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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions >> David Wyld & Co, Solicitors v Dadourian & Anor [2011] EWHC 1517 (QB) (20 June 2011) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2011/1517.html Cite as: [2011] EWHC 1517 (QB) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM MASTER ROBERTS
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
DAVID WYLD & CO, SOLICITORS |
Claimant/ Respondent |
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- and - (1) JACK DADOURIAN |
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(2) HELGA DADOURIAN |
Defendants Appellants |
____________________
Mr Simon Edwards (instructed by MaCarten & Co., Solicitors) for the Defendants/Appellants
Hearing dates: 13 May 2011
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Mrs Justice Cox:
Introduction
The Issues on Appeal
(1) Were the bills delivered by the Claimants to the Defendants simply interim on account bills, or final "statute" bills?
(2) Was counsels' work carried out pursuant to a conditional fee agreement that was not in writing, not in compliance with section 58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 and thereby unenforceable?
(3) Did Master Roberts err in refusing the Defendants' request for an adjournment in the circumstances?
The Relevant Background
" the material made available to me, and in particular the reasons for abandoning it, tend to indicate that this application was always known to be an application which could not properly or sensibly be made and/or that it was made on a false basis or could be demonstrated to be made on a false basis. The Dadourians have abandoned it because they acknowledge that they have, for one reason or another, been caught out "
Summary of the Present Claim
"You have the right to object to this bill by way of the firm's complaints procedure and/or by making a complaint to the Legal Complaints Service and/or by applying to the Court for an assessment of the bill under part III of the Solicitors Act 1974."
The Defendants made no objection and no complaint in respect of either the solicitors' or counsel's fees contained in these two bills. Nor did they make any application for an assessment.
The Defendants' Request for an Adjournment
"If David Wyld had done a better job and obtained relief from freezing orders to enable us to pay the proper costs of the action and to maintain ourselves we would not be in our present dire condition."
In view of the history of this litigation, and in particular the judgment of Mann J. in February 2006, I consider that that is an unattractive observation to make to this Court.
"I then emailed the Defendants and said that, in the light of the fact that the Claimant did not agree to an adjournment, I was unable to grant an adjournment on the papers. The Defendants would have to attend or arrange representation for an oral hearing prior to the hearing on 23 November 2010, or the application would be dealt with at the hearing on 23 November 2010. The Defendants have not issued a formal application for an adjournment or requested a hearing to consider an adjournment prior to 23 November 2010, although I have received a letter from the first Defendant on behalf of both Defendants seeking an adjournment of the hearing until a date in the New Year. He says,
'We are seeking new solicitors and hope to have a firm engaged before the end of the year. In case this matter is dealt with in our absence and our request for an adjournment is refused, we have lodged our skeleton argument.'"
"I bear in mind the following matters. Firstly, this is the second application on behalf of the Defendants for an adjournment. Secondly, there is no medical evidence before the Court that within any set period of time the First Defendant's health will have improved to an extent that he can travel to court and attend a hearing. Further, there is no medical evidence that the first Defendant cannot now travel to court by reason of ill-health. I have noted the medical evidence that the Second Defendant suffers from severe depression and needs continuous psychiatric supervision. There is no medical evidence that within the foreseeable future she will be able to attend Court. There is no evidence before me as to why the Defendants have not arranged legal representation for this hearing. The proceedings were issued on 26 March 2010. The Defendants have known about today's hearing since the adjournment of the hearing on 12 July 2010. I accept Mr Ferris's submission that the application for summary judgment does not require the presence of either of the Defendants, particularly bearing in mind that they have filed and served two detailed witness statements and a detailed skeleton argument."
In all the circumstances he concluded that there were no grounds for an adjournment; that the request was a delaying tactic; and that it would not be just to order an adjournment.
The Substantive Judgment on the Applications
The Appeal
(i) All the bills delivered to the Defendants, including the two bills which are the subject of the present claim, were merely requests for interim payment on account, and not final "statute" bills. Thus the Claimants have not yet delivered a final bill that complies with section 69 Solicitors Act 1974 and they must do so before they can sue for their fees. This, he submits, is confirmed by the nature of the bills themselves; the way in which David Wyld has referred to them in his second and third witness statements, describing them as "regular interim bills"; and the fact that the Claimants rely upon only one retainer as an entire retainer, and that none of the bills seeks to rely on any natural break in that retainer.
(ii) With regard to both counsel instructed in the case, the fees incurred, in respect of which the two outstanding bills were delivered, were in relation to a conditional retainer. That retainer did not comply with the provisions of section 58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, as amended, and the conditional fee agreement in respect of counsels' fees was therefore unenforceable, so that the Claimants cannot recover these fees from the Defendants.
(1) that Master Roberts' decision to refuse the request for an adjournment was an exercise of his discretion which was clearly open to him in the circumstances. Given the history of this litigation and the Defendants' conduct on previous occasions Master Roberts was entitled to find that the request was a delaying tactic, in circumstances intended to frustrate the 23 November fixture.
(2) that Master Roberts' decision that all the bills delivered, including the two bills the subject of the claim, were final "statute" bills was clearly right on the evidence before him and his reasoning cannot be impugned. All the bills covered irregular periods of time, clearly identified; the final two bills were served in a "natural break"; and neither bill was headed "Interim bill" or "On account".
(3) that there was no conditional fee agreement under which counsel were instructed. On the evidence there was merely a concession, made on a traditional basis, for counsel to reduce part of their fees if the Defendants' appeal to the Court of Appeal failed. This applied only to disbursements for counsels' fees. The Claimants did not agree to reduce any of their own fees and the Claimants' agreement with the Defendants plainly did not provide for the Claimants' fees and expenses, or any part of them, to be payable only in specified circumstances. The Claimants were therefore entitled to all their fees and expenses and there is no question of any unenforceable conditional fee agreement.
(A) The Status of the Bills
"3. Instructions
The instructions are, initially with the aid of junior counsel, to prepare and make an application in the Chancery Division Claim number HC04C00366 to release property currently subject to a freezing order of the English Court situate in France, in order to fund the conduct of the defence for you as the third and fourth defendants in this matter. Provided that we are successful in such an application it is intended that I should take over the conduct of the defence for you but I emphasise that until funding is in place either pursuant to the removal of the freezing order on the French property or otherwise, I can not undertake the further preparations for trial or other applications to the court. Since the trial is scheduled to commence on 27th February and it is extremely unlikely in the current procedural climate that we would have any chance of adjourning the matter, it will be essential that I receive speedy instruction on numerous matters that I am likely to raise with you. You agree that for purposes of liaising with you both in relation to this preliminary proposed application to release the French property from the freezing order and more generally in relation to preparations for trial if that application is successful, I should liaise with Paul Simms. I understand that you are aware that there are certain areas on the facts and pleadings where a conflict of evidence might arise with Paul Simms but that I should nonetheless discuss your case fully with Paul Simms and obtain every assistance that he is prepared to make available.
6. Expenses and disbursements
In appointing me to act on your behalf, you are also authorising me, unless you instruct me to the contrary, to incur such expenses and disbursements as I consider necessary which you will be required to reimburse to me. I will consult you before incurring any significant expenses or disbursements.
Examples of expenses and disbursements which I may have to pay on your behalf include court and commissioner's fees, fees of counsel and other experts, search and registration fees, stamp duty and special bank transaction costs. I will not mark up such disbursements when I recharge them to you except as specified below.
From time to time as I require or consider appropriate I may engage the services of external solicitors or junior counsel (to do work normally carried out by solicitors) or costs draftsmen in which case I will charge a fair and reasonable rate for their services as though they were employees of partners in the firm which may include a mark-up on the fees charged by them to me.
7. Accounts
I will submit invoices to you at regular monthly intervals or at appropriate stages in the conduct of the matter, whichever is the sooner. I am willing to discuss with you the most appropriate accounting procedures for any particular matter. In view of the proximity of trial, as soon as the application to vary the freezing order is made and achieved, I would draw down £500,000 from the funds which will be provided to me on account to cover all of counsel's fees for the trial since I will have to pay the fees in tranches together with my firm's fees and disbursements. I must know that I have the funds at my disposal for this purpose. In the event of counsel's fees and our costs and disbursements not adding up to £500,000, then I will refund the balance after the termination of the Action. When I draw down the £500,000, I will refund to Citilegal Consultants Limited the amount that they advance to me to start my preparations and make the application for the mortgage on the French Property to the court. These figures are the best estimate that I can currently make of the cost of trial (not including any subsequent issues) and they are based on an assumption that the trial will commence on 27th February and last for 6 weeks. The estimates for counsels' fees included in the above figures are on that basis.
Unless indicated expressly to the contrary, bills will take the form of final account for all work done during the relevant period, except as specified below. All bills are payable in full and in sterling, without any deduction for bank or other charges, or by way of set-off or counterclaim or otherwise, within thirty-days.
Disbursements will sometimes be included in a bill relating to a period later than that in which the disbursements were incurred, reflecting the fact that sometimes invoices for disbursements are not delivered to me in a timely manner.
Where an interim bill is delivered it will not necessarily be a final bill for the work done during that period. In such a case the bill will be marked "Interim bill".
If you have any query about your bill, you should contact me straight away.
Article 4 of the Solicitors' (Non-Contentious Business) Remuneration Order 1994 entitles you to require me, within one month of the receipt of a fee note, to obtain a remuneration certificate from the Law Society in respect of non-contentious work (in other words, where there are no Court proceedings), stating that in their opinion the sum charged is fair and reasonable. In respect of all matters, you may be entitled to have my charges reviewed by the Court under the relevant provisions of the Solicitors Act 1974. Details of your rights to a review and/or remuneration certificate will be supplied on request. I reserve the right to request payments in advance on account of fees and disbursements."
Later on, in paragraph 11 of this letter, dealing with general matters, the Claimants said the following:
" If you lose an action, you will be liable to pay my fees and disbursements in accordance with these terms of retainer. In addition, the court is also still likely to exercise its discretion to order you to pay a proportion of your opponent's costs."
"69 Action to recover solicitor's costs
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, no action shall be brought to recover any costs due to a solicitor before the expiration of one month from the date on which a bill of those costs is delivered in accordance with the requirements mentioned in subsection (2); but if there is probable cause for believing that the party chargeable with the costs--
(a) is about to quit England and Wales, to become bankrupt or to compound with his creditors, or
(b) is about to do any other act which would tend to prevent or delay the solicitor obtaining payment,
the High Court may, notwithstanding that one month has not expired from the delivery of the bill, order that the solicitor be at liberty to commence an action to recover his costs and may order that those costs be [assessed].
(2) The requirements referred to in subsection (1) are that the bill must be--
(a) signed in accordance with subsection (2A), and
(b) delivered in accordance with subsection (2C).
70 Assessment on application of party chargeable or solicitor
(1) Where before the expiration of one month from the delivery of a solicitor's bill an application is made by the party chargeable with the bill, the High Court shall, without requiring any sum to be paid into court, order that the bill be assessed and that no action be commenced on the bill until the assessment is completed.
(2) Where no such application is made before the expiration of the period mentioned in subsection (1), then, on an application being made by the solicitor or, subject to subsections (3) and (4), by the party chargeable with the bill, the court may on such terms, if any, as it thinks fit (not being terms as to the costs of the assessment), order-
(a) that the bill be assessed; and
(b) that no action be commenced on the bill, and that any action already commenced be stayed, until the assessment is completed.
(3) Where an application under subsection (2) is made by the party chargeable with the bill-
(a) after the expiration of 12 months from the delivery of the bill, or
(b) after a judgment has been obtained for the recovery of the costs covered by the bill, or
(c) after the bill has been paid, but before the expiration of 12 months from the payment of the bill,
no order shall be made except in special circumstances and, if an order is made, it may contain such terms as regards the costs of the assessment as the court may think fit.
(4) The power to order assessment conferred by subsection (2) shall not be exercisable on an application made by the party chargeable with the bill after the expiration of 12 months from the payment of the bill."
"'There are two kinds of interim bills, and the difference between them is crucial.
1. INTERIM STATUTE BILLS
(a) Self contained final bills
These are called statute bills because they comply with all the requirements of the Solicitors Act 1974 and result in all the consequences which flow from such compliance - the solicitor can enforce payment by suing the client, the client can obtain an order for taxation and the various time limits relating to the client's rights to tax run from the date of their delivery. Although they are interim bills they are also final bills in respect of the work covered by them. There can be no subsequent adjustment in the light of the outcome of the business. They are complete self-contained bills of costs to date. Interim statute bills are rare and during the currency of the retainer can arise in only two ways: by natural break or agreement.
(b) Natural Break
There is authority for the rendering of an interim bill at a natural break in protracted litigation. There is, however, little authority in identifying what is a natural break. In Chamberlain v Boodle & King [1982] 1 WLR 1443 Lord Denning said "it is a question of fact whether there are natural breaks in the work done by a solicitor so that each portion of it can and should be treated as a separate and distinct part in itself, capable of and rightly being charged separately and taxed separately." In that case the Court of Appeal held that there had been no natural breaks justifying treating a series of accounts rendered during litigation as final accounts and that they should accordingly be treated as one bill all of which could be taxed. The Council of the Law Society's advice is not to rely on the "natural break" principle as a ground for delivering a bill except in the clearest cases.
(c) Agreement
"Before a solicitor is entitled to require a bill to be treated as a complete self-contained bill of costs to date, he must make it plain to the client expressly or by implication that that is his purpose of sending in that bill for that amount at that time. Then, of course, one looks to see what the client's reaction is. If the client's reaction is to pay the bill in its entirety without demur, it is not difficult to infer an agreement that the bill is to be treated as a self-contained bill of costs to date"- per Roskill LJ in Davidsons v Jones-Fenleieh (1980) 124 Sol Jo 204 (following In re Romer and Haslam [1893] 2 QB 286).
In that case the court found that each of four bills delivered was complete and final in its own right and that the time for taxing three of them had expired. ...
2. INTERIM BILLS ON ACCOUNT
(a) Request for payment on account.
... It is vital to differentiate between a request for payment under s.65(2), which is usually known as a "bill on account", and an interim statute bill, particularly as both are often described as "interim" bills.
(b) Not enforceable by action.
A bill on account is really nothing more than a request for payment on account. Not being a statute bill it cannot be sued upon by the solicitor, the client cannot apply for it to be taxed and, of course, the time limits for applying for a taxation do not run. '"
" by the time one reaches In Re Romer & Haslam, it is plain that the Court of Appeal, Lord Esher, Master of the Rolls, Lord Justice Bowen and Lord Justice Kay, recognised that in certain circumstances a solicitor might, in the course of a long drawn out common law action or arbitration, properly send in bills from time to time to his client, bills made out to a certain date or up to a certain point which is described in the judgments as a 'natural break', intending them to be paid up to that date or point subject of course to the client's statutory right, as it then was, to have that bill taxed either after delivery or, in certain circumstances, even after payment.
But as the judgments in In Re Romer & Haslam show, for this entitlement to remuneration to arise a very clear intention had to be manifested by the solicitor when he sent in his bill to the client that it was intended to be a complete bill to date, which the solicitor wanted to have finally settled and that the solicitor was not, in sending in that bill, merely either telling his client how matters were going on or only seeking a payment on account towards whatever the final bill might be."
"There is now no doubt, I venture to think, what the law is. In a case such as the present, a solicitor is entitled to select a point of time which he regards an appropriate point of time at which to send in a bill. But before he is entitled to require that bill to be treated as a complete self-contained bill of costs to date, he must make it plain to the client either expressly or by necessary implication that that is his purpose of sending in that bill for that amount at that time. Then of course one looks to see what the client's reaction is. If the client's reaction is to pay the bill in its entirety without demur it is not difficult to infer an agreement that that bill is to be treated as a complete self-contained bill of costs to date."
"Then it was said that those bills do not show on their face any 'natural break', to use the phrase that is used in the judgments in In Re Romer & Haslam. If by 'natural break' it is meant a 'natural break' which can be identified as a particular point in the litigation that is so. But I do not see why there should not be a 'natural break' ascertained by reference to one or more particular points of time. In the ultimate analysis it must always depend, as Lord Justice Bowen said, upon the right deduction to be drawn from the particular facts of each case. Neither Master Jacob nor Mr Justice McNeill had the benefit of being referred to ln Re Romer & Haslam. If they had it may well be that each would have reached the same conclusion as I have done.
To my mind, and applying that decision to the facts of the present case, there are here not one but four bills. I therefore approach the remaining question on that basis."
(B) Was there an unenforceable conditional fee agreement?
"In broad terms since the Freezing Orders remained in force on the assets of the Defendants it was necessary to discuss and agree the arrangement for payment of fees in some detail with the Defendants. These discussions took place partly on the telephone between the Defendants at their flat in Paris at Rue de la Tremoille and myself, and partly between the Defendants in Paris and Mr Cakebread, Miss Levy and myself together in their chambers. We had detailed discussions regarding the brief fees and refreshers for Mr Cakebread and Miss Levy and we agreed on specific sums which would be reduced by 50% in the event that we were not successful in either the strike out applications against us or the appeal we were mounting."
"58 Conditional fee agreements
(1) A conditional fee agreement which satisfies all of the conditions applicable to it by virtue of this section shall not be unenforceable by reason only of its being a conditional fee agreement; but (subject to subsection (5)) any other conditional fee agreement shall be unenforceable.
(2) For the purposes of this section and section 58A
(a) a conditional fee agreement is an agreement with a person providing advocacy or litigation services which provides for his fees and expenses, or any part of them, to be payable only in specified circumstances
(3) The following conditions are applicable to every conditional fee agreement-
(a) it must be in writing;"
"In any event in order to get through the appeal and strike out applications are best estimate is that it will take Stuart Cakebread 15 days to prepare, including keeping say 1 or 2 days available to deal with further material we might receive from Paul Simms and 8 days at the hearing i.e. 23 days at £2,750 (I have 1 think agreed with his clerk to reduce his daily rate to this rather than the £3,000 that he requested) therefore:
£63,250 payable to Stuart
Juliette Levy is expected to have to spend 18 days preparation and another 8 days at the appeal i.e. a total of 26 days. I am confident that 1 will be able to negotiate fees of not more than £2,000 a day but equally she will not want any less than that for this commitment. We therefore have:
£52,000 payable to Juliette
It would be impractical not to have transcripts which the court and the claimants are proposing to organise and we have to allow £1,000 per day for this in the Court of Appeal i.e.:
£8,000 for transcripts
I have given consideration to the minimum fee that I can reasonably charge. I will have not less than 13 days preparation and 1 would be prepared in all the circumstances to cap my fee at £2,000 per day. i.e.:
£26,000 payable to David Wyld
We are therefore looking at a reasonable estimate which I hope would cater for having to deal with additional material from Paul Simms:
Total of £149,250.
As I have repeatedly told you; preparing for what will be a very major hearing in the Court of Appeal is not significantly different from preparing for the trial although the fees are much less in part because we do not have a QC. Stuart considers, and I agree with him, that it is not practicable when the other side now have 2 Counsel for us not to have 2 Counsel to deal with all the points that arise.
I have to ask therefore whether you can put in hand arrangements for payment on account for £148,250 as soon as possible. We will be very seriously compromised if we are not put in funds at once to proceed.
Of course it may be that for example the strike out application would collapse after half a day or a day and it may be that the Court of Appeal will not need extensive arguments from our side but will ask the other side to respond earlier in the hearing than we currently estimate.
In events of that kind we will be likely to hold sums on account, reflecting a smaller number of days of hearing on both Counsels fees, my fees and transcripts.
Please can we discuss this as soon as possible since I cannot adopt a 'do nothing' approach. In the absence of being funded in full and very quickly I will have to go off the record and inform Counsel that 1 am unable to retain them for the conjoined hearings and, more immediately, the preparations for them."
"Dear Jack and Helga,
I am sending you a yet further copy of the account of 2nd December.
This is the best estimate that I could produce, and you asked me to let you have it in the form of a bill rather than an estimate, to take us up to the end of the hearings before the Court of Appeal.
You correctly say that I have £113,000 on account, out of which I have already defrayed a proportion of the fees set out on the attached account. The funds that I have taken have included the minimum requirements of counsel to take them up until approximately 3 weeks ago and that has been £30,000 to Juliette Levy and £8,400 to Stuart Cakebread, £11,400 of my fees and some of the copying charges shown on the bill as £4,640.07 although I am receiving further bills.
I believe that I will be able to reduce the total shown on this account by at least some of the fees for the transcripts of £8,000 and I will also arrange by absenting myself from the court to be able to reduce my fees.
The total amount of the reduction below the approximately £201,000 indicated may therefore be as much as sum £13,000.
The whole point of the agreement that I made with Stuart Cakebread and Juliette Levy on your behalf was to avoid the `brief fee' which barristers normally seek to charge and to relate their bills only to the time actually being spent on preparation and in court. This is the point that I just mentioned to you - that when the courts as they have, you will recall, done in every single case on this matter for you adjourned for a day or taking an extra or two's reading time. Counsel is invariably working flat out and that is all part of the overall fee which I have negotiated at somewhat less than their usual [amounts].
I currently (on a per diem working basis) am significantly in deficit and I will be in still more deficit on each succeeding day over the next 5 or 6 days with counsel working either preparing arguments on other points arising in the appeal or in court.
I appreciate that you are aware that I am completely `off side' regarding my professional rules and regulations both in owing counsel far more than I hold and also in agreeing at your specific request not to charge you for the full time spent during the hearing, either by not being present or by notionally not being present.
In return for this I had understood you clearly to indicate that you would be arranging for me to be forwarded the £30,000 received from Jordan, that we would receive some kind of undertaking from a funder regarding that balance of the fees and you would also write letters which we drafted for you to the directors/managers of Brinton.
At present I am in a deficit position but physically hold funds of £ 59,044.75."
"Dear Jack and Helga
Re: Fee Notes
You will recall that you asked me to provide a 'bill not an estimate' at the very beginning of December shortly before the appeal hearing.
The result was that I let you have the bill of 2 December 2008. Since this was a bill I had to make certain assumptions even in charging disbursements (which in total are far more than my own firm's fees as usual). Further discussions have taken place as result of which I now send you a credit note for the amount of that account (£201,255.07) but I enclose herewith another account. The reason why this account, the real one reflecting what has actually happened, is much more is that at the time of preparation of 2 December 2008 on account I was still in negotiation with counsel with whom I have now agreed to significantly higher preparation and brief fees than were incorporated in that earlier account.
I have in fact reduced my own account, in particular I have reduced £20,000 to £15,750 to reflect the reduced amount of work that I was able to do and I have eliminated the fee for transcripts which we have so far at least been able to avoid incurring on your behalf.
The figures in respect of counsel are however now for Stuart Cakebread £130,000 and for Juliette Levy £103,750.
I have as shown on the account paid Stuart £8,400 and Juliette Levy £30,000.
I am at the moment holding the sum of £59,044.75. With this I am disbursing £30,000 to Juliette (reducing the amount that I owe her to £73,750) and £7,500 each to Stuart Cakebread and to my firm on account of the outstanding fees (leaving £122,500 owing to Stuart Cakebread) and £8,250 owing to my firm.
In summary therefore I am due to receive, as I should have done as a condition precedent of acting on your behalf in the appeal a further sum £190,455.25.
It is matter of extreme concern that we did agree to go ahead without full payment in advance but that was on the basis that:-
a) The £30,000 en route from Jordan would be paid into our Client Account from Mr Adom Tenjoukian.
b) We got some sort of undertaking from a funder that in due course the fees would be paid.
c) That you would write a letter in accordance with a draft that I sent to you to request the director /managers of the 'Corporate Defendants' as they have come to be called to release funds as and when they are able too to pay for these fees.
I do know that you have had further communication from Nicholas Frimond regarding further funding being necessary for the excellent work that he is undertaking.
I should also mention, for completeness, making the most favourable possible assumptions about what will happen in the future, i.e. we win on a significant point in the appeal and not just in defeating the strike out application, we will need very significant funding for going forward.
Not only will I have to pay fees of counsel and my own firm's fees before I can for example instruct counsel to turn up to argue points in the court of appeal, but also I will be busy enforcing any costs order and indeed carrying out detailed assessments of the various groups of costs which we ought to receive. All this will require funding. Stuart has estimated that this will not be less than £100,000. I think that should be sufficient including fees to cost assessors and experts and I will not need all that immediately.
I thought I should put all this in writing to you.
Since very often I receive a communication from you which seems to have ignored past communications I will try to put all this in summary on one piece of paper in addition to this letter. It would be a shame if we succeed at this point but are not able to pursue matters in the necessary way on your behalf to achieve anything!"
" In relation to the earlier account however Counsel are prepared to waive half their fees relating to the appeal. In the case of Stuart Cakebread this was 70% of his fees and delivered in respect of the whole (i.e. he spent 30% of his time and effort on the strike out application) and in the case of Juliette it is 60% (i.e. she spent 40% of her time on the strike out application)."
This is followed by the particularised figures that are now claimed.
(C) The Refusal of the Adjournment