BAILII [Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]

England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) >> A (A Child) [2014] EWFC B106 (1 July 2014)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2014/B106.html
Cite as: [2014] EWFC B106

[New search] [View without highlighting] [Printable RTF version] [Help]


IMPORTANT NOTICE

This judgment was delivered in private.  The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the child and members of his family must be strictly preserved.  All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with.  Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

 

Case No: NY14C00008

 

IN THE FAMILY COURT

AT NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE                                                                   

The Law Courts

The Quayside

Newcastle-Upon-Tyne

NE1 3LA

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989 &

THE ADOPTION AND CHILDREN ACT 2002

AND IN THE MATTER OF:  A (A CHILD)

 

Date:  Tuesday, 1st July 2014

 

 

Before:

 

HER HONOUR JUDGE HUDSON

 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

 

Re:  A (A Child)

 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

 

Counsel for the Local Authority: Mrs Walker

Counsel for the Mother:  Miss Routledge

Counsel for the Father:  Mr Murray

Counsel for the Maternal Aunt:  Ms Taylor

Counsel for the Child:  Ms Goldstein

 

Hearing dates: 30th June 2014 & 1st July 2014

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

Transcribed from the Official Tape Recording by

Apple Transcription Limited

Suite 204, Kingfisher Business Centre, Burnley Road, Rawtenstall, Lancashire BB4 8ES

Telephone: 0845 604 5642 – Fax: 01706 870838

 

 

Number of Folios:  90

Number of Words:  6,491


JUDGMENT

 

1.                  THE JUDGE:  These proceedings concern a young boy, A, who was born on 1st November 2013 and is therefore 8 months of age.  His parents are M, who is 22 years of age and F, who is also 22.  They share parental responsibility for A as F is named on his son’s birth certificate.  F is represented by the Official Solicitor in these proceedings following an assessment by Dr Lisa Rippon, who reported on 4th March 2014, confirming that F lacks capacity to litigate.

2.                  Following his birth, A was in the care of his mother in circumstances that I will deal with in further detail shortly.  He remained in her care until 27th December 2013 when he was accommodated by the local authority and placed in foster care, where he remains.

3.                  A was accommodated after he was found to have bruising over his lower back, upper buttocks and thighs, for which there was not considered to be any adequate explanation.  A skeletal survey which was undertaken on 30th December 2013 also revealed a metaphyseal fracture of A’s left ankle which, on the evidence, was sustained on an earlier occasion to the bruising.

4.                  Care proceedings were issued on 23rd January 2014.  The children’s guardian appointed to represent A’s interests in the proceedings is Karen Burns (the CG).  The case first came before me on 4th February 2014.  At that stage A’s parents were agreeing that he should remain in foster care, but I nonetheless made an interim care order in the light of the known questions in respect of F’s capacity.  F is the subject of Court of Protection proceedings himself.

5.                  I gave further case management directions at two further hearings, on 24th March 2014 and on 21st May 2014.  At the hearing on 21st May 2014 I joined MA, A’s maternal aunt, as an intervener to the proceedings as she was then implicated by the parents, and by F in particular, as a potential perpetrator of the injuries which A had sustained.

6.                  Although the injuries to A precipitated his placement with foster carers and these proceedings, it was recognised by all parties throughout the case management of the proceedings that this is not a single issue case.  The case was therefore listed before me for a final hearing on 30th June 2014 on the basis that the court would determine, insofar as appropriate to do so, the causation and perpetration of the injuries to A within the context of a composite final hearing.

7.                  When the case came before me yesterday, 30th June 2014, I was told that the parties were inviting me to approve a threshold basis which attributed responsibility for the causation of A’s injuries to his mother and/or his father but without exploring the evidence to determine whether either of them could be identified as the perpetrator.  In circumstances in which both parents deny responsibility for causing any injury to A and where M has asked the court to consider A’s return to her care, I took some time to review the evidence and consider the appropriateness of such a course.  Having done so I indicated that, exceptionally, I was prepared to take this course for reasons I will set out in my judgment.

8.                  The local authority seeks a final care order in respect of A with a care plan of his placement for adoption, having ruled out all options for his placement within his birth family.  The local authority has issued a placement application which falls for determination at the conclusion of the care proceedings if a care order is made and the care plan approved.

9.                  The relationship between M and F has now ended.  M asks to be given another opportunity to care for A, although she accepts that she has made mistakes and that A came to harm at a time when he was in her overall care.  On behalf of F, the Official Solicitor does not oppose the making of a care order based on the local authority’s final care plan.  F’s own wishes, however, are for A to return to M’s care and for him to continue to have contact with A.  F does not want A to live away from his birth family.

10.              It is clear from everything that I have read and heard that both of A’s parents love him very much indeed.  They both want what they believe is best for him.  They have each said they want A to have a better childhood than they have had, which is very much to their credit.  They both say, and I accept, that they would each do all they could to provide for A; M by caring for him and F in the contact he would wish to have.  Both of A’s parents have been very committed to him in terms of attending the contact available to them since the proceedings started.  M has also attended hospital appointments with A.

11.              A’s guardian supports the local authority’s plan for him and the making of a care order and a placement order.  Her views are set out in her reports dated 20th June 2014 and 30th June 2014 in the care and placement applications respectively.

12.              At the outset of the hearing I was told by Miss Routledge, representing M, that she did not seek to challenge the local authority’s evidence or witnesses by way of any cross‑examination, nor did she seek to cross-examine the CG.  Similarly, on behalf of F, Mr Murray’s instructions from the Official Solicitor were not to challenge any of the evidence and not to oppose the orders sought.

13.              I was told that M wanted to give some brief evidence about her wishes for A to return to her care.  In these circumstances the oral evidence I heard has been brief evidence today from M.  Mr Murray indicated that F did not wish to give evidence himself, but Mr Murray outlined the points that F wants to bring to my attention about A’s future and his wishes for it.  I heard submissions from Mr Murray and also from Miss Routledge.

The Background

 

14.              Both of these young parents had very difficult childhoods themselves.  In the case of M, she has not had a meaningful relationship with her own father in circumstances which are set out in further detail in the social work evidence.  She also experienced an unhappy time in the care of her mother and step-father, with Social Care involvement for a period of years between 2005 and 2010.  M has also disclosed other difficulties in her family, which once again are referred to in the initial social work assessment.  The case papers record complex family dynamics which have resulted in very strained relationships between M, her own mother and her sister.

15.              F also had a very difficult childhood.  The case papers record the numerous different placements he had from the age of 4, when he was placed in local authority care.  He lived in a number of different foster placements and a plan for adoption sadly did not come to fruition for him.  In his teenage years F was in a number of different residential placements.  From the age of 18 he resided in numerous different placements, including hostels and bed and breakfast accommodation, all of which came to an end as a result of what is described as challenging behaviour. 

16.              The case papers set out in further detail the circumstances which have formed the basis of the Court of Protection proceedings relating to F.  In summary, he is on the autistic spectrum and has been diagnosed with an attachment disorder.  His life experiences have also given rise to post traumatic stress disorder.  F has also been involved with the criminal justice system.  He has now been living for some time at residential accommodation and, as I have already recorded, is subject to Court of Protection orders.  There is ongoing assessment of his ability to live independently.

17.              The relationship between the parents started at about the end of 2012.  Within a short number of months M was pregnant.  There were concerns before A’s birth because of his parents’ known circumstances.  There were also issues relating to M’s cannabis use at that time and the impact that that could have on her unborn baby.  It is, however, very much to M’s credit that she worked very hard during the course of her pregnancy and with A’s social worker, Rick Padfield, to address her cannabis use and to start making good preparations for the baby’s arrival.  In these circumstances, a care team meeting in October 2013 agreed a plan for A to be cared for by his mother but with extensive professional support. 

18.              A was born on 1st November 2013.  He was discharged from hospital to his mother’s care, then living at the home of her own mother.  The very next day there was a significant violent incident between M and MA, during which injuries were sustained.

19.              On 3rd December 2013 M and A moved to emergency accommodation.  Two days later she took A to a Youth Project (which has provided considerable support to her) in the company of F.  When they arrived, A was noted to be soaked with urine, he was inadequately dressed and was very cold.  Although M and F agreed that they would return A to M’s accommodation, they took him instead to a hotel in Gateshead with insufficient milk for his needs.  Rick Padfield visited F and M following this.  There was obvious concern about the circumstances in which A had been cared for, but A’s parents were not accepting that anything had been inappropriate.

20.              The local authority’s concerns gave rise to a strategy meeting on 9th December 2013 which recommended a child protection conference.  That was held on 16th December 2013 and A was made the subject of a child protection plan under the category of neglect.  The child protection plan set out the framework within which it was hoped that A’s care could be secured in the care of his mother, including the need for stable routines for him.  There was to be no unsupervised contact between A and his father.  This agreement was not adhered to.  M agrees that there were times when F was left unsupervised with A and there were also occasions where A was taken out at inappropriate times of the evening and night.

21.              On 27th December 2013 M showed bruising to A’s back, buttocks and thighs to the health visitor.  The health visitor referred A to Social Care and for a medical examination.  M said in her evidence today how upset she is that this action was taken without her being consulted.  She accepts that A needed to be seen but was unhappy about the way the arrangements were made.

22.              The medical examination concluded that the bruising was likely to have been caused non-accidentally.  A strategy meeting was held on 29th December 2013, which recommended A’s placement in foster care.  The following day the skeletal survey was undertaken, which revealed the fracture to the left distal tibial metaphysis.  That fracture has now been dated to approximately between 11th November and 9th December 2013 and was therefore caused on a different occasion to the bruising.

23.              The police interviewed both parents on two occasions.  The first interviews took place on 2nd January 2014.  In the course of his interview F raised the possibility that MA could be responsible for A’s injuries.  At subsequent hearings before me this was raised by both parents.  At the hearing in May 2014 I was told that there was an active case being put against MA.  In fact this has not materialised.  In her second police interview on 22nd May 2014, M was clear that she was not making any allegation against her sister.  It has been confirmed at this hearing that neither parent is putting any specific case against MA, other than general concerns about her personality and behaviour.

24.              The police disclosure includes at G123 a transcript of text exchanges between M and F in which they evidently discuss what explanations they could give for A’s injuries.  The circumstances in which F in particular has given a number of different explanations to professionals about how A’s injuries could have been sustained must be seen in the context of these exchanges.

25.              M accepts that she breached the agreement that F should only have supervised contact with A.  She accepts that there have been times that she left A in his sole care, which was contrary to the agreement.

26.              I have already referred to the capacity assessment which was undertaken by Dr Rippon in respect of F.  Dr Rippon has had the advantage of involvement in the Court of Protection proceedings, where she also assessed F.  Dr Rippon’s assessment concluded that F lacks capacity to litigate, to agree to A’s accommodation and also to consent to any adoption.  She was asked to consider the question of F giving evidence and being cross-examined.  Her report recorded her opinion that F could give evidence, but she cautioned about the reliability of his evidence should he do so.  She described him having a very concrete understanding of language.  She contemplated the prospect of answers from him which would appear out of context or unusual.  Mr Murray told me of the inconsistent responses that he had received from F during his conferences and his concern in light of that about the prospect of F being cross-examined.  

27.              M has also been assessed by Dr Rippon in the course of these proceedings.  Dr Rippon’s report in respect of M is dated 6th May 2014.  She assessed M as having a borderline learning disability.  Although she considered that M could manage court proceedings, giving evidence and being cross-examined, Dr Rippon’s view was that M may struggle with complex concepts and information.  Dr Rippon stressed the need for any evidence to be managed with unambiguous, short and simple questions.

28.              As I considered the appropriate course in relation to the factual issues and A’s injuries, I reminded myself of the relevant legal provisions when determining such issues.  It is, of course, for the Local Authority to prove its case as to threshold.  It is not necessary for the court to resolve every factual dispute, only those which will inform the planning for A and which can properly be determined on the evidence.  Where one person makes an allegation against another, it is for the person making the allegation to prove it.  Where non-accidental injury is alleged, the fact of so-called non-accidental injury must be proved before any question of perpetration arises.  The medical evidence is not, in fact, in issue in this case. 

29.              The standard of proof is the simple balance of probabilities: Re B (Children, Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35.  The test to be applied to the identification of a perpetrator of any non-accidental injury is also the balance of probabilities: Re S-B (Children, Perpetrator: Non-Accidental Injury) [2009] UKSC 17.  A perpetrator should be identified where that can properly be done on the balance of probability.  There is, however, no obligation to identify the perpetrator and the court should not strain to do so where the evidence is insufficient to make such a finding.  Where the perpetrator cannot be identified on the balance of probabilities, the court should identify who is within the pool of perpetrators.  A person is within the pool of perpetrators if there is a real possibility that he or she was responsible: North Yorkshire County Council v SA [2003] EWCA Civ 839.

30.              On the evidence before me, A was in his mother’s primary care at the time both the bruising and the fracture were sustained.  It is clear that A spent time in the joint company of his parents, but also times when he was in the sole care of F.  The text exchanges I have referred to make it clear that the parents were together trying to come up with a story that could fit A’s injuries.  I have highlighted the limitations of each of the parents as reflected in Dr Rippon’s assessments and in the evidence overall.

31.              As a matter of course, I consider it my responsibility to achieve as much clarity and make such specific findings when considering issues of perpetration and causation of so-called non-accidental injuries in cases such as this.  I do so to assist the planning for the child or children concerned, but also considering the prospect that the parents may parent other children or be involved in the lives of other children.  That is a very real prospect in this case.  I note that M had a subsequent pregnancy which was terminated, following the end of her relationship with F.

32.              Having considered the circumstances of this case through that prism, I reached the following conclusions.  I concluded that there was no real possibility that MA was responsible for causing any non-accidental injury to A.  There is no active case put that she did so and it is, in my judgment, right on the evidence that she is discharged as an intervener on the basis that she is excluded as a possible perpetrator.  I further concluded that there was no realistic prospect of me determining responsibility for the injuries sustained by A as between his parents, having regard to the limitations of the evidence as it stands and the parents themselves.  In those circumstances I could see no benefit to A or his parents to require them to give oral evidence in the course of these proceedings, knowing what I do about each of them.  I therefore approved the course which was proposed by the advocates.  I should record that all parties in these proceedings have the benefit of representation by experienced, specialist family lawyers. 

33.              Mrs Walker (representing the Local Authority) provided me with a document this morning which sets out the agreed basis (as between the Local Authority, M and the Official Solicitor on behalf of F) upon which the court is invited to find the threshold criteria established.  It is a four-page document which will be appended to today’s order.  Pages two and three record the substantive findings relating to the injuries sustained by A, which summarise the two separate injuries (the bruising and fracture), that they are non-accidental injuries, the probable causation and symptoms of those injuries, the circumstances in which there has been no adequate explanation for how those injuries were caused and the determination that those injuries were caused by either M and/or by F, although each denies responsibility for doing so. 

34.              The schedule includes a finding of failure to protect A against each of his parents in respect of these injuries.  The final page of the threshold document (at paragraphs three to seven), sets out more general findings in relation to the circumstances in which M and F came to parent A, the very difficult circumstances that they have each had in their lives which have left them ill-equipped to care for a young baby and the lack of stability in A’s early life.  I am satisfied that those threshold findings are an appropriate and proportionate determination of the threshold in this case, in the circumstances as I have outlined them. 

35.              I therefore move to the welfare determination, which must be seen against those wide-ranging threshold findings.  A has had continuing contact with both of his parents throughout these proceedings.  He has had contact with his mother three times each week and with his father once a week.  It is to their credit that they have remained very committed to that contact.  I have no doubt that the contact has provided them each with a great deal of pleasure, in terms of their time with A and their opportunity to care for him.  They have been able to do so within the limitations of the contact and with the considerable support that has been provided for each of them.

36.              The Local Authority social worker, Rick Padfield, undertook a parenting assessment.  Following the separation of the parents, it proceeded as an assessment of M as a proposed sole carer for A.  The parenting assessment is at C31 to C40 in the court papers.  It also considered F’s circumstances and the role that he would wish to play in A’s life.  The assessment recognises the love that both M and F have for their son and their wish to provide for him.  It is a sympathetic assessment, reflecting the difficulties that each of the parents has had and the impact that that has had on their ability to care for A.  The assessment nonetheless has reached a clear conclusion that the welfare of A could not be assured if he were to be cared for by his mother having ongoing contact with his father, as a result of the matters identified in the course of that assessment.  F has also received parenting support from Children North East through the work of Bernadette Brown.  The statement of Rick Padfield at C59 records issues which have arisen from that parenting support.  The Local Authority considered alternative family carers.  The only assessment which was undertaken was a viability assessment of A’s maternal grandmother.  That assessment reached a negative conclusion and did not therefore proceed any further.

37.              In undertaking my welfare analysis, I have had full regard to the recent case law which is relevant to the approach of the court in determining applications for care and placement orders.  The judgment of the Supreme Court in Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33 is of central importance in providing guidance as to the correct approach of a court, where it is asked to consider a care plan for the permanent removal of a child from the birth family.  The judgment given in June 2013 considered in detail the approach of the European Convention on Human Rights Article 8 proportionality in a public law children case.  The judgments of the Supreme Court judges stress the significance of a decision of the court to remove a child from the birth family and for the child to be placed for adoption against the wishes of the birth family.  The judgments emphasise that a care order and adoption is an extreme option and ‘a last resort’, in the words of Lord Neuberger.

38.              A care order cannot be made in such circumstances unless the order is proportionate, bearing in mind the requirements of Article 8.  Lady Hale described the test for severing the relationship between parent and child as ‘very strict, only in exceptional circumstances and where motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child’s welfare; in short, where nothing else will do’.  The test is therefore one of necessity.  The welfare of the child is paramount but, as Lord Neuberger said at paragraph 77 the interests of a child self-evidently require his or her relationship with natural parents to be maintained unless no other course is possible in a child’s interests.   He went on to say (at paragraph 104) that the interests of the child include being brought up by the natural family, ideally by the natural parents or at least one of them.

39.              The Court of Appeal gave judgment in Re G (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 965 the following month, on 30th July 2013.  The judgment of Lord Justice McFarlane stressed the need for a proper, thorough and holistic evaluation of the placement options, giving full weight to the Article 8 rights.  Such an approach involves the court balancing the pros and cons of placement options in any case.  Lord Justice McFarlane stressed the need for substantive consideration of the Article 8 considerations in relation to the issue of permanent separation of a child from the birth family.  He said:

 

‘What is required is a balancing exercise in which each option is evaluated to the degree of detail necessary to analyse and weigh its own internal positives and negatives and each option is then compared, side by side, against the competing option or options.

40.              Where the court is considering a plan of adoption, the evaluation must take place in the context of the welfare provisions of Section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, whereby the child’s welfare throughout his life is the court’s paramount consideration.  The welfare checklist in Section 1(4) includes, of course, in Section 1(4)(c) the likely effect on the child throughout his life of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person.

41.              Lord Justice McFarlane also referred to Re B and the repeated use in their Lordship’s judgements of phrases such as ‘a high degree of justification’, necessary’, ‘required’, ‘a very extreme thing’, ‘a last resort’, and ‘nothing else will do’.  He said that in the light of this, ‘it is clear that the importance of a child either living with or maintaining a relationship with her parents and natural family have not been reduced’. 

42.              In Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146 the President also again referred to the striking language used by the Supreme Court in Re B and to the degree of necessity before a care plan for adoption is approved.  In paragraph 80, by reference to Strasbourg authority, he said that family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances; everything must be done to preserve personal relations and ‘rebuild’ the family; and it is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his upbringing.

43.              The President approved the global holistic approach to the welfare evaluation.  He stressed the need for proper evidence from the Local Authority and Children's Guardian, addressing all the realistic options with an analysis of the arguments for and against each option.  He further stressed that the assessment of the parents’ ability to care for the child must take account of the assistance and support the Local Authority and other professionals, should reasonably make available to the family.

 

44.              In Re W (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 1227, Lord Justice Ryder set out in paragraph 39 the three questions the court has to answer in any care case:

 

(i)                What is the harm and/or likelihood of harm?  

(ii)              To what is that harm attributable?  

(iii)            What will be best for the child? 

 

He went on to say (at paragraph 100) that the court is to undertake its evaluation to determine what is best for the child by reference to three questions:

 

(i)                What is the welfare analysis of each of the placement options that are available?

(ii)              (ii) What is the welfare evaluation, that is the best option among those available? And

(iii)            What orders are proportionate and necessary, if any?

 

45.              My welfare analysis is therefore undertaken in accordance with the provisions of the 2002 Act, giving paramount consideration to A’s welfare throughout his life and by reference to the extended welfare checklist in Section 1(4) of the Act.  A is a very young child, who has all the usual care needs of a child of his age.  He does, however, have particular health needs.  He has required a series of hospital admissions during the months of his life to date.  He has had difficulties which have given rise to an infection leading to septicaemia.  A is going to need further medical treatment.  It is thought that he will need to be circumcised.  There is, however, the possibility of further significant medical treatment including the removal of a kidney.  He is a child who will need a high quality of consistent care to ensure that all of his care needs, including those medical needs, are met. 

46.              A spent the first weeks of his life living with his mother and having contact with his father.  He has had ongoing contact with both of them since he was placed in foster care.  Any placement for A away from his birth family will, undoubtedly, have an emotional impact upon him in the future.

47.              The realistic placement options in this case have been identified as A’s placement back in the care of his mother, with whatever supports could be put in place to assist her, or, alternatively, his placement away from the birth family.  Realistically, having regard to A’s age and circumstances, a placement away from the birth family would be for adoption.  The Local Authority’s balance sheet analysis at C63 to C72 considers all the placement options for A and weighs the positives and negatives in respect of each of them.  The CG, in her final analysis at E121 to E127, had also considered the placement options and balanced the positives and negatives for A. 

48.              A placement for A with M would bring with it the obvious advantage to him of a placement within his birth family and with his mother.  I have no doubt that he would be given love and the best care that his mother could provide for him.  The question, however, is whether M is able to provide A with a consistently safe and appropriate standard of care throughout his childhood, taking account of the supports that would be available for her to do so. 

49.              The realistic alternative for A is his placement for adoption.  Any other placement in long-term care would be with carers who could not be considered permanent in the way that a placement for adoption would be.  The advantages of a placement for adoption would be the permanent nature of the placement and the security it can provide with adopters who would be matched for their suitability with A’s particular needs.  The disadvantages of adoption are clear and are fully set out in the social worker and the CG’s analyses: the loss of A’s relationships with his birth family is the central issue; there is, of course, also a risk of breakdown in any adoptive placement.

50.              The evidence before me is that a placement for adoption is likely to be realistic and achievable for A.  Having considered the analyses of the social worker and the CG, I have concluded that there is a clear outcome to this case.  The harm to A is the harm that he has sustained in the past and the repetition of such harm in the future, the neglect of his basic care needs and also the risk of further injury to him in circumstances in which, in the early weeks of his life, he sustained two separate episodes of injury.  It has not been possible within these proceedings to identify precisely how A was injured or who was responsible, other that it was either his mother or his father, but the overall shortcomings in A’s care must be attributable to the care that he received in those weeks before his accommodation in foster care.

51.              The welfare analysis undertaken by the Local Authority and the CG has been reflected by my own analysis.  I have concluded that the only option that can meet A’s welfare needs throughout his life is the Local Authority’s plan of his placement away from his birth family for adoption.  I have concluded, sadly, that there is no alternative for A.  It is in my judgment necessary and proportionate to the issues in the case. 

52.              The Local Authority’s plan for A is for him to maintain a link with his family through indirect contact.  On behalf of F, Mr Murray indicated that he would wish for any adoption to be an open adoption so that he could maintain regular contact with A, which F considered should be at a level of weekly (as he presently enjoys).  I must consider the arrangements for contact which are proposed and the circumstances in which, if A is placed for adoption, his links with his birth family can be preserved.  Having regard to his age and his circumstances and the understandable resistance to the plan for him on the part of his parents, I have concluded that the Local Authority’s plan for indirect contact is the right plan for A.  Once again, it is the only course which is likely to meet his welfare interests.  I therefore approve the Local Authority’s plan, I make a care order approving the care plan and, as I have already indicated, I discharge MA as an intervener.

53.              I turn finally to the placement application.  The application was issued only yesterday following approval by the agency decision maker of the recommendation of the plan for adoption.  The court now has the Local Authority’s application, statement of facts and Annex B report.  I am grateful to the CG for completing her report yesterday.  That report supports the making of a placement order.  M does not consent to the making of a placement order.  In those circumstances, the court can only make such an order if her consent is dispensed with in accordance with section 52 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 on the basis that A’s welfare requires it.  Dr Rippon assessed F’s capacity to consent to adoption at the time she completed her capacity assessment in March 2014 and concluded that F lacked the capacity to consent to adoption.  On behalf of F, the Official Solicitor instructed Mr Murray to ask for an updated assessment of F’s capacity to consent to any adoption, but realistically indicated that the court may take a decision that, based on A’s welfare, consent should be dispensed with  so that the need for a further assessment would then no longer apply. 

54.              I have just made a care order approving the plan of adoption.  In my judgment the plan needs to be put into effect without any delay.  The making of a placement order provides the best means of achieving this.  Once again, A’s welfare throughout his life is my paramount consideration and I have taken account of the matters set out in the extended welfare checklist in section 1(4) of the 2002 Act.  Article 8 rights are clearly engaged in respect of the application, a placement order providing a route for A’s placement for adoption.  In the judgment I have given in the care application, I reached a clear decision that A’s future must lie away from his birth family and with his placement for adoption.  Any further delay for A is not in his best interests. 

55.              Despite A’s parent’s wishes, I have reached a clear conclusion.  I adopt the welfare analysis in the judgment that I have given in respect of the application for a care order.  I have concluded that the making of a placement order is in A’s welfare interests.  It is a necessary and proportionate step to allow the Local Authority to proceed to the realistic and achievable goal of a placement for adoption.  In circumstances in which A’s parents do not consent and in the light of the Official Solicitor’s position, I have reached, once again, a clear conclusion that the consent of A’s parents to this application must be dispensed with on the basis that his welfare requires it.  I therefore do so and make a placement order in respect of A. 

56.              As I indicated at the outset, this case properly falls within the President’s transparency guidelines so that a transcript of judgment will be prepared, funded by the parties jointly (but excluding the intervener, MA).  I expect today’s order to include provision as required by the President for the judgment to be published in an anonymous form.  It will be transcribed in a form which will allow it to be published on BAILII, subject, of course, to the usual restrictions which will be attached to it in terms of further publication or identification of those involved. 

[Judgment ends]


BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2014/B106.html