight of the evidence and the
significance of Sufi & Elmi all pointed, as regards Mogadishu, towards an analysis that concentrated upon Article 15(c) and Article 3 of the
ECHR. So far as the position is concerned elsewhere in southern and central
Somalia, the Refugee Convention loomed much larger, and is engaged in the case
of several of the appellants; but we have decided to adopt the same order of
analysis of the general evidence, partly for consistency, but mainly because
the significance of RT (Zimbabwe) in the case of those at risk of living
under Al-Shabab is best appreciated once one has examined the position in terms
of Article 3.
(a) Article 15(c)
328. One might have thought
that, in the light of Elgafaji and QD (Iraq) the law on Article
15(c) was now reasonably settled, so far as the United Kingdom was concerned.
That law was conveniently summarised at [67] of HM (Iraq):
“a. The
Article seeks to elevate the state practice of not returning unsuccessful
asylum seekers to war zones or situations of armed anarchy for reasons of
common humanity into a minimum standard (QD at [21]).
b. The
scope of protection is an autonomous concept distinct from and broader than Art
3 protection even as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
in NA v United Kingdom (Elgafaji at [33]-[36]; QD at [20],
[35]); HH and Others) at [31]).
c. It
is concerned with ‘”threat .. to a civilian’s life or person” rather than to
specific acts of violence .. the threat is inherent in a general situation of
.. armed conflict…The violence that gives rise to the threat is described as
indiscriminate, a term which implies that it may extend to people irrespective
of their personal circumstances’ (Elgafaji [34]).
d. The
Article is intended to cover the ‘real risks and real threats presented by the
kinds of endemic acts of indiscriminate violence - the placing of car bombs in
market places; snipers firing methodically at people in the streets - which
have come to disfigure the modern world’. It is concerned with ‘serious threats
of real harm’ (QD at [27] and [31]).
e. ‘Individual’
must be understood as covering harm to civilians irrespective of their identity
where the degree of indiscriminate violence characterising the armed conflict
taking place reaches such a high level that substantial grounds are shown for
believing that a civilian …would solely on account of his presence on the
territory… face a real risk of being subjected to the serious threat’ (Elgafaji
[35]).
f. ‘The
more the applicant is able to show that he is specifically affected by reason
of factors particular to his personal circumstances, the lower the level of
indiscriminate violence required’ (Elgafaji [39]).
g. A
consistent pattern of mistreatment is not a necessary requirement to meet the
real harm standard. ‘The risk of random injury or death which indiscriminate
violence carries is the converse of consistency’ (QD at [32]).
h. There
is no requirement that the armed conflict itself must be exceptional but there
must be ‘an intensity of indiscriminate violence great enough to meet the test
spelt out by the ECJ’ and this will self evidently not characterise every such
situation (QD at [36]).
i. ‘The
overriding purpose of Article 15(c) is to give temporary refuge to people whose
safety is placed in serious jeopardy by indiscriminate violence, it cannot
matter whether the source of the violence is two or more warring factions
(which is what conflict would ordinarily suggest) or a single entity or faction’
(QD at [35]).
j. ‘Civilian’
means all genuine non-combatants at the time when the serious threat of real
harm may materialise (QD [37]).”
329. The ECtHR’s judgment
in Sufi & Elmi has, however, cast some doubt over the proposition
summarised at [67b] of HM. In order to understand the issue it is
necessary to remind ourselves of what the CJEU said in Elgafaji:-
“31. … it
is appropriate to compare the three types of ‘serious harm’ defined in Article
15 of the Directive, which constitute the qualification for subsidiary
protection, where, in accordance with Article 2(e) of the Directive,
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the applicant faces ‘a
real risk of [such] harm’ if returned to the relevant country.
32. In
that regard, it must be noted that the terms ‘death penalty’, ‘execution’ and ‘torture
or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country
of origin’, used in Article 15(a) and (b) of the Directive, cover situations in
which the applicant for subsidiary protection is specifically exposed to the
risk of a particular type of harm.
33. By
contrast, the harm defined in Article 15(c) of the Directive as consisting of a
‘serious and individual threat to [the applicant's] life or person’ covers a
more general risk of harm.
34. Reference
is made, more generally, to a ‘threat ... to a civilian's life or person’
rather than to specific acts of violence. Furthermore, that threat is inherent
in a general situation of ‘international or internal armed conflict’. Lastly,
the violence in question which gives rise to that threat is described as ‘indiscriminate’,
a term which implies that it may extend to people irrespective of their
personal circumstances.
35. In
that context, the word ‘individual’ must be understood as covering harm to
civilians irrespective of their identity, where the degree of indiscriminate
violence characterising the armed conflict taking place assessed by the
competent national authorities before which an application for subsidiary
protection is made, or by the courts of a Member State to which a decision
refusing such an application is referred reaches such a high level that
substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, returned to the
relevant country or, as the case may be, to the relevant region, would, solely
on account of his presence on the territory of that country or region, face a
real risk of being subject to the serious threat referred in Article 15(c) of
the Directive.
36. That
interpretation, which is likely to ensure that Article 15(c) of the Directive
has its own field of application, is not invalidated by the wording of recital
26 in the preamble to the Directive, according to which ‘[r]isks to which a
population of a country or a section of the population is generally exposed do
normally not create in themselves an individual threat which would qualify as
serious harm’.
37. While
that recital implies that the objective finding alone of a risk linked to the
general situation in a country is not, as a rule, sufficient to establish that
the conditions set out in Article 15(c) of the Directive have been met in
respect of a specific person, its wording nevertheless allows by the use of the
word ‘normally’ for the possibility of an exceptional situation which would be
characterised by such a high degree of risk that substantial grounds would be
shown for believing that that person would be subject individually to the risk
in question.
38. The
exceptional nature of that situation is also confirmed by the fact that the
relevant protection is subsidiary, and by the broad logic of Article 15 of the
Directive, as the harm defined in paragraphs (a) and (b) of that article
requires a clear degree of individualisation. While it is admittedly true that
collective factors play a significant role in the application of Article 15(c)
of the Directive, in that the person concerned belongs, like other people, to a
circle of potential victims of indiscriminate violence in situations of
international or internal armed conflict, it is nevertheless the case that that
provision must be subject to a coherent interpretation in relation to the other
two situations referred to in Article 15 of the Directive and must, therefore,
be interpreted by close reference to that individualisation.
39. In
that regard, the more the applicant is able to show that he is specifically
affected by reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances, the
lower the level of indiscriminate violence required for him to be eligible for
subsidiary protection.”
330. In Sufi & Elmi,
the ECtHR said:-
“225. In Elgafaji
the ECJ held that article 15(c) would be violated where substantial grounds
were shown for believing that a civilian, returned to the relevant country,
would, solely on account of his presence on the territory of that country or
region, face a real risk of being subjected to a threat of serious harm. In
order to demonstrate such a risk he was not required to adduce evidence that he
would be specifically targeted by reason of factors particular to his personal
circumstances (Elgafaji, cited above § 35). Nevertheless, the ECJ
considered that such a situation would be ‘exceptional’ and the more the
applicant could show that he was specifically affected by reason of factors
particular to his personal circumstances, the lower the level of indiscriminate
violence required for him to be eligible for subsidiary protection (Elgafaji,
cited above, § 39).
226. The
jurisdiction of this Court is limited to the interpretation of the Convention
and it would not, therefore, be appropriate for it to express any views on the
ambit or scope of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Direction [sic]. However,
based on the ECJ’s interpretation in Elgafaji, the Court is not
persuaded that Article 3 of the Convention, as interpreted in NA,
does not offer comparable protection to that afforded under the Directive. In
particular, it notes that the threshold set by both provisions may, in
exceptional circumstances, be attained in consequence of a situation of general
violence of such intensity that any person being returned to the region in
question would be at risk simply on account of their presence there.”
331. Article 3 of the ECHR
provides that “no-one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment”. Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive
provides that serious harm consists of “torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin”. Given the
identical wording, so far as concerns treatment etc in the country of origin,
we are apparently left in the position that the CJEU has held that there is a
difference between Article 15(b) and (c), whereas the ECtHR, in effect, does
not consider there to be a difference between the ambit of Article 3 ECHR and
Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. That, at least, seems to be so,
if one reads “under the Directive” in [226] as referring to Article 15(c)
rather than Article 15(b), as it seems one must.
332. As the ECtHR
acknowledges at [226], it is not the jurisdiction of that Court to interpret
the Qualification Directive. That is the job of the CJEU, which they have
discharged (for the present at least) in Elgafaji. However, the
difficulty remains, that the ECtHR appears in Sufi & Elmi to be
giving Article 3 ECHR a wider “field of application” than the CJEU is prepared
to give Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive (even making allowances
for the different wording designed to prevent Article 15(b) being used in
“ill-health” cases where the risk is said in part to arise from the lack of
host State treatment).
333. Having said this, it
is, as the ECtHR states, established that a general situation of violence in a
place of destination can cross the Article 3 threshold. In NA v
United Kingdom, the Court reviewed its case law, concluding that it had
“rarely found a violation of Article 3 on that ground alone” [114]. Having
surveyed its case law the Court held that it “has never excluded the
possibility that a general situation of violence in a country of destination
will be of a sufficient level of intensity as to entail that any removal to it
would necessarily breach Article 3 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the Court
would adopt such approach only in the most extreme cases of general violence,
where there was a real risk of ill-treatment simply by virtue of an individual
being exposed to such violence on return” [115].
334. The position appears,
therefore, to be that, on a particular set of the facts, general violence in a
place is so serious and intense as to cross the Article 3/Article 15(b)
threshold and, in so doing, it would also necessarily cross the threshold
required for Article 15(c). The binding case law of Elgafaji, however,
makes it plain that the converse is not true; in other words, Article 15(c) can
be satisfied without there being such a level of intensity of violence as is
required for Article 3 to apply as a general matter. How this is achieved is
not precisely articulated by the CJEU, but seems to involve the fact that, as
the Luxembourg Court found at [33] of Elgafaji, Article 15(c) covers “a
more general risk of harm” than does Article 3 of the ECHR. To this may be
added the observation that the nature of the harm in Article 15(c) includes
matters less severe than encompassed by Article 15(b)/Article 3 ECHR.
335. At first sight, the use
of the test of exceptionality, inherent in the ECtHR’s language in [115] of NA
v United Kingdom and explicit in [38] of Elgafaji might seem to
confine the application of Article 15(c) and Article 3 in situations of
generalised violence to the same narrow ambit. But that this is not, in
reality, the case can be seen, not only from what we have just observed about
the nature of the risk and of the harm, but also from what Sedley LJ held in QD
(Iraq):
“Nor,
however, has the judgment [in Elgafaji] introduced an additional test of
exceptionality. By using the words “exceptional” and “exceptionally” it is
simply stressing that it is not every armed conflict or violent situation which
will attract the protection of art 15(c), but only one where the level of
violence is such that, without anything to render them a particular target,
civilians face real risks to their life or personal safety” [25].
336. The appellants
contended that the AIT in GS (Article 15(c): indiscriminate violence)
Afghanistan CG [2009] UKAIT 00044 were wrong to hold at [71] that relevant
forms of harm protected against by Article 15(c) should not extend to questions
of “dignity”. Reliance was placed on Recital (10) to the Qualification
Directive:-
“(10) This
Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles
recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union. In particular this Directive seeks to ensure full respect for human
dignity and the right to asylum of applicants for asylum and their accompanying
family members.”
337. Also relied on by the
appellants was Article 61 of the consolidated version of the EU Treaty, which
mandates the progressive establishment of “an area of freedom, security and
justice” which includes “safeguarding the rights of nationals of third
countries”. As we have already indicated, the law as expounded in Elgafaji,
which we must follow, together with QD (Iraq), which we must also
follow, makes it apparent that Article 15(c) has a wider sphere of application
than Article 15(b). That sphere or “field of application” was articulated by
the CJEU in its judgment. In doing so, the CJEU made no reference to Recital
(10) and concepts of “dignity”, whether in relation to Article 15(c) or more
generally. Nor did it refer to the EU Treaty. We agree with Mr Eicke that
Recital (10) does more than acknowledge that the substantive provisions of the
Directive are regarded as meeting this aim. Still less do we find that Article
61 of the Treaty has any relevance.
338. We have carefully
considered all the evidence, in particular the statistics relating to civilian
deaths and injuries in Mogadishu, in the period since that considered in AM
& AM. We have not, however, excluded from our consideration statistics
regarding combatants and those statistics which do not make plain whether the
casualties were combatants. Whilst combatants are of course not “civilians”
within the ambit of Article 15(c), combatant casualties in an urban area in
which many civilians are present can help in assessing the risk to civilians of
indiscriminate violence. They are part of the holistic assessment of all the
relevant evidence, which must lead to the value judgement of whether there
exists a sufficiently serious risk of Article 15(c) harm.
339. On the state of the
evidence as it was in July 2011, before Al-Shabab’s withdrawal from Mogadishu, we have concluded that, for most returnees from the United Kingdom, having to
live or stay for a significant period of time in Mogadishu would have exposed
them to Article 15(c) risk. Whilst we accept the respondent’s evidence that
the CIA World Fact Book gives a “crude death rate” for Somalia at June 2011 as
14.87 per thousand, which is lower than various African countries including
Nigeria and South Africa, and also lower than Russia, the statistical evidence
regarding Mogadishu, together with the evidence regarding the behaviour of the
combatants, indicated plainly that the armed conflict was one which affected
the lives of civilians in the way encompassed by Article 15(c). That was so,
notwithstanding the evidence which indicated that most civilian casualties
arose in and around Bakara Market and that the TFG had recently announced it
would no longer shell that area whenever it came under attack from Al-Shabab
elements situated there.
340. Although we accept the
respondent’s evidence regarding the battle lines that had formed in Mogadishu,
prior to Al-Shabab’s withdrawal, as a result of which TFG-controlled areas in
the south of the city were not part of the main conflict zone, the appellants’
evidence, which we have cited above, indicated not only that – immediately
before that withdrawal - such areas were not “safe” (a standard far lower than
that required for Article 15(c)) but that they remained places where civilians
could properly be said to run Article 15(c) risks, both from the asymmetrical
warfare which Al-Shabab was even then tending to use in those areas but also
from undisciplined elements of the TFG’s forces.
341. We agree with the
appellants that it is not possible to derive any positive conclusion, so far as
Article 15(c) risk is concerned, from recent influxes of IDPs into Mogadishu. The fact that Mogadishu might have been perceived by a starving person from the
countryside as a better option than remaining at home to suffer and possibly
die in the current famine was more indicative of the extremely serious nature
of the humanitarian position in southern and central Somalia, outside
Mogadishu, than it was evidence of any improvement in Article 15(c) risk, prior
to the Al-Shabab withdrawal.
342. It is common ground
between the parties that Al-Shabab’s military withdrawal from Mogadishu is of
significance; but both sides nevertheless contended that it made no difference
to the stance they had respectively adopted at the hearing and in their closing
written submissions. The appellants submitted that there were still Article 3
ECHR and QD Article 15(c) risks in the city; the respondent submitted that
there were still no such risks.
343. So far as Article 15(c)
is concerned, the main consequence of the withdrawal is that there are
currently no longer any military “front lines” cutting across Mogadishu, with
resultant risk to civilians of being caught in crossfire between contending
conventional fighting forces. In particular, there is no longer any need for
the TFG/AMISOM to shell Bakara Market (or any temptation to do so), since there
is no longer any (or any significant) Al-Shabab military presence in that part
of the capital.
344. Given the preponderance
of civilian casualties were in the Bakara area, this development clearly has a
bearing on the assessment of Article 15(c) risk, of more significance than the
previous evidence, which depended on taking a view as to whether the TFG/AMISOM
would honour their word not to shell the Market, if attacked from there. We
have, however, concluded that an Article 15(c) risk continues to exist for the
majority of those returning to Mogadishu after any significant period of time
spent abroad. Our reasons are as follows.
345. Despite our rejection
of the appellants’ submissions to the effect that the respondent bears a legal
burden of showing that a place previously unsafe has become safe, it is the
case, as the Tribunal said in EM and others, that any assessment that
material circumstances have changed, will need to demonstrate that “such
changes are well established evidentially and durable”. The durability of the
situation brought about by Al-Shabab’s withdrawal is clearly problematic,
viewed as at October 2011, which is no doubt why the respondent contended that
the position had essentially changed earlier, with the announcement of the
TFG/AMISOM “no retaliation” policy regarding Bakara Market, coupled with the
relatively stable position of the Southern districts of Mogadishu, which were
already in the control of the TFG/AMISOM. However, we have serious doubts
whether the policy would have been maintained, or would be maintained if
Al-Shabab were to return, given the clear evidence as to past promises being
broken. We have already explained why, for the ordinary inhabitant, there is
still a significant risk of harm from conflict-related incidents in the
southern districts. Thus, the only factor to which it is at present appropriate
to have regard is the recent withdrawal of Al-Shabab; and that cannot yet be
said to be durable, however much one might hope it will be.
346. In fact, the latest
evidence indicates that conventional fighting between Al-Shabab and the
TFG/AMISOM may not have entirely ceased in Mogadishu, in that there are reports
of clashes, involving mortars, in certain northern districts of the city.
Elsewhere, there are plainly significant and disturbing reports of the kind of
asymmetrical warfare which Al-Shabab was using to an extent, behind the
government forces’ lines, even before the withdrawal, and to which there is
good reason to fear they may make greater resort, following the withdrawal. We
entirely understand the respondent’s criticisms of Dr Hammond’s updated report,
insofar as it might be interpreted as being based on assertion instead of hard
evidence. But, given the recent history of Mogadishu and the starting point
provided by the conclusions in AM & AM, it would be wrong to rush to
the conclusion that there is no real risk of Al-Shabab adopting and being able
to implement such a tactic.
347. As part of the
holistic assessment we must make, regard clearly has to be had to the current
humanitarian crisis in Mogadishu. The most recent evidence includes the
declaration of famine in the IDP camps located in the city. Although the
distribution of food is proceeding in a commendable fashion, there are still
serious problems regarding malnutrition and disease, as well as gross
overcrowding. These factors bear on Article 15(c) risk in two ways. First, they
make it impossible to find, as a general matter, that someone involuntarily
returned to Mogadishu is not at risk of ending up in one of the districts where
conventional (in any event, significant) fighting is still occurring. Second,
as regards all but the better-off or best-protected citizens, the direct and
indirect effects of the humanitarian crisis are likely to be such as to
diminish their capacity for vigilance, as regards such things as IEDs,
unexploded ordinance, opportunistic criminals and continuing Al-Shabab elements
intent on spreading fear by intimidation, kidnapping and beheading.
348. We are conscious of
the evidence, disputed by the appellants, that returnees from the United Kingdom may be given up to £1,500 by the United Kingdom in order to assist resettlement and
reintegration. We are, however, unable to find that a person who stands to get
such funds will thereby be able, as a general matter, to surmount the problems
we have just mentioned, at least in all but the immediate term.
349. As well as the latest
evidence of such behaviour on the part of Al-Shabab, there is evidence of a far
smaller, but nonetheless material, risk from rogue elements of the TFG,
operating in Mogadishu, who may seek directly to harm ordinary people, such as
by robbery, or else may pose an indirect risk, by fighting amongst themselves
or with official elements.
350. Putting all this
together, we conclude that, as at the present time, an Article 15(c) risk
exists, as a general matter, in respect of the majority of those in Mogadishu and, as a general matter, as to those returning there from the United Kingdom.
351. Who might fall within
an exception to that finding? Reference has already been made to the evidence
regarding voluntary returnees to Mogadishu, such as businessmen. The
appellants urged us not to draw from this evidence any conclusion favourable to
the respondent’s position, contending that the fact that certain individuals
were prepared to run a high degree of risk, for example to make a profit, was
not evidence that the risk did not exist. That risk should not be borne by
those, such as the appellants, who were not willing to run it.
352. We also note the
appellants’ criticism of the finding in AM and AM that those connected
with extremely powerful actors would not run an Article 15(c) risk by returning
to Mogadishu. The ECtHR in Sufi & Elmi decided, in any event, to
circumscribe that category by reference to powerful actors at the “highest
level”.
353. Whilst we fully accept
that some returnees, whether businessmen or those Somalis from the Diaspora
returning to engage in NGO work, may well do so in the teeth of a real risk of
serious harm, the evidence regarding returnees is, we consider, such as to make
it inconceivable that it is only those risk-takers who choose to return to
Mogadishu.
354. The evidence regarding
the busy nature of Mogadishu International Airport has already been mentioned.
In her “Care and Compassion” report, Dr Hammond described a survey of private
investors in Somaliland (40) Puntland (29) and south/central Somalia (18):-
“One of the most
interesting findings from this survey was that 88.9% of the respondents in
south/central Somalia had lived abroad at some time. The main countries that
they had lived in were the United Arab Emirates and United Kingdom (each with
four respondents) as well as Canada (two respondents).”
The report
continues:-
“Respondents from the
private sector included hotel owners, cosmetics importers, sales companies,
electricity providers, care organisations, fuel providers, medical and drug
vendors, furniture importers, barbers, sweet sellers, transport operators,
telecommunications companies, export agents, fishing companies, media
representatives, a cell phone repairer, a banking company, an electronics
importer, a remittance company, agricultural investors, a goldsmith,
stationers, importers of construction materials, educational providers,
restaurant owners, water providers, and other trades and businesses.
Organisations in Somaliland tended to be older (37.5% had been operating for at
least ten years), whereas in Puntland and south central they were younger
(68.9% in Puntland and 70.6% in south central had been operating for less than
ten years).”
Earlier in the same
report we find:-
“Interviewees who are involved
in the private sector stressed that some space for business can be negotiated
for business in Somalia despite the threats from militias, Al-Shabab, and
corrupt TFG officials. Businesses are generally able to rely on clan support
to deter criminal attacks on their holdings, and can work out arrangements to
move goods across insecure zones. Remittance companies, for instance, are able
to work with very large sums of cash and rarely experience armed robbery.
However, as discussed below some people in the Diaspora said that the
insecurity dissuaded them from becoming involved in business.”
355. We have already
referred to Mr Burns’ evidence regarding businessmen and also other
travellers. Mr Burns said in oral evidence that he travelled to Mogadishu once every eight weeks. He “confirmed that people did return to join their
families for holidays and younger Somalis who had never been to Somalia wanted to come and see what it was like. Others came for marriage and some brought
their daughters to be circumcised.” When it was put to him that there was no
evidence that those returning for family visits were badly treated, Mr Burns
“agreed that he had not seen any such evidence but stated that such returnees
did not travel around, would remain in the family compound and then leave. He
stated that when he visited Somalia he never left the compound.”
356. It is simply not
possible to conclude from this evidence that all who choose to return to Mogadishu at the present time do so against the background of a real risk to life or
person. We accept that many of those who come would be prepared to tolerate
living in confined circumstances, such as a residential compound, for a limited
period of time, but that to expect a person to return permanently to such a situation
is a different matter (a point noted at [173] of AM and AM).
357. Nevertheless, the
evidence before us points to there being a category of middle class or
professional persons in Mogadishu who can live to a reasonable standard, in
circumstances where the Article 15(c) risk, which exists for the great majority
of the population, does not apply. A returnee from the United Kingdom to such a milieu would not, therefore, run an Article 15(c) risk, even if
forcibly returned. Into this category we place those who by reason of their
connection with “powerful actors”, such as the TFG/AMISOM, will be able to
avoid the generalised risk. The appellants argued that no such category exists;
but we reject that submission. Indeed, the category that emerges from the
evidence is wider than the “powerful actors” exception, and covers those whose
socio-economic position provides them with the requisite protection, without
running the risk of assassination faced by those in or associated with the TFG.
358. The significance of the
category we have identified should not, however, be overstated. For most
people in Mogadishu the Article 15(c) risk persists, at the present time. In
the case of a claimant for international protection, a fact-finder would need
to be satisfied that there were cogent grounds for finding that the claimant
fell within such a category.
359. We have had close
regard to the views of the UNHCR which are that Article 15(c) conditions
pertain across the entirety of southern and central Somalia, including Mogadishu, such that all civilians are at risk of indiscriminate violence, by reason
only of their presence there. We note that, in areas taken by pro-TFG
militias, whether in Mogadishu or outside, there is evidence that Al-Shabab
“have reverted to guerrilla-style attacks … including roadside bombs, which is
again reminiscent of the insurgency against the TFG and Ethiopian army between
2007 and 2009” (June 2011 update to the Eligibility Guidelines, para 3.5).
360. Although we accept, per
Mr Hickman, that UNHCR holds the view it does about Article 15(c), it is not
the case that the Eligibility Guidelines themselves specifically state that
such an Article 15(c) risk pertains in southern and central Somalia. At Part IVA of the May 2010 Guidelines, which sets out the “General Approach” to
eligibility for international protection, the only specific international
Convention cited is the OAU Convention of 1969. Article 1(1) of that defines
“refugee” in terms replicating Article 1(A) of the Refugee Convention. For
those not meeting these criteria, the Guidelines recommend that they “should be
granted international protection under the extended refugee definition in
Article 1(2) of the OAU Convention. In States in which the OAU Convention does
not apply, a complementary/subsidiary form of protection should be granted
under relevant national and regional frameworks.”
361. Article 1(2) of the
OAU Convention is, upon inspection, in very different terms from that of
Article 15(c):-
“2. The
term ‘refugee’ shall also apply to every person who, owing to external
aggression, occupation, foreign domination and events seriously disturbing
public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or
nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to
seek refugee in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.”
362. In Part I (Armed
conflict in Southern and Central Somalia), there is a specific reference to
Article 15(c), in the context of UNHCR’s conclusion that an Article 15(c) risk
extends across the whole of that part of the country. But the source cited in
the footnote in support of this proposition is AM & AM, which, as we
have seen, found that it was only in Mogadishu that the level of severity of
the conflict was so grave as to place the great majority of the population at
risk of the harm described in Article 15(c). Be that as it may, we do not
consider that we should go beyond having very careful regard to the UNHCR’s
views, and “accept the assessment set out in the Eligibility Guidelines on
Somalia update”, as Mr Hickman contended at [35] of his written submissions.
Nor do we accept the submission that those Guidelines represent “the most
comprehensive analysis of the security situation in Somalia”. Their methodology
is sound, the range of external sources wide and the organisation itself well
placed to give its own highly-informed view. The Guidelines nevertheless form
only a part of the evidential matrix which the parties to the present
proceedings have assembled.
363. Before leaving the
issue of Article 15(c) in Mogadishu, it is necessary to say something with an
eye to the use that will be made of our country guidance findings in the next
few weeks and months. In assessing cases before them, judicial fact-finders
will have to decide whether the evidence is the same or similar to that before
us (Practice Direction 12). To the extent it is not, they are not required to
regard our findings as authoritative. As we have emphasised, it is simply not
possible on the evidence before us to state that the changes resulting from
Al-Shabab’s withdrawal from Mogadishu are sufficiently durable. Far too much is
presently contingent. As time passes, however, it may well be that judicial
fact-finders are able to conclude that the necessary element of durability has
been satisfied. How, if at all, that impacts on the assessment of risk on
return will, of course, depend on all the other evidence.
(b) Article 3
Armed conflict
364. Even before the recent
withdrawal of Al-Shabab forces from Mogadishu, we consider that the evidence we
have been given as to the position in that city, up to July 2011, is such that
we are entitled to make a different finding regarding Article 3 and Mogadishu, than that of the ECtHR in Sufi & Elmi. Before that withdrawal, the
evidence before us, in particular the oral and written evidence of the expert
witnesses, was not such as to show that anyone in the city was at real risk of
Article 3 harm by reason only of their presence there. Although the ECtHR had
before it evidence regarding returns to Mogadishu International Airport, this
was largely contained in the UKBA Fact-Finding Mission report, which, as we
have seen, the ECtHR regarded as carrying less weight than we have seen fit to
give it. More particularly, however, it does not appear that the ECtHR was
aware of the extent and scale of businesses operating in Mogadishu or of
voluntary returns from the Somali Diaspora, including the reasons for such
returns.
365. We are mindful that
[178] and [179] of AM & AM suggested that, in the period examined in
that case, an Article 3 risk existed in Mogadishu by reason of the armed
conflict then prevailing in that city. However, the evidence before us makes it
sufficiently clear that, before August 2011, the position had for some time
been materially different. A front line across Mogadishu had emerged, with
conventional fighting increasingly being confined to certain areas. In more
recent times, there had been an absence of the large-scale displacement of
civilians out of Mogadishu, about which the Tribunal in AM & AM
received evidence, and which it regarded as significant indicators of the high
level of risk faced by civilians in the capital at that time.
366. In any event, the
Al-Shabab withdrawal in August 2011 in our view constitutes evidence which
means that it can no longer be said that any person in Mogadishu, regardless of
his or her circumstances, is at Article 3 risk from the armed conflict there.
As we have already explained, we do not consider that the evidence of the
withdrawal means, as at the present date, that it can safely be said that the
generality of the population no longer faces an Article 15(c) risk. Those
reasons, however, do not apply in relation to Article 3. This is so despite the
issue of the “durability” of the new situation being, at first sight, the same
for both provisions. It is plain from NA v United Kingdom that the
circumstances required in order to make good an Article 3 claim purely by
reference to a general situation of violence need to be exceptionally grave.
There is on any rational view a significant and immediately apparent difference
between an armed conflict between opposing forces, contending for a city
(albeit with attendant asymmetrical attacks by one of the parties) and the
absence (or relative absence) of overt conventional conflict. There is no
evidence we have seen to indicate that Al-Shabab’s conventional forces remain
poised outside Mogadishu, ready to re-enter the city at any time. The situation
is, thus, sufficiently “durable” to compel us to find that – even if (contrary
to paragraph 364 above) an Article 3 risk had existed immediately before
Al-Shabab’s withdrawal - it does not exist at present.
367. The consequence of the
latest turn of events seems to us to be a good illustration of the different
“field of operation” for Article 15(c), identified by the CJEU in Elgafaji,
as examined by us at paragraphs 328 to 335 above. The availability of Article
15(c) enables international protection to be afforded in circumstances where
the truly exceptional circumstances required by NA v United Kingdom do not pertain. There is thus no justification for succumbing to the temptation
of diluting the test for finding an Article 3 risk by reason of generalised violence
(or, we might add, of the corresponding test for Article 15(b) harm).
Humanitarian situation
368. The humanitarian
situation in Mogadishu, though very serious, is not so grave as in the
countryside, despite the declaration of famine conditions in the city’s IDP
camps. Aid is being delivered to those in such camps much more easily than in
other areas, particularly those where difficulties are still being experienced
with Al-Shabab. It is rural refugees, rather than established residents of Mogadishu, who are having to live in such camps. A returnee from the United Kingdom may be able to avoid having to go to an IDP camp, even though, as we have earlier
found, the overcrowding in the safer districts of the city may well cause him
or her to live in some other district. Someone with family connections in Mogadishu or who is fit for work could avoid the camps, where, as a general matter, risk of
Article 3 harm currently pertains.
369. Conversely, a
returnee could face real risk of a violation of Article 3, by reason of his or
her vulnerability. For example, a woman with children returned without any
family and without family support in Mogadishu from those already there, may
well suffer treatment proscribed by Article 3, regardless of any financial
assistance provided by the United Kingdom Government, given her increased
susceptibility to opportunistic attack.
(c) Refugee Convention
370. A striking feature of
the present appeals was the absence in the evidence before us of anything to
suggest that, certainly in comparison with the time before the rise of the
Union of Islamic Courts, a returnee to Mogadishu, of whatever clan, would face
a real risk of persecution by reason of his or her clan. The Gundel reports
indicated that a community such as the Reer Hamar was no longer the subject of
targeted violence, albeit that they might still be the subject of
discrimination. Mr Burns spoke in his evidence of majorities and minorities,
not by reference to powerful or impotent clans but, rather, by reference to who
was numerically in the majority in a particular area of the city. Dr Hammond’s
evidence regarding Diaspora aid suggested that, in many cases, such aid was
provided without regard to the clan of the recipient. The continuing
importance of clans in Mogadishu, accordingly, appears at present to lie
primarily in the clan as possible means of support for a returnee.
371. Accordingly, except as
regards the issue of FGM, it is unlikely that a proposed return to Mogadishu at the present time will raise Refugee Convention issues. Fact-finders will,
nevertheless, need to be alive to the possibility of such issues emerging in
the future if, for example, the city were (as in the past) to become prey to
powerful clans, enforcing their rule over weaker clans by means of armed
militias.
(2) Southern and central Somalia, outside Mogadishu
Evidence
and submissions
372. So far as conflict
outside Mogadishu is concerned, Mr Hickman, for the UNHCR, submitted that
Article 15(c) protection should extend throughout southern and central Somalia,
on the basis of the UNHCR’s conclusion in the Eligibility Guidelines of May
2010 that:-
“The widespread disregard
of their obligations under international humanitarian law by all parties to the
conflict and the reported scale of human rights violations make it clear
that any person returned to southern and central Somalia would, solely on account of his/her presence in southern and central Somalia, face a real risk of serious harm.”
373. We have already
examined this issue in relation to Mogadishu (see above). As regards the
position outside the capital in southern and central Somalia, the ECtHR in Sufi
& Elmi did not accept the UNHCR’s proposition. At [270] the Court held
that “it would appear that it is the conflict in Mogadishu which is primarily
responsible for Somali civilian casualties and widespread displacement” and
that “reports describe the fighting outside Mogadishu as sporadic and localised
around key strategic towns … consequently, while there is fighting in some
areas, other areas have remained comparatively stable”. Accordingly, at [271]
the Court was:-
“…prepared to accept that
it might be possible for a returnee to travel from Mogadishu International Airport to another part of southern and central Somalia without being exposed to
a real risk of treatment proscribed by Article 3 solely on account of the
situation of general violence. However, this will very much depend upon where
a returnee’s home area is. It is not possible for the court to assess the level
of general violence in every part of southern and central Somalia and, even if it were to undertake such an exercise, it is likely that its conclusions will
become outdated very quickly. Consequently, if the applicant’s home is one
which has been affected by the conflict, the conditions there will have to be
assessed against the requirements of Article 3 at the time of removal.”
374. In the present
proceedings, the respondent likewise pointed to the UKBA Fact-Finding Mission
as indicating that the level of conflict outside Mogadishu was much reduced in
most areas and most areas were described as stable. This was supported by the
written statement of Mr Burns and confirmed in his oral evidence. The OCHA
Protection Cluster Update suggested fighting in Lower Juba and Gedo, with the
COIS Report referring to clashes on the Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia border and armed
conflict in Bula Hawa and to a lesser extent in the vicinity of Beletweyne and
Dolo. In April 2011 the UN Security Council referred to fighting in Doolow,
Bulo Hawa, Lwq, Elwaaq, Dhoobley, Diif and Taabdo.
375. Conversely, there was
little evidence of fighting in Kismayo or in Lower Shabelle, including
Merka/Marka. According to Mr Burns, in May 2011 there was acute armed conflict
in Gedo, moderate armed conflict in Hiraan and Galgaduud regions and low armed
conflict in the rest of southern/central Somalia. There was no evidence, the
respondent contended, of conflict in the Afgoye Corridor (e.g. Nairobi evidence: R M Ali). The most recent evidence points to a continuation of
significant fighting in Gedo, some in Hiran and problems beginning to appear in
parts of Puntland.
376. Not all territorial
gains and losses involved combatant casualties. Thus, the TFG captured one
town after Al-Shabab pulled out (COIS 8.37) whilst conversely Al-Shabab retook
a TFG town after the latter’s forces vacated it, owing to a dispute over
salaries (8.40 – 8.41).
377. As will already have
become very apparent, the appellants sought to advance their claims to
international protection by reference to the evidence regarding the actions of
Al-Shabab towards those living or coming within areas of its control in
southern and central Somalia. Although such areas included those in the north
of Mogadishu, the subsequent withdrawal of Al-Shabab from the capital means
that it is necessary to consider this aspect of the cases by reference to
Al-Shabab areas outside Mogadishu. Mr Eicke submitted that Al-Shabab should
not be regarded as a monolithic force, acting in the same manner in all the
places it held. Furthermore, the evidence (e.g. UNSC monitoring December
2008/December 2009; Landinfo August 2010) suggested that there were not enough
Al-Shabab fighters to run their areas on their own, so that it was necessary
for Al-Shabab to form alliances with local clans and councils of elders. This
fitted with the evidence from the Nairobi informants, that Al-Shabab would come
to a village and then move on, leaving two or three people to control it.
378. Although Al-Shabab’s
core leadership was ideologically aligned with Al-Qaeda and global jihad, there
was evidence that rank and file fighters had not shown a strong affinity for
jihad (COIS 10.05). The same report suggested that Al-Shabab was losing
support by its alienation of fellow Islamists and harsh interpretation of
Sharia, based on the radical Wahabi strand of Islam. Dr Hammond, it was said,
had apparently accepted the view in the British High Commission letter that
different and sometimes contradictory Sharia based decrees were given, which
may or may not be enforced.
379. Human Rights Watch
World Report 2011, whilst referring to the grinding depression that
characterised daily life and the harsh and intolerant measures taken in the
name of Sharia law, nevertheless indicated that Al-Shabab rule in many areas
brought relative stability and order, a fact not lost on residents. The UKBA
Fact-Finding Mission also contained evidence to the effect that there could
well be over reporting of human rights abuses in Al-Shabab-controlled areas by
NGOs. The appellants’ suggestion that the contrary was likely to be the case,
owing to the difficulties in reporting, was not, according to Mr Eicke, born
out by the many reports coming from the like of Shabelle Media News.
Furthermore, Dr Hammond had given evidence of an instance where Al-Shabab had
allowed men and women to be educated together in school, when this was a
condition of a funding organisation.
380. Nor, according to the
respondent, did the evidence suggest that Islamic groups had restricted
people’s ability to carry out business in such a severe way as to prevent them
from supporting themselves. Furthermore, there was evidence that Al-Shabab
itself provided certain services to the people under its control (Accord –
Issue 21).
381. It was an important
part of the appellants’ case that a Somali who had spent even a relatively
short period outside that country would immediately stand out as such by reason
of changed language, clothing and gait, as well as the fact that they would be better
fed, and that this would cause them, if in one of Al-Shabab’s areas, to be
regarded by Al-Shabab as being a spy for TFG/AMISOM or for Ethiopian or Western
powers, or at least of having un-Islamic sympathies. The respondent contended
that it was inherently improbable that the way persons spoke their own language
would change perceptibly after an absence of only a few years, let alone a
period of a few months, as Dr Hammond had asserted. An inability to understand
the latest slang was more credible, but likely to be temporary. Also temporary
were wearing different clothes and weighing more than others in the area. Mr
Burns could provide no examples of a Diaspora person having difficulties with
Al-Shabab and the evidence indicated that 68% of social service providers were
from the Somali Diaspora. Furthermore, Mr Burns had no reasonable explanation
for why there were no reports of the 16,000 persons who, it was common ground,
had been returned from Saudi Arabia, being subjected to mistreatment by Al-Shabab.
Bearing in mind Dr Hammond’s evidence regarding remittances, the respondent
submitted that there must be many Somalis in Al-Shabab-controlled areas
receiving remittances from relatives in the West and, although Al-Shabab might
wish to “tax” such remittances, there was nothing to suggest that people
receiving them had come to the adverse attention of Al-Shabab due to their
connections with Western countries. The expert evidence to the contrary was,
according to Mr Eicke, based on speculation and interpolation from the fact
that Al-Shabab was said to be “hypervigilant” of espionage by foreign forces.
382. Although the
respondent accepted reports in the evidence of individuals being mistreated by
Al-Shabab after being accused of spying, no details were given of these
incidents; nor was there was anything to suggest they were connected with a
person being away from Somalia. The same was true of the evidence regarding
punishments meted out for violations of Al-Shabab’s code of dress and
behaviour. Any temporary differences occasioned by being away from Somalia could be addressed with the aid of the large UK Diaspora population, before the returnee
went back to Somalia.
383. The respondent
accepted that a returnee from abroad might be suspected of having money but
there was no real evidence that this would lead to an increased risk of
extortion of kidnapping. Indeed, there was no reason why a returnee, as
opposed to someone receiving remittances from abroad, would be treated
differently in this regard. This was particularly so, given the absence of
evidence that the 16,000 Saudi Arabian returnees had suffered any problems.
384. Despite possible
suggestions to the contrary, the respondent said there was no clear evidence
that Al-Shabab immediately imposed requirements as to dress, beards, etc. on
every person who was merely passing through one of its checkpoints. There was
evidence of commuter traffic between the Afgoye Corridor and Mogadishu, with
persons passing from the Corridor to the capital in order to work or transact
business. The Bakara Market was also said to be in the process of relocating
to the Afgoye Corridor, suggesting further visits to the Al-Shabab-controlled
area that included the Afgoye Corridor. Nor was there any direct evidence to
suggest a person who came to live in an Al-Shabab-controlled area was not
allowed the required time to adjust to local requirements. Having family
connections in the Al-Shabab area would also, according to the respondent, tend
to negate any adverse interest that there might be in the returnee as a result
of having lived abroad.
385. As for the position of
women in Al-Shabab-controlled areas, the evidence of Dr Hammond and Mr Burns
was both to the effect that women did, in fact, work in such areas and were
also able to set up businesses there. Indeed, since as a result of the
conflict, many women were now the breadwinner for their household, working was
an imperative. There was also material in the Nairobi evidence that confirmed
that Al-Shabab permitted women to work, although INGO in Somalia indicated that this varied from place to place. A report of January 2011 relating to
Kismayo, which asserted that Al-Shabab had banned women from working
completely, went on to state that they had in fact been “banned from working
cafeteria” (sic) and “selling khat in the centre of town”. A ban on selling
khat, which also appears to have occurred in Bardhere, was disproportionately
affecting women who were the main khat sellers, but was not, Mr Eicke
submitted, evidence of a total prohibition on women being able to work.
386. Although some evidence
indicated that women in Al-Shabab-controlled areas had to be veiled, there was
no clear evidence, according to the respondent, of the degree of veil required
and a photograph in appellants’ bundle A, comprising an FSNAU Quarterly
document, showed a woman in Shabelle in April 2011 who was clearly not veiled.
The area was then Al-Shabab-controlled.
387. Nor was there evidence
that suggested women generally had been stopped from travelling in Al-Shabab
areas or restricted to Muhrem (having to stay home unless with an adult male).
There was one report (allheadlinenews.com) from the Afgoye Corridor suggesting
that there were such restrictions and a report also stated that women’s ability
to access markets was constrained by limitations on access to transportation
because of rules regarding sex segregation. The problem appeared, rather, to
involve women not accompanied by adult males, which, Mr Eicke submitted, could
be solved by a clan member or friend, or by the driver of a minibus being
likely to be male. In any event, evidence such as the SAACID report on the
drought in Somalia made it plain that there were large-scale movements of women
and children from Bay/Bakool to Mogadishu, which was inconsistent with the
suggestion that women could not travel unless accompanied by an adult male.
According to UNSC November 2010, although less than 5% of cases of sexual
violence were said to have been carried out by parties to the conflict, the
continued fighting had rendered women and children more vulnerable to sexual
violence because of displacement, destitution, the breakdown of the rule of law
and the re-emergence of armed groups and freelance militias. Nevertheless, the
respondent contended that there was no clear evidence the situation had
deteriorated since AM & AM or that there was any greater risk in
this regard to women in Al-Shabab-controlled areas. A conclusion that a real
risk existed in the case of a woman said to be prone to sexual violence was
actually based on factors personal to her. A woman returning to an area where
she had clan support or other resources would plainly be in a different
position to a lone woman in some IDP camps with no protectors or resources. There
was, furthermore, evidence that rape was not an Al-Shabab policy and not
condoned.
388. Dr Hammond’s evidence
confirmed that divorce is a practice known in Somalia and, due to the deaths of
husbands or otherwise, the respondent contended that it was plainly not
uncommon for women to be single parents. Indeed, one of the present appellants
claimed in oral evidence he had left his wife and children in Somalia. Appellant ZF said she did not leave Somalia after her husband’s death because she was looking
after her sister’s two children.
389. As for forced
recruitment, there was some evidence of this, including in the UKBA
fact-finding report, also involving the recruitment of children (COIS 22.26)
but the prevalence of the practice was questionable. Mr Burns’s report
acknowledged forced recruitment was not common and that the tactics for
recruitment appeared to favour indoctrination and wages. This was supported by
the Landinfo report of June 2009. Mr Burns said it was not current Al-Shabab
policy to recruit forcibly at gunpoint and the main risk at checkpoints was, he
conceded, the payment of tolls. In fact, Mr Burns’ description of Al-Shabab
checkpoints suggested, according to the respondent, a structured and
disciplined behaviour. Dr Hammond stopped short of saying that there would be
forced recruitment at gunpoint although there might be “pressure”.
390. Mr Eicke submitted
that not all IDPs in southern and central Somalia lived in IDP settlements.
According to the UKBA fact-finding report, IDPs tended to live with family
members and the British High Commission letter quoted a source as saying that
IDPs who had “higher levels of assets do not live in IDP camps”.
391. UNOCHA indicators
reproduced in the COIS Report showed that compared with 2010, there had been an
increase in GDP per capita in Somalia and improvements in life expectancy,
measles immunisation and population using improved drinking water. There had,
however, been a deterioration in some indicators, including adult and under-5
mortality, as well as numbers of IDPs and refugees. In 2010, 43% of the
population earned less than US$1 a day and inflation and continuing insecurity
led to a decreased standard of living in all areas. Nevertheless, Somalia maintained a healthy informal economy said to be “partially based on livestock,
remittance/money transfer companies and telecommunications”. Dr Hammond’s
“Cash and Compassion” report described the powerful effect of the Diaspora in
terms of cross-clan support for IDPs and investment in infrastructure such as
schools and hospitals. The Landinfo report of 22 August 2010 suggested that “most” Somalis were dependent on remittances from relatives abroad. Hawilaad
(remittance) companies were able to count on the entire community to protect them
from theft. The “Cash and Compassion” report also indicated that Diaspora
could send money to family members displaced by war within a day or two of
their dislocation, anywhere in Somalia, even to IDP camps. The use of
electronic communications technology was confirmed by Mr Burns.
392. In AM & AM,
the Tribunal noted that the humanitarian crisis in southern and central Somalia was widely said to be the worst in seventeen years, with 3.2 million people (43% of
the population) dependent on assistance. The respondent submitted that,
following AM & AM, the figure had reduced to about 2 million, and
although this had risen, numbers were said still to be below those of AM
& AM. At the end of 2010 the figure was 2.4 million, according to a
COIS Report. Malnutrition rates had increased from 17.9 to 25% in Gedo and 25
to 30% in Juba region in less than six months.
393. The main reason for
the rise in those needing food assistance had been the poor rains. This was a
temporary phenomenon, although rainfall in 2011 was expected to be less than
average (reliefweb.int). Shortfalls in funding had meant that the World Food
Programme was only feeding 66% of the 1 million people who needed it, according
to a BBC report. Many organisations undertaking humanitarian services in
southern Somalia had ceased or reduced activities due to the security situation
or problems in dealing with Al-Shabab (COIS/High Commission letter). The
evidence still indicated that there were organisations providing food and
humanitarian assistance, both in Mogadishu and elsewhere. The appellants’ own
expert evidence provided confirmation of NGOs operating in the Afgoye Corridor,
notwithstanding Al-Shabab control.
394. In AM & AM
the Tribunal found at [156] to [161] that the humanitarian crisis had not
“reached the threshold where civilians per se or Somali civilian IDPs per se
can be said to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm or treatment
proscribed by Article 3 ECHR”. Whether a person could be returned would need
to be assessed on an individual basis. The respondent contended that there was
no need to revise this assessment. Evidence of NGO’s working in Al-Shabab
areas could be found in many places in the Nairobi evidence and Dr Hammond
accepted that NGOs were operating in the Afgoye Corridor. Assistance in
Al-Shabab-controlled areas was also provided by Islamic, charitable and other
organisations (Landinfo - 16 June 2009). The “Cash and Compassion” report
instanced Diaspora using clan elders to make room for aid in Al-Shabab areas
and the Daynille Hospital, in an Al-Shabab area, was built by North American
Somali Diaspora.
395. At [186] to [190] the
Tribunal in AM & AM considered that, whilst many residents had been
displaced from Mogadishu and become IDPs, an equally sizeable number appeared
to have made their way to areas of southern Somalia where they had traditional
clan connections. IDPs from more influential clans or sub-clans appeared to
have a better chance of being tolerated in the area to which they had fled and
IDPs who had a traditional clan area, especially if they had family or friends
there, had better prospects of finding safety and support, although not if the
area was already saturated with other displaced people. Those who lacked
recent experience of living in Somalia appeared likely to have difficulty
dealing with the changed environment, and those returning to their home area
from the UK might be perceived as having relative wealth and be more
susceptible to extortion. Whether the IDP was female was a significant factor,
given the evidence of additional risks women and girls face of abduction, rape
and harassment. Also relevant would be the evidence about prevailing economic
conditions [160].
396. The respondent
submitted that the evidence of Mr Burns strongly suggested that clan protection
was still relevant, even in Al-Shabab-controlled areas. Landinfo were told
(June 2009) that “great efforts are still made to help relatives and
neighbours”. It was common to find families consisting of six to eight members
opening their homes to a further six to eight relatives and sharing what little
they had; although without money transfers from abroad the very difficult
living conditions would be significantly worse for most of the population.
More recent population movement tracking reports confirmed, according to the
respondent, that people did look for clan/social support in times of
difficulty.
397. The appellants
supported and adopted the submissions made by UNHCR in relation to the whole of
southern and central Somalia being within the ambit of Article 15(c) at the
present time.
398. As for the behaviour
of Al-Shabab towards those it controlled, the appellants submitted that the
only evidence relied on by the respondent for saying that enforcement of requirements
and restrictions was not uniform was the Human Rights Watch Report “Harsh War,
Harsh Peace”, which merely referred to rules being imposed “in many areas”.
There was, however, no positive evidence about particular areas where the rules
were not enforced. By the same token, the assertion that Al-Shabab was not a
monolithic entity was undermined by the respondent’s acceptance that Al-Shabab
shared a common agenda – of defeating AMISOM-TFG – and sought justification in
Sharia for its system of laws and conduct. The Human Rights Watch Report had
been quoted at [165] of Sufi & Elmi, where the Court noted that
Al-Shabab exerted “enormous control over personal lives and devotes remarkable
energy to policing and penalising conduct that it deems idle or immoral” and
that “no detail is too minute to escape the group’s scrutiny”. In many areas
administrators have banned public gatherings, dances, musical ringtones,
western music and moves, khat chewing and cigarette smoking. Men were
prohibited from shaving beards and moustaches or wearing long hair or long
trousers. Sometimes being “idle” involved playing soccer or talking among
friends.
399. The Human Rights Watch
Report also made reference to Al-Shabab leaders in many areas having “embraced
amputations and executions as punishment and turned them into public spectacle.
400. Amongst the evidence
relied upon by the appellants to demonstrate the harshness of Al-Shabab and, in
particular, its paranoid fear of “spies” was the following. In July 2009,
Al-Shabab beheaded several people in Baidoa who were accused of spying for the
TFG. On 28 September 2009 Al-Shabab publicly executed two young men in Masla,
having accused them of spying for the US, TFG and AMISOM (Amnesty
International). A traditional elder in the Bakool region was beheaded on 7 September 2009 for allegedly making telephone contact with a TFG official (USDOS). The
same USDOS report described Al-Shabab torture of TFG members and individuals
suspected to be sympathetic to the TFG. In October 2009 people in Kismayo were
forced by Al-Shabab to watch amputations. In Merka on 25 October 2009 people were forced to watch the executions of two people accused of spying. It was
said of this incident that the executions were in retaliation for a reported US helicopter attack. Amnesty International in November 2009 described Al-Shabab as almost
invariably carrying out its executions, floggings and amputations in public,
thereby asserting their control through displays of cruelty and violence aimed
at intimidating and instilling fear. In March 2010 Al-Shabab beheaded two
employees of a telecommunications company, accusing them of spying for the TFG
by helping direct TFG shells towards Al-Shabab positions. In April 2010
Al-Shabab was suspected of beheading five builders for having worked on the
construction of the Parliament building in Mogadishu. In June 2010 there was a
description of an Al-Shabab officer beheading an alleged spy. In October 2010
Al-Shabab executed two girls in Beletweyne having decided that they were
spies. Residents were forced to watch. On 24 October 2010 Al-Shabab killed four men accused of spying for AMISOM/TFG. Two teenage boys were executed in
Benadir in November 2010, one having been accused of sexual assault, the other
of spying. Two teenagers in Beletweyne were executed on 22 March 2011, whilst on 10 April in Kismayo four men were beheaded, having been accused of
espionage. 23 others were also accused of espionage and “crimes against
Islam”. Also in Kismayo, twelve days later, a mentally handicapped man accused
of espionage was detained and tortured by Al-Shabab. On 3 May 2011 Al-Shabab arrested seven people accused of collaborating with humanitarian agencies. Six
were killed. In Baidoa on 4 May 2011 Al-Shabab publicly executed two men
accused of spying for the TFG near Baidoa. On 8 May 2011 Al-Shabab arrested at least ten people, including women, in Beletweyne, accusing them of having
loyalty to TFG forces. On 4 May 2011 Al-Shabab executed two men in Baidoa for
allegedly spying on behalf of Ethiopia, Kenya and the TFG. A Baidoa resident
speaking anonymously said that “Al-Shabab has no evidence for what they did
this afternoon. It is an awful crime against humanity to kill innocent
people.”
401. As for Al-Shabab religious
rules, in October 2009 in Merka Al-Shabab ordered men not to shave beards, or
they would be punished. Using unsterile tools, Al-Shabab in the same town
began removing the gold and silver teeth of residents, alleging they were a
sign of vanity (August 2009). In October 2009 Al-Shabab sent men with whips to
Bakara Market (in Mogadishu) to flog women found not wearing socks. They also
detained women not wearing the Al-Shabab prescribed veil. In April 2010 in Jowhar Al-Shabab banned the use of bells in schools “saying they sounded like Christian
church bells”. In June 2010 30 people were detained in Afgoye for watching the
World Cup on television. In August 2010 hundreds of men were arrested by
Hisbul Islam for having shaved their beards and grown moustaches. In August
Al-Shabab were reported to be checking people’s mobile phones at a checkpoint
and forcibly shaving heads. In October 2010 in Jowhar more than twenty men were arrested for refusing to grow beards or having trousers longer than to their
ankles. The arrests were said to be “part of a wider operation in the
regions”. In January 2011 in Jowhar Al-Shabab banned men and women shaking
hands and walking and talking together in public, this to be enforced by
floggings. On 10 May 2011 a pregnant woman was beaten nearly to death in
Kismayo by Al-Shabab for wearing a headscarf which was not the Al-Shabab
decreed dress.
402. The Human Rights Watch
Report, “Harsh War, Harsh Peace” (April 2010), has already been mentioned. It
is also noteworthy, however, that that report spoke of a “climate of fear”
preventing most people from speaking out against abuses of power and that the
Al-Shabab rules and their enforcement “often seem to depend partly on the whims
of the militiamen who enforce them”. It could be beatings and detention for
having an appearance disapproved of by Al-Shabab or because of the contents of
one’s telephone. No excuse was acceptable to Al-Shabab for appearing in public
other than going to the mosque during the five daily prayer times. Thus, an
old woman was whipped for being on the street at this time, as was a man in Medina. The same report described Al-Shabab as often threatening to kill people they
suspected of harbouring sympathies for their opponents or who resist
recruitment. Women were said to “bear the brunt of the group’s repression and
abuse”. Women were said to need to be fully veiled and to wear the
“particularly thick and bulky abaya that touches the ground and hides all
physical contours”. A former Al-Shabab fighter described patrolling in order
to enforce women’s dress codes and whipping those who were not dressed
properly. One woman was detained and whipped for rushing out of her house,
uncovered, to grab her young son.
403. The same report also
referred to Al-Shabab having issued numerous death threats and carrying out
many other killings that have received “scant publicity”. Testimony gathered
from refugees included a description of two brothers having their throats slit
for carrying a camera in Ras Kamboni and of a woman seeing her husband and
other men taken from a bus by Al-Shabab, being accused of supporting the TFG.
They were never seen again.
404. There were numerous
recorded incidents of Al-Shabab exacting “taxes”, often by means that plainly
amounted to extortion. A report on 5 August 2010 described those who refused to pay as being “harassed and often killed” with armed Al-Shabab personnel
“demanding money from traders and jewellery from women”. On 9 August 2010 Al-Shabab in Jowhar were said to be collecting farm products and goods from
local farmers by force. Al-Shabab claimed the money would be used to finance
their war against TFG/AMISOM.
405. On 18 October 2010
Al-Shabab were reported as having banned “mobile phone banking” which was
thought to be intended to block what was perceived as a rival to traditional
money transfer schemes, known as Hawala, which Al-Shabab could influence – that
is, tax – more easily.
406. On 7 January 2011 a camel herder was killed by Al-Shabab for refusing to hand over five camels. On 27 February 2011 the TFG’s Minister of Agriculture and Livestock condemned the extremists
for stealing animals from pastoralists under the pretext of collecting zakat.
On 24 April 2011 Al-Shabab imposed “fees” on pupils and teachers in Jowhar,
stating that students must select one of two options to pay the money or else
to contribute personally to jihad and anyone who did not do either of these
“will be seen as anti-Islam”, according to the Al-Shabab commander in charge of
finance. In Afgoye in May 2011 many business owners were said to have closed
their shops because they were unable to pay the “fees” imposed by Al-Shabab.
In the same month, 40 traders in Baidoa were said to have been arrested after
they refused to pay tax.
407. According to Dr
Hammond, an individual stopped at an Al-Shabab checkpoint could expect to be
asked where they were going to or from, the nature of their business and how
much money they had with them. Mr Burns considered that travellers “acting out
of the ordinary” were detained at such roadblocks for questioning. Dr Mullen
described to us trivial personal items such as dental fillings and sunglasses
as determining passage or interrogation at Al-Shabab checkpoints.
408. The appellants relied
on the evidence of Mr Burns that a returnee from the West would easily be
identified by Al-Shabab security and political structures and viewed with
significant suspicion. If the returnee could not provide satisfactory
responses to questioning, indefinite imprisonment would be the normal course or
execution if thought to be a spy. Dr Hammond also spoke of executions by
Al-Shabab of those suspected of spying for Western governments or the
TFG/AMISOM.
409. The appellants
contended that there was, in fact, significant evidence of forced recruitment
by Al-Shabab. Human Rights Watch in April 2010 reported that Al-Shabab had
kidnapped and killed young men for refusing offers to join the group as
fighters. Several of those interviewed by Al-Shabab for the purposes of
recruitment had fled to Kenya after being threatened. In May 2010 UNICEF and
the UNSG’s Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict were “appalled
to learn that the recruitment and use of children as soldiers by armed groups
in Somalia is rising”. In November 2010 the UN Secretary General confirmed a
“considerable increase” in the scale of recruitment and use of children during
the previous two years, describing the practice as having become “more
systematic”. On 12 May 2011 an Al-Shabab official, learning that the TFG was
recruiting fighters in recently seized towns, stated that the best way to deal
with this was to prevent youth from travelling from Al-Shabab areas.
410. There was evidence of
forced marriage and the killing of those who refused to comply. In October
2010 Amnesty International received reports of girls being forced to marry
Al-Shabab members, whilst in the same month it was reported that a woman had
“attempted suicide by drinking rat poison” after Al-Shabab had tried to force
her to marry. They dismissed her claim that she was already married “saying
that her husband was a TFG spy”.
411. All this, according to
the appellants, underscored the finding at [159] of AM & AM, where
the Tribunal acknowledged as “significant” the evidence of Alex Tyler, the
UNHCR’s Protection Officer, that “Al-Shabab cells are likely to investigate any
newcomer to their areas to determine whether the individual is connected with
the TFG or otherwise opposed to them”. At [160] the Tribunal also noted that
“those who lack recent experience of living in Somalia appear more likely to
have difficulty dealing with the change in environment”.
412. The appellants urged
us to accept the evidence of Dr Hammond and Mr Burns, that a variety of clues,
such as gait, speech, clothes worn, a healthy and well-fed appearance, and so
forth, would show a person to be a returnee. Even if some of these were
temporary characteristics, the risk as a returnee would be immediately
present. Although the respondent had stressed the absence of evidence
regarding harm coming to the 16,000 Somalis returned there from Saudi Arabia,
she had produced no evidence about the numbers of Somalis removed from Europe
or the West generally and no evidence about what had happened to them. This
suggested no significant numbers of Somalis had in fact been removed. There
was, simply, a lacuna regarding the evidence as to the fate of the Saudi
returnees. Furthermore, Dr Hammond stressed that there was a difference
between the perception on the part of Al-Shabab of someone coming from an
Islamic country and someone coming from the West.
413. It was likely,
according to the appellants, that if a returnee from the United Kingdom received money from the United Kingdom Government to assist in return, Al-Shabab
would learn about this, bearing in mind the evidence that they monitor
remittances. Al-Shabab’s finding that the person had received money from the
UK Government would create or compound suspicion that the person was working
for that government against Al-Shabab.
414. The appellants
submitted that the humanitarian situation in central and southern Somalia had deteriorated significantly since the ECtHR received submissions and evidence in
Sufi & Elmi. For instance, the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis
Unit on 30 June 2011 updated the number of people in crisis from 2.4 to 2.85
million (January to June). The overwhelming majority of the 2.85 million were
in the south where there was “extremely limited food assistance due to
insecurity”. The 1.75 million people in crisis in the south included rural,
urban and IDPs, an increase from 1.4 million in January. Poor farmers in lower
Shabelle and Bay regions were joining the numbers of people in crisis due to
the very poor Gu harvest outlook. On 30 June Oxfam GB, writing of lower Juba, described the “devastating drought and ongoing conflict” as having left people
“facing starvation”. One elderly man told the Oxfam official of a Somali
proverb: “You use your feet to escape during war and drought”. Many were
fleeing to Kenya but parts of that country had had as little rain as Somalia. On 1 July 2011 the Danish Refugee Council described Somalia as being on the brink
of disaster, with war and drought forcing more than 30,000 people to flee Somalia every month. On 20 June 2011 FSNAU estimated that the total number of people in
need of humanitarian assistance would increase in the second half of 2011, with
the main driving factors being the worsening food security situation, including
unfavourable prospects for the Gu season harvest. The UNHCR on 5 July 2011 noted that the “devastating drought has forced more than 135,000 Somalis to
flee so far this year. In June alone, 54,000 people fled across the two
borders [Kenya and Ethiopia], three times the number of people who fled in
May”. UNHCR estimated that a quarter of Somalia’s 7.5 million population was
now either internally displaced or living outside the country as refugees. The
organisation was “particularly concerned by unprecedented levels of malnutrition”,
especially among refugee children. On 5 July 2011 the Famine Early Warning Systems Network was reported as stating that localised famine could be witnessed in
some of the worst drought-affected areas in southern Somalia in September.
415. At this point it is
convenient to refer to some of the more recent documentary evidence adduced by
the respondent. On 30 June 2011 allafrica.com reported information given to
IRIN that relief agencies were looking at the option of cash transfers, saying
that the system helped beneficiaries by giving them freedom of choice. In
February 2011 a family in Baran started receiving cash, rather than food,
thereby enabling the head of the family (a mother of seven) to decide how to
spend the aid. The protection cluster update weekly report of 1 July 2011 reported the UN as recently stating that Somalia was experiencing “the worst
drought in over 60 years”, with over a million Somalis located in “nearly
unreachable areas … for humanitarian aid”. Save the Children reported an
average number of 1,300 Somali refugees arriving everyday at Kenya’s Dadaab Camp, many of them children, having travelled weeks on foot to reach the camp. On 6
July, a news report described how the Somali Diaspora were helping the nation
through its crisis. Interviewed in London, the CEO of Dahabshiil, a global
money transfer company which “sends more than US$1 billion to Somalia every year” described how, when there was a crisis, individual people who were in the
Diaspora wanted to send money back home. The CEO said that remittances were an
important way for people to make sure those they love get through hard times.
416. On 6 July 2011
Al-Shabab was reported, from Mogadishu, to be calling upon “both Muslims and
non-Muslims to act quickly to deliver humanitarian assistance to the
drought-infected Somali people”. The spokesman, Sheikh Ali Mohamed Rage, said
that those wanting to help the starving should contact Al-Shabab officials.
Shortly after, Reliefweb referred to the suspension in 2009 of US$50 million of
US humanitarian assistance for Somalia “out of concern that it might benefit
Al-Shabab, designated as a terrorist organisation”. Humanitarian assistance to
populations under the control of Al-Shabab was “under close scrutiny by the
United Nations Security Council since its Resolution 1916 of March 2010, as the
group represents a threat to peace and security and is suspected of diverting
humanitarian aid to fuel its own war efforts”. On 6 July, BBC News also
reported the lifting of the ban on foreign aid agencies by Al-Shabab; however,
an article accessed on 13 July 2011 described Al-Shabab fighters as having
detained in Baidoa personnel working for international relief organisations,
namely, UNICEF and the Red Cross. The aid personnel were taken to an unknown
location and at the time of writing the reason for the incident was not known.
This “comes as Al-Shabab said last week it was lifting the ban on aid agencies
to help the starving people”.
417. BBC News Online July
reported the accounts of individuals who had reached the Kenyan border from
south Somalia. Weheleey Haji and her five children trekked for several weeks
from their homeland in Somalia, walking for 22 days, drinking only water. Her
baby had been born under a tree in the Dadaab Refugee Camp, just after
arriving. Rukiyo Noor had been travelling for twenty days with a 1 month old
baby. Told about the Al-Shabab ban on foreign aid agencies being lifted,
Mohamed Abdi, walking with his wife and children towards Dadaab, was sceptical.
He said that Al-Shabab militiamen had told the family to turn back, saying “it
was better to die in our motherland. They wanted us to pray for the rains.”
Mr Abdi, however, said he had no choice and set out on the journey. Although
there was “relative peace in Somalia where I live”, the family had still
decided to flee because of the drought.
418. On 11 July it was
reported in Washington DC that USAID would contribute approximately 19,000
metric tons of food to assist Somalis in need. On 13 July, the BBC reported
that UK charities were poised to boost aid to Somalia and that the Organisation
of Islamic Cooperation Aid Agency had started distributing aid in Mogadishu,
following the lifting of the ban by Al-Shabab.
419. The appellants
submitted that the ECtHR’s finding at [292] of Sufi & Elmi, that
having to seek refuge in an IDP camp would constitute Article 3 ill-treatment,
was made in spite of the evidence regarding the supposed “urbanisation” of the
Afgoye Corridor:-
“The Government submitted
that there is evidence of increased urbanisation of the Afgoye Corridor.
Although this assertion is supported by a number of the country reports, it is
not clear to the Court whether or not urbanisation has improved conditions for
the majority of IDPs. In fact, some reports suggest that IDPs are experiencing
increasing difficulties in finding shelter in the Afgoye Corridor as landlords
are either selling land that IDPs live on or are charging rent that they cannot
afford.”
420. As for domestic
authority, in NM, the Tribunal found that “any person at real risk on
return of being compelled to live in [an IDP camp] as having little difficulty
in making out a claim under Article 3, if not under the Refugee Convention
also” [102]. In HH, the Tribunal said that a person who had been
displaced from his or her home in Mogadishu “without being able to find a place
elsewhere … with clan members or friends, and who, as a result, is likely to
have to spend any significant period of time in a makeshift shelter along the
road to Afgoye, for example, or in an IDP camp, may well experience treatment
that would be proscribed by Article 3 of the ECHR”. In AM & AM the
Tribunal considered that having to live in the dire humanitarian conditions of
an IDP camp could amount to treatment in breach of Article 3 and, in doing so,
according to the appellants, rejected a submission from the respondent, similar
to that now advanced, that “of and by itself, poor humanitarian conditions in
Somalia, even if in an IDP camp, would not establish an Article 3 breach” [87].
421. The appellants
submitted (citing Limbuela v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2005] UKHL 66 and Moldovan v Romania No 2 (2005 App. 41138/98) that
whilst a mere failure to provide a basic level of support which resulted in
destitution and degradation would not, without more, engage Article 3, the
positive institution of a regime which resulted in such destitution and
degradation could amount to “treatment” within Article 3. Thus, dealing with
the evidence regarding displacement from Mogadishu as a result of the armed
conflict there, the predicament of those displaced was not a consequence of
naturally occurring phenomena or lack of resources in Somalia but a consequence of the treatment by agents of serious harm. The conflict was also
responsible for the destruction of physical and social infrastructure,
indispensible for people in such a position to sustain themselves adequately.
That breakdown had diminished if not extinguished the capacity of state and
non-state institutions, including traditional systems such as elders, clan
leaders etc., to provide protection to IDPs, thereby leaving the latter
particularly vulnerable to criminal violence. The actors were also responsible
for denying or substantially restricting humanitarian access to the displaced.
422. Looking at
humanitarian circumstances in the context of Article 15(c), the appellants
referred to [94] of AM & AM where the Tribunal found that “within
the context of Article 15(c) … the serious harm involved did not have to be a
direct effect of the indiscriminate violence; it was sufficient that there was
causal nexus of some kind”, not including, however, the situation where the
consequences were only remotely connected with the violence.
423. As we have already
indicated, in the aftermath of the events in Mogadishu of August 2011, the
appellants and the respondent chose to put in updated evidence regarding the
position outside Mogadishu. So far as armed conflict was concerned, both sides
pointed to instances of fighting between the TFG and Al-Shabab, in various
places outside the capital. The appellants noted that there was now fighting
in the Gedo region, an area previously perceived to be relatively free from
conflict. According to the appellants, this underlined the volatility of the
situation and pointed to there still being a risk of serious harm by reason of
indiscriminate violence. Amongst other things, on 27 August 2011 Al-Shabab
were reported to have set fire to two engines used to draw water from wells in
Garbaharrey, Gedo, thereby exacerbating the situation for residents who were
already suffering from the effects of famine. On 29 August, pro-government
forces seized four villages in Gedo, previously held by Al-Shabab.
424. In August 2011 there
were reports of Al-Shabab fighters who had left Mogadishu arriving in Kismayo
and Baidoa in Lower Juba. Fighting was taking place with government forces
near Afmadow. On 21 August, plans to launch “a massive offensive” against
Al-Shabab in Lower and Middle Juba regions were said to be at their last stage
of preparation. On 6 September, US drone attacks in Kismayo were followed by
reports of Al-Shabab suspecting people near their bases there of spying,
leading to the arrests of many.
425. There was a report on
21 August of fighting between Al-Shabab and another faction in Hiran, whilst in
both late July and August, there were reports of targeted killings and roadside
bombs in Puntland, with the Puntland Minister of Security expressing concern
that Al-Shabab, having withdrawn from Mogadishu, would relocate to his region.
On 3 September 2011 in Galkayo, 60 people were killed and 75 wounded (mostly
civilians) following two days of fighting between Al-Shabab and security
forces.
426. Analysing the latest positions
regarding armed conflict outside Mogadishu, the respondent considered that it
remained the case that fighting was confined to certain areas. That finding
had led to four of the six districts of Gedo coming under the TFG’s control,
with Garbaharey and Bardere remaining with Al-Shabab. Elsewhere, pro-TFG
militias were said to have gained further ground in Hiran, Galgaduud, Bay and
Bakool, and Lower Juba (African Union, 13 September). The same report
considered that the security situation in Puntland and Galmudud had
deteriorated. In Puntland, there was fighting between the region’s security
forces and pro-Al-Shabab militias, whilst in Galmudud, rival clans had been
fighting each other. On the other hand, the respondent contended that the
evidence showed security had improved in border areas between Somalia and Ethiopia/Kenya.
427. The AI Briefing
described fighting outside Mogadishu in southern Somalia as “sporadic”. There
were suggestions that Al-Shabab fighters from Mogadishu had mobilised in the
Gedo region, whilst there were tensions reported amongst the TFG militia
controlling areas of southern Somalia. In the Mudug region of central Somalia, fighting had erupted at the end of August in Galkayo, causing massive displacement from Galkayo Town to nearby villages (Protection Cluster Update).
428. In the latest evidence
served by the appellants, there are various reports of Al-Shabab ill-treatment
of those under its control. On 23 July Al-Shabab were said to have beheaded
two animal herders in Afgoye and announced that a further three would suffer
the same fate. The herders had refused to surrender their animals to
Al-Shabab. On the same day Al-Shabab arrested four teenagers in Lower Shabelle, accusing them of activities against Islamic religion because they had been
watching films on their mobile telephones. On 25 July Al-Shabab imposed a ban
in Afgoye on the slaughter and sale of domestic animals, whilst a day later
Al-Shabab arrested 30 women in the Afgoye Corridor because they had allegedly
broken a rule relating to the wearing of thick and broad veils. On 15 August
Al-Shabab executed a man accused of collaborating with the TFG in Hiran and on
16 August they arrested and tortured a 72 year old man accused of supporting
the TFG. On 18 August there was a further report of women being charged with
not wearing appropriate veils in public in Afgoye. On 24 August there were
said to be increased threats and harassment of civilians in Kismayo from
Al-Shabab and that anyone coming to the city would be interrogated because the
organisation wished to know the motive behind their movements. On 29 August
Al-Shabab were said to be maintaining checkpoints on the outskirts of Mogadishu, and behaving antagonistically towards those who say they knew nothing of the
situation in Al-Shabab’s former strongholds. On 27 August there was a report
of young men fleeing the Afgoye Corridor, following the kidnap and beheading of
a young person by Al-Shabab.
429. The respondent
maintained her submission that there was not a reasonable likelihood of
ill-treatment at Al-Shabab checkpoints for the majority of Somalis using them.
Support for this was identified in the August 2011 Landinfo report which
concluded that people could travel relatively freely, both in government
controlled areas and in areas controlled by other groups including Al-Shabab.
This was so even though both sides had reintroduced some checkpoints, mainly at
the entrance to Mogadishu. Some Al-Shabab checkpoints were said to be manned
by children as young as 12 years old. Refugees arriving at the Dadaab camps in
Kenya told Landinfo that they had not suffered an excess of attention from the
Al-Shabab checkpoints in Lower Juba. In March 2011, however, several
interviewees said there could be some risk in travelling to the south but that
people travelled in spite of this. The main challenges related to the crossing
of frontlines “not least entry into Shabab areas where newcomers risk
accusations of espionage. People who are most at risk in Shabab-controlled
areas are young men and to some extent young women. But given Shabab’s need
for revenue, people are generally quite safe, as long as they can pay for
themselves at checkpoints. Women usually travel with a male relative or in
groups.”
430. The respondent also
relied on a Landinfo report in support of the proposition that those living in
Al-Shabab areas who had relevant clan links could be in a better position. Al-
Shabab administration was said to be able to grant “some influence to local
people and clan elders, but only to a certain extent and only to the extent
that it does not threaten Shabab’s political goals on the local level or
otherwise. The influence of the council of elders remains restricted even
here. According to various international sources and Somali representatives,
the expulsion of international aid organisations is a good example of this lack
of influence.” Later in the same report there was reference to examples
“indicating that the authority of the elders is undermined and eroding in areas
controlled by Al-Shabab”. Some detected that, behind the religious rhetoric of
Al-Shabab, there were “also the expression of social inequalities and desires
for political power among rival clans and groups”.
431. A Landinfo report of
July 2011 indicated that some families saw the benefit of having a son-in-law
affiliated with Al-Shabab “as this can provide protection and opportunities,
especially amongst minority groups and minor clans”. However, this category of
marriage differed little from the so-called “black cat” marriages of the days
of the warlords. Many Al-Shabab soldiers belonged to marginalised minority
groups. Those who escaped Al-Shabab areas for having transgressed the
organisation’s rules were unlikely to find Al-Shabab devoting resources to look
for them. The figure of 3,570 IDP movements from Mogadishu to Afgoye in June
to September 2011 undermined, according to the respondent, the contention that
there were high risk and difficulties at checkpoints for the ordinary Somali.
432. As for the position of
women, the Protection Cluster Update of 26 August 2011 reported that 130 women
in Jowhar had received scholarships, including accommodation in the vocational
training centre. The respondent contended that the situation in Al-Shabab
areas was in practice far more flexible than suggested by the appellants.
Women did work, since they needed to do so to support their families. The
Landinfo report of July 2011 described women who did not comply with the
organisation’s strict dress code as being “at risk of harassment”.
Nevertheless, Shabab was said to have to some extent to tolerate women being
visible in public. There was some evidence that Al-Shabab dress codes for
females were related to revenue raising, in that women were forced to buy new
clothes or fabric. Much of the evidence related to forced marriages was
anecdotal and needed to be treated with caution.
433. The latest evidence on
forced recruitment disclosed a complex picture. Religious arguments were
“consistently used in the context of recruitment, while threats and violence,
according to well-informed sources, are currently not usual or necessary yet
no-one has ruled out cases involving the use of force”. Although there were
instances of older men being approached, “the most important target group is
still young boys aged 12-16 years. The children are lured and instructed to
fulfil their duty as devout Muslims.”
434. The AI Briefing stated
that, although the large scale movement of Somalis across the Ethiopian and
Kenyan borders had reduced since June/July 2011, many people continued to seek
refuge in countries neighbouring Somalia and that there were “many instances of
human rights abuses against people in flight, such as looting, extortion, and
sexual violence”. Those, particularly men, fleeing towards Puntland had been
refused passage at checkpoints and either deported or arrested.
435. Turning to the wider
humanitarian situation outside Mogadishu, the appellants pointed to the further
declarations by the UN of famine, so as to cover most regions of southern Somalia. The appellants pointed to recent evidence that, despite earlier announcements to
the contrary, Al-Shabab continued to prevent or restrict aid agencies from
operating in areas they controlled. This had resulted in agencies being unable
to reach an estimated 2.2 million Somalis (US Secretary General’s Report of 30
August). Thus, for example, on 21 July, Al-Shabab allegedly refuted the UN’s
declaration of famine in Somalia, saying that Somalis had no need of assistance
from non-Muslims. The lifting of the ban on aid agencies did not, according to
the report, include those who had been banned earlier, because Al-Shabab
regarded them as “spies” (Somalia Report). The appellants also pointed to various
pieces of evidence regarding Al-Shabab preventing people from fleeing its
areas, to escape the consequences of the famine.
436. For those who,
nevertheless, managed to travel, the UN Secretary General’s Special
Representative on sexual violence in conflict stated on 11 August that, during
the journey from Somalia to the Kenyan camps, “women and girls are subjected to
attacks, including rape, by armed militants and bandits” and that Al-Shabab
militants were said to be abducting girls for forced marriage to fighters. On
23 August, a 6 year old girl was taken by hyenas, whilst travelling. On 3
September five people were killed and five injured when bandits opened fire on
a minibus travelling from Bal’ad to Jowhar.
437. On 20 July, famine was
declared in southern Bakool and Lower Shabelle and on 3 August famine was
declared in parts of middle Shabelle and the Afgoye corridor. The criteria for
a declaration of famine required acute malnutrition exceeding 30% in a given
area – the actual malnutrition rates were as high as 58% in some areas; a crude
death rate exceeding two in 10,000 per day – in some parts the rate was fifteen
per day; and food access below 2,100 calories per day for at least 20% of the
population. Malnutrition rates in the Somali famine-declared areas were “the
highest in the world, with peaks of 50%. Nearly half of the Somali population,
3.7 million, is now in crisis and an estimated 2.8 million of those people
reside in the south” (Somalia: Famine and Drought Situation Report 23 August).
438. Although the
appellants acknowledged that the evidence clearly showed that some people were
being provided with some assistance, it was submitted that it would be wrong
for the Tribunal to conclude that this sufficiently ameliorated the situation
in which the appellants in the present appeals would find themselves if
returned.
439. The appellants
reiterated their submission that it would be wrong to treat humanitarian
considerations as analogous to another naturally occurring phenomenon, notwithstanding
that climate conditions played a significant part in the current crisis. The
human conduct involved could, the appellants contended, be described as
“treatment” within the meaning of Article 3 of the ECHR.
440. According to Professor
Menkhaus (8 August) all of Africa was relatively used to droughts and floods
and the local population historically had developed “pretty elaborate coping
mechanisms. But those coping mechanisms have been overloaded in recent decades
by a wide range of factors”. The coping mechanisms had become broken;
“particularly in Somalia”. According to Menkhaus “a big part of the crisis in Somalia is not just that people used to be able to farm for subsistence and now can’t;
there are lots of people whose purchasing power has been badly eroded”. The
Professor identified a “perfect storm” in Somalia, involving the worst drought
for 60 years and people displaced by years of warfare. He attributed the fact
that Somaliland had not seen famine to that region’s reasonable level of
security and stability, in contrast to Somalia. That view was supported by
Professor Samatar, who noted that neither the drought of the mid 1970s nor that
of 1984 produced famine in Somalia “because the Somali state was able to
mobilise the population and to seek the assistance of the international
community to deliver aid to the needy”. The last time Somalis suffered major
famine was in 1992 which, according to Samatar, was not caused by drought, but
by marauding warlords. As for the present position, Professor Samatar
considered that the Somali people had been “made vulnerable to ecological
disturbances” because of the US war on terror, and consequent backing of the
Ethiopian invasion; the TFG, which was “known for its corruption, incompetence
and internal strife”; and Al-Shabab, who obstructed the provision of
international assistance and whose existence led to the US blocking aid to what
is identified as a terrorist group.
441. The TFG prime minister
acknowledged that the insurgency and the violence that Al-Shabab imposed were
“a fundamental cause of the famine we are suffering”. However, the UN
Secretary General’s report on Somalia noted that “deforestation and land
degradation in southern areas of Somalia have increased exposure and vulnerability
to the effects of natural hazards and climate change, such as drought and
floods. Much of the deforestation can be attributed to the charcoal trade as
the land where the acacia forests have been cut down for charcoal, such as
between the Juba and Shabelle rivers, often becomes unsuitable for grazing,
leading to increased conflict over land and water and the displacement of local
population”.
442. The respondent pointed
to recent evidence that, it was submitted, showed improved aid access in
southern Somalia. This extended not only to Mogadishu but to the Afgoye
corridor. OCAJ’s Humanitarian Overview of August 2011 stated that food
assistance had been scaled up significantly, from 730,000 people in July to 1.3
million in August. In the south, 648,000 people had benefited from food
distributions in August, which was double the number of people reached in
July. Emergency water services for each 1.7 million people in August, and
140,000 in July. Coverage of areas facing famine was, however, still a major
challenge for the humanitarian community. Operations had been scaled up
substantially in Gedo and parts of Lower Juba. According to a UNSC Report of
30 August, during the past two months over 23,300 severely malnourished
children in central and southern Somalia had been provided with ready-to-use
therapeutic foods. Continued support for the drinking water systems, including
in Mogadishu and the Afgoye corridor, was providing safe drinking water to more
than 1.9 million people. Thirteen hospitals across southern Somalia received enough emergency health kits to assist a catchment area of 130,000 for three
months. Over 24,500 farmers and pastoralists had, according to the United
Nations, refused agriculture and livelihood interventions to prepare for the
coming rains in October to December.
443. According to Relief
Web, the ICRC had been able to provide food aid in Al-Shabab areas outside Mogadishu. A Relief Web map showed that all 470,000 of those targeted in Mogadishu for aid
had been reached. In the central regions, of a target of 320,000, 313,488 had
been reached; in southern regions the figures were 440,000 and 415,326.
444. Al-Shabab had recently
allowed Turkey to distribute assistance to people living under the
organisation’s control. Turkish humanitarian organisations were providing
relief in Bay and Bakool regions, in cities like Baidoa and Kismayo.
Constraints on the provision of aid included limitations on international
funding and infrastructure problems. Professor Menkhaus was quoted as saying
that the “challenge right now is just to get food aid in” but that the second
challenge was towards rebuilding livelihoods. The question of governance of Somalia remained outstanding. Although Al-Shabab “may be crumbling, ….the TFG remains irrelevant
and is just the source of massive corruption”. The Professor reported in
August that there had been a shift in US policy, which now involved protecting
NGOs from being prosecuted under the Patriot Act for doing business with
Al-Shabab. Nevertheless, Al-Shabab continued blocking food aid.
445. The respondent
submitted that problems of access for the UN World Food Programme had not been
experienced by all international aid agencies. Thus, the ICRC was able to
operate in Al-Shabab areas.
446. AI’s briefing
described the humanitarian crisis in southern and central Somalia as having already claimed tens of thousands of lives, of which the majority were children.
The crisis has now affected some four million people including three million
living in south and central Somalia “and is predicted to worsen, with the onset
of the rainy season. Aid agencies are concerned that contagious diseases,
including cholera and measles, will spread further”.
447. AI noted Médicins Sans
Frontières as stating that many areas in southern and central Somalia remained
without access to humanitarian aid and that Al-Shabab, “ already suspicious of
western agendas, has placed bans on foreign staff, on the supply of medicines
and materials by air, and on vaccination activities” (5 September). There
continued to be reports of humanitarian workers being abducted and held
temporarily by Al-Shabab, as well as temporary arrests of relief workers in
areas controlled by the TFG militia. In Mogadishu, Turkish relief workers had
been held by TFG forces after returning from delivering aid to Al-Shabab
controlled areas. Al-Shabab was reported to be preventing populations in need
of assistance from moving to areas controlled by the TFG, both in Bay and
Bakool and in lower Shabelle. Persons who had fled from famine stricken
villages to Baidoa were reportedly turned back by Al-Shabab in late
September.
The
Tribunal’s findings
(a) Article 15(c)
448. On the evidence before
us, we do not consider that the internal armed conflict which obtains in
southern and central Somalia (outside Mogadishu) is at present at such a level
as to place everyone there who is a civilian at real risk of the harm described
in Article 15(c). We acknowledge that the starting point in AM & AM
in effect requires us to identify a material change. The evidence of the
intervening years, including large Al-Shabab territorial gains, constitutes
such a change, albeit that there are areas where the organisation’s rule is
being challenged. The current fighting, as that of the recent past, is both
sporadic and localised. Like the ECtHR, our assessment of the evidence does not
accord with what appears to be the thrust of the UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines
and there is nothing in the update to those Guidelines which suggests a
different stance is called for. There is copious evidence to the effect that
large parts of southern and central Somalia are relatively peaceful, in the
sense that there is no conflict taking place there. In Al-Shabab areas there
is a dark side to that peace, as we have seen and will shortly have to address.
449. Also like the ECtHR,
we stress that, in individual cases, it will be necessary to establish where a
person comes from and what the background information says is the position in
that place. If fighting is going on, whether symmetrically or asymmetrically,
that will have to be taken into account in deciding whether Article 15(c) is
applicable. Although an armed conflict may exist across an area, without there
having to be actual fighting in every part of that area, the assessment is
ultimately a fact-sensitive one; and we consider the present reality to be as
we have found.
450. Like the Tribunal in AM
& AM, we take the view that indirect forms of harm, such as may be
encountered by an IDP in an IDP camp, fall to be taken into account for the
purposes of Article 15(c), provided that the person’s circumstances (such as
finding themselves in such a camp) can properly be said to have as an operative
cause the armed conflict. This would be the position for those who have to
flee a real risk to life and person in Mogadishu, by moving into the
countryside. As can be seen from the evidence, however, the more recent
picture in 2011 is of people fleeing the drought by moving into Mogadishu.
(b) Article 3
451. As is apparent from Sufi
& Elmi, there are three elements to Article 3 risk in southern and
central Somalia: the armed conflict, the risks inherent in living under
Al-Shabab rule; and the humanitarian position, consequent upon the prolonged
drought. We address each in turn.
Armed conflict
452. In view of our finding
regarding Article 15(c), there can be no question of a returnee being at real
risk of Article 3 harm in southern and central Somalia solely on account of the
situation of armed conflict or “general violence” (Sufi & Elmi
[271]). An individualised assessment is required, depending on the location
concerned.
Living under Al-Shabab
453. At [277] the ECtHR in Sufi
& Elmi concluded that “a returnee with no recent experience of living
in Somalia would be at real risk of being subjected to treatment proscribed by
Article 3 in an Al-Shabab-controlled area”. It did so on the basis of the
evidence before it regarding Al-Shabab’s enforcement of “a particularly
draconian version of Sharia law” [273] and the impossibility of predicting the
fate of a returnee who came to the attention of Al-Shabab for failing to comply
with that organisation’s rules, having regard to reports that “Somalis have
been beaten or flogged for relatively minor infringements” [276].
454. In these proceedings,
the respondent urged the Tribunal to draw somewhat different conclusions from
the evidence that was before us. It was submitted that this evidence disclosed
that Al-Shabab was not, in fact, a monolithic organisation and that its
practices varied from place to place. There was evidence of Al-Shabab
tempering its behaviour, as for example in Dr Hammond’s evidence regarding
mixed education being permitted. Furthermore, the nature of Al-Shabab‘s organisation
and its relative lack of manpower resulted, at least in various places, in it
having to forge working relationships with existing governing structures, such
as elders, which had the result of tempering the harshness of its social
controls.
455. All this is true; but
we do not find that it much assists the respondent’s case. It is, in practice,
extremely difficult indeed to identify with any degree of precision the places
where a more moderate Al-Shabab rule pertains. Furthermore, there was evidence
that Al-Shabab leaders rotate from place to place on a regular basis,
presumably in part to ensure that that leadership remains unsullied by what is
perceived as un-Islamic ways of life. It may, of course, be the case that, as
matters unfold, evidence regarding a particular area will, indeed, show the
requisite stability created by a permanent, “moderate” Al-Shabab governance.
However, that is not the position at present.
456. Both the appellants
and the respondent contended that the picture of what goes on in Al-Shabab
areas was not an entire or true picture. The respondent submitted that, based
on certain evidence, it was likely that Al-Shabab atrocities were
over-reported. It is certainly the case that, looking at the various bundles
of evidence before us, the same incident occurs in more than one news report.
The fact that that is clear to us suggests that information gatherers, such as
Human Rights Watch, are likewise able to identify such cases and ensure that
anything they say on the matter is not thereby exaggerated.
457. The appellants, again
on the basis of a certain amount of evidence, submitted that it was likely
there was under-reporting of Al-Shabab atrocities and other bad behaviour. As
a matter of common sense, one might imagine that an individual beating of a
person in a remote village in Somalia is less likely to be reported than the
beating of a person in a city, town or village in the United Kingdom. But, be that as it may, we do not need to have recourse to any supposition as to under-reporting.
It is abundantly plain from the evidence before us, only a part of which we
have specifically mentioned above, that Al-Shabab regularly behaves in a way
which seriously violates fundamental human rights.
458. This does not mean
that everyone present in an Al-Shabab area faces a real risk of Article 3
ill-treatment. The ECtHR did not so find; and nor do we, on the evidence
before us. Plainly, those who are of the same ideological persuasion as
Al-Shabab are not at the same risk as those who are not. In so saying, we are
mindful of the evidence which suggests that a majority of the population falls
in the latter category.
459. The ECtHR considered
that persons who were able to “play the game” (to use a phrase borrowed from
the UKBA FFM report) would also not be at real risk; but that a person without
recent experience of living in Somalia would be unlikely to be able to do
this. We will examine in due course the significance of “playing the game” in
the context of the Refugee Convention. First, however, we must assess the
evidence, in order to determine whether it can be said returning after a
significant absence from Somalia would, indeed, preclude a person from
conforming with Al-Shabab’s requirements.
460. Mr Eicke submitted
that the extremely strong links that exist between the Somali Diaspora and
people in southern and central Somalia, particularly assisted by modern means
of telecommunications, meant that it would be perfectly possible for a Somali
in the United Kingdom to enquire, either directly or through Diaspora
organisations or groups, as to what was necessary, by way of compliance with
Al-Shabab requirements, in the area to which the person concerned would be
returning. To some extent, this is so, however, there are two reasons why it
does not materially carry matters forward for the respondent.
461. First, there is the
problem of Al-Shabab’s rotating leadership, to which we have just referred. It
is, accordingly, reasonably likely that – despite the potential returnees’ best
efforts – any information gleaned would be out of date before he or she was
actually able to return. Secondly, there is the issue of the alleged
heightened vulnerability to adverse Al-Shabab interest of a person returning
from the United Kingdom or other countries of the West.
462. It was in relation to
this issue that the appellants drew particular attention to the evidence
regarding Al-Shabab’s generally paranoid behaviour and, in particular, its
apparent fear of spies. There is sufficient of this evidence, often of a
harrowing nature, to support the appellants’ contention that one of the ways in
which a person may most seriously fall foul of Al-Shabab is by being suspected
of being a spy, whether for TFG/AMISOM, the Ethiopians, the USA or other western interests.
463. The key question,
however, is whether this risk, which appears to exist to some extent for
everyone living in Al-Shabab areas, becomes a real risk of harm in respect of
those returning from the United Kingdom. Mr Eicke submitted that there was no
evidence to suggest that it did. He pointed to the absence in the news and
other reports regarding execution etc. for “spying” of anything to suggest that
the victims were chosen because they had recently arrived in the area. He also
drew particular attention to the 16,000 Somalis whom Saudi Arabia had last year
returned to Somalia and the absence of any evidence that they had been harmed
(the most recent evidence indicates thousands more were returned this summer).
For their part, the appellants submitted that there was, in fact, no evidence
one way or the other as to what had happened to the returnees from Saudi Arabia
and that the absence of any evidence that those returned from the West had
suffered difficulties in this regard could well be due to the fact that few if
any such persons were being returned.
464. It is true that there
is no specific evidence one way or the other. However, given the fact of
Al-Shabab’s paranoia, its violently anti-Western stance and its (perhaps
justified) feeling of insecurity in recent times, as funding has become more
difficult and military reverses more common (including what appears to have
been a forced withdrawal from positions in Mogadishu), we do not consider that
it is engaging in speculation to conclude that the fact of having come from the
United Kingdom is, as a general matter, likely to elevate the risk to a person
of being branded a spy, which carries the very real risk of serious
ill-treatment or death. The only exception we would make is where the returnee
is seeking out Al-Shabab in order to join its ranks as a fighter for
international jihad. There was evidence before us that, regrettably, some of
those joining Al-Shabab come from this country.
465. Would a returnee from
the United Kingdom be identifiable as such? Mr Eicke said, in effect, that
there was no hard evidence to indicate a positive answer; the experts’
testimony was anecdotal and speculative. In any event, the matters the experts
had identified, such as linguistic differences, gait and physical appearance,
would be of only temporary duration.
466. We very much doubt
whether persons who have been away from Somalia for only a short period of
time, and certainly only since the emergence of Al-Shabab as a major actor in
southern and central Somalia, would have undergone linguistic changes and
changes in his or her deportment, such as to draw Al-Shabab’s attention to
them. We are, however, prepared to accept, having regard to the lower standard
of proof, that a person who has been outside Somalia for a longer period could
have undergone such changes. It is also plainly the case that an overweight or
even well-nourished man or woman is likely in the present sad state of affairs
to be noticeable in southern and central Somalia.
467. As for these
characteristics being only temporary, we agree with Mr Toal that the adverse
attention is likely to come to pass immediately or soon after return, before
the individual can lose those characteristics. Mr Eicke did not seek to
suggest that, as a general matter, there might be some place in Somalia where returnees could “re-acclimatise” before venturing into an Al-Shabab area.
468. The position of women
in such areas calls for specific mention. Although there was some evidence
that a woman’s ability to work might be restricted by Al-Shabab, the stronger
evidence indicated that women are, in fact, allowed to undertake employment in
Al-Shabab areas, particularly where they are the breadwinners and the
consequences of any other attitude would be to make the woman and her family
utterly destitute. The evidence on forced marriages was too exiguous to draw
any meaningful conclusion. There was, however, evidence that in certain
Al-Shabab areas at least women were compelled to dress in a way that involved
them wearing hoods and extremely heavy clothing such that, as Ms Short
submitted, it would be in itself inhuman treatment to expect a woman to do any
kind of activity during a Somali summer.
469. The evidence that this
is what women are, in fact, required to do by Al-Shabab was, however, somewhat
sparse and contradicted, both by the photographic evidence to which Mr Eicke
drew our attention as well as by the evidence of women being able to work and
look after their families, and the evidence regarding the significant journeys
made on foot by women seeking respite from the drought. None of the news
reports to which our attention has been drawn mentioned such women claiming to
have been compelled to dress in the way just described. We accordingly conclude
that a female returnee to an Al-Shabab area from the United Kingdom is not
reasonably likely to face treatment that is materially different from that
faced by a man.
470. We do not find the
evidence shows that a returnee from the United Kingdom runs any significant
risk of forced recruitment into the ranks of Al-Shabab. Mr Burns’ evidence was
to the effect that such recruitment was not common and the latest evidence
tends to support his view. Nor do we consider that a returnee from the United Kingdom would be at any greater material risk as a result of a perception that he or
she would have money, whether or not from United Kingdom Government sources.
Indeed, we are not persuaded at all by the expert evidence, which sought to
suggest that there was some degree of animosity as between current residents in
Somalia and the Diaspora. On the contrary, the evidence points to an
extremely strong degree of connection between the two groups, not least
financially. There is only very limited evidence that Al-Shabab has
successfully stopped people from using mobile telephones etc. in order to get
funds, and we do not consider it can be said that there is a reasonable
likelihood of a person returning to an Al-Shabab area being identified as a
returnee on the basis of his or her use of a mobile telephone.
471. Our conclusions on
this issue are, accordingly, with some nuances very much like those of the
ECtHR in Sufi & Elmi: in general, a returnee with no recent
experience of living in Somalia would be at real risk of being subjected to
treatment proscribed by Article 3 in an Al-Shabab controlled area. We consider
that “no recent experience” in this context means that the person concerned
left Somalia before the recent rise of Al-Shabab, and its territorial gains in
the region, which occurred in 2008. This does not, however, mean that a person
with such recent experience will be unable to make good a claim to
international protection. Even in such a case, the person concerned will, of
course, be returning from the United Kingdom, with all that that may entail.
However, in general it will be less likely that such a person would be readily
identifiable as a returnee. Even if he or she were, the evidence may point to
him or her having struck up some form of accommodation with Al-Shabab, whilst
previously living under their rule
472. Although having family
in the Al-Shabab area of return may, depending on the circumstances, alleviate
the risk, the rotating nature of Al-Shabab leadership and the fact that
punishments are meted out in apparent disregard of local sensibilities mean
that, in general, it cannot be said that the presence of family is likely to
mean the risk ceases to be a real one.
473. We consider that the
general findings we have just made encompass those who are reasonably likely to
have to pass through Al-Shabab areas. Although the evidence regarding
behaviour at checkpoints was mixed, and we accept that in some areas, such as
the Afgoye Corridor, there has been (at least until very recently) considerable
traffic to and from the Al-Shabab-controlled area, the unpredictability of
Al-Shabab behaviour, the extremely grave and immediate likely consequences of
being categorised as a spy and the assumption that one of the functions of
checkpoints is to serve what Al-Shabab regards as its security concerns, point
clearly towards including travellers within the general finding, just as the
ECtHR did at [277] of Sufi & Elmi.
Humanitarian situation
474. We have considered in
Part H of this determination the judgment of the ECtHR at [278] to [283] of Sufi
and Elmi and its use of MSS v Belgium and Greece. In essence, the
use which the ECtHR made of that case was that because Greece was responsible
for the Article 3 infringement on its own territory, (not least because it had
detained the applicant but also because of the way of life to which it
effectively condemned him after release), there was no need, when assessing
whether Belgium had breached Article 3 by removing the applicant to Greece, to
apply the “very exceptional” test or standard found in the case of N v
United Kingdom.
475. At [282] of Sufi
& Elmi, the Court found that if “the dire humanitarian conditions in
Somalia were solely or even predominantly attributable to poverty or to the
state’s lack of resources to deal with a naturally occurring phenomenon, such
as drought, the test in N v United Kingdom may well have been considered
to be the appropriate one”. The Court, however, found that the drought was
only a contributory factor to the humanitarian crisis, which was “primarily due
to the direct and indirect actions of the parties to the conflict”.
476. As we have already
held, whilst we consider it right to have close regard to the Court’s findings
of fact, to which it then applied its jurisprudence, we are in no sense bound
by section 2 of the 1998 Act or its attendant domestic jurisprudence to make
the same findings of fact.
477. On the evidence before
us, we conclude that it is not the actions of the parties to the conflict which
have caused the state of famine in southern and central Somalia and the present international humanitarian crisis but, rather, the worst drought there has
been for 60 years. Although the effects of the drought have been noticeable
for some time, and discussed in previous country guidance cases, the
predominant factor behind the decision of families to leave their homes and
trek long distances, in often appalling conditions, either to Mogadishu or to
neighbouring countries, has been because their livestock have perished, and
their subsistence farming is no longer sufficient to support them. It is
impossible to accept the suggestion that the parties to the conflict have
caused a breakdown in infrastructure, which has led these families to leave.
478. There is no suggestion
that, even before the Somalia civil war started in the 1990s, there was much in
these areas by way of infrastructure. There is more force in the point that
systems of clan support have broken down as a result of the fighting and still
more force in the submission that the activities of Al-Shabab, not least in
prohibiting foreign non-Muslim aid, have made the situation worse. But, the
fact remains in our assessment that it is the drought that is the predominant
cause of what the world was witnessing in Somalia in the summer of 2011.
479. In so finding we have
had regard to the very latest evidence, including the observations of Professor
Menkhaus, that Somaliland is also affected by the drought but has avoided
famine because it has social peace and governance. But the requirement of
“predominant cause” cannot be so easily satisfied; and the evidence points to
that cause being a natural one, albeit helped on by human beings. Thus, for
example, the UN Secretary General’s report referred to deforestation exacerbating
peoples’ vulnerability to drought and flood.
480. This does not,
however, mean that, because they are not a predominant cause, the direct and
indirect actions of the parties to the conflict fall to be left out of account
in deciding whether the humanitarian conditions in southern and central Somalia are such as to bring Article 3 into play. On the contrary, as we have already
indicated, it seems to us that those actions have a very real role in the
assessment of whether, in terms of the law as set out in N v United Kingdom, the present situation is one of those “very exceptional cases” in which
humanitarian conditions trigger Article 3. Looking at the evidence in this
holistic way, we find that the present situation in southern and central Somalia is, indeed, one of those “very exceptional cases”.
481. In so finding we have
reminded ourselves of Mr Eicke’s submissions, as recorded in Part H, which were
effectively reiterated in the respondent’s October written submissions, to the
effect that one must beware of diluting the N test by bringing into
account such things as the incompetence or corruption of a government of a
State, as a factor in making its inhabitants more prone to the effects of
climate and disease, than are those in the developed world. There are,
regrettably, very many countries whose system of government could be said to
aggravate the adverse effects of natural phenomena. But it is the very
prevalence of such cases that, we consider, answers Mr Eicke’s objection: they
are not capable of underpinning a finding that a “very exceptional” situation
exists.
482. The contrast between
such cases and that of southern and central Somalia is stark, as the evidence
shows. A test founded on exceptionality must still be capable of being met;
otherwise it is bogus. We consider that the widespread famine, unique to our
planet at the present time, coupled with the exacerbating factors we have
described, discloses a situation of sufficient exceptionality to cross the
threshold set in N. It is this mix of factors that makes the situation
exceptional, not the predominance of the parties’ actions that causes the
threshold to be lowered.
483. We need to say
something about the position of IDPs and IDP camps. In Sufi & Elmi,
the ECtHR regarded the Afgoye Corridor as, in effect, one large IDP camp, in
which conditions for the majority of IDPs were such as to engage Article 3.
The Court reached that conclusion in part by a comparison with the Dadaab Camps
in Kenya, about which there was more background evidence [291].
484. In their closing
submissions of July, the appellants drew attention to what our predecessor
tribunals have said about the likely situation of a person, displaced by
fighting, having to subsist in a Somali IDP camp. We agree with what was there
said. It is, nevertheless, important to observe that the ECtHR appears, on the
evidence before it, impliedly to have accepted that the Afgoye Corridor
settlement is not a place where every inhabitant, or even everyone who might be
designated an IDP, is at real risk of Article 3 violations. At [286] the Court
relied upon evidence that IDPs were “experiencing increasing difficulties in
finding shelter in the Afgoye Corridor as landlords are either selling land
that IDPs live on or are charging rent that they cannot afford”. There was
similar evidence before us.
485. The inexorable
conclusion from this is, of course, that the Afgoye Corridor, the satellite
photographs of which do indeed indicate significant recent expansion and
ordering, is a place where persons of varying economic means live. The
evidence regarding commuting between the Afgoye Corridor and Mogadishu, for the
purpose of conducting business in the city, is not compatible with a blanket
finding that everyone in the Afgoye Corridor settlement is effectively
destitute. That is so, notwithstanding the recent designation of famine in such
camps. These are places where the appellants’ own evidence indicates that there
is food to be had, albeit at a high price. We find that, as with the Dadaab
Camps, there are various kinds of persons who may be labelled IDPs. Some of
these – indeed, it would seem a significant number – have achieved some form of
socio-economic security, enabling them to buy land and undertake businesses. It
is, however, highly likely that, for many more, life remains highly precarious,
and the famine conditions have made matters worse than they were before.
486. Our conclusion on the
humanitarian position in southern and central Somalia (excluding Mogadishu) is as follows. Like the ECtHR at [296] of Sufi & Elmi (but by a
different route) we have concluded that as a general matter a returnee who
would find themselves in an IDP camp, following a return to southern and
central Somalia at the present time, would be at real risk of exposure to
treatment contrary to Article 3 on account of the humanitarian conditions
there.
487. However, we go further.
Given the severe nature of the humanitarian crisis, worse even than when the
ECtHR considered the position, a person who would in normal conditions have had
the ability to go to his or her home village, which is unaffected by the
fighting but which is within an area in which there has been a declaration of
famine, should at present and as a general matter be assumed to face in that
village the kind of desperate situation as is disclosed in the background
evidence, with the result that, lacking means of sustenance, he or she would
have to try to take refuge somewhere else, such as many thousands of others are
doing. Leaving aside for this purpose the issue of Al-Shabab, we do not
consider that even the possible availability of the United Kingdom Government
money for return (as to which there is an evidential dispute) is likely
materially to affect the position in this regard. In areas where there simply
is no food, having money is unlikely to put a person in a better position;
everyone in such areas is reasonably likely to be reliant on international aid.
(We note Professor Menkhaus’ comment that “there is food on the market in much
of Somalia”, but we are here considering a rural person, where the only food
was from the land and that land is now barren.) Thus, although we have, like
the Strasbourg Court, used the likelihood of ending up in an IDP camp as a
general touchstone for Article 3 harm, the basic position is, rather, that the
generality of those hypothetically removed to southern and central Somalia at
the present time will face Article 3 violations by reason of the humanitarian
conditions prevailing in the region.
488. It is necessary to
emphasise that these are general findings. There may be cases where
the evidence indicates that a person is from, say, a town in southern and
central Somalia (other than Mogadishu) where the drought is having less of an impact
than in the countryside, and where a person has family or clan support. If the
town in question is under Al-Shabab control, there are likely to be other
problems, as we have indicated above. But, purely by reference to the
humanitarian position, such a person would, nevertheless, be returnable without
Article 3 breach. Judicial fact-finders will need to be satisfied that the
evidence supports such a conclusion (see further paragraphs 503 to 507 below).
489. The likelihood of going
to an IDP camp in the Afgoye Corridor may not involve an Article 3 risk, even
given the present humanitarian position, where the person concerned is not
reasonably likely to find themselves at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder
but, rather, is someone who owns property and has a business. That is highly
unlikely to be the case, however, with a person who has been in the United Kingdom for any significant length of time. Indeed, absent special factors, such a
person is highly likely to be in a vulnerable position in such a camp,
notwithstanding money from the United Kingdom government.
490. Finally, it is
necessary to make it clear that the generalised Article 3 risk, which exists by
reason of the famine, is likely to be temporary in duration. The international
effort seen in the past months has undoubtedly begun to make an impact; and it
is to be hoped and expected that, once the dangers of the rainy season are
passed, the humanitarian position will reach the point where the exceptional “N
situation” is over. As we have said in relation to the conflict in Mogadishu, judicial fact-finders will need to have close regard to whether the evidence
shows a sufficient change to depart from our findings on this particular issue.
Even then, however, absent some more fundamental change in the picture, there
are still likely to be Article 3 issues if, notwithstanding the end of the
famine, the potential returnee is still reasonably likely to end up at the
bottom of the socio-economic ladder in an IDP camp.
(c) Refugee Convention
491. As can be seen from
Part H of this determination, the subject of living under Al-Shabab control
gave rise to a number of legal submissions from the parties. The appellants
were keen, in oral evidence, to assert they had genuine religious differences
with Al-Shabab, stemming from their different interpretation of the Muslim
faith. The submission made in consequence was that, even if the appellants,
following return to an Al-Shabab area, were able to “play the game” demanded by
Al-Shabab, they would nevertheless suffer a violation of their right to freedom
of religion. They also asserted that they had a conscientious, if not
religious, objection to paying Al-Shabab “taxes”.
492. At Part M of this
determination, we set out our findings as to the credibility of the evidence of
the appellants on these and other issues.
493. Whilst we do not rule
out the possibility of a person suffering a flagrant breach of his or her right
to freedom of religion, as a result of finding themselves having to obey the norms
imposed by those who follow a far stricter (indeed, in the view of the person
concerned, abhorrent) version of the same basic religion, the kinds of
requirements imposed by Al-Shabab, about which we heard evidence, objectionable
as many of them are, do not readily lend themselves to such a conclusion.
However, as we have indicated in Part H, the question of whether the Refugee
Convention is engaged in practice is unlikely to turn on such matters, and does
not in the case of the present appellants. It is abundantly plain from the
evidence, that Al-Shabab’s reasons for imposing its requirements and
restrictions are religious. It is also plain from the evidence that those who
transgress and are punished are regarded by Al-Shabab, not merely as people who
have transgressed what it sees as its laws, but who have thereby demonstrated
that they remain in a state of kufr (apostasy), as described in the
International Crisis Group report. This is not to say that every such
punishment by every Al-Shabab member in every place will be so motivated; but
it is, on the evidence, likely enough to constitute a real risk.
494. There is, accordingly,
the required religious element under Article 1(A) of the Refugee Convention,
existing in the potential refugee; namely, imputed religious opinion.
495. The remaining issue,
therefore, is whether there is a real risk that the punishment inflicted will
be sufficiently serious to satisfy Article 9 of the Qualification Directive.
On the basis of the evidence we have seen, we are fully satisfied there is a
real risk that it would be.
496. At this point, the
principle in RT (Zimbabwe) locks firmly onto the factual/legal matrix
and provides the answer to the question of whether those returnees who, for
whatever reason, would be able to “play the game” and who are reasonably likely
to do so, nevertheless fall to be treated as refugees. On the basis of RT (Zimbabwe), they do. We remind ourselves of what the Court said at [36]:-
“36. It
may be said that there is marked difference in seriousness between the impact
of having to lie on isolated occasions about political opinions which one does
not have, and the ‘long-term deliberate concealment’ of an ‘immutable
characteristic’, involving denial to the members of the group their ‘fundamental
right to be what they are’ (see per Lord Hope para 11, 21). We are not
persuaded, however, that this is a material distinction in this context. The
question is not the seriousness of the prospective maltreatment (which is not
in issue) but the reason for it. If the reason is political opinion, or
imputed political opinion, that is enough to bring it within the Convention. In
this case, we are concerned with the ‘imputed’ political opinions of those
concerned, not their actual opinions (see para 4 above). Accordingly, the
degree of their political commitment in fact, and whether political activity is
of central or marginal importance to their lives, are beside the point. The ‘core’
of the protected right is the right not to be persecuted for holding political
views which they do not have. There is nothing ‘marginal’ about the risk of
being stopped by militia and persecuted because of that. If they are forced to
lie about their absence of political beliefs, solely in order to avoid
persecution, that seems to us to be covered by the HJ(Iran) principle, and does not defeat their claims to asylum.”
497. As for the issue of
Al-Shabab “taxes”, we have already indicated that we agree with Mr Toal’s
submission that, whilst a genuine conscientious objection to such payment is a
prerequisite for the purposes of the Refugee Convention, in practice it would
take little to persuade a judicial fact-finder that someone did indeed find it
genuinely against their conscience to make financial contributions, however
unwillingly, to a proscribed terrorist organisation, such as Al-Shabab. Having
said that, however, we do not believe that the present appellants have any such
genuine objections (see Part M below).
(3)
Internal relocation
498. As we have explained
in Part H(4) of this determination, we do not find that any formal burden of
proof rests on the respondent to show that internal relocation is reasonably
available to an appellant. Depending on the nature of the case, however, the
respondent may (indeed, usually will) be required to raise the issue, so as to
put it “in play” in any appellate proceedings, but it is then for the appellant
to discharge the burden, as part of the requirement to prove, to the lower
standard, that he or she is entitled to international protection. What sort of
evidence will be required to demonstrate that it would not be reasonable to
expect the person to relocate will, of course, depend on all the circumstances.
(a) To Mogadishu
499. In the light of our
earlier findings regarding Mogadishu, that persons currently there are, as a
general matter, running an Article 15(c) risk, it would plainly be unreasonable
to expect a person whose home is elsewhere in southern and central Somalia to relocate to Mogadishu. The limited qualification we have made to the assessment of
Article 15(c) risk is highly unlikely to have application to a person whose
home area is not Mogadishu because the necessary accommodation and social
support to alleviate the risk of indiscriminate violence are unlikely to be
available.
500. Another factor in
assessing the reasonableness of relocation to Mogadishu is the present
humanitarian situation in the city, including the state of famine that has been
declared in the IDP camps. A person with significant contacts may be able
(absent Article 15(c) issues) to avoid having to live in such a camp and thus
have a viable relocation alternative.
(b) To an IDP camp in
the Afgoye Corridor
501. On the basis of our
earlier findings, it would, as a general matter, be unreasonable/unduly harsh
to expect a returnee to live in an IDP camp, unless there was evidence that he
or she would be able to achieve the lifestyle of those better-off inhabitants
of the Afgoye Corridor settlements. That would depend, we consider, on the
returnee having family or other significant connections with such better-off
elements. In the absence of these, we do not consider that even the likelihood
of United Kingdom money for the returnee would be enough to eliminate the risks
inherent in IDP camps, including threats against the person. This is, of
course, particularly relevant in the case of a female returnee.
(c) To an area
controlled by Al-Shabab
502. For the reasons we
have already given, a returnee from the United Kingdom to an Al-Shabab area,
certainly if he or she had no history of having lived under Al-Shabab in that
area, faces at the present time a real risk of serious harm. Internal
relocation to such an area is, accordingly, out of the question. Although
Al-Shabab appears to be losing ground outside Mogadishu to the TFG, it still
remains dominant in large parts of southern and central Somalia.
(d) To an area not
controlled by Al-Shabab
503. As we have found, the
current humanitarian crisis in southern and central Somalia is, at present, in
general sufficiently grave as to engage Article 3. It therefore follows that
internal relocation to a place stricken by famine or near-famine would not be
possible, even if that place is not under the control of Al-Shabab.
Nevertheless, we have found that there are certain exceptions to the Article 3
risk, as regards a person’s home area in central and southern Somalia (paragraph 468 above).
504. Although a person
returning to a place that was his or her former home is likely to be in a
better position than someone who has not previously lived there, the importance
of clan connections remains, as it did in AM & AM, notwithstanding
the enormous strains placed on the clan system. Landinfo (June 2009) suggested
that clan protection “is still relevant, albeit primarily in relation to
ordinary crime” and that clans continue to be important in relation to where a
person flees. The evidence of Tony Burns suggested this was true even in
Al-Shabab-controlled areas. The Landinfo report quoted one source as follows:-
“Scarce resources and
natural disasters such as floods and droughts limit the possibility for and
willingness to support new arrivals in an area, even where they belong to the
same clan. However, great efforts are still made to help relatives and
neighbours. …it is common to find families consisting of six to eight members,
opening their homes to a further six to eight relatives. They share the little
they have, but without the money transfers from abroad, the already difficult
living conditions would be significantly worse for the large majority of the
population.”
505. Population movement
tracking reports from UNOCHA estimate the numbers of journeys carried out on
the basis of seeking clan/social support. Monthly figures range between 11,000
and 22,000 but with 69,000 in January 2010 and 48,000 in March 2010. Albeit
looking at a slightly earlier time, the Danish Immigration Service in 2007
recorded an international organisation as saying that “any Somali has the
opportunity to attain security within his or her clan. This is even applicable
if a person does not have any close relatives in the country. As long as a
person is living inside the traditional area of the clan he or she enjoys the
protection of that clan.”
506. A senior researcher in
the Institute for Security Studies, reporting on 11 July 2011, stated that, following the failure of the Somali state “over the years, a variety of local and
smaller government structures have emerged in that country – as opposed to
large-scale actors – which are often to a considerable extent effective in
governing smaller parts of the country. In recent times, what has emerged
along the coast could be likened to a loose bunch of city states.”
507. A person who has a
clan or strong family connection with a particular area in south or central Somalia, not controlled by Al-Shabab, particularly a town, may, in the light of all this,
have an internal relocation alternative to that place. In the light of the
present humanitarian crisis, the cogency of the indicators pointing to such a
position would need to be powerful. However, as the nature of that crisis
diminishes, as we all hope it must, the importance of such an internal
relocation alternative is likely to grow. The same is true if Al-Shabab
continues to lose territory to the TFG/AMISOM and/or those aligned with them.
(4)
Travelling home or to another place of safety
508. In AM & AM,
the Tribunal considered that the method and route of return of the appellants
to their respective home areas were not legally relevant to the Tribunal’s task
of determining their entitlement to international protection. That approach
was questioned in HH & Others and we have concluded that, in the
present appeals, the issue of risk whilst travelling home or to another place
of safety is one which we need to address in order to decide the appellants’
claims to international protection.
509. To this end, we
received a good deal of evidence and submissions regarding methods and routes
of return, including from Mogadishu to the appellants’ home areas (in those
cases where that was different). In all five cases, the respondent’s intention
is that the appellant should be returned to Mogadishu. Precisely the same
stance was taken by the respondent in Sufi & Elmi, notwithstanding
that Sufi came from Qoryoley, a town under Al-Shabab control, and Elmi from
Somaliland [302] [311]. The ECtHR at [311] was clearly puzzled as to why the
respondent was not proposing to return Elmi to Hargeisa, the main town of Somaliland. The Court thought that her decision not to do so appeared to contradict the
assertion that Elmi would, in fact, be admitted to that self-governing area.
As we have already seen, appellant ZF, despite her protestations to the
contrary, has in practice been held to come from Somaliland. The respondent’s
stance was, in effect, that it was up to appellant ZF, if she saw fit, to get
from Mogadishu to Somaliland. It is, however, for the Tribunal to decide
whether it is reasonably likely that she will suffer serious harm getting
there. If she would, appellant ZF would be entitled to international
protection, subject to the issue of being able to live elsewhere in Somalia. In this regard, Article 8 of the Qualification Directive is not apt to exclude an
assessment of “risks to life and limb”, as opposed to mere “technical obstacles
to return” (QD [83]).
510. The same is true of
appellant AMM (who comes from Jowhar) and appellant MW (who comes from Merka)
and, indeed, of the other appellants, who need to get from Mogadishu
International Airport, the point of return, to the city of Mogadishu.
511. We have already made
findings regarding the risk to a person of having to traverse an Al-Shabab
area. It is, however, necessary at this point to say a little more on the
issue. Mr Eicke submitted that there was no evidence that every person passing
through an Al-Shabab checkpoint, even on a temporary basis, would be stopped
and mistreated if they were, for example, a man without a beard. He also
emphasised the evidence of Mr Burns that the main risk at checkpoints was the
payment of tolls. Dealing with travel from Mogadishu to Somaliland, Mr Eicke
submitted that the evidence from the UNOCHA and the UKBA fact finding report
indicated that many IDPs travelled to Somaliland, where they were referred to
as “refugees”; and that overland routes included travelling via Afgoye, Beled
Weyne, Galkayo, Las Anod and Burao (Microcon – June 2009 – Anna Lindley). The
Anna Lindley report also indicated that the evidence did not show a risk for
southerners at checkpoints in Somaliland. The Nairobi evidence contained a
statement by an individual, who had escaped from Al-Shabab and yet was able to
travel through areas where there must have been Al-Shabab checkpoints.
512. Mr Burns considered
that taking an overland route from Mogadishu to Somaliland would be
unimaginable, or, as recorded by Mr Schwenk, “insane”. Those comments were,
however, according to the respondent, from people who had no first-hand
knowledge of conditions en route. We deal below with how one might gain
entry to Somaliland, once at its borders, including the issue of the type of
passport a person who is not actually being returned by the respondent to
Hargeisa might need, in order to get him to Somaliland.
513. Mr Schwenk criticised
the respondent’s reliance on the Lindley report. He said it was concerned with
those fleeing the then present Ethiopian forces and that the majority of those
covered by the report were travelling in family/clan groups. Even then, the
report demonstrated that there were serious problems for those travelling.
Many of the poorest people found themselves walking large segments of the
journey and many described it as “the worst time in their life”. Some had to
endure considerable hardship, walking for days with little or no food or water,
as well as being prey – if women – to sexual violence which appeared to be
“very common”.
514. The respondent also
relied on AM (Evidence – route of return) Somalia [2011] UKUT 54 (IAC)
which held, relying on the UKBA fact finding report, that Al-Shabab checkpoints
“are generally well disciplined and their concern is whether travellers comply
with the rules and norms of behaviour required”.
515. We do not consider
that the Lindley report has a material bearing on the issue. It was compiled
before the full emergence of Al-Shabab in its present form. It is clear that
the main informants were parts of what appear to have been significant groups
of people, moving north in order to find refuge. There is no evidence to
suggest that, if appellant ZF were to embark on the journey, she would be able
to move in such a group. In any event, it is evident that such group movements
run the real risk of enduring considerable vicissitudes.
516. So far as Al-Shabab is
concerned, as is already evident from our findings, a distinction needs to be
drawn between people passing through checkpoints, who are long-term residents
of Somalia, and those who have been living in the West for any significant
period of time. The evidence that we have had the benefit of considering is
far greater than that available to the Tribunal in AM [2011].
517. We do not consider
that the risks to travellers, particularly women, are likely to be materially
alleviated by travelling in a minibus or other form of transport, operated by a
person who has never been away and “knows the ropes”. Using such a form of
transport may, we accept, be of assistance; but the combination of the
unpredictability of Al-Shabab behaviour and the evidence of their brutality,
when they take against an individual, is such as to constitute a real risk.
518. Whilst being in the
presence of a male minibus driver, or similar, might facilitate travel by a
single woman, it does not significantly alter either the general risk we have
just described or the specific risk of sexual violence towards women.
519. Although we have
concentrated on appellant ZF, the findings we have made regarding travel also
apply to those, such as appellant MW, who might be travelling from Mogadishu to destinations within central or southern Somalia. A judicial fact- finder
would need to be satisfied that the person concerned could, in fact, travel
home or to the other proposed place of safety, without going into an
Al-Shabab-controlled area. Even then, the position for unaccompanied women is
likely to be severely problematic, compared with, say, a young, able-bodied
man.
520. The overwhelming
message from the evidence before us is that it is sufficiently safe to travel
from Mogadishu International Airport into the city. TFG/AMISOM control the
road. Although there was some evidence of problems, including IEDs, the risk
run in travelling along the road, in any form of transport, does not constitute
a real risk of serious harm, including Article 15(c) risk. The latter risk
arises by reason of being in the city.
521. So far we have dealt
with overland travel. A striking feature of the evidence before us, however,
and one which may well have implications for future Somali appeals, was the
availability and relative safety of air travel within Somalia (including, for this purpose, Somaliland).
522. Flying into Mogadishu International Airport is sufficiently safe. This was the clear import of the
evidence, both written and oral. Dr Hammond’s description of problems at the
airport and of aircraft adopting a certain trajectory in order to avoid arms
fire, was at variance not only with the evidence we heard but also the findings
in HH and AM & AM. The airport area itself is, and long has
been, under the control of TFG/AMISOM. We were not provided with any evidence
to suggest that commercial aircraft are at real risk of being shot at whilst en
route to other airports in Somalia.
523. Informants told the
UKBA’s Fact-Finding Mission that air travel within Somalia was common. We were
presented with no evidence from the appellants to indicate the contrary. The
FFM team were told that, as well as regular flights between Mogadishu and Nairobi, there were flights to Hargeisa from Nairobi and flights from Djibouti to Berbera ( Somaliland). African Express, Puntair, Juba and Dalow all operated flights in
Somalia. A security adviser said that “people travel regularly within Somalia by land and by air. Most airports are operational, mainly with charter flights and
it is possible to fly to Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Garowe, Galcayo and Bossasso.”
524. If, in a hypothetical
case, the respondent is able to point to evidence that the returnee can fly
from Mogadishu International Airport to a town in central and southern Somalia, the focus of the appeal may well be upon the person’s hypothetical situation in
that town, rather than on any problems accessing it by an overland route. This
was not, however, the position in the present appeals, where there is no
suggestion that appellant AMM could fly to Jowhar or appellant MW to Merka
(both of which are, in any event, currently controlled by Al-Shabab). Nor was
it suggested that either they or appellants FM and AF (who come from Mogadishu) could fly to some other place in central or southern Somalia.
(5) Somaliland and Puntland
525. These appeals were not
earmarked as potential vehicles for giving country guidance on the position
within Somaliland or Puntland. However, subject to what we will say in a
moment, it appears to be accepted by the respondent that “the authorities in Somaliland, like the authorities in Puntland, would only admit those who originated from
the territory or those who had close affiliation to the territory through clan
membership. In Somaliland, the majority clan was the Isaaq” (Sufi &
Elmi [103]). The ECtHR was there citing what it regarded as evidence from
the respondent’s Operational Guidance Note on Somalia of 1 July 2010. Whilst we take the view (as the Tribunal did in EM & Others) that Operational
Guidance Notes are not, as such, evidence, it is nevertheless possible to have
regard to them as an indication of the respondent’s view of the available
evidence. Indeed, an examination of the OGN of March 2009, included in the
evidence of the appellants, makes it plain that the respondent’s views in this
regard are rooted in the COIS Report on Somalia. There is, accordingly, no
evidential basis for departing from the conclusion at [101] of NM and others,
that Somaliland and Puntland
in
general only accept back persons who were former residents of those regions and
were members of locally based clans or sub clans. The Netherlands Ministry of
Foreign Affairs report of November 2004 notes at paragraph 4.6 that UNHCR is
encouraging the return of Somalis originating from Somaliland and Puntland
’Originating from’ is interpreted here to mean ‘having previously lived
there for some time (more than a year)’” (original emphasis).
526. In closing written
submissions, the respondent appeared to suggest that appellants FM and AF,
neither of whom had been found to have any link with Somaliland or Puntland,
could nevertheless find refuge in one of those areas, on the basis that “once a
person is not believed on the question of their clan there remains a
hypothetical case that they could in fact find assistance (either clan-based or
any other) in those other regions”. As far as we are aware, this suggestion
was not put to either of the appellants by the respondent, when they gave
evidence (either in the current proceedings or in previous ones). In Part J of
this determination, we shall have more to say about the relationship between
our country guidance and a Somali appellant who is found not to be credible.
In the present appeals, however, the submissions at [395] and [400] of the
respondent’s closing submissions came far too late in the day to have any
material part to play.
527. Nevertheless, as a
general matter it is interesting to observe the close connection between the
area known as Somaliland and the United Kingdom, in the context of Somali
immigration to this country. In the “Cash and Compassion” report, we find the
following:-
“3.2 United Kingdom
Current estimates of the
number of Somalis living in the UK range from 95-250,000. The official 2001
census reported a population of 43,000 (Casciani, 2006). The 2006 Annual
Population Survey (APS) gives a figure of 82,300. However, neither of these
figures include Somalis born in the UK or in any country outside Somalia. The census figures from 2001 suggested 89% of all Somalis were living in London, but this percentage is almost certainly lower now as a result of the dispersal
policy. Large Somali communities have developed in Bristol, Manchester, Birmingham, and Leicester, among other places.
The UK’s Somali population is older and better established than in many other European countries. The
first Somalis to settle in the UK were seamen from Somaliland who [were] in the
British merchant navy, and settled in coastal areas such as Cardiff, Bristol and Liverpool during the early 1890’s (Change Institute 2009:24). During World
War 2, Somalis served with the British navy, and some took up residency in the UK to obtain employment, particularly in Sheffield and South Yorkshire (Ibid, citing Halliday
1992:1B). The post-war economic boom in the UK also drew Somalis; the
Somalilander community in London’s East End (one of the areas with the largest
concentrations of Somalilanders in the UK) formed during this period (Bradbury
2008:175). Only since the weakening and eventual collapse of the government of
Somalia at the end of the 1980’s – early 1990s has the population included
large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers. Today Somalis are consistently
among the top ten countries generating asylum seekers to the UK.”
528. In the light of this
connection, it is not unreasonable to hypothesise that some of those who arrive
in the United Kingdom seeking international protection from alleged harm in
southern and central Somalia are, in reality, persons from, or otherwise having
a strong connection with, Somaliland. Indeed, that is precisely the position
with appellant ZF. Where the respondent has reason to believe that an asylum
seeker may come from Somaliland (or Puntland) it is open to the respondent to
test that assumption, for example, by means of linguistic analysis. Once the
issue has been put in play, usually in the respondent’s letter of refusal, the
claimant will need to address the issue in any subsequent appellate
proceedings.
529. Where the respondent
contends that a claimant is, in fact, from Somaliland or Puntland, the issue as
to how that person is supposed to get there safely becomes highly material. As
we have already explained, the whole nature of Somali cases involving claims to
international protection is such that issues of safety on return are integral
to the Tribunal’s determination of entitlement to such protection. The form of
international protection, for these purposes, may include that under the
Refugee Convention, even where the person concerned would not have a
well-founded fear in his or her home area ([26] and [27] of AM & AM,
approved in [59] of HH & Others).
530. We have to say that we
are at something of a loss to understand the respondent’s position regarding a
person such as appellant ZF or Elmi in Sufi & Elmi. Although the
evidence points firmly towards them having the requisite degree of connection
with Somaliland and facing no real risk of serious harm, if returned to that
region, the respondent has chosen to put her case on the basis that return will
be to Mogadishu International Airport. The ECtHR in Sufi & Elmi
thought that this decision might, in fact, point towards Elmi not being able to
get into Somaliland. That certainly does not appear to be the case with
appellant ZF, where the respondent has argued forcefully that appellant ZF
could travel to Somaliland by land or air. In either case, she would have to
do so on her own, in the sense that the respondent presumably considers that
her obligations regarding return cease when appellant ZF has left Mogadishu International Airport. Given, however, that there are flights from Nairobi to Hargeisa, Somaliland (albeit stopping at Mogadishu), it is at first sight hard
to see why the respondent could not propose to return appellant ZF to
Hargeisa. Mr Burns appeared to accept that the Somaliland authorities would be
prepared to accept a person travelling on an EU travel document; but, because
of the respondent’s stance, we did not hear sufficient evidence or submissions
on the matter to make any proper findings on this issue. In any event, once a
case reaches this point, it is likely that Article 8(3) of the Qualification
Directive becomes relevant. This provides that the power of Member States in
Article 8(1), to determine that a person is not in need of international
protection “if in a part of the country of origin there is no well-founded fear
of being persecuted or no real risk of suffering serious harm and the applicant
can reasonably have been expected to stay in that part of the country”, may
apply “notwithstanding technical obstacles to return to the country of
origin”. In HH & Others the Court of Appeal found at [83] that the
ambit of Article 8(3) was “probably confined to administrative difficulties
such as documentation”, as opposed to risks to life and limb, in getting to the
place in question. Thus, it would seem that difficulties regarding the
documentation required to satisfy the Somaliland authorities would not, in such
a scenario, entitle a claimant to succeed.
531. For the appellants, it
was submitted that Article 8 of the Qualification Directive was confined to the
issue of internal relocation; that is to say, where a person has established a
well-founded fear in one part of a country and the issue is whether he or she
could find safety in another part. The wording of Article 8(1) is, however,
plainly wide enough to encompass the case of a person who has no well-founded
fear in the home area but whose case depends upon establishing a real risk of
harm en route. In HH & Others, the Court of Appeal, whilst
considering that Article 8 was “to do principally with internal relocation”
made no finding that it was confined to such a situation. Nor is there anything
in the Qualification Directive itself to suggest that Article 8 is so
restricted. Article 8 is entitled “Internal protection”, not “Internal
relocation” or “Internal flight”. It is difficult to see how, as a matter of
logic or principle, a person should have a greater entitlement to international
protection if their home area is not the place where they have a
well-founded fear, compared with where the home area is the place of
well-founded fear.
532. It may be that the
respondent’s stance, both as regards Elmi and appellant ZF, is driven by the
difficulty of getting the Somaliland authorities to accept the return of anyone
from the United Kingdom to their area. An insight into the somewhat fraught
relationship between those authorities and the respondent is provided by
reading the judgments in R (on the application of) MH v SSHD [2010] EWCA Civ 1112, concerning a claim of unlawful detention brought by a person from
Somaliland, whom the respondent had not been able to return there. But, as we
have indicated, from the point of view of an entitlement to international
protection under the Refugee Convention or the Qualification Directive, such
problems could well be said to be “technical obstacles” within Article 8.
533. In the case of
appellant ZF, as we have seen, the respondent’s stance is that appellant ZF
will be returned to Mogadishu. There is no suggestion on the respondent’s part
that appellant ZF will land there, in possession of an EU travel document. In
order to persuade the Somaliland authorities to let her in to their self-proclaimed
state, she will, accordingly, need to procure something called an “old green
passport”.
534. We heard a great deal
of evidence and submissions about old green Somali passports. Before the
collapse of the Siad Barre regime, the Somali government of that time issued
passports, which were bound in green covers. The TFG does not recognise such
passports and has its own forms of official international travel
documentation. The authorities of Somaliland, however, do not recognise TFG
passports; instead, they continue to recognise the old green Somali versions.
535. This, of course,
presents a difficulty for a person, such as appellant ZF, who does not (or does
not any longer) have an old green passport. The solution, according to the
respondent, is to go to Bakara Market (or, perhaps, a market in the Afgoye
Corridor, following the recent closure of Bakara) and buy such a passport on
the “black market”. Although not a legitimate international document, such a
passport will be good enough to secure admission to Somaliland.
536. The appellants do not
contend that this hypothesis is factually wrong. On the contrary, Mr Burns
confirmed that it was possible to purchase such a passport in the manner
described. What the appellants contended was that the procurement and use of
such a passport would be a criminal offence in the United Kingdom and that
neither appellant ZF nor anyone in the same position should be expected to have
to obtain such a passport in order to gain entrance to Somaliland.
537. In R v Horseferry
Road Magistrates Court ex-parte Bennett [1993] UKHL 10, the House of Lords
was concerned with whether the trial for criminal offences of Mr Bennett should
be halted on the basis that he had been unlawfully abducted from a third
country (South Africa). The House of Lords allowed Mr Bennett’s appeal on the
basis that the judiciary had a responsibility for the maintenance of the rule
of law that embraced the willingness to oversee executive action and to refuse
to countenance behaviour that threatened either basic human rights or the rule
of law, such as did a criminal trial where the defendant was only present
because he had been illegally abducted, with the apparent collusion of United
Kingdom police. Appellant ZF submitted that, by the same token, any removal
which relied upon her committing an unlawful act could not itself be lawful.
The Identity Documents Act 2010, section 4, created a criminal offence of
possession of a false identity document with improper intention. A person
guilty of an offence under the section was liable to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding ten years or to a fine (or both). This reflected the serious way
in which Parliament viewed offences regarding such documentation. R v Singh
[1999] 1 CR APP R (S) 490 reinforced the fact that a passport was an important
document and that it was necessary for the integrity of passports to be
maintained. It was, accordingly, a serious offence knowingly to use a false
passport, whatever the precise nature of the offence charged in relation to
that activity. A similar point was made in R v Adekunle Adebayo [2007] EWCA Crim 878.
538. The appellants also
relied upon R v Uxbridge Magistrates, ex-parte Adimi [1999] EWHC Admin 765, which concerned the operation of Article 31 of the Refugee Convention in
the context of prosecutions under United Kingdom law for using false travel
documentation. Article 31 provides that Contracting States “shall not impose
penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who,
coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened …
enter or are present in their territory without authorisation, provided they
present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for
their illegal entry or presence”.
539. We are not persuaded
that the use by a person of an unofficial document, of the kind with which we
are concerned, in order to access Somaliland, falls to be discounted, as the
appellants assert, on the basis of illegality. The Bennett case involved
a quite different factual matrix. There were plainly serious public policy
concerns about allowing a person to be tried in the United Kingdom for a
criminal offence, when the United Kingdom authorities had been complicit in his
illegal removal from a third country to this one. Likewise, Adimi
involved Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, which is not in issue in the
present proceedings. So far as the Serious Crime Act 2007 is concerned, we did
not hear anything approaching adequate submissions on this issue. In
particular, we did not receive any submissions regarding the extraterritorial
reach of the Act (as to which Schedule 2 is relevant); nor as to relevant
defences. The assertion that the respondent would be committing a criminal
offence under section 44 of the 2007 Act in removing an appellant to Mogadishu, where the respondent intends the appellant to obtain false travel documentation,
is an issue that might need to be fully addressed in some other appeal. For
the reasons we will shortly come to, however, the matter does not arise in the
present proceedings; and we in fact doubt whether it will prove a key issue in
other cases.
540. We do, however, feel
that we should say the following. We very much doubt that entitlement to
international protection under the Refugee Convention or the Qualification
Directive will often turn upon whether the claimant, if returned to the country
of his or her origin, would be reasonably likely to do something which, if done
in the United Kingdom, might constitute a criminal offence. In very many parts
of the world, what would be regarded in this country as criminal bribery (and
what may well be regarded as such in the country in question) is in practice an
accepted part of everyday life. It is, of course, properly arguable that a
society where bribery is likely to be determinative of whether someone will
avoid serious harm is a place where the actions of the State are so arbitrary
or otherwise extreme as to give rise to a real risk, in any event. But in other
cases the picture may be more complex; and the fact that a person would, if in
this country, be committing an offence under our criminal law is not per se
determinative of the issue of international protection. Thus, a person in a
developing country who is working in the informal sector, as a street trader,
may on occasion have to bribe local officials in order to remain in business.
If judicial fact- finders were required to exclude from their deliberations the
possibility of a person returning home to work in the informal sector, on the
basis that he or she cannot be expected to pay a bribe, then the ambits of both
the Refugee Convention and the Directive will, at a stroke, have been
substantially enlarged. We doubt whether those who brought those international
instruments into being did so on the basis that this would be the result.
541. Mr Schwenk sought to
pray in aid RT (Zimbabwe); but we do not consider that the ratio of that
case has any relevance in answering the question whether a person can be expected
to act illegally. There is no Refugee Convention reason (such as actual or
imputed political opinion), which provides a nexus between the refusal to do an
illegal act and the harm which may ensue. The street trader, who refuses to
bribe the local official and, as a result, loses his market pitch, is not being
persecuted for a Refugee Convention reason; he is being punished for not paying
a bribe. The same would be true if the official’s response was to inflict
ill-treatment on the trader.
542. So far as the old
green passports themselves are concerned, regardless of the fact that appellant
ZF might, if she was within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, be
committing a criminal offence, there is no evidence before us to lead to the
conclusion that buying such a passport in a market in southern Somalia is a
criminal offence under the rule of the TFG or that, even if it is, the matter
is regarded by them as in any way serious. So far as the authorities in Somaliland are concerned, plainly old green passports are regarded as legitimate.
543. There is a somewhat
spurious element to the appellants’ submissions on the “legality” issue of the
old green passport, given the current circumstances in Somalia. In short, the Tribunal concludes that these “legal” objections are unfounded.
544. But, once we turn from
the law to the facts, it is frankly surreal of the respondent to expect
appellant ZF, a 67 year old woman with no recent experience of living in the
Horn of Africa, to disembark at Mogadishu International Airport, travel into
the city of Mogadishu to Bakara Market (assuming it is open), look for an old
green passport there, or travel to a market in the Al-Shabab-controlled Afgoye
Corridor, if, as might be the case, the vendors of such passports have
relocated there, and then either return to Mogadishu International Airport in
order to fly to Hargeisa, or else undertake a journey by land to Somaliland.
The respondent did not, in fact, energetically advance the option of going back
to the airport, preferring instead to look in detail at the evidence regarding
land journeys, including those undertaken by refugees, moving in groups to Somaliland, and to the evidence of minibuses, which Mr Burns contradicted. We shall have
more to say on this when we look in detail at appellant ZF’s appeal in Part L
of this determination. As a general matter, however, we conclude that, at the
present time, it will in most cases be impracticable for returnees to obtain
old green passports in southern and central Somalia, in order to make the
journey to Somaliland, because of the dangers involved in acquiring such
documentation.
545. This is so, whether or
not there are in Mogadishu members of the Isaaq clan, which is the majority
clan or ethnic group in Somaliland. Having noted what Mr Burns and Dr Hammond
said, and having regard to the written evidence, we find that it is highly
likely that there are, in fact, members of the Isaaq clan present in Mogadishu,
albeit not in great numbers. We accept, however, the appellants’ evidence
that, any such Isaaq are unlikely to be favourably disposed to the Somaliland
authorities and, for that reason, to have much to offer by way of assistance to
a person arriving in Mogadishu who wishes to go to Somaliland.
546. We have already considered
the position of those who, according to the more recent evidence, have been
seeking to move from the south into Somaliland and Puntland, as refugees. We
do not consider that this evidence casts any doubt on the general position we
described at the beginning of this section, regarding the sorts of persons whom
the authorities in Somaliland and Puntland would be willing to see admitted,
particularly in the context of those coming from the United Kingdom. Insofar
as those from the south are concerned, without clan or family connections, they
will be treated as IDPs and be likely to find themselves in IDP camps, the
conditions of which have in the past been categorised as very poor and which
there is no evidence before us to indicate have subsequently improved. Thus,
if appellant ZF or others in her position were to succeed in reaching the
borders of Somaliland or Puntland, without the likes of an old green Somali
passport, they are likely to be treated as another IDP. However, it is also
clear that Somaliland “is less susceptible to widespread humanitarian
emergencies than the rest of Somalia” (Rightnet Independent Analysis: Somalia:
A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment, August 2003), as, indeed, the map
showing the degrees of problem occasioned by the 2011 emergency attest, as does
the evidence of desperate pastoralists from the south making their way to
Somaliland.
(6)
Female genital mutilation
547. According to the
Population Reference Bureau (2010), drawing on figures from 2006, the incidence
of FGM in Somalia is 97.9%. Broken down by region, urban regions stand at
97.1% and rural at 98.4%. The lowest region is 94.4% and the highest 99.2%.
Other similar studies show a fractionally lower rate but it is universally
agreed to be over 90%. 96.7% of women are cut before the age of 19, according
to the PRB. 66% of those not cut by then will be by the age of 39. Thus, Ms
Short submitted, a female in Somalia was not safe even if she reached adulthood
uncut. Cutting can take place at any time from the age of 3.
548. The background
evidence indicates that the predominant type of FGM in Somalia is “pharoanic”,
categorised by the World Health Organisation as Type III, narrowing the vaginal
opening through the creation of a covering seal by cutting and repositioning
the labia minora and/or the labia majora, with or without removal of the
clitoris (infibulation). Mr Burns, however, gave evidence that, whilst outside
the main cities, FGM was almost 100% pharoanic, into which category he would place
MW’s home of Merka, in the cities he considered it was now 90% “sunna. When I
say “sunna”, I mean anything from partial infibulation to small cuts, depending
on the family’s preference.” Al-Shabab were opposed, according to Mr Burns, to
the pharoanic form but did say that women should practise the “sunna” form.
549. Not surprisingly, in a
country with such high rates of FGM, the societal requirement for any girl or
woman to undergo it is strong. Dr Hammond gave evidence that in some cases the
extended family could take the girl to be circumcised without the knowledge of
consent of the mother if it was suspected the mother might object. Appellant
MW, if returned, would have to seek to survive within her “clan matrix” where
she “would come under heavy pressure to have any female daughter circumcised.
She would have a say in the decision to circumcise or not, but if she was
relying on a female or clan member that had a strong predilection to
circumcise, then [appellant MW] would find the daughter circumcised – even
without her consent.” Mr Burns considered that if a woman opposed circumcision
it would “still almost certainly happen at the hands of female family members
who would put pressure on the mother and even resort to having the girl
circumcised when the mother is temporarily absent. Even the daughter of some
of the nurses working in our clinic and who oppose FGM have been taken and
circumcised by female relative[s] while their mothers were at work.” According
to another witness statement “What happens all the time is that cutting is
arranged by a child’s grandmother, aunt, or other family members regardless of
the attitude of the mother. This even happened in my own family.” There was
other written evidence before us to similar effect.
550. In the conditions
pertaining in Somalia, Ms Short submitted that it would be impossible for a
mother to conceal the fact that her daughter had not undergone FGM. Mr Burns’
evidence was that family members would know “almost straightaway. Her female
family members would ask, other girls would ask her daughter.” Other
statements from those with experience in Somalia were to similar effect,
including those from Sahra Moallim: “Girls will find out whether other girls
have been cut. It is something they talk about among themselves a lot. Girls
show their cut genitalia to one another when they go to the toilet. If a girl
does not show herself or if she refuses to show herself then it will be known
that she has not been cut.”
551. Ms Short relied upon
the US State Department Somali Report on FGM or FGC, together with the evidence
of Mr Burns and Ms Moallim, as indicating that there had been no abatement in
the risk to females, despite the actions of civil society. Thus, the USSD
concluded that a campaign launched within Somalia prior to the overthrow of
Siad Barre fell away with the collapse of the Somali state. Ms Moallim, for
her part, was currently campaigning to have FGM included among the violations
of human rights based on the agenda of a Somali version of the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was being talked about in Somalia. She had, however, met with much resistance from Somali human rights
organisations, which indicated the depth of a Somali’s attachment to the
practice of FGM.
552. As in other countries
where the practice is widespread, in Somalia FGM is regarded as a rite of
passage, upon which a girl’s future marriage prospects depend (Almroth
2005:14). The USSD Report recorded that many Somalis mistakenly viewed the
procedure as a religious obligation; but the concept of “family honour” was
also involved, with FGM being intertwined with notions of virginity. A woman
active in Somali human rights work opined that “a lot of Somali people
mistakenly believe that it is un-Islamic for girls not to undergo FGM”. There
was thus, according to Dr Mullen, “tremendous social pressure for families to
conform to this practice both in Europe and in Somalia. Dr Hammond agreed that
“social pressure to have the procedure done to one’s daughters is very strong
in Somalia, as an uncircumcised woman is often not considered to be
marriageable and to bring shame on her family”. According to Ms Moallim a
woman who resisted having her daughter cut would be seen as rejecting Somali
tradition and as importing “gaallo (non-believer) ideas into Somalia, as having abandoned her religion and as preventing her daughter from following her
religion”.
553. The respondent
submitted that the evidence did not, in fact, show that in general a mother
opposed to FGM would be incapable of withstanding societal pressures to have it
done to her daughter. Reliance was placed on para 2.19 of the COIS Report on
Somalia, where a Somali woman was recorded as stating that she was able to
withstand pressure from her mother-in-law to have her daughter circumcised,
albeit that the informant’s refusal led to her husband divorcing her and
cutting off contact with his daughters. Despite this making life “hard in the
camp” for the informant, she stated that she would never go back on it, despite
the fact that the girls were “often bullied in school”. The informant’s
biggest fear was that “someone from my family will take my daughters one night
and try to circumcise them. I have no protection and no man in my life to
protect us.”
554. Perhaps more helpful
to the respondent’s case was the Landinfo report on female genital mutilation
of December 2008 which recorded that “certain trends indicate a positive shift
with regard to general mutilation in Somalia”. According to this, the custom
is mainly a female affair and the young generation of men between 15 and 26 do
not regard FGM to be a prerequisite for marriage. Somali sources referred to
“a claim that given the fact that men comply with the decisions women make, it
should be possible for mothers to oppose FGM”. By contrast, however, the World
Bank and other sources emphasise that men “carry major responsibility for the
continuation of the practice”. For a majority of the population, FGM remained
a prerequisite for marriage, with prospective husbands demanding a circumcised
wife. Since payment of a dowry is still common, the fathers of daughters
played a key role in encouraging FGM, in order to get the dowry.
555. The same report
asserted that girls who had not been circumcised could in fact hide the fact
that they were uncircumcised until they got married. Girls who were not
infibulated “might experience harassment and teasing and might encounter
difficulties in becoming married”.
556. The respondent noted
the evidence of Mr Burns in cross-examination that if the woman’s sub-clan was
indifferent to FGM, a mother’s wish would be respected. Nor was there any
evidence, according to the respondent, of Al-Shabab enforcing FGM, albeit that
they did not actively prohibit it.
557. It is, of course,
established law that FGM “constitutes treatment which would amount to
persecution within the meaning of the Convention”, whatever form of it is
practised and that, having regard to the sexually discriminatory nature of the
practice, its infliction upon a woman engages the Refugee Convention by
reference to the “particular social group” category (K and Fornah v
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 46).
Notwithstanding the interesting evidence about Somali men complying with the
decisions that women make, we can see no reason to refuse to find the relevant
PSG in Somalia, when it has been found in all the other African countries in
which the Tribunal or the higher courts have had occasion to examine the
matter.
558. Likewise, we have no
difficulty in finding that a Somali mother may suffer persecution and treatment
in breach of her own Article 3/15(b) rights if her daughter is subjected to FGM
against the mother’s wishes. As the AIT found in FM (FGM) Sudan CG
[2007] UKAIT 00060:-
“Given the first
appellant’s abhorrence of FGM, any infliction of it upon either of her
daughters is, we find, reasonably likely to have so profound an effect upon the
first appellant as to amount to the infliction on her of persecutory harm. In
the light of our finding as to the nature of the particular social group in the
present case, it follows that the first appellant is at real risk of
persecution for a Refugee Convention reason (Katrinak v Secretary of State
for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 832: Recital 27 to Council
Directive 2004/83/EC).”
559. This point is also
borne out in the UNHCR’s Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Female
Genital Mutilation (May 2009):-
“11. The
parent could nevertheless be considered a principal applicant where he or she
is found to have a claim in his or her own right. This includes cases where
the parent will be forced to witness the pain and suffering of the child, or
risk persecution for being opposed to the practice.
12. Even
where the parents have been in the country of asylum for some time, a
well-founded fear on behalf of the child or because of the parents’ own
opposition to FGM can arise upon the birth of a daughter post-flight. The fact
that the applicant did not demonstrate this conviction or opinion in the
country of origin, nor act upon it, does not itself mean that a fear of
persecution is unfounded, as the issue would not necessarily have arisen until
then. The birth of a daughter may, in these circumstances, give rise to a sur
place claim. If it is held that the opposition or fear of FGM is a mere
artifice for the purpose of creating grounds for asserting a fear of
persecution, a stringent evaluation of the well-foundedness of the fear is
warranted. In the event that the claim is found to be self-serving, but the
claimant nonetheless has a well-founded fear of persecution, international
protection is required.”
560. The prevalence of FGM
in Somalia is, we find, so great that an uncircumcised, unmarried Somali woman,
up to age 39, will in general be at real risk of suffering FGM. The risk will
obviously be at its greatest where both parents are in favour of FGM.
Conversely, where both parents are opposed to it, the question of whether the
risk will reach the requisite level will need to be determined by reference to
the extent to which the parents are likely to be able to withstand what are, as
a general matter, strong societal pressures (from both men and women) in
Somalia for the procedure to be carried out on their daughter. Unless the
parents are from a socio-economic background that is likely to distance them
from mainstream social attitudes, or there is some other particular feature of
their case (such as living in a place where – exceptionally - an anti-FGM
stance has taken hold) the fact of parental opposition may well as a general
matter be incapable of eliminating the real risk to the daughter that others
(particularly relatives) will at some point inflict FGM on her.
561. At this point, it is
necessary to say something more about the issue discussed in Part H of this
determination, regarding the entitlement to international protection of a
mother whose claim to be opposed to FGM has been disbelieved. Ms Short
submitted that, even if the Tribunal were not to believe her client’s account
of objection to having her daughter subjected to FGM, and even where appellant
FM might “consent to” or “promote” her daughter being cut this “may still
amount to persecution as it is discriminatory social and cultural determinants,
rather than true free will that determine a girl being cut. In that context,
the purported wishes of the mother do not support a lack of persecutory anguish
since she can be harmed even by submitting to the torture of her daughter.”
562. As we stated in Part H,
we do not consider that, notwithstanding its status as a “living instrument”,
the Refugee Convention can be construed as affording refugee protection to a
person who is in favour of inflicting harm on another, whether or not the
societal and religious background of that person might be responsible for her
having that wish, and whether the harm is inflicted by that person or by
someone else, with her approval.
563. In her closing
submissions, Ms Short urged us to find that, even in the case of Somali women
who acquiesce in or promote FGM on their daughters, this merely “reinforces
their powerlessness in a persecutory patriarchal male-dominated society. It is
telling that support for FGM is negatively correlated to education, reaffirming
the intersection of all forms of discrimination, disempowerment and violence
against women” ([82] of written closing submissions).
564. In this regard, Ms
Short sought to rely on Shah and Islam v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [1999] UKHL 20, where Lord Hoffman found that the causal
requirement in Article 1(A) of the Refugee Convention could be satisfied either
by the persecution or the lack of protection being “for reasons of” a
Convention ground. That is, of course, so; but it does not meet the issue with
which we are concerned, where the person who will be immediately responsible
for the harm is seeking refugee protection by reference to that very harm.
565. Ms Short also relied
on HJ (Iran). However, to rely on this judgment is, we consider, to
seek to invert the findings that the Supreme Court made. Appellant MW’s social
and cultural background may explain why she would cause her daughter to be
circumcised. But appellant MW is still the person causing the serious harm to
a member of a particular social group by reason of that membership and, thus,
committing an act of persecution for the purposes of the Refugee Convention.
What Ms Short was in effect asking us to do was to adopt a degree of cultural
relativism that is not to be found in the Refugee Convention, let alone in HJ
(Iran). For example, Article 1(F), which excludes from protection those
who have committed various serious crimes, contains no reference to exculpatory
factors stemming from the perpetrator’s social or other background. It is also
difficult to see how Ms Short’s case could be brought within Article 1(A) of
the Refugee Convention, since the applicant who wishes to inflict the harm does
not have a “fear” of persecution, whether or not that fear – if it existed –
would be well-founded.
566. We spoke in Part H of
a spectrum of cases, of which true willingness, albeit stemming from social
conditioning, stands at one extreme, just as the case of duress stands at the
other. In the context of Somalia, the evidence, as we have indicated, suggests
in general that there will be a very high degree of societal pressure. In
particular, the evidence of Mr Burns and others that mothers who refuse to have
their daughters circumcised could well fall outwith the ambit of any clan
protection strikes us, in the present circumstances, as likely to be highly
significant for the mother, raising the spectre of destitution, at least in
some cases. Furthermore, although there is some indication that, amongst
younger Somali men, the position might be changing, the preponderance of the
evidence still points towards an uncircumcised woman having poor prospects of
marriage. The socio-economic fears that that may engender in the mother are
also, as a general matter, likely to be great.
567. Accordingly, we consider
that it would be open to a judicial fact-finder, in such circumstances, to find
the Refugee Convention engaged in the case of a mother who was genuinely
strongly opposed to inflicting or procuring FGM on her daughter but who, on the
evidence, was reasonably likely, sooner or later, to countenance it, as the
lesser of two evils.
Part J
ASSESSING THE NEGATIVE PULL OF LIES: MA (SOMALIA)
568. In his submissions on
behalf of the UNHCR, Mr Hickman dealt in some detail with the judgment of the
Supreme Court in MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2010] UKSC 49. MA was a citizen of Somalia, a member of the Isaaq clan who
came here illegally in 1995 and in 1998 was sentenced to eight years’
imprisonment for rape and indecency with a child. The ensuing legal
proceedings concerning the respondent’s attempt to deport MA were protracted,
but on 1 July 2009 the AIT dismissed MA’s appeal. That decision was reversed
by the Court of Appeal in HH & Others (MA being one of the “Others”)
but restored by the Supreme Court.
569. MA (Somalia) is
of general importance, dealing as it does with the frequently-encountered
question of to what extent an appellant who has been found to have told lies
should have that finding held against him or her, in determining entitlement to
international protection:-
“21. …
The task of sorting out truth from lies is indeed a daunting one. It is all
too common for the AIT to find that an appellant’s account is incredible. And
yet there may be objective general undisputed evidence about the conditions in
the country to which the Secretary of State wishes to send the appellant which
shows that most of the persons who have the characteristics of, or fall into
the category claimed by, the appellant will be at real risk of treatment
contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR or persecution for a Refugee Convention
reason (as the case may be), but that a minority of these, because of special
circumstances, are not subject to such risk.”
570. In GM (Eritrea) and
Others [2008] EWCA Civ 833 the Court of Appeal addressed the case of an
Eritrean asylum seeker, who had not been found credible as to her claim to have
left Eritrea illegally, but where the background evidence indicated that only
limited classes of person were allowed to leave that country legally. At [53]
Laws LJ (with whom Dyson LJ agreed) held that the fact that it was reasonably
likely that any 17 year old girl from Eritrea, about whom nothing else relevant
was known, left the country illegally “does not entail the conclusion that this
particular 17 year old girl did so. The reason is that the probability
that a particular person has or has not left illegally must depend upon the
particular facts of her case… There may indeed be a general probability of
illegal exit by members of a class; but the particular facts may make all the
difference.”
571. At [54] Laws LJ held
that the “position would only be otherwise if the general evidence was so solid
as to admit of only fanciful exceptions”. At [31] of MA (Somalia), Sir
John Dyson considered that what “Laws LJ was saying at para 54 was that, where
a claimant tells lies on a central issue, his or her case will not be saved by
general evidence unless that evidence is extremely strong. It is only evidence
of that kind which will be sufficient to counteract the negative pull of the
lie.” Much, however, depended on the bearing that the lie had on the case. It
was for the Tribunal to decide what weight to give to the lie, as well as to
all the other evidence in the case, including the general evidence [32]. As
was made plain in the context of criminal law in R v Lucas [1981] QB
720, the judicial fact-finder had to be alive to the fact that “people lie for
many reasons” [32]. Thus, “the significance of lies will vary from case to
case” [33].
572. The Supreme Court
found that the Court of Appeal was wrong to find that the AIT had not, in fact,
followed the approach articulated, that dismissing an appeal because a person
had lied, without more, would be wrong. The Supreme Court further held that
the AIT had not overlooked the fact that MA had spent the last twelve years in
prison and administrative detention in the United Kingdom, which was a relevant
factor in deciding whether he could now avail himself of clan contacts in Mogadishu.
573. Mr Hickman submitted
that MA (Somalia) made it clear that a Tribunal should adopt the
following approach:-
“First, it should decide on
the evidence and circumstances other than the evidence given by the
individual concerned what the likelihood is of him or her being without
sufficient protection if returned to Place A (evidence A);
Secondly, the Tribunal
should consider whether the individual’s evidence establishes a reasonable
possibility that he or she has no protection on return to Place A (evidence B);
and
If the individual has told
a lie about his or her connections to Place A, this may be of ‘no great
consequence’ or it may suggest (to a greater or lesser extent) that he or she
does benefit [from] protection in Place A and is trying to conceal it. In this
latter situation the lie will have a ‘negative pull’ as evidence that such
protection exists … and the Tribunal must consider whether it is sufficient to
undermine the other evidence (including the statistical likelihood), i.e. Evidence
A, that the individual is not able to benefit from protection on
return.” (Mr Hickman’s emphases)
574. Thus, the UNHCR
contended, it is clear that the mere fact a person has told a lie about their
connections in Mogadishu is not a sufficient reason for holding that they would
benefit from protection if returned as the Tribunal must (1) consider the other
evidence and (2) assess the significance of the lie, including the precise
nature to which it relates and the possible motives for it.
575. We do not, for our
part, consider that there is much to be gained by seeking to construct a
prescribed set of steps from MA (Somalia), particularly if they might
lead to a “mechanistic” rather than a holistic approach. Fact-finders in this
jurisdiction are well aware of the potential dangers involved in approaching
the evidence before them in a particular sequence, notwithstanding the fact
that one “must start somewhere”.
576. It is, of course,
axiomatic that the Tribunal will need to be satisfied that the appellant has,
in fact, told lies, whether to it or to the respondent. As the Supreme Court
indicates at [31] to [33], the significance or “negative pull” of the lie will
possibly depend not only on the strength of the background evidence but on
whether the lie – looked at in its own terms – is about an issue that is
central to the disposition of the appeal. Thus, the Supreme Court approved
what the Court of Appeal at [104] of GM had said about the case of
another Eritrean appellant, namely, that it “might understandably carry far
less weight” because the lie was in fact against the interests of the
appellant. It should also be observed, however, that those who sit in this
jurisdiction are familiar with cases where a person tells lies about issues
which that person thinks are important for his claim when, whether because of
the passage of time or otherwise, they are not. In such a circumstance, it
will be open to the Tribunal, given the earlier lies, to approach with caution,
the appellant’s evidence regarding matters which are central to his current
claim.
577. It will be for
judicial fact-finders to decide, on the basis of the totality of the evidence
before them, whether, to the extent that this country guidance remains
authoritative (in terms of Practice Direction 12), the case before them is one
where, notwithstanding an appellant’s lies, it would be “fanciful” to conclude
that the appellant falls within one of the various exceptions we have
identified in the country guidance in the preceding Part of this
determination. We should, however, refer back to what we have said earlier
regarding the respondent’s closing submissions, which were to the effect that
someone who is found to have told lies about his or her experiences in southern
or central Somalia has failed to discharge the burden of showing that they are
not, in reality, from Somaliland or Puntland. In short, the issue of coming
from Somaliland or Puntland will need to have been “in play” in the appellate
proceedings.
578. So far as concerns an
ability to live in Mogadishu at the present time without Article 15(c) risk,
the exception we have identified (paragraphs 357 - 358 above), though
undoubtedly limited, we do not regard as inherently fanciful. Whether it
becomes such in the context of a particular case will depend on all the
circumstances.
Part K
SUMMARY OF LEGAL FINDINGS
579. At this point, it is
probably helpful to gather together and summarise the various legal findings we
have found it necessary to make in the course of determining these appeals.
580. Whilst section 2 of the
Human Rights Act 1998 and its associated case law requires United Kingdom
tribunals in general to give effect to the jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights, including that Court’s guidance on how to approach evidence in
international protection cases, the weighing of evidence and the drawing of
conclusions as to the relative weight to be placed on items of evidence adduced
before a United Kingdom tribunal are ultimately matters for that tribunal. Whilst
the factual finding the Strasbourg Court has made as a result of applying its
own guidance is something to which the domestic tribunal must have regard,
pursuant to section 2, it is not bound to reach the same finding (paragraphs
97 – 123).
581. There is nothing
jurisprudentially problematic with the Strasbourg Court’s judgment in Sufi
& Elmi, as regards Article 3 of the ECHR. The Court’s finding, that the
predominant cause of the humanitarian crisis in southern and central Somalia
was due to the current warring parties, meant that the high threshold
(identified, inter alia, in N v United Kingdom) for finding an
Article 3 violation in the case of naturally occurring phenomena did not need
to be met (paragraphs 124 – 130).
582. That high threshold
is, however, still capable of being crossed in cases of sufficient
exceptionality. In deciding what constitutes an exceptional case, regard must
be had to all the factors, including the actions of the parties to a conflict,
albeit that those actions are not the predominant cause of the humanitarian
crisis (paragraphs 131 - 132 and 474 – 482).
583. Despite the suggestion
in the judgment in Sufi & Elmi that there is no difference in the
scope of, on the one hand, Article 3 of the ECHR (and, thus, Article 15(b) of
the Qualification Directive) and, on the other, Article 15(c) of the Directive,
the binding Luxembourg case law of Elgafaji (as well as the binding
domestic authority of QD (Iraq)) makes it plain that Article 15(c) can
be satisfied without there being such a level of risk as is required for
Article 3 in cases of generalised violence (having regard to the high threshold
identified in NA v United Kingdom). The difference appears to involve
the fact that, as the CJEU found at [33] of Elgafaji, Article 15(c)
covers a “more general risk of harm” than does Article 3 of the ECHR; that
Article 15(c) includes types of harm that are less severe than those
encompassed by Article 3; and that the language indicating a requirement of
exceptionality is invoked for different purposes in NA v United Kingdom
and Elgafaji respectively (paragraphs 328 – 335).
584. Article 10 of the
Qualification Directive requires the holding of some sort of belief, comprising
a coherent and genuinely held system of values, whether these be theistic,
non-theistic or atheistic, and is not satisfied in the case of a person who
holds no such belief. Social restrictions, such as bans on watching football or
television, do not comprise an interference with the right to religion, in the
case of a person whose religious etc beliefs do not require him or her to
participate in those activities. It is immaterial that a person may be
permitted, according to those beliefs, to participate in the activities
concerned.
585. Even where the
motivation for a law is religious, the religious aspect will not, without more,
lay the basis of a claim to international protection in relation to anyone who
might fall foul of that law. However, the more such religiously motivated laws
interfere with someone’s ability to hold and practise their religious or other
beliefs, the more intense will be the scrutiny.
586. The necessary
religious element to satisfy Article 1(A) of the Refugee Convention is not
satisfied solely by reference to the persecutor; but that element can be
satisfied if the persecutor ascribes to the victim a perceived religious
opinion (paragraphs 190 – 199).
587. There is no general
legal principle that, in determining a person’s entitlement to international
protection, the Tribunal must leave out of account any possibility of that
person’s carrying out an act in the country of proposed return, which – if
carried out in the United Kingdom – would constitute a criminal offence. A
genuine conscientious objection to complying with unjust laws or demands may,
however, provide an entitlement to such protection (paragraphs 200 – 206 and
536 - 543).
588. On the assumption that
Al-Shabab’s likely behaviour towards those who transgress its rules is as found
in this determination, the position is as “extreme” as the factual basis in RT
(Zimbabwe). In the light of RT, a person from an Al-Shabab area who
can show they do not genuinely adhere to Al-Shabab’s ethos will have a good
claim to Refugee Convention protection, once outside Somalia (subject to
internal relocation and exclusion clause issues), regardless of whether the
person could and would “play the game”, by adhering to Al-Shabab’s rules. As
can be seen from a comparison with Sufi & Elmi, the effect of RT
is, accordingly, to take the Refugee Convention beyond the comparable ambit of
Article 3 ECHR protection (paragraphs 207 – 217 and 491 to 496).
589. There is no legal
burden on the Secretary of State to prove that there is a part of the country
of nationality etc of an appellant, who has established a well-founded fear in
their home area, to which the appellant could reasonably be expected to go and
live. The appellant bears the legal burden of proving entitlement to
international protection; but what that entails will very much depend upon the
circumstances of the particular case. In practice, the issue of internal
relocation needs to be raised by the Secretary of State in the letter of
refusal or (subject to procedural fairness) during the appellate proceedings.
It will then be for the appellant to make good an assertion that,
notwithstanding the general conditions in the proposed place of relocation, it
would not be reasonable to relocate there. In an Article 3 claim, a similar
position pertains, in that, although the test of reasonableness/undue harshness
does not formally apply, unduly harsh living conditions etc – albeit not
themselves amounting to a breach of Article 3 – may nevertheless be reasonably
likely to lead to a person returning to their home area, where such a breach is
reasonably likely (paragraphs 218 – 227).
590. An appellant who
pursues their appeal on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds, following a
grant of leave, is entitled to have their appeal decided on the hypothetical
basis (if the facts so demonstrate) that family members would be reasonably
likely to return with the appellant and that potential harm to those family
members would cause the appellant to suffer persecution or Article 15(b) harm (paragraphs
228 – 237).
591. A person is not
entitled to protection under the Refugee Convention, the Qualification
Directive or Article 3 of the ECHR, on the basis of a risk of harm to another
person, if that harm would be willingly inflicted by the person seeking such
protection (paragraphs 238 – 240 and 561 – 567).
592. Article 8(1) of the
Qualification Directive provides that Member States may determine that a person
is not in need of international protection “if in a part of the country of
origin there is no well-founded fear of being persecuted or no real risk of
suffering serious harm and the applicant can reasonably be expected to stay in
that part of the country. Article 8(3) states that Article 8(1) applies
“notwithstanding technical obstacles to return to the country of origin”.
Although the Court of Appeal in HH & Others found that Article 8 was
“to do principally with internal relocation”, there is nothing in that judgment
or in the Qualification Directive that demonstrates the Article is so confined,
and it would be illogical for it to be so. Accordingly, difficulties in
securing documentation to effect a return to a person’s home area may not
entitle that person to international protection, whether or not there are real
risks to that person in some other area of the country concerned (paragraphs
530 - 531).
593. In assessing the
effect of an appellant’s lies (whether to the Secretary of State or a judicial
fact-finder), it is unnecessary to construct a prescribed set of steps from the
judgments of the Supreme Court in MA (Somalia), particularly if they
might lead to a “mechanistic” rather than a holistic approach. The significance
or “negative pull” of the lie will possibly depend not only on the strength of
the background evidence but on whether the lie – looked at in its own terms –
is about an issue that is central to the disposition of the appeal. Where a
person tells lies about issues which that person thinks are important to their
claim but which, because of the passage of time or otherwise, are not, it is
open to the Tribunal, given the earlier lies, to approach with caution the
person’s evidence regarding matters that are central to the current claim (paragraphs
568 – 578).
PART L
COUNTRY
GUIDANCE ON SOMALIA
Mogadishu
594. Despite the withdrawal in early August
2011 of Al-Shabab conventional forces from at least most of Mogadishu, there
remains in general a real risk of Article 15(c) harm for the majority of those
returning to that city after a significant period of time abroad. Such a risk
does not arise in the case of a person connected with powerful actors or
belonging to a category of middle class or professional persons, who can live
to a reasonable standard in circumstances where the Article 15(c) risk, which
exists for the great majority of the population, does not apply. The
significance of this category should not, however, be overstated and, in
particular, is not automatically to be assumed to exist, merely because a
person has told lies.
595. The armed conflict
in Mogadishu does not, however, pose a real risk of Article 3 harm in respect
of any person in that city, regardless of circumstances. The humanitarian
crisis in southern and central Somalia has led to a declaration of famine in
IDP camps in Mogadishu; but a returnee from the United Kingdom who is fit for
work or has family connections may be able to avoid having to live in such a
camp. A returnee may, nevertheless, face a real risk of Article 3 harm, by
reason of his or her vulnerability.
596. Except as regards
the issue of female genital mutilation (FGM), it is unlikely that a proposed return
to Mogadishu at the present time will raise Refugee Convention issues.
Southern
and central Somalia, outside Mogadishu
597. Outside Mogadishu,
the fighting in southern and central Somalia is both sporadic and localised and
is not such as to place every civilian in that part of the country at real risk
of Article 15(c) harm. In individual cases, it will be necessary to establish
where a person comes from and what the background information says is the
present position in that place. If fighting is going on, that will have to be
taken into account in deciding whether Article 15(c) is applicable. There is,
likewise, no generalised current risk of Article 3 harm as a result of armed
conflict.
598. In general, a
returnee with no recent experience of living in Somalia will be at real risk of
being subjected to treatment proscribed by Article 3 in an Al-Shabab controlled
area. “No recent experience” means that the person concerned left Somalia before the rise of Al-Shabab in 2008. Even if a person has such experience,
however, he or she will still be returning from the United Kingdom, with all
that is likely to entail, so far as Al-Shabab perceptions are concerned, but he
or she will be less likely to be readily identifiable as a returnee. Even if he
or she were to be so identified, the evidence may point to the person having
struck up some form of accommodation with Al-Shabab, whilst living under their
rule. On the other hand, although having family in the Al-Shabab area of return
may alleviate the risk, the rotating nature of Al-Shabab leadership and the
fact that punishments are meted out in apparent disregard of local
sensibilities mean that, in general, it cannot be said that the presence of
family is likely to mean the risk ceases to be a real one.
599. Al-Shabab’s reasons
for imposing its requirements and restrictions, such as regarding manner of
dress and spending of leisure time, are religious and those who transgress are
regarded as demonstrating that they remain in a state of kufr (apostasy). The
same is true of those returnees who are identified as coming from the West.
Accordingly, those at real risk of such Article 3 ill-treatment from Al-Shabab
will in general be refugees, since the persecutory harm is likely to be
inflicted on the basis of imputed religious opinion.
600. Although those with
recent experience of living under Al-Shabab may be able to “play the game”, in
the sense of conforming with Al-Shabab’s requirements and avoiding suspicion of
apostasy, the extreme nature of the consequences facing anyone who might wish
to refuse to conform (despite an ability to do so) is such as to attract the
principle in RT (Zimbabwe). The result is that such people will also in
general be at real risk of persecution by Al-Shabab for a Refugee Convention
reason.
601. The same
considerations apply to those who are reasonably likely to have to pass through
Al-Shabab areas.
602. For someone at
real risk in a home area in southern or central Somalia, an internal relocation
alternative to Mogadishu is in general unlikely to be available, given the risk
of indiscriminate violence in the city, together with the present humanitarian
situation. Relocation to an IDP camp in the Afgoye Corridor will, as a general
matter, likewise be unreasonable, unless there is evidence that the person
concerned would be able to achieve the lifestyle of those better-off
inhabitants of the Afgoye Corridor settlements.
603. Internal relocation
to an area controlled by Al-Shabab is not feasible for a person who has had no
history of living under Al-Shabab in that area (and is in general unlikely to
be a reasonable proposition for someone who has had such a history - see
above). Internal relocation to an area not controlled by Al-Shabab is in
general unlikely to be an option, if the place of proposed relocation is
stricken by famine or near famine.
604. Within the context
of these findings, family and/or clan connections may have an important part to
play in determining the reasonableness of a proposed place of relocation. The
importance of these connections is likely to grow, as the nature of the present
humanitarian crisis diminishes and if Al-Shabab continues to lose territory.
605. Travel by land
across southern and central Somalia to a home area or proposed place of relocation
is an issue that falls to be addressed in the course of determining claims to
international protection. Such travel may well, in general, pose real risks of
serious harm, not only from Al-Shabab checkpoints but also as a result of the
present famine conditions. Women travelling without male friends or relatives
are in general likely to face a real risk of sexual violence.
606. An issue that may
have implications for future Somali appeals is the availability of air travel
within Somalia (including to Somaliland). Flying into Mogadishu International Airport is sufficiently safe. There is no evidence to indicate a real risk to
commercial aircraft flying to other airports in Somalia.
Somaliland and Puntland
607. The present
appeals were not designed to be vehicles for giving country guidance on the
position within Somaliland or Puntland. There is no evidential basis for
departing from the conclusion in NM and others, that Somaliland and
Puntland in general only accept back persons who were former residents of those
regions and were members of locally based clans or sub clans. In the context of
Somali immigration to the United Kingdom, there is a close connection with Somaliland.
608. A person from
Somaliland will not, in general, be able without real risk of serious harm to
travel overland from Mogadishu International Airport to a place where he or she
might be able to obtain an unofficial travel document for the purposes of
gaining entry to Somaliland, and then by land to Somaliland. This is particularly
the case if the person is female. A proposed return by air to Hargeisa,
Somaliland (whether or not via Mogadishu International Airport) will in general
involve no such risks.
Female
genital mutilation
609. The incidence of
FGM in Somalia is universally agreed to be over 90%. The predominant type of
FGM is the “pharaonic”, categorised by the World Health Organisation as Type
III. The societal requirement for any girl or woman to undergo FGM is strong.
In general, an uncircumcised, unmarried Somali woman, up to the age of 39, will
be at real risk of suffering FGM.
610. The risk will be
greatest in cases where both parents are in favour of FGM. Where both are
opposed, the question of whether the risk will reach the requisite level will
need to be determined by reference to the extent to which the parents are
likely to be able to withstand the strong societal pressures. Unless the
parents are from a socio-economic background that is likely to distance them
from mainstream social attitudes, or there is some other particular feature of
their case, the fact of parental opposition may well as a general matter be
incapable of eliminating the real risk to the daughter that others
(particularly relatives) will at some point inflict FGM on her.
Part M
Re-making the decisions in the appeals
Appellant
AMM
611. Appellant AMM has been
comprehensively disbelieved in his evidence, save that he comes from Jowhar.
It is common ground that those negative credibility findings stand. Amongst
the undoubted problems with the credibility of appellant AMM is the fact that
he gave a false name to the United Kingdom authorities when he made his third
asylum application. His assertion in oral evidence that he was forced to do so
struck us as absurd.
612. In general, having had
the opportunity of hearing and seeing appellant AMM give oral evidence, we
considered him to be an extremely poor witness. His evidence regarding his
alleged religious differences with Al-Shabab bore every indication of having
been manufactured for the purpose of the present proceedings. He entirely
failed to persuade us that he held any genuine religious or similar beliefs,
which were likely to be stifled, restricted or otherwise interfered with by
Al-Shabab. Appellant AMM is, in short, a cynical opportunist, intent on
securing status in the United Kingdom by any means he considers likely to
achieve that result, regardless of whether those means involve lying. Having
said this, the previous finding, that he is from Jowhar, stands. Jowhar is in
an Al-Shabab-controlled area. We are also prepared, just, to accept that
appellant AMM has been outside Somalia since 2000. He has certainly been here
since 2005 and the respondent does not appear to take issue with the fact that
appellant AMM was rescued in the Mediterranean from a sinking vessel. He has,
accordingly, been away from Somalia for a long time, certainly long before the
rise of Al-Shabab. Appellant AMM’s claim not to know the whereabouts of his
wife and 12 year old child struck us as a further instance of his mendacity,
since he has no doubt calculated that it would be better from his point of view
to assert that he was no longer in touch with them. Given his general lack of
credibility and the ease with which contact can be made over mobile telephones
with those in Somalia, we consider that the truth of the matter is that
appellant AMM’s wife and children are living in Jowhar, and that he knows this
full well.
613. Does the “negative
pull” of appellant AMM’s lies reach the point where it overrides the general
evidence regarding risk to returnees to Al-Shabab areas from the United Kingdom for those who have been away from Somalia for a significant period? The issue is
whether the extreme likelihood that appellant AMM has close family members in
Jowhar would facilitate his return there, removing any real risk that he would
suffer the serious adverse attention of Al-Shabab; in particular, as a
perceived spy. We do not consider that it would. The evidence before us as to
Al-Shabab executions, beatings and so forth, does not disclose that the victims
of these atrocities were lacking family members in the areas concerned. Whilst
it plainly might be possible for appellant AMM’s family to liaise with the then
current Al-Shabab commander, in advance of appellant AMM’s return, the
capricious and unpredictable nature of Al-Shabab rule means that we cannot
conclude that this would eliminate a real risk to appellant AMM. On the
contrary, the highlighting of his having come from the United Kingdom may have the opposite effect.
614. Added to this is the
reasonable likelihood, given the geographic spread of Al-Shabab’s control in
southern and central Somalia, diminishing though it is, that appellant AMM
would have to cross an Al-Shabab area on his way to Jowhar. Even if he has
family etc. in Jowhar, they would be unlikely to be able to smooth his passage
through such intermediary areas. Those operating such checkpoints are
reasonably likely to observe from appellant AMM’s behaviour that he has no
recent experience of Somalia, which may very well lead to him being identified
or at least assumed to be from the West.
615. It is reasonably
likely that any serious harm that Al-Shabab would inflict upon appellant AMM
would be motivated by that organisation’s Manichean view of religion and that
appellant AMM would suffer because – irrespective of his own absence of any
religious belief – he would be perceived as a religious apostate.
616. Although, in view of
that finding, it is immaterial, we did not believe appellant AMM when he sought
to persuade us that he had some kind of conscientious objection to paying taxes
to Al-Shabab. Once again, his oral evidence bore every appearance of being
concocted.
617. The respondent did not
point to any other areas of central and southern Somalia, outside Mogadishu, to which appellant AMM might go, where Al-Shabab are not in control. That there
are such areas is, however, apparent from the evidence. In the circumstances,
we do not consider that appellant AMM could, at the present time, reasonably or
without undue hardship relocate to such an area. The likelihood is, bearing in
mind the current humanitarian emergency, that appellant AMM would struggle to
survive. This is so, notwithstanding the fact that he could avail himself of
an initial £500 and, possibly, a further £1,000, from UKBA’s relocation
package. Coupled with a family or other support network, such as that provided
by a clan, such financial assistance may well render internal relocation
reasonable, according to Januzi standards. On its own, however, we do
not consider that it would, in the case of appellant AMM.
618. Again, despite the
negative pull of his lies, we do not find that, looking at the evidence
overall, appellant AMM has failed to show a reasonable likelihood that,
wherever else he might go in central and southern Somalia, he would have such
family/clan connections.
619. The same is true of
relocation to Mogadishu. We do not consider that the negative credibility of
appellant AMM is so strong as to lead us to conclude that he would be able to
live there in the kind of circumstances we have described as being the current
exception to the general Article 15(c) risk to returnees to that city.
620. Appellant AMM’s appeal
accordingly falls to be allowed on refugee grounds. He is not entitled to
humanitarian protection. His appeal succeeds on Article 3 ECHR grounds by
reference to the risk to him from Al-Shabab.
Appellant MW
621. Appellant MW has not
been found credible in the past, save as to her assertion that she comes from
Merka. In particular, her previous evidence, that she did not know what clan
she was from, is plainly damaging of her credibility, given her background and
continued exposure to Somali culture.
622. Her oral evidence to
us was intensely problematic. Her reply to Ms Short’s question as to what
would happen if she arrived in Mogadishu with her three children, was to state
that “people in Mogadishu did not use pushchairs” and that she would be unable
to carry her three children without one. This reply we consider to be
symptomatic of appellant MW’s lack of inclination to engage seriously with the
appeal process (perhaps because of her recent grant of discretionary leave).
623. What was revealing,
however, was her oral evidence regarding her attitude towards female
circumcision. Appellant MW’s answers are recorded in Appendix 1 to this
determination. We consider that they demonstrate clearly appellant MW’s
acceptance of the practice in Somalia. Indeed, we conclude that the only
factor that would preclude appellant MW from circumcising her daughter in the United Kingdom is the criminal proscription on the practice that exists here. Although, as
we have seen from the background evidence, societal pressures in Somalia to
have FGM performed can be severe, appellant MW’s decision to have her daughter
circumcised would be likely to be made long before any such pressures arose.
624. Appellant MW’s partner
gave oral evidence. Despite his vague assertion that he was taking medication
“for his memory”, with the implication that memory problems had affected his
performance as a witness in the past, it was plain to us that the partner was
merely not a very good liar. It beggars belief that, as he asserted, he was
unaware that he had been found in the past in a judicial context not capable of
being believed. It was also striking that, although he said in evidence that
his clan did not have “any power”, he claimed he did not know what his clan in
fact was. When it was put to him that he had been divorced in the United Kingdom under British law, he replied “what divorce?” His subsequent reply to the
question of how he might not know how to get married and yet knew how to get
divorced was entirely unpersuasive.
625. The partner’s
assertions regarding his attitude to FGM, whilst a little more coherent, struck
us as being more manufactured than genuine. Whilst we accept what Ms Short
said about the position regarding benefits and how, until appellant MW was
granted discretionary leave, there may well have been negative financial
implications for her and her partner to be living together, both she and her
partner exhibited an extremely supine attitude towards this issue. We
certainly did not form the impression that the couple were straining to live
together. We say that notwithstanding the evidence that they now have three
children and that the partner is mentioned on the relevant birth certificates.
626. Having said all this,
we do accept that appellant MW has maternal feelings towards her children and
that, if forcibly removed to Somalia, she is at least reasonably likely to seek
to take her children with her, in order not to be parted from them. We were
presented with no evidence to suggest that her partner or anyone else would, in
those circumstances, seek to prevent the children’s departure with appellant
MW.
627. Accordingly, for the
purposes of section 84(1)(g) of the 2002 Act, we approach appellant MW’s appeal
on the hypothesis that she would find herself in Somalia with her three
children. In such circumstances, it is, we find, possible that her partner
would choose to accompany them; but it is sufficiently unclear to conclude that
there is a reasonable likelihood of MW and her children going to Somalia alone.
628. In view of what we
have found to be the true attitude of appellant MW towards female circumcision,
it is evident that she cannot succeed in showing that she is a refugee on the
basis of the real risk that her daughter would be circumcised. Appellant MW is
highly likely either to be the perpetrator of such mutilation or to procure it
from others (see paragraphs 561 et seq above). We have formed our
conclusions of this aspect of appellant MW’s evidence having regard to the
report of the independent social worker, Ms Cox, who claimed that appellant MW
“became visibly upset when talking about her fear of [b]eing subject to FGM if
she were to return with her to Somalia”. We witnessed no such distress during
the quite lengthy questioning of appellant MW on this issue in the present
proceedings. Whilst we are prepared to accept that this is what Ms Cox saw,
appellant MW’s thorough lack of credibility in other areas of her claim leads
us to conclude that she was seeking to deceive the social worker. What we do
accept, however, as we have said, and as Ms Cox goes on to record, is that
appellant MW “could not consider leaving [the children] in the UK if she was returned to Somalia but equally feared for their safety there”.
629. Leaving aside FGM, in
the light of our findings regarding MW’s maternal feelings, it is plain that
she would be very likely to experience feelings of anguish, amounting to
Article 3 ill-treatment, if she were to see her children severely harmed or
suffering from severe malnutrition, somewhere in southern and central Somalia.
As we have found, the situation in large parts of that region are such as to
make such a fear well-founded. Whilst we accept that appellant MW could well
receive money transfers, not only from UKBA but also from her relative in
Canada, the general insecurity faced by women, with no male protector would, we
find, be significantly aggravated in the case of appellant MW, by reason of her
long absence from Somalia and her consequent lack of coping mechanisms, such as
women heads of households have had to forge in recent years.
630. In view of our adverse
credibility findings, we consider it very likely that appellant MW has some
(albeit extended) family in Merka; but that is an area controlled by Al-Shabab
and we accordingly make similar findings in relation to appellant MW as we have
in the case of appellant AMM. Like him, appellant MW has been outside Somalia for a significant period of time and would be returning from a Western country.
There is, accordingly, a real risk of her being perceived as an apostate. We
do not, however, accept, any more than we did in the case of appellant AMM,
that appellant MW has any genuine religious etc beliefs that are reasonably
likely to be interfered with by Al-Shabab’s socio-religious requirements. Her
children are far too young to be subject to forced recruitment and we do not
consider that appellant MW has any conscientious objection to the payment of
“taxes”.
631. As a single woman with
children, appellant MW would clearly be in a heightened risk category from the
point of view of sexual violence, which is prevalent in southern and central Somalia. We do not, however, find that she is at real risk of Article 15(b) ill-treatment
or persecutory ill-treatment by reason of having to wear oppressively heavy
clothing in an Al-Shabab area. As we have found, the evidence that Al-Shabab
imposes such requirements is too sporadic to give rise to a generalised real
risk.
632. Appellant MW’s travel
to Merka from Mogadishu International Airport is likely to involve serious
problems, including those faced at Al-Shabab checkpoints. As with appellant
AMM, we find that those operating the checkpoints are reasonably likely to
discern from appellant MW’s appearance, and those of her children, (leaving aside
issues of clothing) that she has no recent experience of Somalia and is likely to be from the West.
633. As with appellant AMM,
whilst it is theoretically possible that appellant MW could relocate to a
non-Al-Shabab area in southern or central Somalia, no such potential area has
been identified by the respondent. Furthermore, there remain the problems of
getting to such an area and the reasonableness of conditions there, given the
general humanitarian situation and the likelihood (despite appellant MW’s lack
of credibility) that she would not have family or clan protection.
634. As for Mogadishu, in the light of our Article 15(c) findings, this is plainly not a reasonable
relocation alternative for appellant MW and her children, whether or not her partner
(who says he comes from there) would be hypothesised as returning with her.
635. At [91] of Ms Short’s
closing submissions, she submitted that the right to education of appellant
MW’s children would be violated by returning them to Somalia. Given, however,
that the only hypothesis with which we are concerned is that in section
84(1)(g) of the 2002 Act, the children’s right to education is not an issue in
the present proceedings.
636. On the basis of these
findings, appellant MW is entitled to recognition as a refugee. She is,
accordingly, not entitled to the grant of humanitarian protection.
Appellant ZF
637. Appellant ZF is, at
67, the oldest of the five appellants; she is also the most recent arrival in
this country, having reached here in September 2009. On the basis of the
original Tribunal’s undisturbed findings of fact, appellant ZF comes from
north-west Somalia, which, as we have indicated, in this context means Somaliland. The original Tribunal found that there was a “chance that she has lived in Mogadishu”, although she did not originate from there. The overwhelming likelihood is,
accordingly, that appellant ZF is an Isaaq.
638. We had the benefit of
hearing and seeing appellant ZF give evidence. She cut a poor figure. She
sought to resile from an important element of her evidence regarding her
alleged rape by Al-Shabab militia. She failed to come up to proof, in terms of
her written statement, in relation to alleged religious differences with
Al-Shabab. She gave inconsistent evidence as to when her daughter was supposed
to have left Somalia. She attempted to exaggerate problems regarding her
health, mentioning a variety of conditions from heart problems to severe
arthritis, which her GP had not seen fit to refer to in his letter. She could
give no credible explanation for not being in contact with her daughter. She
could give no credible explanation of how, according to her, she had been able
to make a long journey on her own from Ethiopia to the United Kingdom. She persisted in her assertion, in the face of the evidence (including linguistic
evidence) that she was not from Somaliland. Her evidence as to why she had not
left with her daughter involved appellant ZF contradicting herself as to
whether she had money (albeit in the form of jewellery which she could have
sold). She claimed there was no Somali community in Newcastle, when her
doctor’s letter stated that she had specifically requested being moved to that
city in order to be near the Somali community. Her claim to have been raped by
Al-Shabab, who were also supposed to have killed her husband, was intensely
problematic, given that she said this happened in 2001, before the emergence of
that organisation.
639. The case of appellant
ZF is a striking instance of a person whose claim to international protection
turns entirely on the respondent’s decision to return the appellant to Mogadishu, as opposed to Somaliland. In Part I we have examined the possible reasons why
the respondent has adopted such a course.
640. On the basis of our
credibility findings and the background evidence, we have no doubt at all that
appellant ZF would not be at real risk of persecution or other serious harm in Somaliland. She has completely failed to show that she is without family and/or clan
protection there. Her ability to raise US$3,000 to fund her journey to the United Kingdom demonstrates that she is able to call upon significant financial resources,
even before one takes account of the money that UKBA would make available to
assist her return.
641. However, appellant ZF
will be a refugee if there is a real risk of her being persecuted for a Refugee
Convention reason in the country of her nationality; namely, Somalia, at or
after the point of her return. In order to get an old green Somali passport
(see above) appellant ZF would have to run the real risk of Article 15(c) harm,
if such passports are still available in Bakara Market (and assuming it would
be open for business), or Article 3 and Refugee Convention harm, if she has to
venture into the Afgoye Corridor. The respondent submitted that there was, in
fact, evidence from appellant ZF that she had lived for a significant period of
time in Mogadishu and also been in Afgoye. The previous Tribunal, however,
plainly did not believe anything more than that there was a chance appellant ZF
had at some time been in Mogadishu. Her whole account of problems in Mogadishu and Afgoye, which were central to appellant ZF’s claim before that Tribunal, was
found (quite properly) to be lies. We consider that it is taking the
consequences of those lies too far to hold that appellant ZF has, in reality,
been able to live without difficulties in those places.
642. At [26] of his closing
submissions on behalf of appellant ZF, Mr Schwenk contended “that all the
evidence points to the Respondent proposing to send the Appellant to Mogadishu
from where she is expected to make her way overland to the north”. We agree.
The respondent did not to any material extent advance the submission that
appellant ZF, having got the old green passport, could return to Mogadishu International Airport and board a plane to Hargeisa. We have, nevertheless,
considered that possibility; but by that time there is a real risk that serious
harm will have befallen her.
643. As we have already
found by reference to the background evidence, appellant ZF’s overland route to
the borders of Somaliland is fraught with dangers. The evidence does not
disclose that appellant ZF would be able to avoid a real risk of serious harm.
In particular, we agree with Mr Schwenk at [31] “that when travelling through
Al-Shabab-controlled areas she will be perceived by Al-Shabab to have
transgressed Islamic mores and will thereby be at risk”. The Convention ground
is perceived religious opinion, albeit that we do not consider appellant ZF has
any genuine religious or conscientious beliefs that are likely to be interfered
with by Al-Shabab. In this regard, we do not consider it necessary to repeat
what we have said regarding appellant AMM and appellant MW, save that there is
nothing to suggest that appellant ZF’s age would remove any real risk to her.
644. Appellant ZF is
entitled to recognition as a refugee. She is not entitled to the grant of
humanitarian protection. Her appeal will also be allowed on Article 3 ECHR
grounds.
Appellant FM
645. Appellant FM, who
arrived in the United Kingdom in July 2006, from Kenya, told Immigration Judge
Courtney that he was from a minority clan (Ashraf), had lived his entire life
up to leaving Somalia in the district of Hamar JaabJab, Mogadishu, had married
a woman from the majority Hawiye clan and thereby incurred the animosity of his
in-laws, causing him to leave. The only part of this evidence that survived
the Immigration Judge’s well-founded adverse credibility findings was that
appellant FM had lived in Hamar JaabJab.
646. In his oral evidence
to us, appellant FM said he could not return, on the basis that he would have
no employment and there was no stability. He said he could not look for work
because jobs were organised by clans and given to people who belonged to the
clans concerned. The port near Hamar JaabJab was, he said, controlled by major
clans and other clan members would be unable to find work there.
647. Appellant FM claimed
to be a Sufi. He described elements of that sect’s beliefs and practices,
which persuaded us that he was telling the truth about this. We also
considered that he gave truthful evidence about being able to live in Hamar
JaabJab during the fighting, but having to move to a different district, such
as Hamar Weyne, when the fighting was intense. Asked about present
circumstances, appellant FM said that although government forces held Hamar
JaabJab during the day “during the night others would come”. He considered
nowhere in Mogadishu to be safe. He did not believe that he could move to
another area outside Mogadishu, not controlled by Al-Shabab, because a person
needed a clan connection. He agreed that there was no conflict in Somaliland.
648. Appellant FM said that
he had last spoken to his wife five weeks ago and that his father-in-law had
asked him to release his wife from the marriage so that she could marry someone
else. They were now said to live in Ceelasha Biyaha, an area outside Mogadishu that was controlled by Al-Shabab. He had tried to call his wife back but there
had been no reply. He confirmed that he had left Somalia because his
father-in-law opposed the marriage and now wanted appellant FM to divorce.
649. It is in our view
significant that appellant FM’s own evidence is that his reason for leaving
Hamar JaabJab in February 2006 was not because of the fighting and consequent
displacement of civilians from that district but because of alleged
ill-treatment from his father-in-law. Immigration Judge Courtney did not
believe the account of that ill-treatment or, indeed, that appellant FM was
even married. Having heard appellant FM ourselves, we do not conclude that he
has shown why that finding should be displaced, save that we consider it
reasonably likely that he is, in fact, married. The evidence that he had been
in touch with his wife as recently as five weeks ago did not strike us as
overtly self-serving, notwithstanding the assertion that the father-in-law
supposedly wants appellant FM to divorce his wife.
650. At the time of the
hearing and for a significant period before, Hamar JaabJab had been under the
control of the TFG/AMISOM. Notwithstanding that and the withdrawal of
Al-Shabab’s conventional forces from Mogadishu, we have found that it would in
general be a violation of Article 15(c) to return any civilian to Mogadishu at the present time. We have carefully considered whether appellant FM might
fall within the limited exception to that general finding, concerning those
whose socio-economic position enables them to avoid the risks run by the great
majority of the population, whilst maintaining a reasonable lifestyle, albeit
centred on a residential compound. The fact that appellant FM did not leave Mogadishu because of the generalised fighting could well be said to be a pointer towards
his falling within such an exception. On the other hand, his description of
moving with his wife and children to other districts, such as Hamar Weyne, fits
well with the background evidence and tends to put him outwith the category
just described.
651. Looking at the
evidence overall, we conclude that the negative pull of the lies appellant FM
has seen fit to tell is not such as to place him within the exception.
Accordingly, appellant FM would be entitled to humanitarian protection by
reason of Article 15(c), if we do not find him to be a refugee.
652. We do not, however,
find that appellant FM’s hypothetical presence in Hamar JaabJab is such as to
make him a refugee. Whilst Al-Shabab is capable of posing a real risk of
indiscriminate violence to civilians generally in that district, we do not
consider that the evidence shows that – even before the August 2011 withdrawal
of Al-Shabab’s conventional fighting forces – they were reasonably likely to
have had such a presence in Hamar JaabJab as to be able to persecute appellant
FM for his imputed religious opinions. Appellant FM told us he understood
that, by night, “others” (presumably meaning Al-Shabab) would come into Hamar
JaabJab. That may be so; but the evidence as a whole simply fails to disclose
a sufficient risk of persecutory harm, as opposed to the real risk of a threat
of indiscriminate violence.
653. Mr Symes submitted
that appellant FM would have to venture into Al-Shabab-controlled areas of Mogadishu in order to have anything resembling an ordinary life; in particular, he would
need to go to Bakara Market to buy everyday things and, possibly, obtain
employment. That may have been so before Al-Shabab’s withdrawal; but it is not
the case now. In any event, even before that withdrawal, Mr Burns had
confirmed that there were a host of markets around Mogadishu catering for basic
needs, including in TFG/AMISOM-controlled areas, albeit not operating on the
scale of Bakara Market. Furthermore, employment opportunities exist in Hamar
JaabJab and in its adjacent port area. Appellant FM claimed that he would be
unable to secure employment there, because he was from a minority clan. He has
not been believed as to that aspect of his claim. Furthermore, Mr Burns’
evidence was to the effect that the demographics of Hamar JaabJab were
considerably different from those that existed in 2006.
654. Since appellant FM
does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention
reason in his home area, it is unnecessary to determine whether, for the
purposes of that Convention, he has an internal relocation alternative, either
in southern or central Somalia or in Somaliland/Puntland. The respondent,
however, contended that such an internal relocation was feasible, as a means of
avoiding Article 15(c) harm in Mogadishu.
655. We reject that
submission, as regards southern and central Somalia, for the same reasons as we
have given in relation to the previous appellants. As for Somaliland and
Puntland, we have already indicated why we do not consider that such a
relocation alternative can properly be raised at this stage of the appellate
proceedings. On this issue, Mr Symes drew attention to the judgment of Sedley
LJ in Daoud v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 755, that:-
“Internal relocation is
not, as Home Office presenting officers seem often to think it is, a throw-away
submission in case other arguments fail. It is a serious and frequently
problematical issue, requiring proper notice, proper evidence and proper
argument, and it is governed by legal tests to which this court has more than
once devoted attention.” [12]
656. In any event, the
adverse credibility findings in appellant FM’s case are nowhere near those
required to raise as a serious issue that he might, in reality, have the
requisite degree of connection with Somaliland and Puntland as to be able to
live in either of those regions. Finally, even if this were otherwise,
appellant FM would have to make his way from Mogadishu to the borders of those
regions, with the attendant risks that we have described in relation to other
appellants.
657. As we have earlier
held, to live in Mogadishu at the present time, following the withdrawal of
Al-Shabab, does not in general raise a real risk of treatment proscribed by
Article 3 ECHR.
658. Appellant FM is not
entitled to recognition as a refugee. He is, however, entitled to humanitarian
protection (Article 15(c)). His appeal is dismissed on Article 3 grounds.
Appellant AF
659. Like appellant AMM,
appellant AF has extensive experience of the appellate system in the United Kingdom. This is the second occasion on which his appeal has been remitted to a
tribunal by the Court of Appeal. Previous judicial findings of fact, undisturbed
by the circumstances of the remittals, establish that appellant AF is a member
of the Madhiban clan (a Migdan) who, although being born in Merka and having
lived there until 1989, made his home in Mogadishu, in the districts of
Shangani, Hamar Weyne and Hamar JaabJab (all of which at the hearing were under
TFG/AMISOM control). Although he experienced discrimination and some minor
harassment during the time of the clan conflicts, he was never physically
harmed. He enjoyed the protection of a Habargidir man, who was appellant AF’s
clan patron. Immigration Judge Adio did not believe that the patron had been
killed, contrary to the assertion of appellant AF.
660. Appellant AF was able
to raise money with the assistance of his patron, by selling appellant AF’s
mother’s land. Appellant AF left his wife and children at home, went to Bakara
Market, made travel arrangements and then left Somalia for the United Kingdom. This was in 2001.
661. Like appellant FM,
appellant AF told us in oral evidence that he would move with his wife and
children to another area of Mogadishu, when the fighting in their area became
intense. He confirmed that during the fighting he had never left the city.
Appellant AF claimed not to know where his family were and that he had no
connections with his clan. Looking at the evidence overall, including the
previous judicial findings, we do not consider that there is any credibility in
those assertions. We consider that the truth of the matter is that appellant
AF’s family remain in Hamar JaabJab, that he knows this full well and that he
is likely to be in touch with them by mobile telephone. Appellant AF claimed
in oral evidence that he had no phone cards and no money to spend on calling
persons in Somalia, but then undermined that assertion by saying that “if he
did call they would ask him for money”. He then changed his evidence again, by
asserting that the reason he did not speak to them was that “he did not know
their numbers”.
662. Appellant AF’s attempt
to portray himself as religiously opposed to Al-Shabab was entirely
unpersuasive. He claimed that he had been brought up “believing that even
killing an insect was wrong”. The hyperbolic nature of that assertion did not
advance appellant AF’s case; quite the opposite. The reasoning we have
employed in relation to appellant FM, so as to conclude that he is at real risk
of Article 15(c) harm, if returned to Mogadishu, is also relevant in the case
of appellant AF and causes us to make the same finding in respect of him. In
both cases, we do not, in particular, consider that the problems with
credibility properly lead us to conclude that appellants fall within the
exception to the Article 15(c) class of those at risk.
663. By the same token,
however, we do not find that appellant AF falls to be recognised as a refugee.
There is no real risk of him coming to the adverse attention of Al-Shabab in
Hamar JaabJab or in any other area of the city to which he might wish or need
to go, whether for employment or other purposes, such as to constitute a real
risk of persecution or Article 3 harm. Like appellant FM, however, he does face
the real risk of a serious threat of Article 15(c) harm.
664. We make the same
findings regarding other areas of southern and central Somalia and the possibility of relocation to Somaliland and Puntland, as we have just made in
relation to appellant FM. Finally, there is on the evidence no real risk of
appellant AF suffering Article 3 harm in Mogadishu at the present time.
665. Appellant AF is not
entitled to be recognised as a refugee. He is, however, entitled to
humanitarian protection (Article 15(c)). His appeal is dismissed on Article 3
grounds.
Signed Date
Upper Tribunal Judge P R Lane
Appendix
1
Summary
of Oral Evidence
Appellant AMM
1.
The
appellant gave his evidence in Somali through the court interpreter and
confirmed that he lived in Manchester and that he had made the statement
contained in the bundle. He stated that it had been read back to him in Somali
and that the contents were true.
2.
The
appellant was asked for his opinion of Al Shabab. He stated that the difference
between himself and Al Shabab was the interpretation of the religion. He stated
that according to Islam, killing and taxation was prohibited and so Al Shabab
were acting against Islam. He stated that they entered other people's houses by
force and took away televisions and radios. He was asked what he had to say
about the claim that Al Shabab were killing in the name of Islam. He stated
that according to his religion, only God could give and take away life. He said
Somalia had been a Muslim country for centuries that now Al Shabab had a
different version of Islam which they were using for their own interests. He
stated that they interpreted the religion in a different way. Islam meant peace
and the killing and execution of people was not allowed. He stated that the
collection of taxes was not right, particularly when it was used to buy weapons
and wage wars against civilians. He was asked how he would feel if he was
stopped at a checkpoint and asked to pay money. He stated that he would feel
guilty because he would believe that he had committed a crime against God by
paying money. He was asked to explain his reply and he stated it was because
that money would be used to kill others.
3.
The
appellant was then cross examined by Mr Staker. He confirmed that he was born
in January 1977 and that he was 34 years old. It was put to him that he was
healthy and able bodied. He replied that he may look that way but he was stressed.
It was acknowledged that he might find the hearing stressful but it was pointed
out that there was no medical evidence as to any ongoing health problems. He
stated that he had been stressed for six years. He agreed that he had had
several previous appeals. He confirmed he arrived in 2005 and that after the
refusal of his first appeal he had gone to Ireland and claimed asylum there. He
stated that it had not been his intention but when he had lost his appeal and
was told to leave the country he went there and made a claim. He had been told
at Dublin that he had to return to the UK and that was what had happened and he
then had several more appeals. It was put to him that the Tribunal had accepted
he was from Jowhar but that the rest of his account had been rejected. He said
he disagreed with the findings. He was asked whether he had any family in Somalia and he said he did not. He had three brothers in Libya and although they used to
have contact with each other, that was no longer possible because of the
ongoing problems in Libya. He stated that he did not believe there was any
communication with people in Libya and he said a lot of Somalis had been killed
there because they were suspected of working for Gaddafi’s forces. He stated
that he had two sisters working as cleaners in Saudi Arabia and that he was in
contact with them. He had also been in contact with his wife before his
departure for Ireland but he no longer knew where she was. He stated he had no
relatives at all in Somalia as his father had been an only child and so had his
mother. He was asked about clan connections. He stated that there were always
clan connections but it was not possible to rely on them. He stated he had
considered committing suicide many times. He had some Somali friends here and
he watched Somali news on the television.
4.
The
appellant confirmed that he had heard of the voluntary assisted return program
and he was aware of the assistance offered under it. He was asked whether he
would accept that assistance if he returned to Somalia. He replied that he had
not come to the UK to make money but to save his life. He stated that if Somalia was stable he would go voluntarily. He did not want any money. He was asked whether
he was aware that 80% of the population of Mogadishu lived under TFG control.
He asked whether Mr. Staker was suggesting that Mogadishu was safe. The
question was repeated. He replied that he believed that Mr. Staker was
misinformed. He stated that the TFG were only in control in Villa Somalia and they were unable to move without guards. The population generally was not safe
and there was no ‘80% safe area’. It was put to him that 80% of the population
lived in areas that were not under the control of Al Shabab. He stated that the
population lived outside Mogadishu and only came into the city in the morning
in order to avoid war. He stated there were no safe areas and there was war
everywhere. He stated that a minister had been killed by his own niece and the
port was under fire just the other day. It was put to him that there were large
areas outside Mogadishu that were not under the control of Al Shabab. He
replied that he was not aware of any such places; to his knowledge the whole of
Somalia, with the exception of Somaliland and Puntland, was under Al Shabab
control. He was asked whether he had heard that there were parts of Somalia where there was no fighting. He replied that if the capital was not safe then
nowhere was safe. He stated that Somaliland and Puntland were clan-based and
had their own problems. He stated that Jowhar was an Al Shabab base. He was
asked whether he was aware that internal travel was possible in Somalia. He replied that he would be accused of being a spy if he returned. It was put to
him that there were transport links between Mogadishu and Jowhar. He stated
that he was aware of that. It was put to him that people did move between Al
Shabab and TFG controlled areas. He disagreed with that and said that once
somebody was in an Al Shabab area, they would be unable to move into a TFG
controlled area and vice versa. The only way to move between areas was to avoid
checkpoints otherwise one could be executed. He said he had heard people
talking about this.
5.
The
appellant was asked whether he knew of anyone who had returned to Somalia after living for a long time in the UK or in Western Europe. He said he had, but did not
specifically know anyone who had done so.
6.
It was
put to him that he had claimed in his witness statement that children were
forcibly recruited by Al Shabab. He agreed with this. It was put to him that he
was not a child and had no children. He stated that he did have a 12-year-old
child but he did not know his whereabouts. He was asked on what basis he
claimed in his statement that Al Shabab forced people to listen to long sermons
of jihad. He replied that Al Shabab aimed to brainwash people. It was put to
him that this was just a presumption on his part. He replied he had heard
people talking about it. He was asked whether he knew of anyone who had been
punished for refusing to fight for Al Shabab. He replied that Al Shabab did not
allow any news broadcasters to record facts about them but he had heard that
people were missing. The question was repeated. He said he had not seen
anything on the television but there were lists on the internet of people who
had been executed.
7.
The
appellant stated that he was a Sunni Muslim. He was asked whether there was
anything about him that was different from other Sunni Muslims. He stated that
Al Shabab called themselves Sunnis but they were not. He stated that Al Shabab
were after people like him and wanted to force them to do what they (Al Shabab
) wanted. The appellant was asked whether he was required by his religion to
smoke and chew khat. He stated he was permitted to do so. The question was repeated.
He replied that it was his hobby to smoke and chew. He was asked whether he
would be prevented from going to the mosque and praying by Al Shabab. He said
he had not heard that they would do that but they did force people to go and
pray.
8.
He was
asked about his objections to taxation. He replied that taxes were taken and
used to kill people and so in a way both he and the killers were at fault. He
was asked whether it would be against his religion to pay taxes in the UK if he disagreed with the objectives of the government. He replied that he had not
claimed that his religion did not allow him to pay tax and he explained that if
he paid taxes in the UK he knew that the money would be used for housing or the
infrastructure and not for killing.
9.
In re-examination
the appellant confirmed that he had left Somalia in 2000 and had not been back
since then.
10.
In
response to questions from the Tribunal the appellant stated that he believed
the UK was a safe country and that it was up to the government here to use
taxation in whatever way it chose. He was asked where he had left his wife when
he left Somalia. He stated that he had left her in Jowhar with her family. He
was asked what had happened to her family. He replied that she was an orphan
and he meant he had left her with his family. He was asked why he had given a
false name to the UK authorities when he made his third asylum application. He
stated that he was forced to do so; it had not been his intention and that
people who came here after him had obtained refugee status. He accepted that it
had been a mistake and he should not have done it but he had been given the
wrong advice.
11.
The
appellant was asked what he had done between leaving Somalia in 2000 and
arriving here in 2005. He said he had been travelling through Ethiopia, Sudan and Libya. He had spent ten days at sea trying to get to Europe from Libya. The boat had sunk and he had been rescued by a cargo ship and brought to the UK.
12.
The
appellant was asked whether he understood what a Sufi Muslim was. He asked
whether that was the name of a man. He was asked whether he understood Sufism.
He said he understood it as ‘Khalifi’; they were peaceful religious people. He
was not one of them; he was Tabliq. There were no questions arising and that
completed this appellant's evidence.
Appellant MW
13.
The
appellant was examined in chief by Ms Short. She gave her evidence in Somali
through the court interpreter. She confirmed her address in Bristol. She
confirmed that she recalled the statement she had made to the solicitors and
that she had told the truth for that purpose. She confirmed the signature at
the end of the statement was hers and that she would tell the truth to the
tribunal.
14.
The
appellant stated that she had travelled from Bristol for the hearing with her husband
and their three children. She said she would have struggled without him. She
was asked how she would have managed to carry their children if she had been on
her own and she stated that two were in a pushchair and one was holding her
hand. She was asked what would happen if she arrived in Mogadishu with the
children. She stated that people in Mogadishu did not use pushchairs. She would
be unable to carry her three children without one. She was asked where she
bought her children's clothes from. She replied she bought them from Asda, Next
and H&M. She was asked whether she had any Islamic clothes for the children
and she replied in the negative.
15.
The
appellant was asked about her religion. She stated that she was a Muslim. She
described herself as a normal Muslim and not like Al Shabab. That completed
examination in chief.
16.
The
appellant was then cross-examined by Mr Staker. She stated that she knew nobody
in Somalia and had no friends or family there and no contact with anybody else.
She knew some Somali people in the UK but had no family here. As far as she
knew her husband had no family either and did not know many people here. She
was asked what her knowledge of Somalia was and she replied that she heard on
the news that there were killings and chaos. It was put to her that the
Tribunal had not considered it credible that she did not know which clan she
belonged to. She repeated that she did not know.
17.
The
appellant confirmed that she had arrived with entry clearance as a spouse in
2006 and that she left her first husband in May 2007. She moved in with her
current partner although they subsequently had an argument and she moved out.
Although they later reconciled and had an Islamic marriage, they had not lived
together since. She stated that in April 2008 he was registered as the father
of her first child and that her two younger children were also his. She
confirmed that at the time of her initial hearing she was in an ongoing
relationship with her partner. She stated that she disagreed with the finding of
the Tribunal that it was not a strong relationship. When she was asked why they
were not living at the same address, she stated that it was the government's
job to put them in the same house. She was asked whether she had applied for
housing so that they could live together and she replied that they were going
to do that; they received an application form yesterday. That was despite the
fact that they had reconciled in 2008.
18.
The
appellant stated that she had been looked after by her aunt in Somalia and they
maintained contact after the appellant came to the UK and whilst she was still
married to her first husband but when they had separated he retained the
contact details. She stated she had no other way to contact her. Her aunt's son
lived in Canada but there was no communication between them. The appellant was
asked about the time when she had left her current partner in 2008. She said
she had met a family on the street and had gone to live with them. It was put
to her that that did not sound credible. She maintained her reply.
19.
The
appellant was asked about her comment in paragraph 12 of her witness statement
and she was asked to clarify whether she meant most or all girls were
circumcised. She said girls were circumcised. The question was repeated and she
replied that all those that she knew had been circumcised. She was asked
whether she knew of anyone who was called names for being uncircumcised. She
replied "they would say bad things to you if you were not
circumcised". She was asked whether that meant that she knew people who
were not circumcised. She stated that everyone was. She explained in her
culture it was a shame not to be. She was asked whether she knew of any Somalis
opposed to the practice. She replied that it was forbidden in the UK but it was permitted in Somalia. The question was repeated and she gave the same answer. It was
put to her that people could still oppose the practice even if it was the norm.
She stated that it would be shameful not to be circumcised. She was asked
whether she knew of anybody in the UK who opposed the practice or whether it
was just the law that stopped them from having their daughters circumcised. She
stated that in Somalia people were circumcised by unprofessionals. She was
asked what the attitude of the Somali community was here. She stated that
people followed the law. She was asked whether Somalis here would consider
circumcision if they were able to. She replied in the negative. She was asked
whether she knew of anyone who opposed the practice and she stated she did not.
She repeated that all females in Somalia were circumcised. The appellant was
asked who would place pressure on her to have her daughters circumcised if she
had no family or clan links in Somalia. She replied that it was their tradition
and if she did not do so "everyone" would say "bad words".
She was asked who she meant. She stated "everywhere you go people would
say it". She was asked how anybody would know. She stated that there were
no private toilets and showers, children played and urinated outside and it
would become known. She was asked whether there would be any other consequences
apart from the calling of names. She replied that it would be shameful. She was
asked who would be able to force her to have her child circumcised if she refused
to do it. She replied that it would be degrading for her child and she would be
depressed. She was asked what she would do if she had to choose between having
the procedure done and being called names. She replied she would have her
daughter circumcised.
20.
The
appellant was asked whether she was aware of the support available to Somalis
who returned voluntarily. She said she was not. It was put to her that the VAR
programme provided funds and assistance. She stated that she did not need to
contact them.
21.
The
appellant was asked whether there was any reason why Al Shabab would be
displeased with her if she returned to Somalia. She stated that they would be
able to differentiate between those who had remained in Somalia and those who returned there. It was put to her that she did not have any information about
what happened to people who returned. She replied that she was aware that there
were killings, torture and looting every day. She was asked whether there was
anything contrary to her religion if she did what Al Shabab wanted to do. She
replied that they forced people to do things and people preferred to dress the
way they wanted to. She was asked whether she would be able to look like
someone who had never left Somalia and she replied that this would not be
possible because with children one could not pretend. The question was
repeated. She stated that people in Somalia looked rough, they were starving
and so it would not be possible to look like them. It was put to the appellant
that there were women in Somalia without husbands who were able to look after
their children. She replied that those women had families and clans and she did
not.
22.
In
re-examination the appellant stated that her accommodation was paid for by NASS
and that her husband received housing benefit. She stated that she did not
experience any difficulties regarding the payments that she received.
23.
In
response to questions from the Tribunal, the appellant stated that her husband
had left the Wilson Street address in 2008. When asked why he had left, she
replied that it was because the accommodation was a bedsit. She was asked
whether that was where she had lived with him. She stated it was not, they had
lived together somewhere else. It was put to her that Wilson Street was the
address where they had married and she was asked where it was that she had then
lived. She then said that she had lived there with her husband but they then
moved to another address. She stated that he had left Wilson Street for health
reasons. She was asked whether it was shameful amongst the Somali community in
the UK not to circumcise daughters. She replied that it was not allowed here
but it was done in Somalia where there was only one culture. She was asked how
it was that the culture changed just by being in the UK. She stated that people
were not forced here and it was not shameful. The government would detain
people who carried out the procedure on their children. In the UK it was normal not to carry this out and there were no problems for uncircumcised girls
to get married. That completed this appellant's evidence.
Oral evidence of appellant MW’s partner
24.
The
witness, partner of MW, gave his other name as AMM and his address. His
evidence was given in Somali. He confirmed that he had been telling the truth
when he prepared his statement but said that he had been on medication at the
time. He was asked whether the medication had any impact on his memory and he
replied that he took the medication for his memory. When this was queried, he
replied that he suffered headaches so he took the medicine. He had sustained an
injury which affected his nervous system. He confirmed that it was his
signature on the statement and that he would tell the truth to the Tribunal.
25.
The
witness was asked whether he would be able to support his partner if she were
returned to Somalia with the children. He said that he received income support,
had no other source of income and had no money to send them. He was asked
whether he had ever sent money to Somalia. He said he had sent money to his mother
on two occasions. He was asked where she had been living and he replied she had
been in Ethiopia but because she was attacked there, she had returned to Somalia.
26.
In
cross-examination the witness confirmed that he had given evidence for his
partner at her earlier appeal. He was asked whether he had been aware that he
was found to have been a witness not capable of being believed. He said he had
not known this. He was asked whether he had lived with his partner from 2007
until January 2008. He confirmed that he had and added that people ‘could
fight’. He was asked whether he and his partner had reconciled at the time of
her appeal and he confirmed that they had. He was asked why they had not lived
together since then and he replied that he lived in a one-bedroom place with
elderly people. He was asked whether he had made attempts via the authorities
to be re-housed with his family. He stated that they had received a form this
week having advised their solicitor that they wanted to be together. He stated that
no children were allowed where he was currently living. He was asked why it had
taken from September 2008 until now to take steps to be re-housed. He said it
was due to his lack of experience and because he did not speak the language.
There was nobody that he could have asked. He was asked why he and his partner
had not married under British law. He stated that he did not know how to do
that as he did not know the language. He said he did not know many Somalis in
the UK and he did not know of anyone sending money back to Somalia.
27.
When
asked about his views on FGM he stated that he did not want his daughter to be
circumcised and that he was strongly opposed to the practice. He was asked
whether he knew of any others who opposed it and he replied that he did not
want it for his daughter. He was asked what the attitude towards circumcision
was in Somalia and he replied that there were bad people there who forced
others into it. He was asked who would be able to compel them to have the
procedure done on their daughter if they opposed it. He replied Al Shabab
would. It was put to him that he need not be in an Al Shabab area. He replied
that he had lived in Mogadishu. To his knowledge all of Mogadishu was
controlled by Al Shabab.
28.
In
response to questions from the Tribunal the witness was asked what clan he came
from. He stated that it was not a clan that had any power. The question was
repeated. He stated that he did not know. He was asked whether he had opposed
FGM whilst he lived in Somalia. He replied that his religion said that no
looting was allowed. The question was repeated. He replied that he believed it
was wrong. He was asked whether he would have been willing to marry a woman who
had not been circumcised and he said he would.
29.
The
witness was asked when he had left his earlier address. He said he could not
remember. He had lived on the top floor and had been offered a ground floor
flat because of health problems. It was put to him that he had been divorced in
the UK under British law. He asked "what divorce?". He was reminded
of what he stated in paragraph 3 of his witness statement. He said he had not
divorced MW. He was asked whether he had been divorced and he said he had. He
was asked whether the divorce had taken place through the British courts. He said
he received a letter and signed it. He was asked how he had known what to do
with it. He stated that he had been helped by a Somali lady. He was asked how
it was that he did not know how to get married yet knew how to get divorced. He
stated that his former wife had brought him here and she knew how the system
worked. She was the one who had contact with the courts and when he received a
letter a man had helped him. There were no questions arising and that completed
the evidence of this witness.
Appellant ZF
30.
The
appellant gave evidence in Somali through the court interpreter. Examined by
Mr. Schwenk, the appellant confirmed her Newcastle address and agreed that she
had made the statement dated 31st May 2010. She was asked whether it was right,
as stated at paragraph 12 of that statement, that she had been raped by Al
Shabab militia. She stated that she had been raped but as she had been in a
state of confusion she did not know who had been responsible. Subject to that
amendment she adopted the contents as being true and accurate.
31.
The
appellant was asked about her religion. She stated that she was a Muslim. When
asked what type of Muslim she was, she replied she was “just a Muslim”. She was
asked whether she followed the same form of Islam as other Somalis and she said
she was a genuine Muslim. The question was put again; she gave the same reply.
She was asked whether she had ever worn clothes that covered her face and she
replied in the negative. She said she was elderly. She did not know why people
covered their faces. She wore a bra. She had been married but her husband had
been killed ten years ago. She had a daughter but she had left Somalia in 2000 and they had not had contact since then. She then amended that to 2002. She
said she had no idea of the whereabouts of her daughter. She knew no one in Somalia. There was no one who could obtain a passport for her. She had no form of travel
document. She was supported by NASS and had no savings. She had not been asked
by the Secretary of State to complete any kind of application form for a travel
document.
32.
The
appellant was then cross examined by Mr Staker. It was put to her that the
position of the elderly in Islam was one of respect. She disagreed. She was
asked whether she had a clan attachment. She stated she was from a minority
clan. She had no family at all in Somalia. She had not had any siblings; she
then amended this evidence and said she had had one who had left Somalia. There had been an uncle but he had health problems and she did not know whether he
was alive or dead.
33.
The
appellant was asked about her health. She said she had difficulties walking. It
was put to her that the only letter in relation to her health was a letter from
her doctor which was written for accommodation purposes. She confirmed she had
headaches and pains in her thumb and foot. It was put to her that the other
problems she complained of in her witness statement – heart problems, high
blood pressure, asthma and severe arthritis – were not mentioned by her doctor
in his letter. She maintained she had told the doctor about those problems and
could not explain why they had not been included. She stated she was on
medication. She had no other documentary evidence of her ill health.
34.
The
appellant said that she disagreed with the findings of fact made by the
Tribunal. She was from a minority clan and had lived in Mogadishu. After she
was widowed she lived in Hamar Weyne and then in a refugee camp near Afgoye.
She said she could not recall when her daughter had left Somalia; it was 2001 or 2002. They had lost contact with each other. It was put to her that that was
remarkable given the evidence of the extent of communication between those who
had left and those who remained. The appellant replied that her daughter was
not in Africa; perhaps she was in Europe. She agreed that it was unusual for
there to be no contact but she could not explain the lack of communication.
35.
The
appellant stated that the $3000 she had spent on her journey came from
jewellery that her husband had bought for her. It was put to her that she had
survived alone for some eight years. She said she had been able to do so by
moving from place to place however she had been persecuted and raped. She was
reminded that that part of her account had been rejected by the Tribunal. She
made no comment. It was put to the appellant that she had been able to make a
long journey alone via Ethiopia. She replied by stating that she had no
protection and would be killed if she returned.
36.
The
appellant was asked whether she was aware of the Voluntary Assisted Returns
Programme (VARP). She repeated her previous answer. The question was put again.
She said she had not heard of it. It was put to her that assistance was made
available through the programme not only for the journey but also to contact
family and that she would be given £1500. She stated she could not go; there
was no protection in Somalia and there were rapes and killings. She was asked
whether she kept abreast of the situation in Somalia. She said that she did not
see many Somalis in the UK but she knew the situation in Somalia was unstable. She was asked for the source of her information. She said that there was no
Somali community in Newcastle but she knew it was not safe to return. She was
asked whether she had heard that 40% of the population in Mogadishu lived under
TFG control. She said she did not know that. She also said she was not aware
that Hamar Weyne was under TFG control. It was put to her that the evidence did
not indicate a high level of violence in Hamar Weyne. She maintained that her
clan faced problems on a daily basis. She was asked whether she had been aware
that the Afgoye corridor had become more urbanised and permanent. She said she
had not. She was asked whether she was aware that it was possible to fly
directly to Somaliland. She said she was not from Somaliland. She was asked
whether she was aware that the situation in Al Shabab areas varied from
district to district. She said she had not heard anything about that but
maintained that Al Shabab controlled most places. It was put to her that some
areas had more lenient requirements than others. She said she was elderly and
had health problems; she was not aware of what was happening in Somalia. It was put to her that she was no different from other Muslims and so she should
have no problems with Al Shabab. She stated she could not return. If she did,
she would have problems. She did not know anyone who had returned and she
agreed she had no personal knowledge of what would happen on return.
37.
The
appellant was asked whether anything Al Shabab might ask of her would be
contrary to her religion. She maintained that she was happy with the way she
currently dressed and that Al Shabab forced women to cover their faces and body
and wear gloves.
38.
She
stated that her husband was from the Bandhabow clan.
39.
In
re-examination the appellant said that she would not cover her face; if she had
to, she would feel frustrated. She stated that her uncle would be around 70.
She then said that she had been 65 when she left Somalia two years ago and her
uncle was 78. She repeated that she did not know what had happened to her
daughter.
40.
In
response to questions from the Tribunal, the appellant stated that her daughter
left Somalia after the death of her father (the appellant’s husband). She did
not live with her in Afgoye. She fled with other people. It was said she was
going to the UK. The appellant had not been able to accompany her because she
had no money and had a bad back. She was reminded that she had said that she
had jewellery. She then said that the situation had been chaotic and she had
been unable to sell it. When asked why it had taken her some seven years to
leave Somalia after her daughter’s departure, she said that there had been no
market for her jewellery and besides, she was looking after the two children of
her deceased sister. When asked what had happened to those children, she said
that she had asked people to take them to Kenya because she had health
problems. Some nine months later, she left. The appellant said that her health
problems began after she had been beaten and raped ten years ago. She said that
she had been supported by aid organisations in Afgoye and in Mogadishu other
people had helped her. The money for her daughter’s travel had been raised by her
clan and her late husband’s clan. It was pointed out to her that although she
stated that there was no Somali community in Newcastle, the letter from her
doctor specifically requested that she be moved to Newcastle in order that she
could be near the Somali community. She was asked whether she was in contact
with them. The appellant then agreed that there was a Somali community in Newcastle but she stated that she received no help from anyone. She was asked whether she
was in contact with them and she admitted she saw some of them.
41.
It was
put to the appellant that she had stated in her witness statement that her
husband had been killed by Al Shabab. She was asked whether that was correct.
She replied that she did not know. She said four people came to their home,
killed him and raped her. It was pointed out to her that in her witness
statement she expressed fear about Al Shabab because of what she claimed they
did to her. She replied that Al Shabab controlled the area and killed people.
She was asked whether she knew if Al Shabab existed in 2001. She replied there
had been many Islamic groups. There were no questions arising and that
completed this appellant's oral evidence.
Appellant FM
42.
The
appellant gave evidence through the Somali interpreter provided by the court.
He was examined by Mr Symes. He gave his address as 3 Ray’s Avenue and his date
of birth as 5 August 1987. He confirmed that he had said in his statement that
most of his friends had left for Kenya. He was asked what had happened to his
other friends. He replied what he had meant was that he did not know about the
others, only about those with whom he had contact. He was asked how he would
support himself if he returned to Somalia. He stated he could not return as he
had no employment and there was no stability. He was asked whether he would
look for work if he returned to Hamar JaabJab. He stated that he would not be
able to look for work because jobs were organised by clans and given to people
who belonged to the clans concerned. It was put to him there was a port in
Hamar JaabJab and it was asked whether he would be able to find work there. He
stated that it was controlled by major clans and other clan members would be
unable to find work there.
43.
The
appellant confirmed that he followed the Sufi sect. He said he had always done
so and his family were Sufis. He was asked for an example of what this meant in
practice. He stated that Sufis commemorated certain saints and visited their
graves. He said they were very religious people. He had visited the graves of
saints whilst he was in Somalia but this had been before Al Shabab took
control. He also used to go to the mosque to commemorate the Prophet’s birth.
He was asked how he followed the Sufi faith in the UK. He stated that every
year there was a celebration and people gathered together and had a drink,
prayed and speeches were given. This was known as Digri. It was specific to
Sufism and was an important part of his life.
44.
The
appellant was asked whether his appearance had altered since he had arrived in
the UK. He said it had. He was asked to describe in what way it had changed. He
stated that he had been slim, younger and had not had any grey hair when he
came here.
45.
In
cross-examination the appellant confirmed that he had lived in Hamar JaabJab
all his life. It was put to him that there would have been a lot of fighting in
that area and he agreed that was correct. He was asked how it was that his
family had never moved out of the area despite the conflict. He then said that
they had moved temporarily when there was fighting and that they then moved
back when the situation had stabilised. He was asked whether they had moved to
a different district of Mogadishu. He replied they sometimes went to Hamar
Weyne. He was asked whether it had always been possible to move away and he
replied in the affirmative, adding that lots of families did the same.
46.
It was
put to the appellant that the Tribunal had found that he and his aunt had been
able to enjoy sufficient protection in order to keep their assets safe during
the war. He confirmed that the aunt had been his father's sister and said that
they had land attached to that mosque and that the people in the mosque had
looked after it. People knew his father who owned the land. He now had no
family left in Mogadishu and his aunt was in Kenya. He was asked whether he had
any clan connections and he said that he did not know anybody in Mogadishu. The appellant was asked whether there was anyone at the mosque who still knew
his father. He said that they knew his aunt and that he had no connection with
them. He agreed he had Somali friends in the UK.
47.
The
appellant was asked whether he was aware that 80% of the population of Mogadishu lived in TFG controlled areas. He said that he had not been aware of this. He was
asked whether he had been aware that Hamar JaabJab was currently under TFG
control. He replied that he heard government forces came in during the day but
that during the night others would come. He was asked whether he was aware that
there was not a high degree of conflict in Hamar JaabJab. He replied that it
was similar to other districts and that nowhere in Mogadishu was safe. He was
asked whether he was aware that a lot of people lived there and made a living.
He maintained that those people had connections with their clan and had money
so they were safe. He said without that, one was not safe. He added that if
someone agreed with Al Shabab then they would have no problems. The appellant
was asked whether he was aware that there were places in Somalia outside Mogadishu that were not controlled by Al Shabab. He stated that he listened to the
news and watched television and that it was important to have a clan connection
as without it survival was not possible. The question was repeated. He agreed
that there was no conflict in Somaliland. It was put to him that they were even
areas without fighting in central and southern Somalia. He stated that he was
not sure of that and gave an example of a man from the south who went to the
central area to work as a butcher a few months ago. He stated that some
livestock went missing and this man was accused of being responsible because he
was an outsider and he was killed.
48.
The
appellant was asked whether he was aware that there were minibuses for internal
travel. He said he only knew of travel by lorry. He was asked whether he was
aware that people travelled between TFG and Al Shabab controlled areas. He
stated that if someone did this they would be suspected and killed. He was
asked whether he was suggesting that this happened to anyone travelling from
one area to another. He said that he meant only those who were new and had not
been seen before would be at risk.
49.
The
appellant was asked whether he had heard of the voluntary assisted returns and
reintegration programme. He said that he had heard a lot about it. He confirmed
he was aware of the available assistance. He was asked whether he would seek
such assistance if he returned. He replied that if he had to return he would
kill himself.
50.
The
appellant was asked whether there was anything different between him and any
other Sufi in Somalia. He stated that Sufis were all the same. He was asked
whether there was any reason why Al Shabab would target him as opposed to any
other Sufi. He stated that Al Shabab members had gone to the graves of saints
and had dug out their bodies. He said they did not permit anyone to visit the
graves or celebrate. He said they had placed a bomb in a Sufi mosque and many
people had been killed. The appellant was asked whether he was prohibited by his
religion from having a beard. He stated that he was not. He was asked whether
Al Shabab would require him to do anything that was contrary to his religion.
He stated that the disagreement between the Somali people and Al Shabab was
that the latter wanted to make rules about how to dress whereas the former
wanted freedom. He was asked whether he knew of anyone who had been killed for
not having a beard. He said that he had heard of this. He added that they gave
people a hard time and beat them.
51.
It was
put to the appellant that he would know how to make himself look like the other
Somalis if he was returned to Somalia. He stated that coming from abroad, it
would take some time to socialise and it would be difficult to integrate. He
agreed that there would be a period of adjustment. It was put to him that the
duration of the period might depend on how motivated he would be to
re-integrate. He said that it also depended on having family, friends and links
to provide one with information. He was asked whether he knew of anyone
targeted for not watching executions. He said he did not but that he heard on
the radio and on television that people were forced to watch. He said people
were executed for refusing to fight for Al Shabab. He did not know of anyone
personally because he had no family there but he heard this on television. That
concluded cross examination. There was no re-examination.
52.
In
response to questions from the Tribunal, the appellant stated that after the
death of his parents he had gone to live with his aunt who lived in a separate
house in Hamar JaabJab. He was asked what had happened to his family's house
and he said it had been hit by a missile and destroyed when the civil war
started in 1990. There had been no adult male in his aunt's household. His aunt
left for Kenya in 2007. He was asked to clarify his earlier evidence that
having money made one safe. He replied that money alone did not help; one also
had to have clan links. It was put to the appellant that the expert evidence
had been their clan membership was no longer a relevant factor in the issue of
security. He stated that no one was safe but if the situation of minority and
majority clans was compared, then the majority clans had more of a chance. The
appellant was asked how he had been able to hold on to the family land
throughout the civil war. He stated that it was attached to the mosque and the
people there protected it. He was asked what clan those people belonged to and
he replied they were mostly from majority clans but they nevertheless helped
him because they were honest and religious people.
53.
The
appellant stated that he had been married in 2006 and that his wife was still
in Hamar JaabJab when he left. He was asked when he had last spoken to her and
he said that this was five weeks ago. He said that his father-in-law had asked
him to release his wife so that she could marry somebody else. He said this was
because he (the appellant) was unable to support her. He said that his
father-in-law had always opposed the marriage because he was from the Hawiye
clan. He stated that they were now in Ceelasha Biyaha, an area outside Mogadishu that was controlled by Al Shabab. A lot of people had fled there. He said he had
been surprised and shocked by his father-in-law's request and had not agreed to
it. He said he had since tried to call back but there had been no reply. He was
asked whether there had been any suggestion in the conversation that the
appellant could return and live with his wife. He stated that he had left Somalia because his father-in-law opposed the marriage and that he now wanted the appellant
to divorce his wife. He said that his father-in-law had given him an ultimatum
on the phone and had said that if he did not divorce his wife he would offer
her to somebody else even though she was still married to him. That completed
his evidence.
Appellant AF
54.
The
appellant gave evidence in Somali through the court interpreter and confirmed
that he recalled making his witness statement, that it had been read back to
him in Somali and that the contents were truthful. He agreed that he had been
referred to a consultant about his health and stated that he had an appointment
to see him on 16 July. He stated that his condition was the same as it had been
when his statement was prepared and he had been given some medication in the
interim by his doctor.
55.
The
appellant was asked how he would feel about having to pay taxes to Al Shabab at
checkpoints. He stated he was not happy about that because he knew that the
money was used to buy weapons. He stated that if he paid the money he would
feel guilty about that but if he refused then he could be beaten. He was asked
why he would feel guilty about paying the money. He stated that the money would
be used to kill people and therefore he would be indirectly responsible for
that.
56.
In
cross-examination the appellant confirmed that his health had not given him any
problems until a few months ago. He stated that he had first seen his doctor
about his current problems in April or May but because he had moved he was
unable to see the doctor and had to register with a new one. The letter he had
produced from his doctor was the first time that he had seen him about his
problems. It had been around April. It was put to the appellant that although
he had claimed in his statement to have bouts of vomiting, his doctor's letter
failed to mention that. The appellant stated that he had been given medication
for the vomiting. It was put to him that it seemed strange that his GP would
fail to mention vomiting in his letter to the consultant. The appellant stated
that the purpose of the letter was so that a scan could be arranged. This had
been booked for 16 July. He was asked whether his appeal hearing might have
caused his health concerns. He replied that he could not blame the Tribunal for
that and that his ill-health had come from God.
57.
The
appellant was asked whether he had any family left in Somalia. He said he had some distant relatives and clan links but he did not know where his cousins,
uncles and aunts were. The last time he had any information, they were in Mogadishu. He stated he was from the minority Madhiban clan but he now had no connections
with them at all. His uncle was from the same clan. He agreed that his uncle
might have connections but he and his uncle had not had any contact with each
other since the appellant’s departure.
58.
The
appellant confirmed that he had lived in several districts of Mogadishu and
that he had been able to move between districts in order to avoid the conflict.
He stated, however, that this had nothing to do with moving to clan-based
areas; he would move with his wife and children and others fleeing the conflict
and then move back when the fighting had ceased. He confirmed that he had been
living in Mogadishu when the war broke out and that he had never left the city.
He confirmed that he was originally from Merka. Despite the conflict he had not
returned there. It was put to him that he had been able to live, work, marry
and raise a family in Mogadishu despite the conflict. He agreed this had been
the case. It was put to him that the situation was not particularly different
at the current time and that he could return and do the same thing. He replied
that it was completely different now. It was put to him that he could return to
Merka. He stated that Merka was under Al Shabab control.
59.
The
appellant was asked whether he was aware of the voluntary returns programme and
he stated that he was. He was also aware of the available assistance. He was
asked whether he would take advantage of this if he returned. He stated that Mogadishu was not safe and that Merka was under Al Shabab control. If he returned he would
be killed. It was put to him that 80% of the population in Mogadishu lived
under TFG control. He replied that he did not believe that and it was more
likely to be 40%. He was asked whether he was aware that Shingani, Hamar
JaabJab and Hamar Weyne, all areas that he had lived in, were under TFG
control. He confirmed that he was. It was put to him that the evidence did not
suggest there was a high level of conflict in any of those areas. He maintained
that was not the case and stated that Mogadishu was not safe and was under
siege. He stated that even government members were unable to travel without
escorts and that recently a minister had been killed and Al Shabab had accepted
responsibility for that. It was put to him that a significant number of
ordinary Somalis lived in Mogadishu and made a living in some way. He replied
that those people were not living, they were just surviving. There was no
employment and no security. It was put to the appellant that people also lived
in the Afgoye corridor and moved to Mogadishu to work. He stated that there was
no security and no safety and that whatever money such people earned was less
than what they lost on a daily basis. It was put to the appellant that Merka
was stable. He said it was not and that it was under the control of Al Shabab.
It was put to the appellant that there was no fighting there. He questioned how
that could be claimed and stated that there was a war going on.
60.
The
appellant was asked whether he was aware that travel was possible between TFG
controlled areas and those controlled by Al Shabab. He said that anyone coming
from an Al Shabab area would be seen as a spy and would not be safe. He stated
that in Merka people were forced to go and fight in the war. It was put to the
appellant that Al Shabab were less hard-line in some parts of the country,
particularly outside Mogadishu. He stated that was not correct; there was one
ideology and that was jihad and he did not want to kill anyone.
61.
The
appellant stated that he was a Sunni Muslim. He was asked whether there was
anything about his background that would make him of particular interest to Al
Shabab. He stated that his religion and the way that he lived was different to
Al Shabab’s interpretation. He stated that he was brought up believing that
even killing an insect was wrong. He stated that Al Shabab wanted people to
commit acts which were unreligious. He was asked whether there was any reason
that Al Shabab would seek to recruit him over any other Somali. He replied that
they would recruit anyone who was strong. It was put to him that he would be
able to blend in on his return. He stated that he had been away for 10 years
and he would be unable to live within the new system. He felt safe here and was
unable to return.
62.
The
appellant was asked whether he would be required to do anything by Al Shabab
that was contrary to his religion. He said he would not but maintained that his
religion permitted him to choose how to dress whereas Al Shabab imposed dress
requirements and also forced people to go to the mosque. The appellant was
asked whether it was contrary to his religion to pay taxes because he disagreed
with how the money would be spent and whether it would be against his
principles to pay taxes here. He stated that once people started working in the
UK, tax was deducted but that in return if they fell ill they knew the
government would support them. He questioned what Al Shabab would use the taxes
paid to them for.
63.
In
re-examination the appellant was asked why it had taken a month to get an
appointment to see a specialist. He stated that he had been told by his GP that
he would have to wait for a few weeks for an appointment. He stated that he had
got fed up of waiting and on 25th May he called the hospital to ask whether he
could have an appointment. None were available at the time but shortly
afterwards he was contacted and offered an appointment for 16th July.
64.
The
appellant was asked why he had not had contact with any clan members since he
left Somalia. He stated that he had no phone cards and no money to spend on
calling them. He added that if he did call they would ask him for money. In any
event, he added, he did not know their numbers.
65.
In
response to questions from the Tribunal, the appellant said that he had left
his wife and children alone. He was asked how he had thought they would be able
to manage without any support. He stated that he had been in the Bakara area
when all his travel arrangements were made and he had no time to go and see his
wife. The question was repeated. He stated that he had been in Bakara for three
days and there was no time to go home. He was asked whether he had considered
using his money to move himself and his family somewhere closer where they
could all be safe. He stated he had never thought of that; he only thought that
he had to save himself and escape.
66.
The
appellant was asked to clarify his earlier evidence about people being made to
go and pray. He stated that his religion required people to wash themselves
before prayers but if they were seen on the streets they would be taken and
made to go to the mosque. He stated that some mosques might have facilities for
ablutions but his main objection was to people being forced to go and pray. He
confirmed that there were five times a day for praying and that those times did
not differ in Al Shabab areas. That completed the appellant's evidence.
Dr Laura Hammond
67.
Dr
Hammond confirmed that the contents of her report were a truthful response to
the questions that had been put to her in the letter of instructions from
Wilson Solicitors. She stated that she had undertaken research in the Horn of
Africa from 1992 and had lived in Ethiopia between then and 1997. She had been
involved in working for the UNDP repatriating refugees from Ethiopia back to Somalia. She had spent time in Puntland, Somaliland and the Gedo region and had
returned there in early 2002 and late 2008. Meanwhile she had continued her
research on Somalia and in 2008 had done some further work for the UN which
included advising the UK government. She had returned to the region twice in
2011 examining six sites in southern and central Somalia (although she had
remained in Nairobi) and the position of the Somali Diaspora in Nairobi, Oslo,
London, Dubai, Toronto and Minneapolis. She stated that last week she had been
in the Horn teaching for the Rift Valley Institute and giving a training course
in Kenya where she had been able to speak to many people who had just returned
from the Accord meeting in Kampala. She stated that her expertise was in
applied and academic work with Somalis and non Somalis who had worked in this
area for a very long time. She stated that by comparison she was regarded as a
junior and she had nineteen years of experience. She had extensive contacts
among the UN and NGOs and amongst the aid community. She also had dealings with
people of all clan groups and from all walks of life in the Diaspora.
68.
Dr
Hammond was asked whether her assessment had changed since she wrote the
report. She replied that the area under the control of AMISOM and the TFG had
expanded since then and there was an increase in fighting around Bakara market.
She referred to a recent incident where an airport VIP guard leaving a mosque
had been killed by a suicide bomber and also to the assassination of the
interior minister. She stated that the TFG was not a functioning structure and
there was a crisis over whether its mandate would be extended. She said those
in the know predicted that the TFG would lose the expanded area of control as
they did not have the capability to maintain it. She explained, when asked for
clarification, that the TFG had never been very strong, that it had been set up
in 2004 under donor led pressure and had never been popular. Its mandate was
due to expire in August 2011 and it had pushed for a three-year extension which
was not accepted. However, a one-year extension had been approved in Kampala on the condition that the Prime Minister resigned. People on the ground in TFG
areas wanted an election and were not happy that the Prime Minister had been
forced to resign; as a result there were currently protests on the streets.
69.
Dr
Hammond confirmed that she was aware of people who voluntarily travelled to Mogadishu. She explained that these would be aid workers, society leaders, business people
and contractors working at the airport. She agreed that they were taking a risk
in returning there. She explained that when an aircraft landed at Mogadishu airport it had to dip down sharply on the runway and then stop before it reached
the end of the runway so as to avoid being hit by mortar shells. She stated
people then disembarked from the aircraft and ran towards the airport building.
She agreed that AMISOM control was tight at the airport. She stated that
important personnel travelled between the airport and Villa Somalia in armed military vehicles. For the ‘ordinary’ Somali, she stated it was not advisable to
hire security escorts or guards as that would invite attention and suspicion
from the TFG and Al Shabab. She stated that some people travelled with a few
armed guards in a car behind them. People minimised risk by coming in to Mogadishu, staying for short periods and leaving as soon as possible. She pointed out that
their families lived elsewhere.
70.
Dr
Hammond was asked about the reference to Ceelasha Biyaha referred to at
paragraph 1.18 of her report. She stated it was an area on the outskirts of
Waberi, further down the coast from the airport. She stated that in order for
people from that area to reach the market they would have to pass through
roadblocks. She stated that although AMISOM posted patrols on main roads which
they checked on a daily basis for landmines and other security risks, they did
not clear the secondary roads. She was asked what inferences could be drawn
from the reports that thousands of people used the roads to cross to Bakara
market. She stated that people knew there were risks but they had to purchase
goods they needed and they had to work. This was part of daily life. Although
many people were injured in the marketplace, risks had to be taken. The
conflict had been ongoing for some twenty years and residents had normalised a
certain amount of risk which they balanced against daily life challenges.
71.
Dr
Hammond was referred to her observations on the capacity of people to obtain
protection (paragraph 1.17 of her report) and was asked whether she would have
given the same reply two or three years ago. She stated that she would not have
done so. She said that two or three years ago it was much more about clan
politics but now the situation had shifted. Support was drawn from a range of
clans although there was a breakdown of clan protection in the city. She
pointed out that the president’s own clan (the Hawiye) had demonstrated against
him and that the interior minister had been killed by his niece. She said that
the impact of the conflict on the economy had meant that those who were
powerful in the past had had their positions challenged. Some were no longer as
wealthy, some had to pay protection money to Al Shabab and some had had to
change their allegiances. There was a different situation now as to who held
power compared to the situation five years ago. Even if someone had been in a
position to provide protection before, due to the impact of the conflict there
was no longer any guarantee that they would be in a position to do so now.
72.
Dr
Hammond was asked whether there were any organisations in Somalia which promoted the return of displaced people to Mogadishu. She stated there were none. She
explained that most international organisations had no access to displaced
people who were largely in the Afgoye corridor. The last estimate was that
409,000 displaced people lived there. She stated that all international
organisations agreed that it was not appropriate to send people back there.
Those who returned were aid workers or people who were able to come and go
quickly and who knew they could seek shelter in the airport if necessary or
could leave the country. The average Somali could not do that; they did not
have the resources or necessary travel documents.
73.
Dr
Hammond was asked to explain why Al Shabab tried to control Somali behaviour
(paragraph 1.37). She explained that their ideology claimed to be a literal
interpretation of the Quran. They fought different kinds of Jihad, inside Somalia and also internationally, and additionally a personal jihad to control behaviour,
maintain purity and resist temptation. She was asked to explain why people
returning from the West would be suspected of being spies (1.41). She stated
that someone who had travelled to the West and applied for asylum would be seen
as someone trying to escape the movement and their loyalties would be seen as
being with the West. Al Shabab had a hostile attitude towards the West which it
viewed as a corrupting force drawing people away from purity and therefore
considered those returning from the West as spies or informants. The
consequences could be torture or execution, often without evidence. She stated
it was unclear what provoked this reaction as in all the cases she had seen
there was no evidence to support the suspicion that the people were spies. She
added that as many of the suicide bombers had been people returning from the
West; the TFG were also suspicious of them.
74.
Dr
Hammond elaborated on her comments about patron client relationships pertaining
to AF, a Madhiban (Midgan) clan member (paragraph 2.4). She stated that such a
relationship ensured somewhere for the client to live and work but this
protection did not extend to physical protection. She stated that AF had been
away from Somalia for some time and because of the economic collapse the war
had brought to many people, the arrangement of who had power had changed since
that time. There were questions as to whether the person who had provided him
with support in the past would still be able to do so. She explained that
protection in this sense did not transfer from one individual to another and
other clan members would not feel the same responsibility to someone who had
been protected by one of their members.
75.
Dr Hammond
stated that she had met AMM just before the hearing commenced. She was asked
whether there was anything about him that would make him identifiable as an
outsider if he returned to Somalia. She stated that it would be clear that he
was wearing clothes bought outside Somalia, that he looked healthy and was
rather heavy, all of which suggested he was relatively well off. That would
make people suspect that he had come from a foreign country or that he had
access to wealth and either he or his family members could be kidnapped and
held for ransom. If he returned to Jowhar, which was where he was from, that
could be a problem as he did not have a beard.
76.
Dr
Hammond was asked for her reaction to the statements taken from people in Nairobi by a team of solicitors from Wilsons. She stated that given the short period of
time involved, she was impressed by the wide range of people who had been
located and interviewed; these included the former prime minister, residents of
Eastleigh and aid workers. She agreed the contents of their statements were
entirely consistent with her own knowledge of the situation. She pointed out
that if aid workers or NGO staff were questioned about their experiences, many
might be unwilling to speak on record for fear of putting themselves or their
organisations at risk particularly if they lived in Al Shabab areas. She
confirmed that although she sat on a panel charged with reviewing country of
origin information, there was no independent review of the fact-finding mission
report or the OGNs as the latter contained policy information.
77.
When
questioned specifically about ZF, Dr Hammond stated that she would have to be
met by somebody at Mogadishu airport and transport to Hargeisa would have to be
arranged. If the journey was made over land she would have to travel by bus or
minibus from Mogadishu through south-central Somalia and through Gulkayo. All
these areas were under Al Shabab control except for Gulkayo which was under the
control of a different militia. If she was wearing foreign clothing or had a
suitcase which looked as though it had been purchased abroad, or if she wore
jewellery she would be noticed and would be vulnerable particularly travelling
alone. Women were under the most scrutiny regarding their dress and behaviour.
She would then have to pass through Puntland, and North Gulkayo tended to
return people to South Gulkayo if they were not from that area. Assuming she
made it through, she would then have to cross the border into Somaliland. She
would have to show that she had family waiting for her and they might have to
be questioned before she was admitted. In all, it was a perilous journey.
Additionally, she might be made to pay fees at roadblocks and she could be
robbed, beaten or arrested if she breached behaviour and dress codes. She
stated that a relatively speedy journey would take three or four days but it
had been known to take weeks. She stated that one would have to stay overnight
when the bus stopped and if she had no family she would have to remain on the
bus. An unaccompanied woman would have difficulties in being accepted at a
hotel.
78.
With
regard to MW who had no family in Somalia, Dr Hammond said it was unclear who
would be able to meet her at the airport. As her area of Merka was under Al
Shabab control it would be difficult even if she had family members for them to
travel from Merka to Mogadishu. As she had been away from Somalia for twelve years, the situation was nothing like it was when she had left. She would now be
required to cover herself from head to toe, cover her face, leave no hair
showing, and wear thick socks and, possibly, gloves. As traditional Somali
dress sometimes revealed the shoulder and hair, the expectation that she would
immediately be able to fall into the new dress code was not realistic. She
referred to an incident a week ago where several indigenous Somali women were
arrested for expressing joy at a wedding. The point she wanted to make was that
even though they had lived there all their lives and would have been aware of
behavioural codes, this was unexpected.
79.
Dr
Hammond explained that children were seen as the asset of a clan which had
responsibility for raising them and making sure cultural expectations were met.
If a mother objected to FGM it was not enough. If the clan were in favour of
circumcision then the child could be subjected to the procedure at any time
when the mother was absent. The only option available to the mother would be to
leave the family but as Al Shabab did not permit women to work, she needed
family support to survive. As long as a woman remained living with her family
she would be unable to withstand pressure to have her daughters circumcised. If
she were to leave the family, she would need some other means to survive.
Widows were sometimes married off to soldiers in Al Shabab areas and she would
be vulnerable to that.
80.
Dr
Hammond was asked whether MW’s divorce in the UK would be accepted as a valid
Islamic divorce by Al Shabab. She replied that if it had been granted by the UK courts and not in accordance with Islamic practice, then there was the chance that it
would not be accepted as valid. This could have consequences for MW as she had
three children by her second husband. It would depend on the attitude of her
first husband's clan who may not accept that she had left them and who may make
claims on the children, their education, the issue of FGM and whether they
should be recruited into armed service.
81.
In
cross-examination by Mr Eicke, Dr Hammond was asked whether she was aware of
the guidance on the preparation of expert reports contained in the practice
directions. She confirmed that she was. She stated that she believed that she
had provided a balanced picture. She confirmed that she was a social
anthropologist and stated that her academic research had focused on refugees
and that she was aware of refugee law. She was also convener on an MSc
programme on migration. When questioned about her comments on linguistic
analyses, she stated that in reviewing country of origin information she had
seen questions asked about the usefulness of Sprakab reports and that she was
aware of challenges to them. She admitted that she had not been aware that this
matter had been considered by the Tribunal in 2010.
82.
Dr
Hammond stated that she had last been in Somaliland in 2008. When she conducted
her research between June 2010 and May 2011 she had been the team leader for a
group of researchers some of whom were in South and Central Somalia. She
explained that they were local researchers living in those areas. The research
had pertained to investors who received money from abroad and the manner in
which they were perceived. She stated that people were reluctant to talk about
receiving money from the Diaspora for fear of making themselves a target for
extortion or of being seen as a spy. She stated that the information fed back
to her was that people were worried that information they gave would be traced
back to them by Al Shabab and they would be suspected of having foreign
allegiances. It was put to her that the social services providers she had
referred to were mainly returnees yet they had returned without problems and
were playing important roles in the community. She replied that it depended on
where they were. More had returned to TFG controlled areas. She explained that
some people who returned came and went making use of the fact that they had
durable residence in another country or foreign citizenship in order to facilitate
their travels. She was questioned about the lack of interview transcripts in
her material. She stated that two transcripts had been provided with it but the
other information contained in her report had not been undertaken specifically
for this case and that it would be impossible for her to keep track of all the
interviews and conversations she had ever had. She stated that it was not her
practice to keep transcripts of all the interviews she conducted. She stated
that the situation was different for researchers preparing the fact-finding
mission report because they did not have her experience or knowledge and so
they had to follow a list of set questions. She explained that she had prepared
her report in the way that she had because she had been asked to provide her
own opinion of the answers she had been given. She stated she had undertaken
research in Nairobi about Somalis travelling back and forth to Somalia and had been told that they did so for business reasons. They did not consider Mogadishu to be safe but managed to minimise the risk by making short trips.
83.
In
clarifying the information contained in paragraph 1.50 of the report, Dr
Hammond stated that the UN source she had cited was the same person who had
been interviewed in transcript 2 that the information had been contained in a
conversation that had taken place outside the interview context. It had been
about displaced people in the Afgoye corridor who were not assisted by
international workers but were helped instead by local businessmen or the
Diaspora. She cited an example of a recent incident where a business woman had
set aside $10,000 for distribution in the Afgoye corridor.
84.
It was
pointed out to Dr Hammond that she had relied on just two reports – Human
Rights Watch and the Fact Finding Mission - in reaching her analysis. She was
asked why she had not referred to the vast number of other available reports
contained, for example, in the respondent’s bundle. She replied that she did
not find the UN Security Council reports to be particularly reliable because
they had a particular agenda and that she had not referred, for example, to the
Oxfam or Landinfo reports not because of neglect but because of the wide range
of information that was available. She conceded that the two latter reports
were reliable. She was asked why she had relied upon the UN monitoring group
report of March 2010 and she replied she found it to be a more authoritative
source than the UN Security Council. She explained this was the last report
that had been prepared by them although a more up-to-date one was expected
soon. She also explained that she was analysing how the situation had changed
since 2008 following the end of the Ethiopian occupation. The monitoring group
report had been relied on to show how the situation had changed for combatants
in the intervening period. She explained that the shift had occurred with the
withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and the rise of Al Shabab; suicide bombings had
begun at this time rather than before.
85.
Dr
Hammond was asked to comment upon the reliability of UNOCHA. She stated that
they had a reasonable understanding of what was going on but had no presence in
Al Shabab areas. They were less reliable than organisations not associated with
the UN. Questions were then put about the figures from the Elman peace
organisation cited at paragraph 3.3 of her report. She agreed that it was
unclear whether the so-called rise in casualty figures was a comparison to the
2009 figures or to the earlier and higher 2007 figures. She stated, however,
that not all casualties were reported. She had cited the figures because they
had been requested although she remained sceptical about them. However, as far
as figures went, they were a reliable reflection of the information that was
available. She suggested that the organisation may not have access to figures
of casualties in other areas. She explained that the risks to the population
between 2006 and 2009 were different and that the shift in tactics had led to
random violence and bombings, all of which are impacted on civilians. She
stated that in considering the drop in the number of casualties in Mogadishu cited by the Elman peace organisation, one had to bear in mind the enormous
displacement of the population from the city. She stated that a drop in
absolute numbers when 1 million people had left did not provide any indication
of whether the risk to them had decreased. She agreed that the city was more
clearly delineated between two factions now than it was previously. She was
asked whether that could be an improvement for civilians in Mogadishu. She
stated that it was possible to live in areas which posed fewer risks but given
that all civilians would need to get to Bakara market they would have to cross
riskier areas. She explained that TFG areas had expanded since the report had
been written and there were safer residential areas but civilians could not
survive in those areas alone. She gave the example of the district of Hamar
JaabJab; it was a smaller area and a resident would have to travel outside for
facilities. Additionally, Al Shabab were able to infiltrate and attack TFG
controlled areas. She agreed that there were at least seventeen markets in Mogadishu (as listed on the map key) and that one of them was shown to be in Hamar JaabJab.
However she insisted that civilians would still have to travel outside the area
to Bakara, which was a large commercial centre providing a range of services,
including money transfer.
86.
Dr
Hammond was asked to explain how the citation she had given of a journalist’s
article in paragraph 1.12 of her report could be used to justify her conclusion
that the information as to the extent of TFG control was unreliable. She stated
that this passage emanated from an article written by Geoffrey York who had
visited areas under AMISOM control and had found that in fact they were not
controlled by AMISOM. It was put to her about the quotation contained in her
report did not support that finding. She stated that there were other ways he
established that control was not as great as it was claimed to be. She was
asked whether she had seen any other figures of areas under TFG control and she
stated that there were no composite figures but she had seen reports where it
was said that areas claimed to be under AMISOM control were not in fact so
controlled. She stated there were some 9,000 AMISOM troops in Somalia.
87.
Dr
Hammond was referred to the information contained in Dr Mullen’s report that
80% of the fighting in Mogadishu was centred around Bakara market. She was
asked whether that meant that the risk for civilians was not as high outside
that area as it was in 2008. She replied that some areas of Mogadishu were
deserted. Many residents had fled to the Afgoye corridor. However there were
risks wherever people remained and Bakara was one of those places. The TFG now
had control over the access road and had plans to take control of that area but
it would be a tough fight and as the TFG was in some confusion at the current
time, now was not the moment to launch an attack to do so. They were waiting
for the right time. When asked to clarify her earlier comment about people
taking to the streets to protest, she clarified that supporters of the Prime
Minister had demonstrated on the streets and demanded the resignation of the
speaker and the president instead. She was asked whether that meant that people
felt safe enough to protest on the streets. She said that some did but there
had been retaliation by the police and it was not without risk. She explained
that there were times when people felt frustrated enough to behave in this way
and pointed to an example in 2008 when people had protested about the increase
in food prices. She said the TFG was not able to quell the protests and Al
Shabab took advantage of the unrest to attack as they had recently done at the
seaport. She agreed that the list of districts controlled by the TFG provided
in the Mullen report was mostly correct although the district of Hodan was not
entirely under TFG control. She was shown a map of conflict areas (respondent's
volume 3, Tab 13, p.1485). She was asked where Bakara market was and she said
it was in the centre of Hawal Wadaag.
88.
Dr
Hammond was shown a news report about Bakara being a no-fire zone. She stated
that AMISOM had issued such statements before but had breached them. They were
unpopular with the civilian population because they fired indiscriminately and
showed no concern for civilians. Whilst they did not fire around the market
area, casualties would drop however things could change in weeks or months; this
was not a long-term picture. The only reason they had not taken the market at
the moment was because they did not have the ability to maintain it. She said
that when AMISOM troops were attacked by Al Shabab, their response was always
to fire into the market regardless of where the attack had come from.
89.
Dr
Hammond was referred to pages 273 and 288 of respondent's volume 1 regarding
relocation to Mogadishu. She stated that the airport compound was secure and
that the AMISOM compound was also safer now than it had been about troops were
unable to travel around the city and it was a ‘bunkerised’ presence.
90.
Dr
Hammond was referred to paragraph 1.13 of her report and asked what dates this
estimate was based on. She said she was unsure. Different figures from different
reports were put to her pointing to the unreliability of statistics and she
agreed that figures were difficult to obtain. She was asked whether she agreed
with the UNHCR paper contained at Tab 6, respondent's volume 1, on displacement
and nomadic lifestyles. She stated that the 60% figure applied to the whole of Somalia and that lifestyles were more nomadic in the north and the north east.
91.
With
regard to safety on return to Mogadishu, Dr Hammond agreed that armed escorts
were not needed between the city and the airport because they could be
counter-productive but she stated that travel was a risk nevertheless. She
stated that ordinary Somalis would not use an armed escort because they did not
have access to any but even if they did it would be seen as a risk. She stated
she had asked people how they had travelled around and was told they used
minibuses or taxis. She stated that there used to be clan-based armed buses on
the streets but these had been prohibited by Al Shabab. She agreed that the
situation inside the airport had improved.
92.
Dr
Hammond was referred to paragraph 3.21-3.25 of Mr Burns' report on airport
security. She said she had never heard of a deal being made between Al Shabab
and the TFG/AMISOM. She stated that although it was secure in the airport,
people inside had been passing information on to Al Shabab. This was
illustrated by the incident last week of an airport VIP guard who had been
killed when leaving a mosque. She said that Somalis were not allowed into a
number of areas housing aid workers. She stated that although the road to the
airport was currently controlled by AMISOM, the situation could change at any
time.
93.
It was
put to Dr Hammond that her reference to a checkpoint in her report (1.23 to
1.24) was about a roadblock in Afgoye rather than in the city of Mogadishu. She agreed there was no information about checkpoints in Mogadishu. It was put
to her that the quotation did not support her analysis of risks and checkpoints
and that perhaps the reason why there were no reports of problems with Mogadishu checkpoints was that there weren't any problems. She said that there were
articles which dealt with forced recruitment of young men at checkpoints. She
said the only information in the fact-finding mission report about checkpoints
was the information she had provided and she did not believe that the
experience of people at checkpoints differed regardless of whether or not they
were inside or outside Mogadishu. She stated that we knew checkpoints in Mogadishu existed because a leader had recently been killed at one.
94.
With
regard to the issue of forced recruitment, Dr Hammond was referred to Mr
Burns's report which maintained that it did not frequently occur. She stated
that Al Shabab had a sophisticated way of compelling people to join them. They
used a range of tactics including threatening to harm family members and
putting pressure on schools to p