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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) >> ROBA (AAR) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Rev1) (OLF members and sympathisers) Ethiopia (CG) [2022] UKUT 1 (IAC) (29 December 2021) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKUT/IAC/2022/1.html Cite as: [2022] UKUT 1 (IAC) |
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[2022] UKUT 1 (IAC)
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Field House by Skype for Business |
Decision & Reasons Promulgated |
On 24 February 2021 |
|
|
………………………………… |
Before
Mr. C M G OCKELTON, VICE PRESIDENT
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN
Between
ABDI ROBA
(FORMERLY KNOWN AS AAR (ETHIOPIA))
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. A Burrett, Counsel, instructed by JD Spicer Zeb Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms. M Bayoumi, Counsel, instructed by the Government Legal Department
Country guidance: OLF members and sympathisers (supporters)
(1) MB (OLF and MTA - risk) Ethiopia CG [2007] UKAIT 00030 still accurately reflects the situation facing members and supporters of the OLF if returned to Ethiopia. However, in material respects, it is appropriate to clarify the existing guidance.
(2) OLF members and supporters and those specifically perceived by the authorities to be such members or supporters will in general be at real risk if they have been previously arrested or detained on suspicion of OLF involvement.
(3) Those who have a significant history, known to the authorities, of OLF membership or support, or are perceived by the authorities to have such significant history will in general be at real risk of persecution by the authorities.
(4) ‘Significant’ should not be read as denoting a very high level of involvement or support. Rather, it relates to suspicion being established that a person is perceived by the authorities as possessing an anti-government agenda. This is a fact sensitive assessment.
(5) Whether persons are to be excluded from recognition as refugees or from the grant of humanitarian protection by reason of armed activities may need to be addressed in particular cases.
1. General application of country guidance
(1) The treatment of country guidance as a presumption of fact means that it will be for the parties seeking to persuade the Tribunal to depart from it to adduce the evidence justifying that departure.
(2) An assessment as to whether to depart from a CG decision is to be undertaken as to: (i) whether material circumstances have changed; and (ii) whether such changes are well established evidentially and durable.
(3) The law, and the principle, are not affected by the age of the CG decision. It may be that as time goes on, evidence will become available that makes it more likely that departure from the decision will be justified. But the process remains the same, and unless in the individual case the departure is shown to be justified, the guidance contained in the CG decision must, as a matter of law, be adopted.
(4) If the parties fail to abide by their general duty in respect of identifying extant country guidance, it remains for the Tribunal to consider such guidance and to follow it.
(5) Any failure by the Tribunal to apply a CG decision unless there is good reason, explicitly stated, for not doing so might constitute an error of law in that a material consideration has been ignored or legally inadequate reasons for the decision have been given.
(6) A party that before the First-tier Tribunal has failed to address extant country guidance or has failed to demonstrate proper grounds for departure from it is unlikely to have a good ground of appeal against a decision founded on the guidance.
Contents
Section |
|
Paragraph numbers |
A |
Introduction | |
B |
Existing country guidance | |
C |
Legal framework | |
D |
Country background evidence | |
E |
Parties’ cases in summary | |
F |
Analysis | |
G |
Country guidance | |
H |
Individual appeal | |
I |
Anonymity | |
J |
Notice of decision | |
Objective documentary evidence before the Upper Tribunal |
| |
Home Office documents filed with the Upper Tribunal |
| |
Expert evidence filed with the Upper Tribunal |
| |
Letter from Amnesty International, authored by Tom Southerden, dated 9 November 2020 |
|
DECISION AND REASONS
A. Introduction
B. The Existing Country Guidance
‘17. … In our view there is a current risk to OLF members and sympathisers who have been previously arrested and detained on suspicion of OLF involvement or who have a significant history, known to the authorities, of OLF membership or sympathy. We have not considered that it is suitable for designation as a Country Guideline case because we did not have sufficiently full evidence or submissions. But equally it is right that we should make known, by reporting, the views we have reached on the basis of the latest available evidence as presented in this case. …'
(1) As at February 2007, the situation in Ethiopia is such that, in general:-
(a) Oromo Liberation Front members and sympathisers;
(b) persons perceived to be OLF members or sympathisers; ...
(c) ...
will, on return, be at real risk if they fall within the scope of paragraph (2) ... below.
(2) OLF members and sympathisers and those specifically perceived by the authorities to be such members or sympathisers will in general be at real risk if they have been previously arrested or detained on suspicion of OLF involvement. So too will those who have a significant history, known to the authorities, of OLF membership or sympathy. Whether any such persons are to be excluded from recognition as refugees or from the grant of humanitarian protection by reason of armed activities may need to be addressed in particular cases.’
C. The Legal Framework
Country guidance
107(3) In the case of proceedings under section 82 ... or by virtue of section 109, or proceedings in the Upper Tribunal arising out of such proceedings, practice directions under section 23 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007—
(a) may require the Tribunal to treat a specified decision of the Tribunal or Upper Tribunal as authoritative in respect of a particular matter; and
(b) may require the Upper Tribunal to treat a specified decision of the Tribunal or Upper Tribunal as authoritative in respect of a particular matter.’
‘12.2 A reported determination of the Tribunal, the AIT or the IAT bearing the letters “CG” shall be treated as an authoritative finding on the country guidance issue identified in the determination, based upon the evidence before the members of the Tribunal, the AIT or the IAT that determine the appeal. As a result, unless it has been expressly superseded or replaced by any later “CG” determination, or is inconsistent with other authority that is binding on the Tribunal, such a country guidance case is authoritative in any subsequent appeal, so far as that appeal:
(a) relates to the country guidance issue in question; and
(b) depends upon the same or similar evidence.’
46. The system of Country Guidance determinations enables appropriate resources, in terms of the representations of the parties to the Country Guidance appeal, expert and factual evidence and the personnel and time of the Tribunal, to be applied to the determination of conditions in, and therefore the risks of return for persons such as the appellants in the Country Guidance appeal to, the country in question. The procedure is aimed at arriving at a reliable (in the sense of accurate) determination.’
D. Country Background Evidence
General Country Information
EPRDF rule (1991 to 2019)
Prosperity Party rule (2019 onwards)
Oromia Region
OLF
OLA
E. The Parties’ Cases
‘In Oromia, there were arbitrary arrests and detention of thousands of people suspected of supporting OLA and opposition political parties by kebele militia, Oromia Police and the EDF. In the absence of criminal charges against many of the former detainees, the security forces told all of them they were suspected of supporting, sharing information with and feeding the OLA. Suspects were held in detention in local police stations for more than five months on average without charge, while thousands were transported to unofficial places of detention such as Tolay Military Training Camp and Sanqale Oromia Police Training College. Detainees were not accorded access to lawyers, courts, their families or anyone else outside the places of detention. At least 10,000 people were held in detention at Tolay during the of mass detentions that began in January 2019.’
‘2.4.22 Since the country guidance determination in MB, the country situation has improved. Following the removal of the OLF’s designation as a terrorist group in 2018, hundreds of thousands of people gathered in Addis Ababa to welcome back its leaders, although sources noted subsequent arrests. In April 2019 the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) split from the OLF political party and in May the OLF stated it would merge with the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC). In November 2019, the OLF registered with the election board (NEBE) as a political organisation, agreeing to work with other political parties in Oromia state. In January 2020, the OLF signed an agreement with the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) and Oromo Nationalist Party (ONP) to form a coalition in the forthcoming elections (at the time of writing postponed indefinitely). However, some sources indicate that the OLF (and the OLA) may not be a single entity, but has fractured into a number of sub-groups and in some areas is not controlled by a single person or entity. OLF sources told the Home Office in September 2019 that they operated in Addis Ababa and the surrounding area and had opened 40 offices in 2019 across the country, although 30 subsequently closed.’
2.4.26 The country information indicates that there are very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence to depart from UT’s findings in MB. Since 2004, there has been a fundamental change in the legal status of the OLF now that designation as a terrorist organisation has been removed by the state, its leaders and exiled members have been able to return to Ethiopia, and it has been able to register as a political party in anticipation of national elections, opening offices and is able to operate and work with other political parties. OLF supporters and members do continue to face harassment and arrest from the state however, the available evidence does not indicate that all OLF activists, members or supporters - which may number in the hundreds of thousands to millions - throughout Ethiopia are at risk of treatment amounting to persecution by its nature and/or repetition. The assessment of risk for a person will vary between different areas of Ethiopia and within Oromia itself. OLF members or supporters in Oromia, particularly in areas where armed conflict between the OLA and the armed forces continues, face a higher risk of treatment that amounts to persecution than those in Addis Ababa.
2.4.27 In general, a person who is a member or supporter of the OLF is not at risk of persecution for that reason alone. Instead, each case must be considered on its facts with the onus on the person to demonstrate that they will be at risk of persecution based on their profile, political activities, past experiences including any arrests (and the timing of, location of and their experience during those arrests), and the proposed place of return.
‘... tolerance for political dissent has increased considerably since April 2018. Opposition political parties are able to organise and operate significantly more freely, particularly in Addis Ababa, and their members face a low risk of harassment, arrest and detention by virtue of their political affiliations and views. DFAT assesses Ethiopians can openly criticise the ruling party.’ [para. 3.41, DFAT]
‘The authorities have typically welcomed voluntary returnees to Ethiopia, including, since April 2018, government critics and opponents. DFAT assesses that returnees, including failed asylum seekers and/or government critics and opponents, face a low risk of monitoring, harassment, detention and official discrimination … DFAT assesses that people who openly criticise the ruling party while they are outside of Ethiopia face a low risk of official harm on their return to Ethiopia.’ [para. 5.37, DFAT]
‘DFAT assesses that, under the current federal government, failed asylum seekers face a low risk of harm on their return to Ethiopia, including where they sought asylum on political grounds.’ [para. 5.38, DFAT]
‘3.8. While there was widespread violence against, and detention of, protesters across Oromia State between 2014 and 2018, DFAT assesses this was not ethnically motivated, but reflected the then-federal government’s sensitivity to political opposition. The situation for government critics, including ethnic Oromos, has improved significantly since April 2018. DFAT assesses that individuals who are part of, or have links to, armed OLF factions engaged in criminal activities and clashes with government forces are likely to be of interest to the authorities, and face a moderate risk of arrest and detention. The risk of arrest and detention faced by OLF members who participate peacefully in the political process is low. DFAT assesses, overall, Oromos face a low risk of official discrimination based on their ethnicity, including with respect to employment in the public sector. DFAT assesses that, excluding in Addis Ababa, Oromos face a moderate risk of violence in areas or states where they constitute a minority.’ [Emphasis added]
F. Analysis
‘This report is informed by DFAT’s on-the-ground knowledge and discussions with a range of sources in Ethiopia. It takes into account relevant and credible open source reports, including those produced by: the United Nations and its agencies; the US Department of State; the UK Home Office; the World Bank; the International Monetary Fund; leading human rights organisations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Freedom House; and reputable news sources. Where DFAT does not refer to a specific source of a report, this may be to protect the source.’
‘302. In addition to taking account of open source materials such as the US Department of State human rights reports, DFAT is based on “on-the-ground knowledge and discussions with a range of sources in Sri Lanka.” However, none of the sources are identified, there is no explanation as to how the information from these sources was obtained, and there is no annex containing, for example, records of any interviews (unlike the FFM), Indeed, it is unclear whether any formal interviews took place. The report does not provide direct quotes from any source. In light of these matters, it is difficult to gauge the reliability of the sources which have informed the “judgement and assessment” applied to them by the authors of the report …'
‘4.1.4 However, Landinfo, in an English summary of their note, based on a range of sources, on political developments in Ethiopia in 2019-20, with a focus on Oromia, observed ‘When Abiy Ahmed took office as Prime Minister in 2018, optimism was high. Two years later, the human rights situation has deteriorated, and the authorities have reverted to repressive methods in order to curb political opposition and maintain law and order.’
G. Country Guidance
1) OLF members and supporters and those specifically perceived by the authorities to be such members or supporters will in general be at real risk if they have been previously arrested or detained on suspicion of OLF involvement.
2) Those who have a significant history, known to the authorities, of OLF membership or support, or are perceived by the authorities to have such significant history will in general be at real risk of persecution by the authorities.
3) ‘Significant’ should not be read as denoting a very high level of involvement or support. Rather, it relates to suspicion being established that a person is perceived by the authorities as possessing an anti-government agenda. This is a fact sensitive assessment.
4) Whether any such persons are to be excluded from recognition as refugees or from the grant of humanitarian protection by reason of armed activities may need to be addressed in particular cases.
H. Individual Appeal
‘34 Bearing in mind the significant and startling changes to the country since the appellant left, and the fact that his family including his father remain in the country, I am not satisfied that the appellant can prove that there is a reasonable likelihood that he will be persecuted on the basis of his political opinion or any ill-treatment he may have suffered in the past. There is now a willingness on the part of his country to offer him protection and he is not at risk from the State authorities. No country can give a citizen complete protection and whilst there may be incidents of violence and opposition at a local level there is no evidence before me that this is supported or perpetuated by the authorities. …’
I. Anonymity
J. Notice of Decision
i) Refugee Convention grounds
ii) Human rights (article 3) grounds
Signed: D O’Callaghan
Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan
Dated: 21 December 2021
APPENDIX 1
Objective documentary evidence before the Upper Tribunal
Item |
Document |
Author/Publisher |
Date |
1. |
‘Suppressing Dissent Human Rights Abuses and Political Repression in Ethiopia's Oromia Region’ |
Human Rights Watch (USA) |
05/05 |
2. |
Report of the Committee against Torture, 66th Session, (A/66/44) |
UN Committee against Torture |
2011 |
3. |
‘Because I am Oromo: Sweeping repression in the Oromo Region of Ethiopia’ |
Amnesty International (UK) |
28/10/14 |
4. |
‘Ethiopia: The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), including origin, mandate, leadership, structure, legal status, and membership; treatment of members and supporters by authorities (2014-2015)’ |
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (Canada) |
7/5/15 |
5. |
‘National Intelligence and Security Services - Ethiopia’ |
Action on Armed Violence (UK) |
2/4/16 |
6. |
‘Political unrest simmering in Ethiopia’ |
Deutsche Welle (Germany) |
10/2/17 |
7. |
‘A license to torture’ |
Amnesty International (UK) |
28/3/17 |
8. |
‘The original sin of Ethiopia federalism’ |
Yonatan Tesfaye Fessha, Ethnopolitics 16, 3 (June 2017), pp232-245 (published UK) |
6/17 |
9. |
‘Cracks emerge in Ethiopia ruling coalition’ |
Argaw Ashine, The East African (Kenya) |
14/6/18 |
10. |
‘Ethiopia: Political situation and treatment of opposition’ |
Danish Immigration Service (Denmark) |
9/18 |
11. |
Ethiopia Stakeholder Report for the United Nations Universal Periodic Review |
The Advocates for Human Rights (USA) and United Oromo Voices (USA) |
10/18 |
12. |
‘Game Over? Abiy Ahmed, The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front and Ethiopia’s Political Crisis’ |
Jonathan Fisher and Meressa Tsehaye Gebrewahd, African Affairs 118/470, pp 194-206 (published UK) |
12/18 |
13. |
National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: Ethiopia |
Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Thirty-third session (6–17 May 2019) |
25/2/19 |
14. |
‘Ethiopia: Abiy’s First Year as Prime Minister, Review of Arbitrary Detention, Torture and Detention Conditions’ |
Human Rights Watch (USA) |
5/4/19 |
15. |
‘Human Rights Abuses in Ethiopia’ |
Oromo Support Group (Australia) |
7/19 |
16. |
‘Why I nominated Abiy Ahmed for the Nobel Peace Prize’ |
Awol K Allo |
13/10/19 |
17. |
‘Ethiopia's Abiy Ahmed: Inside the mind of this year's Nobel Peace Prize winner’ |
BBC (UK) |
10/12/19 |
18. |
‘World Report 2020: Ethiopia’ |
Human Rights Watch (USA) |
14/1/20 |
19. |
‘Ethiopia: Vendor killed, musician injured after police attack opposition supporters in Oromia’ |
Amnesty International (UK) |
17/2/20 |
20. |
‘COI Ethiopia: Opposition groups - recent developments’ |
Ministry of Immigration and Integration (Denmark) |
3/20 |
21. |
‘2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia’ |
US Department of State (USA) |
11/3/21 |
22. |
‘Failed politics and deception: Behind the crisis in western and southern Oromia’ |
Addis Standard (Ethiopia) |
20/3/20 |
23. |
‘Landinformation: Etiopien - Säkerhetsläget, politisk utveckling och utsatta grupper’ |
Migrationsverkets (Swedish Migration Agency) (Sweden) |
14/5/20 |
24. |
‘Onslaught in Oromia: A hidden war threatens Ethiopia’s transition to democracy’ |
The Economist (UK) |
19/5/20 |
25. |
‘Beyond law enforcement: Human rights violations by Ethiopian Security Forces in Amhara and Oromia’ |
Amnesty International (UK) |
29/5/20 |
26. |
‘Ethiopia: Rape, extrajudicial executions, homes set alight in security operations in Amhara and Oromia’ |
Amnesty International (UK) |
29/5/20 |
27. |
‘Ethiopian security forces accused of 39 extrajudicial killings’ |
Reuters (UK) |
29/5/20 |
28. |
‘Ethiopia's security forces accused of torture, evictions and killings - report’ |
Tom Gardner, (The Guardian, UK) |
29/5/20 |
29. |
‘The fragile federation: A musician’s murder sparks mayhem in Ethiopia’ |
The Economist (UK) |
5/7/20 |
30. |
‘Country Information Report, Ethiopia’ |
Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade (Australia) |
12/8/20 |
31. |
‘Mass arrests in Ethiopia raise spectre of repressive past’ |
Dawit Endeshaw (Reuters, UK) |
13/8/20 |
32. |
‘Written Statement submitted by Society for Threatened Peoples, a non-government organisation in special consultative status. |
United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 54th Session 14/9/20 to 2/10/20 |
19/8/20 |
33. |
‘Qeerroo: A regimented organization or a spontaneous movement?’ |
Ethiopia Insight (Ethiopia) |
21/8/20 |
34. |
‘Let that be your last battlefield in Ethiopia’ |
Yves-Marie Stranger (Ethiopia Insight, Ethiopia) |
24/8/20 |
35. |
‘Ethiopian political parties agree to cooperate’ |
Fana Broadcasting Coporate (Ethiopia) |
23/9/20 |
36. |
‘Charges state that Hachalu’s assassins were part of “OLF-Shane” anti-government plot’ |
Ethiopia Insight (Ethiopia) |
7/10/20 |
37. |
‘From Nobel peacemaker to authoritarian: Ethiopia falling out of love with Abiy Ahmed’ |
Jane Flanagan, Samuel Getachew (The Times, UK) |
8/10/20 |
38. |
‘Ethiopia: The OLF Chairman Dawub Ibsa, and audiences present to attend media brief put under house arrest at the Chairman’s residence’ |
Human Rights League of the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia) |
14/10/20 |
39. |
‘Regions blames OLF-Shene, TPLF for deadly attack in West Wollega’ |
Ethiopian Monitor (Ethiopia) |
2/11/20 |
40. |
‘Ethiopia says militants killed 32 people in Oromia Region’ |
Samuel Gebre, Simon Marks (Bloomberg News, USA) |
2/11/20 |
41. |
‘Ethiopia: Over 50 ethnic Amhara killed in attack on village by armed group’ |
Amnesty International (UK) |
2/11/20 |
42. |
‘Ethiopia: OLF-Shene Group, TPLF are behind vicious attacks on civilians’ |
Ethiopian Herald (Ethiopia) |
3/11/20 |
43. |
‘Ethiopia: Police arbitrarily arrested Dr. Diriba Wakjira, Deputy Chairperson of HRLHA’s board - His whereabouts and fate remains unknown since November 06, 2020!’ |
Human Rights League of the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia) |
6/11/20 |
44. |
‘Awol Allo Reflections on The Oromo Protests’ [Transcript of interview] |
The American Assembly, Columbia University (USA) |
12/11/20 [Interview 8/20] |
45. |
‘Ethiopia expels Crisis Group senior analyst’ |
International Crisis Group (Belgium) |
22/11/20 |
46. |
‘Ethiopia: The unrelenting extrajudicial killings of citizens in Oromia Region by the so-called ‘Oromia Special Force’ is very alarming’ |
Human Rights League of the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia)
|
22/11/20 |
47. |
‘As Ethiopia’s army declares daily victories, its people are being plunged into violence’ |
Alex de Waal (The Guardian, UK) |
24/11/20 |
48. |
‘Ethiopia’s Tigray Crisis: Fears of ethnic profiling stalk conflict’ |
BBC (UK) |
25/11/20 |
49. |
‘Nobel Peace Prize Winner To Belligerent Warmaker: Ethiopia Under Abiy Ahmed’ |
Eyder Peralta NPR (USA) |
29/11/20 |
50. |
‘The unfolding crisis in Ethiopia’ |
Lauren Ploch Blanchard, written testimony before Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives (USA) |
1/12/20 |
51. |
‘Ethiopia's Tigray Crisis: Why Nobel laureate Abiy Ahmed sent his troops to battle’ |
BBC (UK) |
6/12/20 |
52. |
‘Why has civil war returned to Ethiopia?’ |
The Economist (UK) |
10/12/20 |
53. |
‘The Prosperity Group has arrested OLF members and leaders again’ |
Oromo Liberation Front. Press Release (Ethiopia) |
20/12/20 |
54. |
‘OLF accuses Gov’t of fresh crackdown on its members; Oromia Region says measures taken on several dozen rebel members, thousands arrested across region’ |
Siyanne Mekonnen (Addis Standard, Ethiopia) |
21/12/20 |
55. |
‘Ethiopia: At least 100 dead in latest surge of violence against ethnic minorities’ |
Amnesty International (UK) |
23/12/20 |
56. |
‘Exceedingly worrying and volatile situation in Ethiopia’ [transcript of remarks made at a press conference] |
Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights |
9/12/20 |
57. |
‘Ethiopia poll plans continue despite opposition crackdown’ |
Habtamu Tibebu (BBC, UK) |
22/12/20 |
58. |
‘Ethiopia: OLF-Shene rebel leader reportedly dead’ |
Agence de Press Africaine (Republic of Congo) |
29/12/20 |
59. |
‘Schism threatens oldest Oromo political party, once again. Can latest electoral board decision right the wrong?’ |
Addis Standard (Ethiopia) |
30/12/20 |
60. |
‘It did not feel like we had a government: Violence and human rights violations following musician Hachalu Hundessa’s assassination - Investigation Report’ |
The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (Ethiopia) |
1/1/21 |
61. |
‘Chaos in the Rift - a microcosm of Ethiopia’s brutal polarization’ |
Ethiopia Insight (Ethiopia) |
5/1/21 |
62. |
‘All is not quiet on Ethiopia’s western front’ |
Tom Gardner (Foreign Policy, USA) |
6/1/21 |
63. |
‘Etiopia, Politisk utvikling og menneskerettighetssituasjon i 2019- 2020, med fokus på Oromia-regionen' |
Landinfo (Norway) |
6/1/21 |
64. |
Talking and fighting about self-determination in Ethiopia |
Alex de Waal (UK) |
11/1/21 |
65. |
‘Ethiopia’s Oromia conflict: Why a teacher was killed ‘execution-style’ |
BBC (UK) |
16/1/21 |
66. |
‘Ethiopia’s leader must answer for the high costs of hidden war in Tigray’ |
Simon Tisdall (The Guardian, UK) |
24/1/21 |
67. |
‘Report: Ethiopia’ |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (The Netherlands) |
2/21 |
68. |
‘Prison conditions in Ethiopia’ |
ARC Foundation / Garden Court Chambers (UK) |
2/2/21 |
69. |
UN: Ethiopia may not have control of a large part of Tigray |
The Independent (UK) |
4/2/21 |
70. |
‘World Report 2021: Ethiopia’ |
Human Rights Watch (USA) |
18/2/21 |
71. |
‘Oromia Police rearrests OLF members again after Oromia Supreme Court dismisses charges and order their release’ |
Addis Standard (Ethiopia) |
29/3/21 |
72. |
‘OLF’s Colonel Gemechu Ayana taken away by security forces; PR says whereabouts of detained members unknown; Chairman remains incommunicado’ |
Addis Standard (Ethiopia) |
19/5/21 |
73. |
‘Amnesty calls for the release of OLF’s chairman under house arrest for months’ |
Addis Standard (Ethiopia) |
16/6/21 |
74. |
Mission https://oromoliberationfront.org/english/mission/ |
Oromo Liberation Front |
Undated |
APPENDIX 2
Home Office Documents filed with the Upper Tribunal
Item |
Title |
Date |
1. |
Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN): Ethiopia: Oromos (version 3.0) |
11/19 |
2. |
Report of a Home Office Fact-Finding Mission: Ethiopia: The political situation |
2/20 |
3. |
Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN): Ethiopia: Opposition to the government.4.0) (version |
7/20 |
4. |
Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN): Ethiopia: Actors of Protection (version 1.0) |
9/20 |
5. |
Country Police and Information Note (CPIN): Ethiopia: Background information, including internal relocation |
9/20 |
6. |
Response to an Information Request: Ethiopia: Oromos and the Oromo Liberation Front |
2/21 |
APPENDIX 3
Expert evidence filed with the Upper Tribunal
Document |
Author |
|
Date |
1. |
Dr. Awol Allo |
Senior Lecturer in Law at Keele University |
2/11/19 |
2. |
Peter Thorne |
Consultant Clinical Psychologist |
5/11/20 |
3. |
Dr. Awol Allo |
Senior Lecturer in Law at Keele University and Fung Global Fellow at Princeton University |
6/11/20 |
4. |
Dr. Awol Allo |
Senior Lecturer in Law at Keele University and Fung Global Fellow at Princeton University |
8/12/19 |
5. |
Dr. Awol Allo |
Senior Lecturer in Law at Keele University and Fung Global Fellow at Princeton University |
Undated |
APPENDIX 4
Letter from Amnesty International, dated 9 November 2020
1. The appellant filed and served a letter authored by Tom Southerden on behalf of Amnesty International, dated 9 November 2020.
2. The latter is annexed to this decision, with the name of the appellant edited so as to prevent identification.
Amnesty International
Ms Kam Dhanjal
JD Spicer Zeb Solicitors
83 Kilburn High Road
London
NW6 6JE
9 November 2020
Dear Ms Dhanjal
Re: [Appellant], Ethiopia & Country Guidance on Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) Supporters and Activists.
We write regarding your above-named client, who we understand has sought international protection in the UK. We understand that this application has been refused by the Secretary of State and on appeal at the First Tier Tribunal. We further understand that this case has now progressed to the Upper Tribunal where it is being considered for use as a vehicle for a new country guidance case on the issues last determined in the case of MB (OLF and MTA - risk) Ethiopia CG [2007] UKAIT 00030 (hereafter referred to as MB). We understand that it is the Secretary of State’s position, accepted by the First Tier Tribunal Judge, that there has been [sic] there are very strong grounds, supported by cogent evidence of a change in circumstances in Ethiopia, to justify a departure from the findings in MB. A panel of the UT will be considering whether the current country guidance in MB should continue to apply.
You have asked for [sic] Amnesty International if we are able to respond to the following questions regarding your client’s case, in light of our organisation’s ongoing research and experience of human rights conditions in Ethiopia:
Question 1: Do Oromo Liberation Front members and sympathisers (whether perceived or otherwise) continue to be at real risk of persecution in Ethiopia?
Question 2: To what extent does the above depend on profile; (with reference to the appellant’s case for instance)?
Question 3: Are you able to comment on the assertion by the Home Office at 2.4.26 of their July CPIN on Ethiopia that there are very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence to depart from the Upper Tribunal findings in the current country guidance case of MB (OLF and MTA - risk) Ethiopia CG [2007] UKAIT 00030 (29 March 2007) set out at 2.4.21 - 22 of the current CPIN on opposition to the Government?
Question 4: The present position of members and supporters of the OLF vis-a-vis government security forces?
Question 5: Is there today likely to be a presumption by the state that an Oromo person on return to Ethiopia is a member of, affiliated to or associated with the OLF?
Our answers to these questions should be read alongside our publicly published information on Ethiopia, all of which is available from the Ethiopia database on our website.[i]
In particular, however, we would ask that this letter be read alongside our recent in-depth report, ‘Beyond Law Enforcement: Human Rights Violations By Ethiopian Security Forces In Amhara And Oromia’, a copy of which we have provided as an annex to this letter.
Our answers to these questions have been prepared by Amnesty International UK’s Refugee and Migrant Rights Programme in conjunction with the individual Ethiopia research team based at AI’s International Secretariat. The Ethiopia research team consists of experienced research and campaigning staff who conduct continual research in the field and from AI’s regional hub office in Nairobi, Kenya. They conduct field research to gather information and testimony, as well as maintaining regular contact with a range of sources in Ethiopia, which includes Ethiopian human rights organisations, UN bodies and international non-governmental sources. They also receive information from detainees and their families, lawyers, journalists, asylum-seekers and refugees, diplomats, humanitarian agencies, and government officials. They monitor newspapers, websites and other media outlets. All research is carried out in accordance with the goals of the organisation and the principles of independence and impartiality.
Over the last ten years our organisation has provided responses to queries of this kind in excess of 400 individual cases, across a wide range of nationalities and at various stages of the international protection process in the UK, including at first instance, before the First-Tier and Upper Tribunal, the High Court, the Court of Appeal and in proceedings in the European Court of Human Rights. We can confirm that no financial income is derived from preparing letters of this kind regarding international protection cases.
Documents in the Case
In relation to the case of [the appellant] we have had sight of the following documents
- Determination of FTT Judge Obhi, dated 18th July 2019
- Appellant’s Bundle of Documents to the FTT Appeal, including, inter alia;
Screening Interview Record, 25th September 2017
SEF Interview Record, Dated 16th March 2018
Home Office Reasons for Refusal Letter, dated 2nd May 2019
Statement of [the appellant], dated 5th June 2019
We have also read the following Home Office publications, relevant to [the appellant’s] case and to the wider country guidance issues in this case:
- Country Policy and Information Note Ethiopia: Opposition to the government, Version 4.0, July 2020
- Report of a Home Office Fact-Finding Mission Ethiopia: The political situation, February 2020
- Country Policy and Information Note Ethiopia: Oromos, Version 3.0 November 2019
We have also read the current country guidance case in relation to OLF members and supporters in Ethiopia, MB (OLF and MTA - risk) Ethiopia CG [2007] UKAIT 00030.
Having read these documents and emails to us, we understand that [the appellant] is a young man and an Ethiopian national of Oromo ethnicity. He states that he is the son of a farmer and OLF supporter. He states that in 2013 (when [the appellant] would have been aged around 13) police raided his family home on several occasions looking for his father, and that his father was eventually arrested in February 2014 due to his involvement with the OLF. He states that his father was held in Dallomana prison until Jan 2016 when he was taken to hospital, weak from beatings and torture. [The appellant] states that in 2015 a fellow pupil brought an OLF flag to his school and distributed it and displayed it amongst the pupils. The police arrived, rounded the students up and questioned them. [The appellant] states he was beaten and arrested and then held in Dallomana prison for 10 days before being made to sign a promise not to be involved with the OLF again and threatened he would be killed if he did so. He states that despite this he began secretly attending OLF meetings, distributing leaflets and in February 2016 took part in an OLF demonstration against police misconduct in the region. He states that he was arrested again and detained, this time for 28 days during which time he states he was beaten and questioned about his activities. He states he was released after payment of a bribe, by his uncle, and that it was then arranged for him to travel on the overland route out of the country.
Background - Human Rights in Ethiopia
This section refers to information published in our recent public report, ‘Beyond Law Enforcement: Human Rights Violations By Ethiopian Security Forces In Amhara and Oromia’, and should be read alongside that report.
Ethiopia has been ruled since 1991 by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF); a coalition of ethnically-based parties representative of the main regions in Ethiopia’s ethnic-federal constitutional system, dominated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The EPRDF pursued a highly autocratic and repressive governing strategy, criminalising and in other ways targeting political opponents, real and perceived, and imposing strong controls on freedoms of expression, assembly and association. Arbitrary detention, unfair trials and trumped up charges were commonly used, and abuses in custody up to and including torture and extrajudicial executions were widespread.
The EPRDF also fought a prolonged war against the Oromo Liberation Front (and its armed wing the Oromo Liberation Army, OLA), an Oromo nationalist group that had fought against the previous government of Mengistu Hailemariam and which in 1991 was briefly part of a transitional government led by the EPRDF coalition. The OLF always had an uneasy relationship with the TPLF, and these tensions led to the OLF leaving the transitional government in 1992 to take up a low-level armed struggle against the government. The OLF stated that its fundamental objective was to exercise the Oromo peoples’ right to self-determination. The EPRDF viewed them as violent separatists threatening the integrity of the nation.
Moving to the years 2014 and 2015, spurred by the government’s systemic human rights repression, as well as economic and political marginalisation, youth in the Oromia and Amhara regions launched a wave of what would become large scale and sustained street demonstrations, of a kind that had not previously been seen in the country under the EPRDF. The government used excessive, and often lethal, force to quell the protests, killing, beating and arresting protesters. The protests continued until February 2018, when the then Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn was forced to resign. He was replaced by a new Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, the first Oromo to hold the post.
In an attempt to appease the public protest, Prime Minister Abiy, announced reforms to address economic issues as well as structural and systematic human rights issues. Thousands of prisoners who were serving sentences on politically motivated charges were released. The state of war with neighbouring Eritrea was ended and relations were normalised. Bans on many websites and independent news outlets were lifted; and a number of opposition groups were removed from the official government terrorist list. This latter move included the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), whose leaders were told it was safe to return to the country from their prolonged exile abroad.
In response, many senior political opponents in the Ethiopian diaspora, including a number of OLF figures, return to the country after agreeing to pursue peaceful means to achieve their political goals. National parliamentary elections were scheduled for 2020 and in November 2019 Prime Minister Abiy, as chairman of the EPRDF, dissolved the coalition and merged most of its constituent parties into a new coalition party to contest the elections, named the Prosperity Party. The TPLF did not become part of this new coalition party.
However, despite the ambitious reform agenda pursued by Prime Minister Abiy, there were a number of key areas that remained untouched. In particular, the state security apparatus, including the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF), the regional police forces and government-controlled local militias, remained largely unreformed. While the government took some steps to ensure accountability for past human rights violations (principally the prosecution of some federal security officers accused of torture and ill-treatment of detainees) little was done to address the abusive practices of security forces and the leadership, institutional culture and legal framework that enabled them. The truth about the depth of past human rights violations committed since 1991 is yet to come out and reparations for victims remained elusive. The bulk of past atrocities in Ethiopia - including widespread acts of killing, torture and other ill-treatment, and excessive use of force against protesters - remained unaccounted for.
At the same time, the period during which Prime Minister Abiy’s government was instituting its human rights reforms was interspersed with political and ethnic tensions that prompted military insurgencies and inter-communal violence in Amhara, Oromia, Harar, Dire Dawa, Benishangul and the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) regions. In particular, a splinter wing broke away from the Oromo Liberation Army, the military wing of the OLF, after rejecting the OLF’s adoption of exclusively peaceful means. The OLA splinter group staged armed attacks in Western and Southern parts of Oromia. In response to the armed violence in January 2019 the government launched a law-enforcement offensive, ostensibly against the OLA, arguing that violent ethnic separatists posed a fundamental threat to the liberalising reform programme that Prime Minister Abiy was trying to institute.[ii]
Over the next year, regional and federal security forces oversaw a campaign of mass arbitrary arrests and detentions; the routine use of torture and other serious ill-treatment; and the use of extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances in the Oromia region and elsewhere. In addition, security forces have arbitrarily banned certain flags and expressions and/or the use of mobile phones; imposed internet blackouts and physical curfews, movement restrictions and checkpoints; and in some cases have been implicated in forced evictions. The OLA were not, however, the main target for these tactics. Oromo civilians resident in areas of suspected OLA activity were arbitrarily targeted and accused of providing practical and moral support to the OLA. Individuals perceived as being associated with the OLF, (whether through membership, support, historic association through security agency records, or family ties) were particularly targeted, on the pretext of support for the OLA and terrorist violence, but a far wider group of people, either associated with other Oromo nationalist groups, such as the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), or in some cases having no association beyond being Oromo and living in a certain area, were also caught up in these arrests.
Moving into 2020, the year was designated as a national election year, with parliamentary elections due to be held in August. However, following the start of the global coronavirus pandemic the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) postponed the elections indefinitely, on the grounds that it was not safe to conduct ordinary campaigning and polling practices. This was inevitably a highly contentious decision and how the country will move forward from this point is still being heatedly debated. Our current understanding of the official position is that the elections will now be held in May or June 2021.[iii]
In the meantime, in a move that escalated the tension between the Federal government and the Regional government in Tigray, the TPLF - a party which controls all the seats in the Tigray Regional State Parliament - held a regional election in September 2020. This move was deemed unconstitutional by the NEBE and the results were not recognised by the national government. In response the government withheld the national budget allocation for the region, which has been met with a vociferous response from the TPLF leadership and heightened tensions.[iv] During the period when this letter was being prepared, the Ethiopian government announced that military action would be taken against the TPLF in Tigray. The government blamed the TPLF for attacking the Ethiopian National Defence Force’s Northern Command based in the regional capital Mekelle, after “months of continued provocations and incitement for violence by the TPLF”.[v] While not directly relevant to this case, this is an important and concerning development both in its own terms and in demonstrating the strength of the Ethiopian federal government’s response to the rival ethnically-based regional political groupings it faces.
In Oromia, prior to the general election’s suspension the OLF held a commanding lead in the polls and were widely predicted to win political control of the region away from the Oromo Democratic Party (formerly known as the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organisation (OPDO)), which has governed the region as part of the EPRDF coalition since 1991. However, the postponement of the elections was combined with both targeted arrests and killings of leading OLF figures and the ongoing use of mass-scale arbitrary arrests and other repressive tactics targeted at OLF activists and supporters in the region.
In the early hours of 29 February 2020, security officers stormed a guest house in the southern part of Addis Ababa where five senior members of the OLF and four supporters were staying. All nine were arrested. While eight were subsequently released, Abdi Regassa, a member of the OLF’s Executive Committee who had previously returned to the country from exile following the 2018 reforms, was held in incommunicado detention.[vi] On 7th March, three OLF members, including a member of the Central Committee and a political officer, were arrested by police immediately after visiting Abdi Regassa. Despite having charges against them dropped and their release ordered by a court at the end of March, police continue to hold them in detention.[vii] On 3 June 2020 Bekele Bidra, the head of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) office in Bole Sub-City of Addis Ababa was killed in his car.[viii]
Perhaps most significantly, given the consequences, on 29th June, Hachalu Hundessa a very popular Oromo singer, was shot and killed in the street in Addis Ababa.[ix] A week earlier he had given a controversial interview to the Oromo Media Network (OMN), a youth-orientated Oromo nationalist television network. In the aftermath of his killing, protests sprang up in Addis Ababa and the Oromia region, some of which degenerated into intercommunal violence, which together with a violent police response left at least 177 dead and hundreds wounded.[x] The Ethiopian government has sought to place the blame for the killing on the ’OLF-Shene’, Shene being a term for the armed factions of the OLA, and suspects have been charged. They deny the charges, as does the OLF-Shene. The suggestion is widely disbelieved in Oromia, but we are yet to see the strength of the evidence in the case.
Following these protests the police arrested thousands of people, many of whom remain in incommunicado detention with their whereabouts unknown. The arrests continued for weeks and reached over 10,000 people at their height.[xi] Many of those arrested were OLF and Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) members and supporters, while others were accused of being so. On 30th June, Jawar Mohamed, a leading figure at the Oromo Media Network and for the OFC, was arrested on charges relating to the killing of a policeman during the protests. He and 22 others connected to the OMN have since been charged with terrorism offences.[xii] On 26th July reports emerged that Daud Ibssa, the Chairman of the OLF, who had returned to the country from exile in 2018, had been placed under house arrest.[xiii] He was subsequently freed, but was again placed under house arrest in October, when a press conference he was holding from his home was raided by the authorities. Journalists for Oromo nationalist outlets and others attending the press conference were arrested and taken away when they tried to leave.[xiv]
In August, widespread reports emerged of further killings of protesters and perceived supporters of the OLF by security forces in Addis Ababa and various towns around Oromia. While we have not been able to verify the exact number of dead, we have confirmed that at least 20 protesters were killed and believe that the real figure is likely to be higher than that; there are reports of dozens more being killed.[xv] The killings were part of a disproportionate use of force against demonstrators protesting about the arrest of Jawar Mohamed and about the mass arrests following the killing of Hachalu Hundessa.[xvi]
Targeted killings of individuals by security officers have also continued, either following accusations of involvement with the OLF-Shene, or in some instances with no explanation at all. Recent, non-exhaustive, examples include the October 23rd killing of five young men in the town of Nekemte in the East Wollega zone of western Oromia by the Oromia Special Police. Police stated that the men had been involved in the killing of a policeman the week before and had fired on officers when the house they were in was raided. Other witnesses reported that the men were unarmed, uninvolved with the armed movement and were extrajudicially executed in their homes after an anonymous denouncement.[xvii] Two days later, on 25th October, university lecturer Fecadu Tolera was reportedly shot dead, again by Oromia Special Police officers outside his house. No official explanation has been given for his killing. Oromo nationalist supporters believe it was connected to his academic publications discussing the history of the foundation of Ethiopia and Oromia’s place within it.[xviii]
On 1st November, at least 54 people from the Amhara ethnic group were killed in an attack on Gawa Qanqa village in Guliso District of West Wellega Zone. The attack appears to have been carried out by members of the OLA. The attack took place just a day after Ethiopian National Defence Force troops withdrew from the area unexpectedly and without explanation. Witnesses said dozens of men, women and children were killed, property looted and what the militants could not carry away, they set on fire.[xix]
On Sunday 8th November 2020, Prime Minister Abiy announced a slate of changes at the top level of the security apparatus, replacing the heads of the ENDF, the National Intelligence and Security Service, the Federal Police and also Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister.[xx] These appointments appear to be more a reshuffling than a serious sign of reform from a human rights perspective. None of the new appointees are new faces to the security sector; all have been part of the system for a very long time holding other senior posts. The reason for the reshuffle appears to be more to do with loyalty to Prime Minister Abiy and commitment to the current military operations against the TPLF, mentioned above, done with any reform agenda.
With this background in mind, we will now address each of your questions in turn.
Question 1: Do Oromo Liberation Front members and sympathisers (whether perceived or otherwise) continue to be at real risk of persecution in Ethiopia?
As is set out in our summary of the background above, Ethiopia has undergone, and is continuing to undergo, significant political developments in the last few years. The change of Prime Minister has brought both a new agenda for government and some important symbolic developments in a country that continues to suffer from ethnic division and factionalism; in particular the coming to power of the first Oromo prime minister. However, there is an inherent tension in a liberalising reform agenda being pursued by a new Prime Minister at the head of a governing coalition that is very similar to the previous one, and without fundamental reform to the security services. This is particularly the case in the context of the ongoing popularity of influential regional/ethnic separatist movements such as the OLF, tensions between the federal government and the Tigray regional government of the TPLF, and increasing incidents of inter-ethnic violence across the country, particularly targeting minorities.
Despite the encouraging signs of the first months of Prime Minister Abiy’s rule, which, along with many others, our organisation praised at the time, we are increasingly concerned at what appears to be a downward spiral for human rights in the country. As was noted above, most recently this has been indicated by the announcement of a military operation against the TPLF, but has now long been the case in the Oromia, and also the Amhara, regions. What may have begun as a police action to deal with a relatively small armed splinter group, the OLA, and violent attacks on ethnic minorities in the region, particularly Amharas, has now in our assessment gone well beyond law enforcement.[xxi]
It is increasingly apparent that the security apparatus has used the rise of a relatively small OLA as a pretext for a widespread crackdown on supporters and perceived supporters of Oromo nationalism in general and the OLF in particular, who are viewed as a threat to the territorial integrity of the state and an obstacle to the current government and its agenda. This crackdown has come in the context of Federal and Regional elections that, prior to their suspension due to the Coronavirus pandemic, the OLF and other nationalist parties were expected to do very well in; potentially displacing the political leadership the security services had been loyal to since the early 1990s. As discussed above, those with OLF backgrounds have been targeted in the crackdown, but so have others unconnected to the OLF but affiliated with other Oromo nationalist organisations, including journalists and others working for nationalist-sympathising media outlets, such as the Oromo Media Network (OMN) and members of other nationalist groups such as the OFC. Others still have also been caught up through participation in protests or mere residence in areas targeted by the security services. Those arrested are increasingly and routinely labelled as ‘OLF-Shene’; Shene being a term for the armed factions of the OLA. It is therefore more instructive, in our view, to focus on the question of Oromo people perceived as opponents of the new government, who are then as a result either perceived or labelled as OLF activists, than solely on those people with documented histories of OLF involvement specifically.
As part of this, we would emphasise the extreme arbitrariness of the Ethiopian security services’ conduct in Oromia and in its dealings with Oromo people perceived as political opponents of the government. While this is a longstanding issue, it is particularly pronounced at the present time, where mass-roundups, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial executions are regular occurrences, alongside indiscriminate violence in response to public demonstration and perceived dissent. In Oromia, the grounds on which a person can be accused or perceived of being a supporter of the OLF, and therefore a potential supporter of the OLA and a threat to the government, are broad, dependent on the whims of the officers involved and to an extent unpredictable. As discussed in our ‘Beyond Law Enforcement’ report, in recent months the reasons have included simply being Oromo and living in a certain location, or because a person’s mobile phone rang and interrupted a public meeting.[xxii] While specific individuals are certainly targeted, based on suspicion of OLF involvement, the arbitrariness of the security services’ conduct has meant that in multiple instances, where security officials were not able to find the suspects they were looking for, they arrested or abducted family members including children. In one instance, the police physically assaulted an 8-year-old girl, because they couldn’t find her mother at home when they came to arrest her.[xxiii]
As a general statement, our organisation’s assessment is that Oromo Liberation Front members and sympathisers (whether perceived or otherwise) do continue to be at risk in Ethiopia. Further details about the nature and extent of that risk will be discussed in our response to the questions below.
Question 2: To what extent does the above depend on profile; (with reference to the appellant’s case for instance)?
There are a number of ways in which a person’s profile is relevant to the level of risk they face.
Firstly, much of the targeting of individuals perceived as members or supporters of the OLF is conducted by local militia and police forces, informing and working alongside federal forces operating in the region. These local militia and police officers are stationed in local communities, ostensibly providing protection and security services to the community, but also providing intelligence gathering on perceived anti-government activists and their supporters for the authorities. As has been, and will be, highlighted throughout this letter, security force operatives conduct themselves with high levels of arbitrariness and benefit from a high degree of impunity from accountability, even following the Prime Minister’s reforms. In this context, both formal arrest records and institutional as well as personal memory of individual officers play a major role in determining who is perceived as possessing an anti-government agenda and therefore subject to suspicion.
This makes a history of arrest for OLF or other Oromo nationalist activity an important risk factor in the current context. It also makes a family history of OLF or other Oromo nationalist activity a significant risk factor. This institutional and personal memory at the local level routinely extends to identifying whole families as supporters of the OLF, based on the political activities of one or two members, or holding the whole family responsible for the activities of one or two members.
While men, and young men in particular, make up the majority of those targeted by the authorities or caught up in mass arrests, gender and age do not appear to offer any significant level of protection against suspicion and targeting by the authorities. Our researchers found that women are routinely targeted for arrest, often on accusations of providing support for the ‘OLF-Shene’. Likewise, older people and children have also been targeted, particularly those who have family connections to ‘OLF-Shene’ suspects.
Another factor relates to the person’s stature within the organisation, or the extent of their public profile. While this is hard to precisely delineate, given the arbitrary nature of the security forces’ conduct and the ever-changing circumstances in the country, there does appear to be some limited protection from arrest afforded to very senior and prominent members of the OLF, whose arrest would risk causing disproportionate adverse consequences for the government. For example, as discussed above the chairman of the OLF, Daud Ibssa, has not been imprisoned. However, it appears that in these circumstances alternative methods are used to inhibit their capacity to operate effectively, including house arrest, communication shutdowns and the arrest of middle-ranking individuals working under and alongside them, thus leaving them isolated. At the same time, rank and file members and supporters benefit from no such protection.
Beyond personal profile elements, there are two points regarding geography that we also consider to be relevant profile factors in the question of risk.
Firstly, we have noted the statement in the Home Office’s Country Policy and Information Note that,
‘the available evidence does not indicate that all OLF activists, members or supporters … throughout Ethiopia are at risk of treatment amounting to persecution by its nature and/or repetition. The assessment of risk for a person will vary between different areas of Ethiopia and within Oromia itself’ (emphasis added)[xxiv]
We are concerned that this is potentially misleading, insofar as it implies that the entirety of the country of Ethiopia is a relevant consideration in this case. The OLF, and those perceived as supporting it, are present essentially exclusively in Oromia and the capital Addis Ababa (which is in any case geographically encircled by Oromia). The realistic question, therefore, is whether there are areas of Oromia or Addis Ababa where the risks identified in MB no longer apply.
On this second point, we note that the CPIN states that,
‘Areas such as West Wollega and Guji, in western and southern Oromia respectively, have been subject to government and OLA (sometimes also referred to as ‘shene’, a faction of the OLA), clashes, violence and killings including of civilians, attributed to both sides. The federal government has established military ‘command posts’ in these areas in an attempt to counter the OLA threat. … There have been reports of OLA, ‘shene’ and OLF members and sympathisers being arrested and detained, as well as some being extra-judicially killed, in the areas around ‘command posts’ where there have been notably high levels of violence and fighting, particularly in western and southern Oromia.’[xxv]
And goes on to argue that,
‘OLF members or supporters in Oromia, particularly in areas where armed conflict between the OLA and the armed forces continues, face a higher risk of treatment that amounts to persecution than those in Addis Ababa.’[xxvi]
This section of the CPIN concludes by asserting that a person who is a member or supporter of the OLF is not at risk of persecution for that reason alone, and that each case must be considered on its facts, including the ‘proposed place of return’ the person would be being sent to.[xxvii]
While we broadly agree with the thrust of the Home Office’s description of both sides’ actions in areas such as West Wollega and Guji, and events following the introduction of ‘command posts’ in those regions, we are respectfully concerned that abusive conduct by the security forces in the rest of Oromia has not been given sufficient prominence. In the last year, our organisation has documented hundreds of arrests of OLF members and perceived supporters in East and West Hararghe (eastern zones of Oromia), North, west and east Shewa (northern zones of Oromia, around Addis Ababa), and East and West Arsi (central zones of Oromia).[xxviii] Incidents like these are illustrative of the widespread nature of the crackdown on those perceived as OLF supporters throughout the Oromia region.
With regards to Addis Ababa itself, our organisation has recorded instances of individuals associated with the OLF or OLF-supporting media networks being arrested, detained or attacked in Addis Ababa, in some cases repeatedly. In addition to the incidents discussed in the above ‘background’ section of this letter, these include the July arrests of OLF political officers Chaltu Takkele and Gemmechu Ayana, and Kennesa Ayana, a member of the OLF’s central committee.[xxix] There are also reports from the OLF, that we are yet to fully confirm, of wider scale arrests of OLF supporters in the city over the summer.
The final points we would make regarding the extent to which a person perceived as an OLF supporter’s profile would affect the level of risk they face relates to their recent and ongoing participation in activism for the Oromo nationalist cause.
While, in our view, individuals being returned to Ethiopia from the UK with a known history of OLF support, whether that be an arrest history or otherwise, face a significant risk for that reason alone, individuals who go on to continue their activism with the OLF on return will inevitably face an even greater risk. Likewise, individuals who have engaged in significant recent activism on behalf of the OLF, or other Oromo nationalist groups, while in the UK may also face a greater risk. This would include participation at the large-scale, and at times disorderly, demonstrations that have taken place outside the Ethiopian embassy in London over the summer of 2020.[xxx] These demonstrations were closely monitored by the Ethiopian authorities, who reportedly raised diplomatic complaints with the British government over what they perceived to be the British police’s failure to appropriately protect the Embassy and its staff.[xxxi] The events have also been widely reported in Ethiopian media and videos have been circulated online amongst both supporters and opponents of the OLF’s cause.[xxxii]
With reference to [the appellant], the appellant in this case, our organisation has not previously documented his case and we are therefore not able to comment on his background directly. We would note, however, that his claimed background, as summarised above, is in our experience very common amongst young supporters and activists for the OLF or the wider Oromo nationalist movement, including a family history of involvement, youth engagement and serious adverse experience with the Ethiopian security forces. If his background is accepted by the Tribunal, in our organisation’s view it contains a number of elements that in combination would indicate a significant risk of being perceived as a supporter of the OLF, including his age and gender, his family history of involvement with the OLF and his arrest history.
Question 3: Are you able to comment on the assertion by the Home Office at 2.4.26 of their July CPIN on Ethiopia that there are very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence to depart from the Upper Tribunal findings in the current country guidance case of MB (OLF and MTA - risk) Ethiopia CG [2007] UKAIT 00030 (29 March 2007) set out at 2.4.21 - 22 of the current CPIN on opposition to the Government?
Having read the MB case, it is our understanding that it finds that OLF members and sympathisers and those specifically perceived by the authorities to be such members or sympathisers will in general be at real risk if they have been previously arrested or detained on suspicion of OLF involvement. So too will those who have a significant history, known to the authorities, of OLF membership or sympathy.
Based on our ongoing research into the recent events of 2019 and 2020 documented in our published reports, it is our organisation’s assessment that while much has changed in Ethiopia since MB was promulgated in 2007, the situation has not improved sufficiently to justify an assertion that the risk assessment made in MB is no longer valid. Indeed, in our assessment, the nature and the extent of the current risks may be broader than the above summary position given in MB would seem to imply, insofar as the need for a ‘significant’ history of membership or sympathy for the OLF does not reflect the extent of the mass and arbitrary arrests of Oromo people, including those with little realistic connection to the OLF and the increasing targeting of other non-OLF Oromo nationalist groups, and other abuses that are being perpetrated in the Oromia region.
One caveat we would make to this assessment is that some former OLF and other exiled opposition group members are now active supporters of the new government such as by taking up government posts or through supporting the party in public electoral activities.[xxxiii] We do not consider such people to be at significant risk, absent other factors, as the underlying basis of the risk is to Oromo people perceived by the authorities to be opponents of the new government, in the context of arbitrary decision making over suspicion or ’innocence’ conducted by local militia and police officers acting with impunity and with political and institutional loyalty to the new government. A former OLF member or supporter who went out of their way to demonstrate that they had withdrawn themselves entirely from politics might also be able to benefit from some level of protection, but this would be less reliable and in the arbitrary context described above, would be very difficult to precisely define.
For these reasons, and those given in our answers to questions 1,2 and 4, while we agree with the Home Office’s assessment that since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in April 2018 there has been an important change in the political landscape, we are respectfully of the view that the Country Policy and Information Note overstates the case by arguing that these constitute sufficient grounds for departing from the risk criteria identified in MB.
Question 4: The present position of members and supporters of the OLF vis-a-vis government security forces?
Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, as we have noted above, despite Prime Minister Abiy’s reform programme the security forces remain largely unreformed across any of the relevant metrics, including personnel, leadership, institutional culture, political independence and accountability. This has been amply demonstrated by their activities in Oromia and elsewhere over 2019 and now into 2020. Moreover, their actions, which include engaging in mass arbitrary arrests and the use of extreme violence up to and including extrajudicial executions and torture, have been given political cover and downplayed by Prime Minister Abiy and his leadership group as merely ‘robust measures’.[xxxiv] Indeed, the reform programme has itself been invoked as justification for these actions, with the argument that a strong response is necessary to deal with those that the government views as opponents or obstacles to its agenda.[xxxv]
Secondly the reliance placed on the fact that a number of key OLF figures returned to Ethiopia in 2018 for evidence that it is now safe for OLF supporters to return is, in our view, undermined by many of those leaders’ subsequent arrest and detention. As we noted above, both Abdi Regassa and Daud Ibssa have been arrested and detained since returning. Other senior OLF figures detained since return include Michael Boran, Shigut Geleta, Lemi Benya, Kenessa Ayana and Colonel Gemechu Ayana.[xxxvi]
The ongoing use of sweeping powers of detention against thousands of perceived OLF/OLA supporters may differ from previous periods of OLF suppression in terms of political context and external justification, but this does not change the reality of ongoing suppression of the Oromo nationalist movement and those Oromos perceived as engaging in dissent by security services loyal to the current government and acting with near total impunity.
Question 5: Is there today likely to be a presumption by the state that an Oromo person on return to Ethiopia is a member of, affiliated to or associated with the OLF?
It is not our organisation’s view that any Oromo person being returned to Ethiopia from the UK would be presumed by the state to be associated with the OLF. As has already been noted, there are Oromo people in senior positions in the Ethiopian government, including the Prime Minister himself; the region is currently governed by an ethnic Oromo party loyal to the national government; and it is policed largely by locally recruited police officers and militia members. As such, we do not consider that there is a universal presumption of Oromo ethnicity equating to opposition to the government generally or support for the OLF specifically.
That said, we do consider that the circumstances of an Oromo person being forcibly returned from the UK to Ethiopia, whether or not the Ethiopian authorities were aware that they were being returned as a failed asylum seeker, would be likely to give rise to at least some initial suspicion of the individual by the authorities, which could in turn prompt some further enquiries and background checks. If these enquiries were to reveal a connection to the OLF or other Oromo opposition groups, then the considerations relating to risk described in our answers to the questions above would apply.
Conclusion
Since coming to power in 2018, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has instituted a number of important reforms that opened up an opportunity for fundamental human rights change in Ethiopia, including the release of political prisoners and the repeal of a range of repressive laws. However, a number of areas remain largely or entirely unreformed, most pertinently the state security apparatus, which remains politically loyal to the governing party and which engages in arbitrary and extremely abusive practices, including mass arrests, incommunicado detention, torture and extrajudicial execution. At the same time, the government has been confronted by increasing ethnic tensions in the country, intercommunal violence and the growing influence of nationalist, self-determination and independence movements in various regions of Ethiopia. The government sees these movements both as obstacles to its agenda and as potential threats to the territorial integrity of the nation.
The state security apparatus, under the command of the government and with its political backing, has engaged in serious human rights abuses across the country, but particularly in the Oromia region, which is home to an ambitious and popular nationalist movement for self-determination. This security apparatus has used the rise of a relatively small armed splinter faction, the OLA, as a pretext for a widespread crackdown on supporters and perceived supporters of Oromo nationalism in general and the OLF in particular. This crackdown has come in the context of Federal and Regional elections that, prior to their suspension due to the Coronavirus pandemic, the OLF were expected to do very well in; potentially displacing the political leadership the security services have been loyal to since the early 1990s.
The crackdown has been characterised by extreme brutality, including public extrajudicial executions and other forms of extreme arbitrary and indiscriminate violence. Rather than focus its efforts on targeting and confronting the relatively small armed splinter faction from the OLA, which has undoubtedly committed grave human rights abuses itself, the security services have instead focused on civilians in Oromia and suspected OLF supporters in particular. Thousands have been arrested and detained for prolonged indefinite periods on broad and unparticularised grounds of suspected support for terrorism and the OLA. Thousands remain detained to this day.
In this context, it is our organisation’s assessment that the overall risk assessment findings of the MB case remain appropriate, and may even be too narrow, even if the background justification for them has changed.
We hope that this letter will be of assistance to the Tribunal in its deliberations. Please feel free to contact us at the above address if you wish to discuss any of these matters further.
Yours sincerely
Tom Southerden - Refugee Researcher
Refugee and Migrants’ Rights Programme - AIUK
[ii] See e.g. https:www.economist.com/by-invitation/2020/09/17/abiy-ahmed-on-the-threats-to-ethiopias-democratic-transition
[iii] See e.g. https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-politics/ethiopia-proposes-holding-postponed-vote-in-may-or-june-2021-fana-idUSKBN27F14A
[iv] See e.g. htpps://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-53807187
[v] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/11/ethiopia-authorities-must-ensure-human-rights-are-respected-in-tigray-military-operator
[vi] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/03/ethiopia-police-must-account-for-missing-oromo-opposition-leader/
[viii] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/ethiopia-popular-musicians-killing-must-be-fully-investigated/
[ix] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/ethiopia-popular-musicians-killing-must-be-fully-investigated/
[x] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/ethiopia-account-for-all-people-arrested-after-hachalu-hundesa-killing/
[xi] [No footnote provided]
[xiii] https://www.ezega.com/News/NewsDetails/8042/OLF-Leader-Daud-Ibssa-under-House-Arrest-Party-Official
[xv] https://addisstandard.com/analysis-oromia-reeling-from-state-violence-after-security-forces-kill-injure-a-staggering-number-of-protesters/
[xvi] https://addisstandard.com/analysis-oromia-reeling-from-state-violence-after-security-forces-kill-injure-a-staggering-number-of-protesters/
[xvii] https://addisstandard.com/analysis-teachers-doctors-not-spared-as-use-of-excessive-force-extrajudicial-killings-in-oromia-intensify-what-we-know-so-far/
[xviii] [No footnote provided]
[xix] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/11/ethiopia-over-50-ethnic-amhara-killed-in-attack-on-village-by-armed-group/
[xx] https://addisstandard.com/news-alert-unprecedented-move-by-pm-abiy-sees-new-leadership-in-entire-security-sector-foreign-ministry/
[xxiv] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/900975/CPIN_-_Ethiopia_-_Opposition_to_the_government.pdf
[xxv] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/900975/CPIN_-_Ethiopia_-_Opposition_to_the_government.pdf
[xxvi] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/900975/CPIN_-_Ethiopia_-_Opposition_to_the_government.pdf
[xxvii] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/900975/CPIN_-_Ethiopia_-_Opposition_to_the_government.pdf
[xxix] See e.g. https://www.france24.com/en/20200706-political-arrests-follow-protests-that-killed-166-in-ethiopia
[xxx] See e.g. https://borkena.com/2020/08/25/radical-oromo-mob-took-down-ethiopian-flag-at-the-embassy-in-london/
[xxxi] https://borkena.com/2020/08/25/radical-oromo-mob-took-down-ethiopian-flag-at-the-embassy-in-london/
[xxxiii] E.g. Mr Taye Dendea, who previously served jail terms of three and seven years on charges that he belonged to the OLF is now working as a PR for the Oromia Prosperity Party. Mr Lencho Bati, formerly chairman of the exiled Oromo Democratic Front, is now an advisor to the Prime Minister.
[xxxiv] https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2020/09/17/abiy-ahmed-on-the-threats-to-ethiopias-democratic-transition