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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Jameel & Anor v Times Newspapers Ltd.  EWCA Civ 983 (21 July 2004)
Cite as:  EWCA Civ 983,  EMLR 665,  EMLR 31
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COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEENS BENCH DIVISION
(MR JUSTICE GRAY)
HQ03X01813 and HQ03X01775
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE LONGMORE
LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY
| JAMEEL AND ANOTHER
|- and -
|TIMES NEWSPAPERS LIMITED
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 190 Fleet Street
London EC4A 2AG
Tel No: 020 7421 4040, Fax No: 020 7831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
Stephen Suttle QC (instructed by Times Newspapers Limited) for the Respondent
Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Sedley :
"A Saudi billionaire who helped build one of Britain's biggest car dealerships is being sued by the families of victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Yousef Jameel, whose family firm bought the British business Hartwell in 1990, is named in papers claiming more than $1 trillion damages from defendants accused of helping to fund Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network.
Lawyers acting for the families say Jameel was one of the rich Saudi individuals and businesses, targeted by fundraisers acting for Muslim causes, including rebel fanatics, called "the Golden Chain" because their net worth totalled more than £51 billion.
Money from Saudi Arabia is said in court documents to have financed Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan where the hijackers trained. Jameel, whose family is one of the wealthiest in Saudi Arabia, is among 225 defendants named in papers filed in a Washington DC court.
Hartwell turns over more than £600m and employs 3,500 people in Britain. Its 48 outlets sell Audi, Volkswagen, Jaguar and Ford cars. Its other interests include property, software and financial services. It was bought by the Saudi-based Abdul Latif Jameel Group (ALJ).
The Jameel family first made its money through a Toyota franchise in Saudi, along with oil, shipping and real estate. Jameel recently transferred his shareholding in the £2 billion a year company to his children.
Jameel's lawyers say he no longer has an interest in Hartwell. They also emphasise that there is no case to answer: he has never supported or made donations, either directly or indirectly, to Bin Laden. They add that he has not been contacted by the lawyers for the September 11 case or served with papers, although he knew that a Yousef Jameel was cited as a defendant. They also point out that other wealthy Arab donors have been defrauded into innocently giving money for humanitarian causes which was used to fund Jihad fighters.
"Mr Jameel recognises that because of his standing and prominence as a businessman in Saudi Arabia and his well known generosity it is understood, rightly or wrongly, that he is [the person named in the writ], "Jameel's lawyers said.
ALJ made a substantial donation for "the rescue and help" of Muslims in Kosovo. In 1999 ALJ gave the Saudi Red Crescent about £1.3 m. A charitable organisation modelled on the Red Cross and based in Riyadh, the Saudi Red Crescent is also named as a defendant in the September 11 action. Jameel's lawyer said his client was unaware of the donation. Jameel was at the centre of a legal row in 1988 when he was accused by Carole Bailey, his British former wife, of kidnapping their daughter and holding her in Saudi Arabia. He had indicated in court that he would not prevent the girl's return to Britain and had persuaded the court to remove a £1m bond that would have been forfeit. It is understood that the row with Bailey has been resolved.
After their acrimonious divorce Jameel, who is in his late fifties, married Linda Richards, a former model with whom his has three daughters.
Jameel's name was added to the list of defendants after the name "Yousef Jameel" was found on a computer disk seized by Bosnian police during searches of the offices of a charity known as the Benevolence International Foundation in Sarajevo in March last year.
That document, known as the Golden Chain list, was used in the case against the head of a Saudi-based charity that was said to have conned donors and misused their cash. Enaam Arnaout was accused by American authorities of funnelling money to Al-Qaeda, but admitted a lesser offence of sending money to Muslim fighters in Bosnia and Chechnya.
Jameel's lawyers said it was possible he was the person in the Golden Chain document. But it listed only wealthy individuals who could be asked for money: there was no evidence that they had donated. Jameel said he was approached by a fundraiser on the list but had never contributed.
He also pointed out that the draft list dated from 1988, "when Bin Laden's role with the Afghanistan mujaheddin against the Soviet army was looked on favourably by the Islamic and western governments alike". He emphasised his close relations with America, saying he studied at the American University in Cairo and was appalled by the September 11 attacks.
On Friday lawyers for the September 11 families took the unusual step of publishing the names of Jameel and other defendants including 37 individuals and eight charitable organisations, in the International Herald Tribune and Al-Quds, the Arabic newspaper, in an announcement of the start of legal proceedings. American courts allowed notice to be served in this way because of risks to bailiffs in Saudi Arabia.
Motley Rice, the American law firm, is representing 2,760 relatives of the September 11 victims. Its case says the "actions of the defendants… were intentionally malicious, unconscionable, and in reckless disregard of the rights and safety of all the plaintiffs". But there are no details of specific charges against Jameel.
- In the Hartwell action, an application by the defendants to strike out the claim or to enter summary judgment for them on the grounds, in essence, that the article bore no meaning defamatory of Hartwell; or that, if it did, Hartwell had no real prospect of defeating a plea of justification.
- In the Jameel action, an application by the defendants for summary judgment under CPR part 24 on the grounds that the article was not capable of meaning that that there were serious and substantial grounds for suspecting that Mr Jameel had been associated with Osama bin Laden and had helped to fund terrorist training.
Mr Jameel's case
"… A statement that a police officer is under is investigation is no doubt defamatory, but the sting in the libel is not as sharp as the statement that he has by his conduct brought suspicion on himself. That point is reflected in a passage in the speech of Lord Devlin in Lewis already cited which refers to " three categories of justification – proof of the fact of the enquiry, proof of reasonable grounds for it and proof of guilt". We do therefore see a significant difference between subparagraphs (2) and (4). The latter calls the plaintiffs' conduct into question in a way that the former does not, and subparagraph (4) can be allowed as an amendment only if it is both a possible meaning and is capable of being supported by particulars which are not hearsay and (in the Shah sense) focus on the conduct of individual plaintiffs. A less stringent test is appropriate for subparagraph (2), as the plaintiffs' advisers seem to have gone some way to acknowledging, as noted above."
The reference in the final sentence of this passage is to the fact that the claimants had not demurred to the ten heads of particulars pleaded by the newspaper in support of meaning (2), namely grounds for investigation.
i) The courts should give to the material complained of the natural and ordinary meaning which it would have conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader.
ii) The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking. But he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available.
iii) While limiting its attention to what the defendant has actually said or written the court should be cautious of an over-elaborate analysis of the material in issue.
iii) The court should not be too literal in its approach: (see Lewis v Daily Telegraph Limited  AC 234 at 277 per Lord Devlin and in particular "the lawyer's rule is that the implication must be necessary as well as reasonable. The layman reads in an implication much more freely; and unfortunately, as the law of defamation has to take into account, is especially prone to do so when derogatory").
iv) A statement should be taken to be defamatory if it would tend to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally or affect a person adversely in the estimation of reasonable people generally.
v) In determining the meaning of the material complained of the Court is not limited by the meanings which either the claimant or the defendant seeks to place upon the words.
17. The caption to the photographs is couched in terms of allegation and accusation. The word "linked" in the headline is in inverted commas. It is clear from the text of the article that the link is made in the proceedings brought in the US on behalf of the families of the victims of the September 11th atrocity against no less than 225 defendants. Mr Jameel is said "by lawyers acting for families" to be one of the rich Saudi individuals, called "the Golden Chain", who had been "targeted" by fundraisers acting for Muslim causes including rebel fanatics (see paragraph 3 of the article). I accept that the ordinary reader might well not appreciate that the targeting is unrelated to the funding of the 11th September atrocity. Later in the article (paragraph 9) there is reference to Mr Jameel's family group of companies having made a donation to an organisation which is also a defendant in the proceedings brought by the families of victims of 11th September. The article also refers (at paragraph12) to Mr Jameel's name having been on the "the Golden Chain list", which was found in Sarajevo and which featured in a prosecution brought against a man named Arnaout, who was accused (but not convicted) of funnelling money to Al-Qaeda without the knowledge of those who had donated it.
18. But those passages in the article have to be read in the context of what is to be found in other inter-woven passages which give Mr Jameel's side of the story mostly through the mouth of his solicitors. As Mr Suttle points out, these passages tell the reader the following:
i) that Mr Jameel had no case to answer:
ii) that Mr Jameel had never supported or made donations, either directly or indirectly, to Osama Bin Laden;
iii that Mr Jameel had not been contacted by the lawyers for the plaintiffs in the US proceedings or served with papers, although he knew that a Yousef Jameel was cited as a defendant;
iv) that other wealthy Arab donors had been defrauded into innocently giving money for humanitarian causes which was used to fund Jihad fighters;
v) that Mr Jameel "recognises that because of his standing and prominence as a business man in Saudi Arabia and his well known generosity it is understood, rightly or wrongly, that he is [the person named in the writ]";
vi) that Mr Jameel was unaware of the 1999 donation by ALJ to Saudi Red Crescent;
vii) that, whilst it was possible that Mr Jameel was the person named in the "Golden Chain" list, that document listed only persons who could be asked for money and that there was no evidence that they had donated;
viii) that Mr Jameel had been approached by a fundraiser named on the list but had never contributed;
ix) that the "Golden Chain" list was draft only and dated from 1988, "when Osama Bin Laden's role with the Afghanistan mujaheddin against the Soviet army was looked on favourably by Islamic and western governments alike";
x) that Mr Jameel had close relations with the USA, studied at the American university in Cairo and was appalled by the September 11th attacks;
xi) that there are no details in the particulars of claim in the US proceedings of any specific charges against Mr Jameel and
xii) that Mr Jameel no longer has any interest in Hartwell.
19. I have to ask myself whether, given the inclusion of those passages, the putative ordinary reasonable reader could reasonably understand the article to mean that there are serious and substantial grounds for suspecting and/or which may prove that Mr Jameel is associated with Osama Bin Laden in connection with terrorism and/or that he helped fund the training of terrorists who carried out the September 11 atrocities. I cannot accept that the words are capable of bearing that meaning. Although it is by no means a conclusive point, nowhere in the article does the author adopt or endorse the allegations made in the US proceedings. Moreover the article tells the reader in clear terms that it is reporting allegations made in those proceedings. In the light of the detailed refutation of them incorporated in the article, I do not accept that there is any warrant for the ordinary reasonable reader taking it that the US lawyers must have had reasonable grounds for making the allegations against Mr Jameel.
20. As to the Golden Chain list, the reader is told that Mr Arnaout conned the donors when he funnelled their money to Al-Qaeda. It is further made clear (paragraphs 14 and 15) that the donors named in the list are not said to have made donations and that Mr Jameel asserts that he made no contribution. In ant event the article reports Mr Jameel's assertion that he list dates back to a time when the activities of Osama Bin Laden were looked on favourably by western governments. The article concludes by saying there are no specific charges levelled against Mr Jameel in the US proceedings.
13. The argument for Mr Jameel proceeded as follows: Mr Price drew attention to the eye-catching photographs and to the caption. He described the headline of the article as being the "bane", that is the sting of the libel on his client. He relied on two authorities for the proposition that it is rarely possible for the text of an article to draw the sting of a defamatory headline. The first is Charleston v News Group Newspapers Limited  2 AC 65, which as it happens was a case where it was accepted that the obviously defamatory headline and photographs were neutralised by the accompanying text. But Lord Nicholls said at 74C:
" This is not to say that words in the text of an article will always be efficacious to cure a defamatory headline. It all depends on the context, one element in which is the lay out of the article. Those who print defamatory headlines are playing with fire. The ordinary reader might not be expected to notice curative words tucked away further down the article. The more so, if the words are on a continuation page to which a reader is directed".
14. Then second authority relied on was Mitchell v Faber and Faber Limited  EMLR 807. Hirst LJ said at 815:
"So far as the antidote is concerned, it seems to me that only in the clearest of cases would it be proper for a judge to rule that the sting in the words, which are ex hypothesis capable of a defamatory meaning in themselves, is drawn by the surrounding context, so that in the result those words cease to be capable of a defamatory meaning. In my judgment the general though perhaps not universal rule should be that this is a matter for the jury and not the Judge to decide".
Reliance was also placed on dicta to a similar effect in Cruise v Express Newspapers  EMLR 780 at 786; Sergi v ABC  2 NSWLR 418 and Mark v Associated Newspapers  EMLR 839.
15. This is not of course a case where rejection of the claimant's pleaded meaning would result in the case being withdrawn from the jury because, for present purposes, it is accepted by Mr Suttle that the article is capable of bearing the lesser, but still defamatory, meaning for which he contends. Nor is it a case where the newspaper has included a bare denial by the claimant, which appears to have been the situation contemplated in Mark v Associated Newspapers (see paragraph 42). Nevertheless I accept that I should not readily accede to the suggestion that the passages relied on by the newspaper have the effect of reducing the meaning of the article to a level lower than would otherwise have been the case.
16. It appears to me that I must consider what meanings the Sunday Times article is capable of bearing by following the approach laid down in Skuse and Gillick and by determining what the article read as a whole would have conveyed to readers, giving due weight to the headline but reading it in the context of the text of the article as a whole.
…"Once it is recognised that the article may be asserting no more than that in one way or another the respondents may unwittingly have assisted terrorists in the past and may by introducing more controls be able to prevent that in future, the borderline between what for convenience we have been calling level 2 meaning (reasonable grounds to suspect) and level 3 meaning (grounds merely for investigation) becomes somewhat blurred.
The difference and inter-relationship between level 2 and level 3 meanings have been disclosed in a number of cases, most notably in Lewis v Daily Telegraph  AC 234 (where this distinction was first drawn), Bennett v News Group Newspapers Ltd  EMLR 218. It is not perhaps an entirely satisfactory distinction"
4. In their natural and ordinary and/or inferential meaning, and in the context in which they appeared, the said words bore and were understood to bear the following meaning, namely that there are sufficient grounds to enquire whether the Claimant has been associated through funding with Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda and/or whether he helped to fund the training of the terrorists who carried out the September 11th atrocities
serious and substantial grounds for suspecting, and/or which may prove, that the Claimant is associated with Osama Bin Laden in connection with terrorism and that he helped fund the training of the terrorists who carried out the September 11th atrocities.
In accordance with what is said earlier in this judgment, the deleted words should be restored and placed ahead of the underlined ones, followed by the word "alternatively". So pleaded, the action may go to trial.
Justification and repetition
"The learned Judge held that the repetition rule, derived from a decision of the House of Lords, and re-stated by this court in Stern v Piper  QB 123, did not apply to this case. This was wrong: the repetition rule applies to all cases, without exception, in which the allegedly defamatory publication takes the form 'A says that B is / has done [something defamatory]'."
23) It might at first blush appear that the distinction between what I have called level (ii) and level (iii) meanings is artificial and over-refined. But, quite apart from the fact that the distinction is one which is clearly made in the authorities to which I have referred, it appears to me that there are real distinguishing features.
24) In the first place an imputation that there exist reasonable grounds for suspicion of misconduct generally (but not invariably – see Chase at 231 per Brooke LJ) arises because the person suspected has acted in such a way as to bring suspicion on himself. As Hirst LJ put it in Shah:
"For these reasons I consider Mr Browne's submission is correct, and that it is an essential requisite of a defence of justification of reasonable suspicion that it should focus on some conduct on the plaintiff's part giving rise to reasonable suspicion.
I choose the word 'focus' advisedly, in order to avoid any implication that such a defence must be exclusively confined to allegations of such conduct. Clearly it will be necessary, particular in the complicated case like the present, for the defendant to portray in some detail the relevant background, and also to set out material which connects together the main facts relied upon".
25) The second distinguishing feature is that sufficient grounds may exist for an enquiry or investigation in circumstances where the information available is incomplete and where it may comprise or consist in hearsay statements. To take a mundane example, a police officer to whom a complaint is made may justifiably conclude that further investigation into that complaint is required even if it is based exclusively on hearsay evidence.
26) I ask myself what follows from the existence of those two distinguishing features in terms of the permissible ambit of the particulars of justification. I start by considering whether the conduct rule applies to a plea of justification of the meaning that there are sufficient grounds for an enquiry/investigation. As I have already pointed out, such grounds may exist independently of any incriminating conduct on the part of the individual concerned. The state of the evidence may be such that there is no action or omission on the part of the individual such as to require an enquiry/investigation. But the evidence is nevertheless such as to call for an enquiry/investigation. This suggests that, as a matter of logic, there is no reason to impose the requirement that any plea of justification to a level (iii) meaning should be based on the conduct of the claimant. Indeed Mr Price accepted that the conduct rule will not always apply in cases where the meaning sought to be justified is a level (iii) meaning. The point is not free of authority. In the passage quoted earlier from the judgment in Bennett, Robert Walker LJ pointed out the significant difference between a level (ii) and a level (iii) meaning, saying "the former calls the plaintiff's conduct into question in a way that the latter does not".
27) That is not, however, to say that in every case where the imputation sought to be justified is the existence of sufficient grounds for enquiry/investigation, the plea of justification may succeed even if no conduct on the part of the claimant is relied on. I think Mr Price is right when he says that it all depends whether the article in question alleges conduct on the part of the claimant. If it does, then it will or may be necessary for the defendant, albeit seeking to justify at level (iii) only, to assert and prove that conduct as part of his defence of justification.
28) Is this such a case? Mr Price contends that the Sunday Times article included an allegation of conduct on the part of Mr Jameel, namely that he supported Muslim causes including rebel fanatics (paragraph 3). I do not so read the article: it says no more than that Mr Jameel was one of those "targeted" by fundraisers. The article does not appear to me to allege any conduct on the part of Mr Jameel. It is couched entirely in terms of what is alleged against him. Accordingly I cannot accept that it is fatal to the prospects of success for the plea of justification that it does not rely on any conduct on the part of Mr Jameel.
29) I turn to the repetition rule. The rationale of this rule is contained in the pithy statement of Lord Devlin in Lewis at page 248 that:
"For the purpose of the law of libel a hearsay statement is the same as a direct statement and that is all there is to it".
It appears to be established that, in cases where the words impute actual guilt of misconduct or the existence of reasonable grounds to suspect such conduct, a defendant cannot rely on hearsay statements (or repetitions) in his particulars of justification. In such cases what the defendant has to establish is the existence of objectively reasonable grounds for asserting guilt or the existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion, as the case may be. In Shah May LJ put it thus at 269:
"If a defendant wishing to justify a publication to the effect that there are reasonable grounds to suspect the plaintiff of discreditable conduct can rely on what he has been told by persons whom he regards as honest and reliable, it must follow that evidence would be admissible as to the reputed honesty and reliability of the defendant's informants. The practical problems which that might cause in a case such as Hinduja's case are obvious. In principle, however, evidence of this kind would be objectionable because it would introduce irrelevant considerations in purported proof of what the defendant has to establish. The defendant has to establish that there are objectively reasonable grounds to suspect the plaintiff. The evidence under consideration would be directed rather to an essentially subjective judgment of the honesty and credibility of third parties. In human terms, anyone is entitled to believe what third parties tell them. But such belief does not establish that what is reported is objectively credible."
Hirst LJ expressed himself in similar terms and Neill LJ agreed with both judgments.
30) The question which arises in the present case is whether that reasoning applies in cases where the imputation sought to be justified is the existence of sufficient grounds for enquiry/investigation rather than reasonable grounds for suspicion. As already pointed out, grounds for enquiry/investigation do not have to be shown to be "objectively reasonable". The point of the investigation is to discover whether they are so. I find it difficult to see how in principle hearsay material may not be relied on to support the contention that sufficient grounds exist for enquiry or investigation. That appears to have been the view of Robert Walker LJ in Bennett. In the passage already quoted he appears to contemplate that a "less stringent test" is appropriate in a level (iii) meaning case, i.e. that hearsay statements may in a suitable case be relied on.
31) My conclusion is therefore that the Sunday Times is not to be shut out in the circumstances of the present case from relying in support of its plea of justification to the lesser meaning of sufficient grounds to enquire/investigate upon material which includes hearsay statements.
2. The principal questions which I am asked to decide are:
(i) whether the article is capable of bearing the meaning put on it on behalf of Mr Jameel, namely that it meant that there are "serious and substantial grounds for suspecting and/or which may prove" that Mr Jameel's family is associated with OBL in connection with terrorism and helped fund the terrorists who carried out the September 11th atrocities or
(ii) whether the article is capable of bearing no higher meaning than that put on it by the newspaper, namely that there were "sufficient grounds to enquire" whether Mr Jameel has been associated through funding with OBL and Al-Qaeda and/or whether he helped to fund the atrocities of 11th September and
(iii) if the latter, whether the plea of justification in that meaning is bound to succeed with the result that the Sunday Times is entitled to summary judgment.
The third question, though expressed to arise only if the meaning were limited to level (iii), arises equally if the meaning is not so limited but includes level (iii). The former was the situation found by Gray J; the latter is the situation found by us. In both cases, as it seems to me, the permissible mode of justification of a libel arises out of the question of meaning: indeed, if Mr Price is right in his insistence on the point, the repetition rule is principally a rule about meaning (see the remark of Simon Brown LJ in Stern v Piper  QB 123, reiterated by him in Mark v Associated Newspapers  EMLR 839, para.29, that the rule "dictates the meaning to be given to the words"; though it is right to say that in the course of argument we have respectfully wondered whether "conditions" or "qualifies" might be a preferable verb).
"There is a reasonable prospect of a successful appeal on grounds 1 and 2. Even on the judge's approach to meaning it is appropriate that this court should consider the applicability of the repetition rule."
It seems to me unsatisfactory that an issue which was at the forefront both of the grounds of appeal and of the single Lord Justice's reasons for granting permission to appeal should be abandoned by the appellant on the grounds that have been given to us. It also seems to me - and both counsel agreed with this - that it is a double misfortune that the action will now go to trial on the basis of an unappealed ruling on a potentially critical point, with the risk that it will one day reappear in this court in a fresh endeavour to apply the repetition rule to level (iii) meanings.
"I cannot accept that the article is capable of bearing the meaning that there are serious and substantial or even reasonable grounds for suspecting that Hartwell, or money generated by its business, helped fund the September 11th atrocity."
Reverting to the Skuse principles, Gray J considered, as I do, that it would take a very suspicious-minded reader to find such an implication in the article. He pointed out in particular that money derived from Hartwell's business by Mr Jameel's family was not Hartwell's money.
Lord Justice Longmore:
"In deciding whether words are capable of conveying a defamatory meaning, the court should reject those meanings which can only emerge as the produce of some strained or forced or utterly unreasonable interpretation."
This was said in the course of that learned judge's statement of principles in relation to determining whether words are capable of bearing a particular meaning. This court described the whole of Eady J's statement of the principle as "an impeccable synthesis", see  EWCA Civ 1263, para. 7.
39. In this case the question is whether the article complained of is capable of meaning that there are serious and substantial grounds for suspecting that the claimant or his family helped fund the terrorists who carried out the atrocities of 11th September 2001 in New York. It is admitted that the article is capable of meaning that there are sufficient grounds to enquire whether the claimant helped to fund the atrocities. As Simon Brown LJ said in Jameel v Wall Street Journal  EMLR 89 at paragraph 20 the distinction between the two meanings "is not perhaps an entirely satisfactory distinction". The difference between the two imputations is largely a matter of degree. I cannot say that a juror who selected the first meaning would have selected a meaning which emerged as the produce of a strained, forced or utterly unreasonable interpretation. I would not myself interpret the article in that way but that is not the test. A jury could reasonably interpret it in that way. I therefore agree that the appeal should be allowed.
40. It is ironic that in the earlier Jameel case Eady J had decided that the newspaper article in issue in that case was incapable of meaning that there were sufficient grounds for inquiry into the relevant conduct (the lesser imputation) and thus could only mean, if it meant anything defamatory, that there were reasonable grounds for suspicion (the higher imputation). This court considered that it was for the jury to determine what the meaning was. The present case is precisely the converse; Gray J has ruled out the more serious imputation and only left the less serious imputation to the jury. The result, however, is the same; the jury should be entitled to consider both meanings.
Lord JusticeMaurice Kay:
Appeal allowed. The appellant's costs of appeal to be paid by the respondent. The appellant's costs below to be paid as to 85% by respondent. Permission to appeal refused.