![]() |
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] [DONATE] | |||||||||
England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions |
||||||||||
PLEASE SUPPORT BAILII & FREE ACCESS TO LAW
To maintain its current level of service, BAILII urgently needs the support of its users.
Since you use the site, please consider making a donation to celebrate BAILII's 25 years of providing free access to law. No contribution is too small. If every visitor this month gives just £5, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing this vital service.
Thank you for your support! | ||||||||||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Hendy v Ministry of Justice [2014] EWHC 2535 (Ch) (23 July 2014) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2014/2535.html Cite as: [2014] EWHC 2535 (Ch) |
[New search] [View without highlighting] [Printable RTF version] [Help]
CHANCERY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
||
B e f o r e :
____________________
Robert Hendy |
Claimant |
|
- and - |
||
Ministry of Justice |
Defendant |
____________________
Rachel Toney (instructed by The Treasury Solicitor) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 16th, 17th & 19th & 27th June 2014
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Mann :
Introduction
The employment and disciplinary procedures
"Minor instances of misconduct will generally be addressed informally through normal day to day management action. The formal disciplinary process will be used for more serious misconduct or where the employee continues to repeat minor misconduct."
The document goes on:
"Discipline policy
PURPOSE
This policy and the related guidelines:
- Set out the disciplinary process for all to see.
- Show managers how to respond to misconduct in a way that resolves issues promptly, focuses on improvement and protects employee's rights.
- Shows employees how they can be expected to be treated if they become involved in a disciplinary process.
...
WHO DOES IT APPLY TO?
This policy applies to all permanent and fixed term employees …
This policy does not form part of your contract of employment. However, you are bound by the provisions of this policy which may be amended from time to time."
- "Destroys the relationship of trust, upon which the employment contract is based, and makes any further working relationship impossible;
- Risks MoJ's property (including reputation); or
- Risks MoJ's obligations to other parties…"
"Employees who are subject to disciplinary process have the right to:
- Be advised in writing that their conduct is the subject of a disciplinary investigation and the nature of the allegations against them.
- Reasonable written notice of the date and time of a disciplinary hearing with a copy of the investigation report with at least 5 working day's notice to prepare and respond to the allegations against them at the hearing.
- Be accompanied or represented at the disciplinary hearing.
- Be notified in writing of the outcome of the process.
- Appeal the outcome of the disciplinary hearing."
"Manage the process in a fair and transparent manner."
In the next column it provides for how "Investigation Officers" are to go about their tasks:
"Investigation Officers will:
- Identify and consider all relevant evidence.
…
- Produce an investigation report, which fairly and objectively accounts for all relevant evidence and justifies its recommendations.
- Produce a summary investigation report for the manager to pass to the employee."
It also specifies what employees "will" do:
"Employees subject to a discipline process will:
…
- Co-operate fully with the process and enable a speedy and fair resolution.
- Attend meetings when required
…
- Advise the investigating manager of any witnesses and/or evidence they would like considered during the process.
- Be available for meetings if suspended.
…
- Lodge any appeal within 15 working days of being informed in writing of the outcomes of the process."
"Each disciplinary process will be different due to variations in the form of the misconduct, its severity, the number of people involved, the employee's disciplinary history and mitigating factors. However, a disciplinary process normally follows these steps:
…
2. An investigation of the allegations either by the manager or by an investigation officer appointed by the manager.
3. A disciplinary hearing where the employee will have the right to respond to the allegations and to be represented or accompanied.
4. The manager making decisions and advising the employee."
"The disciplinary process is a formal process designed to respond to breaches of the Conduct policy. Generally, managers should not depart from the process. However, in limited circumstances, and only in liaison with the HR Contact Centre and with the agreement of the employee, the following departures might be justified."
It then refers to departures required to meet disabilities and mental health matters.
"The aim of the investigation is to make a justifiable recommendation about whether misconduct is likely to have occurred. So whoever conducts the investigation must make enough enquiries to ensure that they have all the available evidence and considered all relevant facts needed to make that recommendation."
Under the heading: "How do I collect evidence from witnesses?" The policy says:
"Witnesses are employees who have observed the alleged misconduct or relevant related behaviour. The person conducting the investigation will obtain statements from witnesses in a meeting or by request if the alleged misconduct is likely to be disputed or its extent is unclear."
"WHAT IS THE INVESTIGATION REPORT?
It is a written report, the aim of which is to make a justifiable recommendation about whether the team member's behaviour constitutes a breach of the Conduct policy.
The report also gives the team member information necessary for them to understand the findings of the investigation.
The person conducting the investigation will complete the investigation report. The report will contain the following:
- … Evidence and witness statements considered during the investigation as attachments.
- … Conclusions drawn from the evidence and witness statements.
- Objective assessments about the relative strengths of inconsistent evidence.
- A recommendation about whether the team member has breached the conduct policy and why.
The above list is not exhaustive and the manager or the Investigation Officer may need to make available other relevant papers to the team member, if requested."
The principal background facts
"6. This issue of the credibility of the complainants and other witnesses is critical, given that Mr Hendy disputes the evidence and accuses the original complainants of giving maliciously false evidence.
...
8. Ultimately, Mr McAllister does not accept Mr Hendy's contentions about the dishonesty of his colleagues. My concern is that he does so without ever putting directly to them Mr Hendy's version of disputed events or Mr Hendy's submissions above. It seems to me a fundamental and necessary testing of the evidence that this happens [sic] at some point in the process, and that it is unsafe to conclude on the credibility of the evidence against Mr Hendy without first putting his rebuttal and other evidence to the other relevant witnesses."
"This puts the onus on the Investigating Officer to gather and evaluate all relevant evidence at the investigation stage of the process. Whatever the approach, it seems to me that the important principle is that there is a sufficiency of enquiry through the disciplinary process taken as a whole.
...
11. I do not suggest it is necessary to shuttle back and forth repeatedly between the witnesses, putting any new fragment of evidence or nuance that emerges from one witness to all the others, before it is safe to draw a conclusion. But I do contend that in a case of potential gross misconduct, a sufficiency of enquiry does require that at some point in the disciplinary process, whether during an investigation or a hearing, that the alternative account of disputed events and other submissions of the person under investigation, which s/he claims are indicative of dishonesty in others, are put to those other witnesses to elicit and assess their responses. This did not happen in this case.
...
13. HMCTS colleagues will need to consider the best means of addressing the deficiency I have identified, and the decision I have made to direct that the matter is reconsidered by another manager. I am conscious that this is far from straightforward. However, I do believe it is important for a further attempt to be made to address the matters investigated, because they are serious allegations and it is in the interests of all concerned and the MoJ that conclusions on them are reached. I have not been persuaded that Mr Ring's decisions should simply be overturned; my conclusion is that an important omission has prevented a sufficiency of enquiry, and it follows that the logical response should be to make good that omission. This would ensure a sound basis on which to reach conclusions on the allegations against Mr Hendy, one way or the other."
"For what it is worth, I think consideration should be given to HMCTS adopting an exceptional approach to a disciplinary hearing, and hearing evidence from the Investigating Officer and witnesses, and allowing Mr Hendy (or colleague) to put questions to witnesses; if Mr Hendy was not in a position to do so (or even to attend), then the Hearing Authority could put to witnesses the matters I have identified need to be put to them."
Mr Paulin said that this cast light on what the appeal manager had in mind when he reached his decision and that he was concerned about the sufficiency of the enquiry. I find that his own note of his decision in fact expresses that concern, and this email really adds nothing to the case.
"My view is that I should focus my assessment on the credibility issue on the evidence in relation to the allegations of bullying and harassment. Since no findings were ever made in relation to the other issues, it does not seem necessary to ask the complainants and witnesses to respond to Mr Hendy's submissions on the credibility of their evidence on those issues."
Mr Goozée's response to that was not in evidence.
"What are the specific allegations concerning my 'personal conduct' on which my current suspension is based and how, even if somehow now believed, each might be said to constitute misconduct by me of any kind?"
"offer an opinion on the original findings, both in the light of any new evidence and more generally."
"Taking all of the evidence into account, I recommend to the Determining Authority that the nature, duration, extent and impact of RH's conduct was sufficient to consider making a finding of gross misconduct."
The claim of Mr Hendy
(i) Mr Parsons did not put some important rebuttal points to the complainants.
(ii) Mr Parsons did not put some rebuttal points adequately.
It seems from the more focused argument advanced by Mr Paulin that the real complaint was in relation to Mr Parsons' dealings with the complainants, and not with the other witnesses as well. I shall therefore focus on dealing with the complainants, but will also make some observations about other witnesses. I shall also make some limited remarks about other matters of complaint that were raised in a more peripheral manner in Mr Paulin's submissions.
The legal background
"there have been a number of irregularities in the proceedings against Dr Chhabra which cumulatively render the convening of the conduct panel unlawful as a material breach of her contract of employment. I have four concerns about the procedure which the Trust followed." (para 34).
"I am persuaded that the cumulative effect of those irregularities is that it would be unlawful for the Trust to proceed with the disciplinary procedure and that the court should grant relief. As a general rule it is not appropriate for the courts to intervene to remedy minor irregularities in the course of disciplinary proceedings between employer and employee – its role is not the "micro-management" of such proceedings: Kulkarni v Milton Keynes Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2010] ICR 101, para 22. Such intervention would produce unnecessary delay and expense. But in this case the irregularities, particularly the first and third, are of a more serious nature. I also bear in mind that any common law damages which Dr Chhabra might obtain if she were to succeed in a claim based on those irregularities after her employment were terminated might be very limited: Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2012] 2 AC 22 and Geys v Société Générale [2013] 1 AC 523, para 73, Lord Wilson. "
"35. First, I do not think that the findings of fact and evidence, which Dr Taylor recorded, were capable when taken at their highest of supporting a charge of gross misconduct. Paragraph 13.4.1 of policy D4 speaks of conduct so serious "as to potentially make any further relationship and trust between the Trust and the employee impossible." This language describes conduct which could involve a repudiatory breach of contract: Dunn v AAH Ltd [2010] IRLR 709, para 6; Wilson v Racher [1974] ICR 428. There is no material in Dr Taylor's report to support the view that the breaches of confidentiality which she recorded, including the former secretary's allegations, were wilful in the sense that they were deliberate breaches of that duty. In my view they were qualitatively different from a deliberate breach of confidentiality such as speaking to the media about a patient."
(a) The court will be prepared to intervene in a disciplinary process if it is demonstrated that the proceedings are being conducted on a basis which makes their conduct a breach of contract such that the pursuit would also be a breach (see also Hussain v Surrey & Sussex Healthcare NHS Trust [2012] Med LR 163, albeit that it is not clear from the report of that case what actual order was ultimately made.)
(b) The case does not identify what breaches are sufficiently serious for these purposes, but in my view they have to be breaches or errors which make the continued pursuit unfair in a manner which cannot be remedied within the proceedings themselves.
(c) Nonetheless, the court will not "micro-manage" an employment disciplinary procedure.
"44. That is not to say that an employer who starts a disciplinary process in breach of the express terms of the contract of employment is not acting in breach of contract. He plainly is. If that happens, it is open to the employee to seek an injunction to stop the process and/or to seek an appropriate declaration. Miss O'Rourke QC submitted that, if in such a situation there is a breach of contract sufficient to support the grant of an injunction but (for whatever reason) the employee does not obtain an injunction, it is anomalous if the normal common law remedy of damages is in principle not available to him. The short answer to this submission is that an injunction to prevent a threatened unfair dismissal does not cut across the statutory scheme for compensation for unfair dismissal. None of the objections based on the co-existence of inconsistent parallel common law and statutory rights applies. The grant of injunctive or declaratory relief for an actual or threatened breach of contract would not jeopardise the coherence of our employment laws and would not be a recipe for chaos in the way that, as presaged by Lord Millett in Johnson, the recognition of parallel and inconsistent rights to seek compensation for unfair dismissal in the tribunal and damages in the courts would be."
Is it arguable that the disciplinary policy was part of the terms of the contract of employment or otherwise contractually binding as such?
"It is common ground that the proper approach for determining whether provisions such as those of the Practitioners Disciplinary Procedure have [been] incorporated into the contract of employment is summarised by Hobhouse J in Alexander v Standard Telephones & Cables Ltd (No 2), [1991] IRLR 286, 292-3 as follows:
"The relevant contract is that between the individual employee and his employer; it is the contractual intention of those two parties which must be ascertained. In so far as that intention is to be found in a written document, that document must be construed on ordinary contractual principles. In so far as there is no such document or that document is not complete or conclusive, their contractual intention has to be ascertained by inference from the other available material including collective agreements. The fact that another document is not itself contractual does not prevent it from being incorporated into the contract if that intention is shown as between the employer and the individual employee. Where a document is expressly incorporated by general words it is still necessary to consider, in conjunction with the words of incorporation, whether any particular part of that document is apt to be a term of the contract; if it is inapt, the correct construction of the contract may be that it is not a term of the contract. Where it is not a case of express incorporation, but a matter of inferring the contractual intent, the character of the document and the relevant part of it and whether it is apt to form part of the individual contract is central to the decision whether or not the inference should be drawn."
"This policy does not form part of your contract of employment. However, you are bound by the provisions of this policy which may be amended from time to time."
The effect of the policy for the purposes of this case
Is there a serious question to be tried as to whether Mr Hendy's case was sufficiently put?
(i) He records the other witnesses he approached, including those identified by Mr Hendy. He considered, rightly, that he had a discretion as to how to approach witnesses, and in particular whether a face to face interview was required.
(ii) In section 6 he records the original complaints and adverse comments of witnesses.
(iii) In section 7 he records Mr Hendy's response to those complaints, including his allegation that the complaints were the product of malice and collusion.
(iv) In section 8 he conducts a "reassessment of original findings". Across the whole section he summarised various aspects of Mr McAllister's report and then gave his own assessment, taking in additional evidence where it was obtained by him. He deals in particular with the following:
(a) An important meeting between Mr Hendy and MMJ, which led to MMJ's complaint, and indicated he found no reason to revise or revoke Mr McAllister's findings in relation to this meeting, which was that Mr Hendy's conduct towards MMJ at this meeting was aggressive and intimidating. This was a matter that he raised with MMJ, and he also contacted some further witnesses so that he could consider its aftermath. He concluded that MMJ's response to the points (which maintained her claim) was "credible" and found no reason to recommend that Mr McAllister's findings be revised or revoked.
(b) Under a heading dealing with "Overt criticism, divisiveness and deliberately creating an atmosphere of uncertainty" Mr Parsons summarised Mr McAllister's findings and records that Mr Hendy sought to undermine the evidence of witnesses by accusing one of them of a malicious attempt to injure him, and to discredit others. These three witnesses have been referred to above. He also took into account Ms Said and the witnesses favourable to Mr Hendy. At paragraph 8.70 he addresses a key point:
"8.70 In my own assessment on this issue, I considered it important to address RH's suggestion that MMJ and LA had escalated their complaints to damage him."
At paragraph 8.73 he says:
"I invited both complainants to comment."
And he records their responses. His conclusion on this important point is at paragraph 8.75:
"I find the complainants' responses credible. RH's assertion that the complaints were deliberately falsely 'escalated' for improper purposes does not hold water. There is no evidence to support his assertion. Further, I note Stephen McAllister's account of both complainants being distressed during his meetings with them and MMJs reluctance to talk about certain aspects of RH's behaviour."
He concludes that he did not recommend any revision or revocation of Mr McAllister's findings.
(c) His next section deals with the allegations of casual racism. This demonstrates that, at least to a degree, Mr Parsons was considering matters which had not hitherto been pursued beyond an investigation. He does not recommend that Mr McAllister's recommendation (which dismissed a complaint about a specific incident, and would have resulted in the matter not being taken forward as gross misconduct) be revised, though he does comment on the dangers of supposedly humorous or ironic comments.
(d) A later section of his report considers whether there was any relevance to be attached to the fact that neither complainant had reported incidents promptly or in some cases at all. This was a point relied on by Mr Hendy as operating in his favour. In this context he spoke to Mr Hendy's line manager. This is another example of Mr Parsons pursuing Mr Hendy's case with a witness in order to test its credibility and force. He concludes by stating that he did not find it surprising that the complainants felt unable to challenge Mr Hendy's behaviour directly or to complain before they did (paragraph 8.117).
(e) He included a section dealing with Mr Hendy's case to the effect that there was good evidence that the complainants enjoyed a friendly relationship with Mr Hendy which was inconsistent with their complaints. This was an issue which he had put to the two complainants. Their response was to say that their anxiety was to stay on the right side of him because of their perception of the likely consequences of failing to do so. Mr Parsons records that he found their responses to be credible.
(f) He records that he put to MMJ Mr Hendy's case that she was of a strong character who would not be intimidated by him in the manner alleged. At paragraph 8.125 he records her answer to the effect that she held strong views but put up with his behaviour because of his unpredictability and his hints at being able to get rid of people. Mr Parsons found this evidence to be credible.
"63. We accept the observations of Mr Pepperall, for the Respondent, that the standard of reasonableness required will always be high where the employee faces loss of his employment. The wider effect upon future employment, and the fact that charges which are criminal in nature have been made, all reinforce the need for a careful and conscientious enquiry but in practice they will not be likely to alter that standard."
"75. Particular care is necessary in testing and weighing the veracity of her evidence. That task was made more difficult by the fact that the local authority has a policy (for perfectly understandable reasons) that children in her situation should not be questioned in the disciplinary process.
76. We recognise that there is a real dilemma for an employer in a situation of this kind. On the one hand it is plainly highly undesirable to subject a young girl, who may already have been subject to abuse, to questioning from the defendant which could cause yet further distress and even damage to health. On the other hand, the consequences for the defendant are extremely serious and there is no doubt that the difficulty he faces in convincing a disciplinary body that the allegations are untrue is compounded where he is not able directly to face and challenge the complainant."
"80. Of course the touchstone is always reasonableness. The recognition that the standard of reasonableness is going to depend upon the state of the case against an employee is found in the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, Wood J giving the judgment, in the case of ILEA & Gravit [1988] IRLR 497. In the course of his decision Wood J said this:
"…in one extreme there will be cases where the employee is virtually caught in the act and at the other there will be situations where the issue is one of pure inference. As the scale moves towards the latter end so the amount of inquiry and investigation, including questioning of the employee which may be required, is likely to increase."
(a) An inconsistency between the tone of email traffic passing between MMJ and Mr Hendy on the one hand and the allegations that he created an atmosphere of intimidation and uncertainty on the other. Mr Paulin said that only two questions were asked of MMJ about this, and that this was "manifestly inadequate". He submitted that the evidence of the communications was flatly contradictory of intimidation. When analysed, this submission is not about the nature and quality of the questions put to MMJ. It is a submission that there was really only one conclusion from the evidence. That is a different point, and was not put as such. Mr Paulin's case was all about procedure and unfairness. Mr Parsons did put a question about this to MMJ, and he got her response. It did not cause him to question her credibility. That was a view he was entitled to reach, on the material that I have seen.
(b) An incident at the meeting on 23rd November which was said to have left MMJ feeling intimidated and upset. This was an important incident. She had already given evidence of it to Mr McAllister. Mr Paulin points out that Mr Parsons did not apparently put to MMJ Mr Hendy's version of the meeting, but rather put to her questions about alleged inconsistencies in her behaviour afterwards. That seems to be true as a matter of fact. However, it is also true that MMJ gave further details of the meeting in an email exchange (recorded by Mr Parsons at paragraph 8.8 of his report). He also contacted two witnesses whom MMJ suggested could give relevant evidence of the aftermath of the meeting. This testing of the evidence is not obviously unfair.
(c) A suggestion of casual racism. Mr McAllister found no case to answer in respect of this allegation, and found in Mr Hendy's favour in relation to a particular incident in which it was alleged that Mr Hendy had made a racist remark about a court user. In his interview with LA Mr Parsons put to her Mr Hendy's suggestion that she was being disingenuous in referring to comments about Jewish people and that her complaints were exaggerated and motivated by malice. The second part of that question was obviously a key point in Mr Hendy's overall case. She acquitted him of anti-Semitism, and was then asked if she considered him to be racist. She answered in the affirmative and referred to the incident with the court user. Mr Parsons then asked whether he had actually used certain words she had previously ascribed to him, and she said she was 100% certain about what he had said and about what he had meant. On the basis of that, Mr Paulin submits that Mr Parsons should have gone on to put the details of Mr Hendy's analysis of the event to her, as it appeared over 3 pages of his submissions. His analysis included detailed points of logic and challenge suggesting why she could not be right. It would have amounted to a detailed cross-examination that one might see in a well-conducted criminal trial, but perhaps not even then. I do not consider it to be arguable that that was necessary in the circumstances. LA had seen the material because it was sent to her. Despite that, she maintained that she was 100% certain about her case. Bearing in mind how it came up, and the fact that casual racism was not a charge that was being pressed as part of a gross misconduct case, and the apparent certainty of her response, I do not think that it can be argued that anything further was required of Mr Parsons.
(d) In relation to collusion, Mr Paulin took the point that the complainants were challenged about it, then Ms Said was approached, and then Mr Parsons failed to meet with Mr Hendy. He goes on to complain about a failure to test credibility on the point. One must bear in mind what the overall complaint was that Mr Paulin was making. He was taking the point that there was a failure to test credibility in the manner provided for by Mr Copple. His first complaint (about the sequencing of events) is about something different, and it was not developed, so I will not consider it further. The question that arises in this hearing (bearing in mind the limits of Mr Paulin's case) is whether the collusion case was sufficiently put to the complainants so as to enable their credibility to be adequately tested. It does not seem to have been put to MMJ at all. However, it was put to LA, and she denied it in terms which, as recorded, are credible. In his report Mr Parsons has a short section devoted to collusion (which includes collusion amongst witnesses as well), and concludes shortly that he found no evidence of it, but it is preceded by comments on the evidence he took (and Mr McAllister's report) which also gainsay a conspiracy. In relation to this specific complaint, therefore, it appears as a matter of fact that collusion was not put to MMJ by Mr Parsons. That certainly has to be fed into the overall fairness calculation, but it is not necessarily fatal, especially bearing in mind the denial of LA.
(i) I remind myself yet again that the exercise assumed to be required is not a mechanical one, and that the object of the exercise was to test the credibility of witnesses (or, as it now appears, the complainants) by putting Mr Hendy's case to them.
(ii) The consequences for Mr Hendy were serious, so the investigation had to be appropriately thorough - see above. However, it does not follow that all witnesses had to be cross-examined as in a criminal case.
(iii) This was a fact-finding exercise in an employment environment in which Mr Hendy would have a further chance to deal with unfairnesses in the disciplinary meeting (and an appeal). A fair process does not necessarily have to involve full trial processes.
(iv) The fact that MMJ declined to engage fully was a problem, but does not necessarily render the process unfair. Otherwise the refusal of one serious player to participate would bring the process down, and that cannot be right. Suppose she had died, or become incapacitated and too unwell to participate, in the meanwhile. It cannot be the case that that would prevent the process from proceeding. The non-mechanical nature of the exercise means that on the facts of this case the investigator has to consider the fruits of such material as MMJ was prepared to provide against the rest of the material, to see what overall judgments could be made about credibility. The relevant questions are the fairness and reasonableness (which are inextricably linked) of the procedure. Mr Parsons' report is as important as is evidence of his discussions with witnesses, because it is that document which shows what Mr Parsons concluded about credibility when he had done what he had done.
Other aspects of the interim declaration claim
American Cyanamid - the other factors
Delay
"Had there been any evidence that the defendant had materially changed his position for the worse on the strength of it, it might well have proved fateful. I find no evidence of this, and on the whole I do not think that the delay of two months by itself is of such a serious order that I ought to refuse the plaintiffs the relief which they seek." (p469, per Oliver J)
Other criticisms
(i) Mr Paulin submitted that any investigator would have found there was not sufficient evidence for gross misconduct. This submission cannot be made out, on the evidence. It has two possible strands. The first is whether there was evidence to support the findings as to what actually happened. I find that there was sufficient evidence for that, on the evidence I have seen. The second is that that evidence, even accepted to the extent that it was, was not sufficient to amount to gross misconduct. That, too, fails on the facts. The conduct which is assumed for these purposes to have been established is capable of amounting to gross misconduct, though whether or not that is its final status will be for determination after a disciplinary hearing. If, in fact, this is a complaint that there ought to have been a better putting of Mr Hendy's case to the witnesses, then it is the same point as that considered above, and the answer to it is the same.
(ii) Mr Hendy has complained that he was not informed of the reasons for his second suspension (that is to say the suspension that was reimposed after his successful appeal). There is no significance in this complaint. The answer is obvious. The effect of the appeal was to put him back in the position that he had been in before his dismissal, that is to say he was employed but suspended for the original reasons. Furthermore, this has nothing to do with whether or not the investigatory process was flawed.
(iii) Mr Hendy has complained that Mr Parsons failed to meet him in the course of the process. It is indeed true that he did not seek to meet Mr Hendy. However, in the circumstances of his inquiry that is not so obviously necessary (if it was necessary at all) as to make Mr Parsons' attitude seriously unfair. It was a procedural step that he was entitled to consider and dismiss if he wished.
Decision