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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Technology and Construction Court) Decisions >> London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA) v Halcrow Gilbert Associates Ltd [2007] EWHC 2546 (TCC) (31 July 2007) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/TCC/2007/2546.html Cite as: [2007] EWHC 2546 (TCC) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
Between:
____________________
LONDON FIRE AND EMERGENCY PLANNING AUTHORITY |
Claimant |
|
- and - |
||
HALCROW GILBERT ASSOCIATES LIMITED |
First Defendant |
|
- and - |
||
HALCROW GROUP LIMITED |
Second Defendant |
|
- and - |
||
LORNE STEWART PLC |
Third Defendant/ Third party |
____________________
Mr Marcus Taverner QC and Ms Chantal-Aimée Doerries
(instructed by Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw LLP) for the Defendants
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Paragraphs | ||
1 | Introduction | 1 – 26 |
2 | Court List and Witnesses of Fact | 26 – 43 |
3 | Expert Witnesses | 44 - 82 |
4 | The Law | |
(a)Negligence | 82 – 86 | |
(b)Damages | 87 – 107 | |
5 | The facts of the January 2005 fire | 108 – 257 |
6 | Experts Opinions | 258 – 270 |
7 | Allegations of negligence against Halcrow – Discussion and Conclusions | |
(a)Introduction | 271 – 280 | |
(b)Failure to consider initially the effect of smoke oil in the ductwork | 281 – 298 | |
(c)DW/142 | 299 – 312 | |
(d)The gaskets and sealants should have been specified to be oil resistant | 313 – 319 | |
(e)Risk assessment | 320 – 341 | |
(f)Risk assessment after discovery of defective sealant | 342 – 347 | |
(g)Design Review after 2004 fire | 348 – 363 | |
8 | The allegations against Lorne Stewart – Discussion and Conclusions | 364 – 430 |
9 | The History after 5 January 2006 | 431 – 559 |
10 | The Remedial Schemes | |
(a)The Schemes | 560 – 595 | |
(b)The Feasibility of carrying out the work | 596 – 608 | |
11 | Extract Ductwork | 609 – 623 |
12 | LFEPA's Intentions | 624 – 647 |
13 | Westemp Panels | 648 – 658 |
His Honour Judge Toulmin CMG QC:
Introduction
"(a) the claims which LFEPA brought against Halcrow in relation to the uncontrolled fire at The Firehouse on 5 January 2005 as set out in paragraphs 271-275 and 279 in LFEPA's amended Particulars of Claim re-served on 30 June 2005 including, for the avoidance of doubt, any claims by LFEPA against Halcrow for fees paid to Halcrow as part of the investigation of the fire post-5 January 2005 and
(b) future claims in respect of defects in The Firehouse which were not apparent or could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered at the date of the settlement agreement."
1. Halcrow's alleged defective design of the ducts and the exhaust system installed in the ceiling voids in The Firehouse. The relevant ducts are identified in the pleading as those which carry smoke during training exercises (para 271)
2. Para 272 of the pleading alleges that the ductwork was wrongly specified by Halcrow in that it was specified to comply with industry standard DW/142 when this standard was for normal commercial air conditioning and ventilation systems and was not designed to be airtight and was stated specifically not to be intended to handle polluted air.
3. It is alleged that the ductwork should have been specified to stainless steel fully welded construction with welded angle flanges and full faced gaskets (para 273).
4. As a result of the allegedly defective ducts LFEPA contends that oil leaked and an uncontrolled fire occurred. In order to prevent any possibility of a recurrence LFEPA claims that all the supply ductwork and possibly all the extract ductwork in The Firehouse needs to be replaced (para 274).
"1. failing to produce a satisfactory design;
2. insofar as it is applicable, failing to ensure that an adequate design was prepared by others and/or failed to ensure that contractors carried out their works in accordance with the terms of the construction contracts; and …
4. accepted defective works and/or allowed unauthorised relaxations to the specifications."
1. Failed to prepare a specification for the distribution ductwork appropriate for the use to which it was to be put (i.e. transfer of hot oil, air and smoke as opposed to normal temperature air).
2. Wrongly specified the ductwork to be manufactured and installed in accordance with HVCA Specification DW/142.
3. Failed to specify the ductwork to be either stainless steel or zintec of fully welded construction with welded iron flanges and full faced gaskets in accordance with HVCA Specification D1/171 (kitchen ventilation systems) or some other specification appropriate for the transfer without leakage of hot air/oil and/or smoke. (This may be a misprint for DW/171.)
4. Failed to provide a specification for the ductwork that was airtight.
5. Failed to produce a satisfactory design.
6. Failed to review its design.
7. To the extent that the material design was not prepared by Halcrow, failed to ensure that adequate design was prepared by others.
(8. Withdrawn)
9. Failed to ensure that the mechanical services contractor (Lorne Stewart) carried out works to the ductwork in accordance with the terms of the mechanical services contract by carrying out inspections of the works as completed or otherwise.
10. Acceptance by Halcrow of defective work and/or allowing unauthorised relaxation to the specifications.
1. Halcrow's ductwork design permitted the leakage of smoke oil through the cross joints in the ductwork insulation when it should not have done so.
2. Halcrow knew or ought to have known that its design would permit such leakage. Each of the options in DW/142 provided for permitted leakage and DW/142 contained a specific warning that special consideration was required for a design where the air in the ductwork was polluted. The ductwork was tested and accepted by Halcrow on the basis that it permitted such leakage.
3. Halcrow should have specified that the gaskets and sealant used in the flange joints needed to be oil resistant.
4. Halcrow failed to review and correct its design during the works and/or after the first fire in 2004.
5. Halcrow should have, but failed to ensure that Lorne Stewart corrected defects to the flange joints before accepting the work as complete and issuing taking over certificates.
1. Lorne Stewart selected and used an unsuitable sealant between the faces of the flanged joints that was incapable of withstanding exposure to smoke oil.
2. In some areas Lorne Stewart failed to apply any sealant at all and/or failed to apply it properly and/or continuously.
3. Lorne Stewart failed to install the appropriate number and spacing of clamps, cleats and fixings for the flanges at the cross joints.
4. Lorne Stewart selected and installed flanges for the cross joints that were not suitable because they did not provide air tight and/or oil tight joints.
5. Lorne Stewart was instructed to rectify the defects in the flange joints
(a) during the defects liability period and/or
(b) following the 2004 fire and/or
(c) after the 2005 fire
and failed to do so adequately or at all.
1.Cost of ductwork replacement | £2,082,904 |
2.Cost of alternative fire training | 2,550,103 |
3.Fire and remedial scheme investigation fee | 193,373 |
4.Less credit for operational savings | (81,812) |
£4,744,568 |
2. Cast List and Witnesses of Fact
3. Expert Witnesses
"1. It is the duty of an expert to help the court on the matters within his expertise.
2. This duty overrides any obligation to the person from whom he has received instructions or by whom he is paid."
"1.1 It is the duty of an expert to help the court on matters within his own expertise: Rule 35(1). This duty is paramount and overrides any obligation to the person from whom the expert has received instructions or by whom he is being paid.
1.2 Expert evidence should be the independent product of the expert uninfluenced by the pressures of litigation.
1.3 An expert should assist the court by providing objective, unbiased, opinion on matters within his expertise and should not assume the role of the advocate.
1.4 An expert should consider all material facts including those which might detract from his opinion.
1.5 An expert should make it clear
(a) when a question or issue falls outside his expertise and
(b) when he is not able to reach a definitive opinion, for example, because he has insufficient information.
1.6 If after producing a report, an expert changes his view on any material matter, such a change of view should be communicated to all the parties without delay and when appropriate to the court."
"14.3 Those instructing experts should keep experts informed of the progress of cases including amendments to statement of case relevant to the expert's opinion.
14.4 If those instructing experts become aware of material changes in circumstances or that information within their control was not provided to experts they should without delay instruct experts to review and if necessary update the contents of their reports."
"The consultant shall also assess the mechanical ventilation extract systems together with artificial smoke devices and materials for use within the scheme."
4. The Law
(a) Negligence
"But where you get a situation which involves the use of some special skill and competence then the test as to whether there has been negligence or not is … the standard of a skilled man exercising and professing to have that special skill. A man need not possess the highest expert skill; it is well established law that it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art. I do not think that I quarrel much with any of the submissions in law which have been put before you by counsel. Mr Fox-Andrews put it in this way, that in the case of a medical man, negligence means a failure to act in accordance with the standards of reasonably competent medical men at the time. That is a perfectly adequate statement so long as it is remembered that there may be one or more perfectly proper standards; and if a medical man conforms with one of those proper standards then he is not negligent."
(b) Damages
1. The fundamental basis of damages is compensation for the pecuniary loss to a party naturally flowing from the breach.
2. This principle is qualified by the duty of a claimant to take all reasonable steps to mitigate its loss.
3. Where in the course of business a party has taken action arising out of the transaction which has mitigated its loss, the effect in actual diminution of the loss which it has suffered may be taken into account even if it had no duty to act. These principles were affirmed by the House of Lords in Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v Eagle Star [1997] AC 191.
"… put a party who has been injured or who has suffered in the same position as he would have been if he had not sustained the wrong."
"Damages are designed to compensate for an established loss and not to provide a gratuitous benefit for an aggrieved party from which it follows that the reasonableness of an award is to be linked directly to the loss sustained. If it is unreasonable in a particular case to award the cost of reinstatement it must be because the loss sustained does not extend to the need to reinstate."
However, Lord Jauncey emphasised in his speech (page 358) that
"What constitutes the aggrieved party's loss is in every case a matter of fact and degree."
I shall return to Ruxley in a moment.
"42. To award the plaintiffs the cost of reinstatement, theoretical or not, if it is intended thereby to put them in the same position as they would have been if the fire had not occurred insofar as money can, can also be reasonable. As between themselves and the defendants one must at least be able to contemplate the possibility if not the probability that the plaintiffs were indeed minded to rebuild their billiard hall and shops."
"If the court takes the view that it would be unreasonable for the plaintiff to insist on reinstatement as where for example the expenses of the work involved would be out of all proportion to the benefit to be obtained, then the plaintiff will be confined to the difference in value."
"Ruxley also supports the proposition that, although what a claimant does with any damages he receives is irrelevant, his intention to reinstate or not to reinstate, while not conclusive, is relevant to the question whether it would be reasonable to reinstate the property – see Lord Jauncey at page 359C-D and Lord Lloyd at pages 372-373; see also for example the passage from the judgment of Sir Robert Megarry VC in Tito v Waddell No.2 [1977] Ch 106 at 132 …"
(a) Halcrow was negligent in its design;
(b) Halcrow's negligence caused LFEPA's loss as claimed;
(c) In considering (b) it is necessary to consider not only whether Halcrow's negligence caused the loss but whether LFEPA suffered a loss for which it should reasonably be compensated, and in particular whether it was reasonable for it to recover the cost of reinstatement of the property. In answering this question I should consider whether or not LFEPA have shown any intention to reinstate the property.
"It is submitted that the contractual measure of damages for failure to review a design where a claim in respect of the original design obligations is Statute barred should be such as to put a claimant into the position that he would have been in if the design had been properly reviewed. Thus if the failure to review occurred after practical completion a claimant should be obliged to give credit for the (possibly substantial) costs which would have been incurred at that stage in correcting the design."
This would seem to be correct.
Stratification
5. The Facts to the January 2005 Fire
"The Authority intends to extend its training facilities at its Southwark Training Centre by providing a firehouse building and associated drill tower on part of the Centre's No.1 drill yard.
The Firehouse building and associated drill tower is a structure providing facilities for recruits and firefighters to develop, maintain and improve their skills in using fire service equipment. This will be undertaken in conditions which simulate operational working conditions (including real fire) in a safe, controlled training environment. Exercises may be of a set programme or varied by prior arrangement by the trainers and the results monitored and recorded.
The exercises are to be carried out in increasingly stressful conditions of heat, smoke, fire, water and resulting humidity and steam. They are also designed to be undertaken in a variety of internal spaces which may need adaption as required for the particular exercise. This is required so that students do not become familiar with the building and their approach to any exercise 'incident'."
"Although HGa as a company does not have specific experience in designing firehouses, the members of the team have considerable and relevant experience in the issues that need to be addressed in the design of firehouses and other similar projects that require a high level of operator interaction with a process in a hazardous environment.
"The team that HGa have drawn together represents expertise at its highest levels in each of the technology areas concerned … It is extremely unlikely that such expertise would be available purely from within a single entity."
Under Clause 1 Halcrow undertook to provide the services set out in the consultant's brief. These included:
1. Managing the Project (1.3.1)
2. Developing the design and preparing all necessary plans and drawings (1.3.2; 1.3.25 and 1.3.50)
3. Preparing the specification for the Project including the mechanical and engineering specification (1.3.53) and
4. Supervising any design or drawings by others, quality controls of materials, testing and commissioning (1.3.61-66 and 71)
"Accordingly, except as expressly provided for in the conditions neither party shall be obligated or liable to the other in respect of any damages or losses suffered by that other which arise out of under or in connection with the Contract or the Works whether by reason or in consequence of any breach of contract or of statutory duty or tortuous or negligent act or omission."
"Neither the contractor nor the purchaser shall be liable to the other by way of indemnity or by reason of any breach of the contract or of statutory duty, (including but not limited to negligence) for any loss of profit, loss of use, loss of production, loss of contracts or for any financial or economic loss or for any indirect or consequential damage whatsoever that may be suffered by the other."
"(a) 12 months calculated from the date of taking over the Works under Clause 29 (taking over) or
(b) 12 months calculated from the date of replacement or rectification to the Engineer's satisfaction of the defect in that Section or part of the Works whichever is the later."
"The Contractor shall be responsible for making good by repair or replacement with all possible speed at his expense any defect in or damage to any part of the Works which may appear or occur during the Defects Liability Period and which arises either:
(a) from any defective workmanship or design or
(b) from any act or omission of the Contractor done or omitted during the said period."
[1. not relevant]
2. the provision of realistic training for firefighters and the agreed limits of such training;
3. the provision of realistic heat as experienced in a real fire situation;
4. the provision of "stage" smoke to mimic smoke experienced in a realistic situation;
5. the provision of realistic fires in fire rooms;
6. the provision of circumstances for simulated fire training for firefighters in reasonable and controlled conditions of safety;
7. the presentation of the four options with their pros and cons.
"2.iii) Artificial smoke is to be used in The Firehouse. It will provide realistic training conditions but as a liquid it will not behave as the carbonaceous particulate smoke created by fires in a house or light industrial premises that The Firehouse represents. It burns off at a temperature of 80 to 100 degrees C depending on the product selected."
Mr Tovey has added:
"HGa wil concentrate on artificial smoke that burns off at 180°C"
"As a general rule should any problem arise from the design, the Authority would seek redress in the first instance from HGa (Halcrow) and would call upon HGa's professional indemnity insurance."
"The contractor must ensure that all the equipment provided as part of this contract is capable of withstanding the conditions of extreme heat, steam, water from a jet to a fire spray, humidity, foam and flame etc that is likely to occur as well as
Water hoses …
Breathing apparatus, air cutting cylinders and similar."
"Ducted supply and exhaust air shall be installed as indicated in the tender drawings. These are diagrammatic and show the philosophy and intended routing. The contractor will provide installation drawings based on those drawings …
From the supply plenum, ducted fresh air is provided to each of the smoke/heat zones as well as the fire rooms. Attenuation is provided on each supply duct with smoke generators and zone heaters (both free issue) installed duct mounted for each smoke/heat zone. For the fire rooms in duct mounted smoke generators (free issue) are to be installed."
"Sealants, joints and materials shall be as specified in DW/142. Where the required temperature rating for sealants, joints and materials exceed those in DW/142 the contractor shall submit with his tender full details together with the type of sealant, joints and materials for temperature ratings within DW/142."
"All ductwork systems shall incorporate sufficient hinged access hatches to facilitate inspection of ducts and for cleaning. Seals to access hatches must be airtight and the access hatches and dust aperture must not compromise the fire and resistance of the ductwork."
"All ductwork and connections shall be adequately braced and stiffened where necessary to prevent sagging, drumming and vibration and shall be completely airtight."
"All site joints for metal ductwork other than flanged joints shall be properly swaged plain slip type with the inside lap in the fire detector airflow and shall be riveted or jointed with self-tapping screws at not more than 60 mm centres. All such joints shall be sealed and rendered airtight with a suitable sealant."
"Access openings shall be provided in the ductwork at suitable positions for the purpose of inspection and servicing of plant and equipment. They shall be rigidly framed with airtight covers designed for easy removal and replacement …
Access panels shall be of 1.2 mm thick galvanised sheet steel with a 25 mm by 6 mm thick approved sealing gasket fixed around the edge with suitable adhesive to form an airtight seating against the duct frame …"
"All supply and extract ductwork which has an operating static pressure greater than 500 N/m2 (Newtons) and all ductwork which will be inaccessible shall be tested for air leakage after assembly on site and before any insulation is applied …"
"The test shall be maintained for a period of 15 minutes during which period the aggregate leakage shall not exceed 1 per cent of the total design flow rate. Any leakage must at once be made good before proceeding with tests on the next section of the ductwork."
"By choosing from the range of options permitted by HGa's specification LS was able to fabricate an appropriate ductwork system for The Firehouse."
"1. Design is not included in your scope of works. You are, however, required to carry out elements of design development in turning diagrammatic tender drawings into fabrication/workshop drawings.
2. Selection of equipment is not design … It is the contractor's responsibility to select the ductwork to comply with the specification.
3. Although the specification calls for low and medium temperature ductwork to be DW/142 there are a number of options, e.g. cross joints. DW/142 does not indicate manufacturers of sealants or gaskets. These need to be confirmed by the contractor. The suitability of the equipment, e.g. the amount of expansion in the joints that can be accommodated can only be provided by the manufacturer."
1.Heat and smoke training areas | 80°C with hot spots of 100°C |
2.Ceiling voids | 80°C with hot spots of 90°C |
3.Plant rooms | 45°C with hot spots local to the heat smoke units of 50°C |
4.Fire rooms | 400°C for some rooms, other fire rooms up to 1000?C in the flames impingement areas for short durations |
5.Other rooms | 350°C |
6.Above fire room doors | Within the heat and smoke rooms and some of the corridors/refuge areas: 400°C with short bursts of hot air up to 800°C from two of the fire rooms. |
"that there is no concise record of the interpreted requirements and the way in which each is to be met by the facilities provided. There is hence no clear "approval of these by [the Authority]". There is the possibility of difference of understanding between the parties involved …"
"Shortcomings in the level of definition of the design process, the appropriateness of design methods used and the certainty of the results"
"2.2 Second Stage Review
A resolution of the questions relating to the adequacy of the facilities provided awaits a clear and final definition of the ways in which the facility will be used. This must come from the client. The actual performance of the facility under these operating conditions now becomes an issue for testing and a proper documented basis for this must be developed and agreed."
"Ductwork in both supply and exhaust system will routinely carry the simulated 'smoke' which consists of an aerosol suspension of mineral oil. Over a period it is to be expected that this oil will condense and collect on the internal surface of the ductwork. This may pose a risk of duct fire which does not appear to have been addressed."
"Design Risk
On the basis of the findings to date, the effect of the issues outlined above is to constitute a serious design risk. This may be in non-achievement of certain requirements; in failure to achieve the specified equipment life or at the extreme an 'unsafe facility'."
"The experimental results indicate that when these smoke generators are properly maintained and used in the prescribed manner under the conditions prevailing during the course of these trials there is little risk of the formation of flammable atmosphere, except possibly in the immediate vicinity of the nozzle. When a smoke generator similar in type to those used in the trials was run for long periods in a small enclosure in a laboratory experiment, concentrations exceeding 100% LEL (lower explosive limit) were detected but such conditions are unlikely to occur in any practical application of these devices."
"This paper concluded that for droplets (of Ondina oil) below 0.014 mm, (i.e. 14 microns) that due to heat transmission these drops have time to vaporise completely before the flame front reaches them and combustion occurs. Thus they exhibit flammability characteristics essentially the same as the fully vaporised material. As the smoke house concentrations are well below the lower flammable limit, these smoke mixtures should not explode."
"Both these approaches suggest 'the smoke atmosphere will not present a flammable hazard'."
"Following this week's inspection of the low temperature ductwork installation we find that many of the flange joints have either failed or are showing signs of impending failure …
"As a matter of urgency you are requested to provide your proposals and programme to rectify all failed joints and other joints that do not comply with the requirements of the specification."
"This failure makes the supply of all material used in the construction of your low and medium temperature ductwork systems which we have personally requested essential.
We remind you of the urgency to complete all defects as commercial use of The Firehouse is due to commence shortly."
I shall refer to this letter later when I deal with the section relating to the liability of Lorne Stewart.
"Halcrow stated that there is a problem with duct work joints and the FH (Firehouse) had experienced leaking of smoke in some rooms. It is believed to be gasket and we don't know if the gaskets are failing due to the heat or the oil ..."
"15.2 Failed joint sealant visible on some dropper ducts and in plant room. Insufficient flange clips provided cf manufacturers recommendations."
"1. Lorne Stewart's ductwork was required to be based on ductwork specification DW/142 which only requires access doors to be provided for access to control dampers. A number of access doors were included in their price for the revised ductwork and these, together with additional instructed access doors have been installed …"
"As stated in our letter to you dated 24 October 2003 please rectify all failed joints and other joints that do not comply with the specification ..."
Mr Tough said in oral evidence that he did not think that Lorne Stewart had given all the details of the sealant which had been used.
"Thank you for your fax of 30 March 2004 enclosing P & P method statement for remedial work to the ductwork gasket joints.
We have the following comments:
In your fax to ourselves of 17 November 2003 you enclosed copy of the facsimile from Fenland Fire Contracts Ltd to P & P of 18 April 2001. This states that the proposed intermescent mastic tape duct gasket material begins to soften and intumesce at 100 degrees C with full intumescent properties at above 150 degrees C. Since the design temperature for the supply ductwork from the riser is 110 degrees C the proposed mastic would be unsuitable. Please find an alternative sealant…
Please confirm that it is proposed to carry out work to all flange joints in the supply ductwork downstream of the heat smoke units and up to the point where the ducts exist in the plant room irrespective of the state of the joint.
"The inside of the existing joints are often characterised by the excess sealant having been squeezed out … would need to be removed …
Is the sealant to be applied as a gasket strip along the joint or by a mastic gum application?"
"We have not been able to identify any substance which is designed for this type of application and it appears that The Firehouse is a unique installation."
Mr Cole did propose the use of a mastic silicone sealant currently installed in The Firehouse which appeared to be suitable.
"The documents include ICS statements that the panels would have a life of at least five years … office room panels are showing signs of deterioration within 6 weeks of being replaced. The ceiling installation is also leaking excessively resulting in heavy smoke staining and soot deposits in the ceiling void. A reasonable ceiling integrity is essential to limit temperatures within the ceiling void … We are more concerned that the lack of performance of the Westemp panels suggests that the panels are not suitable for the application."
"2. Through direct access downstream of the joint area – there was evidence of deterioration (possible burning of the jointing compound) in the joint flange emanating from the bottom right hand corner extending upwards and horizontally to the left hand when viewed looking upstream. There was a light oil deposition on the bottom side of the duct.
3. Through the main access panel on the H and S unit -there was no evidence of any high temperature effect looking upward (downstream) to the flow deflection on the bend. Some light oil deposition was evident on the orifice plate around the burner."
"3. There was evidence of oil in the lagging when inserting the thermocouple and also by virtue of smoke emission in the hot test."
"The only combustible material is the oil in the lagging. The source of ignition is difficult to determine but the only obvious source at a high enough temperature is the nozzle of the adjacent smoke machine which could reach a temperature of 390 to 400?C. Given auto-flammability and a source of air via the leakage from the duct flange and a small fire would have occurred, thus damaging the aluminium cladding.
Zones 4 and 9 are the only heat and smoke zone units firing vertically upwards and therefore giving rise to a possible situation of any leaked oil (due to ductwork leakage) being able to travel under gravity to contract with the smoke machine nozzle. All other zones firing vertically downwards would have any leaked oil travelling away from the smoke machine interface."
"15.2 Lower temperature ductwork and failed joint sealant in plant rooms and insufficient flange clips provided c.f. manufacturers' recommendations."
"In the light of experience gained so far with the ventilation system we strongly recommend that oil drainage is also installed to the supply air ductwork in the plant rooms for which we are currently producing a design."
This theme in relation to outstanding works was repeated in letters to Lorne Stewart dated 21 July 2004 and 19 August 2004.
"It is believed that the fire was external to the zone duct and the medium being condensed smoke oil which had leaked into the duct work insulation through the failed joint …"
"3. Oil leaking down onto smoke injection probe which is directly connected to the smoke generator heater block … and is surrounded by thermal insulation … It is therefore possible that oil migrating through the thermal insulation and reaching the outside of the probe could be the cause of the fire."
"15.2 Low temperature ductwork – failed joint sealant and insufficient flange clips provided. Lorne Stewart agreed to replace the failed sealant during the maintenance period. On programme 15 Nov P&P 5 days."
"We also attended site and witnessed continuous smoke leakage from the ducts during a smoke test. The leakage is not as bad as it was and consequentially will not have a detrimental effect on training."
Experts Opinions
"It is therefore not surprising that Clause 4.3 has been included within DW/142 in order to prompt consideration of any such special environment prior to the application of DW/142.
Hence the presence of Clause 4.3 does not preclude the application of DW/142 at The Firehouse. It simply draws attention to the need to consider whether and in what circumstances it is appropriate."
"Visual inspection indicated degradation and/or flow of sealant from some of these joints and these joints are leaking."
The experts therefore conclude that the sealants were not suitable for exposure to the conditions inside the ductwork.
7. The allegations of negligence against Halcrow. Discussion and conclusions
a) Introduction
274. (a) Halcrow failed in the formulation of the design to consider what happened to mineral oil when it cools and/or impinges on the inside of the ductwork and therefore designed a system which failed to ensure that mineral oil could not leak and cause uncontrolled fires.
(i) when it instructed Lorne Stewart to omit the condensate drains from the ductwork on 26 November 1998 and the requirement that the ductwork be laid to falls;
(ii) when Lorne Stewart failed to provide Halcrow with details of the sealant for the ductwork in March 1999;
(iii) after reading paragraph 3.12 of the Hark Report (for which see paragraphs 191 – 203 above).
(b) Failure to consider initially the effect of smoke oil in the ductwork
(i) investigations to ascertain the amount of smoke oil deposits to be expected;
(ii) assessments or assumptions made for the purpose of ductwork design;
(iii) the assessment of risk associated with such assumptions.
1. Did Halcrow consider what happens to mineral oil when it cools and/or impinges on the inside of the ductwork?
2. If Halcrow did so, was its conclusion one which it was reasonable for it to reach?
3. What action (if any) should it have taken as a consequence? Did it fail to take action or take precautions which it should have taken or made?
4. Was the result of Halcrow's reasonable considerations such that it was incumbent on Halcrow to ensure that mineral oil could not leak from the ductwork system?
5. Was it reasonably foreseeable that if oil did leak from the ductwork it would (or might) lead to ignition resulting in uncontrolled fire?
"Our expectation was that there would be a very fine film, that if you actually put your hand on it and rubbed it, you would be able to feel it but you would not be able to see it.
Q. So that fine film would be formed from liquid smoke oil, would it not?
A. Yes."
"At the time of preparing his specification for the ductwork I would expect HGa to have recognised that a film of liquid oil would be deposited on the inside of the ductwork caused by the oil based smoke passing over the ductwork surface. By a 'film' I mean a light surface coating of oil such that a finger run over the inside surface of the ductwork would feel oily. I would not expect HGa to have predicted that liquid oil deposits would be in excess of a film nor that the quantity of oil would be sufficient for the oil to flow, because it is not self evident that such quantities of oil will be deposited."
(c) DW/142
"This specification is not intended to apply to ductwork handling air which is polluted or is otherwise exceptional in respect of temperature or humidity (including saturated air) nor is it suitable for ductwork exposed to a hostile environment, e.g. contaminated air, off-shore oil rigs etc. The design, construction, installation, supports and finishes in such cases should be given special consideration in relation to the circumstances of each case. This specification is also not intended to apply to domestic warm air installations."
(a) the material to be used for the fabrication of the ductwork, namely galvanised steel;"
(b) the method of jointing adjacent sections of the ductwork, i.e. flanged joints;
(c) the pressure class, i.e. high pressure: this restricted the choice of longitudinal seams and flanged joints, determined the spacing of flanged joints and stiffness, determined the thickness of the sheet metal and determined the test pressure and leakage rate;
(d) the temperature rating (minus 4 degrees C to 110 degrees C); and
(e) the presence of smoke based oil in the ductwork.
(d) The gaskets and sealants should have been specified to be oil resistant
"The specification identifies that the ductwork contains oil smoke and it is obvious on the face of it that any materials within the ductwork system are going to be in contact with the smoke-oil and therefore should be suitable for it."
(e) Risk Assessments – Issues (d) and (e)
1. On 5 September 1997 International Code Services (ICS) produced a detailed Design Risk Assessment. Items 25 to 29 of the Appendix deal with the assessment of the risk of smoke oil. Mr Rollason in his oral evidence described ICS as the world leaders in this area.
2. On 29 September 1997 Halcrow produced a draft training risk register. Item A5.8.2 of Appendix A dealt with the following identified hazard:
"Emergency ventilation system initiated due to a person OR fire in duct."
3. In March 1999 Halcrow produced an Interim Risk Management Report. This updated the previous assessment in item A5.8.2 of Appendix A.
4. In October 2000, DNV Consulting produced its Southwark Firehouse Safety System Study. Section 4.8.4 is entitled "Smoke Generation Oil – Concept Engineering Ltd".
5. Also in the period 1998 to 2000 Mr Hark produced two reports consolidated into one report to which I have already made extensive reference.
"The Firehouse is built to good standard, and the operations can be run safely. Several preventative mitigation measures are necessary but most of these are procedural or where technical should not prove expensive."
"Concept Engineering submitted to Halcrow project representative (Dr R A Cox) data supporting the general safety of their smoke-oil system. The data-pack contained several technical summaries which addressed the use of flammability and toxicity. This included a review by the HSE Research and Laboratory Services Division by Dr J J Smeed in 1982. With respect to flammability their assessment concluded:
'The experimental results indicate that when smoke generators are properly maintained and used in the prescribed manner under the conditions prevailing during the course of these trials, there is little risk of the formation of a flammable atmosphere except possibly in the immediate vicinity of the nozzle. When a smoke generator similar in type to those used in the trials was run for long periods in a small enclosure in a laboratory experiment, concentrations exceeding 100 per cent LEL (lower explosion limit) were detected but such conditions are unlikely to occur in any practical application of these devices'."
1. Detector failure due to oil globules from the smoke.
2. Contamination of personal protective equipment without.
3. Slippery floors and walls.
1. Potential personal injury.
2. Long term exposure to oil.
3. Potential fire hazard in ductwork.
1. Visual checks should determine if oil size is correct
2. Low nitrogen pressure alarm
3. Ductwork cleared once per year
These safeguards were included.
"Ductwork in both supply and exhaust system will routinely carry the simulated 'smoke' which consists of aerosol suspension of a mineral oil. Over a period it has to be expected that this oil will condense and collect on the internal surface of the ductwork. This may pose a risk of duct fires which does not appear to have been addressed."
"So therefore we looked at the possibility of a duct fire due to the presence of the heaters in the supply ducts which is something that no other fire place – fire training installation – at that time had and came to the conclusion that there was not a fire risk at this point."
(f) Risk Assessment after discovery of defective sealants
Review after the fire in 2004
"I think they would have identified … that the primary candidate shall we say was the proximity of heat/smoke units to where the fire took place and … the units where the heat/smoke units fire upwards are in Zones 4 and 9. So I would anticipate that perhaps remedial works would be done to these two units. Perhaps the configuration should be changed. I believe that Halcrow did suggest that the situation be monitored to verify whether or not there was leakage into the insulation at those places. In terms of fire sources, sources of ignition elsewhere in The Firehouse, whether those were considered important would depend upon the analysis that was carried out, so you might say: well, there might be a risk of flames licking up through the ceiling of the fire rooms if you felt the Westemp panels were going to be damaged. I would say that would be the prime fire source that I would identify."
The allegations against Lorne Stewart – Discussion and Conclusion
(1) The General Conditions of Contract, MF/1 Rev 3 1988 Edition
(2) Annex 2 (incorporated documents)
(3) The special conditions which included MF/3
(a) It was responsible for design in the sense that it was responsible for the selection of materials including sealants and flanges.
(b) It was also responsible for the selection of sealants and for ensuring that such sealants were suitable for the temperature conditions which were specified and that the sealants were able to withstand attack by the presence of oil which was identified in the specification at Volume 6 Appendix 8.
(c) It was also responsible for providing flanges with intermediate clamps at 400 mm maximum spacings on ductwork slides over 400 mm and a cleat or clamp installed within 50 mm of the corner of the fixings and that fixings should not exceed 400 mm centres.
"The Contractor shall be responsible for making good by repair or replacement with all possible speed at his expense any defect in or damage to any part of the works which may appear or occur during the defects period and which arises either
(a) from any defective workmanship or design
(b) from any act or omission of the Contractor done or omitted during the same period."
"(a) 12 months calculated from the date of taking over the Works under Clause 29 (Taking Over), or
(b) 12 months calculated from the date of replacement or rectification to the Engineer's satisfaction of the defect in that section or part of the Works whichever is the later. …"
"If any such defect shall appear or damage occur the Purchaser or the Engineer shall forthwith inform the Contractor thereof stating in writing the nature of the defect or damage. The provisions of this Clause shall apply to all repairs or replacements carried out by the Contractor to remedy defects and damage as if the said repairs or replacements had been taken over on the date they were completed."
"The Defects Liability Period shall be extended by a period equal to the period during which the works (or that part thereof in which the defect or damage to which this Clause applies has appeared or occurred) cannot be used by reason of that defect or damage."
"If any such defect or damage be not remedied within a reasonable time the Purchaser may proceed to do the work at the Contractor's risk and expense provided that he does so in a reasonable manner and notifies the Contractor of his intention to do so. The cost reasonably incurred by the Purchaser shall be deducted from the Contract Price or be paid by the Contractor to the Purchaser."
"The Contractor's liability under this Clause shall be in lieu of any contract term implied by law as to the quality or fitness for any purpose or the workmanship of any part of the Works taken over under Clause 29 (Taking Over) and save as expressed in this Clause 36 neither the Contractor nor his sub-contractors, their respective servants or agents shall be liable whether in contract, in tort, (including but not limited to negligence) or by reason of breach of statutory duty or otherwise, in respect of defects in or damage to such part or for any damage or loss of whatsoever kind attributable to such defects or damage or any work done or service or advice rendered in connection therewith."
"For the purpose of this sub-Clause the Contractor contracts on his own behalf and on behalf of and as trustee for his sub-contractors, servants or agents. Nothing in this Clause 36 shall affect the liability of the Contractor under the Conditions in respect of any part of the works not taken over …."
"In all cases the party establishing or alleging a breach of contract or a right to be indemnified in accordance with the contract shall be under a duty to take all necessary measures to mitigate the loss which has occurred provided that he can do so without unreasonable inconvenience or cost."
"… Neither the Contractor nor the Purchaser shall be liable to the other by way of indemnity or by reason of any breach of contract or of statutory duty (including negligence for any loss of profit, loss of use, loss of production, loss of contracts or for any financial or economic loss or for any indirect or consequential damage whatsoever that may be suffered by the other."
"the Purchaser and the Contractor intend their respective rights and obligations and liabilities as provided for in the Conditions to be exhaustive of the rights, obligations and liabilities of each of them to the other arising out of under or in connection with the Contract and the works."
"Accordingly except as expressly provided for in the Conditions neither party shall be obligated or liable to the other in respect of any damages or losses suffered by that other which arises out of under or in connection with the contract or works whether by reason or in consequence of any breach of contract or of statutory duty or tortious or negligent act or omission."
"Should any defect in the material or workmanship be discovered during construction or within twelve months of the trial trip and unconnected with wear and tear or inefficiency, carelessness, neglect or default of engineers, such parts in which the defects are discovered will be replaced … but their liability does not extend to any loss or damage, direct or indirect caused by the failure of such defective parts … but only to the actual cost or remedy of the part; and on and after the expiry of such twelve months all claims upon and all liability of the engine builders … shall be absolutely unenforceable and at an end nor shall their liability ever or in any case either before during or subsequent to the expiry of the said period of twelve months extend to any indirect or consequential damages or claims whatsoever."
"What does one mean by 'direct damage'. Direct damage is that which flows naturally from the breach without intervening causes and independently of special circumstances while indirect damage does not so flow. The breach has brought it about but only because of some supervening event or some special circumstances unknown to the seller. In my judgment the words 'indirect' or 'inconsequential' do not exclude liability from that which is prima facie recoverable: that is do not exclude liability for damages which are the direct and natural result of breaches complained of."
"(iv) The Seller will be liable for any loss damage costs or expense incurred by the Purchaser arising from the supply by the Seller of any such faulty goods or materials or any goods or materials not being suitable for the purpose for which they are required save that the Seller's liability for consequential loss is limited to the value of the contract."
"I do not see why the clear meaning and effect of condition 44.4 should be cut down. If parties want to limit their potential liability to one another in the manner provided by condition 44.4 there is no reason why the law should stand in their way and prevent them from doing so."
1. Clause 44.4 is effective in reflecting the agreement of the parties to limit their rights, obligations and liabilities to those set out in Clauses 36 and 44 of the Conditions as amended by special conditions.
"Please rectify all failed joints and other joints that do not comply with the specification…"
"Following our discussions and expert advice we can confirm that it is now apparent that oil leakage is brought about by an inappropriate specification for the supply and extract of the oil laden smoke. It is therefore not feasible to carry out any further works in this respect unless and until the specification is suitably amended."
Conclusions
8. The History after 5 January 2005
"Our inspection revealed that considerable amounts of oil were evident in Zone 3 bedroom, lagging of supply air ducts within the plant room and in rockwool insulation which had been used around ducting and services where they penetrated through the plant room walls at high levels."
"The most likely source of the oil contamination on the rockwool insulation was leakage of oil (either as a vapour or a liquid) through the joints in the ducts used to carry the oil vapour. This theory was supported by the observation that oil contamination was usually heavier on the upper layer of the rockwool insulation and was also heavier in the vicinity of ducts. In some areas there may have been a contribution from natural condensation of the smoke oil on metal surfaces (as observed on the Durasteel panelling). However this would have been unlikely to have caused the saturation of the insulation observed in some area."
"4.1 The most likely cause of the fire above the ceiling of the Office scenario room of The Firehouse at Southwark Training Centre appeared to be the initiation of thermal oxidation in the oil contaminated rockwool insulation above the Westemp panels."
"Your assistance will be required primarily in relation to the variations, delay and defects claims. In the first instance, however, you will be required to assist in advising the Authority on remedial works and possible re-design in relation of [to?] problems it has become aware of following the fire at The Firehouse on 5 January 2005."
"Halcrow stated that oil leaking from the ducts and ignited by soot 'sparks' was in their opinion the cause of the fire … Halcrow recommended, as well as carrying out the remedial work to seal the ducts, improvement could also be carried out to the Westemp design and the installation workmanship in order to minimise the soot 'sparks' passing through the Westemp panels although this would be an enhancement to the original specification."
"Halcrow reconfirmed that the remedial work required to the ducts was a contract defect which was already on the defect list and is work which Lorne Stewart is required to complete."
"We would rather wait for the outcome of these [forensic] investigations before we carry out any further remedial works to a ductwork system which has an inherent design problem."
"Following our discussions and expert advice, we confirm that it is now apparent that oil leakage is brought about by an inappropriate specification for the supply and extract of the oil-laden smoke. It is therefore not feasible to carry out any further work in this respect unless and until the specification is suitably amended."
"(1) RE (Mr Evans) summarised the options for repair are to replace all supply ductwork with either welded lightweight stainless steel and use existing smoke oil system or discard use of supply ducts and add local smoke generators in each fire room or find an acceptable method to reseal existing ducts (Halcrow's proposal to seal ducts and use of chemical smoke were concluded as unacceptable.
(4) RE is to invite a competent contractor asap to view the installation and advise on resealing the existing ducts and also installing new stainless steel ducts."
"Rob,
When determining the remedial work necessary to put the fire places back on the run we should consider the problem the Training Team raised before Christmas that the cosmetic smoke injected into the fire rooms did not give realistic conditions, due to the heat the smoke hung at low level, allowing trainees to see over the top."
This makes it clear that the issue of stratification was raised before the January 2005 fire.
"From discussion with you last autumn (i.e. 2004) we were aware that generated smoke did not give realistic conditions and hung at low level, allowing trainees to see over the top. This concern was conveyed to the consultant at the time and with the fire has faded from the discussions. I have emailed the consultant to bring back into discussions as modifications may be necessary within the work we will be required to carry out as a consequence of the fire. I am not aware whether this will be a minor or major change to the generation of smoke. Can you please put on paper what exactly is and is not happening, as I expect a response from the consultant to my email below (to Mr Tough)."
"In any fire situation smoke builds from the ceiling or highest point in any structure as there is a build up of unburned gas and products of combustion, the smoke thickens and the visible space between the base of the smoke to the ground (this is referred to as the neutral plane) gets lower to the ground reducing the neutral plane.
The fire-fighting tactics are to pulse spray small quantities of water into this cloud to cool any unburned gas so as to prevent it from igniting. This is done beneath this cloud with the Firefighter crawling in the clear space of the neutral plane.
The Firehouse failed to recreate those conditions as the neutral plane is between the top of the smoke and the ceiling. This is because the temperatures at ceiling height are greater than the temperature of the smoke. It forces people to want to stand up and look over the smoke, this reinforces negative learning, would be a dangerous practice if carried out at a real incident or carbonaceous facility and it does not simulate realistic conditions of how a fire would develop in a confined space."
"LFEPA to advise on smoke performance acceptability but nothing can be done about burn-down of oil mist in fire rooms although it is less when rooms run cooler."
"There is nothing to be done about this. The 'burn-down' of the oil mist was accepted by Derek Watson at the start of the project as the best that technology could provide at the time. We have checked recently and the oil mist used in the Firehouse is still state of the art. The 'burn-down' of Ondina oil will start at 200 degrees Centigrade which is a higher temperature than all the alternatives that we have found. To avoid the clear air at high level, operate the fire rooms at a cooler temperature."
"'Remedial Works'
In order that The Firehouse can be retained to the full range of training activities, it is deemed necessary to replace the supply smoke ductwork with a fully welded and flanged system compliant with HVCA/DW/171 tested to zero leakage and with adequate provisions for oil drainage. It will also be necessary to clean, re-seal with an oil-proof sealant and add drains to the Durasteel extract ductwork, replace the fire damaged wiring, IT, control and communications cabling above the fire room 4. It will also be necessary to inspect, replace and re-seal the 'Westemp' panel suspended ceilings throughout the building, add heat shields above all of the propane burners and re-commission all of the systems."
I have already noted that Mr Evans no longer relies on standard DW/171.
"As we discussed today, all options are for discussion and as you are aware we are at present successfully using temporary chemical smoke without environmental concerns and exhausting this smoke through the existing extract ducts and precipitator/equipment and any problems can be discussed with VT (Vosper Thorneycroft). Also consider the option to remove oil smoke entirely and the use of local chemical generators. This approach will reduce the concern to future fires and will also reduce the on-site work to the existing ducts and ceiling. We are aware that all the insulation will require to be removed and as discussed it may not be necessary to replace all insulation including re-insulating the supply ducting as the supply duct will then for the future be used for heat only.
"In this context LFEPA would consider use of local oil smoke generation or use of chemical smoke if appropriate whether locally or centrally distributed."
1. Achievement of future training objectives was critical. Review of the original design was unnecessary as the present concern was to ensure that Training's future smoke requirements were provided.
2. The four existing fire rooms no longer required smoke generation as it was not possible successfully to produce smoke without stratification. Training considered that stratified smoke, whether from the existing oil smoke system or a chemical alternative, would provide smoke in a way which was detrimental to creating real fire training experience.
3. The existing heated areas were to remain heated as originally intended and some areas would require combined heat and smoke training facilities.
4. Jacobs should research the use of mobile smoke generators which could be located, as required, to suit training needs.
5. Jacobs should also research the possibility of installing exterior oil smoke generators. The mobile smoke generators must be able to provide realistic and sustainable smoke for training purposes.
6. Jacobs was also asked to research the use of a sacrificial layer in reinstating the fire room ceilings. Training would be available to advise.
7. Training considered the reaction of water on fire would produce steam which would provide real smoke training which was preferable to artificial smoke options.
1. Smoke will not be provided in the four fire rooms and should it be required during cold training, mobile smoke generators will be used.
2. Smoke will be required in some heat and smoke zones. This smoke is anticipated to be oil based smoke as temperature of the heated areas is 80?C maximum.
3. Both Training and Jacobs will review Mr Evans' option of local smoke generators which was submitted to Mr Hood in 2005 and approved. The locations of local smoke generators in the heated areas are to be reviewed by Training "and the smoke generators indicated in the firerooms will be considered deleted".
4. Jacobs to research the practicalities of installing exterior smoke generators to produce smoke to the heated areas.
5. Jacobs should research the use of mobile smoke generators.
6. Jacobs should, in researching their engineering solutions, consider the possibility of deleting some existing ceilings which are not required by Training.
Copies of the note were sent to Mr Dobson, Mr Livesey and Mr Moge but not to Mr Evans.
" 1. No smoke is required in the four fire rooms.
2. Local smoke generators are to be provided to the heat and smoke zones as indicated on the drawings prepared by Training March 06 (Mr Richards)."
"2. Oil based smoke is acceptable as understood to be the only known method available that will maintain smoke at the temperatures required in the heat zones. See anticipated stratification resulting from the use of smoke oil is accepted by Training.
3. Smoke to the heat zones will be from local smoke generators and the consultant (Jacobs) is to investigate the options of locating within the heat zones or externally outside The Firehouse.
4. Training no longer require smoke to be provided in the four fire rooms and consider that the steam created from water action on hot burners produces sufficient realism of smoke for fire training.
5. Training in the event of requiring smoke in the four fire rooms during cold training will used water based smoke generator mobiles."
"Following from the fire within The Firehouse Jan 05 opportunity resulted to correct any unacceptable facilities which had been provided as part of the original design and for this work to be carried out as part of the fire repair works. The smoke generation was reviewed with Training and Development."
"During hot training in the four fire rooms a more realistic smoke resulted from the reaction of water from hoses on the hot burners which produces steam which does not stratify, is white and more realistic for training. As a consequence for the future T and D (Training and Development) do not require smoke to be provided to the fire rooms for hot training. Also in the fire rooms during cold training it is preferable to T and D to use artificial chemical smoke from mobiles which can be located to training needs and is a successful industry method which T and D are familiar with for providing smoke at low temperature."
"Also in the heat zones T and D will require smoke and have accepted continuing use of oil generated smoke. For convenience of future more suitable smoke generating methods becoming available and to contain cost, local smoke generators will be used. This arrangement will also benefit maintenance of The Firehouse with not using the ducting for distributing the oil smoke which resulted with the January 05 fire and with lower operating cost resulting from the reduction in used oil."
"PSD will be able to combine this work with the repair works to be carried out to get The Firehouse back into full operation. Also as this work is a reduction on the original design, costs should be less than the cost for reinstatement of the original system proposed to be carried out as part of the repair works and without any additional cost for update to T and D current requirements."
"T & D confirmed that smoke will not be required in the four fire rooms and presented drawings indicating the heated zones and non-heated which will require smoke. It is accepted that appropriate smoke to be provided in the heated areas is likely to be oil based as the maximum temperature requirement is 80?C. In the non-heated areas Jacobs will determine if the smoke will be oil or chemical based. Jacobs are instructed to proceed with the development of T & D's current requirements for review at 24/25 April meetings, and to consider T & D's current requirements as part of an alternative option study."
"Also in discussions with P Livesey there is a major technical issue to resolve and that is how to reduce the risks of future fires in the ceiling voids. This is a resolution required for whichever option Jacobs is instructed to proceed with."
This is a reference to the problems with the Westemp panels.
(a) dedicated smoke generators take time to reach the necessary heat level to produce smoke
(b) the variations of levels of smoke are difficult to control. Smoke levels could be either light, enabling students to move around or very heavy, making the Safety Officers' observations difficult.
(c) (i) As the temperatures in fire rooms rose above 80°C the oil based smoke started to stratify and disburse. This produced an unrealistic scenario for firefighters.
(ii) The problem of stratification is the complete opposite of fire behaviour in real situations.
"Because of this the team were unable to reinforce a critical message to students which is to stay low in fire involved compartments in order to maintain better vision, location of potential casualties and reduce the impact of physiological effects for firefighters working in these environments."
(a) It was decided that it would be appropriate to stop using smoke in the fire rooms. Following this action it also became evident that the application of water to the fires during firefighting procedures produced large volumes of steam which acted in place of the smoke obscuring vision and forcing students to stay low.
(b) As smoke density levels were either light or heavy the team agreed on the alteration of scenarios in various areas of The Firehouse. Although less than ideal, reasonably realistic scenarios could be maintained.
"(c) None of the above adjustments affected the overall objectives and outcomes required for each training scenario."
"5.1 Remove hot smoke making ability in all fire rooms as it is not possible to recreate realistic neutral plane conditions in fire compartments. There would be greater benefits for students if no smoke is present on arrival at fire rooms. This would enable the training team to concentrate on students' firefighting techniques, an essential part of RFT (Real Fire Training) strategy. Those applied techniques would determine how much steam is generated and the subsequent worsening of conditions to fire fighters without measured water application methods. The removal of hot smoke in these areas will also speed up the daily start process for The Firehouse.
5.2 Use of portable or fixed local cold smoke generators for fire rooms that can be used in the absence of fires. Occasionally crews are required to work in or travel through these areas en route to scene of operations. The ability to create smoke in these areas at these times would be beneficial.
5.3 Use of portable or fixed local cold smoke generators in selected areas of Firehouse. This will speed up the daily start process for The Firehouse."
"6.1 With much of the training outcomes being reinforced during knowledge input, the above suggested changes will have no effect on achieving the desired training objectives and outcomes."
"The steel ductwork had gaps at some transverse joints and around access panels. It is not clear if these existed before the fire but we suspect that there was some leakage in these areas. The longitudinal joint method may not be suitable for ducts required to contain fumes laden with mineral oil.
We have concluded that although the systems were generally suitable to resist the fire conditions, the Westemp wall and ceiling systems and the steel ductwork were not adequately smoke tight in fire conditions. This has resulted in a build up of mineral oil on all internal and external surfaces of the ductwork and on the framework of the wall and ceiling systems. The rock mineral wool also appeared to have oil deposits. In our opinion the fire within the ceiling void was started by the mineral oil igniting at one or more hot-spots on the upper surface of the ceiling. The hot-spot(s) may have been caused by the Westemp cover strips being too thin or cracked or by gaps between the ceiling panels and the cover strips.
In our opinion it would not be possible to carry out remedial work on the existing Westemp and steel ductwork systems to prevent a similar fire starting in the future, particularly in those areas around the fire source. It may be possible to develop a suitable system based on a continuous steel skin protected by insulating boards such as the Westemp panels and ceramic blanket, but we are not aware of any access panel system that would remain smoke tight after repeated exposure to temperatures much greater than 100?C. In the heat and smoke room areas we are of the opinion that the Durasteel-based system is suitable, possibly with steel cover strips bedded on a suitable mastic or gasket over all joints. The design of any access panel would have to incorporate a suitable heat-resisting compressible seal."
1. Future smoke contamination of voids leading to potential fire hazard. The Westemp system does not provide a barrier to the passage of smoke and gasses into the voids.
2. Stratification of smoke in Fire rooms which they understood to have inherent problems associated with the base design of the facility and no immediate solution had been identified.
3. Oil residue in ductwork which represents a potential fire hazard. The Report noted that if an acceptable maximum level of oil residue could be determined then a routine cleaning regime could be implemented provided sufficient access could be provided throughout the ductwork systems.
4. Defective extract ductwork to heat/smoke rooms.
5. Smoke contamination of the loft work fabric. A practical cleaning methodology would need to be developed. Given the difficult geometry of this construction it was thought that this might prove difficult to achieve.
6. Water based smoke may be considered to have occupational exposure limits which LFEPA would not find acceptable in a long term training facility such as The Firehouse.
7. Water based smoke systems have higher operating costs than oil based systems.
8. Residual oil contamination in heat/smoke rooms.
"4.3 Siting of Smoke Generators - Recommendations
Heat and Smoke Areas
The siting of smoke systems locally within Training Rooms or Training Zones (combination of Rooms) would be a practical solution in the heat and smoke areas where a compartment temperature of 80?C is expected. Smoke systems could be mounted discreetly on the compartment walls, offered environmental protection from the high compartment temperature and be individually controlled from the control room …
Fire Rooms
For the Fire Rooms we would recommend if smoke were required, that it be introduced into the Fire Rooms via dedicated smoke ducting (75-100 mm id) into which smoke would be introduced via a centrifugal fan. This smoke could then be concentrated between the entry door(s) and the fireplace, giving the smoke the greatest chance to establish itself and form an effective training tool. It would not be practical to site the smoke generators locally within the Fire Rooms themselves."
"Based on a number of site inspections at the London Firehouse, Southwark, we have concluded that the Westemp ceiling and wall systems installed were not suitable for use with the type of oil based smoke used. In our opinion remedial work on the existing system would not be successful and it would be difficult to develop a suitable system that could remain smoke and fume tight at such temperatures. In our opinion the most likely type of steam to be successful would be based on a sealed steel liner protected on the fire side by a combination of ceramic blanket and calcium silicate board. Any new system would require further development work and testing in co-operation with the manufacturer.
"In those areas where the temperatures are about 450?C or lower the Durasteel based systems would be suitable in our opinion with some modifications to ensure joints are adequately sealed, including those around the perimeter of the wall and ceiling linings.
"An improved access panel also needs to be developed and cavity barriers should be added within the wall and ceiling voids."
"LFEPA have not instructed the appointment of a Firehouse design expert or a fire risk assessment expert as Jacobs had recommended and on the instructions of LFEPA Jacobs had stopped work on the project. Jacobs had already expressed its reservations about progressing the Project because of its concerns regarding the underlying design."
"Can we re-instate all Fire Rooms in The Firehouse except Office for all types of cold training which will include use of cosmetic smoke and water?
I envisaged the majority of use would be dry and smoke training. However if crews are moving through these areas with firefighting media there is always the chance that accidental water application will take place."
"I thought that all recommissioning work was on hold until we have a clearer view of the results of the mediation/litigation."
"GLA are asking about The Firehouse for their draft Capital plan because it is in our budget report's Capital programme as 'To be determined' – Can I ask them to take it out altogether?"
"We'll discuss with Barbara (Riddell) tomorrow. It is NOT recommended to remove this project from the Capital programme. I am sure that Fiona (Laurence) will also confirm this recommendation."
10. The Remedial Schemes
(a) The Schemes
"2. The flanges should be full faced stainless steel flanges welded to the ductwork, bolted and sealed with oil resistant gaskets with a temperature rating of not less than 100?C.
6. The ductwork should be pressure tested in accordance with DW/144 to 0/minimal leakage at high pressure class C."
"From the limited amount of medium temperature extract ductwork available from inspection, it is not possible to ascertain whether the joints are failing but from inspection there is evidence of oil contamination within the ductwork. For this reason the costs include for replacing the ductwork but subsequent surveys after the ceilings are removed may indicate that some of the ductwork can be retained."
(i) the need for both hot and cold training;
(ii) different requirements for fire rooms and other heat/smoke areas;
(iii) minimising obstruction in the training areas;
(iv) ease of installation; and
(v) ease of maintenance.
1. The scheme has changed radically since the Authority's expert, Mr Walsh, was forced to concede that the communications system did not need to be taken out and replaced in its entirety.
2. There is no need for the ductwork to be in stainless steel. This is now conceded by LFEPA.
3. There is no evidence that the sealant in the medium temperature extract ductwork is either defective or needs replacing. Nevertheless, LFEPA contends that the remedial scheme should take in the entirety of the medium temperature extract ductwork.
4. If the medium temperature extract ductwork is excluded the quantum dispute between the parties (on figures only) are limited.
5. If the Authority is entitled to replace the entire ductwork system, Mr Smith says that the work should take 42 weeks, whereas Mr Wort says that it will take 46 weeks.
1. Most importantly, if any scheme is to be implemented, the professionals at the Authority favour the use of local smoke generators. Although unfortunately Mr Richards was not called to give evidence, it is clear that this is the scheme which he would favour. Mr Dobson has no objection to it.
2. The assertion by Mr Evans on which the pleaded case is based was made in ignorance of what had occurred and of the Concept Report.
3. There is no technical objection to the scheme.
(1) Enabling works Mr Smith has costed on the basis that the extract ductwork is not being replaced and that as a result the cost of enabling work should be reduced from £71,514 to £43,254, i.e. a reduction of £28,260.
(2) Extract ductwork When considering the scheme without ductwork Mr Smith has deleted the cost which is included in the scenario with ductwork, i.e. £76,274. Mr Wort has not.
(3) M &E repairs The agreed cost of M & E repairs if the extract ductwork is included is £184,809. Mr Smith concludes that the sum should be reduced to £153,421 if the extract ductwork is excluded, making a reduction of £31,388.
(4) Reinstatement works Again, Mr Smith has taken the agreed figure of £130,261 and reduced it to £85,281 as a consequence of the exclusion of the extract ductwork, a difference of £44,980.
(5) Design For the full scheme Mr Wort's estimate is £237,000 and Mr Smith's figure is £100,000. Mr Wort's figure of 15 per cent is acknowledged by the Authority in closing to be at the top end of the range. Mr Smith's figure of 5 to 6 per cent is said to be at the bottom end of the range. The difference without the stainless steel and without the extract ductwork is £137,000 (Mr Wort) against £67,500 (Mr Smith), a difference of £69,500.
(6) Contingency For the full scheme Mr Smith has used a figure of £75,000, or about 4.7 per cent, Mr Wort has given a figure of 10 per cent or £158,000, a difference of £83,000. For the scheme without the extract ductwork and the stainless steel the figures are £120,000 (Mr Wort) against £45,000 (Mr Smith), a difference also of £75,000.
10.(b) The Experts
1. Is there any technical reason precluding the use of local smoke generators for the heat/smoke rooms in order that the existing medium temperature supply ductwork can be retained and used only for ventilation? The experts are agreed that there is no technical reason why local smoke generators cannot be used. The local smoke generators could either be mounted within risers or other accommodation adjacent to the spaces served or within the spaces served.
11. Extract Ductwork
"From the limited amount of medium temperature extract ductwork available for inspection, it is not possible to ascertain whether the joints are failing but from inspection there is evidence of oil contamination within the ductwork. For this reason the costs include for replacing this ductwork but subsequent surveys after the ceilings are removed may indicate that some of the ductwork can be retained".
"From the limited amount of medium temperature extract ductwork available for inspection, the joints do not appear to be leaking. When the ceilings are removed all the ductwork should be inspected to ascertain if any remedial work is necessary".
"It would be prudent to replace the extract ductwork when refurbishing because it would be a proportionately low cost item."
1. I prefer the evidence of Mr Rollason to that of Mr Evans.
2. In general I prefer the evidence of Mr Smith to Mr Wort.
3. Scheme 3 is unnecessarily expensive and I exclude it from my considerations.
4. I accept Mr Rollason's evidence that Schemes 1 and 2 would be viable remedial schemes but are not favoured by Mr Richards and Training.
5. There is no need to do any remedial work on the medium extract ductwork.
6. With regard to Scheme 5, this is a viable scheme but represents a departure from the Scheme which Halcrow devised. It arises out of a development of LFEPA's requirements.
7. Scheme 1 is valued at £795,578. Scheme 2 is valued at £809,905. Scheme 5 is valued at £519,711 if smoke is not required for the fire rooms and £619,309 if it is required.
12. LFEPA's Intentions
"Having agonised over the issues raised by Jacobs' advice and having reviewed our revised quantum advice in the scheme from Mr Wort and having had numerous discussions within the Authority, we took the decision that we should at this stage simply press on with the litigation in order to see what we are able to obtain by way of compensation. Once we know what we have recovered and how much we have to spend we can then review the options open to us and take a view as to what remedial scheme should be implemented."
1. Independent of any problems with the ductwork LFEPA had stopped hot fire training before January 2005 because of the stratification problem.
2. After the fire, in addition to the stratification problem, there were problems with the Westemp panels in the ceilings and walls which were such that extensive and unspecified additional works would need to be carried out, the cost of which would not be recovered in the present action.
3. If any smoke was required for training, such smoke would only be required in the smoke/heat zones and could and should be provided by LSGs. The only way of overcoming the stratification problem would be to make alternative provision for training.
4. I should take into account that the Westemp panels were not fit for purpose and any scheme which would require extensive work on them (not covered by this litigation) would be unlikely to be implemented because of the cost to the Authority.
"For health and safety reasons it is thought that smoke production in these rooms is inadvisable."
13. Westemp Panels
"2. Westemp insulating panels have been used for lining the walls and ceilings; these were not adequate for the purpose and as a result have cracked and/or now show other damage. Alternatively the panels were damaged in the course of installation;
"5. Halcrow failed to design the ceiling adequately or alternatively failed to supervise the work of the contractors in relation to the ceilings such that smoke and propane can access the ceiling voids (in particular above the garage flashover)."
"3.18 If the temperature of the Westemp panel was to reach for example 400 to 500 degrees C due to its proximity to a burner the temperatures within the lower levels of the insulation above the panel could reach 200 to 300 degrees C (or higher). The temperature would be more than sufficient to initiate an oxidation reaction in oil soaked insulation and lead to a fire several hours later.
3.21 … high concentrations of oil in an area above the Westemp panel where the temperature was high enough may have undergone thermal oxidation leading to ignition. This progressive process could have taken a considerable period of time and in my opinion had probably started when The Firehouse was first commissioned and put into full operation.
4.1 The most likely cause of the fire above the ceiling of the Office scenario room of The Firehouse at Southwark Training Centre appeared to be initiation of thermal oxidation in the oil-contaminated rockwool insulation above the Westemp panels."
"8.38 It is therefore most likely that the process of thermal oxidation was initiated when sufficient radiated heat has passed through the Westemp panel to start an oxidation reaction in the oil-soaked installation which led to the fire several hours after The Firehouse had last been used."
"Future smoke contamination avoids leading to a potential fire hazard as described in Technical Consideration Constraints Table, page 2 of 4. The Westemp system does not provide a barrier to the passage of smoke and gases into the voids. Proprietary systems that meet the overall performance specification required for this application are not readily available and a customised solution would need to be developed and tested to prove its suitability for the purpose. It is not certain that a practical and technically viable viability system could be developed within acceptable timescale and cost."
"Oil contamination of the base wood through long term use of oil-based smoke in this area represents a potential fire hazard. The existing condition of the loft room fabric would need to be assessed by a suitably qualified and experienced expert and a scheme for the treatment of the fabric developed. An acceptable maximum level of surface oil contamination for ongoing operations would need to be determined. A practical cleaning methodology would need to be developed. Given the difficult geometry of the construction, this may prove difficult to achieve. "
14. CONCLUSIONS
i) Halcrow was negligent in failing to carry out the limited review of its design identified by Mr Rollason after the fire in June 2004. It was not negligent in the other respects alleged. I note in this context that this was a unique and innovative project.
ii) If Hacrow had done so it would have had to conclude on the basis of the experience gained in the operation of the Firehouse that it was not possible to reinstate the building to the existing design to provide effective hot fire training for the fire-fighters because of the problems of stratification and those associated with the Westemp panels.
iii) Halcrow would have had to formulate a fundamentally new design in order to eliminate these problems.
iv) The consequence of the review would therefore have been to identify the problems with the innovative design which, had they carried out the review then they would have identified a few months earlier.
v) The actual fire damage of the 2005 fire was minimal.
vi) LFEPA must establish on the balance of probabilities that it was reasonable for it to recover the or any cost of reinstating the Firehouse and if so what cost. On the facts as I have found them I cannot be so satisfied.
a) LFEPA two years after the fire has not taken any scheme for reinstatement to the stage of even outline agreement within the Authority let alone detailed costing;
b) Scheme 3 for which LFEPA contends is not supported by its own fire-fighters;
c) Any scheme, apart from perhaps Scheme 5, would require the Authorities to spend substantial sums to replace the Westemp panels, sums which could not be recovered from Halcrow in any event;
d) All schemes except Scheme 5 have the problem of stratification. Unless that problem is overcome the fire-fighters will not regard the scheme as fit for purpose. In this context the fire-fighters will not regard schemes other than Scheme 5 as fit for purpose.
e) The actual works of reinstatement, ie, repair of damage caused by the 2005 fire are minimal.
f) The major concern relates to damage which had manifested itself and was a result of a design for which Halcrow has not been found to be negligent.
g) The reinstatement which is being considered goes to the consequences of the original design and not the 2005 fire.
h) It is doubtful whether Scheme 5, which is the only scheme which has found any support from the fire-fighters themselves, can properly be described as reinstatement. It is, in effect, a new scheme which is derived from the knowledge and experience gained since Halcrow's design.
i) The current method of providing training is satisfactory and there is no need to spend additional money on the Firehouse.