AI v16
Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
HM and others (Article 15(c))
Iraq CG [2012] UKUT 00409(IAC)
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Field House
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Determination Promulgated
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On 30 April, 1-4 May and 12 October 2012
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…………………………………
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Before
MR JUSTICE COLLINS
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STOREY
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ALLEN
Between
HM
rm
hF
Appellants
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr M Fordham QC,
Ms S Naik and Ms B Poynor, instructed by Sutovic & Hartigan in respect of
the first two appellants and Mr M Fordham QC and Mr T Hussain, instructed by
Parker Rhodes Hickmott Solicitors in the case of the third appellant
For the Respondent: Mr C Staker and Mr D
Blundell, instructed by the Treasury Solicitor
A. Law
a)
The guidance as
to the law relating to Article 15(c) of the Refugee Qualification Directive
2004/83/EC given by the Tribunal in HM and Others (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG
[2010] UKUT 331 (IAC) (“HM1”) at [62]-[78] is reaffirmed. Of particular
importance is the observation in HM1 that decision-makers ensure that following
Elgafaji, Case C-465/07; [2009] EUECJ and QD (Iraq) [2009] EWCA Civ 620, in
situations of armed conflict in which civilians are affected by the fighting,
the approach to assessment of the level of risk of indiscriminate violence must
be an inclusive one, subject only to the need for there to be a sufficient
causal nexus between the violence and the conflict.
b)
Given that
country guidance cases may have an impact on a large number of asylum cases and
appeals, their significance in saving costs in future cases, quite apart from
their general importance, should require consideration of the grant of legal
aid for representation in the public interest.
c)
Whilst the Upper
Tribunal will do all it can to ensure representation in a country guidance
case, it cannot be excluded that in highly unusual circumstances such a case
would proceed without claimant representation.
d)
Though very
considerable weight is almost always to be attached to UNHCR guidelines on risk
categories in particular countries, it is not accepted that departure from the
guidelines should only take place for a cogent and identified reason. Cases are
to be decided on the basis of all the evidence and arguments presented to the
Tribunal.
B. Country guidance
- Whilst the focus of the present decision is the current
situation in Iraq, nothing in the further evidence now available indicates
that the conclusions that the Tribunal in HM1 reached about country
conditions in Iraq were wrong.
- As regards the current situation, the evidence does not
establish that the degree of indiscriminate violence characterising the
current armed conflict taking place in the five central governorates in
Iraq, namely Baghdad, Diyala, Tameen (Kirkuk), Ninewah, Salah Al-Din, is
at such a high level that substantial grounds have been shown for
believing that any civilian returned there would solely on account of his
presence there face a real risk of being subject to that threat.
- Nor does the evidence establish that there is a real risk
of serious harm under Article 15(c) for civilians who are Sunni or Shi’a
or Kurds or have former Ba’ath Party connections: these characteristics do
not in themselves amount to “enhanced risk categories” under Article
15(c)’s “sliding scale” (see [39] of Elgafaji).
- Further evidence that has become available since the
Tribunal heard MK (documents - relocation) Iraq CG [2012] UKUT 126 (IAC)
does not warrant any departure from its conclusions on internal relocation
alternatives in the KRG or in central or southern Iraq save that the
evidence is now sufficient to establish the existence of a Central Archive
maintained by the Iraqi authorities retaining civil identity records on
microfiche, which provides a further way in which a person can identify
themselves and obtain a copy of their CSID, whether from abroad or within
Iraq.
- Regarding the issue of whether there would be a risk of
treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR arising from returns from the UK to Baghdad Interna tional Airport (BIAP):
a.
If a national of
Iraq who has failed to establish that conditions inside Iraq are unsafe is
compulsorily returned to Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) on either a
current or expired Iraqi passport, there is no real risk of detention in the
course of BIAP procedures (except possibly in respect of those who are the
subject of a judicial order or arrest warrant). Nor is there such a risk if
such a person chooses to make a voluntary return with a laissez passer document
which can be issued by the Iraqi embassy in the UK.
b.
If, however,
such a person is compulsorily returned to BIAP without either a current or
expired Iraqi passport, he may be at risk of detention in the course of BIAP
procedures and it cannot be excluded that the detention conditions might give
rise to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR. Such a risk is
however, purely academic in the UK context because under the current UK returns policy there will be no compulsory return of persons lacking such documents.
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
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Paragraph |
INTRODUCTION |
1 |
HM1 |
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HM2 |
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Country guidance cases and representation |
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Inquisitorial role |
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The CG issues |
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Geographical application |
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UNHCR materials |
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Presentation of evidence |
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LEGAL FRAMEWORK |
31 |
The law relating to Article 15(c) |
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THE APPELLANTS |
46 |
HM and RM |
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HF |
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY |
52 |
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UNHCHR ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES ON IRAQ AND OTHER KEY MATERIALS |
55 |
UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines |
|
2009 |
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2012 |
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UKBA Iraq Operational Guidance Note (OGN) |
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Tribunal CG and related case law |
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Position in Europe |
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ECtHR cases |
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THE EVIDENCE |
84 |
Expert evidence |
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Dr George: |
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written report |
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oral evidence |
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Dr Fatah: |
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written report |
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oral evidence |
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BACKGROUND EVIDENCE |
107 |
Statistics on violence |
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The inclusive approach |
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Iraq as a whole |
115 |
Parties to the conflict |
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State and coalition actors |
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Insurgents |
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Level and intensity of violence |
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Targeted violence |
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Civilian casualties |
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Targeting of civilians |
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Combatant casualties |
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Sunnis and Shi'as |
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Kurds |
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Former Ba'athists |
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Comparison with other conflicts |
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Population displacement |
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State weakness and protection issues |
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Socio-economic conditions |
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International assistance |
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Returns packages |
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Returns to Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) |
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Returns and documentation |
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Documentation and access to services |
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Internal travel |
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Returnees from the west |
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Provincial level |
189 |
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Tameen Governorate and Kirkuk |
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Baghdad Governorate and Baghdad |
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Diyala Governorate |
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Ninewah Governorate and Mosul |
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Salah al Din Governorate |
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Al Anbar Governorate |
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Levels of violence in the five central governorates-overall picture |
215 |
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KRG |
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SUBMISSIONS |
222 |
The appellants' case |
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The respondent's case |
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Submissions on internal relocation |
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OUR ASSESSMENT 15(c) |
259 |
Confinement to Article |
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The expert evidence |
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Initial observations |
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Comparison with other conflicts |
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The inclusive approach |
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The inclusive approach: other metrics |
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The UNHCR Guidelines |
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Patterns of violence and trends |
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The situation province-by-province |
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Enhanced risk categories |
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Sunni/Shi'a |
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Kurds |
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Former Ba'athists |
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State protection |
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Socio-economic conditions |
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Returnees from the west |
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Position in Europe |
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Documents relating to returns |
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Risk on return at BIAP |
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Returns to Erbil |
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Safety of internal travel |
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Documentation and access to services |
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The future situation |
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Internal relocation |
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MK and internal relocation within the KRG |
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Relocation to central and southern Iraq |
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CONCLUSIONS: GENERAL |
359 |
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THE APPELLANTS' CASES |
361 |
HM and RM |
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HF |
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APPENDIX |
A |
GLOSSARY |
G |
DETERMINATION AND REASONS
1. All three members of
the tribunal hearing these appeals have contributed to this determination. At
the end there is a glossary of terms so as to help readers follow the various
acronyms.
2. This is a country
guidance (CG) case which is concerned to decide whether Article 15(c) of
Council Directive 2004/83/EC (the Qualification Directive)
prevents removal of Iraqi nationals who have no particular reason to be at real
risk of persecution within the meaning of the Refugee Convention or of
treatment which requires them to be accorded humanitarian protection under
Article 15(a) or 15(b) of the same directive. The three appellants are young
men whose accounts, which sought to establish that they would be at risk on
return, were rejected. In each case, the immigration judge who heard their
appeals did not believe their account. In the case of HM and RM, whose appeals
were heard together, the judge found their accounts to be ‘deeply
implausible’. In HF’s case, the judge decided that his account was not credible.
In the result, each appellant is to be regarded as a young man who has no
distinguishing characteristics other than (1) his place of residence in Iraq;
(2) in the case of HM and RM, his Kurdish ethnic origin; and (3) in the case of
HF, his identity as a Sunni Muslim Arab and possible indirect links with the
Ba’ath Party.
3. The appeals of RM
and HM were heard by an immigration judge in June 2008. The appeal of HF was
heard by an immigration judge in June 2009. It will be necessary to refer to the
procedural history to explain the unfortunate delay in dealing with these
appeals. That delay is even more unfortunate since there has been a difference
of view among EU Member States on whether return to Iraq or certain parts of
Iraq is possible and certain aspects of this question are pending before the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the case of YA v UK (see below
[80]) who have said they will postpone a decision until they have seen our
determination. The result of the delay has been to create legal uncertainty as
to the proper disposal of a very significant number of cases involving Iraqis
who fall into the same category as these appellants.
HM1
4. The appeals of HM
and RM together with two other appellants ASA and AA were chosen as CG cases to
determine the Article 15(c) issue. They came before the Tribunal constituted
by the President, Blake J, sitting with Upper Tribunal Judges Storey and Allen
on 8 June 2010, having been fixed for 7 June 2010. A report from an expert, a
Dr Herring, had been obtained by Refugee and Migrant Justice (RMJ) who were
then acting for HM and RM. It seems that that report was not obtained until
the end of May. In any event, on 1 June 2010 Wilson & Co, who were acting
on behalf of AA, indicated to the tribunal that in the light of Dr Herring’s
report, they could no longer continue to act on his behalf. On the same day
RMJ indicated that they were no longer instructed by their clients. When the
case was called on 8 June 2010, counsel appeared for the solicitors stating
that instructions were withdrawn. HM and RM attended later in the day and said
they wished for their appeals to go ahead and to be represented by RMJ.
5. The Tribunal for the
reasons given in [36 – 39] of its decision, HM and Others (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG [2010] UKUT 331 (IAC) (hereafter “HM1”), indicated that in the
circumstances it was unwilling to accede to the request for the appeals to be
withdrawn. There was, it was said, an overriding public interest in proceeding
to determine them. ASA had not applied for his appeal to be withdrawn, but he
was not represented. UNCHR had been permitted to intervene and so to
participate in the proceedings and had submitted detailed written grounds
putting forward its view that compulsory returns should not occur because of
the application of Article 15(c).
6. The Tribunal found
itself facing a real dilemma. Country guidance on the application of Article
15(c) application in Iraq was required as soon as practicably possible since
the ECtHR and many other cases were awaiting it. Time and money had been spent
preparing for the appeals and the delay, waste of money and problems which
would result in endeavouring to find suitable appeals in which appellants were
represented were obvious. In [47] of its decision, the Tribunal indicated why
it decided that the appeals should proceed. It said this:-
“…We had the benefit of a
detailed skeleton argument from the respondent, although it did not bear a
burden of establishing a negative in this case, and it had been sensibly
anticipated that its skeleton argument should address the appellants’ case
rather than deal with protection issues entirely in the abstract. The hearing
took the form of an elaboration of aspects of the written arguments by reference
to the factual materials, a formal response to the written submissions of the
UNHCR, and response to questions put by members of the Tribunal as to various
matters of law, fact and the practicalities of the intended return to Iraq. At the end of the hearing, some information remained outstanding or subject to
confirmation in writing. We asked that it be provided within 14 days, RM and
HM indicated they would like to receive a copy of this further information and
we directed that it should be sent to them. Whilst our decision was under
consideration further information relating to the return of failed asylum
seekers to Iraq came to our attention and we asked for further information from
UNHCR and from the respondent, the appellants again being copied in. This was
provided to us in accordance with the time limits set and is considered below.
We are again grateful to all those who assisted us.”
7. In due course, the
Tribunal decided that enforced returns could take place because the degree of
indiscriminate violence did not reach such a high level in any part of Iraq as
to show substantial grounds for believing that any civilian returned there
would face a real risk within the meaning of Article 15(c) and further, even if
such a risk had been shown to exist in some areas of Iraq, internal relocation
would achieve safety and would not in all the circumstances be unduly harsh.
HM2
8. HM and RM appealed
this decision. The appeal was brought on procedural and substantive grounds,
but the Court did not find it necessary to deal with any of the substantive
grounds since it allowed the appeal on procedural grounds. In its judgment HM
(Iraq) [2011] EWCA Civ 1536 (hereafter “HM2”), the Court quashed
the determination and remitted the case to the Tribunal. Most unfortunately,
the decision of the Court of Appeal was not given until 15 December 2011. It
was then necessary to ensure that there were appeals which could represent the
proper scope of the Article 15(c) issue and that all relevant material was
available. Following three days of hearing in April/May, it was decided to
reconvene for further submissions in October 2012, primarily to ensure that the
Tribunal had full argument on the new UNHCR Guidelines (UNHCR Eligibility
Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers
From Iraq, 31 May 2012 (hereafter “UNHCR Guidelines”), which had become
available in early June 2012 The appellants were properly represented before
us under legal aid and there were very experienced counsel and solicitors on
both sides. In addition, we had written representations from the UNHCR. The
appellants produced reports from two experts, who have given evidence before
the Tribunal in other cases involving Iraq, Drs Alan George and Rebwar Fatah.
Each gave oral evidence before us and we are grateful for their assistance
which we found most helpful.
Country guidance cases
and representation
9. The main argument
raised before the Court of Appeal in HM2 was that there must be, as Mr
Fordham Q.C. put it, “a proper contradictor”, as the authoritative status of a
CG case was akin to a declaration given by a court. While the Court did not
accept Mr Fordham’s contention that as a matter of legal principle there had to
be a proper contradictor in a CG case, it accepted his alternative submission
that the Tribunal erred in the exercise of its discretion in proceeding with
the particular country guidance determination without adequate consideration of
whether proper argument could be secured (see [49] of Richards LJ’s judgment).
10. The Court’s view was
that there were steps which the Tribunal could have taken but did not take in
trying to secure that proper argument on the appellants’ behalf might be
secured.
11. The first suggestion
was that UNHCR might be willing to participate beyond written submissions.
However, in a letter to the Tribunal dated 5 March 2012 UNCHR has made it clear
that it would not, even in the exceptional circumstances such as existed, be
prepared to represent an appellant directly since that could compromise its
objectivity in future cases in which it was involved and was willing to
intervene.
12. The second
possibility suggested was to invite the Attorney General to appoint an amicus
curiae. An amicus is not normally instructed ‘to lead evidence, cross-examine
witnesses or investigate the facts’ – see the Memorandum from the Lord Chief
Justice and the Attorney General set out in Volume 1 of the White Book at
pp.1144-1148. In the light of this, it is difficult to see how in a case such
as this, which involves close examination of expert witnesses and very detailed
fact-finding, that an amicus could properly be provided. In a letter dated 7
March 2012, the Attorney General’s reaction to a question from the Tribunal
whether in the light of Richards LJ’s judgment an amicus would be likely to be
provided has been decidedly lukewarm since he has said he would, as is entirely
proper, follow the terms of the memorandum.
13. The Legal Services
Commission (LSC) was asked whether funding could be supplied in circumstances
such as arose in HM1. Its response as set out in a letter of 8 February
2012 has been negative. The LSC has explained that it can take the wider public
interest into account in determining an application for funding, but, in accordance
with s.4 of the Access to Justice Act 1988, it must act to secure that
individuals have access to services that effectively meet their needs. Thus it
is said that if an applicant’s representative certifies that prospects of
success are poor rather than simply borderline, the LSC would have no
discretion other than to refuse to fund the case.
14. It is necessary to
take stock. Inquiries made of UNHCR and the Attorney General have made clear
that the Tribunal cannot look to either of them to assist with missing
representation. The inquiry of the LSC made clear that its statutory remit
affords it no discretion to assist with the funding of a case where prospects
of success are poor. We are aware that the
abolition of the LSC forms part of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of
Offenders Act 2012 which vests powers and functions to the Lord Chancellor for
the administration of legal aid and the creation of a new Executive Agency
within the Ministry of Justice.
The Court of Appeal has indicated that it is important that a claimant is
represented in a CG case so that proper argument can be deployed. This
encompasses in addition to argument on law the ‘drawing of relevant materials
to the attention of the tribunal and the making of submissions as to the effect
of those materials so that the determination is based on as full and informed
an analysis as possible. In the ordinary course that is achieved through both
sides being legally represented’: see per Richards LJ at [39]. In [42] of his
judgment, Richards LJ said this:
“The features of the legal
aid system which precluded the continuation of public funding before the
tribunal are deeply regrettable, all the more so when it is borne in mind that
public funding was granted for the appeal to this court and the overall costs
to public funds will have been far greater than if funding had been continued
at the time for the proceedings before the tribunal.”
15. CG cases are needed
because a particular issue may be or is likely to arise in other cases and the
determination will save the need to consider the issue and so waste time and
money in subsequent cases. The issue is often contentious, as this one is, and
so it can rarely if ever be said that the outcome is likely to be obvious. It
is necessary to ensure that all relevant material is properly considered. In
this case, having regard in particular to UNHCR’s position and the possible contrary
views of some other EU States, the Home Office’s contention might well not have
prevailed and so on its facts there appeared to be an arguable case on behalf
of the appellants. But whether or not that was so, we would urge the
government to recognise that CG cases are chosen with care and that their
importance in saving costs in future cases, quite apart from their general
importance, makes the grant of representation in the public interest highly
desirable irrespective of the view formally taken of the appellant’s/claimant’s
chances of establishing his or her need for international protection.
16. We have indicated the
importance of CG cases and the care with which they are chosen. Their
importance has been implicitly recognised by Parliament in the insertion of
s.107(3) into the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 by s.26(7) of
the Asylum and Immigration Act 2004. This enables the President to issue a
Practice Direction which may require a specified decision of either level
Tribunal to be treated as authoritative in respect of a particular matter. The
relevant Practice Direction states that determinations of either Tribunal or of
the AIT bearing the letters CG shall be treated as an authoritative finding on
the CG issue identified in the determination, based on the evidence before the
Tribunal which decided it. The Court of Appeal has stated that a failure to
follow a CG decision would amount to an error of law unless there was a good
reason for the failure (R (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982). Furthermore, the Tribunal’s refusal to
permit argument to be advanced to challenge a CG decision unless supported by
fresh evidence has been upheld by the Court of Appeal (Ariaya v Secretary of
State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 48).
17. Choice of appropriate
cases which can constitute CG is a difficult and time consuming exercise. It
requires the Tribunal to take into consideration all relevant evidence, usually
consisting of country reports from various interested persons or bodies who
have knowledge of the situation in the country in question. In addition, there
will often be statements obtained from individuals who have a particular
knowledge of and expertise in the country and who will gather together relevant
reports and may be able to give evidence based on their own knowledge or
experiences. These reports will usually be called on behalf of appellants and
will give their opinion on whether return is in the circumstances safe.
18. It must be remembered
that appeals are brought by individuals who claim that they are entitled to
asylum or to humanitarian protection or human rights protection. Appeals in
this jurisdiction are essentially an adversarial process and frequently depend
on whether the appellant is believed to be giving an honest and accurate
account. But it is of obvious importance that the situation in the country to
which an appellant says he or she cannot return in safety should, so far as
material to that particular appellant’s characteristics, be known. If there is
no CG case which covers an appellant, the Tribunal will have to decide for
itself on such evidence as is available in the individual appeal whether safe
return is possible. But the existence of a CG case will enable the Tribunal,
unless there is evidence that the situation has changed since the CG case was
decided, to avoid a time consuming need to decide whether the circumstances
found to apply to the appellant mean that safe return is or is not possible.
As observed by the Court of Appeal in SG (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 940 (13 July 2012):
“46. The system of Country
Guidance determinations enables appropriate resources, in terms of the
representations of the parties to the Country Guidance appeal, expert and
factual evidence and the personnel and time of the Tribunal, to be applied to
the determination of conditions in, and therefore the risks of return for
persons such as the appellants in the Country Guidance appeal to, the country
in question. The procedure is aimed at arriving at a reliable (in the sense of
accurate) determination.
47. It is
for these reasons, as well as the desirability of consistency, that decision
makers and tribunal judges are required to take Country Guidance determination
into account, and to follow them unless very strong grounds supported by cogent
evidence, are adduced justifying their not doing so.”
19. For these reasons
country guidance cases have an importance beyond the determination of a
particular appeal. They are one of the ways that a specialist Tribunal with
judges with experience of the protection risks in various parts of the world
and expert in the application of legal principles to a frequently shapeless and
changing mass of country information, give effect to the over-riding objectives
of rule 2(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. One of the
aspects of the over-riding objective is that the parties are under a duty to
co-operate with the Tribunal to achieve them: rule 2(4). Although the Upper
Tribunal always hopes to have the assistance of well-informed advocates for
both parties, and hopes that the legal aid scheme will take into account the
public interest in advocates continuing to represent their clients where the
prospects of success are at best borderline, there may be cases where the claimant
ceases to be represented for one reason or another. Self-represented litigants
are not a novel problem in the courts and the tribunals. There may be
alternative sources of representation that the Tribunal can facilitate, but for
the reasons already given it is unlikely that the sources envisaged by the
Court of Appeal will be available in circumstances that were before the
previous tribunal. In any event the public interest requires old guidance to
be revoked and updated by new guidance reflecting contemporary conditions,
whether one party is willing to continue to participate in the appeal or not.
For the Tribunal to be unable to issue up to date guidance as intended because
a party makes a tactical withdrawal in the light of their assessment of the
prospects of success, would pose a severe threat to the whole system and
frustrate the Tribunal’s function. Hence, whilst the Upper Tribunal will do all
it can to ensure representation in a country guidance case, it cannot be
excluded that in highly unusual circumstances such a case would proceed without
claimant representation.
20. Ordinarily a CG case
will deal with relatively limited issues so as to identify whether persons with
a significant political profile or ethnic or religious background are at risk.
But in relation to some countries it is inevitable that the CG case considers
very broad categories of persons and, as a consequence, has an impact on a
large number of asylum claims and appeals. So it is that this case is to be a
CG case on the issue whether Article 15(c) applies in effect to prevent any
removal to Iraq. In MK (documents-relocation) Iraq CG [2012] UKUT 00126 (IAC) the Tribunal has recently given guidance on whether individuals including
women and children can safely relocate in Iraq and whether an individual was
required to return to his or her home area in order to transfer or obtain
documents and food rations. The Tribunal decided (see [88]) that lack of
documentation was generally not an insuperable problem and not a factor likely
to make return to any part of Iraq unsafe or unreasonable. As will be apparent
in due course, this decision is material since it is accepted by both parties
to these appeals (and is now accepted by UNHCR in its May 31, 2012 Guidelines)
that Article 15(c) is not automatically applicable to the situation in every
governorate of Iraq.
21. HM and RM together
with two other appellants, known as ASA and AA, were chosen to constitute the
CG appeals on the issue whether Article 15(c) applied to show a real risk of relevant
harm on return to Iraq. The identification of the cases was made to the
parties in October 2009. In accordance with its practice in CG cases, the Home
Office produced such country material as was relevant amounting to three
volumes. In addition, the UNCHR was invited to participate and produced
written submissions together with two volumes of material which supported the
appellants’ contention that returns should not take place. As is we think
obvious, the importance of CG cases cannot be underestimated since not only
will they affect and probably be determinative of other cases within the UK but decisions of the ECtHR and the courts or tribunals of other EU member States may
consider them to have persuasive value.
Inquisitorial role
22. We have said that an
appeal before the Tribunal in this jurisdiction is essentially an adversarial
process so far as the individual appellant is concerned. However, in deciding
a CG issue the Tribunal must be sure so far as possible that it has considered
all relevant material. Thus it must have an inquisitorial role. Neither Mr
Staker nor Mr Fordham, Q.C disputed this. The Tribunal is sometimes able
through its own library of material and research assistance to learn of
relevant materials which it can then ask the parties to address. But it is
essential that each party to a CG appeal produces all relevant material or
evidence. Mr Staker on behalf of the Home Office recognised its obligation to
put before the Tribunal material which did not necessarily support its case,
particularly if it was aware of something which was not in the public domain.
23. Mr Fordham submitted
that, albeit the Tribunal has an inquisitorial role in deciding a CG case, an
appellant must be able to seek out, deal with and make submissions on the
material which is available. Thus there must be representation. The Court of
Appeal’s decision points in the same direction, but it does not go so far as to
indicate that the law requires representation. We have already given our
reasons at [19] why we think the Court of Appeal was right not to lay down an
absolute rule. In addition to the circumstances identified in that paragraph,
we would note that, for example, representation cannot be forced on an
unwilling appellant. And it must be borne in mind that what is needed is
competent representation and, regrettably, the Tribunal’s experience is that
that does not always result. The Tribunal must, of course, act fairly and so
if some relevant evidence comes to its attention which the parties have not
noted, it must draw it to their attention so that they can deal with it.
The CG issues
24. In case management
directions the Tribunal said as follows:
“The case will be a country
guidance case on the following issues:
(i) whether
there is a risk to the appellants of indiscriminate violence arising from armed
conflict within the meaning of Article 15(c) of the EU Qualification Directive
in their home areas in Iraq (in the case of HM and RM Kirkuk and in HF
Baghdad);
(ii) apart
from their age and gender it is envisaged that the other characteristics of the
appellants that may be relevant to assessment of risk of indiscriminate harm
are: they are all Sunni Muslims, they speak respectively Kurdish Sorani and
Arabic (HF), and may be of Kurdish ethnicity;
(iii) whether
any of the appellants will suffer inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to
Article 3 ECHR and/or Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive on return to
Baghdad Airport or any place connected with the process of return;
(iv) if
there is such a risk as in (i) above then whether internal relocation to any
part of Iraq is available to them and whether they will be able to access such
protection without suffering ill-treatment as per (iii) above. In so far as
prospects of safe relocation are affected by the issue whether the appellants
will be able to access necessary documentation in Iraq, the parties are
informed that the Tribunal will have regard to the pending decision in MK
(Iraq) where promulgation is imminent, whether or not this authority is
reported as a country guidance case by the start of the hearing.”
Geographical application
25. It is material that
it is accepted that return to some governorates will not engage Article 15(c).
That entails acceptance that it may be possible for individuals to live in such
governorates. This may in many cases mean that even if we were persuaded that
Article 15(c) applied in the five central governorates, Baghdad, Diyala, Tameen
(Kirkuk), Ninewah, Salah Al-Din, returns could be made since there could be
either returns to a safe home area or returns to an area of viable internal
relocation. It is not to be assumed that the situation will remain static.
UNHCR materials
26. Much reliance has
been placed by Mr Fordham on the views of the UNHCR and of an unspecified number
of EU States that in the context of present-day Iraq or certain parts of it Article
15(c) does, or is likely to, prevent removal. We shall say more about these
matters below but it may assist to clarify our concluded position at this
stage. We will attach weight to those views and consider carefully the reasons
given for them. But we have to make our minds up based on the full and
detailed material put before us. We pay great respect to the views of UNHCR in
particular, whose sources include not only widely available background data but
also feedback from UNHCR operations, UN agencies and other partners in Iraq. At the same time we cannot ignore the fact that UNHCR is a major international actor
in Iraq, being heavily involved, inter alia, in programmes to assist returns to
Iraq by externally displaced persons (EDPs) among others. We are not in a
position to say whether UNHCR’s role in Iraq means that its assessment of risk
on return is influenced by its concerns about the viability of returning
refugee flows. Nor are we in a position to know why, at least prior to 31 May
2012, UNHCR felt able to say on the one hand that no one from the 5 central
governorates should be forcibly returned to Iraq because of high levels of
indiscriminate violence there, yet on the other hand to engage in UNHCR-facilitated
voluntary returns to Iraq, including to those governorates. We know from the
ECtHR case of FH v Sweden App.no.3261/06 (see below at [80]) that on two
occasions in 2007/8 (December 2007 and February 2008) UNHCR stated that it did
not support any returns to Iraq. What these factors do demonstrate to us,
however, is that we must make our own assessment of Article 15(c) risks based
on the evidence as a whole and the UNHCR materials are only a part of that
evidence.
27. So far as alleged risk
of maltreatment by detention of returnees at Baghdad International Airport
(BIAP) is concerned, the appellants must show that there are substantial
grounds for believing that there is a real risk that those returning will be
treated in such a way as breaches their human rights. It is the respondent’s
contention that they are unable to surmount this hurdle.
28. At the April/May
hearings Mr Fordham submitted that there was evidence which showed that there
was a real risk that those who were subject to compulsory returns would be
detained on arrival at BIAP. The conditions of such detention were so
unpleasant as to breach Article 3 of the ECHR. While such detention would
usually not be lengthy, the conditions were such that even a short period of
detention would breach Article 3. It seemed that much might turn on whether
those removed had proper paperwork which could be provided by the Iraq Embassy
in London. Since this was a general, albeit discrete, issue which would
potentially apply to all who might be removed, it seemed desirable that we
should deal with it at the same time as the Article 15(c) issue. However, there
was a need for further evidence and so we gave time to enable that to be
produced and further argument (if that was considered necessary) to be
produced. We also heard further oral submissions on this matter on October 12.
Presentation of evidence
29. Before turning to the
law and to the facts, we should mention that we discussed with the parties in
the course of the hearing the practical problems arising from the unprecedented
volume of materials adduced. Produced for each member of the panel was a large
number of lever arch files of documents which ran to thousands of pages.
30. We saw the necessity
for one copy of all source material but found that for the hearing itself each
of us was able to work with the equivalent of one A4 ring binder containing
materials which the parties had extracted from the larger set of files as being
the most relevant.
LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
The law relating to
Article 15(c)
31. The Tribunal in HM1
considered the correct approach in law to Article 15(c) in some detail in [62]
to [98]. The only matter raised by Mr Fordham has related to the extent to
which there should be a discounting of the overall figures of deaths by
bombings or shootings, whether specific or general. Otherwise, he has not
criticised the approach set out in some detail by the Tribunal. We must, of
course, set out and explain our approach in law, but in the circumstances we
see no need to repeat in great detail what the Tribunal said in HM1.
For those who wish to consider more detail than we consider it necessary to
spell out in this determination, we can say that we adopt what was said in HM1.
32. We have been referred
to a number of authorities dealing with interpretation and application of
Article 15(c). However, there are two which bind us, namely Elgafaji v
Straatsscretaris van Justitie [2009] 1 WLR 2100, a decision of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities (ECJ, now known as the Court of Justice of
the European Union or CJEU)) and QD (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2011] 1 WLR 689, a decision of the Court of Appeal.
Each of these is binding on us and QD helpfully explains and indicates
how Elgafaji should be applied.
33. Article 15(c) itself
provides as follows, under the heading ‘Serious Harm’:-
“Serious harm consist of
(a) death
penalty or execution;
(b) torture
or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an Applicant in the country
of origin; and
(c) serious
and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of
indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed
conflict.”
34. Article 15 is applied
by Article 2(e) which defines a person eligible for subsidiary protection (a
term which has been described as humanitarian protection in paragraph 339C of
the Immigration Rules which applies Article 15 using the same terminology save
for the addition of ‘unlawful killing’) thus, so far as material:
“… a third country national
… person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial
grounds have been shown for disbelieving that the person concerned, if returned
to his or her country of origin … would face a real risk of suffering serious
harm as defined in Article 15 … and is unable or, owing to such risk, unable to
avail himself or herself of the protection of the country.”
35. It is necessary in
construing Article 15(c) to have regard to recital (26) of the preamble to the
Directive which provides:
“Risks to which a
population of a country or a section of the population is generally exposed do
normally not create in themselves an individual threat which would qualify as
serious harm.”
36. These provisions are
not well drafted, as Sedley LJ observed in [19] of QD. As Advocate
General Maduro points out in his opinion in Elgafaji Case C-465/07 ([31])
the use of the words ‘indiscriminate’ and ‘individual’ in Article 15(c)
requires an attempt to reconcile what seems prima facie irreconcilable. But
this is not the only difficulty. The others are, first, the difficulty created
by the definition in Article 15(c) which refers to a ‘threat’ coupled with the
reference in Article 2(e) to a risk. One thus has the problem of applying a
test which concerns a real risk of a threat. Secondly there is the reference
to internal armed conflict. This latter problem was resolved in QD by
an agreement of all counsel involved which the court accepted that it had an
autonomous meaning which was “broad enough to capture any situation of
indiscriminate violence, whether caused by one or more armed factions or by a
state, which reaches the level described by the CJEU in Elgafaji” ([35]).
That such an armed conflict existed in Iraq was accepted by the Home Secretary
in QD and Mr Staker has not sought to argue the contrary before us.
Sedley LJ went on in QD to observe that the armed conflict itself need
not be exceptional, but that there must be an intensity of indiscriminate
violence great enough to meet the test spelt out by the CJEU. That would not
apply in every situation. Furthermore, a civilian must mean a genuine
non-combatant. Anyone who involves himself in an armed conflict is not to be
regarded as a civilian and the same applies to a member of the armed forces or
police in the country in question.
37. So far as the risk of
a threat is concerned, the Court of Appeal indicated that a pragmatic approach
must be adopted. The grammar of Article 15(c) requires that the threat be
serious. That is the natural reading of the words used and that it is the
proper reading was confirmed by the Court in QD. It emphasises the
point that the threat must result from indiscriminate acts of violence and the
existence of such acts affecting the individual civilian must be shown to be a
reality. As Sedley LJ observed in [21] of QD, not every threat is real
and not every real threat is serious.
38. It seems clear to us
that what lay behind Article 15(c) was the need to enable those who were likely
to be caught up in indiscriminate violence and so to suffer death or injury to
be able to obtain protection. They were to be contrasted with those who fell
within 15(a) or (b) who could show a real risk of a breach of Articles 2 or 3.
The reference to ‘execution’ in 15(a) we would read as intended to cover
unlawful killing since it is incomprehensible that the Directive would
deliberately have omitted the risk of death where there was no question of
internal armed conflict. Thus it is not in the least surprising that in
Elgafaji the ECJ should have regarded 15(c) as dealing with a more general
risk of harm than that covered by 15(a) and (b).
39. The CJEU had to
construe recital 26 of the preamble with Article 15(c). The two are not easy
to reconcile. As the Court noted, the use of the word ‘normally’ in the
recital recognised the “possibility of an exceptional situation which would be
characterised by such a high degree of risk that substantial grounds would be
shown for believing that the person would be subject individually to the risk
in question”. ([37]). The Court went on in [38] to say that the
exceptional nature of that situation was also confirmed by the fact that the
relevant protection was subsidiary, and by the broad logic of Article 15, as
the harm defined in paragraphs (a) and (b) of that Article required a high
degree of individualisation. According to the Court at [39] of its ruling, it
followed that “the more the applicant is able to show that he is specifically
affected by reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances, the
lower the level of indiscriminate violence required for him to be eligible for
subsidiary protection.” This is what UNHCR has referred to as the
“sliding-scale” notion.
40. The Court there seems
to be considering that a person who is at real risk of being either a specific
or a more general target of indiscriminate violence may be accorded protection
when the general level of violence would not be sufficient to establish the
necessary risk to one who could not show any specific reason for being affected
by violence unless it reached a high level. We are not in this case concerned
to consider all those who are specifically affected by factors particular to
their own personal circumstances, although we must address submissions that
being a Sunni or Shi’a or an ethnic Kurd (or being a former Ba’athist)
constitute characteristics which may in particular areas give rise to Article
15(c) risk under the “sliding-scale” identified by the Court in [39]. But, as
will become apparent, we do not think that there is anything in this ethnicity
or religious (or former Ba’athist) affiliation which will add to the risk of
general harm.
41. The ruling by the
Court in Elgafaji was in these terms:-
…
“37. While [recital 26 of
Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004] implies that the objective
finding alone of a risk linked to the general situation in a country is not, as
a rule, sufficient to establish that the conditions set out in Article 15(c) of
the Directive have been met in respect of a specific person, its wording
nevertheless allows by the use of the word 'normally' for the possibility of an
exceptional situation which would be characterised by such a high degree of
risk that substantial grounds would be shown for believing that that person
would be subject individually to the risk in question.
38. The
exceptional nature of that situation is also confirmed by the fact that the
relevant protection is subsidiary, and by the broad logic of Article 15 of the
Directive, as the harm defined in paragraphs (a) and (b) of that article
requires a clear degree of individualisation. While it is admittedly true that
collective factors play a significant role in the application of Article 15(c)
of the Directive, in that the person concerned belongs, like other people, to a
circle of potential victims of indiscriminate violence in situations of
international or internal armed conflict, it is nevertheless the case that that
provision must be subject to a coherent interpretation in relation to the other
two situations referred to in Article 15 of the Directive and must, therefore,
be interpreted by close reference to that individualisation.
39.
In that regard, the more the applicant is able to show that he is
specifically affected by reason of factors particular to his personal
circumstances, the lower the level of indiscriminate violence required for him
to be eligible for subsidiary protection.
…
43. Having
regard to all of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions
referred is that Article 15(c) of the Directive, in conjunction with Article
2(e) of the Directive, must be interpreted as meaning that:
the existence of a serious
and individual threat to the life or person of an applicant for subsidiary
protection is not subject to the condition that that applicant adduce evidence
that he is specifically targeted by reason of factors particular to his
personal circumstances;
the existence of such a
threat can exceptionally be considered to be established where the degree of
indiscriminate violence characterising the armed conflict taking place assessed
by the competent national authorities before which an application for
subsidiary protection is made, or by the courts of a Member State to which a
decision refusing such an application is referred reaches such a high level
that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, returned to
the relevant country or, as the case may be, to the relevant region, would,
solely on account of his presence on the territory of that country or region,
face a real risk of being subject to that threat.”
42. We recognise that the
threat to life or person of an individual need not come directly from armed
conflict. It will suffice that the result of such conflict is a breakdown of
law and order which has the effect of creating the necessary risk. It is
obvious that the risk is most likely to result from indiscriminate bombings or
shootings. These can properly be regarded as indiscriminate in the sense that,
albeit they may have specific or general targets, they inevitably expose the
ordinary civilian who happens to be at the scene to what has been described in
argument as collateral damage. By specific targets, we refer to individuals or
gatherings of individuals such as army or police officers. The means adopted
may be bombs, which can affect others besides the target, or shootings, which
produce a lesser but nonetheless real risk of collateral damage. By general
targets we refer to more indiscriminate attacks on, for example, Sunnis or
Shi’as or vice versa. Such attacks can involve explosions of bombs in crowded
places such as markets or where religious processions or gatherings are taking
place.
43. The CJEU requires us
to decide whether the degree of indiscriminate violence characterising the
armed conflict taking place reaches such a high level as to show the existence
for an ordinary civilian of a real risk of serious harm in the country or in a
particular region. When we refer below to the “Article 15(c) threshold”, this
is what we have in mind. Thus it is necessary to assess whether the level of
violence is such as to meet the test. Thus there were put before us reports
which assessed the number of killings in recent years resulting from acts of
violence which could properly be regarded as resulting from internal armed
conflict. While the ECJ used the word ‘exceptional’, it may be too restrictive
to use this term to describe the test and we would follow the approach in QD
which stated at [36] that the armed conflict itself need not be exceptional but
that there must be ‘an intensity of indiscriminate violence – which will
self-evidently not characterise every such situation – great enough to meet the
test spelt out by the ECJ’.
44. In HM1 at [73]
the Tribunal decided that an attempt to distinguish between a real risk of
targeted and incidental killing of civilians during armed conflict was not a
helpful exercise. We agree, but in assessing whether the risk reaches the
level required by the CJEU, focus on the evidence about the numbers of
civilians killed or wounded is obviously of prime importance. Thus we have been
told that each death can be multiplied up to seven times when considering injuries
to bystanders. This is somewhat speculative and it must be obvious that the
risk of what has been called collateral damage will differ depending on the
nature of the killing. A bomb is likely to cause far greater “collateral
damage” than an assassination by shooting. But the incidence and numbers of
death are a helpful starting point.
45. The harm in question
must be serious enough to merit medical treatment. It is not limited to
physical harm and can include serious mental harm such as, for example,
post-traumatic stress disorder. We repeat and adopt what the Tribunal said in HM1
at [80]:
“In our judgment the nexus
between the generalised armed conflict and the indiscriminate violence posing a
real risk to life or person is met when the intensity of the conflict involves
means of combat (whether permissible under the laws of war or not) that
seriously endanger non-combatants as well as result in such a general breakdown
of law and order as to permit anarchy and criminality occasioning the serious
harm referred to in the Directive. Such violence is indiscriminate in effect
even if not necessarily in aim. As the French Conseil d’Etat observed in Baskarathas,
it is not necessary for the threat to life or person to derive from
protagonists in the armed conflict in question: it can simply be a product of
the breakdown of law and order.”
THE
APPELLANTS
46. The appellants are
nationals of Iraq. All three appeal against decisions of the respondent that
they are to be removed from the United Kingdom by way of directions under
section 10 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.
HM & RM
47. In the case of the
first two appellants, HM and RM, their appeals were dismissed on 20 March
2008. It was accepted by the immigration judge that their father was a former
resident of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) concerned with the oil
business, who had experienced difficulties with the Kurdish authorities. He
came to the United Kingdom in 1998 and sought asylum in 1999. He was granted
exceptional leave to remain. Since 1998, the two appellants had been living in
Kirkuk, in the Tameem Governorate (falling within what are known as “the
disputed territories”). They came to the UK in 2007 and claimed asylum. When
their claims were rejected and they appealed, the immigration judge did not
accept the core elements of their claim to protection and concluded that they
did not have a well founded fear of persecution in Kirkuk. He rejected their
claim to subsidiary protection and concluded that the high threshold required
to engage Article 3 was not met.
48. The two appellants
sought and were granted orders for reconsideration of this decision, after an
initial refusal by a Senior Immigration Judge, by Blake J in the High Court.
Subsequently, after the judgment of the ECJ in Elgafaji, and the
decision of the Court of Appeal in QD, following a Case Management
Review, on 26 August 2009, the decision of the immigration judge was set aside.
It was found that by considering that the appellants could not succeed on
humanitarian protection grounds solely because they had not succeeded on asylum
grounds was a material error of law. However, the findings of fact were
preserved and the case proceeded to second stage reconsideration on whether
“considered simply as two male civilians from Kirkuk these two appellants would
face a real risk of serious harm under paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules
(Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive)”. Thereafter the cases were
joined with two others to proceed as country guidance cases. Neither has a
current or expired Iraqi passport and neither currently holds an Iraqi
laissez-passer document.
49. As already noted, the
country guidance case was heard in June 2010 and the appeals were dismissed.
Subsequently, the decision was set aside by the Court of Appeal in HM2.
HF
50. HF’s appeal against
refusal of asylum was dismissed by an immigration judge on 22 June 2009. He is
from Baghdad. He was found to lack credibility. The judge noted the
submission that he was at particular risk because he was a young male Sunni
Muslim who had indirect links with the Ba’ath party via his father, but the
judge considered there was no credible assessment of his father’s position in
the party. He did not think that the appellant’s links with the party, if they
existed at all, were such as to cause any anxiety on his behalf.
51. The appeal having
been dismissed, the appellant sought and was granted a reconsideration of the
judge’s decision. On 9 December 2009, it was ordered by a senior immigration
judge that the immigration judge had materially erred in law in relying in part
for his guidance as to the law relating to Article 15(c) on the Tribunal
determination in KH (Article 15(c) Qualification Directive) Iraq CG
[2008] UKAIT 46, which the Court of Appeal had subsequently held in QD
was not to be followed. It was ordered that the judge’s credibility findings
were to stand, so the appellant was to be considered as a young Sunni male
whose home area was Baghdad and who might have had indirect links with the
Ba’ath party. Subsequently, it was decided that HF’s case would be an
appropriate one to join HM and RM as cases for fresh country guidance in light
of the quashing of the decision in HM2 since HF is from Baghdad and it
was thought that it would be helpful to have guidance in respect of an
appellant from a part of Iraq other than Kirkuk where HM and RM are from. HF
has an expired Iraqi passport.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
52. In addition to the
steps just described, a Case Management Review hearing took place at Field
House on 16 January 2012, setting out a timetable for the serving of detailed
grounds of appeal, the identification of relevant country information material,
the service of expert reports, and the provision of paginated and indexed
appeal bundles.
53. A further Case
Management Review hearing took place on 16 April 2012 at which further
directions were given in respect of timetabling for the service of a response
by one of the experts and skeleton arguments. It was also clarified that
permission was refused for HM and RM to seek to challenge the decision of the
immigration judge with respect to the Refugee Convention and Article 8.
54. After concluding the
hearing of the appeals in May 2012, we received a number of further submissions.
On 25 May we received the Secretary of State’s Note on Returns, and her Note on
Statistics on 6 June. On 26 June the Secretary of State filed her submissions
on the UNHCR May 2012 Guidelines, and on 29 June the appellants filed their
response to the above three matters. The appellants put in further submissions
on the UNHCR Guidelines on 11 July, the Secretary of State replied to the
appellants’ post-hearing submissions on 18 July, and the appellants filed their
final reply note on 25 July. Following the hearing on October 12, we sought and
received within a short period further factual information relating to
documentation for returnees.
THE
UNHCR ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES ON IRAQ AND OTHER KEY MATERIALS
UNHCR Eligibility
Guidelines
55. As noted earlier and
will be made clearer below, Mr Fordham made a central plank of the appellants’
submissions the UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines on Iraq which he asked us to make
the centrepiece of our own country guidance. It is of particular importance, therefore,
to set out what these guidelines say before going on to summarise the
background evidence otherwise. As already noted, when we began hearing these
appeals the current guidance was the April 2009 “UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines
for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum Seekers”
(April 2009 Guidelines) and the July 2010 “Note on the Continued
Applicability”. Very recently UNHCR has issued revised Eligibility Guidelines
on 31 May 2012. It is pertinent, therefore, to summarise both.
2009 Guidelines
56. The 2009 UNHCR
Guidelines identified two main types of risk categories: (1) specific risk
categories consisting of specific groups who are targeted by the insurgents;
and (2) general risk categories based on geographical considerations.
57. As to (1), UNHCR
considered that for international protection purposes ‘favourable
consideration’ should be given to persons in the following categories: Iraqis
affiliated with political parties in power struggles; government officials and
other persons associated with the current Iraqi government, administration or
institutions; Iraqis (perceived to be) opposing armed groups or political
factions; Iraqis affiliated with the MNF-1 or foreign companies; members of
religious and ethnic minorities; certain professionals (academics, judges,
doctors); journalists and media workers; UN and NGO workers, human rights
activists; homosexuals; women and children with specific profiles. It was made
clear that the above list was not intended to be exhaustive.
58. As to (2), UNHCR
considered all Iraqi asylum seekers from the five central governorates of Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewah and Salah-Al-Din to be “in need of international
protection”.
59. The 2009 Guidelines
and subsequent documents confirming their continued applicability were of
course the focus of submissions at the hearing before us in April and May.
2012
Guidelines
60. Subsequent to that
hearing, UNHCR has issued new guidance: the “UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for
Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers from Iraq”, 31 May 2012. These are divided into four parts: I (Introduction); II (Background
Information); III (Main Actors of Persecution and Violence and Indiscriminate
Violence); and IV (Eligibility for International Protection). The opening
passages of the Guidelines state:
“Introduction
These
Eligibility Guidelines replace the April 2009 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for
Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Iraq and
the 2010 Note on the Continued Applicability of the April 2009 UNHCR
Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of
Iraqi Asylum-Seekers.
The purpose of
these Eligibility Guidelines is to set out the profiles of asylum-seekers for
whom international protection needs are likely to arise in the current context
in Iraq.
The current
situation in Iraq can be characterized as one of ongoing uncertainty due to
several factors, including:
(i)
high levels of political and sectarian violence;
(ii)
the unpredictable security situation, including significant numbers of
civilian casualties as a result of attacks by armed groups;
(iii)
the full withdrawal of US forces from Iraq at the end of 2011; and
(iv)
continuing challenges with regard to establishment of the rule of law,
provision of services, distribution of land, and respect for human rights.
UNHCR’s
recommendations with regard to assessing the international protection needs of
asylum seekers from Iraq, as set out in these Eligibility Guidelines, may be
summarized as follows.
All claims
lodged by asylum-seekers – whether on the basis of the refugee criteria
contained in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 3 and/or
its 1967 Protocol 4 (1951 Convention), or broader international protection
criteria, including complementary forms of protection – need to be considered
on their own merits in fair and efficient status determination procedures and
based on up to-date and relevant country of origin information.
UNHCR considers
that asylum-seekers from Iraq with the following profiles, and depending on the
particular circumstances of the individual case, are likely to be in need of
international refugee protection. These risk profiles are not necessarily
exhaustive, nor is there any hierarchy implied in the order in which they are
presented:
(i)
individuals associated with (or perceived to be supporting) the Iraqi
authorities, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) or the former foreign forces in Iraq (Multinational Forces in Iraq, MNF-I or US Forces in Iraq, USF-I);
(ii) individuals
(perceived as) opposing the Iraqi authorities;
(iii)
individuals (perceived as) opposing the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG);
(iv) certain
professionals;
(v) individuals
with religion-based claims,
(vi) individuals
with ethnicity-based claims;
(vii) women
with specific profiles or in specific circumstances;
(viii) children
with specific profiles or in specific circumstances;
(ix) victims
or persons at risk of trafficking; and
(x)
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) individuals.
In light of the
ongoing non-international armed conflict-related civilian casualties, security
incidents and conflict-induced displacement, in particular in central Iraq,
UNHCR recommends that international protection applications lodged by Iraqis
claiming to flee high levels of and/or intense violence should each be assessed
carefully, in light of the evidence presented by the applicant and other
current and reliable information on their place of former residence. This will
include an assessment of whether the violence in the place of former residence
is of such a level and intensity that international protection is required
under complementary protection regimes, even if the protection need cannot be
related to a 1951 Convention ground.
UNHCR considers
that internal flight options are often not available in Iraq due to serious risks faced by Iraqis throughout the country, including threats to safety and
security, accessibility problems and lack of livelihood opportunities.”
61. At p.7 it
is explained that:
“In
preparing these Eligibility Guidelines, UNHCR has analysed the most up-to-date
and relevant information available from a wide variety of sources at 18 March
2012. However, access to fully comprehensive information on the situation in Iraq is not always accessible for a variety of reasons. In addition to publicly available
sources, the analysis contained in these Eligibility Guidelines is also
informed by reliable reports provided by: (i) Iraqi asylum-seekers and refugees
around the world; (ii) internally displaced person (IDP) and returnee
monitoring operations in Iraq; and (iii) UNHCR operations, UN agencies and
other partners in Iraq.”
62. As
regards risk arising from indiscriminate and generalised violence, the
Guidelines state in its summary at pp. 47-48 that:
“Summary
The
levels of violence in Iraq have declined from that experienced at the height of
the conflict in 2006 and 2007. However, while the violence appears to have
stabilized, is still at a high level and continues to affect a large number of
Iraqis.
As described
above, based on information known and available to UNHCR as at 18 March 2012,
the situation in certain areas, principally in central Iraq, continues to be affected by: (i) significant numbers of civilian casualties; (ii) frequent
security incidents; and (iii) significant numbers of persons who remain
displaced. Consequently, Iraqi asylum-seekers who do not meet the 1951
Convention criteria and who were formerly residing in governorates, districts,
cities, towns, villages or neighbourhoods where, at the time of adjudication of
the asylum claim, high levels and a high intensity of violence continue to be
reported, are, for reason of the foreseen impact on the individual concerned,
likely to be in need of complementary forms of protection on the basis of a
fear of serious and indiscriminate harm arising from that violence.
Information
on the levels, intensity and impact of violence in an asylum-seeker's
governorate, district, city, town, village or neighbourhood of origin is needed
to assess the possible protection needs of persons found not to meet the 1951
Convention refugee criteria under broader international protection criteria.
The current situation in Iraq does not allow for generalised conclusions in
this regard on the basis of broad geographic distinctions. Therefore,
adjudicators will need to assess on a case-by-case basis whether an individual
asylum-seeker who has been found not to meet the refugee criteria of the 1951
Convention will run a risk of serious and indiscriminate harm upon return. In
doing so, the principle of the shared burden of proof requires that both the
asylum-seeker and the adjudicator make every reasonable effort to provide
specific and up-to-date information on the situation in the asylum-seeker's
former place of residence to support their position.”
63.
In Part IV, dealing with Eligibility for International Protection, the
Guidelines summarise matters as follows.
“IV.
Eligibility for International Protection
UNHCR
recommends that all claims by asylum-seekers from Iraq be considered on their
individual merits in fair and efficient refugee status determination
procedures, taking into account up-to-date and relevant country of origin
information. UNHCR considers that, depending on the particular details of their
claims, individuals with profiles and in circumstances similar to those
outlined below are likely to be in need of international refugee protection in
the sense of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol.
This
listing is not exhaustive and is based on information available to UNHCR as at
18 March 2012. An individual's claim is not without merit simply because he or
she does not fall within any of the profiles identified below. Similarly, not
all persons falling within these risk profiles will necessarily be in need of
international refugee protection: in the assessment of whether or not a
claimant would be likely to be exposed to persecution or serious harm upon
return, the specific elements of the individual claim are decisive. Certain
claims by asylum-seekers from Iraq, including of those possibly falling within
risk profiles described in these guidelines, will require examination for
possible exclusion from refugee status.
For
persons who have already been recognized as refugees, their status may be
reviewed only if there are indications, in an individual case, that there are
grounds for cancellation of refugee status which was wrongly granted in the
first instance; revocation of refugee status on the grounds of Article 1F of
the 1951 Convention; or cessation of refugee status on the basis of Article
1C(1-4) of the 1951 Convention. UNHCR considers that the
current situation in Iraq does not warrant cessation of refugee status on the
basis of Article 1C(5) of the 1951 Convention.”
UKBA Iraq Operational Guidance Note (OGN)
64. The Iraq Operational Guidance Note (OGN) of December 2011 says, at [2.3.4] that violence in Iraq, albeit still far above what ought to be tolerable, has levelled off in the past two
years. It is said that if insurgents remain as weak as they are and find no
opportunity to exploit political fractures, security forces operating at
less-than-optimal levels should still face no serious difficulty in confronting
them. However, although oversight by the MoI and MoD was increased, problems
continue with all security forces, arising from sectarian divisions, corruption
and unwillingness to serve outside the areas in which personnel were
recruited. In the KRG, though the security situation is considerably better
than in the rest of Iraq, there are concerns about human rights violations.
65. Roadside terrorist
attacks occur frequently, especially on main routes, though the central provinces are not as hazardous as in 2005-2008. Iraq is seen (referring to the
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) report of June 2011) as moving
away from an emergency situation to a development phase. However, new
displacement still occurs, and a large number of people have unmet humanitarian
needs.
66. At [3.6.2] it is
noted that the security situation in Iraq continues to affect the civilian
population, who face ongoing acts of violence perpetrated by armed opposition
groups and criminal gangs. In particular, armed groups continue to employ
tactics that deliberately target crowded public areas and kill and maim
civilians indiscriminately. Some attacks appear to be sectarian but others
appear random, aimed at terrorising the population at large and casting doubt
over the ability of the Government and the Iraqi security forces to stem the
violence. Targeted assassinations persist across the country. It is said that
steady progress is being made and security incidents are remaining near the
lowest levels in more than five years, despite a spike in attacks during the
March 2010 election. In 2010 the overall level of violence in Iraq was about 90% lower than the peak in 2007. AQI, other Sunni Islamist factions and
various neo-Ba’athist groups still carry out bombings and targeted attacks in
parts of the country and continue to try to trigger a new round of
Sunni-Shi-ite fighting. Security remains a key challenge.
Tribunal
CG and related case law
67. Leaving aside cases
pre-dating the coming into force of the Qualification Directive, the cases
which the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal and its successor the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) have designated as country guidance cases are
(with full citations) as follows. Specific comment is only made on those that
have implications for the issue of Article 15(c)–related risk or the issue of
internal relocation. It should be noted that even in respect of the two cases
overturned by the Court of Appeal, KH and HMI, those decisions
contain a record of evidence relating to background country evidence and expert
evidence as given to those tribunals.
- NS (Iraq; perceived collaborator; relocation) Iraq CG [2007] UKAIT 00046
- KH (Article 15(c) Qualification Directive) Iraq CG [2008] UKAIT 00023
68. The Tribunal
concluded that whilst Iraq was considered to be in a state of internal armed
conflict, it did not consider that there were significantly high levels of
indiscriminate violence throughout Iraq so as to make all civilians at risk of
serious harm.
69. This case was
overturned by the Court of Appeal in QD (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2009] EWCA Civ 620, [2011] 1 WLR 689.
- NA (Palestinians – risk) Iraq CG [2008] UKAIT 00046
- SI (expert evidence – Kurd- SM confirmed) Iraq CG [2008] UKAIT 00094
70. The relevant passage
of the headnote stated:
“3. The
guidance given in SM [SM and Others (Kurds-Protection-Relocation) Iraq CG [2005] UKAIT 00111] regarding relocation of a Kurd from the KRG to central or
southern Iraq, which was that it can in general be effected without this being
unduly harsh and without giving rise to a real risk "in all but the most
exceptional high profile cases" of their relocation being brought to the
attention of [any of the KRG authorities], also remains valid.”
- SR (Iraqi/Arab Christian: relocation to KRG) Iraq CG [2009] UKAIT 00038
71. The headnote stated:
“An Iraqi Arab Christian at
risk in his home area and throughout central and southern Iraq is likely to be
able to obtain the documentation needed by a person wishing to relocate within
Iraq, and is likely to be able to relocate to the KRG with the assistance of a
sponsor, in particular, on the basis of the latest statistics available, in
Erbil or Dohuk”.
- ZQ (serving soldier) Iraq CG [2009] UKAIT 00048
72. The relevant part of
the headnote stated:
“v) Insofar as the
risk categories of NS (Iraq; perceived NS collaborator; relocation) Iraq CG [2007] UKAIT 00046 may cover persons who by virtue of their work have become
members of the Multinational Forces or the Coalition Provisional Authority,
application of its guidance will need to bear in mind that the state's duty to
protect them will be very limited”.
- HM and Others
(Article 15(c)) Iraq CG [2010] UKUT 331 (IAC) (“HM1”)
73. The Tribunal
concluded at [278(viii)] that:
“In short, the risk for
mere civilians of being the victim of indiscriminate harm is not so
substantial, the ability of the GoI is not so negligible and the willingness of
the displaced populations of Iraq is not so compromised that return to that
country would require international protection”.
74. The Tribunal also
held that internal relocation would be a viable option for Kurds both within
the KRG and in southern governorates.
75. This case was
overturned by the Court of Appeal in HM (Iraq) & Anor v Secretary of
State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 1536 (13 December 2011)
(“HM2”). Albeit overturning HMI solely on procedural grounds the Court
of Appeal nevertheless expressly set aside HMI’s country guidance as
well.
-
EA (Sunni/Shi’a mixed marriages) Iraq CG [2011] UKUT 342 (IAC)
76. The headnote stated:
“(1) In
general there is not a real risk of persecution or other significant harm to
parties to a Sunni/Shi’a marriage in Iraq.
(2) It
may, however, be shown that there are enhanced risks, crossing the relevant
risk thresholds, in rural and tribal areas, and in areas where though a Sunni
man may marry a Shi’a woman without risk, the converse may not pertain.
(3) Even
if an appellant is able to demonstrate risk in his/her home area, in general it
will be feasible for relocation to be effected, either to an area in a city
such a Baghdad, where mixed Sunni and Shi’a families live together, or to the
Kurdistan region.”
The most recent country guidance case is MK.
- MK (documents - relocation) Iraq CG [2012] UKUT 126 (IAC) (25 April
2012)
77. Its headnote states:
“(1) Since the lack of
documentation relating to identity in the form of the Civil Status ID (CSID),
Iraqi Nationality Certificate (INC) and Public Distribution System (PDS) card
(food ration card) is not ordinarily an insuperable problem, it is not a factor
likely to make return to any part of Iraq unsafe or unreasonable.
(a) The CSID is an important document, both in
its own right and as a gateway to obtaining other significant documents such
the INC and the PDS. An inability to replace the CSID is likely to entail
inability to access the INC and PDS.
(b) Although the
general position is that a person who wishes to replace a lost CSID is required
to return to their home area in order to do so, there are procedures as
described in this determination available which make it possible (i) for Iraqis
abroad to secure the issue of a new CSID to them through the offices of the
local Iraqi Embassy; (ii) for Iraqis returned to Iraq without a CSID to obtain
one without necessarily having to travel to their home area. Such procedures
permit family members to obtain such documentation from their home areas on an
applicant’s behalf or allow for a person to be given a power of attorney to
obtain the same. Those who are unable immediately to establish their identity
can ordinarily obtain documentation by being presented before a judge from the Civil Status Court, so as to facilitate return to their place of origin.
(2) (a) Entry into
and residence in the KRG can be effected by any Iraqi national with a CSID, INC
and PDS, after registration with the Asayish (local security office). An Arab
may need a sponsor; a Kurd will not.
(b) Living conditions
in the KRG for a person who has relocated there are not without difficulties,
but there are jobs, and there is access to free health care facilities,
education, rented accommodation and financial and other support from UNHCR.
(3) Despite
bureaucratic difficulties with registration and the difficulties faced by IDPs,
it is wrong to say that there is, in general, no internal flight alternative in
Iraq, bearing in mind in particular the levels of governmental and NGO support
available.
(4) Whilst the
situation for women in Iraq is, in general, not such as to give rise to a real
risk of persecution or serious harm, there may be particular problems affecting
female headed households where family support is lacking and jobs and other
means of support may be harder to come by. Careful examination of the
particular circumstances of the individual’s case will be especially
important.”
Position in Europe
78. A September 2010
report by the Washington Post, mentioned countries sending back Iraqis as being
Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Britain (quoted by Dr Fatah at [684] of his
report). Amnesty International in 2010 also included the Netherlands among countries undertaking forcible returns (see also the COIS Bulletin of 22 November
2011, collation of IGC Member States Responses on Returns to Iraq). According to UNHCR, there are five other European countries which undertake forcible returns
to Iraq. In its July 2011 study, Safe At Last?, UNHCR noted that the
determining authorities of Germany, the UK, Netherlands, Sweden and France,
with the concurrence of the judicial bodies in those countries, have not
considered that the Article 15(c) threshold for mere civilians has been met in
Iraq or in any region within it. (The only country mentioned as one where the
courts had found the Article 15(c) threshold to be met was Belgium, in relation to central Iraq.)
79. The appellants cited
a June 2010 judgment of the (First Instance) Finnish Administrative Court
appearing to find that the Article 15(c) threshold was met in Iraq which was upheld by the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court in December 2010.
ECtHR
cases
80. The two most notable
ECtHR cases dealing with Iraq since the beginning of 2009 have been F.H. v Sweden and Al Hamdani v Bosnia and Herzogovina 7 February 2012. The
latter is significant because it illustrates that although (as already noted)
the ECtHR has stayed its
decision on the case of YA v
UK, App.No. 65580/10,
lodged on 10 November 2010 to await the outcome of the HM cases this
has not caused it to adjourn all Iraqi cases reliant on a claim that there
exists an Article 15(c)/Article 3 general risk from high levels of violence.
F.H. v. Sweden, no. 32621/06, § 9320, January 2009
81. Dealing
first with F.H. v Sweden, the Court had noted in its admissibility
decision at [ 62] that in December 2007 and again on 15
February 2008 the UNHCR had stated that it did not promote returns to Iraq in
the present circumstances since its criteria on the conditions needed for the
voluntary return of refugees were not met by the situation in Iraq at that time. In its decision on the merits the ECtHR addressed the
argument that the security situation in Iraq was so bad that to return anyone
to that country would violate Article 3. The Court stated:
“91. In the
present case, the Court recognises the problematic security situation in Iraq. However, it notes that the situation has improved over the last year which is
demonstrated, inter alia, through the progressive relinquishment of security
responsibility over Iraqi provinces from US forces to Iraqi forces, the
indefinite cease-fire declared by the Madhi Army in August 2008, a significant
decrease in civilian deaths and the fact that some Iraqis are voluntarily
starting to return to their homes, encouraged by the Iraqi Government’s
financial incentives and subsidy programme. Although the Court is aware that
the UNHCR, UN and IOM recommend that countries refrain from forcibly returning
refugees to Iraq, they have stated that they are committed to providing
assistance to those who return. Moreover, the Court observes that their
recommendations are partly based on the security situation and partly due to
practical problems for returnees such as shelter, health care and property
restitution.
92. In
this connection, the Court stresses that it attaches importance to information
contained in recent reports from independent international human rights
organisations or governmental sources (see, among others, Saadi v. Italy, cited
above, § 131). However, its own assessment of the general situation in the
country of destination is carried out only to determine whether there would be
a violation of Article 3 if the applicant were to be returned to that country.
Consequently, where reports are focused on general socio-economic and
humanitarian conditions, the Court has been inclined to accord less weight to
them, since such conditions do not necessarily have a bearing on the question
of a real risk to an individual applicant of ill-treatment within the meaning
of Article 3 (see NA v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 122).
93. Hence,
in the present case, the Court concludes that whilst the general situation in
Iraq, and in Baghdad, is insecure and problematic, it is not so serious as to
cause, by itself, a violation of Article 3 of the Convention if the applicant
were to return to that country. The Court therefore has to establish whether
the applicant’s personal situation is such that his return to Iraq would contravene Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention.”
82. The Court went on to address the
applicant’s contention that he would be at risk on return to Iraq on several other grounds, including his Christian faith. At [97] it held:
“97. The
Court will first consider the applicant’s claim that he would risk being killed
because he belongs to the Christian faith. In this respect, the Court observes
that Iraqi national identity cards explicitly note the holder’s religion. Thus,
even if the applicant were not to manifest his religious beliefs openly, it is
likely that his religious affiliation would become known to others as he would
have to show his identity card to the authorities in the course of everyday
life. The Court also takes into account that there have been several incidents
directed against Christians in Iraq, as recently as October 2008 twelve
Christians were killed in attacks in the town of Mosul. However, Christian
congregations are still functioning in Iraq and, from the general information
available, it can be seen that the Iraqi Government has condemned all attacks
against this group and that they intervened with police and military following
the October attack to ensure their safety. Hence, it is clear that there is no
State-sanctioned persecution of Christians and, since the attacks were also
condemned by Islamic groups and no one has accepted responsibility for them, it
appears that the reported attacks were carried out by individuals rather than
by organised groups. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the applicant
would be able to seek the protection of the Iraqi authorities if he felt
threatened and that the authorities would be willing and in a position to help
him. Thus, the Court considers that he would not face a real risk of
persecution or ill-treatment on the basis of his religious affiliation.”
Al Hamdani v Bosnia and Herzogovina 7 February 2012
83. In
Al Hamdani v Bosnia and Herzogovina 7 February 2012 the Fourth Section
reminded itself at [49]-[51] that it never excluded the possibility that the general situation of
violence in a country of destination may be of a sufficient level of intensity
as to entail that any removal to it would necessarily breach Article 3 of the
Convention. At [50]-[52] it stated:
“50. Turning to the present case, the Court notes
that the applicant has visited Iraq twice since the change of regime, in
2003 and 2004. However, the applicant claimed that during these visits he had
been forced to hide in fear of the Kurdish authorities as his friend had told
him that he was under surveillance and that his name was on a “black list”, and
that, after he had left Iraq, the Kurds searched his family’s home looking for
him. On the other hand, not only did he not provide any evidence in support of
these statements, they also seem to be in contradiction to what he previously
said about his visits (see paragraph 23 above). From his previous statements it
would appear that he moved freely in and out of public buildings and on the
streets during his visits (taking his sick father to hospital and, afterwards,
holding a commemoration for him). Moreover, on both visits the applicant stayed
in Kirkuk for more than one month. It should be noted that the security
situation in Iraq was much more dangerous at the time of the applicant’s visits
than it is now (according to Iraq Body Count there were 12,087 civilian deaths
reported in 2003, 11, 072 in 2004 and 4,045 in 2010; www.iraqbodycount.org as downloaded
on 16 November 2011). The Court has already had an opportunity to assess the
general security situation in Iraq (see F.H. v. Sweden, no. 32621/06, §
9320, January 2009). In that case, the Court held that while the general
situation in Iraq was insecure and problematic, it was not so serious as to
cause, by itself, a violation of Article 3 if that applicant, a Christian and a
member of the Ba’ath party, were to be returned there (see also Müslim v.
Turkey, no. 53566/99, 26 April 2005; for a recent assessment of the
security situation in Kirkuk, see Agalar v. Norway (dec.), no. 55120/09,
8 November 2011).
51. Although the Court is aware that the UNHCR, the UN and the IOM
recommend that countries refrain from forcibly returning refugees to Iraq, they have stated that they are committed to providing assistance to those who return.
Moreover, the Court observes that their recommendations are partly based on the
security situation and partly due to practical problems for returnees such as
shelter, health care and property restitution. In this connection, the Court
stresses that it attaches importance to information contained in recent reports
from independent international human rights organisations or governmental
sources (see, among others, Saadi v. Italy, cited above, § 131).
However, its own assessment of the general situation in the country of
destination is carried out only to determine whether there are substantial
grounds for believing that the applicant would be at a real risk of being
subjected to treatment prohibited by Article 3 if he were to be returned to
that country. Consequently, where reports are focused on general socio-economic
and humanitarian conditions, the Court has been inclined to accord less weight
to them, since such conditions do not necessarily have a bearing on the
question of a real risk to an individual applicant of ill treatment within
the meaning of Article 3 (see NA, cited above, § 122).
52. Hence, in the present case, having regard
to the above considerations and the fact that the applicant visited Iraq twice,
at the time of the upsurge of violence in that country, without any
consequences, the Court concludes that he did not adduce any evidence capable
of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if deported,
he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to
Article 3. Therefore, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be
rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. In view of
this conclusion, it is appropriate to discontinue the application of Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court.”
THE EVIDENCE
Expert Evidence
Dr George
Written report
84. Dr George’s report
prepared for this case is dated 26 March 2012 (plus addendum report of the same
date). There is also his response to the Secretary of State’s questions of 9
April 2012.
85. His principal focus
is on the general security situation. At [157] Dr George states that “all three
appellants in this case would be at risk in the centre and to a lesser extent,
in the south of the country because of the general security situation” and at [154]
he says that “all three appellants would be at risk in Iraq, or at least in
Shi’a-dominated and mixed Sunni-Shi’a communities in central and southern parts
of the country, on account of their Sunni religio-political identity”.
86. Dr George writes that
the security situation has changed little from that described by the UNHCR in
April 2009: “If anything, the position has deteriorated somewhat” due to
political uncertainties and the withdrawal of US troops. At the same time “the
period since US withdrawal has not seen a major increase in violence or a
return of generalised sectarian violence”.
87. He states that
despite the relative improvement in the security situation since 2007 the
return of IDPs and EDPs has been slow and halting.
88. At [133] (see also
155), Dr George states that:
“Certain risks will apply
to all returnees from the UK. In particular, they will be at risk of kidnap
because, as persons who have spent time in the west, they will be perceived as
being wealthy; and all returnees will be at risk from the general violence in Iraq.”
89. Dr George considers
that Kurdish ethnicity gives rise to a “real risk….at least in certain parts of
the country. Kurds in Iraq south of the KRG-controlled zone have been targeted
as part of the strife” ([141]).
90. He also considers it
“plausible that the close relatives of actual or perceived abusive or
high-ranking former Ba’athists would be liable to be targeted for revenge…” ([140]).
Oral evidence
91. In cross-examination,
Dr George was asked whether there was any evidence of an IDP ever relocating
without family support and he said that, of course, there were always
exceptions and he was sure there were such cases, but the general position was as
he described it at [221] and [222] of his report. The more assistance there
was in relocation, the easier it was to relocate, but that would not
necessarily surmount a problem, for example for a Sunni in Shi’a area. It was
put to him that, although his view was that it was not possible to relocate
within central governorates, it was the case that there were significant
numbers of IDPs in those areas and there was help from NGOs. He said that in
most cases help for IDPs would be trumped by the other factors. There would be
a risk to returned asylum seekers because of a perception of wealth. There was
no statistical evidence of which he was aware about risk in that regard, but
perceptions in the Middle East often mattered more than reality.
92. Dr George was
referred to his reference in [232] to the appellants facing a real risk of
being kidnapped. He said it depended what you meant by real. It was real but
not very high. He was asked whether it could be the case that in the report,
where he said risk or real risk, it could include low risk. He said it could.
It depended on the context. He would think in future about the adjectives to
attach to the term “risk”. In his report he had used “real risk” to mean
something more than genuine and also something slightly more than nothing.
93. He said that he could
show from figures that Kurds were more at risk in the disputed areas than in Baghdad, but the data was very poor. He could not say whether and to what extent attacks
on Kurds in the disputed territories were ethnically based. A person could be
in the wrong place at the wrong time in the specific context of the disputed
territories. With regard to the data on killings, the statistics would not
always say whether the victim was a Kurd or who the perpetrator was. The
statistical data was very poor. He could not take it any further than his
report. Statistical analysis was to be looked at with caution.
94. Dr George had been
unimpressed by the FCO letters about Iraq produced for the hearing. He was
referred specifically to the letter of 7 April 2012. The Iraq Body Count’s (IBC’s)
daily list of attacks in Kirkuk and also his report showed far more casualties
than the FCO said. He questioned what the basis for what they said was.
Certainly, Sunni extremists were very active, but it was much more than that.
He was not sure that there was such a thing as an indiscriminate attack. He
was not aware of any evidence of Kurds fleeing Baghdad or Kirkuk recently. There had not been mass flight and a lot of Kurds had come back to reclaim
properties seized during Saddam Hussein’s regime. They were discouraged from
entering the KRG who wished them to stay there to support the referendum that
would occur one day concerning Kirkuk. There was movement in and out of the
disputed territories. Being a Sunni or Shi’a was a general risk factor and not
high up the league table of risk. It was a genuine risk factor if
circumstances were such as to make it a risk, for example living near to a
Shi’a area in Baghdad for a Sunni or encountering a Sunni checkpoint for a
Shi’a. It was the same for both. It was a question of context. Sectarianism
could be irrelevant or important. He would expect the appellants as Sunnis to
return to a Sunni area.
95. It was put to Dr
George that in the five central governorates there seemed to be no evidence to
show that life in general did not go on. He said that as a general statement
that was right and likewise in the south. It was the case also in Baghdad and Kirkuk that life went on. It was put to him that evidence did not show that
people were modifying their lives because of the violence and he said he was
not sure about that, citing the separatism and high walls in Baghdad and
security checks. Life had been affected by violence and the potential for
violence. He thought that IBC was reliable. He thought it needed two reports
for each figure. He accepted, broadly speaking, that the levels of violence in
2012 had been roughly the same as in 2010 and 2011, as far as was known. It
was put to him that if there were 4,100 deaths a year in a population of 29
million (taking the lowest population estimate), that was 14 or 15 per
100,000. Dr George said yes, but it was not spread evenly across Iraq and there was a lot of desert.
96. Dr George accepted
there was not a risk of general violence in the KRG or the south. The central
governorates were more dangerous than the others. In some areas, the risk
might be quite low, for example for a Sunni in a Sunni area who, in general,
would not be at risk there. He was referred to the point he made at [147]
concerning Kurdish families from the disputed Jalawla district in Diyala
province who had left for other cities in the province. He said that in Kirkuk province, around 50% of the IDPs had relocated within the governorate and there was
a general pattern which emphasised the significance of family support. Family
support network would be at the top of the list for a relocating family.
Although it could be that people would prefer to live there, the KRG
discouraged relocation of Kurds to the KRG. He agreed that there were a lot
of reasons independently of violence for people moving, for example lack of
water. There were a lot of Kurds in the south, so family connections were
likely to be the reason. Sunnis could do the same. He understood that there
were a lot of Kurds in Kirkuk because of family connections in the KRG or
elsewhere in the Kirkuk Governorate. He was referred to the IOM report
concerning Kirkuk at C9, Q15. He noted the point about difficulties of
transferring PDS cards. That had an impact on the ability to relocate. It was
human nature to want to go home. Quite a high proportion of returnees to Iraq regretted returning. The evidence did not show starvation, people got by, Dr George
agreed. He said there was malnutrition and the MoDM was ineffective.
97. He was referred to
the reasons given for displacement in respect of Kirkuk, including drought and
others. He said none of the others could be excluded.
98. Although he thought
the IBC figures were usable, he did not think that its figures were
comprehensive as not all deaths would meet its criteria and the real figures
were likely to be higher. A lot of deaths were not reported. The criteria of
the IBC were on its website. The IBC table included a wide variety and was
intended to include all deaths resulting from violence. It would record mass
casualty attacks. He was asked whether there was anything between
assassination and mass casualty attacks and he said yes, a grenade at a
checkpoint killing a civilian who happened to be there but who was not the key
target. As regards “woundings” and its meaning, he would take it to mean more
than a scratch but rather a significant injury which could involve
hospitalisation. It would be an injury needing medical treatment. He had
never seen statistics on bruises or grazes. There might be trauma that did not
show up on an attack. The British Embassy letters seemed based on a very
limited range of sources and it did not say which security companies were
involved and what level of person. The IBC corroboration system seemed better.
It was necessary to approach all data in Iraq with caution. There was a view
that no violence was indiscriminate in that all except criminal action was
politically motivated and directed at a particular target with a particular
direction.
99. As regards attacks in
disputed areas, it was very difficult to know whether they were ethnically
motivated or were the consequence of a power issue. The disputed areas were a
main area of risk. He considered Kurds to be at risk especially in the
disputed areas because of their ethnicity.
100. It was the case that
the numbers of those leaving Iraq now was certainly reduced. It was a complex
pattern. There was not a massive surge of Iraqis leaving Iraq and it could be economic.
Dr Fatah
Written report
101. In his very lengthy report of 28 March 2012,
Dr Fatah, like Dr George, addresses the general security situation in Iraq in
some detail and then goes on to analyse the situation in the five central
governorates in particular, dealing in especial detail with Kirkuk. He also provides a detailed analysis of the KRG, assessing in particular security
issues in the region. Thereafter he considers relocation within Iraq, both within the GoI areas and the KRG, commenting on the Danish Fact-Finding Mission
Report of 2010, contrasting its conclusions with his own findings in respect of
a number of issues including documentation matters, a topic on which he sets
out more detailed evidence subsequently. He includes information obtained from
interviews with several people, including a Kurdish police officer in Kirkuk, covering such matters as the security situation in Kirkuk and contrasting the
position of Arabs and Kurds in Kirkuk. He also provides telephone interview
transcripts with several asylum seekers returned from European countries.
Oral evidence
102. Dr Fatah said that he
thought that figures cited in his report showed that from 2010 to today the
killing had become more targeted, for example bombs in cars. It could not be
said that an ordinary Kurd would be at risk per se in Iraq. You had to know where to go. You had to be with someone local and to know where to go. An
ordinary Kurd should not have a problem passing into an Arab area, but if there
was political tension he would be at risk and there might be a reaction to an
incident. Targeting could be of a known individual or of the public. There
were always more civilians killed than security people. Dr Fatah agreed that
people in the KRG face very little violence. He was asked whether it was the
same in the other governorates and he said that where there was one ethnic
group in the region it was fairly stable, but in mixed areas such as Baghdad, Mosul, Salah Al-Din, Diyala and Kirkuk there was more violence. It depended on
the place. He was asked whether there were areas within, for example, the Tameen
(Kirkuk) governorate without problems and he said that the patterns of movement
by people depended on the structure of the area. The violence was never everywhere
and there were random bombs. He was asked whether a family in one part of
Diyala, for example, could move to another part with a lesser level of violence
and he said that it was possible that a person could move to a mainly Kurdish
area there. He was asked whether this was true for all the central
governorates, that they could move to an area where they would be all right,
and he said that this would be the case for a Sunni and a Shi’a. He agreed
that generally in Tameen or Diyala governorate a Sunni or a Shi’a in their own
majority area would generally not be at risk of violence apart from general
violence unless they were a person in the UNHCR risk profile. If a Kurd was in
a Kurdish area, there would be no problem, but he had not looked at a map of
the violence and did not know what the distribution of violence in Kirkuk was. The violence did not prevent daily life from going on, though people got
killed. There was a psychological impact.
103. With regard to deaths,
death by the roadside might not be recorded. He was not sure if IBC would
include every death, but those given were sourced. You could rely on trends.
The graphs all took the same shape. It was put to him that there did not seem
to be any increase since the US troops left and he said it was too early to
say. There were slightly higher figures, but only over a few months. There
had not been much change since 2010.
104. He was asked how broad
would support networks be for a person relocating and he said that political
groups were the best example and that it was all around political groups. If
he were Sunni and wanting to leave, for example, Kirkuk, then he would look to
go where there were other Sunnis if you were from a big tribe. Family was
important. You would look for the tribe initially, which would be Sunni or
Shi’a. He was asked whether, if a person was not influential in the tribe, the
latter would feel obliged to help him and he said not the tribe but more a
political organisation. If a person had no influence, then they would look for
a job. It was put to him that his [705] was very general and he said that if
he were from a city the neighbour would be like a social network and like the
tribe might help with connections for jobs, etc. It was put to him that although
there were job problems for IDPs, there was no evidence of starvation or a
humanitarian crisis and he said he accepted that there was not a humanitarian
crisis, but life was harsh. It was put to him that most IDPs lived in houses
and not in apartments or towns and he said there were people living in camps.
HF was single and of working age and would have to find a job.
105. There were no more
Kurdish neighbourhoods in Baghdad after the Shi’a Kurds were deported by Saddam
Hussein. Kurds in Baghdad would live in mixed neighbourhoods. Some had become
Arabised. He agreed that if you were a Kurd you would know where to go. There
were checkpoints to avoid. With regard to the examples he gave immediately
after [181] of his report, it was suggested to him that it was often unclear
who had attacked and why and who the victim was and he said you could tell from
the figures. Dr George had given an example of a sectarian attack.
106. He said the Shi’a
militia was powerful in Baghdad. As regards risk to a Sunni Kurd who was a
failed asylum seeker in Baghdad, he had to know his way around and if he was in
the wrong neighbourhood he would be at more risk. There was more violence
where there was a greater population. He could not say how the first appellants
could avoid violence in Kirkuk. As regards the departure of the US troops, it had not reduced the exposure of civilians to high levels of violence.
BACKGROUND EVIDENCE
Statistics on Violence
107. Before noting key
statistics relating to conflict-related violence in Iraq, we need to clarify
our approach to the varying figures given by different data-gatherers. In HMI
the Tribunal noted the need for caution when analysing figures relating to
incidents of violence in Iraq. We sound the same note. If anything, the
withdrawal of US troops appears to have resulted in fewer sources of rigorous
data-gathering: as noted by the FCO letter dated 7 April 2012, with the
withdrawal of US forces, there is less corroborated reporting of incidents.
108. Before us the experts
made much the same point and there was broad agreement between the parties that
(1) allowance should continue to be made for underreporting; but that (2) the
Iraq Body Count (IBC) figures, being based on actual reports of specific deaths,
afford reasonably reliable estimates. As regards (1), we would agree with the
respondent that this is not a fixed feature of the reporting of all armed
conflicts but is based on the empirical evidence we have from the data
gatherers themselves who continue to report on Iraqi violence.
.
109. We are conscious that
there are other sources that give lower figures for civilian casualties than
IBC. The latest Brookings Institute Iraq Index, for example, gives recent
figures for deaths ( for 2010, 2,500 and 2011, 1,578) which are much lower than
the IBC figures (for 2010, 4,053 and for 2011, 4,103). As accessed on 4 October
2012, the figures IBC gives for Jan-September inclusive total 2,157. The
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) quarterly report of
30 January 2012 also gives lower figures for civilian deaths (e.g. for 2011,
2,645). The Iraq Health, Interior and Defence Ministers also give lower
figures and indeed, as noted by the May 2012 UNHCR guidelines at p.44, “Iraqi
Governments sources provide consistently lower casualty figures than media
reports by international observers”.
110. We continue
nonetheless to regard the IBC figures as being more reliable because of their
use of multiple sources. The IBC notes that of the 4,087 recorded civilian
deaths for 2011, “[e]vidence of these… was extracted from some 6,828 distinct
reports from over 90 sources covering 1,884 incidents, each of which is openly
listed on the IBC website”. (We note that the UNHCR Guidelines also utilise
these figures.) When considering the IBC figures, it must be borne in mind that
they do not include police deaths, although IBC describes this group as having
been “a major target”. It may assist if we produce a graph showing the documented
number of Iraqi civilian fatalities from 2003 to August 2012.
111. The IBC statistics of
civilian casualties disclose two things in particular. First, that the figures
from 2009 onwards are five times lower than they were in 2006 and 2007 (whereas
in 2006 and 2007 figures were 28,212 and 25,025 respectively, since 2009 the
figures have not risen above 4,704). Second, that although there was a further
drop in 2010 (to 4,045 from the 2009 figure of 4,704) there has been no significant
decrease since 2009 (the figure for 2011 being 4,087). On the basis of IBC
figures for Jan-September 2012 inclusive, 2012 appears to be on course to show
broadly comparable figure to the 2011 one.
112. One matter the
Tribunal sought to ascertain from the parties was whether available studies
clarified what was the ratio of those killed to those injured (it being agreed
that a working definition of the latter category would be persons requiring
hospital treatment following an incident of violence). Whilst, there are some
studies that suggest that this ratio has decreased in recent years (e.g. the
Lancet study covering March 2003 – December 2010 gives a ratio of 2.5), we
continue to think we should take the highest ratio suggested by reputable sources
which it was agreed was in the region of between 4 to 1 and 7 to 1. The CSIS
Report of 9 February 2011 states that as a rough estimate “injured and wounded
would have totalled 5-7 times the number killed” and notes that this ratio is
far higher than in Afghanistan.
The inclusive approach
113. In HMI at [75] the
Tribunal explained why it considered that in seeking to assess whether the
Article 15(c) threshold was met in Iraq it had to adopt an inclusive approach.
114. One aspect of the
inclusive approach is an appreciation that there are threats to the physical
safety and integrity of civilians beyond those measured in the civilian
casualty rates. As put by Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy in a report of 16 February, 2012 entitled “A Violent New Year in
Iraq, The National Interest (cited at n. 217 of the May 2012 UNHCR Guidelines),
“[m]ass casualty attacks tell only part of the story of violence in Iraq, and
mortality statistics overlook the targeted nature of violence in today’s Iraq,
where a high proportion of victims are local progovernment community leaders.
For every one person of this kind who is killed, an exponential number of
others are intimidated into passive support for insurgent groups”. Whilst our principal
focus when examining levels of violence is physical harm causing death or
injury, it is important that we also take account of indirect forms of violence
such as threats, intimidation, blackmail, seizure of property, raids on homes
and businesses, use of checkpoints to push out other factions, kidnapping and
extortion. To adopt Mr Fordham’s metaphor, these factors mean that most Iraqis
(outside the KRG) l continue to ”live under the shadow of violence”.
Iraq as a whole
115. As already noted, it is
not the appellants’ position that Iraq overall is presently afflicted by a
level of violence at or above the Article 15(c) threshold and, of course, it
has not been UNHCR’s position since 2009 that it is either. Indeed, in its May
2012 Guidelines UNHCR observes (see above [61]) that the current situation
“does not allow for generalised conclusions on the basis of broad geographical
distinctions”. Nevertheless it is clear from the background evidence that Iraq remains a country seriously affected by violence.
116. Up until 2011, Iraq had been ranked by the Global Peace Index (GPI) as the world’s least peaceful country
for four consecutive years. The 5th edition of the GPI for 2011
ranks Iraq as the world’s second least-peaceful country after Somalia. In its July 2011 report the Minority Rights Group placed Iraqis fourth on a list of people
most under threat, after Somalis, Sudanese and Afghans.
117. According to UNHCR’s
statistical overview of asylum applications lodged in Europe and selected
non-European industrialised countries, 18 October 2011, Iraq is the fourth largest country of origin of asylum seekers. The proportion of its population
who are displaced persons (15.4%) is the third highest in the world according
to data from UNHCR.
118. According to an August
2010 IOM study identifying an estimated 339,000 Iraqis as being returning IDPs,
55% of returnee families cited improved security as their primary reason for
return. At the same time, 25% of returnee families say they have no access to healthcare
and only 61% have water in their homes.
Parties to the conflict
State
and coalition actors
119. The withdrawal of US
troops was completed on 18 December 2011. The Iraqi security apparatus is said
to number roughly 900,000 soldiers and police. Different figures can be found
for just how many of the overall number of approx. 900,000 are police:
according to the UNSC Report of SG on Children and Armed Conflict – Iraq, 15
June 2011, the police number approximately 400,000; according to a source cited
by the 2012 UNHCR Guidelines, n.217, the figure for police is 650,000 out of a
total of 939,000 ISF.
120. The pro-government
Awakening Councils or Sahwa are now regarded as part of the Iraqi security
forces (Dr Fatah, [72]). Dr Fatah notes that the size of the Kurdish peshmerga
forces and the security forces under the administration of the PUK and KDP is
about 190,000.
Insurgents
121. The main Shi’a
insurgent groups are the Sadr militia or Promised Day Brigade, various Shi’a
Factions like the Special Groups, and Shi’a extremist groups such as Kata’ib
Hizbullah (KH). It remains unclear whether the Mahdi Army, responsible for a
great deal of politically-orientated violence since 2003, has disbanded.
122. The main Sunni
insurgent groups, estimated at around 200,000 in number, include former
Ba’athist regime elements, Sunni Islamists, Salafists, remnants of the Kurdish
Ansar al-Islam and foreign Islamist volunteers. AQI remains the group
responsible for most of the mass casualty attacks since the US withdrawal.
123. According to the SIGIR
30 October 2011 Quarterly Report to the US Congress, a US commander described the decline in the number of foreign fighters as “dramatic”. Whilst AQI
continues to operate primarily in regions with majority Sunni Arab populations,
particularly around Baghdad and Ninewah, it appears unable to command territory
or population centres. According to JSCRA Iraq, 21 March 2011, “[t]errorist
insurgent groups have been whittled down to a hard core, with many less committed
elements having been paved away. Completely reducing this remaining cadre will
be a slow and difficult process”.
124. Many militias have
ties with criminal networks. Violent crime is at high levels. According to the
2012 UNHCR Guidelines p 8, “[c]rime is widespread and some armed groups
reportedly engage in extortion, kidnapping and armed robberies to fund their
other, politically - or religiously, or ideologically - motivated activities,
conflating acts of persecution and criminality…”
Level and intensity of
violence
125. In HMI at [260]
the Tribunal said:
“Like UNHCR we are wary of assuming that
various insurgent groups will not, once again, when it suits, revert to tactics
such as the bombing of market places that maximise civilian casualties and
deploy methods suited to achieving that. However, we do think that it can
properly be said that in August/early September 2010 the various insurgent
groups, AQI included, are weaker organisationally and militarily and that the
evidence does not suggest that this will change in the foreseeable future. To
that extent we do think it is correct to regard the levels of indiscriminate
violence as being not only lower presently but likely not to revert to anything
like the levels they reached in 2006/2007. Whilst the US is committed to a responsible “draw-down” it is clear that there continues to be a great deal of
US and international involvement in, and support for, the Iraqi government. The
main Sunni and Shi’a parties and organisations appear increasingly committed to
distributing power through civil rather than military means.”
126. There are significant
items of evidence that indicate that the nature and intensity of the violence
in Iraq is less serious than it was in 2009. For example, the Global Peace
Index notes that Iraq’s score “improved substantially” in 2011 and that (albeit
at slow rates) there has continued to be year-on-year improvements every year
since 2007. And according to UN statistics, there were a total of 5,470
security incidents in 2011, as compared to 8,909 and 9,213 such incidents in
2009 and 2010 respectively.
127. On the other hand,
there are some other studies that consider that violence in Iraq is again getting worse. For example, as noted by the 2012 UNHCR Guidelines at n.38, Michael
Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, which collates
security metrics from the Iraqi government, observes that Iraq witnessed 36 confirmed attempted mass-casualty attacks in January 2012, a significant increase
of the average of 23 attacks a month in the last quarter of 2011. It further
notes 561 reported attacks in January 2012, compared to 494 reported attacks in
December 2011 and 302 reported attacks in November 2011. The Iraq Brookings
Institute as accessed 4 October 2012 notes that the UN has reported that in the
first 6 months of 2012, 2,101 Iraqis were killed in violent attacks compared to
1,832 in the same period of 2011. The SIGIR report of 30 July 2012 (accessed on
the same) date notes that a series of attacks on 23 July in Taji, Baghdad and Kirkuk resulted in the largest one day death toll in more than 2 years.
128. The thrust of the
background evidence is that overall there is no clear trend demonstrating
either an increase or decrease in the level and intensity of violence assessed
on a year by year basis. So far as concerns the figures for civilian
casualties for 2011, they are similar to those for 2010. It was agreed by both
Dr George and Dr Fatah that January was an unusual month and that overall there
was no evidence to show any increase in that level in 2012. The Brookings
Institute figures for the first 6 months of 2012 suggest that 2012 may see an
increase over the figure for 2011 but only a very small one.
129. So far as concerns
trends relating to the level of civilian casualties, the May 2012 UNHCR
Guidelines state that, that taking the most recent figures, “it appears that
there is no noticeable downward trend in civilian casualty figures since mid
2009” and that, in the words of the IBC in a January 2012 report, a “persistent
low-level conflict” has taken root in the country, which “will continue to kill
civilians at a similar rate for years to come (“an impassable minimum”).” The
great majority of civilian deaths and injuries are caused by the insurgents,
although according to the IBC in January 2012, the rate of civilian deaths
caused by the ISF has increased from 96 in 2010 to 141 in 2011.
130. So far as concerns
combatant casualty figures, all sources record a decline in figures. The CSIS Report,
Iraq: Patterns of Violence, Casualty Trends and Emerging Security Threats, 9
February 2011 discloses that since 2009 there have been roughly similar falls
in combatant casualty figures as there have been in civilian casualty figures.
131. It would appear that
the use of IEDs has become the modus operandi of militants for the last
two years. That appears to show a change of tactics as insurgents and militias
are using smaller bombs and more indirect tactics (source cited by Dr George, [172]).
At the same time, although they only account for a small proportion of attacks,
mass casualty attacks have remained a key part of insurgent tactics ([176]).
132. The USDD Report,
Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, March 2010 noted that the pattern of
violence emerging was that of periodic, spectacular, multiple-device
high-profile attacks as the extremists’ preferred method to create outsized
effects whilst harbouring resources.
133. Dr George said that
“there does not appear to be any firm, consistent trend towards increased or
decreased use of more targeted, or indeed, more indiscriminate, modes of
attack”.
Targeted violence
134. In line with our
earlier observations at [42], rather than conceiving targeted and
indiscriminate violence as dichotomous it would appear that they are both part
of a complex spectrum. Thus, for example within the category of targeted
violence, there can be (1) specific targeting, i.e. very precise attacks, e.g.
by way of an assassin’s bullet; (2) general targeting, i.e. targeting which by
virtue of its method and sometimes purpose harms civilians as well as their
intended targets e.g. a long-range mortar fired at a police station in a
civilian area or a suicide bombing aimed at a mosque belonging to one refugee group
or another. And of course, as we shall return to in a moment, sometimes
civilians as such can be targeted.
Civilian casualties
135. The Danish Immigration
Service report from fact-finding mission to Amman, Jordan and Baghdad of
September 2010 concluded that the proportion of civilian casualties had
increased steadily, with figures for 2009 showing over 70% of all casualties
classified as civilians and one could no longer speak of an improvement in
security for Iraqis. In Kirkuk the situation was particularly fragile.
136. The ICRC briefing
dated 8 November 2011 states that:
“The level of violence
linked to the conflict is slowly decreasing, but its cost remains high in terms
of civilian casualties. Central Iraq and Baghdad especially remain volatile,
unpredictable and often dangerous due to acts of violence that still claim the
lives of tens of persons every month.
Civilians often die in
random attacks designed to spread fear and discord among the general populace.
Even in attacks designed to destabilise state services, civilians are often the
unfortunate victims.”
Targeting of civilians
137. Whilst the overall
casualty figures have not changed significantly, the evidence shows that there
has been an increase within the overall figures in the number of incidents of
targeted violence. According to Dr Fatah, the use of targeted attacks “has
only recently become a feature of violence in Iraq” ([125]). Of course, what is
meant by “targeted” violence is not always clear, since it is possible to be
generally targeted (e.g. by being a member of an identifiable group) as well as
specifically targeted and studies also refer to “civilians” being targeted: see
above at [42], [133].
138. There appears to be a trend
towards increasing targeting of Iraqi security forces and government employees,
although the UNAMI Report for the January to December 2010 period makes clear
that in addition to public officials, persons whose jobs are clearly civilian,
e.g. community and religious leaders, journalists, medical and education
professionals, were the main targets. The UN SIGIR Report dated 26 November
2010 states that with US forces being less of a target “armed opposition groups
have changed tactics, relying more on long-range weapons that target indiscriminately.
It is also clear that the means and methods used in a number of attacks –
Vehicle Borne IEDs and Small Arms Fire are frequently carried out in public
spaces heedless of the toll on civilian lives…”.
139. However, even if the
trend is towards greater targeting of soldiers and police, it is clear that
attacks targeting civilians continue. The various reports reveal that in
addition to government buildings and officials, assailants have targeted a wide
range of places where civilians live or frequent: embassies, hotels, factories,
markets, mosques, checkpoints. People gathering for religious pilgrimages,
weddings and funerals have also been attacked mainly in Shi’a areas (HRW,
2011). A vivid example of an attack wounding many civilians is provided in the
SIGIR Quarterly Report dated 30 April 2012 which contains the following entry:
“24 January: car bomb killed 11 people in Sadr City; multiple vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device (VBIED) and improvised explosive device (IED)
attacks killed 12 and wounded 80 in predominantly Shi’a areas of Baghdad.”
Combatant casualties
140. According to the 2010
US State Department Report on Terrorism in Iraq, the main targets of bomb
attacks during 2010 “were against security forces, government buildings and western
targets”.
141. Among the state actors
in Iraq the police have been a particular target. According to the IBC the
police have been “a major target” with “by far the largest toll of any
professional group”. It records that between 2003-2011 there have been 8,991
police deaths. At p.15 the 2012 UNHCR Guidelines note that:
“members of the Iraqi
Police are often particularly targeted: they do not have heavy weapons and
equipment and receive less training than the Iraqi Army, and are accordingly
reportedly considered the weakest element of the ISP. In 2011, according to
Iraqi Government statistics, about 40% of Iraqis killed were ISF members,
including 609 Iraqi Police and 458 soldiers”.
142. For insurgent
casualties: the IBC has estimated that 20,000 “enemy” – i.e.
insurgent/anti-Coalition - deaths in respect of the period January
2004-December 2009.
Comparison with other
conflicts
143. In the body of
evidence before us there is some material seeking to compare levels of violence
in Iraq with those prevailing in other countries. According to the CSIS study
by Cordemann and Khazai, Iraq and the Challenge of Continuing Violence, 6
February 2012, in 2011 there were fewer attacks, fewer deaths and fewer acts of
hostage-taking place in Iraq than in Afghanistan although the number of wounded
was higher. However the CSIS Report on the Real Outcome of the Iraq War, 8
March 2012, notes that data from the UN National Counter Terrorism Center
(NCTC) show that Iraq had a consistently higher level of violence than Afghanistan during 2009-2011 with no consistent reduction in violence since mid-2009. In
AK (Afghanistan) [2012] UKUT 163 (IAC) at [201]-[207]) the Tribunal
dealt with the principal findings of the CSIS study in relation to a comparison
of the armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and also submissions as to the
relative figures for levels of violence in Somalia.
144. In a similar vein, in
relation to the comparison between levels of violence in Iraq and Somalia, Mr Fordham (whose submissions we shall summarise in due course) pointed out that
according to AMM [2011] UKUT 445 (IAC) in Mogadishu in Somalia, a city of around 2½ million in population, there were 918 deaths in 2010.
Sunnis and Shi’as
145. As regards identity as
a Sunni or Shi’a, the population of Iraq is about 55-60% Shi’a and 12-15% Sunni
Arab. In the 2012 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines at pp.25-6 it is said that
“[d]epending on the individual circumstances of the case, persons with the
profiles described below are likely to be in need of international refugee
protection on account of their religion or perceived religious (or
non-religious) identity” and under (a) states the following:
“a)
Sunnis and Shi’as
While
open sectarian violence between Arab Sunnis and Arab Shi’as ended in 2008,
armed Sunni groups continue to target Shi’a civilians with the apparent aim of
reigniting sectarian tension. Sectarian-motivated violence includes:
mass-casualty attacks targeting Shit'ite civilians and pilgrims; threats
against Sunnis in Shi’a majority areas and Shi’as in Sunni majority areas; as
well as targeted killings of both Sunni and Shi’a clerics and scholars.
Baathist ties and/or purported engagement in terrorism are often equated to
sectarianism by the Iraqi Government and the ISF. Many
individuals accused of Ba'athist ties and/or terrorism and thus perceived to be
engaged in sectarianism are of Sunni background.
i. Shi’a civilans, including pilgrims
Shi’a
civilians - in particular, Shi’as performing their religious duties at the mosque,
during funerals or mournings, or when on pilgrimage - are a key target for
Sunni armed groups. The main aim of these attacks appears to
be to divide Iraqis along sectarian lines in order to reignite tensions and
violence. Attacks are most frequent on religious holidays,
when thousands of pilgrims, including from Iran, march to and gather at Shi’a
holy sites in Baghdad, Kerbala and Najef, but
also in other areas of southern Iraq. Attacks on Shi’a
pilgrims and civilians have also taken place in the mixed governorates of
Diyala, Ninewa, Salah Al-Din and Kirkuk, where Shi’a Turkmen, Shabak or Kurds (Faili Kurds) may also be targeted, and in the mainly Sunni Al- Anbar
Governorate. Shi’a civilians have also frequently been
attacked in their homes, in restaurants or other public places in predominantly
Shi’a governorates, towns or
neighbourhoods.
ii. Sunni Arabs in Majority Shi’a Arab areas and Shi’a Arabs in
Majority Sunni Arab Areas
During
the period of heightened sectarian violence in 2006 and 2007, the
social and demographic make-up of many areas were altered as Sunni and Shi’a
armed groups sought to seize control and to cleanse "mixed" areas of
the rival sect. This occurred principally in Baghdad, Iraq's most diverse city, but also in the mixed towns and
villages surrounding it. During that period, many members of both sects were
internally displaced or fled abroad. To
date, most of Baghdad's formerly mixed neighbourhoods remain largely
homogenized, preventing many from returning to their former
areas of residence. In only a few neighbourhoods of Baghdad do members of both sects live side by side. Most returnees have
returned to areas under the control of their own community. The
recent political crisis, combined with a series of attacks by Sunni armed groups
targeting Shi’a neighbourhoods and pilgrims, has deepened sectarian tensions.
Anecdotal evidence from UNHCR protection monitoring activities suggests that
some Sunnis are leaving mixed and predominantly Shi’a neighbourhoods in Baghdad fearing retaliation. While previously many Iraqi Sunnis fled to Syria and Jordan to escape sectarian violence, reportedly most now seek to relocate within Iraq given tightened visa requirements in these countries and the ongoing violence in Syria.
Both
Sunnis and Shi’as living in or returning to areas in which they would
constitute a minority may be exposed to targeted violence on account of their
religious identity. Both Shi’as in Sunni dominated
neighbourhoods and Sunnis in Shi’a-dominated neighbourhoods have reportedly
been subjected to threatening letters demanding that they vacate their homes.
In cases where individuals do not comply, there are reports of violence or
harassment, including killings.”
146. At (b) on p.26 the
Guidelines deal with members of religious minorities Christians,
Sabaean-Mandaeans, Yazidis, Shabak, Kaka’i etc.
Kurds
147. As regards Kurdish
ethnicity, no major report classes Kurds as a minority group in Iraq; Kurds are one of the second largest ethnic groups in Iraq, comprising some 20% of the
population. Dr George estimates that there are 1.2 million Kurds living in Iraq outside the KRG (compared with 3.8 million in the KRG) concentrated in Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul and Diyala.
148. At [581] of his report, Dr Fatah notes that
the security situation in the KRG is rather different from the rest of Iraq. The KRG is not plagued by daily insurgent attacks and bombings, such as occur in the
central and southern governorates, although there are occasional car bombs,
kidnappings and insurgent attacks. However, he says, the region is still a
tribal society, and thus honour crimes, tribal feuds, and political
assassinations are part of daily life in the KRG.
149. Dr George, at [141]-[148]
of his main report says that Kurds have been targeted in Iraq south of the KRG zone, and there is a history of antagonism between the Kurds and the Sunni
Arabs. Kurds living in Sunni areas have been attacked by insurgents as
“collaborators” with the US occupiers and driven from their homes. He cites a
number of instances of attacks on Kurds, particularly in mixed Arab/Kurdish
areas in the north, where there are tensions over oil.
Former Ba’athists
150. According to the
UNHCR 2012 Guidelines at p. 18, “[t]oday, members of the former Ba’ath Party
or the former regime’s armed forces or security and intelligence services are
reportedly no longer systematically singled out for attack by armed groups”,
although “[t]hey may still be targeted in individual cases”…”. The same report
notes at p. 18, however, that the Iraqi Government continues to use accusations
of “Ba’athism” to sideline political opponents and settle political scores and
in October/November 2011 more than 600 individuals were arrested on charges of
terrorism and alleged Ba’ath Party ties”.
Population displacement
151. The Brookings Iraq Index November 2011 records that between October 2009 and July 2011 there had been 400,740
returns to Iraq. As at January 2011 there were estimated to be 1,343,568
post-2006 IDPs in Iraq. According to the UNSG Report, July 2011, approximately
1.75 Iraqis are estimated to be internally displaced or refugees in
neighbouring countries. According to UNHCR’s Iraq Returnee Monitoring,
August-December 2011, the year 2011 saw a significant increase in registered
returns compared to previous years. The reasons included stabilisation in the
security situation and improvement in the economic situation. UNHCR’s Monthly
Statistical Update on Return – January 2012, lists the number of IDP returns
for the period February 2011 to February 2012 as 212, 490 across all
governorates. The UNHCR Iraq Fact Sheet, July 2012 estimates the number
of IDPs to be 1,332,382 and lists the number of IDP returns in 2012 up to that
point to be 133,610, with Baghdad being the main governorate of return accounting
for some 72%.
152. Whilst there continue
to be new displacements, according to the 2012 UNHCR Guidelines, “new instances
of large-scale displacement have decreased significantly in 2010 and 2011”. In
broad terms, this is as true of the five central governorates as of Iraq as a whole and where there are displacements in the former they often happen by moving
elsewhere within the area, e.g. in October 2010 nearly 1,000 families were
displaced within the Diyala Governorate from Jalawla, Saadiya and Qaratap to
Khanaqeen, Kalar and Kifri. A significant number of IDPs originating in Kirkuk or Baghdad governorates have relocated within their home governorates or within one
of the five central provinces. According to the UNHCR Iraq Returnee Monitoring
August 2011 results, more refugees returned to Baghdad in 2011 than was the
case in 2010 and 64% did so out of a positive response to improvements in the
security and political situation. Further, in terms of the geographical
distribution of IDPs, the IOM evidence indicates that the largest numbers are
in Baghdad and the third largest in Kirkuk.
153. Socio-economic
conditions for IDPs are dealt with below at [162]-[167].
State weakness and
protection issues
154. According to the UNAMI
Report covering the January–December 2010 period, significant problems remain
with law enforcement and the administration of justice, especially in relation
to the provision of and respect for due process and fair trial rights.
155. Citing the US State
Department Report for 2010, published in February 2011, the 2012 UNHCR
Guidelines state that:
“In Iraq, the main perpetrators of persecution are non-state actors. However, protection by national
authorities is unlikely to be available in most cases, given that the national
authorities have limited capacity to enforce law and order. The ISF, which now
have around 930,000 members are widely acknowledged as increasingly capable and
united, reportedly remain vulnerable to corruption, and infiltration by
militants, and continue to be themselves a major target of attacks. In
addition, political disunity has reportedly limited the effectiveness of the
ISP” (p.13).
156. At p.49 it states that
in the KRG, however, generally the Kurdish authorities are able and willing to
provide protection.
157. In reply to a question
from the Tribunal the respondent has confirmed that her current position on
protection has changed since June 2009 when her OGN stated at 3.6.8 that the
authorities in Iraq were unable to provide sufficiency of protection. Her
position since October 2010 has been that the security situation in Iraq has improved and that whilst ongoing violence in Iraq undermines the government’s ability to
protect human rights, there is no general inability of the state to protect its
population.
158. Dr George stated that
he endorsed UNHCR’s view as stated in its 2009 Eligibility Guidelines, with
reference to central and southern Iraq, that “generally protection by national
authorities will not be available, given that the national authorities have yet
limited capacity to enforce law and order, the ISF may be infiltrated by
radical elements and the judiciary is prone to intimidation and corruption”.
159. Dr Fatah assesses the
Iraqi authorities’ capacity to protect those in need as weak. The police and
security forces are ill-trained and infiltration by insurgents within the state
security apparatus is extensive. In the political and security vacuum,
non-state actors are operating actively across the territory. The absence of a
centralised state enables conflict between regions, governorates and the
central government and allows local rulers the freedom to create fiefdoms and
solidify their own power bases.
160. Corruption is rife.
Transparency International’s 2011 Corruption Index, which measures the
perceived levels of public sector corruption, placed Iraq at 175 on a list of
185 countries. The 2012 UNHCR Guidelines note that “[t]he persistent problem
of corruption is said to prevent progress with respect to governance, public
services and security in Iraq. Efforts to combat corruption are reported
hampered, inter alia, by an inadequate legal and institutional framework, weak
parliamentary oversight, ongoing attacks against anticorruption officials, as
well as government interference and political pressures.” All major reports
note that the rule of law in Iraq is lacking, although branches of law
enforcement are making progress. The judicial system is highly vulnerable to
political pressure. Traditional systems of social and legal protection have
been severely compromised by the conflict. The Economist Intelligence Unit
paper January 2011 states that in addition to the malady of corruption, the
unclear delineation of power between the government in Baghdad and the KRG, the
local authorities and the tribally-oriented Awakening Movement “also hinders
governance”.
161. The Brookings
Institute notes that a new Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, as
of 27 October 2011, lists Iraq fourth out of 141 weakest states. On the
Economist Intelligence Unit 2010 Democracy Index Iraq ranked 112th
out of 167 countries (COIS, August 2011, 7.07). Another aspect of governance
in Iraq concerns compliance with international human rights norms. Major
reports, e.g. those by Amnesty International 2011 and Human Rights Watch 2011
and the US State Department Report 2011 continue to regard human rights
conditions in Iraq as extremely poor, albeit there has been a slight
improvement.
Socio-economic conditions
162. According to January
2009 statistics cited in the COIS, 30 August 2011, unemployment in Iraq is 18% and a further 10% of the labour force are part-time workers. According to the
UNSG Report, 7 July 2011, the country’s poverty index remains high (22.9%). The
UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Children, 2011 report states that 23% of Iraqis
reportedly live on less than US $2 per day (cited in 2012 UNHCR Guidelines,
p.165). Illiteracy is also high. There are ongoing problems with the delivery
of essential services. Public services continue to be plagued by severe
deficiencies, notably widespread corruption. Iraq’s crime rate is high.
According to Dr George, the great majority of Iraqis depend heavily on
subsidised rations ([224]).
163. In the 30 June 2012
issue of Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, a New York consulting firm
is quoted as ranking Baghdad as last of 221 cities in a survey of quality of
life and personal security, describing it as ‘the world’s least safe city’.
164. According to Dr
George, there is an economic crisis and housing shortage afflicting Iraq. Persons without a family support network would encounter difficulties finding a
means of supporting themselves and places to live (at [221], [61]-[71]).
Access to jobs relies on corruption, patronage, nepotism or being a political
appointee: a Wasta (person of influence) is needed.
165. The ICRC Report, 29
March 2012, states that Iraq is the country most heavily contaminated by
unexploded munitions and access to public services, such as clean water and
public health care, remains a challenge for many.
166. According to IMF and
CIA World Factbook figures, Iraq’s GDP has increased 11% in 2011, making it one
of the world’s fastest-growing economies. The January 2011 Inspector General
Report commenting on reconstruction noted that the growth rate of Iraq’s GDP
has surged from a reported 2.6% in 2010 to 11.5% in 2011 and 11% in 2012,
“placing Iraq amongst the world’s fastest growing economies”. Since mid-2009
oil export earnings have returned to levels seen before Operation Iraqi
Freedom. As global oil prices remained high, government revenues increased
accordingly. However the GoI remain hard-pressed to translate macroeconomic
gains into an improved standard of living. Iraq still ranked only 161st
in the world in per capita income (CSIS Study, “The Outcome of Invasion: US and
Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq, November 28, 2011).
167. According to the UN
Development Assistance Framework Iraq, 2011-2014, nearly 100% of Iraqis receive
food and non-food items through the Public Distribution System (PDS) although
the system has met with challenges. The 2012 UNHCR Guidelines note evidence
that the overall food situation has improved (p.51). The prevalence of food
insecurity is estimated at 3%. However, poverty is still widespread in Iraq.
International assistance
168. Several UN and
numerous international NGOs and local NGOs are present in Iraq, usually working
alongside relevant Iraqi state agencies such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry
of Human Rights and the Ministry of Displacement and Migration. Dr George
describes the cumulative impact of these bodies as significant (at [228]).
169. According to an NCCI
April 2011 Report, there are estimated to be between 8,000-12,000 traditional
and modern “CSOs” (Civil Society Organisations) in Iraq which provide support
for local communities on religious, tribal, sectarian and ethnic lines. Their
rapid growth has been fuelled by the international humanitarian community’s
pressing need to find local parties for project implementation. These
organisations compensate to some extent for the inability of the GoI to provide
social services and promote economic development.
170. In 2011 the US government provided more than 225 million dollars in humanitarian assistance.
Returns
packages
171. The IOM set up its IOM-Iraq Mission in April
2003. Since then it has channelled more than $76 million into projects for Iraq. It provides emergency food and non-food items as well as integration assistance and
durable solutions. It has established a Programme for Human Security and
Stabilisation in Iraq, which aims for the urgent stabilisation of
disenfranchised Iraqi families and communities by providing socio-economic
reintegration initiatives as alternatives to armed conflict. It has a Regional
Operations Centre which, among other things, assists voluntary returns and
supports the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) in developing its
institutional framework.
172. Refugee Action have
several programmes which provide assistance to returnees, such as AVRIM, which
explains what support the returnee may be entitled to under the Assisted
Voluntary Return Irregular Migrants Programme (AVRIM); a programme explaining
what support is available under the Assisted Voluntary Returns for Families and
Children (AVRFC), including financial support; and a programme explaining
available support under the Voluntary Assisted Return and Integration Programme
(VARRP), again including financial support.
173. Assistance is also
available from UNHCR. $100 per adult and $50 per child, up to a maximum of
$500 per family may be provided. UNHCR Return Integration & Community
Centres (RICC) in Iraq provide support and referral services to government and
other relevant bodies to assist in return and reintegration. UNHCR Protection
Assistance Centres (PAC) and mobile teams provide free legal counselling and
assistance in obtaining civil status documents as well as social counselling
and other referrals. Further UNHCR assistance includes access to shelters and
help with water and sanitation. UNHCR has been informed that the Government of
Iraq (GoI) may provide assistance to eligible returnees (i.e. people who fled
between 01/01/06 and 01/01/08, being displaced for not less than eight months
outside Iraq; people who fled Iraq one year prior to 09/04/03 and returned
after 09/04/03; formerly internally displaced returnees who fled from their
place of origin in Iraq after 01/01/06 to 01/01/08 and registered with MoDM in
the location of displacement). Such assistance may include up to 1 million
Iraqi Dinars (Return Grant, proposed to be increased to 1.5 million as of May
2010) and assistance with utility bills and regaining public sector employment.
Returns to Baghdad International Airport (BIAP)
174. We received a
considerable body of evidence relating to the treatment experienced by
returnees from the UK on June 2010 charter flights in particular.
175. The issue was raised
before the Tribunal in HM1. The evidence included a witness statement
dated 8 July 2010, from Mark Walker, an Assistant Director in the Country
Specific Policy Team in the UKBA. Among other things, Mr Walker said that the
UKBA did not routinely monitor the treatment of individual returnees, and IOM did
not monitor voluntary returns. There is a detailed description of the
circumstances surrounding the 9 June 2010 and 16 June 2010 charter flights to Baghdad. With regard to the former, eleven people were returned, all on EU letters,
detained at the airport, seen by a judge on 14 June and, in the case of one,
released, in the case of the others, who were found to be from the KRG, flown
to Erbil on the 16th, nine being released by the 21st,
the last by the 28th. The periods of delay before release in the cases
of the 16th June returnees (42 in total) were similar (10 days
maximum). Restraint had to be employed on the flight in the case of three of
the returnees. The entire boarding process was recorded and has been
reviewed. The UKBA’s Professional Standards Unit (PSU) was conducting an
investigation into allegations of mistreatment of some of the returnees, as a
consequence of media allegations, but no complaint of mistreatment had been
made directly to the UKBA. Subsequently (14 December 2010), the PSU concluded
that claims of mistreatment from six people made to UNHCR could not be
substantiated to the required level of proof.
176. As regards issues of
ill-treatment of individuals while in detention at BIAP, Karen Abdel-Hady, a
Deputy Director in UKBA’s Returns Directorate states (statement dated 22
November 2011) that UKBA does not have jurisdiction to conduct such
investigations, though enquiries were made by UKBA’s Migration Delivery Officer
(MDO) based in Baghdad. These enquiries led to only limited responses, Iraqi
Al-Amal stating that they were not aware of returnees facing mistreatment
during detention at BIAP, but noting the significant number of accounts of
detainees being abused while in detention in Iraq and the Danish Ambassador to
Iraq stating that he had no information of such alleged mistreatment, though he
was of the view that the level of human rights monitoring of detainees in Iraq
had deteriorated over the last twelve months. A representative of the MoDM
declined to comment on questions relating to the treatment of returnees and
issues around human rights monitoring, and it is relevant also to note that
Al-Amal said it was difficult for independent organisations to gain access to
those in detention at the airport.
177. A letter from Amnesty
International of 15 June 2010 raises concerns about ill-treatment of returnees
on charters to Baghdad on 15 October 2009 and 30 March 2010. A BBC report of
26 June 2010 said that one of the deportees on the 9 June flight told the BBC
that ten British returnees were being held in a single room without adequate
facilities. Tori Sicher, now the solicitor for HM and RM, previously with IAS,
set out evidence of what she was told by HH about detention after the 9 June
2010 charter flight (13 people in one small room, appalling conditions, no
food, unable to sleep, 7/8 days’ detention). HH also claimed to have had a gun
pointed to his head and to have been threatened and others were kicked. In
statements to a solicitor from a different firm, Sean McLoughlin, other
detainees from the same flight claimed ill-treatment. In the context of Iraq as
a whole, UNAMI (January 2011) refer to evidence of torture and ill-treatment
routinely taking place at the time of arrest and while in detention, and to
lengthy detention without charge and bad conditions. The OGN of December 2011
says that MOI and MOD prisons and detention facilities in Iraq are likely to
breach the Article 3 threshold and concerns are also expressed by the FCO, and
by the USSD in its 8 April 2011 Country Report, concerning detention and prison
facilities in Iraq. Dr George, in his Addendum Report of 26 March 2012 was
told by a contact that, as of a year ago at least, general conditions in the
detention facilities at the BIAP police station were very poor, including the
fact that there was no special cell/room for women and children. With respect
to the appellants, he expresses concerns about “possible delays and with
possible risk of maltreatment during detention”.
178. Dr Fatah’s report
contains an analysis based on an unspecified number of telephone interviews
conducted in November 2011 with six asylum seekers who told him they had been
returned to Iraq on various dates in 2010, including several who were on the 16
June flight. These led him to conclude that in practice the Iraqi authorities
do not allow returnees to leave the airport unless they have a guarantor in
attendance who can confirm their identity. Returnees who did not have their
civil status IDs had to pay bribes at checkpoints in order to continue their
journey. All his interviewees were detained until their identity was proven,
some for a matter of hours, others for more than ten to fifteen days. Most
food and water had to be bought by the detainees or guards had to be bribed to
bring it to the cells. He notes, however, that on the basis of a 17 November
2011 letter from the British Embassy in Baghdad as a result of the
introduction of biometric capture equipment (fingerprint scanners), returnees
are no longer subject to further questioning after the immigration officials
have processed them, unless biometric details require otherwise.
Returns and documentation
179. We asked for and
received further written submissions concerning the position on return to Iraq via BIAP. The specific issue on which we requested further submissions was the
approach of the Secretary of State in circumstances where an individual refused
to cooperate in obtaining a laissez passer document on which they could be
returned.
180. It is clear from the evidence
identified in these submissions (which were updated to the last week in October
2012) that currently enforced returns of Iraqi nationals take place by air to
BIAP, whereas voluntary returns in the case of people from the KRG can take
place directly to that area. The current position, as set out in the third
witness statement of Declan O’Neill, is that Iraqi nationals may only be
returned on an Iraqi passport, an expired Iraqi passport, or a laissez passer
document. The last-mentioned is a one way travel document issued by the Iraqi
Embassy in London. It requires the cooperation of the returnee in order to be
issued (see [219]). This represents a change from the previous position when
the Iraqi authorities were prepared to accept EU letters.
181. From the British
Embassy letter of 5 March 2012 and the subsequent letter from the Embassy of 8
April 2012 it is said that the procedure for documenting returnees is
relatively straightforward. The latter letter quotes the Ministry of
Displacement and Migration (MoDM) as being satisfied that there is no risk of
mistreatment or abuse of returnees at BIAP. The IOM concur, saying that the
Immigration Officer checks the passport or travel document issued by the Iraqi
authorities. If they are correct then the passenger can proceed and leave the
airport. The point is that enforced returns from the UK are now pre-cleared during pre-clearance visits to the UK by Iraqi Immigration Officers so the
risks are further minimised.
182. The letter goes on to
say that since the introduction of the October 2011 Iraqi returns policy, there
have been no cases of any UK enforced returnees being detained who have
returned on a valid or expired Iraqi passport and that this has been confirmed
by the IOM and Ministry of Interior. To date, it is said, no enforced
returnees have returned using a laissez passer travel document as the Iraqi
Embassy in London will not currently issue them to enforced returnees. Only
voluntary returnees have returned using laissez passer travel documents and the
Embassy has received no reports of them being detained on arrival. It is said
that there are no detention facilities within the BIAP complex. The only
circumstance in which a person would be detained would be if there was a
judicial order or warrant for their arrest due to previous criminal activity.
It is emphasised in evidence from the MoDM, the MOI, the IOM and Qandil (a
Swedish human rights organisation) that there have been no reports of
procedures involving ethnic or religious discrimination towards Kurds. Qandil
have confirmed that all cases they have managed under the assisted voluntary
returns programme have been processed satisfactorily.
Documentation and access
to services
183. The relevant
documentation required for movement around Iraq and access to services is
described and analysed in some detail in MK. Paragraph 88 of MK
summarises the Tribunal’s findings on this issue. Dr George and Dr Fatah have,
essentially, repeated to us their evidence to the Tribunal in MK.
Internal travel
184. As regards safety of
internal travel, the 2012 UNHCR Guidelines deal separately with travel between
the KRG and the rest of Iraq and then with travel within central and southern
Iraq. On the former it is stated at p.49:
“In
terms of access, roads between the Kurdistan Region and central Iraq cannot be considered safe. Roads from Erbil, Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah to Kirkuk or Mosul are generally only safe when under the protection of the KRG forces,
although attacks on civilians and security forces in areas under their control
have also occurred. Roads that are not under the control of
Kurdish forces are unpredictable and have reportedly been the site of a high
numbers of attacks. There are several official checkpoints
between the central part of the country and the KRG-administered area. There
are also random checkpoints set up depending on the security situation.
Further, the borders of the Kurdistan Region, including between its own
governorates, have been observed to close without advance warning due to
security concerns. Other areas along the unofficial border have been heavily
mined in the past decade and are regularly patrolled by Kurdish Security Forces.
Such conditions make it nearly impossible for persons to cross into the three
northern governorates through the countryside without danger. Therefore, entry
through the major roads and their checkpoints is, practically, the only option
available to most Iraqis seeking to enter the Kurdistan Region. In addition,
there are regular flights from Baghdad and Basrah to Erbil and Sulaymaniyah,
but a one-way ticket from Baghdad to Erbil or Sulaymaniyah costs 101,000 Iraqi
Dinars (approximately US$85), an amount many Iraqis are not able to afford.
Travelling from Baghdad or Basrah to Erbil or Sulaymaniyah by air is considered
fairly safe and there have been no recent security incidents involving civilian
aircraft. There have been infrequent indirect fire attacks on or near the Baghdad and Basrah airports, causing no casualties.”
185. As regards travel
within central and southern Iraq it is said at p. 53:
“Travel
by road within the central and southern governorates remains dangerous,
especially at night. Roadside bombings and
shootings, robberies, kidnappings and carjackings seem to remain daily occurrences,
in addition to attacks on civilian, government and military vehicles on roads
and highways in both urban and rural areas throughout the country. Travelling prior to or during religious festivities also
involves a heightened risk as armed groups are said to aim at launching mass
casualty attacks on Shi’a pilgrims on the road. Military
operations among armed groups and the ISF/Sahwa continue mainly in the central
governorates. Travelling is reportedly often impaired and delayed by ISF/Sahwa
checkpoints and convoys, where there is also an increased risk of being harmed
given the frequent targeting of the ISF/Sahwa. False
checkpoints have also reportedly been erected to stage attacks. Freedom of movement is also impacted by checks at governorate
borders, sometimes reportedly resulting in arrests. Moving
near official government or military/police convoys is said to be particularly
dangerous as they are a frequent target of armed groups, including by roadside
bombs and "sticky bombs" attached under vehicles. There
have also been incidents reported of roadside bombs hitting public buses or
"sticky bombs" being placed inside buses or taxis or
bombings at bus terminals. Movement may further be limited
by curfews and vehicle bans, which can be enforced at short notice. Travel by air from Baghdad International Airport is said to
have improved. No recent attacks on civilian aircraft have been reported, but there are reports of infrequent indirect fire attacks on
or near the Baghdad and Basrah airports. Attacks also occur
regularly on the road between Baghdad and Baghdad International Airport.”
186. Whilst highlighting
that roadside attacks remain a frequent occurrence, Dr Fatah notes that the central provinces are not as hazardous as during 2005-2008 although caution is still
required when travelling in the area ([644]).
Returnees from the west
187. Dr George refers (at [80]-[81] of his
report) to a UNHCR Report from 2004 concerning risk of kidnapping to Iraqis who
return from Western countries as they are perceived as being financially
privileged. He also cites a more recent (July 2009) report of the Danish
Immigration Service, the Danish Refugee Council and Landinfo (the Norwegian
equivalent of the COIS), which makes essentially the same point. SSI Amman (the
United Nations security section) explained that, having lived in Europe for a while people walked, talked and dressed differently. They were perceived to
have money and were easy to spot. Also they were considered to be easy targets
since they usually enjoy very little support from tribes of the receiving
community in general.
188. Dr Fatah (at [621] of
his report) was told by a businessman he interviewed that returnees to Kirkuk from the USA or the UK are regarded as traitors and spies by the Arabs and insurgents
there, and thus they become automatic targets for insurgents. He also notes (at
[705]) that arguably an individual returning after many years abroad might find
it hard to re-enter their tribal network.
Provincial level
Tameem Governorate and
Kirkuk
189. The home area of the
first two appellants is Kirkuk, which is in the Tameem Governorate (also
referred to frequently as Kirkuk Governorate). As already noted, the
population of the Governorate is estimated as 1,395,000. The city’s population
is estimated as being between 0.9-1.6 million (975,000 according to Government
statistics for July 2011, 902,019 according to recent IAU figures).
190. As was pointed out at [186]
in HM1, most violence in the governorate is described as being linked to
the as yet unresolved administrative status of Kirkuk, and related power
struggles between the various Arab, Kurdish and Turkmen actors, accentuated by
the fact that Kirkuk has huge oil reserves. This point is emphasised in
particular in the April 2009 UNHCR Guidelines at [202] to [204]. The same
report refers to the fact that insurgent groups such as AQI also aim to stir
inter-communal violence by attacking proponents of ethnic/religious groups.
There are concerns, which to an extent we have seen set out in the evidence of
Dr Fatah, that tensions among ethnic groups over the unresolved status of Kirkuk could turn into another civil war. There are regular roadside bombings, shootings
and occasional car bombs and suicide attacks. Kirkuk’s Arab and Turkmen
communities complain of harassment, intimidation, arbitrary arrests and
demographic manipulation at the hands of the Kurds, who dominate the
governorate’s political and security institutions. The UNHCR’s concerns were
reiterated in the briefing note of 11 December 2009 and the 28 July 2010 Note
on the Continued Applicability of the April 2009 Guidelines and in their 2012
Guidelines they note that the Governorate continues to be volatile.
191. The ICG report of 28
March 2011 entitled “Iraq Kurds: Confronting Withdrawal Fears” refers to the
existence of strong tensions and politically motivated provocations aimed at
sparking inter-communal conflict in areas with a rich ethnic mix such as Kirkuk City. The reports of the UN Secretary General for the UN Security Council of 31 March
2011, 7 July 2011, and 28 November 2011 refer to the number and range of
incidents involving troop movements, terrorist attacks and car bombs killing
and injuring civilians. It is said that the political and security situation
and the disputed internal boundaries remains a matter of particular concern.
The Danish Immigration Service Report of 10 September 2010 entitled “Security
and Human Rights in South-Central Iraq”, notes that the situation in Kirkuk is fragile and Iraqi security forces (ISF) and US Forces at the time had a strong
presence in the area. The presence of AQI and insurgent groups contributed to
making the situation particularly volatile and there were reports that AQI was
using children as suicide bombers or combatants in Kirkuk.
192. As regards the
situation of IDPs, the IOM report of February 2010 entitled “Kirkuk Governorate Profile” noted that the disputed Kirkuk Governorate remained unstable,
combining continued fears of violence with the already difficult living
conditions faced by IDP and returnee families there. It is said in the report
that, unlike other governorates in Iraq, post-2006 displacement in Kirkuk did not peak in 2006 and 2007 but rather displacement has been a gradual flow from
2006 to present, rooted in ethnic, political and territorial disputes. The
number of families leaving their homes did increase in late 2007 and early 2008
before dropping lower once again. The IOM assessed that most families
displaced in Kirkuk fled in fear after being targeted for religion, sect,
ethnicity or political opinion. Over a third reported fleeing after receiving
direct threats to their lives. The IOM, in its February 2010 assessment,
considered that there remained a possibility of additional return flows to Kirkuk. It is said that gradual returns are occurring now and they may continue. It is
said that, however, due to the contested nature of Kirkuk’s land and population
distribution, return is a complex prospect for those who wish to do so.
193. The IOM’s November
2010 Profile report notes that over 2,000 families were displaced from Kirkuk in the period 2003 to 2006. IOM notes the precariousness of life for many of the
families displaced in or returning to Kirkuk. Displacement from Kirkuk has decreased considerably since 2007, but continues to occur though in
comparatively small numbers and many families are being displaced from one part
of Kirkuk to another. 49% of IDPs in Kirkuk stayed within the
province and intend to integrate in current places of displacement. The IDP
population going to the KRG is relatively low. Nearly 60% of IDPs from Kirkuk assessed by IOM intended to integrate into their current location. 34% of IDP
families living in Kirkuk intend to integrate into their current locations. According
to UNHCR Iraq Operation Monthly Statistical Update on Returns April 2012, the
total number of IDPs returning to Kirkuk in Sept 2011-Aug 2012 was 2,260.
194. Both Dr George and Dr
Fatah consider that Kirkuk is volatile and violent and there are particular
risk factors existing there. Dr Fatah notes that ethnic divisions run deeper
in Kirkuk than elsewhere in the disputed territories and points to the level of
violent attacks in Kirkuk in the last three months with a high number of police
and civilian casualties. He finds that the tensions there are exacerbated by
the existence of KRG and GoI security. Dr Fatah states that the undecided fate
of the “disputed territories”, Kirkuk in particular, and manipulations by
various political factions have created chaos there. Kirkuk remains a
fault-line in Iraq and at the epicentre of the Kurd-Arabs divide in Iraq. He considers that inter-ethnic tension has increased. Dr Fatah notes that Kirkuk is one of the centres of Kurdish national identity and the KRG has symbolically
named it as its regional capital. At an interview with a Kurdish Kirkuk police officer in March 2012, Dr Fatah was told that most insurgents in Kirkuk are Arabs from outside the city who enter it in order to conduct attacks. He was told by
a Kurdish businessman that Kurdish neighbourhoods of Kirkuk were much safer
than others because the Peshmerga safeguarded them. He provides a number of
recent examples of violent attacks carried out in Kirkuk, most of which appear
to have involved specific targeting, but several involved roadside bombs.
The USDD Report
Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, June 2010 records an average of 1.3
daily executed attacks in Kirkuk.
In the CSIS report
of February 9 2011, figures for roadside bombs and car bombs in Kirkuk show a gradual decline from 919 roadside bombs and 69 car bombs in 2007 to 142 and 2
respectively in 2010. There are regular attacks and assassinations, mainly
targeted against ISF and government institutions and officials, but also
civilians. Kirkuk has recently seen a sharp increase in targeted abductions
and killings of professionals
195. Dr George quotes from
the Iraq Body Count (IBC) website in respect of the killings reported in and
around Kirkuk City in the past twelve months. (The IBC states that in 2011
there were 232 deaths in Kirkuk.) Dr George, noting that in 2011 there had been
417 attacks in Kirkuk (Tameen), described it as “amongst the most violent
locations in Iraq”, although he adds that the level of violence there is not
much different from those in other parts of central Iraq when account is taken
of the size of its population. This figure amounted to 7% of the Iraqi total.
In 2011, attacks in Kirkuk were 1.7 times the share that would be expected
given the country’s population (compared with between 1.4 to 1.8 times for Baghdad, Anbar and Mosul, 2.3 times for Diyala and 2.9 times for Salahuddin). The UN
Agency Information Unit (“IAU”) estimates that in Kirkuk in 2011 there were 280
civilian deaths. In an agreed Note of 6 June 2012 on Province by Province
Casualties, the respondent states that on available figures “the level of
civilian deaths for Kirkuk is roughly double the national average (as compared
to 1.8 estimated by Dr George)”.
196. In the 7 April 2012
FCO letter, Tameem is recorded as having one security incident a day. The 30
November 2011 Brookings Institute Report covering insurgent attacks per
province February 2005-May 2010, shows a decline of violence in Tameem. The
USDD June 2010 Report and the CSIS Report “Iraq and the US: Creating a Strategic Partnership”, June 2010 show similar reduced levels.
197. As already noted, the
2012 UNHCR Guidelines refer to the continuing volatility of the governorate.
198. In MK, whilst
describing Kirkuk as a “hazardous place” there being a good deal of evidence of
random and targeted violence in that city (at [98]), the Tribunal did not
consider that it revealed an Article 15(c) level in that city.
Baghdad Governorate and Baghdad
199. Baghdad is the home
governorate of appellant HF. This governorate has a population of some 6 to 7
million (7,145,470 according to IAU); Baghdad City, the country’s capital, has
a population of approximately 6.5 million.
200. As Dr Fatah explains
in his report, a number of factors contribute to the extent and nature of the
security incidents and civilian casualties in Baghdad. He says that Baghdad has experienced violent attacks by various groups for a long time and the main
reasons are it being the capital city, its being highly demographically
diverse, and also the presence of Sadr City in Baghdad. (It houses the base of
Shi’a cleric and politician Muqtada al-Sadr’s popular support, and has been a
breeding ground since the invasion for cadres of the Mahdi Army, the militia of
Muqtada al-Sadr and Al-Sadr Trend, the Sadrist political bloc.) The UNHCR
Guidelines for April 2009 refer to the fact that violence levels in Baghdad had
significantly fallen since the last quarter of 2007, but it continued to be the
case that armed troops targeted members of the ISF/MNF-I and the SoI, as well
as government and party officials and also continued to target civilians, often
in populated places such as markets, mosques, bus stations or restaurants. The
May 2012 UNHCR Guidelines at p. 45 state that the large majority of attacks in Iraq take place in Baghdad. A number of attacks with high casualty numbers were reported in 2011 and
2012, resulting in scores of people killed and injured. These attacks are said
to have taken place in Sunni, Shi’a and mixed areas across the capital. In
addition, daily roadside bombs, shootings and “sticky bombs” attached to
vehicles result in a high number of casualties. In 2011 Baghdad has also been
the centre for popular protests. The ISF has reportedly responded violently,
arresting, beating and even killing protestors. The same Guidelines note also
that Baghdad has a high number of often politically motivated killings of
security officials, government officials and employees, party officials,
journalists, and professionals. Insurgent groups continue to aim at stirring
sectarian violence. Most frequently, members of the ISF and Sahwa,
government officials and employees, religious figures, politicians,
professionals and LGBTI persons are targeted.
201. According to the UNAMI
Human Rights Office/OHCHR Baghdad 2010 Report on human rights in Iraq, January 2011, some 2,953 civilians were killed during 2010 with some 10,434 civilian
injuries, and the worst affected region was the Baghdad Governorate with 1,284
civilian deaths and 5,011 injured. In its annual report on Iraq, 2011, Amnesty
International noted three particular incidents referred to, three coordinated
suicide car bombs exploding in quick succession in Central Baghdad on 25 January,
killing at least 41 people and injuring more than 75 others, a detonation by a
woman walking with Shi’a pilgrims in Baghdad of an explosive belt killing at
least 54 people and injuring more than 100 others, and an attack by the Islamic
State of Iraq (which was responsible for the 25 January attack also), on a
Catholic church in Baghdad where more than 40 worshippers were killed. Further
incidents are described in other reports, some of which pre-date the hearing in
HM1. The USDD Report, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, June 2010, records an average of six daily executed attacks in Baghdad province. At the
hearing in October Mr Fordham produced an illustrative map of security
incidents in the city. The US State Department Report for 2010 stated that in Baghdad in March to May the figure was six attacks per day. Figures given by Cordemann for
the CSIS paper, “Iraq: Patterns of Violence, Casualty Trends and Energy
Security Threats, 9 February 2011, gives a figure of just over five attacks a
day on 28 February 2010. It details that violence in the areas north and west
of Baghdad province largely involved and affected Sunnis, with some directed
against Kurds and Christians. South of Baghdad it largely affected Shi’as. Baghdad province was the main scene of violence throughout the US led phase of the
fighting, violence which was largely Sunni versus Shi’a. Baghdad remained a
key centre of bombing, certified attacks and crime. A non-exhaustive list of
incidents post-dating 18 December 2011 US withdrawal is set out in Mr Fordham’s
skeleton to illustrate the current security situation in Baghdad. The IRIN
report of 19 January 2012 refers to people considering fleeing as the violence
increases, and suicide attacks, assassinations and bombings in Iraq have claimed the lives of at least 265 people and injured hundreds of others since 18
December. It is said that the attacks were mainly carried out by Sunni
extremists from Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) against Shi’a communities. The Sunni
community complains that it has been marginalised by the Shi’a-led government.
There are fears of a return to the days of 2006/2007 where the Shi’a/Sunni
conflict left thousands of people dead and millions of others displaced. The
examples set out are across a spectrum of specific targeting to roadside and
suicide and sticky bombs. According to the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, February 2012, Baghdad is one of three areas of Iraq that are
“sectarian melting pots” where Sunnis groups target Shi’a civilians as well as
Sahwa members and violence is said to be “rising sharply” in these areas.
202. According to the FCO
letter of 7 April 2012, the figure for Baghdad is 2-3 attacks per day. That is
what is stated by the British risk mitigation company AKE in its analysis of
2011 trends. In 2010, UNAMI stated that of the 2,953 civilians killed during
that year and 10,434 civilians injured, Baghdad Governorate was responsible for
1,284 civilian deaths and 5,011 civilians injured. Shortly after the December
2011 US withdrawal, the city was hit by a wave of high profile attacks against
Shi’a districts. The IAU figures for deaths in Baghdad governorate in 2011 is
1,238.
203. Mr Staker cited the UN
Habitat document “Urban Baghdad: Impact of Conflict on Daily Life” which states
that:
“Since the height of the
violence in 2006-2007, conditions in Baghdad have improved. Nearly a third of
those displaced have returned and conflict-related deaths have dropped
considerably. Improved security has allowed greater freedom of movement and
recreation in daily life. Access to jobs and services remains a challenge.”
204. This same report also
notes that whilst the conflict has taken close up a heavy toll on the city,
causing one tenth of its population to flee during its height, the city’s IDPs
live in public buildings, old military encampments or improvised squatter
settlements. Nearly a third of IDPs have returned and improved security has
allowed greater freedom of movement. According to Dr Fatah, the majority of
those who die or who are wounded in Baghdad do so in attacks designed to fuel
the sectarian conflict. Those who are in positions of power or influence are
particularly at risk, especially in the case of Ministry officials, police and
intelligence officers and their family members (at [230]).
205. Dr George quotes from
the 30 January 2012 issue of the US Department of Defence’s “Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq”, itself quoting from a survey by the New York consulting firm Mercer on the quality of life and personal security in 221 cities
worldwide, describing Baghdad as “the world’s least safe city”. The IOM note
that 81% of the families they assessed who were forced to leave their homes in Baghdad remained within the governorate. Return to Baghdad has been slow but continuous,
and improved security in their area of origin was the most prevalent reason for
families to return.
Diyala Governorate
206. It is said by the
UNHCR that Diyala has been plagued by attacks against the ISF/MNF-I and
widespread sectarian violence. It has a diverse religious and ethnic
population and is of strategic importance, given its proximity to Iran and Baghdad, and there is also the issue of the unresolved status of so-called “disputed
areas”, in particular Khalaqeen and as a consequence the governorate has been
contested since the fall of the former regime in 2003. The ethnic and
religious mix of Sunnis and Shi’as, Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen have made it a
fertile ground for militant groups and the scene of brutal sectarian violence.
When AQI was pushed out of Al Anbar in late 2006, it relocated its power base
to Diyala, controlling much of the governorate including the capital. However,
as a result of successive military operations by the MNF-I/ISF between June
2007 and May 2008, and supported by the SoI, AQI was largely pushed out of
Diyala’s main urban centres although it kept hold of more rural areas.
Overall, violence in Diyala decreased significantly as of mid-2007, but AQI
maintained its ability to conduct attacks through the governorate, including in
the populated urban areas, while keeping strict control of rural areas,
terrorising the local population with intimidation, detention, torture, and
extrajudicial executions. Civilians were also targeted by mortar and small
arms fire, assassinations and kidnappings. Crackdowns on Shi’a militias by the
Iraqi government, in particular on JAM, have significantly reduced their
presence and activities in the governorate. The underlying sectarian tensions
in the governorate remained. There were ongoing tensions between Kurdish
parties and the Shi’a coalition. Despite massive military crackdowns, Diyala
remained volatile and continued to see car bombs and suicide bombings, often
targeting members of the ISF/MNF-I and SoI, but also civilians. Dr George (at [147]
of his report) quotes from a Kurdistan News Agency report of 2 March 2012,
referring to the departure in the last week of at least 170 Kurdish families
from the disputed Jalawla district in Diyala Province, leaving for other cities
in the province, fearing terrorist attacks, and it is said that since the fall
of the Ba’ath regime in 2003 more than 1,300 Kurdish citizens from the disputed
areas of Diyala have been killed, and more than 1,700 families have been
displaced, fearing for their lives. In 2011 Diyala experienced 551 attacks,
comprising 10% of the Iraqi total.
207. The IOM in a report of
November 2010 on Diyala said that it continues to be one of the most volatile
and unstable governorates in Iraq, and it is described in the 2012 UNHCR
Guidelines as reportedly among the most unstable governorates, with attacks
mainly directed against security and civilian government institutions, but also
civilians, e.g. in cafes or mosques. There have been attacks on Shi’a civilians
and pilgrims as well as high numbers of targeted killings. Dr Fatah refers to
the declaration in December 2011 by Diyala of itself as an autonomous region,
which led to a mix of violent protests, arrests and mobilisation of state
security forces. The bid for autonomy has been rejected by the GoI in Baghdad, and seems to have stalled, though the issue has not gone away. Dr Fatah says that
violence has remained high in the governorate.
208. According to an IOM
February 2010 Governorate Profile, along with Baghdad and Ninewah, Diyala was
one of the governorates that saw the highest rates of displacement following
the 2006 Samarra mosque bombing, but Diyala was starting to receive returns and
85% of those returning cited the reason as improved security; albeit returnee
families face many hardships and uncertainties on return. The IOM note that 44%
of the families displaced from their homes in Diyala moved elsewhere within the
governorate. Despite the difficulties in the governorate, families continue to
return to their homes, most being prompted by improved security in their area
of origin. There remain security issues, however, 42% reporting that they do
not feel safe, or only feel safe sometimes.
Ninewah Governorate
and Mosul
209. According to the
UNHCR’s April 2009 assessment, the Ninewah Governorate has a very diverse
population of mostly Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen, in addition to various
religious and ethnic minority groups. A combination of the demographic make-up
and the fact that large parts of the governorate are contested between the KRG
and the central government make it a breeding ground for extremist groups
seeking to destabilise the country. After AQI was forced out of most urban
areas of Al Anbar, Diyala and Baghdad Governorates, Mosul City, where a large
majority of the population is living, has become its last urban stronghold.
There is only a limited presence of the SoI in the southern parts of Ninewah:
the main reason for this is the Kurdish opposition to the establishment of an
Arab Tribal Council. The relative security improvements in many parts of the
country have not yet taken hold in Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, despite a
wide scale military operation launched in May 2008 to root out AQI and other
insurgent groups. Mass casualty attacks, kidnappings and targeted
assassinations continue to occur on an almost daily basis. Ninewah’s second
city, Tal Afar, which is inhabited by many ethnic Turkmen, remains a stronghold
of Sunni insurgents and sees regular attacks on the ISF, and to a lesser extent
on the MNF-I. Civilians are targeted on a regular basis, mostly in public
places such as mosques, restaurants and markets. Many attacks target Shi’a
Turkmen in an aim to reignite sectarian violence. Due to the ongoing presence
of Sunni extremist groups and the potential for ethnic political violence, the
governorate of Nineweh remains highly unstable. In addition to suicide and IED
attacks on the ISF/MNF-I, Ninewah continues to see significant numbers of
targeted assassinations and kidnappings of security officials, local government
officials, and employees, party officials, and officers in particular from the
KDP/PUK, the IIP and the Iraqi Communist Party officers, religious figures and
tribal leaders/SoI, members of religious minorities as well as professionals
and journalists. Dr Fatah provides recent examples of violent attacks carried
out in Ninewah. They serve, he says, to reveal the insecure and unstable
environment of the governorate, and of Mosul in particular, which he says is
one of the most unstable and unsafe places in Iraq today. Dr George says that
in 2011 Ninewah experienced 803 attacks, accounting for 14% of the Iraqi
total. According to the 2012 UNHCR Guidelines, Ninewah (particularly Mosul) continues to be volatile, with attacks mainly against ISF, Sahwa and government
institutions, but also civilians. There are regular kidnappings and
assassinations, including members of the ISF, government officials and
employees and tribal and religious figures and there are frequent reports of
attacks on professionals.
210. The IOM has assessed
that 1,123 families from Ninewah have left their homes due to water scarcity
since 2006. Nearly half of the 17,216 IDP families originating from Ninewah
assessed by IOM fled to other parts of the governorate. Most of those families
were displaced in 2006 and 2007. Despite the harsh conditions and continuing
sectarian violence, 113 of IDP families from Ninewah intend to return to the
governorate.
Salah Al-Din
Governorate
211. According to UNHCR,
Salah Al-Din was one of the strongholds of AQI and other insurgent groups
between 2004 and 2007. With the establishment of the SoI, made up of tribal
members as well as former insurgent fighters, these groups have been weakened and
the overall number of attacks decreased in 2008. The security situation
remained unstable, however, as insurgents continued to have a presence in parts
of the governorate. They engaged in battles with the ISF/MNF-I and SoI, and
launched regular attacks on them. In addition, insurgents were said to be
still capable of launching attacks against civilians, including sectarian
attacks targeting minority Arab and Turkmen Shi’as. AQI is reportedly trying
to re-infiltrate Samarra and recruit the city’s unemployed youth. Salah Al-Din
continues to see shootings, kidnappings and targeted assassinations of security
officials, tribal leaders, SoI, and government and party officials. Dr George
notes that substantial parts of the governorate form part of the disputed
territories, which are among the most violent parts of Iraq. In 2011 Salah Al-Din experienced 695 attacks, comprising 12% of the Iraqi total. He also
makes the broader point that the level of violence in the disputed areas is not
much different from that in other parts of central Iraq when allowance is made
for population distribution. Dr Fatah refers to a note on 27 October 2011 by
the Sunni Arab majority of the provincial council to declare the province
economically and administratively autonomous from the central government. The
decision cannot be enforced until a public referendum is held and the move
approved by the province’s residents. He cites a number of attacks and
killings in the province, as do the reports of the UN Secretary-General to the
UN Security Council, dated 31 March 2011, 7 July 2011 and 28 November 2011.
The 2012 UNHCR Guidelines note frequent security incidents in the governorate,
which they describe as one of the most unstable governorates. Attacks are
mainly directed against security and civilian government institutions, but also
civilians, e.g. in cafes and mosques, and also attacks on Shi’a civilians and
pilgrims, with high numbers of targeted killings.
212. The IOM assess that
almost 1 in 3 of the families that were displaced remained in the governorate.
The rate of returns has slowed. There was a significant fall between February
and November 2010 in the numbers of IDPs from the governorate who wanted to
return, which is seen as the effect of changes in the security situation and
political uncertainties, though intentions varied according to the governorate
to which they had moved. Over 50% of IDPs in the governorate when asked in
November 2010 wished to stay and integrate in their current location said yes,
a significant increase over the 19% figure in February 2010.
Al Anbar Governorate
213. Although not one of
the 5 central governorates we shall briefly summarise for completeness the
situation in the only other central governorate, Al Anbar, which the 2009 Guidelines
note as being Iraq’s largest governorate and as having a predominantly tribal
oriented society that is almost entirely Sunni Arab. It was a long time
stronghold of AQI until local tribes established the Anbar Salvation Council in
late 2006 and largely drove out AQI. Since 2007 security improvements have
been significant as overall levels of violence have sharply decreased.
Nevertheless, there remains a lingering AQI presence in Al Anbar which is
capable of targeted assassinations and mass casualty attacks by suicide and car
bombs. Most attacks occur in and around the city of Fallujah and in areas east
of it towards Baghdad, as the proximity to Baghdad makes insurgent activities
more permissive. Acts are mostly directed against the ISF, the MNF-I as well
as members of the Awakening Councils, often resulting in civilian casualties.
A number of examples of this are provided for the period November 2008 to
February 2009, including car bombings and roadside bombs. Also there has been
targeting of security officials, government and party officials, and religious
figures on the part of armed groups. An example is given of an attack on a bus
of Shi’a pilgrims on 12 September 2011 in a report dated 28 November 2011 of
the UN Security-General for the UN Security Council. The governorate is said
to be in dire need of reconstruction and public services but to date efforts in
this regard have been slow and have met with resistance by the Shi’a-dominated
central government. The 2012 UNHCR Guidelines state that Al Anbar has seen a
surge in violence since the summer of 2009. There is speculation that ISI/AQI
is attempting to undermine the provincial authorities and the ISF in order to
increase tension between Sunnis and Shi’as. There were about 10 reported
attacks per week in 2010 and 201 in the governorate. Attacks were frequently
targeted, but bomb attacks in areas frequented by civilians, such as markets
and a cultural centre, as well as attacks on ISF convoys and checkpoints often
resulted in civilian casualties. The IOM has identified more than 7,000
families displaced after 2006 who have returned to the governorate. Improved
security in their area of origin is frequently reported as a reason for
returning.
214. In Al Anbar, a
November 2010 IOM Governorate Profile said it had identified more than 7,000
families displaced after 2006 who had returned. Improved security is
frequently given as the main reason. New displacements still occur, but on a
small scale. The IOM has assessed 4,284 families displaced from Anbar, most of
whom who relocated to Baghdad and Muthanna, wish to stay in their current
locations.
Levels of violence in the
five central governorates-overall picture
215. Iraqi government
statistics give the following population figures for the relevant governorates
as at July 2011: Baghdad 7,055,200; Tameen, 1,395,600; Ninewah, 3,270,400;
Salahuddin, 1,408,200; Diyala 1,443,200; and Al-Anbar, 1,561,000.
216. According to Dr George
at [172] of his report, in 2011 Ninewah experienced 803 attacks, amounting to
14% of the Iraq total. The equivalent figures were Salahuddin, 695, i.e. 12%;
Diyala, 551, i.e. 10% and Kirkuk 417, i.e. 7%.
217. Dr George’s report
notes at [173] that in Kirkuk and Baghdad the levels of violence were 1.7 and 1.5
times greater than what would be expected given the proportion their population
bears to that of Iraq as a whole.
218. At [172] he notes by
reference to UN statistics that security incidents and attacks even in Baghdad (which in 2011 accounted for 32% of the total) had declined. Ninewah had the
second highest number of attacks (14%) whilst Tameen was ranked sixth with 7%.
219. Dr George states that
it is important to read the various indices of violence in the context of the
ratio their numbers bear to the population of the particular governorate. At [173]
he estimates that in this context the most violent governorate is Salahaddin,
then Diyala and Muthania, followed by Kirkuk.
220. n a June 2012 note the
respondent states that on available figures the level of violence in Baghdad is
the same as the national average, although she accepts that for Kirkuk it is now about two times the national average.
KRG
221. As we have noted
above, at [132], Dr Fatah’s evidence indicates a greater degree of security in
the KRG than elsewhere in Iraq. In the 2012 Guidelines, UNHCR describe the
situation in the KRG as “relatively more stable”, though it remains a potential
target for terrorist operations. The general human rights situation in the KRG
has improved in recent years, but observers report on continued abuses. As
regards entry to the KRG, we consider this below, together with the relevant
submissions, when we assess internal relocation in the light of the country
guidance in MK and evidence that has been adduced subsequent to that
decision.
SUBMISSIONS
The
appellants’ case
222. We do not propose to
fully summarise the very lengthy sets of submissions we had from both parties,
although we have found them immensely helpful in identifying relevant evidence
and issues. Where appropriate we will refer to what they say, as we have done
already, in relation to key points as and when they arise.
223. The appellants’ case
at the hearing was that the Tribunal should follow the position taken in the
2009 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines in finding that in Iraq the Article 15(c)
threshold is met in five of the central governorates. As revised in the light
of the publication of the new UNHCR Guidelines of 31 May 2012, their position
was that we should again adopt UNHCR’s position which was now that whilst
decision-makers should assess on a case-by-case basis whether an individual
from Iraq qualified for international protection, those from the five central
governorates were “likely” to qualify by virtue of the high levels and the
intensity of violence there.
224. In approaching our
assessment Mr Fordham for the appellants contended that we should take an
inclusive approach and be on guard not to strip out any of the recorded
violence simply because it is classified as “targeted” violence. Civilians
include everybody; you look at risk experienced by the citizenry as a whole;
there is no subcategory to be deducted from them. Even targeted violence
affects the civilians in the area; it degrades the security environment and
leaves almost everyone living “in the shadow of violence”.
225. As regards Article
15(c), Mr Fordham submitted that there were two distinct issues the Tribunal
had to decide: (1) whether the Article 15(c) threshold of indiscriminate
violence was met – or “likely” to be met - for ordinary civilians in the five
central governorates; (2) whether even if the answer to (1) was no, there were
certain categories of Iraqi civilians in respect of whom there was an enhanced
risk. In this regard he drew attention to the acceptance by the CJEU in Elgafaji
that there was a basic dualism to Article 15(c), in that it covered risk to
civilians as such but it also operated a “sliding scale” such that whenever
there was a relevant characteristic giving rise to risk, Article 15(c) could
protect an individual even if the level of violence was less than needed to
show risk to civilians as such. In this context he submitted that we should
find that being a Sunni or Shi’ia or being a Kurd placed one in an enhanced risk
category, at least when one faced return to a home area where one’s religious
identity or ethnic identity meant one was in a minority.
226. With regard to the question of return to
BIAP in 2010, Mr Fordham urged us to find that the mass of evidence provided
showed that there had been ill-treatment crossing the Article 3 threshold, in
particular in respect of the June 10 and June 16 returns. The degree of
concurrence between the various accounts as regards such matters as the number
of detainees, the nature of the ill-treatment and the duration of the detention
underlined the credibility of the evidence. It was clear that the Secretary of
State was not able to investigate the alleged incidents at the police station
near the airport. There was no good reason to suppose that the situation would
be any different today. The conditions in detention near the airport breached
the Article 3 threshold as identified in MSS v Belgium & Greece [2011] 53 EHRR2.
227. In relation to the
UNHCR Guidelines, Mr Fordham urged that we find them to be authoritative or at
least highly persuasive on the issue of Article 15(c) risks in Iraq. Given that UNHCR had concluded in 2009 that in the five central governorates the
Article 15(c) threshold was crossed for ordinary civilians, and had made clear
in its new 2012 Guidelines that those from such areas were “likely” to be in
need of international protection, it was incumbent on the Tribunal not to
depart from the UNHCR view unless there were highly compelling circumstances caused
by a “step-change” analogous to the way in which cessation provisions operated
under the Refugee Convention. The fact that the Strasbourg Court had not found
the situation in Iraq or Kirkuk to reach the threshold of Article 3 was not
conclusive since the CJEU in Elgafaji had made clear that Article 15(c)
had an additional scope.
228. Whilst it may be that
the violence in Iraq had levelled off in recent years, it was still above what
is tolerable.
229. Although they did not
initially seek to argue that problems with the safety of internal travel in
Iraq gave rise to an extra dimension to risk of Article 15(c) harm on return,
the appellants in further post-hearing submissions have argued with reference
to the 2012 UNHCR Guidelines that for a person fleeing the effects of
indiscriminate violence, it is of particular importance to consider the
concrete prospects of safely accessing areas of Iraq not affected by general
violence, including risk en route from IEDs and bombs throughout Iraq, and
attacks on busy roads, and also the inherent difficulties of identifying
potential safe zones, given the volatility and fluidity of the conflict.
230. As regards the
individual appellants, with respect to HM and RM, it was submitted that they
have no Iraqi documentation, and cannot safely pass into Iraq without the risk of detention, nor travel to their place of origin without risk of being
refused at checkpoints for lack of proper documentation. This also affects
their ability to survive in the absence of access to their PDS cards. In
addition, as Kurds and IDPs, they are at risk in the central and southern
governorates.
231. As regards HF, who is
a Sunni of Arab ethnicity and from Baghdad, where he has family, internal
relocation is not a viable option on account of the levels of violence in the
central governorates and the position of IDPs elsewhere, and on account of his
Ba’athist links.
The respondent’s case
232. The respondent’s case
is that there was no reason to take a different view of Article 15(c) levels of
risk in Iraq than the Tribunal took in HMI and that in any event the
evidence as to the current position did not demonstrate that either in Iraq or
in any of the five central governorates the Article 15(c) threshold was met.
The latest UNHCR Guidelines of May 2012 seemed largely to recognise this. Even
if the Article 15(c) threshold was met – or likely to be met - in one or more
of those governorates, there would be scope for safe and reasonable internal
relocation. There would be no risk on return at BIAP. So far as concerned the
appellants, therefore: (1) none of the appellants would be at risk on return to
their home areas in Iraq; (2) if, which is denied, they would be at risk in
their home areas, then they could relocate anywhere else in Iraq including the
KRG; (3) the intended route of enforced return would be by air to BIAP from
where the appellants could travel in safety to their home areas; and (4) none
of the appellants has established that he would face a real risk of treatment
contrary to Article 3 ECHR on return to BIAP or in any place connected with the
process of return. There were no serious problems with internal travel within Iraq.
233. The respondent did not
accept that being a Sunni or a Shi’a Arab or Kurd or someone connected with the
former Ba’ath Party sufficed to give rise to an “enhanced risk category”. The
respondent’s position was that in order for this to be so it would be necessary
to establish that those of Kurdish ethnicity or Sunni or Shi’a religion have a
materially higher risk than the generality of the population of suffering harm
from indiscriminate violence; yet the appellants have failed to show this.
234. The Secretary of
State’s submissions urge the Tribunal to assess risk on return at the airport
on the factual basis that only enforced returnees with an expired or current
Iraqi passport would be returned. In relation to a returnee who refuses to
cooperate with the process for obtaining a laissez passer and, in so doing,
frustrates the removal process, the Secretary of State’s intention in such
cases is to enforce their removal once a document meeting the requirements of
the Iraqi authorities becomes available, but in the meantime they cannot be
removed. This is because without the necessary documentation there was no
guarantee that they would be accepted by the Iraqi authorities in Baghdad.
235. The submissions point
out that refusal to cooperate in obtaining a laissez passer would amount to a
criminal offence under s.35 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of
Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (“the 2004 Act”).
236. It is clear,
therefore, that a person who refused to cooperate in the obtaining of a laissez
passer document would be at risk of prosecution under s. 35. It is submitted
that this should amount to a strong incentive for individuals in such a
position to comply with the re-documentation process. It is made clear that if
a person does not cooperate he will not be able to be removed whilst the Iraqi
authorities’ position on documentation remains the same, but if the Iraqi
authorities’ position changes to allow return on EU letters as had previously
been the case, then it is argued there would be no reason to suppose that Iraqi
nationals would be returned to Iraq with any risk of detention let alone a real
risk of Article 3 ill-treatment. The point is also made that it is now
possible for voluntary returns to take place directly to the KRG and that is
therefore an option for appellants such as the first two appellants in this
case, which avoids entirely any question of how they would be treated at BIAP.
237. The Secretary of
State’s position is therefore that there is no risk of ill-treatment at BIAP
because anybody returned there would be returning on documentation which would
enable them to leave the airport without delay (subject to them being a person
in respect of whom there was a judicial order or warrant for their arrest), and
as such there is no risk on return.
238. Despite considering
there to be no real risk of even short-term detention at BIAP for enforced
returnees, the Secretary of State requested the Tribunal to make an assessment
of risk of ill-treatment at BIAP for an Iraqi national returned there from the
United Kingdom, bearing in mind there are a number of cases in the High Court
raising the issue of ill-treatment at BIAP as an alleged barrier to removal,
and in light of the accounts of ill-treatment given by failed asylum seekers
returned on charter flights on 9 and 16 June 2010 and 6 September 2010.
239. In relation to the
June 2010 charter flights, the first point made in the Secretary of State’s
submissions is that investigations by UKBA’s Professional Support Unit (PSU)
found that the returnees’ stories of abuse during the returns process by UKBA
officials and their agents were untrue. The point is made that despite having
had the opportunity to do so, none of the returnees has challenged those
findings and, as was held in R (Qader) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2001] EWHC 1785 (Admin), at [22], that makes it very difficult
to accept them as witnesses of truth. .
240. The point is also made
that most, if not all, of the returnees were individuals who were failed asylum
seekers and as such were individuals who had been found not to have been
credible in their asylum claims which diminished the likelihood of them telling
the truth in this regard.
241. The point is further
made that the appellants can point to no independent evidence to support the
allegations of ill-treatment. It is contended that the only reports upon which
they rely from, for example, UNHCR and newspapers, are based not on independent
investigations but rather the unsupported allegations of the returnees. It is
said that the extent to which the appellants rely on, for example, photographs
and medical evidence relating to injuries allegedly received from ill-treatment
by, for example, Mr AA (at B/121), none of this material demonstrates that any
injuries were the result of mistreatment by the Iraqi authorities.
242. It is also pointed out
that since the June and September 2010 charter flights, there have been a
number of returns from Iraq, as detailed in the Secretary of State’s evidence
for these appeals and that despite British Embassy inquiries of a number of
reliable sources, there have been no reports of detention in poor conditions
following any of those flights. It is noted that the appellants do not rely on
any evidence relating to such issues and it is suggested that that is strong
evidence not only that the reports of the returnees on the June and September
2010 flights were not true but also that there is no risk on return at BIAP
now. Accordingly, it is argued that the case for there being a real risk of
ill-treatment at BIAP on return on a charter flight is not made out.
243. Consideration is also
given in the written submissions to the authorities from the ECtHR relied on by
the appellants. NA v United Kingdom [2009] 48 EHRR 15, which is cited
as authority for the proposition that once an individual has adduced evidence
capable of demonstrating substantial grounds for believing that there would be
a real risk of the prescribed ill-treatment, the burden shifts to the
respondent state to dispel any doubts about it, is said not to help the
appellants since the only evidence they can point to is from individuals whose
accounts are incapable of belief and hence they do not get over the first
threshold. Even if they were considered to have passed that threshold, then
they would fail at the second threshold for the reasons set out above. With
regard to MSS v Belgium [2011] 53 EHRR 2, a contrast is drawn between
the evidence that existed of poor conditions for reception of asylum seekers in
Greece and the absence of reports on detention of returnees at BIAP. It is
argued that the appellants are not assisted by their references to reports from
other organisations or detention conditions generally in Iraq, as none of those reports deals specifically with the situation at BIAP and the treatment of
the issue by the experts does not take the matter any further. Reference is
made also to the argument made by the appellants that conditions of detention
“are not disputed”. That, said Mr Staker, was incorrect because the Secretary
of State does not accept the evidence concerning the conditions in which
returnees on the charter flights were held, for the reasons set out above. The
fact that the Secretary of State cannot launch her own independent
investigation into the conditions in detention facilities associated with BIAP,
since Iraq is a sovereign state, is not the same as accepting allegations made
by others in respect of those conditions. It is argued that the evidence
produced by the Secretary of State shows that she has in fact gone to
considerable lengths to investigate the matter with a number of relevant and
reliable interlocutors in Iraq, and it is asserted that the allegations are not
credible.
244. The point is made in
conclusion that the appellants are not assisted by their submissions on
conditions in detention at BIAP. The point is, it is said, in effect academic,
given changes in procedures and as such no issue of risk at the airport arises,
but again it is reiterated that it remains very important for the Tribunal to
deal with the question of detention at BIAP and the allegations on which the
appellants rely concerning the June and September 2010 charter flights.
Submissions on internal
relocation
245. On the first day of
the hearing we said we saw no reason to depart from the findings of the
Tribunal in its recent decision in MK (Documents – relocation) Iraq CG
[2012] UKUT 00126 (IAC), though of course we did not rule out fresh evidence
about such matters being adduced which had not been considered in MK.
In MK the Tribunal concluded that it is wrong to say that there is, in
general, no internal flight alternative in Iraq, bearing in mind in particular
the levels of governmental and NGO support available. In full its country
guidance conclusions were as follows:
“General Conclusions
88(1) Since
the lack of documentation relating to identity in the form of the Civil Status
ID (CSID), Iraqi Nationality Certificate (INC) and public Distribution System
(PDS) card (food ration card) is not ordinarily an insuperable problem, it is
not a factor likely to make return to any part of Iraq unsafe or unreasonable.
(a) The
CSID is an important document, both in its own right and as a gateway to
obtaining other significant documents such as the INC and the PDS. An
inability to replace the CSID is likely to entail inability to access the INC
and PDS.
(b) Although
the general position is that a person who wishes to replace a lost CSID is
required to return to their home area in order to do so, there are procedures
as described in this determination available which make it possible (i) for
Iraqis abroad to secure the issue of a new CSID to them through the offices of
the local Iraqi Embassy; (ii) for Iraqis returned to Iraq without a CSID to
obtain one without necessarily having to travel to their home area. Such
procedures permit family members to obtain such documentation from their home
areas on an applicant’s behalf or allow for a person to be given power of
attorney to obtain the same. Those who are unable immediately to establish
their identity can ordinarily obtain such documentation by being presented
before a judge from the Civil Status Court, so as to facilitate return to their
place of origin.
(2) relocation
to the KRG is in general reasonable.
(a) Entry
into and residence in the KRG can be effected by any Iraqi national with a
CSID, INC and PDS, after registration with the Asayish (local security
office). An Arab may need a sponsor; a Kurd will not.
(b) Living
conditions in the KRG for a person who has relocated there are not without
difficulties, but there are jobs, and there is access to free health care
facilities, education, rented accommodation and financial and other support
from UNCHR.
(3) Despite
bureaucratic difficulties with registration and the difficulties faced by IDPs,
it is wrong to say that there is, in general, no internal alternative in Iraq,
bearing in mind in particular the levels of governmental and NGO support
available.
(4) Whilst
the situation for women in Iraq is, in general, not such as to give rise to a
real risk of persecution or serious harm, there may be particular problems
affecting female headed households where family support is lacking, and jobs
and other means of support may be harder to come by. Careful examination of
the particular circumstances of the individual’s case will be especially
important.”
246. Mr Fordham put in
lengthy written submissions in a skeleton argument on internal relocation, in
which he relied heavily on section C of the UNHCR April 2009 Guidelines on Iraq. UNHCR’s conclusion was that in general there was no internal flight alternative
within the central and southern governorates of Iraq because of the ability of
non-state agents of persecution to perpetrate acts of violence with impunity,
given the ongoing levels of violence in mainly the five central governorates of
Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewah and Salah Al Din, access and residency
restrictions, and the hardship faced in ensuring even basic survival in areas
of relocation. The UNHCR noted that registration with the Ministry of
Displacement and Migration (MoDM) was a condition for access to a range of
basic services as well as government assistance. UNHCR also had concerns about
access to food for IDPs, problems with housing, generally poor functioning and
dilapidated water and sewerage systems and significant deterioration in the
healthcare system. IDPs also had very poor access to income and employment. A
significant number of IDPs surveyed in Iraq had not received any humanitarian
assistance since their displacement.
247. The 2012 UNHCR Guidelines
note, with respect to relocation to the KRG, that the influx of IDPs has had an
important impact on the host communities, placing additional pressure on
already strained public services, though at the same time the area has
benefited from the immigration of professionals whose skills and disposable
incomes boost the local economy, and unskilled IDPs have provided a source of
affordable labour for the construction industry. A person fleeing a state
agent of persecution would remain at risk, but others might be out of reach of
their persecutors as generally the Kurdish authorities are able and willing to
provide protection. It is said that in terms of access, roads between the KRG
and central Iraq cannot be considered safe. Entry through the major roads and
their checkpoints is said to be, practically, the only option available to most
Iraqis seeking to enter the KRG; flights are available but at a price
unaffordable to many Iraqis. We deal with issues of documentation below.
248. The UNHCR say that
most IDPs in the KRG live in rented housing, though some live in improvised
dwellings, and cite health problems. IDPs in the KRG have not had access to
their food rations through the Public Distribution System (PDS) since November
2011, which means they have to spend a high proportion of their income on food,
often leaving them without other essential items such as fuel or furniture.
IDP children can generally enrol in schools, provided their families are
registered with the security department and have an information card, but there
is a shortage of Arabic-language schools and a problem with overcrowding. Only
those registered with the security department have access to employment, so
generally they must have a sponsor, and access to employment may be difficult
in the absence of family, tribal or political connections in the KRG. Also,
employees are usually required to speak Kurdish. IDPs have access to the
public health system, but there are problems of inadequate supplies,
insufficient staffing and overcrowding of public hospitals. As regards
relocation to southern and central Iraq, the UNHCR say that it is not feasible
if the person is fleeing a state agent of persecution, and it is also not
likely to be possible for a person fleeing an armed group. Lack of physical
safety is a general concern for returnees, and generally protection by national
authorities will not be available. Ethno-religious violence in the “disputed
areas” (i.e. Kirkuk, Ninewah, parts of Diyala and Salah Al-Din) compounded by land
and property disputes, high unemployment and drought needs to be considered in
respect of possible relocation to those areas.
249. The Guidelines state
that relocation for categories of individuals fearing harm as a result of
traditional practices and religious norms of a persecutory nature may be
problematic. Travel by road within the central and southern governorates is
dangerous, especially at night. Lack of access to essential services such as
food, drinking water, sanitation, electricity and education remains a problem.
Housing may also be problematic. Nearly half a million Iraqis are reported to
remain in more than 382 informal housing settlements, which are not connected
to regular networks. Access to food including the PDS may be difficult, and
access to education has reportedly been severely impacted by years of
conflict. Access to health care is said to be particularly difficult in rural
areas where many IDPs are located, and unemployment is a major concern for
IDPs. Common ethnic or religious backgrounds and existing tribal and family
ties in the area of relocation are said to be crucial when assessing the
availability of relocation, as they generally assume a certain level of
community protection and access to services.
250. As regards the
northern governorates, it was noted that travel to them is fraught with risks,
and there were bureaucratic and other difficulties in accessing the three
governorates. Access to food via the PDS was uneven across the three
governorates, and IDPs were not able to obtain food rations in their place of
displacement. Access to housing was restricted in all three governorates and
Kurdish IDPs did not have the right to purchase or own property and could only
rent it if they had successfully registered with the Asayish (security). There
were also restrictions on access to public education and in certain areas, in
particular in more rural or homogenous areas, relocation would be difficult on
account of a serious risk of rejection by the community. At pp. 59 to 60 of
the UNHCR Report a non-comprehensive list of groups of people who might not be
able to find protection on relocation in the three northern governorates was
set out. It was argued that there was no good, still less no cogent or
compelling, reason for rejecting the UNHCR analysis.
251. Reliance was also
placed on the expert reports of Dr George and Dr Fatah in respect of the
individual circumstances of the particular appellants and more generally. Mr
Fordham also referred to a letter of 8 April 2012 from the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office concerning the process of returns and noting that the
returnee requires either a passport, an expired passport, or potentially a
laissez passer passport (if the Iraqi Embassy will issue such a document).
252. The skeleton argument
also deals with issues concerning travel from Baghdad to the KRG and related
evidence from Dr Fatah.
253. A further section of
the skeleton deals with entry procedures into and residence in the KRG. Again
reliance is placed on the UNHCR April 2009 Report and the evidence of Dr George
and Dr Fatah. Criticisms are made of the Danish Immigration Service Report of
April 2010 on the basis that it is said not to be reliable and that it should
not begin to displace the UNHCR position, in particular with regard to the
security measures introduced by the Kurdish authorities at their checkpoints.
A more recent report from the Danish Immigration Service, based on the
Fact-Finding Mission between 7 and 24 March 2011, maintains the earlier position
in relation to entry procedures and the requirement of a sponsor. However, it
is noted that there has been a more recent report, which was not before the
Tribunal in MK, dated March 2012 and entitled “Joint Report of the
Danish Immigration Service/UK Border Agency Fact-Finding Mission to Erbil and
Dahuk, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) conducted 11 to 22 November 2011 Update
(2) on entry procedures at Kurdistan Regional Government Checkpoints (KRG);
residence procedures in Kurdistan region of Iraq (KRI) and arrival procedures
at Erbil and Sulaymaniyah Airports (for Iraqis travelling from non-KRI areas of
Iraq)”. It is said that in this report it is accepted by the head of the
Asayish that there is a varying requirement for a reference (or sponsor) and that
the security procedures involve differential treatment for Arabs.
254. The skeleton argument
also quotes from another report that was not before the Tribunal in MK,
“Joint Finish-Swiss Fact-Finding Mission to Amman and the Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG) area in May 10-22 2011”, dated 1 February 2012. This is
quoted as stating that anyone who does not originate from the KRG needs a
sponsor. The report comments on entry procedures to the KRG and also addresses
issues concerning Arabs in the KRG area and also the position of IDPs in the
KRG. In the 2012 Guidelines, UNHCR say that since the fall of the former
regime, the KRG authorities are very vigilant about who enters the area, and
have introduced strict security measures at their checkpoints. It is said that
an ad hoc and often inconsistent approach can be expected in terms of who is
granted access, varying not only from governorate to governorate but also from
checkpoint to checkpoint. A sponsor may be required to be physically present
at the checkpoint to secure the person’s entering: in other cases a letter
notarised by a court clerk attesting to the person’s connection to the sponsor
may suffice, or a telephone call by the officer at the checkpoint to the
sponsor will be enough. It is said that single Arab males, including minors,
are likely either to be refused entry to the KRG or to be allowed entry only
after a lengthy administrative procedure and heavy interrogation. An
information card to be obtained from the Asayish, is required for a person
wishing to stay for more than 30 days, and a sponsor may be required in order
to obtain an information card.
255. In his skeleton, Mr
Fordham goes on to address issues of relocation in the central and southern
governorates, quoting Dr George as stating that there is no part of central or
southern Iraq in which the appellants in these appeals could live in safety due
to the security situation in those parts of the country. Reference is also
made to Dr Fatah’s evidence in respect of the absence of any internal flight
alternative in Iraq. With regard to the situation of IDPs in the central and
southern governorates, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)
Norwegian Refugee Council, is quoted in respect of the difficulties for the 2.8
million Iraqis internally displaced, referred to in its report of 4 March
2010. There are restrictions on the freedom of movement due to the security
situation, and difficulties in replacing lost documents. Reference is also
made to a report of the IOM, dated 18 March 2008 concerning problems
experienced by refugees and IDPs in Iraq due to insecurity and problems with
the infrastructure in Iraq. A further report of the IOM dated 13 April 2010
notes problems with shelter and basic services such as clean water, sanitation
and electricity and noting that much of the Iraqi population depends upon the
PDS food rationing system and that across the country 46% of post-Samarra IDPs
had periodic access to rations at best. There were also serious concerns about
access to healthcare. A further report of February 2011 from the same
organisation refers to difficulties for the 1.6 million Iraqis who are
displaced and the ongoing problems despite comparatively smaller rates of new
displacements since the peak in 2006. There is reference to difficulties in
access to PDS rations and the problem of the inability to transfer ration cards
being a concern throughout Iraq. The Joint Finnish-Swiss Fact-Finding Mission
also contains evidence about difficulties for unregistered IDPs. A contrast is
drawn between the evidence of Dr Fatah, who said that IDPs could access
“support” from the MoDM, and the experience of returnees whose evidence is set
out at section 20.3 of Dr Fatah’s report. Thereafter, the skeleton goes on to
address the particular position of the appellants in this appeal.
256. With regard to MK
it is said that not only is further and detailed evidence provided from the
experts, but that it is clear that the Danish Immigration Service report of
March 2012 and the Swiss-Finnish report of 1 February 2012 were not before the
Tribunal in that case and therefore various of the findings of the Tribunal
fell to be reassessed in light of the evidence adduced above.
257. In his oral
submissions, Mr Fordham addressed the specific country guidance issues
summarised at [88] in MK. He argued firstly, with regard to what was
said at [88(2)], that there was an ambiguity where it was said: “An Arab may
need a sponsor; a Kurd will not” and that it was unclear whether this was concerned
with entry or registration. It was argued that it was right that a Kurd would
not need a sponsor to enter the KRG but that an Arab might well do, and
might be refused entry in the absence of a sufficient family or support
network. He referred to [57] of MK in this regard. It could not be
said that there was an internal flight alternative to the KRG for an Arab, as
at the point of entry they might need a sponsor and in the absence of family or
contacts in the KRG, they would not get one. Also, they would not be able to
access food rations. The fact that it was unlikely the third appellant, a
Sunni Arab, would want to relocate to the KRG was by the way. There were
relevant passages in the Danish/UKBA report at [3.08] and [4.01], [4.11] and [4.35].
It was clear from MK that access to services in the KRG was dependent
upon having been authorised for residence. Paragraph 8.16 of the Danish/UKBA
report supported this point. In addition, there was relevant evidence in the
Joint Finnish-Swiss report at pages 61, 64 to 65 and 90. A person required to
be registered in order to have access to services. A sponsor or reference
would be required for residence. This was dealt with at [8] and various
sub-paragraphs in the Danish/UKBA report. The evidence did not support the
conclusion in MK that a sponsor was not needed. A Kurd from the
disputed areas would be refused residence. Dr George referred to this in [18]
and [40] of his third witness statement. Food rations were clearly important.
Anyone, whether a Kurd or an Arab, who did not originate from the KRG would not
be able to transfer their food rations. This would be even more so for a Kurd
from the disputed areas. The situation was that there existed an essential
safety net in the form of the PDS card but there was a refusal to facilitate
its provision in the area of residence. That might not be too problematic for
a person whose home area was close to the KRG and who therefore would be able
to go there in order to collect their rations monthly, but otherwise a person
would be bereft of subsistence protection and this would not be remedied by the
profile of humanitarian assistance.
258. The evidence was that
in the southern governorates, displaced people faced the prospect that one in
three would be without their food rations and 85% would only have partial
rations. This could be seen at [83] of MK. The Secretary of State
argued that this would not make relocation unduly harsh even if the person had
no family or network of friends. Paragraphs 84 and 87 of MK were
striking with regard to the relevant governorates.
OUR ASSESSMENT
Confinement to the
Article 15(c) issue
259. The burden of
proof in these appeals rests on the appellants, albeit the standard of proof is
relatively low and the seriousness of the issues at stake requires us to apply
anxious scrutiny. In deciding this case we have to have regard to the entirety
of the evidence. This being a CG case we have set out the enormous amount of
evidence with which we have been presented in Appendix A.
260. Our primary focus in
these appeals is strictly confined to Article 15(c) of the Qualification
Directive, and a discrete issue relating to risk on return to BIAP. However,
since this case deals with the current situation in Iraq it will inevitably be
a reference point for decision-makers deciding asylum-related appeals brought
by Iraqis that are not confined to the Article 15(c) issue. In this context we
would reiterate the observations made recently by the Tribunal in AK
(Afghanistan) at [154]-[156] that in the general run of appeals
decision-makers should ordinarily deal first with the issue of refugee
eligibility and only deal with the issue of subsidiary protection (including
Article 15(c) second. They should not deal with Article 3 until last:
“154. That
is so for two main reasons. First of all, decision-makers are obliged by the
structure of the Qualification Directive to give primacy to the issue of
eligibility for refugee protection; whereas Articles 15(b) and (c) are species
of “subsidiary” protection: see recitals 3, 5. Second, to skip over refugee
eligibility would be to lend support to the misconception that persons fleeing
armed conflict cannot fall within the Article 1A(2) Refugee Convention
definition. That has never been so, even if there has been recurrent hesitation
about the criteria that should apply to such cases: see AM & AM
(armed conflict: risk categories) Somalia CG [2008] UKAIT 00091, paras 17, 68.
155.
In relation to why Article 3 ECHR should be dealt with last, the reason is
simple. By virtue of Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive, a person who
can establish an Article 3 risk, will (save in one limited respect relating to
heath cases) be able to show he is entitled to subsidiary (humanitarian
protection) under 15(b). By contrast with Article 3 ECHR, subsidiary protection
(humanitarian protection), including under Article 15(b), entitles the
beneficiary to a legal status both at the level of EU law (Article 24(2) of the
Qualification Directive) and in UK law (para 339C of the Immigration Rules).
156.
As regards whether or not to deal with Article 15(b) or 15(c) first, it might
seem that because the Court of Justice in Elgafaji has held that Article
15(c) has an additional scope to Article 3 ECHR that it would always be easier
to address Article 15(c) first as having broader scope. But establishing
subsidiary protection eligibility under Article 15(b) may sometimes be more
straightforward than seeking to do so under Article 15(c). This may arise
where, for example, the claimant falls within a risk category but cannot show a
Refugee Convention ground (e.g. where he is at real risk of persecution/serious
harm at the hands of a powerful criminal gang). It may also arise where there
is a recent ECHR case that establishes comprehensively that there is an
exceptionally high level of generalised violence in the claimant’s country that
amounts to a violation of Article 3 ECHR (see NA v UK Application no.
25904/07, paras 115-116; Sufi and Elmi v UK Applications nos. 8319/07
and 11449/07, paras 218, 250) and there is no valid reason to take a different
view. Another problem is that whilst it is now established that Article 15(c) has
an additional scope to Article 3 ECHR (a near equivalent to Article 15(b) of
the Qualification Directive), the ascertainment of that additional scope may
not always be a simple matter.”
The expert evidence
261. We found Dr George’s
evidence of considerable assistance and attach significant weight to it.
Nevertheless it is notable, we think, that in his oral testimony he agreed that
the opinions he had expressed in his written reports on the levels of risk or
of persons being “at risk” or “at real risk” did not necessarily mean anything
more than that “some” risk existed. Similarly when he used the term
“plausible” (e.g. at [40] in relation to former Ba’ath Party members) he agreed
this did not necessarily mean anything more than that the particular matter
“could” have happened.
262. Whilst such usages are
entirely understandable in the context of such a report, they limit the
report’s value to us as an assessment of levels of risk in respect of Article
15(c) eligibility. If Dr George’s references about risk and real risk were
taken to mean Article 15(c) risk, then his report would be at odds with a
central tenet of the appellants’ case. Whereas for the appellants it is only in
the five central governorates that the Article 15(c) threshold is reached, his
position would then be more wide-ranging: he described the security situation”
in all parts of Iraq other than the KRG area” being “such as to pose very real
risks to the population at large” (at [191]; see also [220]).
263. We also found Dr Fatah’s
evidence extremely helpful and attach significant weight to it also,
particularly his oral evidence which was generally more ready to recognise
nuances. As with Dr George, we note that Dr Fatah used terms like “risk” and
“real risk” loosely. For example, whereas in his written report he spoke of a
significant risk of kidnapping of returnees from the west, he was prepared to
accept during his oral testimony that the evidence for saying this was a real
risk was lacking and it was no more than “a possibility”.
264. What the proceedings
have revealed is that neither expert was able to give much assistance to the
Tribunal in deciding the core issue of the levels of violence in Iraq beyond
highlighting various aspects of the existing documentary studies dealing with
civilian casualties and related matters. We would emphasise, however, that we
do not mean these observations as a criticism of either expert, since it is not
their job to apply legal criteria. And their presentation of relevant
background evidence has assisted our understanding of trends. On one or two
matters, in particular the issue of whether armed attacks in Iraq have become
more targeted, we have preferred the evidence of Dr Fatah, but that is largely
a function of the fact that he gave more sources and that his analysis was
corroborated by them.
Initial observations
265. Mr Fordham seeks to
rely on the fact that in HMI the Tribunal noted that the casualty
figures for 2006 and 2007 suggested that the Article 15(c) threshold might have
been met in parts of Iraq at that time and expressed particular concerns as to
the situation in Mosul in Ninewah Province. Given such findings it was
incumbent on the Tribunal, he said, not to find that the Article 15(c)
threshold was no longer met unless there were compelling reasons.
266. However in HMI
the Tribunal observed that it was not its task “to re-evaluate what the
Tribunal in KH should have concluded as to the level of risk to
civilians in early 2008” and in relation to the situation of Iraq in 2006 and
2007 and in Mosul in 2009 it stopped short of making any definitive finding on
such matters. It saw its express task as assessment of the current situation.
We entirely agree with Mr Staker that the attempt in the appellants’ skeleton
to invoke a principle of cessation in this respect, analogous to Article 1C of
the Refugee Convention, is misconceived.
267. In the present appeals
we wish to make it just as clear throughout that our concern is to assess the
current level of Article 15(c) risk in Iraq. Of course, for such purposes
evidence as to the historic situation is relevant and the previous findings of
fact made by the Tribunal in both KH and HMI do afford helpful
reference points in certain respects; particularly as we know precisely what
body of background evidence they had before them when reaching their
decisions. But plainly the fact that both were overturned by the Court of
Appeal means that their findings on the evidence before them cannot be treated
as starting points. The effect of the Court of Appeal decisions is that we
must approach this case on the basis that there is no previous binding country
guidance case on the application of Article 15(c) to Iraq.
Comparison with other
conflicts
268. As regards evidence
and submissions drawing a comparison between the conflict in Iraq and those in Afghanistan and Somalia, we take it into account but do not find it of much
assistance, for much the same reasons as were given by the Tribunal in HM1
at [258]:
“258. Although
we would agree that in principle it should be possible to achieve objective
indicators of violence that can be applied in a comparative fashion across
different countries, we have some doubts that current studies/surveys have yet
resolved problems of different methodologies. Figures in any event only furnish
a part of the overall evidence needed to assess Article 15(c) risk. So at best
we would regard this particular comparison (which of course is only valid if at
all in relation to the levels of violence in Afghanistan at the time GS
was heard, not now) as a very rough guide and not one to which we should attach
any significant weight).”
269. As to the reference
made to the recent determination of the Upper Tribunal in AMM and Others v
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKUT 00448, in that case the
Tribunal decided that Article 15(c) should prohibit removals to Mogadishu
unless the individual had connections with powerful individuals or belonged to
a category of middle class or professional persons who could live to a
reasonable standard. Outside Mogadishu, unless at a particular time fighting
was in progress in a particular area in which 15(c) would apply to that area,
in general 15(c) should not prevent removals. That decision is based on its
own facts as is the case in all CG decisions. One cannot on its facts be used
as an authority for another. But it does make the point that the whole
circumstances including the lack of normal facilities which make life tolerable
and which result from the national armed conflict must be taken into account.
The inclusive approach
270. In HM1 at
[75]-[84] the Tribunal explained the need to adopt an inclusive approach.
271. AK (Afghanistan) at [163], reaffirmed this approach. Having explained the need for proper
allowance to be made for underreporting, the Tribunal added this comment:
“…Further,
whilst the inclusive approach is an indispensable safeguard against any
artificial exclusion of relevant types of violence, it must not lead the
decision-maker to run everything together and to overlook or blur important
features of the ongoing conflict, for it is only by a careful delineation and
understanding of these features that a proper assessment can be made about the
levels of indiscriminate violence for Article 15(c) purposes. Ours must be a
qualitative as well as a quantitative analysis. Thus, for example, in AMM
at para 339 the Tribunal considered that, in addition to the level of civilian
casualties, another factor leading them to conclude that in Mogadishu the
Article 15(c) threshold had been crossed related to the “conduct of the
parties” by reference to the highlighting in background evidence of widespread
violations of international humanitarian law.”
272. A further dimension to
the inclusive approach is an understanding that even when focusing on civilian
deaths and injuries it is necessary to take account of the impact of threats of
violence as well as the physical violence itself.
273. In addition, where
armed conflict has been ongoing for some time - and in Iraq it has been going for fifteen years - assessment must take into account its long-term
cumulative effects, not just annualised figures.
The inclusive approach:
other metrics
274. In line with our
inclusive approach, we continue to take the view expressed in HM1 and in
subsequent country guidance cases dealing with Article 15(c) issues – see e.g.
[162] – that in assessing Article 15(c) considerations it is valid to consider
“metrics” other than civilian casualties/”battlefield deaths”, two such other
metrics being population displacement and the degree of state failure.
The UNHCR Guidelines
275. It has been the
appellants’ consistent position throughout this case that it was not
appropriate for the Tribunal to depart from UNHCR’s informed and cogently
reasoned guidance assessment. At the hearing this was advanced in relation to
the April 2009 Guidelines and subsequent UNHCR notes confirming their continued
applicability. In subsequent submissions it was advanced in relation to the
May 2012 Guidelines.
276. In previous country
guidance cases the Tribunal has almost always attached very considerable weight
to UNHCR guidelines on risk categories in particular countries, although it has
seen the degree of weight to be attached to be dependent on a number of factors
including whether or not UNHCR has a presence on the ground in the country
concerned. A similar approach has been adopted by the ECtHR, e.g. in NA v UK and Sufi and Elmi.
277. Mr Fordham sought to
persuade us that we should indeed accord a more primary status to UNHCR
Guidelines so as to reflect its status and mandate, its detailed assessment and
rigorous standards of due diligence such that it is not appropriate to depart,
“save for a cogent and identified reason”, from UNHCR’s guidelines. We
recognise that, as highlighted by Sir Stephen Sedley in EM (Eritrea) & Ors v Secretary of State
for the Home Department
[2012] EWCA Civ 1336 at
[41] that UNHCR, “is today the holder of an
internationally respected office with an expert staff (numbering 7,190 in 120
different states, according to its website), able to assemble and monitor
information from year to year and to apply to it standards of knowledge and
judgment which are ordinarily beyond the reach of a court. In doing this, and
in reaching his conclusions, [the UNHCR] has the authority of the General
Assembly of the United Nations, by whom he is appointed and to whom he reports”. We also recognise that in Iraq UNHCR’s
sources include IDPs and returnees who have made contact with UNHCR in the
context of its monitoring operations as well as other agencies and persons in Iraq. However, we are unable to accept Mr Fordham’s proposition, not out of lack of
respect for UNHCR’s considered views on country conditions or its immensely
thorough and heavily footnoted 2012 Guidelines, but out of concern to ensure we
discharge our duty to decide cases on the basis of the evidence and arguments
presented to us; bearing in mind that in this, as well as most country guidance
cases, we have a very comprehensive body of background evidence together with
expert reports and detailed submissions to put alongside the UNHCR materials.
We would be very surprised if indeed UNHCR took a different view of what should
be our function, but in any event, as Mr Staker pointed out, Mr Fordham’s
submission on this matter is also contrary to authority: see Mhute v SSHD
[2003] EWCA Civ 1029 and R (Golfa) v SSHD [2005] EWHC 2282 (Admin).
278. Observing that in HMI
one reason why the Tribunal did not follow the (then) UNHCR Guidelines was
because it considered UNHCR had strategic concerns (at [274]), Mr Fordham
averred that UNHCR had not said its risk assessment on Iraq was affected by strategic concerns. Mr Fordham also questioned the Tribunal’s doubting of
UNHCR’s consistency, given its heavy involvement in return and reintegration
programmes in Iraq. They were voluntary, not enforced returns and it was only
the latter that was in issue in this case. One could not regard UNHCR’s
Article 15(c) assessment as being flawed by reason of its support for
internationally supervised returns.
279. We find it difficult
to overlook altogether the apparent conflict in UNHCR’s position in relation to
risk on return to Iraq. In order to qualify for UNHCR “facilitation” of
voluntary repatriation, applicants are required to fulfil various criteria, one
of which is stated to be that “Conditions in specific areas of intended return
in Iraq must be assessed by UNHCR as being sustainable”. Yet it is not in
dispute that sometime after February 2008 UNHCR chose to recommence assistance
to Iraqi voluntary returnees even though: (i) its view (at least up to May
2012) was that because of the high level of indiscriminate violence the 5
central governorates were unsafe; and (ii) some of those assisted proposed
returns to these governorates. We note that in Al Hamdami v Bosnia and Herzogovina 7 February 2012 the Strasbourg Court has also seen this apparent
conflict as problematic. The Court observed at [51] that:
“Although the Court is
aware that the UNHCR, the UN and the IOM recommend that countries refrain from
forcibly returning refugees to Iraq, they have stated that they are committed
to providing assistance to those who return. Moreover, the Court observes that
their recommendations are partly based on the security situation and partly due
to practical problems for returnees such as shelter, health care and property
restitution.”
The court went on
to find that there was no generalised Article 3 risk in Iraq.
280. We acknowledge that
UNHCR exercises considerable care in its assistance to voluntary returnees. In
its literature UNHCR states that it provides assistance on an individual case
basis to persons who, “being fully informed of the situation in their places of
origin, chose voluntarily to return”. We acknowledge too that UNHCR’s
assistance has not taken the strong form of “promotion” of returns, but only of
their “facilitation”. It must also be emphasised that inside Iraq UNHCR has
well-established Protection and Assistance Centers (PACs) and Return,
Integration and Community Centers (RICCs), now renamed Protection Assistance
Reintegration Centers (PARCs) to assist returnees who decide to return. That
demonstrates that UNHCR plays an active part in seeking to ensure those who choose
to return voluntarily, do so in safety and with assistance.
281. We also accept that we
are not in a position to assess to what extent if at all UNHCR’s strategic
concerns about orderly returns affect its assessment of the need for
international protection under the Refugee Convention or Qualification
Directive. We further accept that we are not in a position to know to what
extent choices made by voluntary returnees are influenced by considerations
such as the awfulness of their situation outside Iraq or their own
imperviousness to risk. However, we would be wrong not to bear this dimension
of UNHCR’s work in mind. Whilst therefore we continue to have unanswered
questions as to how UNHCR can reconcile its “facilitation” of voluntary returns
with a position (such as was taken in the 2009 Guidelines) that certain areas
of Iraq are unsafe, we do not propose to treat that as a reason for attaching
any less weight to its assessment of international protection needs.
282. Following UNHCR’s
publication post-hearing of new guidelines, there was also an issue between the
parties as to the nature and extent of the change in UNHCR’s position in
relation to Article 15(c) and its applicability. Mr Fordham accepted that the
new Guidelines no longer supported the blanket “geographical” position that
specific provinces could be identified as crossing the Article 15(c) threshold
without more, although they did support, he contended, the position that those
from the five central governorates were likely to be able to succeed under
Article 15(c). Mr Staker argued that the new Guidelines not only do not set
out any blanket position but they also do not specifically apply the Article
15(c) test. Their primary position was that all claims for complementary
(subsidiary) protection have to be considered on an individual basis. If the
Guidelines considered that there were specific governorates or towns or cities
where Article 15(c) criteria are met at present, it was to be expected that
they would have said so. Insofar as the new Guidelines suggest that certain
asylum-seekers are “likely” to be in need of complementary protection, the
Secretary of State considers that to be inconsistent with the remainder of the
2012 Guidelines which rely on a case-by-case basis of approach.
283. In relation to these
submissions we have four responses.
284. First, we cannot agree
with Mr Staker that the 2012 Guidelines no longer seek to give guidance on the
application to Iraq of Article 15(c), although it is true they do not refer in
terms, as was done in the 2009 guidelines, to the case of Elgafaji.
Whilst the new Guidelines do not as such refer to Article 15(c), their
plentiful references to complementary protection “on the basis of a fear of a
serious and indiscriminate harm arising from that violence” clearly encompass Article
15(c). The introductory Note to the Guidelines refers to the Qualification
Directive and comments that UNHCR’s recommendations also touch upon relevant
“complementary or subsidiary protection regimes”.
285. Second, we cannot
agree that the new guidelines are internally inconsistent because they maintain
on the one hand that assessment must be on a case-by-case basis and on the
other that those from areas where there is a high level and high intensity of
violence are “likely” to qualify for complementary protection. It seems to us
that in articulating both of these propositions UNHCR is making it clear that
even though it no longer considers it justified to identify risk on the basis
of “broad geographic distinctions” as such, it continues to regard geographical
indicators (including ones related to governorates as well as sub-governorate
areas) as of very significant weight in assessing risk in individual cases.
The plain inference from its new guidelines is that if an individual is
accepted as “formerly residing in governorates, districts,
cities, towns, villages or neighbourhoods where high levels of violence
continue to be reported”, the likely impact on him is that he will be in need
of complementary forms of protection [emphasis added]. This makes it clear
that the level of violence in “governorates” as well as smaller
geographical areas, can be a basis for deciding whether an individual
qualifies.
286. Third, we are unable
nevertheless to accept UNHCR’s assessment in these new Guidelines that in any
of the five central governorates current level and intensity of violence is
sufficiently high to make it likely that persons from those governorates face
an Article 15(c) risk merely by being present there as civilians, certainly not
if the terms “likely” is intended to denote a real risk or reasonable degree of
likelihood. We do not consider that the evidence we have as to the level of
violence in each of these governorates supports such a conclusion. We note in
any event that the statement in the second paragraph of the Summary (see above
at [61]) about the likelihood of Iraqi asylum seekers being in need of
complementary forms of protection is predicated on there being locations “where,
at the time of adjudication of the asylum claim, high levels and a high
intensity of violence continue to be reported…” – which must mean that if it is
assessed that the level of intensity of the violence is not sufficiently
high, the need for protection is no longer “likely”.
287. Fourth, although the
new UNHCR Guidelines do not specify anything about whether applicants from Iraq
can fall within enhanced risk categories under Article 15(c)’s “sliding-scale”,
it would appear that they do not exclude that being a Kurd or being a Sunni or
Shi’a (or being connected to former Ba’athist Party members) may qualify a
person under Article 15(c) depending on the particular circumstances of the
case. Whilst we do not disagree that in an individual case, being a Kurd or a
Sunni or Shi’a (or being connected to former Ba’athist Party members) may,
taken together with other risk characteristics, place a person at Article 15(c)
risk (and indeed, if those other characteristics are significant enough, at
real risk of persecution or Article 15(b) serious harm), we do not consider
that the evidence establishes that a civilian will be at Article 15(c) risk
merely by virtue of being a Kurd or Sunni or Shi’a (or someone connected to
former Ba’athist Party members).
Patterns of violence and
trends
288. There are, of course,
various question marks over the future security of Iraq including the
unresolved issue of the referendum on Kurdish territories; ongoing Sunni
concerns about being marginalised in the new political system; and the ability
of the GoI to provide adequate security following the departure of close to
100,000 US forces and their allies since January 2009. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
and other insurgent groups have shifted their forces to concentrate on fewer,
larger, attacks. Their agenda remains using terror to destabilise.
289. At the same time, the
evidence we have does reveal a number of trends. The Sons of Iraq (SoI)
programme has done much to reintegrate Sunni elements into the political
mainstream and to reduce Sunni extremism. There has been a significant decline
in Shi’a militia activity due to political realignments. Sadr and the Sadrist
Party maintain their militia but are now part of the Shi’a political alliance.
Some extremist movements such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) have accepted a partial
ceasefire and held reconciliation talks. The March 2010 parliamentary
elections did not see major upsurges. The phased withdrawal of US forces has
not led to a return to generalised sectarian conflict and indeed appears to
have resulted in a significant annualised drop in the number of security
incidents, the average number of weekly incidents having fallen by December
2011 to below 50, compared with 300 seen in early 2009 (15 December 2011
Cordesman paper for CSIS). The International Crisis Group has assessed that
the Iraq security forces are “faring relatively well” (COIS, August 2011, [10.05]).
Whilst AQI’s switch to fewer, larger attacks means that civilians are still at
risk from their attacks, it is broadly recognised that its general military
capacity and that of allied insurgent groups has been downgraded. According to
Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Iraq, 21 March 2011, terrorist and
insurgent groups have been whittled down to a hard core. Patterns of
ethno-sectarian violence also demonstrate a decline.
290. It seems to us that
the appellants’ submissions broadly acknowledged these developments: for
example the appellant’s skeleton highlighted the latest UNAMI Report dated
January 2011 recording a rate of decline in civilian casualties, albeit at a
slowed rate.
291. Whilst it would be
possible to infer from evidence such as the above that violence in Iraq is
continuing to decline, we consider it prudent to approach this case on the
basis that presently violence remains broadly at the same level as in 2010 and
2011, since there continue to be some commentators who consider that the
security situation has in fact deteriorated and we note that on the basis of
figures for the first 6 -9 months of 2012 it is possible the figures for 2012
may show a small increase.
292. What is clear from the
evidence is that in recent years there has been an increase in targeted
killings. We are unable to accept the respondent’s position (as most
forcefully expressed in the July submissions) that the fact of more targeted
violence per se means less indiscriminate violence. As noted earlier, targeted
violence encompasses both specific and general targeting. As both parties
acknowledge, some violence, albeit targeted, can harm civilians in significant
numbers. Sometimes civilians themselves can be the target (see e.g. the
observation in the 2012 UNHCR Guidelines at p.10 that “[u]nlike other armed
groups, Al-Qa’eda in Iraq has reportedly deliberately targeted Iraqi civilians
at large, in particular Shi’as, apparently with the aim of (re)igniting
violence among Iraq’s ethnic and religious groups”). Sometimes, although the
target is a government building or police station, its location is such that
many civilians become collateral victims. Further, as we have explained
earlier, even carefully targeted killings that harm no civilians contribute to
a climate of fear and insecurity which in an indirect way adds to the intensity
of the violence. As noted by the Tribunal in AK (Afghanistan) at [207]:
“We bear
in mind, of course, that the targeted killing of particular types of civilians
is not only murderous but also contrary to international humanitarian law and
its occurrence degrades the security environment for ordinary civilians not in
the targeted categories: the effects of civilian deaths, however caused, on any
population may be extreme and long-lasting. Because targeted killing is one of
“the varieties of ways in which civilians come to harm” (to borrow from the
formulation in the Tribunal case of [HM1] [82]), it does indirectly
impact on risk to ordinary civilians. That is why it can never be right to
attempt some simple subtraction of targeted violence from the overall sum of
indiscriminate violence….”
293. At the same time, we
do not think that the increase in targeted violence is incapable of pointing
towards a diminution in the level of risk to civilians. The fact, for example,
that in 2011, according to Iraqi Government statistics of numbers killed, about
40% of Iraqis killed were ISF members, including 609 Iraqi police and 458
soldiers (UNHCIR 2012 Guidelines, p.15), does represent one indicator that
civilians are not suffering harm in the endemic way that was apparent in
2006/2007.
The situation
province-by-province
294. We have set out above the evidence
concerning the five central governorates. That evidence does not, in our view,
identify a level of violence in any of the governorates such as to cross the
Article 15(c) threshold. Civilian casualties are not the only indice of
relevance, but as a percentage of the respective populations of Baghdad and Kirkuk (see above [215]-[219]) we do not find the 2011 figures supplied by IAU of some 1,338
deaths in Baghdad and some 280 deaths in Kirkuk as indicative of the level of
intensity of indiscriminate violence envisaged by the CJEU as being
sufficiently high to engage Article 15(c) in relation to mere civilians.
295. In reaching this view
we have also borne in mind such matters as the number and range of incidents,
displacement and returns and the views of the experts and human rights
organisations. As an example, we note relevant evidence in respect of Tameen
and Baghdad, which the appellants say are two of the worst affected areas of Iraq. In Tameen governorate which has a population of around 1,395,000, there are an
average of 1.3 daily executed attacks in Kirkuk city. Displacement has
decreased considerably. Gradual returns are occurring and there has been a
significant reduction in roadside bombs and car bombs. In Baghdad governorate,
with a population of 6-7 million, there is an average of 6 daily executed
attacks. Nearly a third of those displaced have returned, the main reason for
returns being improved security in the area of origin.
We bear in mind Mr
Fordham’s contention that the fact that the ECtHR in recent cases (see above [
80] to [83]) has not found the level of violence in Iraq as a whole or Kirkuk to reach the Article 3 threshold is not conclusive as to the issue of risk of serious
harm under Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. We agree with him that
the latter has an additional scope: see Elgafaji [36] and AMM
[334]. However, our findings as regards the Article 15(c) situation in Iraq as a whole and in the 5 central governorates have been made on their own terms.
Enhanced risk categories
296. There is some
confusion over the term “enhanced risk categories”. The appellant’s original
skeleton argument, for example, equates them with what are generally understood
as risk categories (e.g. government officials and other officials associated
with the GoI as set out in UNHCR’s 2012 Eligibility Guidelines in their
Introduction (see above [60]; whereas in the context of Article 15(c), what is
relevant in terms of the Elgafaji sliding scale is individual
characteristics and they are not necessarily limited in that way. Let us,
nevertheless, consider the proposed categories/characteristics advanced by the
appellants. Mr Fordham submits that even if we find that in the five
central governorates the level of indiscriminate violence is not such as to
place mere civilians at risk, we should find the picture changes once we factor
in everyone’s religious identity as a Sunni or Shi’a and/or their ethnic identity
as a Kurd and/or former Ba’ath Party connections.
Sunni/Shi’a
297. There is evidence
indicating that as well as targeting ISF and GoI employees, Sunni extremists
have targeted Shi’as. This is noted e.g. in the FCO letter dated 7 April, 2012
and in the 2012 UNHCR Guidelines but such incidents have not risen to the
extent that they demonstrate a real risk of serious harm to Shi’as in general.
We observe that although the May 2012 UNHCR Guidelines emphasise the harm
caused by the ethno-sectarian conflict between different communities,
especially that between Sunni and Shi’a, they do not state there is a need for
international refugee protection purely because a person is a Sunni or Shi’a
and we do not consider that the evidence shows that there is a real risk of
Article 15(c) harm arising solely because a person is a Sunni or Shi’a
civilian. And even where concern is expressed about both Sunnis and Shi’as
living in or returning to areas in which they would constitute a minority, the
substance of what UNHCR is saying is not that Sunni Arabs living in majority
Shi’a areas and Shi’a Arabs living in majority Sunni Arab areas “will”
be at Article 15(c) risk but simply that “they may be exposed to
targeted violence on account of their religious identity”. In our judgement the
other evidence relating to Sunnis and Shi’as reveals a similar picture. However,
whilst for the above reasons we find the evidence as a whole insufficient to
establish Sunni or Shi’a identity as in itself an “enhanced risk category”
under Article 15(c), we do accept that depending on the individual
circumstances, and in particular on their facing return to an area where their
Sunni or Shi’a brethren are in a minority, a person may be able to establish a
real risk of Article 15(c). (They may, of course, also be able to establish a
real risk of persecution under the Refugee Convention or of treatment contrary
to Article 3 of the ECHR).
298. We would add that in
coming to the above conclusion we have discounted Mr Fordham’s contention in
the appellants’ skeleton argument, that when UNHCR refers to particular
categories/profiles as at risk and to religious and ethnic minorities, this was
intended to embrace Sunnis or Shi’as.
Kurds
299. As regards Kurdish
ethnicity, we accept that discounting the 3.8 million Kurds in the KRG, there
are some 1.2 million Kurds in Iraq and that this number constitutes a
relatively small percentage of the population of central and southern Iraq, but
being one of the second largest ethnic groups in Iraq, comprising some 20% of
the population (concentrated mainly in Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul and Diyala),
Kurds are unsurprisingly not classed by UNHCR or other major international
bodies as a minority group in Iraq.
300. There is nothing in
the 2012 UNHCR Guidelines to suggest that Kurds per se are an enhanced risk
category. Some support is given to the notion of Kurds as an enhanced risk
category by Dr George who in his written report referred to Kurds in central
Iraq “remain[ing] at risk” [146]), and by Dr Fatah who in his report refers to
Kurds in Baghdad being “more vulnerable” ([179]) but in neither instance did
the experts seek to say that the number of attacks on Kurds were at significant
levels. According to Dr Fatah, the number of Kurds in Baghdad is around 100,000–150,000,
far fewer than previously. In Kirkuk, of course, Kurds are the largest ethnic
grouping.
Former Ba’athists
301. It was also suggested
in the written reports of the two experts that being a former Ba’athist or
member of his/her family would be sufficient to place one in an enhanced risk
category for Article 15(c) purposes. However, the evidence as a whole does not
indicate that such persons are at real risk of indiscriminate violence.
Rather, it indicates that whether former Ba’athists are targeted depends very
much on their individual circumstances. Family members of former Ba’athists do
not appear to be of concern as a group in their own right. As noted by UNHCR in
its 2012 Guidelines at p. 18, “[t]oday, members of the former Ba’ath Party or
the former regime’s armed forces or security and intelligence services are
reportedly no longer systematically singled out for attack by armed groups”,
although “[t]hey may still be targeted in individual cases”…”. Given that in
the wake of ongoing US troop withdrawal, thousands of people were arrested all
around Iraq in an operation launched by the security forces against members of
the banned Ba’ath Party (as noted by the OCHA report of February 2012 and by
the 2012 UNHCR Guidelines), persons who can establish that they themselves are
former members of the Ba’athist Party may be able to show they will face
targeting likely to qualify them either as refugees under Article 1A(2) or (if
not) as persons in need of international protection under Article 15(b) or
Article 15(c).
State protection
302. With reference to the
evidence relating to the extent of state failure (one of the further “metrics”
for assessing the level of indiscriminate violence) , it is clear that there
are significant shortcomings in the ability and sometimes the willingness of
the authorities in central and southern Iraq to protect their population. Iraq remains second in global indexes of failed states. At the same time, like the Tribunal
in HM1 at [211], we would observe that, this “metric” must be considered in the
context of the existing levels of physical violence and the related threats
they pose to the civilian population. The protection concerned is principally
about that which a state is able to afford its citizens in a time of war and
emergency; it is not principally about whether, for example, there is a
criminal justice system ensuring punishment of offenders. In this context we
observe that in terms of
the basic task of the Iraqi state in providing security, the evidence indicates
that the ISF is widely acknowledged as increasingly capable and united
notwithstanding problems of corruption and infiltration by militants and
political disunity. Bearing in mind that there is still a state of armed
conflict in Iraq and that the situation is not one in which the state is
required by international human rights law to guarantee all human rights
(derogable as well as non-derogable), we consider that despite serious
shortcomings the state authorities have been able to keep the level of
indiscriminate violence significantly below what it was in 2006 and 2007. So
far as concerns the significance of this “metric” in the context of Iraq, we note that it is not one upon which the appellants sought to rely to any
significant extent.
Socio-economic conditions
303. We noted earlier
evidence describing Iraq’s socio-economic conditions as poor. At the same time,
we identified sources referring to growing signs that economic conditions are
improving and that reconstruction is taking place. The January 2011 Inspector
General Report noted that the growth rate of Iraq’s GDP has surged from a
reported 2.6% in 2010 to 11.5% in 2011 and 11% in 2012, “placing Iraq amongst the world’s fastest growing economies”. At the hearing both experts accepted
that despite the ongoing violence there was no evidence to show that in general
people in Iraq faced food shortages or were prevented from going to work or
school or obtaining access to medical treatment, although roadblocks and
checkpoints in certain areas caused practical problems such as traffic
congestion. It has also to be borne in mind that there are numerous
international NGOs active in Iraq working in conjunction with state agencies
and/or “CSOs” (Civil Society Organisations) and that in 2011 alone the US
government provided more than 225 million dollars in humanitarian assistance:
see above [157]-[159].
304. In the context of
asylum-related appeals we must also bear in mind the evidence that UK returnees to Iraq have available return and reintegration assistance packages. Albeit designed to
meet the short-term problems of return the effect of such packages is to enable
returnees to start from a better position to those IDPs and others trapped
below the poverty line, who live on less than US $2 a day.
305. In any event, as
regards the situation of IDPs, whilst in Dr Fatah’s words, life for many IDPs
is “harsh”, it is clear that there is no humanitarian crisis and that even if
there are continuing difficulties of access, there are various sources of
assistance, e.g. assistance centres and mobile units and various other agencies
offering help with shelter, jobs and access to essential services. According
to the IOM, 58% of IOM-assessed IDPs live in rented homes and only about 15%
live in collective settlements, public buildings or camps. UNHCR is right to
highlight that the IDPs, returnees and squatters who live in the settlements
often face overcrowding and lack sanitation services, drinkable water and
electricity as well as the threat of eviction and secondary displacement, but
partly because of the assistance provided by agencies such as UNHCR it cannot
be said that such persons live in conditions that are at the level of serious
harm or ill treatment. Further, whilst regard to socio-economic conditions is a
relevant consideration to assessment of Article 15(c) violence, it is hard to
see that such conditions significantly affect the intensity of the level of
violence.
Returnees from the west
306. In his written report
at [155-6], Dr George referred to a 9 June 2004 Report by the UN High
Commission for Human Rights and a July 2009 Report by the Danish Immigration
Service, stating that Iraqis who return from western countries may well be
exposed to dangers in relation to kidnapping because they are perceived as
being financially privileged ([232]). Dr Fatah did not identify such Iraqis as
being generally at risk but considered that time spent in the west could make
the three appellants a target of extremist groups ([338]). We bear in mind that
both experts accepted that their references to such persons being at risk did
not necessarily mean anything more than possible risk. We are confident that if
there was any significant occurrence of harm to such persons it would have come
to the attention of relevant NGOs who would have been able to document it,
whereas there are virtually no documented cases. In our judgement the evidence
on risk to returnees from the West really does no more than establish a
possible or remote risk. It does not establish a real risk or a reasonable
degree of likelihood that returnees will face serious harm or ill treatment
Position in Europe
307. We have set out at [77-8]
the state of the information we had regarding the approach to enforced returns
of Iraqi failed asylum seekers taken by other European countries. Whilst this
confirms that apart from the UK there are five other European countries which
undertake forcible returns to Iraq, it does not specify what the approach or
procedures are in other European countries.
308. We know that the
courts of at least one Member State, Belgium, have considered the Article
15(c) threshold to be met at least in one part of Iraq: see above [78]. The
appellants have cited a June 2010 judgment of the (First Instance) Finnish Administrative Court appearing to find that the Article 15(c) threshold was met in Iraq, which was upheld by the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court in December 2010. It is
unclear from the decision whether the specific facts of the case may have
influenced the decision, nor is it clear what materials by way of COI the First-instance Court had before it. Further, and in any event, whatever has been decided
previously by governments/courts or tribunals in other Member States, we have
to decide what the position is in Iraq now on the basis of the very
comprehensive body of evidence before us.
309. We noted earlier ([79])
that there is a case pending before the ECtHR in Strasbourg, YA v UK, App.No. 65580/10, lodged on 10 November 2010 stayed to await the outcome of the HM
cases. We do not understand the Court to have said anything in its proceedings
so far to indicate what its view is of the substance of the case in relation to
Article 3 of the ECHR and, as we have seen, it has not seen the fact that this
case is pending as preventing them from expressly finding that the situation in
Iraq generally or Kirkuk in particular does not meet the Article 3 threshold.
Documentation relating to
returns
310. Earlier we noted
evidence that the Iraqi authorities will now accept as sufficient
documentation to permit admission to Iraq either (i) a passport; (ii) an
expired passport; or (iii) a laissez passer document, albeit the last-mentioned
is currently only accepted in respect of voluntary returnees. It would appear
that with the replacement of the old system based on EU letters there have not
been any detentions of returnees from the UK upon arrival in Iraq, since the new system ensures stronger evidence linking nationality and identity.
311. In response to
questions from the Tribunal, Mr Staker confirmed that if a returnee does not
possess either of the first two aforementioned forms of documentation, he will
not be the subject of an enforced or compulsory return. That was confirmed in
subsequent submissions. Mr Staker points out that a person who refuses to
co-operate with the UK authorities in obtaining such documentation may be
committing a criminal offence. That may be so, but for our purposes all that
is relevant is whether if returned to Iraq with one of these forms of
documentation an individual would be at risk of serious harm or ill-treatment.
Absent any basis for considering that one of the three aforementioned forms of documentation
would not be made available if the individual co-operated (e.g. where a country
of origin refuses to document certain of its residents), it cannot be said that
such persons are at real risk on return of persecution, serious harm or
ill-treatment.
312. On 3 July 2012 the
Guardian reported that the Iraqi Parliament has passed a motion banning the
forced return of failed asylum seekers. Mr Staker makes the point in his Reply
that there is no indication in the article that the “ban” is in any way binding
on the Iraqi authorities. The Secretary of State had received no notification
from the Iraqi authorities of any change in their policy on the return of
failed asylum seekers, and she intended to continue to return such people who
met the documentary requirements outlined above. The appellants say it is for
the Secretary of State to provide information to the Tribunal as to the
operational impact of the Iraqi Parliament vote, rather than awaiting the
notification referred to.
313. It is unclear to us precisely
what is the effect of what appears to be a motion by the (or a part of) the
Iraqi legislature. A letter of 4 October 2012 from the First Secretary (Policy
and Projects) of the British Embassy, Baghdad, writes, inter alia, that the
motion is non-binding, and that documented returns can continue. We note that
according to the COIS report of August, 2011 at [6.03], even in respect of
legislation, the Iraqi executive through the President or Vice Presidents can
veto it and such a veto can only be overridden by a three-fifths majority of
the Parliament. Taking the evidence as a whole, we conclude that the motion
does not prevent documented returns. (Moreover, if despite current indications
this motion for a ban were to become law, then the Secretary of State would
plainly need to modify her returns policy in response.)
Risk on return at BIAP
314. In HMI the
Tribunal had to address the issue of whether the evidence relating to charter
flight returnees on 9 and 16 June 2010 demonstrated that there was a real risk
of Article 3 ill-treatment on return at BIAP. HMI decided that such
evidence failed to establish such a risk largely because of a lack of
supporting evidence coupled with the difficulties in accepting the claims made
by several Iraqis on these flights in the light of their apparent lack of
credibility about certain other matters.
315. In relation to the
June charter flights we now
have significantly more detailed evidence than was available to the panel in HM1.
This helps us in a number of ways. First it makes very clear that although BIAP
itself does not have a detention facility, there is a police station some few
kilometres away which BIAP officials have used in the past in order to
undertake further inquiries of certain categories of returnees and is widely
referred to in background evidence as the “BIAP police station”. Second, it
also makes clear that a significant number of returnees on the 9 and 16 June 2010
charter flights were kept in this detention facility. Third, there is a dearth
of independent evidence as to the precise conditions at this detention
facility. Neither party as we understand it disputes these three points.
316. It is also apparent to
us that the various accounts of adverse conditions in this police station
during the June 2010 returns before us, although based solely on what informants
have told them, are nevertheless ones given at different times to different
persons or bodies which broadly concur in what they describe about the physical
conditions of detention. In addition to the accounts given to Ms Sicher, Mr
McLoughlin and Dr Fatah, the account of RJH to UNHCR in respect of the June 16
flight adds further corroboration. Mark Walker’s statement confirms duration
of 7 days’ detention for 10 KRG returnees on the 9 June flight, and 11 days’
detention in the case of 12 KRG returnees on the 16 June flight. The fact that
a PSU inquiry found insufficient evidence to substantiate claims of
mistreatment by UK officials on the 16 June flight does not demonstrate that
the detainees from that flight and the June 10 flight were untruthful in their
accounts of the conditions of detention at this police station near BIAP. The
inquiries made by UKBA’s Migration Delivery Officer (MDO) in Baghdad are
essentially inconclusive. We see force in Mr Fordham’s submission that the
absence of any reference to detention conditions at the airport in the May 2012
UNHCR Guidelines is not significant, as that report is concerned with Iraq in mid-2012, not in 2010 and in any event we would be cautious of treating such
omission as necessarily considered omission.
317. We accept therefore that up to a dozen or so
people from the 9 June flight were detained for some 7 days in a room of some 4
metres x 4 metres and fed once daily and had to sleep on the floor. As regards
the June 16 flight, 30 or so people appear to have been detained for some 10-11
days in one room, and had to pay for food and water. There is a conflict in
the evidence as to whether they were ill-treated by Iraqi officials (cf the
evidence of RM and SA to Dr Fatah) but agreement that those detained had to
sleep on the floor and that there were inadequate toilet and washing
facilities.
318. Taking stock of this
evidence we note first of all (and again) that it is considerably more than was
before the Tribunal in HM1. Nevertheless, we bear in mind: (i) that we
have not seen any response from the Iraqi authorities to such allegations; (ii)
the country guidance issue we have to decide are concerned with the current
position, not the 2010 position; and (iii) that we are being asked to consider
conditions in detention without either party having assisted us in detail with
the numerous Strasbourg cases dealing with detention conditions: see e.g. Babar
Ahmad and Others v UK, App.no. 24027/07 [2012] ECHR 609, paras 166-179.
Given these considerations, we are cautious of attempting any definitive
findings. In relation to the main case on which Mr Fordham seeks to rely, MSS
v Belgium and Greece [2011] 53 EHRR 2 and the cases it cites at [222], they
only deal with the detention of asylum seekers by European states, not
detention on return to the country of origin. In MSS there were a number
of detainees who had to sleep on the floor; there was no access to the water
fountain outside, and detainees were obliged to drink water from the toilet; in
the sector for arrested persons there were 195 detainees in a 110 sq.metre
space; in a number of cells there was only one bed for 14-17 people; there was
a lack of sufficient ventilation; the cells were unbearably hot and access to
the toilets was severely restricted; there was no soap or toilet paper and
sanitary and other facilities were dirty. The Court attached some significance
to the fact that the applicants were asylum seekers and hence particularly
vulnerable. There were also complaints that the detainees were subjected to
insults, including racist insults and of the use of violence by guards.
319. Against this
background, all we would venture to say on the historic issue of the accepted
detention by the Iraqi authorities of a number of persons returned by the UK on
the June 2010 charter flights is that we consider that the evidence as to the
likely duration of the detentions (up to 7 days on 10 June and 10-11 days on 16
June), the overcrowding and the lack of basic toilet and washing facilities
indicates that it is possible that the Iraqi authorities may have violated the
Article 3 rights of the returnees concerned.
320. As regards the 6 September 2010 flight,
there are detailed witness statements from two persons both of whom describe
ill-treatment in unpleasant conditions on return for a number of days. Again,
in view of its close resemblance to the conditions described by those detained
in June 2010, we consider the evidence about them also points to the
possibility that the Iraqi authorities may also have breached their Article 3
rights.
321. As to whether the procedures now in place are
significantly different, we do not have full evidence and what we have is not
all one way. In his supplementary report of 26 March 2012 Dr George’s contact stated
that in respect of one year ago general conditions in the detention facilities
were very poor. In a 3 November 2011 memorandum UNHCR states that persons who
enter BIAP “will be held at the BIAP police station until their identity is
established.” The same UNHCR memorandum states that “UNHCR and implementing
police staff have been monitoring the arrival of deportee flights at BIAP since
early 2010. This has greatly enhanced the agencies’ ability to monitor and
interview deportees, enabling the provision of legal advice, assistance and
referrals”. UNHCR adds that deportees reported that checking procedures could
sometimes continue overnight and that facilities were not adequate.
322. However, neither of
these sources identifies ill treatment and that is consistent with much of the
other evidence. In this regard we note that a number of sources, including
UNHCR, have confirmed more recently that there have been no reports of
ill-treatment by the authorities at BIAP: see UNHCR’s response to an inquiry
regarding returnees/deportees: documentation, assistance and conditions at
BIAP, interviews between British Embassy, Baghdad, officials and the head of
the Iraqi Parliamentary Human Rights Committee and the Iraqi Al-Amal Associates
in September 2011. This is in addition to 2012 confirmation from both the Iraqi
Ministry of Displacement and Migration and IOM that no mistreatment of
returnees is occurring. The respondent notes that she made specific inquiries
of the 17 participating states of the Intergovernmental Consultations on
Migration, Asylum and Refugees whether any of them were accused of allegations
of ill-treatment on return at the airport in Baghdad. All confirmed they were
not aware of any such allegations.
323. We accept that the
focus of this evidence concerns conditions at BIAP, but we have considerable
doubts that these sources would have been unaware that there was a nearby
police station which was used as a detention facility and would not have made
mention of this facility being inadequate if it was.
324. At the same time, we
recognise that in view of the limited and conflicting nature of the evidence we
have about the post-2010 Iraqi procedures, we cannot make any firm findings. We
can only observe that (i) we think it possible that there may well have been adverse
detention procedures in use in June 2010 and September 2010 in the context of
charter flight returns to Iraq from the UK; and that (ii) it remains unclear,
however, whether any returnees seen by the Iraqi authorities to require
detention following arrival at BIAP would today face similar conditions. In
such circumstances, it seems to us that if the Secretary of State were to
revert to her earlier returns policy (which we have found may possibly have led
to some returnees in 2010 being detained in adverse conditions), then it would
be incumbent on her to demonstrate that Iraqi BIAP procedures making use of
detention would not result in adverse treatment contrary to Article 3.
325. But all this is, and
is likely to continue to be, academic since, in light of the evidence from the
respondent relating to new procedures in force since October 2011 regarding
minimum acceptable documents – there is no real risk (except possibly in
respect of those who are the subject of a judicial order or arrest warrant)
that an Iraqi national who has failed to show he is in need of international
protection and who faces compulsory return would face detention either at the
police station used by BIAP or anywhere else, since in effect they would have
been pre-cleared and/or because they are in possession of a current or expired
Iraqi passport or (if a voluntary returnee) a laissez passer document and so
would be allowed to proceed from the airport without any detention. Of course,
it is implicit in the Secretary of State’s position that for so long as Iraqi
asylum seekers who have failed in their international protection claims lack
relevant documentation they will not be the subject of any attempts to enforce
their removal; but we remind ourselves that such a scenario does not make their
removal contrary to either the Refugee Convention or the Human Rights
Convention: see e.g. MS (Palestinian Territories) [2009] EWCA Civ 17,
[30]; CG (suspension of removal-lawfulness-proportionality) Zimbabwe [2010] UKUT 272, SC (Article 8 – in accordance with the law) Zimbabwe [2012]
00056 (IAC). Whilst our Article 3 ECHR assessment must consider the
consequences of removal on a hypothetical basis, that must have regard to the
realities of the procedures relating to documentation.
Returns to Erbil
326. Since Mr Staker
confirmed to us that it is the intention of the Secretary of State to return
each of the appellants in this case to BIAP, it is not strictly necessary for
us in determining their appeals to deal with the issue of whether there is not
now another option open to Iraqis faced with rejection of their asylum-related
appeals, especially since Erbil is even now not proposed as a route available
for compulsory (enforced) returns.
Safety of internal travel
327. In MK the
Tribunal did not find the road between Baghdad and Kirkuk to be generally
unsafe (see [94]). The respondent produced a number of documents including a
letter from the FCO of 7 June 2010, a number of items from Iraq Business News
and an IOM publication “Returning to Iraq” indicating that travel throughout Iraq by road, air or rail is generally safe. In opposition to this the appellants have
sought in further submissions to argue that there is evidence, in particular in
the UNHCR Guidelines, to show that travel within certain parts of Iraq is unsafe. Earlier we quoted at length from what is said in the 2012 UNHCR Guidelines
about this subject. We would make two observations about the relevant passages
in the Guidelines and the evidence to which they refer. First, they does not
say in terms that the dangers of travel by road within central and southern
Iraq are insuperable; it is noted for example that travel is more dangerous at
night, travelling is more dangerous prior to or during religious festivities,
travelling near official government or military/police convoys is said to
increase the level of danger. And in relation to roads between the KRG and
central Iraq, it is only in respect of routes through the countryside that it
is said to be “nearly impossible for persons to cross into the three northern
governorates without danger”. They go on to say without comment that
”[t]herefore, entry through the major roads and their checkpoints is,
practically, the only option available to most Iraqis seeking to enter the
Kurdistan Region”. Second, it is not suggested that the same dangers affect
travel by air from BIAP and it is also said that “[t]ravelling from Baghdad or Basrah to Erbil or Sulaymaniyah by air is considered fairly safe and there have
been no recent security incidents involving civilian aircraft”. The thrust of
the evidence is therefore that if due caution is exercised the main highways in
Iraq can be travelled on in relative safety and that people are travelling
freely around Iraq.
Documentation and access
to services
328. We set out below at [330]
a summary of the guidance given by the Tribunal in MK relating to
documentation and access to services and our consideration of whether it needs
modification.
329. In short, the most
important document is the CSIS, as it is a gateway to obtaining other
significant documents such as the INC and the PDS. There are various
procedures which make it practicable for persons to replace a lost CSIS without
necessarily having to travel to their home area to get it.
The future situation
330. Both experts gave
their views on the likely future situation. We, of course, are only concerned
with the current situation but must make a prospective assessment of risk. There
are many different views on how events will unfold in Iraq. The CSIS Report, the Real Outcome of the Iraq War, 8 March 2010 considers that whilst “there
is no one scenario that is probable”, the most likely scenario as one of lower
levels of continued sectarian and ethnic rivalry without going back to the
civil war of 2005-2006. Dr Fatah, by contrast, said he fears an Arab-Kurd
civil war. Reports reveal that there are fears by Iraqis of increased
terrorism and economic deterioration. The May 2012 UNHCR Guidelines at p.61
cite the view of Elizabeth O’Bagay of the Institute for the Study of War, 2
February 2012, that “[p]olitics in Iraq remain paralyzed as deliberations among
Iraqi political factions and parties continue to falter, despite a promising
sign with Iraqivya’s return to parliament. This backdrop has set the stage for
armed conflict and the likelihood of sectarian war”.
331. We recognise that the
future in Iraq remains subject to many uncertainties. We agree with UNHCR that
the security situation remains unpredictable and that it is too early to gauge
whether the GoI can overcome the challenges posed by the full withdrawal of US
forces, the ongoing power-struggles between Shi’as and Sunnis and the lack of
settlement over disputed territories. We also acknowledge that the two experts
in this case, Dr George and Dr Fatah, are not alone in fearing that there is a
real potential for new conflicts to break out, particularly between Arabs and
Kurds. However, we consider that so far as Article 15(c) is concerned the most
likely development is that the levels of violence will either continue to
reduce or remain at around the same level as in 2010, 2011 and the first 9
months of 2012. As stated by UNHCR in both its 2009 and 2012 Guidelines, it is
likely that “a persistent, low-level conflict” will continue to kill civilians
at a similar rate for years to come (“an impassable minimum”). This comports
with the CSIS Assessment in March 2012, “The Outcome of Invasion: US and
Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq”, which (echoing the 2010 report) considers
that although there are scenarios which involve increased violence, [t]he more
likely scenario is one of lower levels of continued sectarian and ethnic
rivalry struggle without going back to the civil war of 2005-2008”. Whilst
incidents in January-September 2012 demonstrate that insurgents still have the
will and capability to launch multi large-scale bombings resulting in high
numbers of civilian deaths, the evidence continues to indicate that their
capability to carry out such attacks is diminished.
Internal Relocation
332. We remind ourselves
that in order for there to be a viable place of internal relocation
decision-makers are required to be satisfied that it is both safe (i.e., in the
context of Article 15 of the Qualification Directive, that there is no
continuing real risk of serious harm) and reasonable in all the circumstances:
see Article 8 of the same Directive. We also remind ourselves that in its May 2012
Eligibility Guidelines UNHCR at p.52 summarised its position in its
Introduction (see above [60]) as being that it “considers that internal flight
options are often not available in Iraq due to serious risks faced by Iraqis
throughout the country, including threats to safety and security, accessibility
problems and lack of livelihood opportunities.”
MK and internal relocation within the KRG
333. In considering the
possibility of internal relocation, we have the recent determination in MK.
We must follow that decision unless there is fresh evidence which can challenge
in any way its conclusions. It is to be noted that Drs George and Fatah
produced reports generally discounting internal relocation as a viable option
which were summarised in annexes to the MK determination and that their
reports for this hearing cover much the same ground. Both in its 2009
Guidelines and its May 2012 Guidelines, the UNCHR has also urged caution in
relation to the availability of internal relocation. However, we consider that
the salient difficulties said to affect relocation were considered by the
Tribunal in MK and we would cite first [87] of the determination:
“87. We
bear in mind Dr Fatah’s warning, set out at paragraph 77 above, concerning the
difficulty of a broad approach to the issue of relocation to/within the GoI governorates.
We note the bureaucratic nature of the registration processes which, as Mr
Hussain points out in paragraph 58 of his closing submissions, seem
increasingly aligned with those in the KRG. The very significant numbers of
IDPs (estimated by the IDMC in March 2010 at 2.8 million) face the kind of
difficulties we have set out above, and it may be (IDM May 2009) that IDPs are
not being registered in all governorates. However, the types of difficulty we
have identified are not such, in our view, as either to entail that there is no
internal flight alternative in Iraq, or that relocation is, in general,
unreasonable. The levels of support that we have identified, from the UNHCR
and the Iraqi government in particular, including the fact that two-thirds of
IDPs appear to have PDS cards valid in their governorate of residence, support
us in this view. Where an IDP is unregistered, and hence is unlikely to have a
PDS card, and is unable to access family, governmental or NGO support, it may
be that relocation would be unreasonable, in particular, of course, if they
faced a real risk of significant harm in their home area and could not
therefore be expected to return there to renew their PDS card. The particular
circumstances of a returnee may therefore be such as to make relocation
unreasonable.”
We would next remind ourselves of the
Tribunal’s country guidance at [88] (reproduced word for word in the headnote)
which we have already set out above at [245].
335. In his skeleton
produced after seeing the determination in MK, Mr Fordham sought to
challenge the conclusions and to draw attention to what he submitted were
cogent reasons for doubting the general applicability of internal relocation.
He accepted at the hearing that he was not able to challenge the conclusions
reached in MK unless he could identify cogent fresh evidence or show
that there had been a failure to have regard to existing material.
336. We consider first Mr
Fordham’s argument that there is an ambiguity in the guidance in MK as
to whether the statement that a Kurd would not need a sponsor applied to entry
only or also to registration. If one turns to the section of MK dealing
with this issue, it can be seen from [54] that the Danish mission in March 2010
was told that any Iraqi national with an Iraqi ID was free to enter the KRG and
free to reside there after registration at a local Asayish office. The point
was made by both Dr Fatah and Dr George in evidence in MK that there was
no consistent policy across the KRG borders and there were also inconsistencies
between different governorates and different checkpoints. Dr Fatah, as
recorded at [53] of MK, said that families and individuals wishing to
live in the KRG were required to provide a sponsor. The general tenor of Dr George’s
evidence seems to have been that, depending on the checkpoint, where a person
seeks an information card they may be asked to have a sponsor present or to
provide a letter from the sponsor, notarised by a court. We take this from [47]
of MK. The Tribunal concluded at [57], as summarised at [88], that a
Kurd wishing to enter the KRG would not need a sponsor or guarantor, although
an Arab might.
337. If there is an
ambiguity, then we consider it lies in Dr Fatah’s evidence in MK. On
the one hand, he is recorded at [53] as saying that Kurds did not need a
guarantor and later on in that paragraph as saying that families and
individuals wishing to live in the KRG were still being required to provide a
sponsor. The Danish mission was clear that any Iraqi national with an Iraqi ID
was free to enter the KRG and to reside there. In the circumstances, drawing
this evidence together as the Tribunal did at [57], we consider that the
conclusion that any Kurd wishing to enter the KRG would not require a guarantor/sponsor
although an Arab might was on the one hand clearly open to the Tribunal, and on
the other hand may properly be said to be a finding covering both entry and
residence.
338. In any event, it is
appropriate to go on and consider the evidence that was not before the Tribunal
in MK to see if the position can be said to be any different from that
as concluded in MK. The principal reports are: the Joint Finnish-Swiss
Fact Finding Mission to Amman and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) Area,
May 10-22, 2011 dated 1 February 2012 (the Finnish/Swiss report); the, Joint
Report of the Danish Immigration Service/UKBA Fact Finding Mission to Erbil and
Dahuk, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), conducted 11-22 November 2011 (the
Danish/UK report); and the 2012 UNHCR Guidelines.
339. At [1.02] of the
Danish/UKBA report, the director of an international NGO in Erbil is quoted as
saying that all Arabs, irrespective of ethnic origin or religious orientation,
are free to enter the KRG through the external checkpoints by presenting their
Iraqi civil ID card, and said that there were thousands of persons of Arab
origin living in the KRG, many living with their families, whilst others had
come there to work, including individuals. At [1.08] of the report, the Director
of the Bureau of Migration and Displacement (BMD) of the Ministry of the
Interior of Erbil, explained that at present there were approximately 40,000
IDP families from southern and central Iraq and the disputed areas residing in
all three of the northern governorates. The Director went on, as recorded at [1.09],
to remark that the economic impact of the influx of IDPs on the KRG had been
significant and that this indicated that many IDPs were wealthy. He referred
also to the fact that there were middle class people, skilled workers and
labourers looking for unskilled jobs in the KRG. The Head of Private Bureau of
General Security (Asayish) said that people displaced by violence, i.e. IDPs,
continued to enter the KRG and mentioned that, for example, recently 80 people
from central Iraq and Mosul had come to the KRG for protection. According to
figures from the IOM publication “Review of displacement and return in Iraq” dated February 2011, as recorded at [1.13] of the report, in Erbil governorate 29.47% of the
IDP population was of Arab ethnicity. In Sulaymaniyah 70.80% of the IDP
population was of Arab ethnicity but in Dahuk only 3.90%.
340. As regards security
procedures, the head of the Asayish explained, as recorded at [2.04], that the
Asayish had good levels of cooperation with Iraqi intelligence and there were
two security lists in operation, the “black list” which included people who had
an arrest warrant outstanding for their detention, and a second list, the “stop
list”. It was said by the officer who had overall operational responsibility
for the Mosul/Erbil checkpoint that around 30 people per month were arrested.
This would seem to involve people who were on the black list, but if there was
only a suspicion that someone might be involved in criminal or terrorist
activities they would only be denied entry. These would be people on the “stop
list”. The head of the Asayish was recorded at [2.16] as saying that as
regards the documentation required to prove a person’s identity, this could include
the CSID or their passport, and it might be sufficient to provide only a
driving licence or similar document proving a person’s identity and Iraqi
citizenship, as the system is computerised and a person already on the database
will be logged with their photo and name recorded onto the system.
International organisation A and Harikar NGO (the UNHCR Protection Assistance
Partner in Dahuk) said that the only documentation needed at a KRG checkpoint
was the CSID. At [2.28] the General Manager of Kurdistan checkpoints in the
Kurdistan Regional Security Protection Agency Security General Directorate, KRG
Ministry of Interior Erbil, is quoted as saying that after a person had given
information about their identity to the Asayish they would undergo a second
procedure at the checkpoint to apply for the appropriate entry card and once
the relevant card had been issued they would be free to travel throughout the
KRG, including between the three KRG governorates, without being required to
show any further form of documentation. There is no reference there to the
requirement of a sponsor. Nor was there any reference by PAO (Public Aid
Organisation, the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Erbil) to any
requirement for a sponsor, in their evidence recorded at [2.31] of the report.
341. At [3.08] the head of
the Asayish is recorded as saying that the policy which required a person to
provide a reference at the KRG external checkpoint was abandoned about two or
three years previously, although there might still be some instances in which a
person was asked by the Asayish at the checkpoint to make a telephone call to
someone they knew, to verify their identity. This state of affairs was
effectively confirmed by the officer who had overall operational responsibility
for the checkpoint, during a tour of the Mosul/Erbil checkpoint. At [3.10] the
director of an international NGO in Erbil is recorded as saying that persons of
Arab origin do not need a [person to provide a] reference to be present at the
checkpoint. He and the Harikar NGO both noted that there was no requirement
for a reference to be present at a KRG checkpoint in order for an Iraqi from
outside the KRG to enter.
342. Following from what he
said as recorded at [3.08], the head of the Asayish is recorded at [4.01] as
explaining that individuals not from the KRI (i.e. KRG) might be asked by the
Asayish at the checkpoint to telephone an acquaintance in the KRG to verify
their identity. When asked if an individual not from the KRG and who knew no
one there would be able to pass through the KRG external checkpoint, he said
that this would depend on the individual and the circumstances in the case but
in some instances such a person would be viewed with suspicion, however such
cases were very rare. It was said that fewer than 30 people per month across
all the KRG external checkpoints in all three governorates might be denied
entry purely on the grounds that they were considered suspicious for some
reason. As regards the issue of differential treatment of people from
different ethnic or religious backgrounds, international organisation B said,
in respect of people without genuine identity documents, that a Kurd without
personal ID documents might be treated more sympathetically and permitted entry
because they would normally know someone in the KRG but that a person of Arabic
origin without genuine documents to identify themselves would not be permitted
entry. The officer with overall operational responsibility for the Mosul/Erbil
checkpoint said that the procedures applied at the entry checkpoints did not
discriminate against any ethnic group, and Arabs, Turkmen and Yazidis would be
treated no differently from Kurds seeking to enter the KRG.
343. The same officer is
quoted as completely rejecting the statement from UNHCR quoted in the Danish
2011 report, that Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds from the disputed areas would face
difficulties/rejection at KRG checkpoints. He pointed out that most of the new
houses being bought in the KRG were being purchased by Arabs and not Kurds and
that Arabs from Mosul were moving to the KRG not temporarily for work but also
to live. He also added that the vast majority of Iraqis passing through the
KRG checkpoints were Arabs. PAO said that people from the disputed areas who
were of Turkmen or Arab ethnicity would be questioned for a long time at the
KRG external checkpoints before they would be allowed to enter, because the
disputed areas were more suspicious of terrorism. That organisation also
remarked that there existed ethnic discrimination at a limited level, but it
was not systematic and they were aware that the KRG was trying its best to
change this. He gave the example of some managers of companies in the KRG who
were known to them as experiencing difficulties in attempting to bring skilled
labourers into the KRG from the GoI who would be required to bring all Iraqi
documentation and would still be questioned thoroughly. IOM Erbil stated that
they had never heard of discriminatory policies being applied at the KRG
checkpoints. The director of an international NGO in Erbil, as noted at [4.41],
remarked that Iraqis of Arab origin would normally be required to undergo
greater scrutiny than others, but the procedure was unproblematic and did not
require that a referee should be present at the checkpoint.
344. It seems to us from
this report that there is even less evidence pointing to a requirement for a
sponsor for anyone than was the case before the Tribunal in MK. Indeed,
on this evidence it would seem that in general nobody is required to have a
sponsor, certainly not a Kurd and only in uncommon circumstances an Arab.
345. We turn to the
Finnish/Swiss report. This confirms the inconsistency in guidelines on entry
practices between the three northern governorates and the absence of any
published instructions or regulations on entry procedures. There is reference
at page 59 to several NGOs and the UNHCR having surveyed IDPs at different
times concerning entry procedures to the KRG region at different checkpoints,
and, for example, it is said that the need for a sponsor/guarantor has
essentially ceased at a Dohak governorate entry checkpoint but that even at one
checkpoint congruency can lack at different times. This emerged from a meeting
with the Harikar NGO. At page 60 there is confirmation of the view set out
above that Arabs are screened more carefully than other passengers at the
checkpoints. It is said elsewhere on that page that anyone wishing to enter
the KRG area who does not originate from the region typically needs to know
someone there (a so-called sponsor/guarantor) or have a letter of reference
from an employer in the KRG area. It is said that a sponsor is needed if the
person wants to stay in the KRG area for more than ten days or wants to register
and seek residency in the region. It is also said subsequently that according
to several sources a sponsor/guarantor is often not needed nowadays. Instead,
the person wanting entry needs to have a reference from someone in the KRG
area. None of the above information is sourced, unlike the information in the
Danish/UKBA report. The UNHCR is quoted as being of the opinion that the
terminology has changed but the sponsor system is basically the same as
before. It is also said, according to what is described as “one source” that
there is a general policy of not issuing information cards to single Arab men
and women because of fears of terrorism by the authorities.
346. We have set out at [244]
the relevant views of the UNHCR in its 2012 Guidelines.
347. We do not think that
this evidence taken as a whole advances the position as set out in MK.
We prefer the Danish/UKBA report because it is very much more detailed and is
also sourced. Much of the information in the Finnish/Swiss report is not sourced
and it is very much briefer. We bear in mind, of course, what is said by UNHCR
about documentation and the KRG, in particular with regard to the sponsorship
issue, but that has to be seen in the light of the evidence as recorded in the
Danish/UKBA report, from Harikar and PAO, both UNHCR Protection Assistance
Partners.
348. Taking the evidence as
a whole, we consider that if anything, it tends to show that no-one needs a
sponsor, rather than, as was concluded in MK, that a Kurd will not and
an Arab may. By needing a sponsor we refer not only to entry but also to
residence in the KRG. However, since we accept that what we identify is a
trend in the evidence rather than a fixed conclusion, we do not propose to go
beyond the guidance in MK, and on this evidence we are confident that it
can properly be endorsed.
349. The next point in
respect of which Mr Fordham invited us to revisit the findings in MK is
that summarised at [82(2)(b)] of MK concerning the viability of living
conditions in the KRG for a person who has relocated there. It was concluded
that though there were difficulties, there were jobs and there was access to
free healthcare facilities, education, rented accommodated, and financial and
other support from UNHCR.
350. In his submissions, Mr
Fordham argued that, in the absence of registration of residence, life was
precarious in the KRG. He referred to [8.05] and [8.07] of the Danish/UKBA
report. There it was made clear that a person could not reside in the KRG
without obtaining an information card, and a person who stayed for less than a
month would only have to report to the nearest Asayish office and provide an
address where they were residing in the KRG. The Finnish/Swiss reporters were
told that an IDP without registration was at risk of refoulement to central Iraq.
351. With regard to food
rations, Mr Fordham quoted from the Iraq Thematic Country of Origin Information
Report of 4 April 2012 at [7.13] and [7.14] which, itself quoting from IRIN, in
a report of 21 February 2011 entitled “Iraq: Government Vows to Improve Food
Aid System” said that more than half of Iraq’s 29 million people depend on the
Public Distribution System (PDS), according to the Trade Ministry. Mr Fordham
quoted from Dr Fatah’s report where he said that anyone who did not originate
from the KRG could not transfer their food rations. Difficulties in this
regard were noted in the “Report of the representative of the Secretary General
on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Walter Kälin”, dated 16 February
2011. Mr Fordham also quoted from [7.25] of the Country of Origin Information
Report, noting that the Harikar NGO was quoted in the Danish/UKBA report as
stating that Kurds from the disputed areas would find it very difficult to
transfer their PDS cards and this was related to political factors regarding
the future of the disputed areas and whether they would become part of the
KRG. It was said that in the future, Arabs from southern and central Iraq or the disputed areas would need security clearance from the Asayish in order to have
their PDS cards transferred, and this procedure was lengthy and could take up
to two months.
352. The evidence in this
regard, therefore, does not go quite as far as Dr Fatah suggests. It would
seem that an Arab such as the third appellant would, subject to security
clearance, be able to get his PDS card transferred, though it could take up to
two months.
353. None of this evidence
takes matters any further than the position in MK. The Tribunal there
noted, for example, at [61] difficulties for Iraqis coming to the KRG to have
their PDS card transferred from their place of origin. It was also noted that
IDPs from outside the KRG could go back to the place where their PDS card was
valid in order to collect food rations every month. Clearly that would not be
possible for everyone, but the Tribunal went on to note the evidence concerning
access to housing and employment, free public health and schooling and the
financial support available from UNHCR by way of grants to people on
repatriation and other forms of support from the UNHCR’s Protection and
Assistance Centres.
Relocation to central and
southern Iraq
354. Mr Fordham also
referred to the issue of relocation to the Iraqi territory under GoI
authority. He referred to [83] of MK where it was said, among other
things, that a third of IDPs interviewed in late 2009 did not have a PDS card
valid in their governorate of residence and only 15% of those with one
reportedly received their full monthly entitlement. We do not think the
evidence summarised above in respect of relocation to central and southern Iraq takes matters materially further than was the position before the Tribunal in MK.
Like the Tribunal then, we accept that there may be cases where an unregistered
IDP with no PDS card and no family, governmental or NGO support could not
reasonably be expected to relocate. It will always be important to have regard
to individual circumstances. However, for the generality of Iraqis, despite
difficulties that may be experienced in respect of such matters as access to
health care, education and jobs, we consider that relocation within the central
and southern governorates is generally safe and reasonable.
355. We turn finally in
this context to the issue of documentation.
356. Again we do not see
any reason to depart from the guidance in MK save in one respect, set
out below. There is no fresh evidence in the reports of Dr George and Dr Fatah
going beyond what they said in their evidence to the Tribunal in MK. In
the Danish/UKBA report, international organisation B told the delegation that
the Bureau of Migration and Displacement was not known to be very active in
assisting people in need of personal documents. Public Aid Organisation (PAO)
(the UNHCR Protection Assistance partner in Erbil) said that they would provide
support to IDPs who needed to re-obtain missing documentation, dealing with
three to five cases of this kind per month. They said that the issue of
documentation amongst IDPs was not a common occurrence now compared to previous
years. IDPs in the KRG usually had their personal documentation. They also
said that due to the relative stabilisation in the security situation across
Iraq, people were more confident to return back to their place of origin for a
short period of time to acquire documentation and would even pay for people
such as taxi drivers to return on their behalf and through a power of attorney
obtain documentation for them. They said that in the majority of cases IDPs
would not be at risk of harm if they returned to their place of origin
temporarily.
357. In the British
Embassy, Baghdad letter of 7 April 2012, which stems from discussions between a
member of staff at the British Embassy in Baghdad, the MoDM, Quandil (a Swedish
humanitarian aid organisation and refugee actions representative in Iraq), the
Ministry of Interior, UNHCR and the International Rescue Committee, it was
confirmed by the MoDM and Quandil that it was rare for IDPs not to have and be
in possession of their ID cards. Quandil said that even if a family lost all
of their documents they could obtain copies from the Central Archives. The
letter goes on to say at [15] that the Civil Identity Records are retained on
microfiche in a central archive so that, for example, when the records in the
Civil Status Office in Basra were destroyed, copies were available on
microfiche in Baghdad. It is said that it is most unusual for personal or
civil records to go missing.
358. This evidence, if
anything, adds to what was said by the Tribunal in MK. At [40] the
Tribunal commented that there was nothing to show that it was, or perhaps ever
had been, the case that a central register in Baghdad had been kept. This
further evidence requires us to modify that position. Given the current state
of the evidence in this regard, we consider that we can add to the guidance in MK
by noting the existence of the Central Archive retaining civil identity records
on microfiche, providing a further way in which a person can identify themselves
and obtain a copy of their CSID, whether from abroad or within Iraq.
Conclusions:
General
359.
We should first make
clear our position as regards the substance of the guidance given in HM1.
As we made clear, we are to approach those appeals by considering all the
material now available, since we are two years on, and reaching a conclusion
based on all material. We have had the advantage of hearing the experts and
having their views tested in cross-examination and the benefit of detailed
submissions from counsel on both sides. To an extent we have now had time and
opportunity to consider whether what was a “pre-election forecast” has proved
to be appropriate. The Tribunal in HM1 considered all the material
before it. Mr Fordham in the Court of Appeal was in the end only able to show
a failure to consider 3 reports and one which had only came into existence less
than a month before the determination was promulgated. It follows that
essentially all relevant material was considered, but in the absence of the experts’
views and submissions on behalf of the appellants. Although our focus in this
decision is on the situation in Iraq now, we are satisfied that in HM1
the Tribunal reached country guidance conclusions which were correct.
360.
So far as concerns the
situation now our guidance is as follows:
A.
Law
a) The guidance as to the law relating to
Article 15(c) of the Refugee Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC given by the
Tribunal in HM and Others (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG [2010] UKUT 331 (IAC)
(“HM1”) at [62]-[78] is reaffirmed. Of particular importance is the
observation in HM1 that decision-makers ensure that following Elgafaji,
Case C-465/07 BAILI; [2009] EUECJ Case C-465/07 and QD (Iraq) [2009] EWCA Civ 620, in situations of armed conflict in which civilians are affected
by the fighting, the approach to assessment of the level of risk of
indiscriminate violence must be an inclusive one, subject only to the need for
there to be a sufficient causal nexus between the violence and the conflict.
b) Given that country guidance cases may
have an impact on a large number of asylum cases and appeals, their
significance in saving costs in future cases, quite apart from their general
importance, should require consideration of the grant of legal aid for representation
in the public interest.
c) Whilst the Upper Tribunal will do all it
can to ensure representation in a country guidance case, it cannot be excluded
that in highly unusual circumstances such a case would proceed without claimant
representation.
d) Though very considerable weight is almost
always to be attached to UNHCR guidelines on risk categories in particular
countries, it is not accepted that departure from the guidelines should only
take place for a cogent and identified reason. Cases are to be decided on the
basis of all the evidence and arguments presented to the Tribunal.
B. Country guidance
i. Whilst the focus of the present decision
is the current situation in Iraq, nothing in the further evidence now available
indicates that the conclusions that the Tribunal in HM1 reached about country
conditions in Iraq were wrong.
ii. As regards the current situation, the
evidence does not establish that the degree of indiscriminate violence
characterising the current armed conflict taking place in the five central
governorates in Iraq, namely Baghdad, Diyala, Tameen (Kirkuk), Ninewah, Salah
Al-Din, is at such a high level that substantial grounds have been shown for
believing that any civilian returned there would solely on account of his
presence there face a real risk of being subject to that threat.
iii. Nor does the evidence establish that
there is a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) for civilians who are
Sunni or Shi’a or Kurds or have former Ba’ath Party connections: these
characteristics do not in themselves amount to “enhanced risk categories” under
Article 15(c)’s “sliding scale” (see [39] of Elgafaji).
iv. Further evidence that has become
available since the Tribunal heard MK (documents - relocation) Iraq CG
[2012] UKUT 126 (IAC) does not warrant any departure from its conclusions on
internal relocation alternatives in the KRG or in central or southern Iraq save
that the evidence is now sufficient to establish the existence of a Central Archive
maintained by the Iraqi authorities retaining civil identity records on
microfiche, which provides a further way in which a person can identify
themselves and obtain a copy of their CSID, whether from abroad or within Iraq.
v. Regarding the issue of whether there
would be a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR arising from returns
from the UK to Baghdad International Airport (BIAP):
a). If a national of Iraq who has failed to
establish that conditions inside Iraq are unsafe is compulsorily returned to
Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) on either a current or expired Iraqi
passport, there is no real risk of detention in the course of BIAP procedures
(except possibly in respect of those who are the subject of a judicial order or
arrest warrant). Nor is there such a risk if such a person chooses to make a
voluntary return with a laissez passer document which can be issued by the
Iraqi embassy in the UK.
b). If, however, such a person is
compulsorily returned to BIAP without either a current or expired Iraqi
passport, he may be at risk of detention in the course of BIAP procedures and
it cannot be excluded that the detention conditions might give rise to a real
risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR. Such a risk is however, purely
academic in the UK context because under the current UK returns policy there
will be no compulsory return of persons lacking such documents.
THE APPELLANTS’ CASES
HM and RM
361. The backgrounds of HM
and RM are set out at [47]-[49] above. Neither has any documentation. In light
of our general findings above, we do not consider that either has made out a
claim for Article 15(c) protection, either on immediate return to Baghdad, in transit to Kirkuk or in Kirkuk itself. Neither their age nor sex nor Kurdish
ethnicity will give rise to a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c).
362. As to what would happen
to HM and RM at BIAP, we observe that the Secretary of State has made clear
that under her current returns policy there will be no enforced returns of
undocumented persons. Enforced returns are confined to those who have a current
or expired Iraqi passport. Currently, therefore, HM and RM do not stand to be
returned. In the meantime, of course, it is open to the appellants, if they
choose, to make a voluntary return with a
laissez passer document which can be issued by the Iraqi embassy in the UK. Were they to do that, then, again there would be no real risk of detention because the
evidence is clear that such persons are not detained on arrival.
363. Should HM or RM choose
to move to the KRG, whether on a temporary or permanent basis, we would
anticipate no difficulties beyond minor delays. Indeed, given that both were
originally resident there, we consider there may not even be any minor delays.
364. We consider that living
conditions for them either in the KRG or in central or southern Iraq would be safe and adequate for them and that relocation within any of these areas
would not be unreasonable. In this regard we bear in mind that they are
relatively young with no health difficulties.
HF
365. Mutatis mutandis, many
of the above conclusions are relevant to HF also, although as he has an Iraqi
ID card and driving licence currently held by the Secretary of State, we
consider that this documentation would enable him to obtain a CSID and a laissez
passer and to pass through BIAP controls without difficulty and be reunited
with his family members who include his mother, two sisters and an aunt in
Baghdad. We see no “enhanced risk factors” attaching to his Arab ethnicity or
his Sunni Muslim religious identity that would place him at risk in Baghdad or elsewhere in Iraq. The evidence does not establish any risk to him on account
of his deceased father’s links to the Ba’ath Party. If he chose to relocate to
the KRG or other parts of central or southern Iraq, we consider that would be both
safe, accessible and not unreasonable.
366. For the above reasons
we conclude:
That the decision of
the immigration judge in the case of HM and in the case of RM was wrong in law
and have been set aside. The decision we re-make is to dismiss their appeals;
That the decision of
the immigration judge in the case of HF was wrong in law and has been set
aside. The decision we re-make is to dismiss his appeal.
Signed
Mr Justice
Collins
APPENDIX
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE BEFORE THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on International
protection: "Internal Flight or relocation alternative" within the
context of Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol
relating to the status of refugees
|
23.07.2003
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Annotated Comments on the EC
Council Directive
|
29.04.2004
|
-
|
Hansard:
Removals and voluntary departures, by type, nationals of Iraq to Iraq, January 2004 to June 2011
|
14.07.2005
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Country of Origin Information, Iraq
|
10.2005
|
-
|
The
New York Times: To stay alive, Iraqis Change Their Names
|
05.09.2006
|
-
|
Institute
for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index: Methodology, Results and
Findings 2007
|
2007
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), Stories of Return
|
2007
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Strategy for the Iraq Situation
|
01.01.2007
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR issues latest Iraq advisory
|
09.01.2007
|
-
|
Brookings, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of
Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq
|
29.01.2007
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Iraq: A humanitarian operation that
will go on for years
|
02.02.2007
|
-
|
International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Civilians without Protection: The ever
worsening humanitarian crisis in Iraq
|
04.2007
|
-
|
UK
Border Agency COIS Reports, Operational Guidance Note v3: Iraq
|
12.02.2007
|
-
|
US
Department of State, Iraq Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2006,
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006: Iraq
|
06.03.2007
|
-
|
United
Nations (UN), The Report of the Secretary General on Iraq pursuant to para graph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004)
|
07.03.2007
|
-
|
Human
Rights Watch (HRW), Iraq: US Data on Civilian Casualties Raises Serious
Concerns
|
12.04.2007
|
-
|
International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)Humanitarian Needs
of Populations Displaced From Iraq
|
18.04.2007
|
-
|
International
Crisis Group (ICG), Iraq and the Kurds: Resolving the Kirkuk Crisis
|
19.04.2007
|
-
|
UN
Assistance Mission for Iraqi (UNAMI), Human Rights Report: 1 January - 31
March 2007
|
25.04.2007
|
-
|
UK Border Agency COIS Reports, Iraq COI Report April 2007
|
30.04.2007
|
-
|
United
Nations (UN), Humanitarian Briefing on the Crisis in Iraq
|
02.05.2007
|
-
|
United
Nations (UN), The Report of the Secretary General on Iraq pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004)
|
05.06.2007
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Iraq: Situation continues to worsen,
local governorates overwhelmed
|
05.06.2007
|
-
|
Freedom
House Freedom in the World 2007: Iraq
|
26.06.2007
|
-
|
Carnegie
Endowment, Iraq Four Years after the U.S.-Led Invasion: Assessing the Crisis
and Searching for a Way Forward
|
07.2007
|
-
|
Human
Rights Watch (HRW), Caught in the Whirlwind: Torture and Denial of Due
Process by the Kurdistan Security Forces
|
02.07.2007
|
-
|
US
Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2007: Iraq
|
09.2007
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Governorate Assessment Report Erbil Governorate
|
01.09.2007
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Governorate Assessment Report
Sulaymaniyah Governorate
|
01.09.2007
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Governorate Assessment Report Dahuk
Governorate
|
01.09.2007
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR's Eligibility Guidelines for
Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers
|
05.09.2007
|
-
|
United
Nations (UN), The Report of the Secretary General on Iraq - Report of the Secretary General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1770 (2007)
|
15.10.2007
|
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|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Iraq: Ability of IDPs to Transfer PDS
cards by governorate
|
11.2007
|
-
|
United
Nations (UN), Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq: Facts and Figures
|
13.11.2007
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR says time not right for
large-scale Iraq repatriation
|
23.11.2007
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Addendum to UNHCR's Eligibility
Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi
Asylum-Seekers
|
17.12.2007
|
-
|
Institute
for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index: Methodology, Results and
Findings 2008
|
2008
|
-
|
Iraq
Body Count (IBC), Civilian deaths from violence in 2007
|
01.01.2008
|
-
|
UK Border Agency COIS Reports, Iraq COI Report January 2008
|
08.01.2008
|
-
|
Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), The Patterns in Violence and
Casualties in Iraq 2007: The Need for Strategic Patience
|
08.01.2008
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM): Iraq Displacement 2007 – Year in Review
|
10.01.2008
|
-
|
United
Nations (UN), The Report of the Secretary General on Iraq pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1770 (2007)
|
14.01.2008
|
-
|
Brookings, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of
Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq
|
28.01.2008
|
-
|
IRIN:
Iraq: More relief aid needed in Mosul after blast
|
28.01.2008
|
-
|
Human
Rights Watch (HRW)World Report 2008: Iraq
|
31.01.2008
|
-
|
The
Independent: Sunni vs Shia: The real bloody Baghdad
|
05.02.2008
|
-
|
BBC
News: Assault looms in Iraq’s ‘worst place’
|
07.02.2008
|
-
|
International
Crisis Group (ICG)Civil War, The Sadrists and the Surge
|
07.02.2008
|
-
|
Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Violence in Iraq: Reaching an 'Irreducible Minimum'
|
25.02.2008
|
-
|
Iraq Updates: Civilian wounded in explosion in
Kirkuk
|
25.02.2008
|
-
|
Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion
and expression: Summary of cases transmitted to Governments and replies
received (Iraq excerpt)
|
25.02.2008
|
-
|
Iraq Updates: Police chief escapes attempt on
his life
|
28.02.2008
|
-
|
Iraq Updates: Unknown gunmen kidnap two
workers, trucker in Kirkuk
|
28.02.2008
|
-
|
International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Iraq: No Let Up in the Humanitarian Crisis
|
03.2008
|
-
|
International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Crossing the desert – the ICRC in Iraq: analysis of a humanitarian operation
|
03.2008
|
-
|
Iraq Updates: Parliament rapporteur blames
army for Kirkuk attack
|
01.03.2008
|
-
|
Iraq Updates: Kirkuk attack casualties up to
fourteen
|
01.03.2008
|
-
|
US
Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2007: Iraq
|
11.03.2008
|
-
|
UN
Assistance Mission for Iraqi (UNAMI), Human Rights Report: 1 July – 31
December 2007
|
15.03.2008
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM): Emergency Needs Assessments: Post-February
2006 displacement in Iraq, bi-weekly report
|
15.03.2008
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), Iraq: Five years on, more people
displaced than ever before
|
18.03.2008
|
-
|
International
Rescue Committee (IRC), 5 Years Later, a hidden crisis
|
20.03.2008
|
-
|
Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Human Rights Annual Report 2007: Iraq
|
25.03.2008
|
-
|
US
Department of State (USSD), US Department of State, Excerpt from
"Country Reports on Terrorism" 2007
|
04.2008
|
-
|
University of New South Wales, The Standard of Proof
in Complementary Protection Cases: Comparative Approaches in North America
and Europe
|
01.05.2008
|
-
|
Canadian
Immigration and Refugee Board, Responses to Information Requests
|
02.05.2008
|
-
|
UK Border Agency COIS Reports, Iraq COI Report May 2008
|
15.05.2008
|
-
|
Amnesty
International, Iraq: Amnesty International Report 2008
|
28.05.2008
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), Iraq displacement & return 2008
Mid-year review
|
6.2008
|
-
|
Amnesty
International, Rhetoric and reality: the Iraqi refugee crisis
|
15.06.2008
|
-
|
Brookings,
Ministry of Displacement (MoDM) and Migration, National Policy on
Displacement
|
07.2008
|
-
|
Freedom
House Freedom in the World 2008: Iraq
|
02.07.2008
|
-
|
United
Nations (UN), The Report of the Secretary General on Iraq pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1770 (2007)
|
28.07.2008
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), IOM Monitoring and Needs Assessments,
Assessments of Iraq Returns
|
08.2008
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), IOM Displacement Monitoring and Needs
Assessments, Tent Camp Assessment Report
|
08.2008
|
-
|
Brookings,
The Looming Crisis: Displacement and Security in Iraq
|
05.08.2008
|
-
|
UK Border Agency COIS Reports, Iraq COI Report August 2008
|
15.08.2008
|
-
|
US
Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2008: Iraq
|
19.09.2008
|
-
|
European
Legal Network on Asylum (ECRE and ELENA), The Impact of the EU Directive on
International Protection
|
01.10.2008
|
-
|
UK
Border Agency COIS Reports, Operational Guidance Note v4: Iraq
|
29.10.2008
|
-
|
Council
on Foreign Relations, Ansar Al-Islam (Iraq, Islamists/Kurdish Separatists),
Ansar Al-Sunnah
|
05.11.2008
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM): Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah Al-Din Governorate
Profiles Post-2006 IDP Needs Assessments December 2008
|
12.2008
|
-
|
UN
Assistance Mission for Iraqi (UNAMI), Human Rights Report: 1 January - 30
June 2008
|
02.12.2008
|
-
|
Wikileaks:
Abu Ghraib, A New Day
|
17.12.2008
|
-
|
Iraq
Body Count (IBC), Post-surge violence: its extent and nature
|
28.12.2008
|
-
|
Institute
for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index: Methodology, Results and
Findings 2009
|
2009
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Statement on Subsidiary
Protection under the EC Qualification Directive for People Threatened by
Indiscriminate Violence
|
01.2009
|
88.
|
Integrated
Regional News Service (IRIN), Iraqis want free food programme to continue,
finds survey
|
04.01.2009
|
-
|
UK Border Agency COIS Reports, Iraq COI Report January 2009
|
12.01.2009
|
-
|
Human
Rights Watch (HRW)World Report 2009: Iraq
|
14.01.2009
|
-
|
Brookings, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of
Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq
|
30.01.2009
|
-
|
Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Report of the Special
Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief: Summary of cases transmitted to
governments and replies received (Iraq excerpt)
|
16.02.2009
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), IOM Emergency Needs Assessments, Three
Years of Post-Samarra displacement in Iraq
|
22.02.2009
|
-
|
US
Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Iraq
|
25.02.2009
|
-
|
UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian
Update
|
03.2009
|
-
|
Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Report submitted by the
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders: Summary of
cases transmitted to Governments and replies received (Iraq excerpt)
|
04.03.2009
|
-
|
Amnesty
International, Challenging Repression: Human Rights Defenders in the Middle
East and North Africa
|
11.03.2009
|
-
|
Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Annual Report on Human Rights 2008 – Iraq
|
26.03.2009
|
-
|
UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian
Update
|
04.2009
|
- 1
|
Amnesty
International, Hope and Fear: Human Rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq
|
14.04.2009
|
- 1
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for
Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers
|
27.04.2009
|
- 1
|
UN
Assistance Mission for Iraqi (UNAMI), Human Rights Report 1 July – 31
December 2008
|
29.04.2009
|
- 1
|
US
Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008: Iraq
|
30.04.2009
|
- 1
|
Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Iraq: Trends in Violence and
Civilian Casualties: 2005-2009
|
05.05.2009
|
- 1
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR revises guidelines for Iraqi
asylum claims
|
05.05.2009
|
- 1
|
Jane's
Sentinel, Country Risk Assessment: “Infrastructure Iraq”
|
22.05.2009
|
- 1
|
Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion
and expression: Summary of cases transmitted to Governments and replies
received (Iraq excerpt)
|
27.05.2009
|
- 1
|
Amnesty
International, Iraq: Human Rights in Republic of Iraq: Amnesty International
Report 2009
|
28.05.2009
|
- 1
|
UNDP,
Overview of landmines and explosive remnants of war in Iraq
|
06.2009
|
- 1
|
Brookings,
Internal Displacement in Iraq: The Process of Working Toward Durable
Solutions
|
01.06.2009
|
111.
1
|
Journal of Humanitarian
Assistance, Counting excess civilian casualties of the Iraq War: Science or
Politics?
|
22.06.2009
|
- 1
|
Danish
Immigration Service, Security and Human Rights Issues in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), and South/Central Iraq (S/C Iraq)
|
07.2009
|
- 1
|
UK Border Agency COIS Reports, Iraq COI Report July 2009
|
10.07.2009
|
- 1
|
Freedom
House Freedom in the World 2009: Iraq
|
16.07.2009
|
- 1
|
International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Civilians without protection
|
08.2009
|
- 1
|
Inter
Agency Information & Analysis Unit (IAU Iraq), The Humanitarian Situation
in Iraq: Inter-Agency Factsheet
|
08.2009
|
- 1
|
International Committee of the Red Cross: Iraq: ongoing conflict claims hundreds of civilian lives every month
|
13.08.2009
|
- 1
|
Voice of America News: Baghdad Blasts Kill 95
|
19.08.2009
|
- 1
|
Human
Rights Watch (HRW), Iraq: Halt All Attacks on Civilians
|
23.08.2009
|
- 1
|
Voice of America New: Southern Iraq Blasts Kill 11
|
24.08.2009
|
- 1
|
Voice of America News: Explosions in Northern Iraq Claim More
Lives
|
29.08.2009
|
- 1
|
UK Border Agency COIS Reports, Casework
Instructions - Humanitarian Protecton Article 15 (c)
|
09.2010
|
- 1
|
Human
Rights Watch (HRW), UPR Submission
|
01.09.2009
|
- 1
|
Voice of America News: Government Says August Was Bloodiest
Month for Iraqis in Past Year
|
01.09.2009
|
-
|
Inter Press Service News Agency (IPS): Iraq: Stormy Times as U.S. Withdraws
|
05.09.2009
|
- 1
|
Voice of America News: Bombs across Iraq Kill 18
|
07.09.2009
|
- 1
|
Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Joint written statement
submitted by the Women's International Democratic Federation (Abuse and
Torture in Iraq)
|
07.09.2009
|
- 1
|
Voice of America News: Suicide Truck Bomb Kills 20 in Northern Iraq
|
10.09.2009
|
- 1
|
International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Operational Update – Iraq: ICRC Activities in August 2009
|
15.09.2009
|
- 1
|
UK Border Agency COIS Reports, Iraq COI Report September 2009
|
16.09.2009
|
- 1
|
UK Border Agency COIS Reports, Kurdistan
Regional Government Area of Iraq COI Report September 2009
|
16.09.2009
|
- 1
|
Human
Rights Watch (HRW), Iraq: Halt All Attacks on Civilians
|
23.08.2009
|
- 1
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Protection Monitoring Assessments
Summary, January – October 2009
|
10.2009
|
- 1
|
Voice of America News: Suicide Bomber Kills 6 at Iraqi
Funeral
|
05.10.2009
|
- 1
|
Inter
Agency Information & Analysis Unit (IAU Iraq)Fact Sheet: Housing &
Shelter in Iraq World Habitat Day
|
05.10.2009
|
- 1
|
HJT Research: Iraqi asylum seekers deported from the UK are sent back to Britain
|
16.10.2009
|
- 1
|
Voice of America News: At Least 15 Killed at Sunni Mosque in Iraq
|
16.10.2009
|
- 1
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Involuntary returns to Central Iraq contrary to UNHCR guidelines
|
23.10.2009
|
- 1
|
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Two Car Bombs Kill At Least
132 in Baghdad
|
25.10.2009
|
- 1
|
Voice of America News: Dual Baghdad Bombings Kill 155, Wound
500
|
26.10.2009
|
- 1
|
US
Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2009: Iraq
|
26.10.2009
|
- 1
|
Amnesty International: Latest killings of civilians in Baghdad a 'war crime'
|
26.10.2009
|
- 1
|
Voice of America News: At Least 8 Killed in Iraq Bombings
|
01.11.2009
|
- 1
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), Assessment of Return to Iraq
|
03.11.2009
|
- 1
|
International Organization for Migration (IOM): Displaced
Iraqis Face New Set of Challenges upon Return
|
03.11.2009
|
- 1
|
ISN
Security Watch: Baghdad divided
|
09.11.2009
|
- 1
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), Returning to Iraq: Country Information
|
10.11.2009
|
- 1
|
Ministry
of Transport: Armour Group undertake security for Ministry of Transport, Baghdad International Airport
|
12.11.2009
|
- 1
|
Voice of America News: Gunmen Kill 13 Villagers near Baghdad
|
16.11.2009
|
- 1
|
Voice of America News: Killings in Iraq Highlight Continuing
Security Concerns
|
16.11.2009
|
- 1
|
Brookings,
Resolving Iraqi Displacement: Humanitarian and Development Perspectives
|
18.11.2009
|
- 1
|
Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Universal Periodic Review
– Iraq: Summary of stakeholders' information
|
01.12.2009
|
- 1
|
Voice of America News: Car Bombs Kill Over 100, Wound More
than 400 in Baghdad
|
08.12.2009
|
-
|
UK Border Agency COIS Reports, Iraq COI Report December 2009
|
10.12.2009
|
- 1
|
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): UNHCR
reiterates concern about involuntary returns to Iraq amid violence
|
11.12.2009
|
- 1
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR reiterates concern about
involuntary returns to Iraq amid violence
|
11.12.2009
|
- 1
|
UN
Assistance Mission for Iraqi (UNAMI), Human Rights Report 1 January - 30 June
2009
|
14.12.2009
|
- 1
|
Voice of America News: Bombings in Baghdad, Mosul Kill 8;
Many Wounded
|
15.12.2009
|
- 1
|
Voice of America News: 20 Killed in Central Iraq Bomb Attacks
|
24.12.2009
|
- 1
|
Voice of America News: Violence in Iraq as Muslims,
Christians Mark Religious Holidays
|
25.12.2009
|
- 1
|
Congressional
Research Service, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
|
29.12.2009
|
- 1
|
Voice of America News: 23 Dead in Twin Bombings in Iraq's Anbar Province
|
30.12.2009
|
- 1
|
Iraq
Body Count (IBC), Civilian deaths from violence in 2009
|
31.12.2009
|
- 1
|
International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ICRC Annual Report 2010
|
2010
|
- 1
|
Institute
for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index: Methodology, Results and
Findings 2010
|
2010
|
- 1
|
RAND,
An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of Al-Qa’ida in Iraq
|
2010
|
- 1
|
Minority
Rights Group International, Report: Still Targeted: Continued Persecution of
Iraq’s Minorities
|
2010
|
- 1
|
UN
Assistance Mission for Iraqi (UNAMI), Human Rights Report, 1 July – 31
December 2009
|
2010
|
- 1
|
Ministry
of Planning, National Development Plan, 2010 – 2014
|
2010
|
- 1
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), IDP Programme Projects 2006-2010
|
2010
|
- 1
|
United
Nations (UN), Humanitarian Action Plan
|
2010
|
- 1
|
Iraq Body Count (IBC), Database
|
01.01.2010
to date
|
- 1
|
National
Counter-Terrorism Command, Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (database
source calendar - extracts up to Calendar Year 2011)
|
01.2010
- 31.12.2011
|
- 1
|
Institute for War and Peace Reporting (UK): Iraq: Fear Grips Anbar after Bombings
|
05.01.2010
|
- 1
|
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Bomb Attacks Kill Seven in Iraq
|
07.01.2010
|
- 1
|
Freedom
House Freedom in the World 2010: Iraq
|
21.01.2010
|
- 1
|
Human
Rights Watch (HRW)Country Summary
|
20.01.2010
|
- 1
|
Voice of America News: Three Suicide Bombers Attack Baghdad
Hotels, Killing 36 People
|
25.01.2010
|
- 1
|
Brookings, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of
Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq
|
26.01.2010
|
- 1
|
Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGR), Quarterly Report and
Semiannual Report to the United States Congress
|
30.01.2010
|
- 1
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), Governate Profile: Diyala
|
02.2010
|
- 1
|
International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), A tough road home: Uprooted Iraqis in Jordan, Syria and Iraq
|
02.2010
|
- 1
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), Governate Profile: Kirkuk
|
02.2010
|
- 1
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), IOM Mission in Iraq: Newsletter Volume II 2010
|
02.2010
|
- 1
|
United
Nations (UN), Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of
resolution 1883 (2009)
|
08.02.2010
|
- 1
|
Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), The Uncertain Security
Situation in Iraq: trends in violence, casualties and Iraqi perceptions
|
17.02.2010
|
- 1
|
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Sixteen Killed In Spate of
Attacks Across Iraq
|
22.02.2010
|
- 1
|
Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Returnees and IDPS face difficulties
in registration and obtaining documentation required (2005 – 2009)
|
25.02.2010
|
- 1
|
International
Crisis Group (ICG)Iraq’s Uncertain Future: Elections and Beyond
|
25.02.2010
|
- 1
|
Congressional
Research Service Iraq Casualties: US Military Forces and Iraqi Civilians,
Police and Security Forces
|
25.02.2010
|
- 1
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Iraq Operation Monthly
Statistical update on return - March 2010
|
03.2010
|
- 1
|
UNHCR,
Iraq Fact Sheet
|
03.2010
|
- 1
|
US
Department of Defence, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: March 2010 Report to Congress
|
03.2010
|
- 1
|
Voice of America News: Early Voting in Iraq Marred by Suicide Attacks
|
04.03.2010
|
- 1
|
Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) Iraq: Little new displacement but
around 2.8 million Iraqis remain internally displaced: A profile of the
internal displacement situation
|
04.03.2010
|
- 1
|
Compass Direct (USA): Violence Escalates in Mosul, Iraq ahead of Elections
|
05.03.2010
|
- 2
|
Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Iraq: Meeting the Challenges
of 2010
|
10.03.2010
|
- 2
|
US
Department of State, 2009 Human Rights Report: Iraq
|
11.03.2010
|
- 2
|
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Car Bomb Kills Seven in
Fallujah
|
15.03.2010
|
- 2
|
Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Human Rights Annual Report 2009 - Countries of
Concern: Iraq
|
17.03.2010
|
- 2
|
Danish
Immigration Service, Honour Crimes against Men in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and the Availability of Protection
|
23.03.2010
|
- 2
|
Iraq
Body Count (IBC), Iraq War Logs: What the numbers reveal
|
23.10.2010
|
- 2
|
Voice of America News: Violence Rocks Iraq Ahead of Vote Results
|
26.03.2010
|
- 2
|
Voice of America News: At Least Six Killed in Iraq Bombings
|
28.03.2010
|
- 2
|
Voice of America News: Car Bombs Kill 5 in Iraqi Holy City
|
29.03.2010
|
- 2
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), IOM UK’s Reintegration Assistance to
returnees under VARRP’s New Approach (2007 – 2009)
|
04.2010
|
- 2
|
Norwegian
Directorate of Immigration, The Making of UNHCR's guidance and its
implementation in the national jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, Norway and Sweden
|
04.2010
|
- 2
|
Economist
Intelligence Unit Country Report, Iraq
|
01.04.2010
|
- 2
|
Voice of America News: Iraqi Insurgents Kill 24 People with Ties
to Pro-US Militia
|
03.04.2010
|
- 2
|
Voice of America News: Three Massive Bombs Rock Baghdad, at Least 41 Killed
|
04.04.2010
|
- 2
|
Brookings,
April 2010 Index Update: A look into the Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq Index Projects
|
05.04.2010
|
- 2
|
Voice of America News: Bombs Kill 35 People in Shi'ite
Neighborhoods of Baghdad
|
06.04.2010
|
- 2
|
Amnesty International: Killings of civilians in Iraq constitute 'war crimes'
|
07.04.2010
|
- 2
|
Voice of America News: Bombings in Iraq Kill 6
|
10.04.2010
|
- 2
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Diyala Initiative - Facilitating
returns and creating conditions for sustainable reintegration
|
12.04.2010
|
- 2
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), IOM Emergency Needs Assessments, Four
Years of Post-Samarra displacement in Iraq
|
13.04.2010
|
- 2
|
Voice of America News: Baghdad Violence Kills Sunni Cleric,
Two Others
|
14.04.2010
|
- 2
|
Danish
Immigration Service Entry Procedures and Residence in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) for Iraqi Nationals
|
15.04.2010
|
- 2
|
Amnesty International: Iraq urged to investigate secret
prison allegations
|
19.04.2010
|
- 2
|
Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Q & A Iraq after the
death of Al-Qaeda in Iraq's Leadership
|
19.04.2010
|
- 2
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), IOM Emergency Needs Assessments
Displacement from Mosul, Ninewa
|
20.04.2010
|
- 2
|
Human Rights Watch: Iraq: Detainees Describe Torture in
Secret Jail
|
27.04.2010
|
- 2
|
Amnesty
International, Iraq: Civilians under fire
|
27.04.2010
|
- 2
|
Voice of America News: Human Rights Watch: Torture 'Routine'
at Secret Iraqi Detention Facility
|
28.04.2010
|
- 2
|
Institute for War and Peace Reporting (UK): Sadr City Shaken by Bombings
|
29.04.2010
|
-
|
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Reports: Eight Killed In Baghdad Car Bomb
|
29.04.2010
|
-
|
Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGR), Quarterly Report to the United States Congress
|
30.04.2010
|
-
|
International
Rescue Committee (IRC), 10,000 Refugees from Iraq – A report on Joint
Resettlement in the European Union
|
05.2010
|
-
|
Kurdistan
Regional Government, Fact Sheet: Travel to the Kurdistan Region in Iraq
|
01.05.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: Attack on Iraqi Students Kills One,
Wounds 80
|
02.05.2010
|
-
|
Iraq
Body Count (IBC), Exaggerated claims, substandard research, and a disservice
to truth
|
05.05.2010
|
-
|
US
Department of State, Iraq Status Report
|
05.05.2010
|
-
|
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Scores Killed, Wounded in
Attacks in Iraq
|
10.05.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: Attacks in Iraq Kill More Than 100
|
10.05.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: Attacks in Iraqi Capital Kill at Least
Five Police Officers
|
11.05.2010
|
-
|
United
Nations (UN), Development Assistance Framework for Iraq 2011 – 2014
|
11.05.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: Attacks Kills Ten in Baghdad
|
13.05.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: Bombings near Iraqi Stadium kill at
least ten
|
14.05.2010
|
-
|
Danfoss,
First Quarterly Report Jan-March 2010
|
17.05.2010
|
-
|
Iraq
Body Count (IBC), Documented civilian deaths from violence
|
20.05.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: Car bomb kills 23 in Iraq
|
21.05.2010
|
-
|
Brookings, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of
Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq
|
25.05.2010
|
-
|
Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion
and expression: Summary of cases transmitted to Governments and replies
received (Iraq excerpt)
|
26.05.2010
|
-
|
Amnesty
International, Iraq: Amnesty International Report 2010
|
27.05.2010
|
-
|
Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Iraq and the United States: Creating a Strategic Partnership
|
06.2010
|
-
|
Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Notes: The Iraqi Security Forces:
Local Context and U.S. Assistance
|
06.2010
|
-
|
US
Department of Defence, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: June 2010 Report to Congress
|
06.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: at Least Five Killed in Iraq Explosions
|
06.06.2010
|
-
|
Amnesty International: European states must stop the imminent
forcible return of Iraqis
|
06.06.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: At least Seven Killed in Iraq Attacks
|
07.06.2010
|
-
|
Foreign & Commonwealth Office: Iraq – Internal Travel
|
07.06.2010
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR cautions against European
deportations to Iraq
|
08.06.2010
|
-
|
Amnesty International: UK: Removals to Iraq put lives in danger
|
08.06.2010
|
-
|
UNHCR: UNHCR cautions against European deportations to Iraq
|
08.06.2010
|
-
|
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Baghdad Bank Attack Kills 12
|
13.06.2010
|
-
|
Amnesty International: Stop forcible returns from Europe to Iraq
|
17.06.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: At Least 20 Killed in Iraq Attacks
|
18.06.2010
|
-
|
Guardian: Iraqi asylum seekers claim they were beaten on
flight to Baghdad
|
18.06.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: Twin Suicide Blasts Kill More Than Two
Dozen in Baghdad
|
20.06.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: Bomb Attack Kills 8 in Northern Iraq
|
21.06.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: Nine Killed in Iraq Attacks
|
24.06.2010
|
-
|
International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Iraq: helping detainees and their families
|
28.06.2010
|
-
|
UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Iraqi Kurdish
Border Displacement Situation Update Note
|
07.2010
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), Iraq Facts and Figures
|
01.07.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: Suicide Bomber Kills At Least 30
Shi'ite Pilgrims in Baghdad
|
07.07.2010
|
-
|
Voice
of America News: Suicide Bombers Kill at Least 46 in Iraq
|
18.07.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: Iraqi Mosque Bombing Kills 15
|
21.07.2010
|
-
|
HJT Research: News media reports on the fate of failed Iraqi
asylum seekers deported from the UK
|
22.07.2010
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Note on the Continued Applicability
of the April 2009 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the
International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers
|
28.07.2010
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Annex to the Note on the Continued
Applicability of the April 2009 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing
the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers: Reports of
Attacks and Security Incidents in Iraq since April 2009
|
28.07.2010
|
-
|
United
Nations (UN), Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of
resolution 1883 (2009)
|
29.07.2010
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq
|
08.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: Iraq's July Death Toll Highest In Two
Years
|
01.08.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: Iraq Bombings Kill At Least 12 in
Southern City of Kut
|
03.08.2010
|
-
|
US
Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009: Iraq
|
05.08.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: Roadside Bombs, Shootings Kill Ten in Iraq; Gunmen Kill 5 in Baghdad Checkpoint Shooting Spree
|
15.08.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: Explosions Wreak Havoc in Major Iraqi
Cities
|
25.08.2010
|
-
|
Ajazeera: Pulling out of Iraq, ‘US combat troops are leaving
the country, but can the Iraqi army ensure security?’
|
30.08.2010
|
-
|
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): UNHCR
concerned at ongoing deportations of Iraqis from Europe
|
03.09.2010
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR concerned at ongoing deportations
of Iraqis from Europe
|
03.09.2010
|
-
|
Jane's
Sentinel, Security Assessment: The Gulf States: Security and Foreign Forces”
|
05.09.2010
|
-
|
BBC News: Fresh claims of Iraqi deportation “beatings”
|
09.09.2010
|
-
|
Guardian: Deported Iraqi asylum seekers say they were beaten
and forced off plane
|
09.09.2010
|
-
|
Coalitions to Stop Deportations to Iraq (UK): Iraqi refugees
assaulted on mass deportation flight to Baghdad
|
09.09.2010
|
-
|
Danish
Immigration Service Security and Human Rights in South/Central Iraq
|
10.09.2010
|
-
|
Amnesty International: Thousands of Iraqi detainees at risk
of torture after US handover
|
13.09.2010
|
-
|
Amnesty
International, New order, same abuses: Unlawful detentions and torture in Iraq
|
13.09.2010
|
-
|
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Rights Group Says Torture,
Abuses Routine in Iraqi Prisons
|
13.09.2010
|
-
|
Voice of America News: Car Bombs Kill at Least 29 People in Iraq
|
19.09.2010
|
-
|
IRIN: Refugees: UNHCR concerned over Iraqi deportations
|
29.09.2010
|
-
|
International
Reconstruction: Fund Facility for Iraq
|
30.09.2010
|
-
|
UK
Border Agency COIS Reports, Operational Guidance Note, Iraq v.6
|
01.10.2010
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),Monthly Highlights, October
|
10.2010
|
-
|
Congressional
Research Service, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq
|
01.10.2010
|
-
|
UNAMI:
UN expert calling for action on behalf of internally displaced persons in the
Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Erbil - 03 October 2010
|
03.10.2010
|
-
|
Congressional
Research Service Iraq Casualties: US Military Forces and Iraqi Civilians,
Police and Security Forces
|
07.10.2010
|
|
Canadian
Immigration and Refugee Board, Travel Report: Iraq
|
29.10.2011
|
-
|
The
Guardian: Iraq war logs reveal 15,000 previously unlisted civilian deaths
|
22.10.2010
|
-
|
The
Guardian: Wikileaks Iraq, data journalism maps every death
|
23.10.2010
|
-
|
Iraq
Body Count (IBC), Iraq War Logs: The truth is in the detail
|
23.10.2011
|
-
|
International
Crisis Group (ICG), Loose Ends: Iraq’s Security Forces between US Drawdown
and Withdraw
|
26.10.2010
|
-
|
New
York Times: A New Attitude in Sadr City (Slides)
|
29.10.2010
|
-
|
New
York Times: Baghdad’s Shiite Heart Beats as War Ebbs
|
29.10.2010
|
-
|
International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Operational Update Nov - Dec 2010, Iraq: unexploded munitions put civilians at risk
|
11.2010
|
-
|
Amnesty
International, Denmark, Human rights violations and concerns in the context
of counter-terrorism, immigration-detention, forcible return of rejected
asylum seekers and violence against women
|
11.2010
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), Governate Profiles
|
01.11.2010
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), Iraq displacement reports, Special focus
– Disputed Internal Boundaries
|
01.11.2010
|
-
|
Guardian:
European court demands halt to forcible return of Iraqi asylum seekers
|
05.11.2010
|
-
|
Guardian:
Two asylum seekers deported to Baghdad and allegedly tortured were not Iraqi
|
10.11.2010
|
-
|
Amnesty
International Public Statement: European states must stop forced returns to Iraq
|
10.11.2010
|
-
|
Council
of Europe: Member states must respect ECHR decision on forced expulsions of
Iraqis
|
16.11.2010
|
-
|
US
Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2010: Iraq
|
17.11.2010
|
-
|
Guardian:
Iranian wrongly deported to Baghdad claims he was tortured
|
21.11.2010
|
-
|
Amnesty
International: UK asylum removals to Iraq: Amnesty Response
|
23.11.2010
|
-
|
United
Nations (UN), Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of
resolution 1936 (2010)
|
26.11.2010
|
-
|
International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Operational Update September – October
2010, Iraq: Civilians still enduring undue hardship
|
30.11.2010
|
-
|
The
Iraq Partners Forum, Iraq Briefing Book
|
12.2010
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Iraq Fact Sheet, December 2010
|
12.2010
|
-
|
US
Department of State, Iraq Status Report
|
01.12.2010
|
-
|
Swedish
Immigration Service, Delrapport fån utredningsresa till Irak –
oktober/november 2010 (utsatta grupper –kristna), Migrationsverket
2010-12-09, Lifos 24184
|
09.12.2010
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), IOM Emergency Needs Assessment,
Displacement of Christians to the North of Iraq
|
15.12.2010
|
-
|
UNHCR:
UNHCR Dismayed at forced repatriation of Iraqis: reports increase in flight
of Iraqi Christians
|
17.12.2010
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR reports increase in flight of
Iraqi Christians; reiterates advice on protection needs
|
17.12.2010
|
-
|
IRIN:
Christian IDPs find refuge in Kurdish north
|
23.12.2010
|
-
|
IRIN:
Middle East: Iraqi refugees – interpreting the statistics
|
28.12.2010
|
-
|
US
Government Accountability Office, Accountability Office, Displaced Iraqis:
Integrated International Strategy Needed to Reintegrate Iraq’s Internally
Displaced and Returning Refugees
|
12.2010
|
-
|
Iraq
Body Count (IBC), Iraqi deaths from violence in 2010
|
30.12.2010
|
-
|
Iraq
Body Count (IBC), Documented civilian deaths from violence
|
30.12.2010
|
-
|
Chr
Michelson Institute (CRI), Between Two Societies: Review of the Information,
Return and Reintegration of Iraqi Nationals to Iraq (IRRINI) programme
|
2011
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), IOM Iraq Newsletter - Volume I 2011 -
Oct/Nov/Dec 2010
|
2011
|
-
|
RAND, From Insurgency to Stability, Vol II:
Insights from selected case studies
|
2011
|
-
|
Social
Watch, Social Progress and Environmental Damage, the Basic Capabilities index
and CO2 emissions
|
2011
|
-
|
Institute
for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index: Methodology, Results and
Findings 2011
|
2011
|
-
|
RAND,
The 2008 Battle for Sadr City
|
2011
|
-
|
UN
Assistance Mission for Iraqi (UNAMI), 2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq
|
01.2011
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), IOM Iraq Newsletter, Vol II, 2011
|
01–03/2011
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), IOM Iraq Newsletter, Vol II, 2011
|
01–03/2011
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR concerned at planned forced
return from Sweden to Iraq
|
18.01.2011
|
-
|
UNHCR:
UNHCR seeks common sense European approach towards those fleeing violence
|
19.01.2011
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR seeks common sense European
approach towards those fleeing violence
|
19.01.2011
|
-
|
Human
Rights Watch (HRW)Word Report 2011: Iraq
|
24.01.2011
|
-
|
Radio
Free Europe: Iraq Drafts Plan to Help IDPs, Refugees
|
26.01.2011
|
-
|
Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGR), Quarterly Report and
Semiannual Report to the United States Congress
|
30.01.2011
|
-
|
Brookings, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of
Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq
|
31.01.2011
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq
|
02.2011
|
-
|
Amnesty
International. Broken Bodies, Tortured Minds: Abuse and Neglect of Detainees
in Iraq
|
02.2011
|
-
|
Inter
Agency Information & Analysis Unit (IAU Iraq), Governorate Profiles 2011
|
02.2011
|
-
|
International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Database
|
02.2011
|
-
|
Guardian: G4S security firm was warned of lethal risk to
refused asylum seekers
|
08.02.2011
|
-
|
Institute
for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR): City of Contrasts
|
08.02.2012
|
-
|
Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Iraq: Patterns of Violence,
Casualty Trends and Emerging Security Threats
|
09.02.2011
|
-
|
Jane's
Sentinel, Security Assessment: “The Gulf States: Security”
|
12.02.2012
|
-
|
PLoS
Medicine, 2011; 8 (2): e1000415, Violent Deaths of Iraqi Civilians,
2003–2008: Analysis by Perpetrator, Weapon, Time, and Location
|
15.02.2011
|
-
|
Iraq
Body Count (IBC), New Study: Analysis by Perpetrator, weapon, time and
location (2003-2008)
|
16.02.2011
|
-
|
United
Nations (UN), Report of the Representative of the Secretary General on the
human rights of internally displaced persons, Walter Kalin, Visit to Iraq
|
16.02.2011
|
-
|
Refugees
International, Iraq’s displaced: a stable region requires stable assistance
|
16.02.2011
|
-
|
Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), A Threat Transformed, Al
Qaeda and Associated Movements in 2011
|
20.02.2011
|
-
|
Human
Rights Watch: Iraq: Vulnerable Citizens at Risk
|
21.02.2011
|
-
|
Human
Rights Watch (HRW), Iraq: Vulnerable Citizens at Risk
|
21.02.2011
|
-
|
Human
Rights Watch (HRW), At a Crossroads: Human Rights in Iraq Eight Years after the US-Led Invasion
|
22.02.2011
|
-
|
International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Iraq: Facts and Figures, January –
December 2010
|
03.2011
|
-
|
International
Rescue Committee (IRC), Annual Report 2010 Iraq Country Programme
|
03.2011
|
-
|
Jane's
Sentinel, Security Assessment: The Gulf States: Non-State Armed Groups
|
21.03.2011
|
-
|
UK Border Agency COIS Reports, Iraq Country of Origin Information (COI) Report March 2011
|
25.03.2011
|
-
|
International
Crisis Group (ICG), Iraq and the Kurds: Confronting Withdrawal Fears
|
28.03.2011
|
-
|
Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Human Rights and Democracy: the 2010 Foreign
and Commonwealth Office Report (extract)
|
31.03.2011
|
-
|
United
Nations (UN), Second report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6
of resolution 1936 (2010)
|
31.03.2011
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), IOM Iraq Newsletter, Vol III 2011
|
04-06/2011
|
-
|
Inter
Agency Information & Analysis Unit (IAU Iraq), Landmines and Unexploded
Ordinance Factsheet
|
04.2011
|
-
|
National
Counter-Terrorism Command, Iraq's Civil Society in Perspective
|
04.2011
|
-
|
UK Department for International Development
(DFID), Iraq Operational Plan
|
04.2011
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Comments MOMD Comprehensive Plan to
address Displacement in Iraq, Meeting of UN and International Organisations
with GoI
|
05.04.2011
|
-
|
US Department of State, 2010 Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices: Iraq
|
08.04.2011
|
-
|
Amnesty
International, Days of rage: Protests and Repression in Iraq - Testimonies/Case Studies
|
12.04.2011
|
-
|
Iraq Business News: AKE Security, Sticky Bombs
on the Rise
|
19.04.2011
|
-
|
National Counter-Terrorism Center, 2010 Report on Terrorism
|
30.04.2011
|
-
|
Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGR), Quarterly Report to the United States Congress
|
30.04.2011
|
-
|
Oxfam,
Protection of civilians in 2010: Facts, figures, and the UN Security
Council’s response
|
05.2011
|
-
|
Amnesty
International, Denmark: Human Rights violations and concerns in the context
of counter-terrorism, immigration-detention, forcible return of rejected
asylum seekers and violence against women
|
05.2011
|
-
|
InterSOS,
Providing Fair Protection Processes and Documentation for Internally
Displaced and Host Communities: The Experience of the Protection and Assistance Centers (PACs) in Southern Iraq
|
05.2011
|
-
|
US
Commission on Religious Freedom (ISCIRF), Annual Report 2011
|
05.2011
|
-
|
InterSOS,
Addressing the legal needs of the displaced in Southern Iraq
|
05.2011
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Iran, Return Guide for the Voluntary
Repatriation of Iraqis
|
05.2011
|
-
|
Institute
for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR): Iraqis’ Mixed Emotions Over Bin Laden’s
Death
|
06.05.2011
|
-
|
Freedom
House Freedom in the World 2011: Iraq
|
12.05.2011
|
-
|
Amnesty
International, Amnesty International Annual Report 2011 - Iraq
|
13.05.2011
|
-
|
International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Annual Report Iraq
2010
|
17.05.2011
|
-
|
IRIN:
Iraq, Preparing for a possible returnee influx
|
18.05.2011
|
-
|
InterSOS,
Stories from the Protection and Assistance Centers of Iraq
|
25.01.2011
|
-
|
US
Department of State, Strengthening Iraq: Fact Sheet
|
19.05.2011
|
-
|
iCasualties
List of US fatalities as of May 28 2010
|
28.05.2011
|
-
|
Danish
Immigration Service Iranian Kurdish Refugees in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)
|
06.2011
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Global Report 2010: Iraq
|
06.2011
|
-
|
Inter
Agency Information & Analysis Unit (IAU Iraq), Urban Baghdad: Impact of
conflict on daily life
|
06.2011
|
-
|
Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Iraq: IDPs and their prospects for
durable solutions
|
06.2011
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), IOM Iraq Newsletter, Vol IV 2011
|
06-09/2011
|
-
|
British
Embassy Baghdad: ISSUE: Foreign contractors/risk to western collaborators in Baghdad and Iraq
|
01.06.2011
|
-
|
Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Multiple bombings in Ramadi leave at least five dead
|
02.06.2011
|
-
|
Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty: At least 17 killed in blast at mosque in Iraq's Tikrit
|
03.06.2011
|
-
|
Middle
East Institute, Displacement and National Institutions: Reflections on the
Iraqi experience
|
06.06.2011
|
-
|
Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UN official urges stronger
action to protect Iraqi civilians
|
07.06.2011
|
-
|
Middle
East Institute, Iraqi Refugee and IDPs: From Humanitarian Intervention to
Durable Solutions
|
09.06.2011
|
-
|
Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Six killed in bombings in Iraq's Mosul
|
11.06.2011
|
-
|
Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Car bombs kill more than 20 in central Iraq
|
21.06.2011
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Iraq Fact Sheet, May 2011
|
21.06.2011
|
-
|
Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Baghdad Market Blasts Kill at Least 21
|
23.06.2011
|
-
|
Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Iraq Suicide Attack Kills At Least Two
|
26.06.2011
|
-
|
Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO)Quarterly Update on Iraq, 30 December 2011, 30
September 2011, 30 June 2011, 31 March 2011
|
30.06.2011
|
-
|
National
Geographic: Baghdad After the Storm
|
07.2011
|
-
|
Minority
Rights Group International, State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous
People 2011, Events of 2010
|
07.2011
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Safe at Last? Law and Practice in
Selected EU Member States with respect to asylum-seekers fleeing
indiscriminate violence
|
07.2011
|
-
|
Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty: U.S. general warns insurgent attacks threaten Iraq
|
05.07.2011
|
-
|
United
Nations (UN), Third report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6
of resolution 1936 (2010)
|
07.07.2011
|
-
|
Iraq Business News: AKE Security, Safety in Kurdistan
|
08.07.2011
|
-
|
Institute
for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR): New Role for Najaf
|
13.07.2011
|
-
|
Congressional
Research Service, Iraq: Politics, Governance and Human Rights
|
15.07.2011
|
-
|
IRIN:
Iraq: Youth unemployment driving emigration
|
20.07.2011
|
-
|
United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), Iraq, Complex Emergency
|
26.07.2011
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): UNHCR assists hundreds of displaced
Iraqis at border with Iran
|
27.07.2011
|
-
|
British
Embassy Baghdad: ISSUE: Freedom of Movement and Requirements to Transfer
Personal Documentation in Order to Relocate in Iraq
|
27.07.2011
|
-
|
Ministry
of Transport: The opening of Mosul International Airport
|
28.07.2011
|
-
|
Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGR), Quarterly Report and
Semiannual Report to the United States Congress
|
30.07.2011
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), IOM Country Fact Sheet, Iraq
|
08.2011
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Iraq Refugee Returnee
Monitoring: 2011 Mid Year Report and UNHCR, Iraq Fact Sheet, June – July 2011
|
08.2011
|
-
|
Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Unlocking protracted displacement: An
Iraqi case study
|
08.2011
|
-
|
Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Car bomb attack targets church in northern Iraq, injures 14
|
02.08.2011
|
-
|
Press
Release: UNAMI and UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights : 2010
Report on Human Rights in Iraq: Human rights situation in Iraq remains fragile
|
08.08.2011
|
-
|
Congressional
Research Service, Iraq: Politics, Governance and Human Rights
|
09.08.2011
|
-
|
International
Organisation for Migration (IOM UK), IOM Iraq Newsletter, Vol I, 2012
|
10-12/2011
|
-
|
USATODAY.COM:
Iraq army delays pullout from cities over security
|
08.10.2011
|
-
|
Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Dozens killed in Iraq bombings
|
15.08.2011
|
-
|
UN
News Service: UN officials condemn wave of deadly bombings across Iraq
|
15.08.2011
|
-
|
Congressional
Research Service, Iraq Map Sources
|
15.08.2011
|
-
|
UN
News Service: Deploring deadly blasts in Iraq, Security Council urges
punishment of perpetrators
|
18.08.2011
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-
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US
Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2010: Iraq
|
18.08.2011
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|
Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Turkish Army Says Up To 100 Kurdish Rebels Killed
in Northern Iraq
|
23.08.2011
|
-
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Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty: At least 28 dead in Baghdad mosque attack
|
28.08.2011
|
-
|
Congressional
Research Service, Iraq: Politics, Governance and Human Rights
|
29.08.2011
|
-
|
UK Border Agency COIS Reports, Iraq Country of Origin Information (COI) Report August 2011
|
30.08.2011
|
-
|
IWPR:
Hard Times for Iraqis Fleeing Unrest Elsewhere
|
31.08.2011
|
-
|
IWPR:
US Troops Face New Threat from Iraqi Shia Militia
|
31.08.2011
|
-
|
Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Confronting an Uncertain
Threat: The Future of Al Qaeda and Associated Movements
|
09.2011
|
-
|
The
Lancet Journal, Casualties in civilians and coalition soldiers from suicide
bombings in Iraq, 2003 – 2010: a descriptive study
|
01.09.2011
|
-
|
Iraq
Body Count (IBC), Casualties of suicide bombings in Iraq, 2003-2010
|
03.09.2011
|
-
|
US
Department of State, July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom
Report: Iraq
|
13.09.2011
|
-
|
Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Gunmen kill 22 Shi'ite pilgrims in Iraq
|
13.09.2011
|
-
|
Iraq Business News, AKE Security: A Return of
Illegal Checkpoints
|
13.09.2011
|
-
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Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Bomb attacks against Iraq security forces Kill 17
|
14.09.2011
|
-
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Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Iraq: Response still centred on return
despite increasing IDP demands for local integration
|
23.09.2011
|
-
|
Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Multiple explosions reported in Iraqi shrine city
of Karbala
|
25.09.2011
|
-
|
International
Crisis Group (ICG), Failing Oversight: Iraq's Unchecked Government
|
26.09.2011
|
-
|
International
Crisis Group (ICG), Iraq’s New Battlefront: The Struggle over Ninewa
|
28.09.2009
|
-
|
Congressional
Research Service Iraq: Politics, Governance and Human Rights
|
30.09.2011
|
-
|
National
Counter-Terrorism Command, Political, Humanitarian, and Military Frameworks
in the Iraqi Disputed Territories on the Eve of US withdrawal
|
10.2011
|
-
|
Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Iraqi security forces end hostage crisis,
casualties reported
|
03.10.2011
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Refugees Return to Baghdad, September
2010 – August 2011
|
03.10.2011
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), IDPs Return to Baghdad, September
2010 – August 2011
|
03.10.2011
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Total Return to Iraq September 2010 – August 2011
|
03.10.2011
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Total IDPs return to Iraq, September 2010 – August 2011
|
03.10.2011
|
-
|
United
Nations (UN), Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of
resolution 2001 (2011)
|
28.11.2011
|
-
|
Voice
of America News: Series of Baghdad Bombings Kill at Least 25
|
12.10.2011
|
-
|
Iraq
Business News, Iraq controls own airspace for first time since 2003
|
12.10.2011
|
-
|
IWPR:
Iraqi Kurds offer Christians a Sanctuary
|
12.10.2011
|
-
|
Iraq Business News, US Helps build safe and
efficient rail system
|
13.10.2011
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Asylum Levels and Trends in
Industrialized Countries: Statistical overview of asylum applications lodged
in Europe and selected non-European countries
|
18.10.2011
|
-
|
British
Embassy Baghdad: Entry Procedures for UK Returnees
|
19/10/2011
|
-
|
Voice
of America News: US Withdrawal Raises Questions of a Vacuum in Iraq
|
21.10.2011
|
-
|
Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Iraq and US Strategy in the
Gulf
|
24.10.2011
|
-
|
Voice
of America News: Iraq Car Bombs Kill at Least 5
|
26.10.2011
|
-
|
Brookings,
Index of State Weakness in the Developing World
|
27.10.2011
|
-
|
The
Guardian: Double bomb attack strikes Iraqi capital
|
28.10.2011
|
-
|
Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGR), Quarterly Report to the United States Congress
|
30.10.2011
|
-
|
Brookings,
From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National approaches to internal
displacement
|
11.2011
|
-
|
UNHCR:
Response to inquiry regarding returnees/deportees: documentation, assistance
and conditions at Baghdad Airport
|
03.11.2011
|
-
|
Iraq Business News, AKE Security: Mapping
Violence in Iraq
|
05.11.2011
|
-
|
Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty: At Least 12 Killed As Blasts Rock Baghdad
|
06.11.2011
|
-
|
The
Guardian: Triple Blast hits Baghdad Market
|
06.11.2011
|
-
|
Voice
of America News: Bomb Blasts in Central Baghdad Leave Eight Dead
|
06.11.2011
|
-
|
International
Committee of the Red Cross:Iraq: ICRC delivering more aid where it is needed
most
|
08.11.2011
|
-
|
Congressional
Research Service, Iraq: Politics, Governance and Human Rights
|
10.11.2011
|
-
|
Congressional
Research Service Iraq: Politics, Governance and Human Rights
|
10.11.2011
|
-
|
European
Commission Humanitarian, Aid & Civil Protection Humanitarian Implementation
Plan (HIP): Iraq Crisis
|
11.11.2011
|
-
|
UK
Home Office, Proscribed terrorist groups
|
11.11.2011
|
-
|
Christian
Science Monitor: As US exits Iraq, a top general’s warning
|
21.11.2011
|
-
|
Mawtani.com,
International companies invest in six Iraqi shopping centres
|
21.11.2011
|
-
|
UK Border Agency COIS Reports, Bulletin –
Collation of IGC Member States’ Responses to Returns to Iraq
|
22.11.2011
|
-
|
UKBA: Iraq bulletin – Collation of IGC
Member States’ Responses on Returns to Iraq dated 22 November 2011
|
22.11.2011
|
-
|
Voice
of America News: Three Bombings Kill 19, Injure 65 in Southern Iraq
|
24.11.2011
|
-
|
Voice
of America News: Baghdad Bombings Kill 15
|
26.11.2011
|
|
Voice
of America News: Iraqi Violence Kills 22
|
28.11.2011
|
-
|
Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), The Outcome of Invasion: US
and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq
|
28.11.2011
|
-
|
Minority
Rights Group International, Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life
|
28.11.2011
|
-
|
Brookings, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of
Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq
|
30.11.2011
|
-
|
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Iraq Operation, Statistical Report on
UNHCR Registered Iraqis and Non-Iraqis
|
30.11.2011
|
-
|
Iraq Knowledge Network, Essential Services
Fact Sheet
|
12.2011
|
-
|
UK Border Agency COIS Reports, Operational
Guidance Note: Iraq
|
12.2011
|
-
|
Iraq
Knowledge Network, Labour force fact sheet
|
12.2011
|
-
|
Voice
of America News: New, Deadly Attacks Rattle Iraqi Province
|
01.12.2011
|
-
|
Voice
of America News: Iraq Bombings Kill 28 Shi'ite Pilgrims
|
05.12.2011
|
-
|
Integrated
Regional Information Network News (IRIN): Iraq: Overall violence down - but
attacks on minorities continue
|
05.12.2011
|
-
|
United
Nations: “Withdrawal of United States forces in Iraq at year's end will give
Iraqis chance to prove themselves, but entails many challenges”, UN envoy
tells Security Council
|
06.12.2011
|
-
|
Congressional
Research Service, Iraq: Politics, Governance and Human Rights
|
06.12.2011
|
-
|
UK House of Commons, The Terrorism Act 2000:
Proscribed Organisations
|
07.12.2011
|
-
|
Institute
for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR): Sunni Separatist Fears as US Troops Leave
Iraq
|
07.12.2011
|
-
|
McClatchy
Newspapers: Huge numbers of Iraqis still adrift within the country
|
11.12.2011
|
-
|
New
York Times: Junkyard Gives up Secret Accounts of Massacre in Iraq
|
14.12.2011
|
-
|
International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Iraq: People living in rural areas remain
among the most affected
|
14.12.2011
|
-
|
Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Iraq: Putting US Withdrawal
in Perspective
|
15.12.2011
|
-
|
National
Public Radio (NPR): There’s No Going Home For Iraqi Squatters
|
17.12.2011
|
-
|
New
York Times: Iraq After the US military withdrawal
|
18.12.2011
|
-
|
NPR,
“The IED: The $30 bombs that cost the US billions”
|
18.12.2011
|
-
|
National
Public Radio (NPR): Former Envoy to Iraq says situation still ‘very fragile’
|
18.12.2011
|
-
|
Voice
of America News: Crumbling Infrastructure Slows Iraqi Growth
|
19.12.2011
|
-
|
Human
Rights Watch (HRW)Iran/Turkey: Recent Attacks on Civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan
|
20.12.2011
|
-
|
The
Guardian: Sunni leaders warn of sectarian chaos in Iraq
|
20.12.2011
|
-
|
Human
Rights Watch: Iran/Turkey: Recent Attacks on Civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan At Least a Dozen Dead; Thousands Displaced Since July
|
20.12.2011
|
-
|
Foreign
Policy News: The Damage Done
|
21.12.2011
|
-
|
Reuters
Alertnet FACTBOX – Security developments in Iraq
|
21.12.2011
|
-
|
The
Guardian: Baghdad car bomb attack rips through Iraq's already failing hopes
|
22.12.2011
|
-
|
Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Scores Killed In Wave Of Bombings In Baghdad
|
22.12.2011
|
-
|
Human
Rights Watch: Iraq: Deadly Bombings an Assaul |