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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> BODÉN v. SWEDEN - 10930/84 [1987] ECHR 26 (27 October 1987)
Cite as: (1988) 10 EHRR 367, [1987] ECHR 26

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In the Bodén case*,


* Note by the registry: The case is numbered 18/1986/116/164. The

second figure indicates the year in which the case was referred to the

Court and the first figure its place on the list of cases referred in

that year; the last two figures indicate, respectively, the case's

order on the list of cases and of originating applications (to the

Commission) referred to the Court since its creation.


The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with

Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human

Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the relevant

provisions of the Rules of Court, as a Chamber composed of the

following judges:

Mr. R. Ryssdal, President,

Mr. G. Lagergren,

Mr. F. Gölcüklü,

Mr. L-E. Pettiti,

Mr. R. Macdonald,

Mr. R. Bernhardt,

Mr. J. De Meyer,

and also of Mr. M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr. H. Petzold,

Deputy Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 25 March and 24 September 1987,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the

last-mentioned date:


1. The case was referred to the Court by the European Commission

of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 18 July 1986, within the

three-month period laid down by Article 32 § 1 and Article 47

(art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. The case originated in an

application (no. 10930/84) against the Kingdom of Sweden lodged with

the Commission on 10 January 1984 under Article 25 (art. 25) by a

Swedish citizen, Mr. Gunnar Bodén.

The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44,

art. 48) and to the declaration whereby Sweden recognised the

compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The

purpose of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the

facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its

obligations under Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.

2. In response to the inquiry made in accordance with

Rule 33 § 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicant stated that he

did not wish to take part in the proceedings pending before the Court.

3. The Chamber of seven judges to be constituted included, as ex

officio members, Mr. G. Lagergren, the elected judge of Swedish

nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and

Mr. R. Ryssdal, the President of the Court (Rule 21 § 3 (b)).

On 26 September 1986, the President drew by lot, in the presence of

the Registrar, the names of the five other members, namely

Mr. F. Gölcüklü, Mr. L.-E. Pettiti, Mr. R. Bernhardt, Mr. A.M. Donner

and Mr. J. De Meyer (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and

Rule 21 § 4) (art. 43). Mr. R. Macdonald, substitute judge,

subsequently replaced Mr. Donner, who was prevented from taking part

in the consideration of the case (Rules 22 § 1 and 24 § 1).

4. The Swedish Government ("the Government") informed the

Registrar on 29 October 1986 that negotiations were being conducted

with the applicant with a view to arriving at a friendly settlement

and then, on 4 February 1987, that the negotiations had proved


5. Mr. Ryssdal, who had assumed the office of President of the

Chamber (Rule 21 § 5), ascertained, through the Registrar, the views

of the Agent of the Government and the Delegate of the Commission

regarding the need for a written procedure. Having regard to their

concurring statements, he decided on 26 February 1987 that it was not

necessary for memorials to be filed (Rule 37 § 1) and directed that

the oral proceedings should open on 23 March 1987 (Rule 38).

Prior to that, on 12 and 18 February, the applicant had lodged claims

for just satisfaction under Article 50 (art. 50) (Rule 49 taken

together with Rule 1 (k)). He provided further particulars of these

claims on 24 April at the request of the President.

6. The hearing was held in public at the Human Rights Building,

Strasbourg, on the appointed day. Immediately before it opened, the

Court had held a preparatory meeting.

There appeared before the Court:

- for the Government

Mr. H. Corell, Ambassador, Under-Secretary for Legal

and Consular Affairs, Ministry for

Foreign Affairs, Agent,

Mr. P. Löfmarck, Under-Secretary for Legal Affairs,

Ministry of Transport and Communications,

Mr. H. Berglin, Legal Adviser, Ministry for Foreign

Affairs, Advisers;

- for the Commission

Mr. Gaukur Jörundsson, Delegate.

The Court heard addresses by Mr. Corell for the Government and

by Mr. Gaukur Jörundsson for the Commission, as well as their replies

to the questions put by the Court and several judges.


I. Particular circumstances of the case

7. The applicant, Mr. Gunnar Bodén, was born in 1939. He is a

Swedish citizen resident in Falun and a car driver by profession. He

owned, together with his brother Mr. B. Bodén, the properties

Källviken 1:18, 1:25 and 1:26.

8. On 30 June 1977, the Falun Municipal Council

(kommunfullmäktige) adopted an area plan (områdesplan) with a view to

the development of a housing estate in an area including the

applicant's properties. On 9 February 1978, the Municipal Council

decided to apply to the Government for an expropriation permit for

this area.

9. The applicant objected to the expropriation in respect of two

of the three properties concerned, because, as he submitted to the

Government, he doubted that they were needed for the development

contemplated and, further, he wanted to live with his mother in his

parents' home situated on one of the properties. He claimed that,

when working out and adopting the area plan, the Municipal Council had

not taken his interests sufficiently into account, something that

would have been possible within the framework of a somewhat modified

plan. However, the Government, taking the view that the Municipal

Council had shown the need to include the applicant's properties,

concluded that the conditions laid down in the Expropriation Act 1972

(expropriationslagen 1972:719 - "the 1972 Act") were satisfied.

On 1 March 1979, they issued an expropriation permit.

10. The decision indicated that the issue of the permit had to be

followed by the institution of proceedings by the Municipality before

a real estate court not later than 3 March 1980. An action, the

object of which was to settle the terms of the expropriation (see

paragraph 15 below), was commenced on 28 February 1980 before the Real

Estate Court at the Falun District Court (tingsrätten).

11. The applicant, his brother and the Municipality were involved

in negotiations for a settlement until 2 July 1984. On that date,

before the main hearings started, they finally concluded an agreement:

the applicant and his brother were to sell the properties to the

Municipality, which was to lease back to the applicant for a period of

five years, with a possibility of prolongation, a house situated

thereon. On 17 August, the Real Estate Court struck the case off its

list since, as a result of the settlement, the Municipality had

withdrawn its claim for expropriation.

12. On 17 December 1986, after the present case had been brought

before the European Court of Human Rights, the Municipality of Falun

concluded an agreement with the applicant for the repurchase by him of

the properties for 235,000 Swedish crowns, the same amount as it had

paid for them in 1984.

II. Relevant domestic law

A. Town-planning law

13. The Building Act 1947 (byggnadslagen 1947:385 - "the

1947 Act") is the main legal instrument governing planning in respect of

the use of land for construction and urban development. It provides

for the drawing up of a master plan (generalplan), which establishes

within a municipality the framework for other and more detailed plans,

namely city plans (stadsplaner) and building plans (byggnadsplaner).

As in the present case, a municipal council may draw up an area plan,

instead of a master plan. The manner in which area plans are

elaborated and their content are not expressly governed by the 1947

Act but general principles of administrative law are, of course,


B. Legislation on the issue of expropriation permits

14. The issue of expropriation permits is governed by the

1972 Act. Under Chapter 3, section 1, such a permit is normally

granted by the Government.

For cases like the present, the grounds justifying the issue of a

permit are stated in Chapter 2, section 1, of the 1972 Act (as amended

by the Act of 1976:46), which reads as follows (translation from


"Expropriation is allowed in order to enable a municipality to acquire

rights over land which is needed, as a result of future societal

requirements, for urban development (tätbebyggelse) or constructions

in connection with such development. ... Within areas of urban

development expropriation is allowed only if there is reason to assume

that, within a foreseeable time, the area will be subject to building

or other construction activities which are deemed important in the

general interest, or if there is an urgent necessity for the

municipality to acquire rights over the land for the furthering of

planned building or for any other similar reason. ..."

However, a permit must not be granted if the purpose of the

expropriation can be attained by other appropriate means, or if the

disadvantages of the expropriation would outweigh, from general and

individual points of view, its advantages (Chapter 2, section 12, of

the 1972 Act).

15. Under Chapter 3, section 4, of the 1972 Act, the sole effect

in law of the issue of an expropriation permit is to confer on its

holder an entitlement to acquire the designated property.

Consequently, the issue of a permit leaves legally intact the owner's

right to use, sell, let or mortgage his property (see also

paragraph 17 below), and does not automatically lead to expropriation.

Before the expropriation can be finalised, its terms - such as the

compensation to be paid to the owner and the boundaries of the

expropriated area - have to be settled in proceedings before a real

estate court. Moreover, the expropriation is not completed until the

compensation - in principle equivalent to the market value - has been


16. The proceedings before the real estate court have to be

instituted by the holder of the permit within the time-limit which it

specifies, failing which the permit will lapse (Chapter 3, section 6,

of the 1972 Act).

The 1972 Act is silent as to the length of this time-limit and as to

the criteria upon which it is to be fixed. However, Chapter 3,

section 6, provides that it may be extended in special circumstances,

or reduced if the owner so requests and establishes that the

inconvenience for him in the expropriation remaining pending has

increased significantly. No decision to reduce the time-limit can be

taken until one year has elapsed since the issue of the expropriation


17. Some reasons for restricting the time-limit and, hence, the

duration of the validity of expropriation permits were stated in the

Bill 1972:109, page 227, which led to the 1972 Act (translation from


"Naturally, the mere issue of an expropriation permit often places

[the owner] in a state of uncertainty. In practice, his opportunities

for disposing of his property by selling it, assigning the use thereof

or having premises erected thereon are considerably restricted. He

may also have difficulty in deciding whether to incur expenditure on

upkeep or modernisation. The disadvantages resulting from an

expropriation permit are evidently increased if the judicial

proceedings are not set in motion for a long time."

C. Remedies available

18. Generally speaking, the Swedish administration is not subject

to supervision by the ordinary courts. Those courts entertain

proceedings against the State only in contractual matters, on

questions of extra-contractual liability and, under some statutes, in

respect of administrative decisions.

Judicial review of the administration's acts is therefore primarily a

matter for administrative courts. These courts comprise three levels:

the county administrative courts (länsrätterna); the administrative

courts of appeal (kammarrätterna); and the Supreme Administrative

Court (regeringsrätten). They are composed of independent judges and

enjoy, as a rule, wide powers which enable them not only to set aside

administrative acts but also to vary or substitute them. There is,

however, an important exception to this principle, in that no appeal

may be made against decisions of the Government (see paragraph 20


1. Appeals against municipal decisions to adopt an area plan or apply

for an expropriation permit

19. Chapter 7, section, 1 of the Municipal Act of 1977

(kommunallagen 1977:179) provides for and regulates, in a general way,

the right to appeal (kommunalbesvär) against decisions by

municipalities. This Act enables residents of the municipality to

challenge, for instance, a municipal council's decision to adopt an

area plan or apply for an expropriation permit.

At the relevant time, this remedy was exercisable before the County

Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen), but only on the following

grounds: failure to observe the statutory procedures, infringement of

the law, ultra vires conduct, violation of the complainant's own

rights, or other unfairness. The appeal had to be filed within three

weeks from the date on which approval of the minutes of the decision

had been announced on the municipal notice-board. The County

Administrative Board's decision could, within three weeks from its

notification to the complainant, be the subject of an appeal to the

Supreme Administrative Court.

These provisions were slightly amended in 1980, with effect from

1 January 1981, in that the first appeal now has to be made to the

Administrative Court of Appeal and not to the County Administrative


2. Appeals against a decision to issue an expropriation permit

20. Swedish law contains no provision for appeals to the ordinary

or the administrative courts against the Government's decisions to

issue expropriation permits. Accordingly, such decisions are in

principle not subject to court review.

However, there is a limited possibility to file a petition before the

Supreme Administrative Court for re-opening of the proceedings

(resningsansökan). Further particulars of this remedy appear in the

Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment of 23 September 1982 (Series A no. 52,

pp. 19-20, § 50).

3. Possibilities of compensation for prejudice

21. The 1972 Act does not in principle provide for compensation

for prejudice resulting from the length of the validity of, or failure

to utilise, an expropriation permit. It does, however, contain one

exception (Chapter 5, section 16): compensation is payable for

prejudice occasioned by the issue of an expropriation permit if the

authority or person to whom it was granted has instituted, but

subsequently abandoned, proceedings before a real estate court

(see paragraphs 15-16 above).

22. According to Chapter 3, section 2, of the Civil Liability

Act 1972 (skadeståndslagen 1972:207), acts of public authorities may

give rise to an entitlement to compensation in the event of fault or

negligence. However, under section 7, an action for damages will not

lie in respect of decisions taken by Parliament, the Government, the

Supreme Court, the Supreme Administrative Court or the National Social

Security Court.


23. In his application of 10 January 1984 to the Commission

(no. 10930/84), Mr. Gunnar Bodén complained that the expropriation

permit had been issued in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1) and that he had no possibility of having the dispute relating

to the issue of the permit reviewed by a tribunal satisfying the

requirements of Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.

24. On 5 December 1985, the Commission declared admissible the

applicant's complaint under Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1). The remainder

of the application was declared inadmissible.

In its report of 15 May 1986 (Article 31) (art. 31), the Commission

expressed the unanimous opinion that there had been a breach of

Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1). The full text of the Commission's opinion

is reproduced as an annex to the present judgment.


25. At the hearing on 23 March 1987, the Government requested the

Court "to find that the complaint falls outside the scope of

Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1)".



26. The applicant complained that he did not have the opportunity

under Swedish law to challenge before a court an expropriation permit

affecting two properties of which he was part-owner (see

paragraphs 7-9 above). He alleged a violation of Article 6 § 1

(art. 6-1) of the Convention, which, so far as is relevant, reads:

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,

everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ..."

27. In view of the submissions made, the first issue to be

resolved is the applicability of this provision and, more

particularly, whether the instant case involved the "determination" of

a "civil right".

A. Applicability of Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1)

28. According to the Court's established case-law, Article 6 § 1

(art. 6-1) extends only to "contestations" (disputes) over "civil

rights and obligations" which can be said, at least on arguable

grounds, to be recognised under domestic law; it does not in itself

guarantee any particular content for "civil rights and obligations" in

the substantive law of the Contracting States (see, as the most recent

authority, the W v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987,

Series A no. 121, pp. 32-33, § 73).

29. The applicant's right of ownership of the properties in issue

is without doubt - and that was not disputed - a civil right (see,

mutatis mutandis, the Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment of

23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, p. 29, § 79, and the Poiss

judgment of 23 April 1987, Series A no. 117, p. 102, § 48).

30. As to whether there was a "contestation" within the meaning of

Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1), regard should be had to the principles

enunciated in the Court's case-law, summarised in the Benthem judgment

of 23 October 1985 (Series A no. 97, pp. 14-15, § 32):

(a) Conformity with the spirit of the Convention requires that the

word "contestation" (dispute) should not be construed too technically

and should be given a substantive rather than a formal meaning.

(b) The "contestation" (dispute) may relate not only to the actual

existence of a right but also to its scope or the manner in which it

may be exercised. It may concern both questions of fact and questions

of law.

(c) It must be genuine and of a serious nature.

(d) The expression "contestations sur (des) droits et obligations de

caractère civil" (disputes over civil rights and obligations) covers

all proceedings the result of which is decisive for such rights and

obligations. However, a tenuous connection or remote consequences do

not suffice for Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1): civil rights and obligations

must be the object - or one of the objects - of the "contestation"

(dispute); the result of the proceedings must be directly decisive for

such a right.

31. The Government maintained that the issue of the expropriation

permit was purely a policy decision and that there was consequently no

genuine "contestation" (dispute) concerning questions of law or of

fact susceptible of judicial assessment; what was involved was rather

an assessment "so far removed from the exercise of the normal judicial

function that the safeguards in Article 6 (art. 6) cannot be taken as

covering resultant disagreements". The Government in this respect

referred to the van Marle and Others judgment of 26 June 1986

(Series A no. 101, p. 12, § 36).

32. The Court does not share this view.

According to his pleadings before the Commission, Mr. Gunnar Bodén's

allegations were, inter alia, that the application of the 1972 Act was

arbitrary in his case and that the responsible authorities had not

properly appreciated the public interest in expropriating his

properties. More importantly, the Government informed the Court that

before the permit was issued, the applicant had submitted arguments

contesting that his properties were needed for the development

contemplated and contending that, when working out and adopting the

area plan, the Municipal Council had not taken his interests

sufficiently into account (see paragraph 9 above). This being so, it

appears that there existed a serious disagreement between

Mr. Gunnar Bodén and the Swedish authorities which raised questions

going to the lawfulness, under the applicable Swedish legislation, of

the issue of the permit (see paragraph 14 above).

Furthermore, the expropriation permit was decisive for the applicant's

property rights. It affected the very substance of ownership in that

it authorised the Municipality of Falun to expropriate at any moment

within the time-limit set in the permit. Mr. Gunnar Bodén's right of

property thereby became precarious and defeasible (see the

above-mentioned Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment, Series A no. 52,

p. 23, § 60).

The objections lodged by the applicant with the Government against the

Municipal Council's request for an expropriation permit thus gave rise

to a "contestation" (dispute) over one of his "civil rights", as those

expressions are understood for the purposes of Article 6 § 1

(art. 6-1). This provision is therefore applicable to the present


B. Compliance with Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1)

33. The Government admitted, should the Court find Article 6 § 1

(art. 6-1) to be applicable, that the applicant was not afforded the

safeguards it sets out. The Court nevertheless has to ascertain

whether the applicant enjoyed the "right to a court", guaranteed to

him under Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1) (see the Golder judgment of

21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, p. 18, § 36).

34. The Government pointed out that both the Falun Municipal

Council's decision to adopt an area plan and its decision to request

an expropriation permit could be challenged before the County

Administrative Board and, subsequently, the Supreme Administrative

Court (see paragraph 19 above). However, these two decisions were only

preparatory steps which, in themselves, did not at that stage

interfere with the applicant's civil rights (see the above-mentioned

Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment, Series A no. 52, pp. 30-31, § 85).

This being so, the Court finds no reason to undertake a further

examination of these remedies.

35. The Government's decision as to the issue of the permit was

not open to appeal before either the ordinary or the administrative

courts, or before any other body which could be considered to be a

"tribunal" for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1) (see

paragraphs 18 and 20 above).

Admittedly, the applicant could have challenged the lawfulness of such

a decision by requesting the Supreme Administrative Court to re-open

the proceedings. However, this extraordinary remedy does not, for the

reasons set out in the above-mentioned Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment

(p.31, § 86), meet the requirements of Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1).

36. Nor would the requirements of Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1)

have been satisfied by any possibility which the applicant might have

had of seeking compensation for prejudice (see paragraphs 21-22

above). Such an action would have concerned only certain effects of

the expropriation permit and would not have determined the lawfulness

of its issue.

C. Conclusion

37. There was accordingly a violation of Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1).


38. Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention provides:

"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal

authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is

completely or partially in conflict with the obligations arising from

the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the said Party allows

only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this

decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary,

afford just satisfaction to the injured party."

In letters received on 12 and 18 February 1987, the applicant sought

by way of just satisfaction financial compensation for prejudice

allegedly suffered and reimbursement of costs and expenses incurred.

At the hearing on 23 March 1987, the Government stated that the

applicant had not provided the Court with any precise information as

to damage. As to his costs and expenses, they suggested that the

Court should ask him to furnish further particulars, which he did on

24 April 1987. The Government and the Commission have not submitted

any further comments.

The Court considers that in the circumstances the question of just

satisfaction is ready for decision (Rule 53 § 1 of the Rules of


A. Damage

39. The applicant claimed 100,000 Swedish crowns (SEK) as

compensation for pecuniary damage attributable to the increase in

building costs over ten years.

The Government disputed that any issue of compensation for pecuniary

damage arose in the present case under Article 50 (art. 50).

40. The breach found by the Court consists of the absence of a

court remedy for the applicant to challenge the lawfulness of the

issue of the expropriation permit.

However, the applicant has not adduced sufficient evidence to

establish that, had such a remedy been available to him, the domestic

court would have arrived at a decision in his favour. Neither is it

for the Court to inquire into the merits, under Swedish law, of the

issue of the permit.

It must also be observed that the parties concerned finally reached

agreement as to the transfer of the properties in 1984 and as to their

re-purchase in 1986.

Consequently, the Court sees no cause to award the applicant any

compensation in respect of pecuniary damage.

41. The applicant also sought 85,000 SEK for non-pecuniary damage.

As regards this claim, the Court shares the view of the Commission and

the Government that, in the particular circumstances, the finding of a

violation constitutes in itself adequate just satisfaction for the

purposes of Article 50 (art. 50).

B. Costs and expenses

42. The applicant claimed:

(a) 5,400 SEK in respect of legal fees referable to the Strasbourg


(b) 7,000 SEK for miscellaneous expenses (translation, typing,

telephone, postage, etc.);

(c) 7,710 SEK for the costs of registering ownership of the

re-purchased properties;

(d) 2,000 SEK for loss of earnings occasioned by his having been

obliged to visit the offices of various Swedish authorities;

(e) 7,000 SEK for his own work in preparing the case.

The Government expressed their readiness to reimburse, in the event of

the Court finding a violation of the Convention, all costs and

expenses reasonably incurred by the applicant in connection with his


43. (a) It was not disputed, and the Court considers, that the

legal fees claimed were actually and necessarily incurred and

reasonable as to quantum (see, inter alia, the Zimmermann and Steiner

judgment of 13 July 1983, Series A no. 66, p. 14, § 36).

(b) Although the applicant did not supply any vouchers, the Court is

also satisfied that he incurred certain miscellaneous expenses with a

view to obtaining redress of the violation by the Convention

institutions. It finds it equitable to award 3,500 SEK under this


(c) On the other hand, the costs of registering ownership of the

re-purchased properties are not attributable to the absence of a court

remedy. There is consequently no causal link between the violation

found by the Court and these costs.

(d) It has not been established that there is a sufficient connection

between the visits alleged to have occasioned a loss of earnings and

the matter held by the Court in the present judgment to be in breach

of Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1).

(e) Since the applicant was assisted by a lawyer before the

Commission and did not take part in the proceedings before the Court

(see paragraph 2 above), the Court does not consider that the item of

7,000 SEK claimed for his own work can be regarded as "necessary" for

the purposes of Article 50 (art. 50).

Mr. Gunnar Bodén is consequently entitled to be reimbursed, for costs

and expenses, the sum of 8,900 SEK, from which must be deducted the

amount of 3,410 French francs already paid in respect of legal costs

by the Council of Europe.


1. Holds that Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1) applied in the instant case;

2. Holds that Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1) has been violated;

3. Holds that the respondent State is to pay to the applicant in

respect of costs and expenses the sum of 8,900 (eight thousand nine

hundred) Swedish crowns, less 3,410 (three thousand four hundred and

ten) French francs to be converted into Swedish crowns at the rate

applicable on the date of delivery of the present judgment;

4. Rejects the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in

the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 27 October 1987.

Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL


Signed: Marc-André EISSEN


In accordance with Article 51 § 2 (art. 51-2) of the Convention and

Rule 52 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of

Mr. De Meyer, joined by Mr. Pettiti, is annexed to the present


Initialled: R.R.

Initialled: M.-A.E.


My remarks concerning paragraphs 30 and 31 of the judgment of today's

date in the Pudas case (1) also apply to paragraphs 28 and 30 of the

judgment in the present case.

The reasons set forth in paragraphs 29 and 32 of the present judgment

suffice to establish that "the instant case involved the

'determination' of a 'civil right'" (2). Those in paragraph 32

furthermore suffice to establish, as far as necessary, that there was

a dispute ("contestation") concerning that right.


(1) Judgment of today, Series A no. 125-A, p. 21.

(2) Paragraph 27 in fine of the judgment, p. 39 above.


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