![]() |
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] [DONATE] | |||||||||
England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions |
||||||||||
PLEASE SUPPORT BAILII & FREE ACCESS TO LAW
To maintain its current level of service, BAILII urgently needs the support of its users.
Since you use the site, please consider making a donation to celebrate BAILII's 25 years of providing free access to law. No contribution is too small. If every visitor this month gives just £5, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing this vital service.
Thank you for your support! | ||||||||||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions >> Siddiqi v Aidiniantz [2020] EWHC 699 (QB) (24 February 2020) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2020/699.html Cite as: [2020] EWHC 699 (QB) |
[New search] [View without highlighting] [Printable PDF version] [Help]
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand London, WC2A 2LL |
||
B e f o r e :
____________________
TARIQ SIDDIQI | Claimant | |
- and - | ||
JOHN AIDINIANTZ | & OTHERS Defendants |
____________________
THE FIRST AND FOURTH DEFENDANTS appeared in person (Mr. John Aidiniantz).
THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS DID NOT APPEAR AND WERE NOT REPRESENTED
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
If this Transcript is to be reported or published, there is a requirement to ensure that no reporting restriction will be breached. This is particularly important in relation to any case involving a sexual offence, where the victim is guaranteed lifetime anonymity (Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992), or where an order has been made in relation to a young person.
This Transcript is Crown Copyright. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority. All rights are reserved.
MR JUSTICE SAINI:
"The defendants now apply, by notice dated 12 April 2019, for orders striking out the claims and entering summary judgment in favour of the second to fifth defendants. The claimant has responded by indicating that he now wishes to abandon the original Claim Form and Particulars of Claim, and to substitute entirely new wording by amendment. His draft amendments would drop the claims for blackmail and defamation. They would retain the claim in harassment. But they would add further causes of action. The draft Amended Claim identifies five causes of action, as follows (except that I have added the numbering in square brackets):
"The Claimant claims damages for [1] conspiracy to injure by unlawful means and/or [2] wrongful interference and/or [3] breach of confidence and/or [4] harassment and/or [5] interference with his Article 8 rights by (i) the creation of websites in his name and without his consent namely [Web addresses specified] and the use of them to publish and promote false derogatory and damaging allegations of him and his family (ii) the publication of false derogatory and damaging allegations of him and his family both online and to third parties and (iii) the publication of private and confidential information relating to him and his family."
…"
"For all these reasons, I refuse permission to amend the case against the first defendant in the form of the draft proposed. This decision is final so far as it relates to the claims in conspiracy, wrongful interference, and under the Human Rights Act. The conspiracy claim has no real prospect of success. I would not grant permission to plead either of the economic torts relied on, even if the pleaded case was in good order. The direct claim under the Human Rights Act is hopeless, as a matter of law. As to harassment, breach of confidence and misuse of private information, my decision is that the Claim Form and APoC cannot go forward as they stand; but this is not a decision that there is no claim in any of those torts that might succeed. The claimant may wish to re-apply for permission to amend. To keep that option alive, I shall not strike out the entirety of the existing Claim Form. It must be amended to cut it down to a claim for damages for harassment, but the possibility of adding to it will remain live."
"But thirdly – and, to my mind, most importantly - the court's ability to make interlocutory costs orders following, in particular, the Access to Justice reforms in 1998, is a sanction which is available to it in order to encourage responsible litigation. The court marks what it regards as an irresponsible application by an immediate order for the payment of costs. That is intended to bring home to a party - when considering whether to make an application - that an unsuccessful application may carry a price which will have to be paid at once. If the court is not in a position to enforce immediate interlocutory orders for the payment of costs which it was thought right to make, then the force of that sanction is seriously undermined. It is important that, in cases where the court thinks it right to make an order for immediate payment on an interlocutory application, that it does have the power - and can exercise the power - to ensure that order is met. For the reasons which Patten J explained, the only effective sanction in a case of this nature is to require payment of interlocutory costs as the price of being allowed to continue to contest the proceedings. Unless the party against whom an order for costs is made is prepared to, or can be compelled to, comply with, that order, the order might just as well not be made.
"That point attracted the judge, He said this, at paragraph [16] of his judgment:
'In any event I take the view that orders of the court, even in relation to interim costs, require to be complied with and that, unless there is some overwhelming consideration falling within Article 6 that compels the court to take a different view, the normal consequence of a failure to comply with such an order, is that the court, in order to protect its own procedure, should make compliance with that order a condition of the party in question being able to continue with the litigation.'
For my part, I would hold that - whether or not a statement in such general terms can be supported – the proposition can be supported in a case (such as the present) where there is no other effective way of ensuring that the interim costs order is satisfied. That, of course, is always subject to what the judge referred to as the overwhelming consideration falling within Article 6: that orders requiring payment of costs as a condition of proceeding with litigation are not made in circumstances where to enforce such an order would drive a party from access to justice. But, for the reasons that the judge explained and to which I have already referred, this was not such a case."
(i) The ultimate aim of the Court is to identify the just order from a case management perspective, bearing in mind the overriding objective.
(ii) In approaching that task, the "working" or "default rule" is that a litigant should not be able to continue with his or her claim without satisfying an existing and non-appealed final costs order, and the court should impose a condition requiring compliance.
(iii) However, if a claimant can show his or her Article 6 rights will be interfered with by such a condition (because they cannot pay, and a genuine claim will therefore be stifled) that is a material, but not conclusive, consideration pointing against such a condition.
(iv) Finally, the Court must take into account all other circumstances of the case, including the procedural behaviour of the defaulting party in deciding on the just order to make.
31. Turning then to the application of the principles, I have already set out the case management history of the claim. Even bearing in mind the fact that the Claimant was, for a large period of time, acting as a litigant in person, the history tells an unfortunate procedural tale. I will return to that issue in due course but will first consider whether there will in fact be an Article 6 interference, as argued before me on behalf of the Claimant.
CERTIFICATE
Opus 2 International Limited hereby certifies that the above is an accurate and complete record of the Judgment or part thereof.
Transcribed by Opus 2 International Limited
Official Court Reporters and Audio Transcribers
5 New Street Square, London, EC4A 3BF
Tel: 020 7831 5627 Fax: 020 7831 7737
civil@opus2.digital
** This transcript has been approved by the Judge (subject to Judge's approval) **