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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> E v N (Approved) [2025] IEHC 323 (07 May 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2025/2025IEHC323.html Cite as: [2025] IEHC 323 |
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THE HIGH COURT
FAMILY LAW
IN THE MATTER OF THE JUDICIAL SEPERATION AND FAMILY LAW REFORM ACT 1989, AND IN THE MATTER OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT 1995, AND IN THE MATTER OF THE FAMILY LAW (DIVORCE) ACT 1996
RECORD NO. 2024 58 CAF
[2025] IEHC 323
BETWEEN
E
APPLICANT/RESPONDENT
-AND-
N
RESPONDENT/APPELLANT
JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Jordan delivered on the 7th day of May 2025.
1. The applicant and the respondent were married to one another in 2012 in the United States of America.
2. The judicial separation proceedings were commenced by a Family Law Civil Bill which issued on the 27th of November 2018. In those proceedings the applicant was the wife.
3. Subsequently and before the final determination of the judicial separation proceedings in the Circuit Court the husband issued a Family Law Civil Bill on 01 July 2024 in which he sought a decree of divorce under the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 (as amended).
4. In order to avoid confusion this judgment will refer to the wife/husband or the mother/father.
5. There is one dependent child of the marriage, namely A, who was born in March 2016.
6. The wife is a Manager. She was born in 1978.
7. The child of the marriage A was born after a very difficult birth. There were significant concerns for his development at the early stages but he has thankfully done extremely well and the initial concerns in relation to his development have dissipated. Unfortunately, the traumatic birth caused his mother significant medical complications.
8. The traumatic birth caused the mother to sustain significant injuries. A medical report from Professor B (Consultant General and Surgeon) dated 26 July 2024 was submitted in evidence. At that time the mother was awaiting further treatment.
9. In her medical report Professor B has expressed the view that it would be impossible for the mother to have a very dynamic job - a job with high stress or a job which involves a lot of travel because these create work circumstances which she would not be able to deal with. It is not a case of not dealing with them at a psychological level but rather it is a case of not being able to deal with them on a physical level.
10. Fortunately, the nature of the wife's work is such that she can manage her work despite her medical condition. She is working part time hours at present. This suits her as she is the primary carer for A.
11. The husband was born in 1970 and works internationally in a responsible job. He has had back and neck problems in recent years. A medical report from Mr N (Consultant Neurosurgeon) dated 23 December 2024 was submitted in evidence. In it Mr N said that he had originally seen the husband in 2017 for lower back pain issues. He saw him again in 2019 and the husband reattended him in 2024. The report indicates that essentially the husband has had lower back pain and neck pain. It has mainly been affecting his neck, lower back and also in the nerve distribution. The report indicates that the husband was given injection treatment in February 2024 and further injection treatment in April 2024. This reduced the pain somewhat.
12. Mr N does say that the husband does have nerve root compression in the spine and essentially "we had agreed that you were going to consider reducing your working and I think it would be advisable for you to continue working on a part-time basis, in order to facilitate your recovery".
13. The husband was on long term disability between September 2023 and May 2024 due to his back and neck issues.
14. The medical report of Professor B is comprehensive and the wife's medical condition is clearly a significant issue for her.
15. The medical report of Mr N is a short report and the long term prognosis is not clear from it. It does however appear from the report that the husband should be back conscious going forward. It is the position that he has had time off work due to the condition and he is understandably concerned that the condition may impact on his work in the future.
16. Unfortunately, significant difficulties arose in the marriage at a quite early stage and the parties separated in April of 2017. The marriage did not survive to the fifth anniversary.
17. There were proceedings in the District Court in May 2017. The wife's application under the Domestic Violence Legislation failed. Since then there have been protracted proceedings in the Circuit Court in relation to access in particular - involving an appeal and a cross appeal from the District Court. There was also an appeal to the High Court in relation to access and maintenance orders made in the Circuit Court Proceedings on 27 March 2023. Ultimately the judicial separation proceedings came on for hearing on 31 July 2024. The then recently issued divorce proceedings were also before the court at that time and the final order in the proceedings was an order made in the divorce proceedings.
18. The case is a cautionary tale in relation to the cost of family law litigation. The dispute between the parties has been ventilated in the District Court, in the Circuit Court and in the High Court. The current appeal of the substantive order is the second appeal by the husband to the High Court. The legal costs summary dated 25 February 2025 submitted to the court on behalf of the wife indicates total costs accrued to date of 258,000. Of this 44,000 has been paid leaving a total said to be outstanding of 214,000.
19. It is necessary to point out that this legal costs summary is just a page with figures on it. The court does not know what the agreement is between the wife and her solicitors in relation to costs and the costs have not been adjudicated. The figure presented appears aspirational in so far as the wife's legal team is concerned and no hard evidence has been presented to substantiate the figures claimed.
20. The same can be said of the husband's legal costs summary save to say that he has paid more to date. He could afford to do so. The summary of legal fees to date presented to the court in respect of the husband's fees indicates total legal fees to date of 212,000 [much of which appears to be paid]. In evidence the husband said that this figure did not include accountant's fees which he felt were another 20,000 or 30,000. Thus, the total legal costs of both sides are asserted to be somewhere in the region of 500,000 - with approximately 300,000.00 of these fees outstanding.
21. After making provision for costs said to be owed on both sides the value of the remaining matrimonial assets according to the D v D schedule is in the region of 1.1 million. This puts the scale of the legal costs in context.
22. Significantly, it does also seem that the wife probably would have qualified for legal aid but decided not to apply in the belief that the service available from the Legal Aid Board may have been inferior to that available privately. A number of points arise in this regard. Firstly, it is difficult to comprehend the view concerning the quality of service available from the Legal Aid Board. It and its staff are experienced and expert in Family Law cases. Such litigation makes up the vast majority of its work. The court knows of no reason to doubt the quality of the service it provides and the experience of this court is to the contrary. It is true that the demands on the Legal Aid Board does give rise to delays on occasion but there is nothing in the evidence in this case to suggest that the proceedings would have suffered a greater delay or be more protracted if the Legal Aid Board was representing the wife. Secondly, deciding not to apply for legal aid and not availing of legal aid representation if available was somewhat irresponsible on the part of the wife when she clearly could not afford private representation and when the total resources were not great. The court considers that legal aid probably would have been available to the wife had she applied for it having regard to her means and its experience of similar cases. She should at least have applied for legal aid. Thirdly, there was ample opportunity for her to revisit applying for free legal aid throughout and it is difficult to comprehend why she did not do so.
23. It is readily apparent that the proceedings have been high conflict proceedings. It is also apparent from reviewing the proceedings, related documentation, recordings and correspondence - and after hearing the evidence - that both parties have been unyielding and determined to prevail. However well intentioned, the correspondence of the solicitors acting for the wife illustrates a need to dominate the narrative at every opportunity - with little or no effort to tone down the rhetoric despite solicitors acting for the husband asking that this be done on more than one occasion. Furthermore, the correspondence on behalf of the wife routinely forays into an attempt to try matters through correspondence when this serves no useful purpose. Unfortunately, that approach fanned the flames throughout and added significantly to the legal costs. It was an unwise and unnecessary approach.
24. The Family Law Civil Bill seeking the judicial separation was served in November 2018. The solicitors for the wife endeavoured to progress the case to hearing but the husband delayed and added to costs by doing so. It was not until August 2021 that the husband's defence and counterclaim, affidavit of means, affidavit of welfare and s.6 certificate were delivered.
25. Since the dispute between the parties began in 2017 the wife makes the point that the husband has had six successive firms of solicitors act for him and he represented himself at one stage. It seems as if the court is invited to draw the inference that this illustrates how unreasonable and non-receptive to advice the husband is. The court is dis-inclined to speculate in this regard particularly when there may be other explanations for the change in solicitors. Amongst those is the undoubted legal costs being incurred by the family law litigation which was like a rolling snow-ball. Solicitors on record for the husband may well have considered the situation [ including the correspondence in the case ] impossible to the point of being potentially ruinous for both sides - and they may have decided to quit the case. And the husband may have pushed back against requests for payment of fees. The court does not know what led to solicitors changing so often but is satisfied that treating the changes as objective evidence adverse to the father is not justified.
26. There is in the saga of this litigation an undercurrent of frustration in the actions of the father. It is the position that a very deep split in the relationship led to an impossible inter-personal rivalry between the father and mother concerning the custody of, access to, and affections of their son. The significant injuries which the mother suffered when giving birth undoubtedly contributed to the destruction of the relationship and the ensuing completely toxic animus on both sides.
27. This is not in fact a case where the father decided to waste money on litigation although there is in the mother's submissions an assertion to that effect. This is rather a case where the father availed of his right of access to the courts to achieve an objective he believed was justified - essentially concerning his access to and involvement with his son. Misguided and all as his entrenched and at times unreasonably combative position may have been it is wrong to lumbar him with full responsibility for the high legal costs incurred. Both sides contributed to the disagreements and to the high-conflict nature of the litigation.
28. In so far as A is concerned this Appeal is not concerned with the substantive issues of custody and access. However, the court must have regard to all of the circumstances and it is appropriate to observe as follows ; -
(a) A is doing extremely well with many strengths and a very well developed intellectual ability.
(b) A is achieving well and behaving very well at school.
(c) A is participating in sport and in particular football and behaves very well whilst participating [evidence of Mr. X].
(d) A mixes well and gets on well with cousins and extended family - without any behavioural problems. The evidence of Ms Y (a sister in law of the respondent) illustrates that this is so - in relation to what is clearly an important and normal connection to paternal cousins of similar age and to the extended paternal family.
(e) A spends time with his paternal uncle and wife and cousins and apparently enjoys sleep-overs with them. He also spends time with his paternal grandmother. Such a healthy normal relationship with the extended family is important.
(f) Some time was spent on behavioural challenges and angry outbursts by A when alone with his mother at home. And indeed such angry outburst have taken place. Dr. C (Chartered Clinical Psychologist) following assessment in October 2023 referred to these as some behavioural challenges, as noted by his mother, which may be his way of expressing or demonstrating some overwhelm. In circumstances where he does present with some possible challenges related to expression of his emotions and some possible anxiety and behavioural challenges as related by his mother Dr. C felt that the Parents would benefit from completing certain parenting programmes.
(g) Notwithstanding the deep hurt and mis-trust between both parents it is to their mutual credit that A is doing so well against a backdrop of a traumatic birth, the mothers ensuing medical problems, the failure of the marriage and the protracted and acrimonious litigation. Both parents are entitled to receive this credit.
(h) The introduction of the words " with primary day to day care and control " to the mother which appears to have occurred on the hearing of the appeal from the District Court on 27/3/2019 was unfortunate in this case as it appears to have introduced a confusing and unhelpful dynamic in terms of the respective legal rights of both parents as Guardians of their son. Those rights arise by operation of law and any alteration in a Guardians rights should be made by a clear court order/direction and for a stated reason [and such orders and directions are sometimes necessary]. Although the Circuit Court Order in March 2019 states "An Order that the parents have joint custody with primary day to day care and control to..." the mother (with further orders then regulating the father's access) the use of the word control did subsequently cause problems. In a letter to the husband's solicitors on 20 January 2020 the wife's solicitors wrote; -
"We hereby notify the father that the mother will be exercising this primary care and control. She will no longer acquiesce to the husband's unreasonable demands in general and specifically in relation to access ...."
On this, the court must observe that there is little if any support in the evidence or indeed in the papers to support the mother's repeated assertions concerning the father's "unreasonable demands". There is however support for the view that the mother has throughout harboured a desire to control everything insofar as the child is concerned. In an affidavit sworn in May 2021 the mother, amongst other things, recited her issues concerning the father cutting the child's hair. After making the point that she is "the primary carer for A" the mother went on to say "...he continues to do things, it seems, in an effort to undermine me and this order of the court and knowing that it will upset me, whatever the cost to the child. While, it may seem a trivial matter, the father knows that I have asked him not to cut A's hair without first discussing it with me. This matter first arose in 2017, again in 2019 and more recently when the father cut A's long hair short and shaved the back and sides closely. There was no discussion with me in advance. Given the written request not to do this, and my distress when he did it before, he can only have done this to emotionally and psychologically hurt me..."
On this one cannot but observe that a complaint about a father cutting his son's hair and an allegation that this was done to emotionally and psychologically hurt the mother puts in context the level of conflict on both sides in so far as their son is concerned.
(i) It does also appear that the court is asked to infer that responsibility for the angry and dysregulated behaviour of A whilst with his mother - and which she has highlighted - should be attributed to the father. No objective or persuasive evidence to support such an inference is provided to the court. Indeed, the report of Dr. C does not support such an inference.
(j) Another significant contribution to the protracted nature of the litigation and to the custody and access problems is the mother's narrative concerning alleged intimidating, abusive and controlling behaviour of the father before the marriage break-up and since. In an affidavit sworn in June 2021 the husband complained that he was distressed by the wife's continued employment of her skills to carefully weave a narrative that misrepresents matters and denigrates his character. He complained that the mother had demonstrated a level of literary flamboyance in levelling such allegations and he complained that there was a tendency towards embellishment. Having listened to the evidence adduced at the hearing of the appeal and having reviewed the papers submitted the court is satisfied that the husband's complaints are not entirely without substance. The fact is that there is little if any objective or persuasive evidence to substantiate the behaviour alleged. Pointing to the father reacting angrily to such allegations - in the pleadings and in court - is at best very weak evidence to support what the mother asserts.
(k) Furthermore, the mother's allegations - including those of control and coercion - are completely at odds with the evidence concerning the marriage relationship before the quite sudden break-down. The allegations are at odds with her handwritten cards of July 2016 and August 2016 to the father which were produced in evidence. These cards and in particular the August card tell the story of the mutual loving and supportive relationship of the parties and also of "the worst time of our lives" which followed the traumatic birth. It is simply not possible to reconcile what the mother wrote in the cards with her subsequent allegations. It is true that a spouse trying to cope with and fend off abuse will frequently shower affection on the abuser and such demonstrations of affection may well be a symptom and sign of coercive control and abuse. In this case however the court is entirely satisfied that any suggestion that the cards were as a result of an abusive or controlling relationship is not credible when one considers all of the evidence. Both sides have behaved badly towards one another after the marriage broke down. In so far as the mother's allegations against the father are concerned it is hard to argue that he was not entitled to defend himself.
(l) It is also true that the father did behave badly in so far as maintenance payments were concerned. However angry he may have been he ought to have maintained his wife and child better than he did when they were struggling financially.
(m) The court is satisfied that the main causes of the conflict between the parties are the traumatic birth and its significant health implications for the mother, the effect which that had on the relationship and the ensuing tug of love over their child.
(n) When reason will not prevail on either side the effectiveness of court orders is dramatically reduced - as happened here.
29. The issues on appeal are largely related to the financial orders made by the Circuit Court Judge with another significant issue being the order granted pursuant to s.6 of the Domestic Violence Act 2018 against the husband.
30. There is a statutory and constitutional obligation on the Court to consider what constitutes proper provision for the parties and their dependants at the time when it is asked to grant a decree of divorce.
31. A good starting point concerning what is meant by "proper provision" is the dicta of Murray J. in D.T. v. C.T. [2002] 3 IR 334 at p. 408 ; -
"Proper provision should seek to reflect the equal partnership of the spouses. Proper provision for a spouse who falls into the category of a financially dependent spouse (where the other spouse is the source or owner of all or the bulk of income or assets of the marriage) should seek, so far as the circumstances of the case permit, to ensure that the spouse is not only in a position to meet her financial liabilities and obligations, continue with a standard of living commensurate with her standard of living during marriage but to enjoy what may reasonably be regarded as the fruits of the marriage so that she can live an independent life and have security in the control of her own affairs, with a personal dignity that such autonomy confers, without necessarily being dependant on receiving periodic payments for the rest of her life from her former husband."
In this case the "fruits of the marriage" in terms of assets are very modest. This is readily apparent from the D v D Schedule which shows that the main assets on both sides were acquired before the marriage and/or by inheritance (or similar - i.e. estate planning). They cannot reasonably be regarded as the fruits of the marriage. That said, the court must have regard to the total assets owned in order to make proper provision.
32. In the Court of Appeal case of N.O. -v- P.Q. [2021] IECA 177, Whelan J. states:-
"[47]....The role of the court under each statutory framework is the same; namely, to endeavour to ensure that the couple together with their dependants are properly provided for having due regard to the non-exhaustive statutory checklist of factors adumbrated and "all the circumstances of the case" .....
[48.] The extensive jurisprudence in regard to "proper provision", in the context of the granting of decrees of divorce, is therefore relevant and of assistance in carrying out the statutory exercise, particularly having regard to the factors specified ..... which are to be taken into account by the court in carrying out that exercise. The said factors and matters are not in any sense exhaustive as the words "in particular" in s. 16(2) make clear."
33. Whelan J. goes on to state:-
"In Q. R. v. S.T. Irvine J. (as she then was) had characterised the approach to the exercise of discretion by the trial judge in accordance with the statutory provision thus:
"106. The onus on the trial judge in the present case was to consider all of the assets potentially available and then to fashion orders for ancillary relief that would likely secure for the parties and for their lifetime the lifestyle which they enjoyed prior to the marriage breakdown..."
34. In dealing with the fact that the only asset was the inherited asset, Whelan J. stated:-
"The statutory remit and the principle of fairness requires a more calibrated approach where a farm holding has been within one spouse's family for generations and was assured to one spouse, who carries on the business of farming on a full-time, or substantially full-time, basis and where it constitutes the sole or a significant source of income to the family, particularly if it was acquired from a parent or relative with at least an implicit expectation that it would be retained in specie for future generations. In my view the nature of the inherited property is relevant as are all the material circumstances surrounding its acquisition. Furthermore, if an inherited property provides the entire or a substantial portion of the income for one of the spouses and/or provides employment for a spouse, same are material factors which must be taken into account in balancing the competing rights and interests of the parties.
79.Having said that, I do not think that there are any strict rules governing the approach of a trial judge in "farming cases" per se. Each case will turn on its own particular facts and the circumstances of the case. The nature and source of an asset and the moral duties and obligations implicitly attendant upon the acquisition of same may well be factors to be taken into account by a trial judge in determining what constitutes "proper provision" in the context of a claim where one of the parties derives a significant source of income from an inherited or acquired farm holding."
35. The case of HN v. BN (BY) [2016] IEHC 330 involved lands which had been transferred in their entirety to the respondent wife by her father. At para. 90 of the judgment, Keane J. cited Denham J. in G v. G [2011] 3 IR 717 : -
"Assets which are inherited will not be treated as assets obtained by both parties in a marriage. The distinction in the event of a separation or a divorce will all depend on the circumstances. In one case, where a couple had worked a farm together, which the husband had inherited, the wife in a separation sought 50%. However, the order given by a court was 75% to the husband and 25% to the wife. This is a precedent to illustrate an approach, but the circumstances of each case should be considered specifically."
36. The unreported case of M. v S. [2020] IEHC 562 contains a clear summary of applicable principles from para. 64 on. Dealing with "Non-Discrimination" Barrett J. states:-
"[20] The work of a spouse in the home cannot be a basis for discriminating against her by reason only of the fact that the husband was the major earner or the breadwinner during the course of the marriage (D.T. v. C.T., Murray J., at p. 427).
[21] Lord Nicholls, in White v White [2001] 1 AC 596 emphasised that the whole tenor of English divorce legislation was the avoidance of a discriminatory approach: the fact that, as often happened, the wife had devoted the greater part of her time to looking after the children and caring for the home generally, was no ground for confining her share of the family assets, in the event of a breakdown of the marriage, to so much of the assets as met her 'reasonable requirements'. That is also the law in Ireland (D.T. v. C.T., Keane C.J., at p. 389).
[22] In Cowan v Cowan [2002] Fam 97, a so-called 'ample resources' case, Thorpe LJ, at pp. 118-19, summarised his understanding of White v White [2001] 1 AC 596 as follows, 'Disapproved is any discriminatory appraisal of the traditional role of the woman as home maker and of the man as breadwinner and arbiter of the destination of family assets amongst the next generation. A calculation of what would be the result of equal division is a necessary cross check against such discrimination...Disapproved is any evaluation of outcome solely or even largely by reference to reasonable requirements.' Provided that it is always borne in mind that in 'ample resources' cases an equal division of assets is emphatically not mandated by the legislation, Keane C.J. considered that there should be no difficulty in adopting a broadly similar approach in this jurisdiction. (D.T. v. C.T., Keane C.J., at pp. 389-90).
[23] When a court is exercising its discretion in making provision for spouses on an application for divorce, the following should be considered: (i) in making such provision a spouse who has worked principally in the home during the course of the marriage should not be disadvantaged in the making of such provision by reason of that fact; (ii) both spouses are entitled, in principle, to seek that the provision made for them provides them with a measure of independence and security in their lives and there is no reason why, in principle, a non-earning spouse should be confined to periodic payments. The extent to which this can be achieved in practice will depend on the circumstances of the case, the resources available and the exercise of the judicial discretion in taking into account all the factors referred to in s.20; (iii) a court has power to direct the payment of lump sum payments where this is considered an appropriate means of making proper provision for one or other of the spouses; (iv) all the resources, assets and income of the applicant and the respondent should be taken into account (D.T. v. C.T., Murray J., at pp. 431-32)."
37. The Supreme Court decision in D.T. v C.T [2002] 3 IR 334 is authority for the following propositions:-
i) The appropriate date for assessment of assets is the date of the trial. On this the court is conscious that the situation has changed somewhat from the Circuit Court due to further costs having accumulated.
ii) Discrimination based on the particular role of a spouse in a marriage - for example, the wife as homemaker - is not permissible.
iii) Each case must turn and be decided on its own circumstances and proper provision must be assessed having regard to those circumstances.
iv) There is no provision requiring equal division of assets since some cases may require a greater division in favour of a dependent wife for instance, particularly where there are dependent children and others may require a lesser portion due to other facts like inheritance.
38. The scheme established provides for proper provision, not division. It is not a question of dividing the assets at the trial on a percentage or equal basis although the percentage yardstick is a useful guide. All the circumstances of the family, including the particular factors referred to in the Act are relevant in assessing the matter of provision from the assets. In D.T. v C.T [2002] 3 IR 334 the Supreme Court considered a yardstick of one-third as being a useful benchmark at the lower end of the scale - and which may be a useful guide to fairness when looking at the specific circumstances and the factors in s. 20 (or 16). That the yardstick is simply a guide is obvious if one contemplates the differing considerations in a 30-year marriage when compared to a 1 year marriage for example. The Court has a broad discretion to be exercised fairly which discretion is only circumscribed by the matters in Sections 16 of the 1995 Act or Section 20 of the 1996 Act.
Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996
39. "20(1) In deciding whether to make an order under section 12, 13, 14, 15 (1) (a), 16, 17, 18 or 22 and in determining the provisions of such an order, the court shall ensure that such provision as the court considers proper having regard to the circumstances exists or will be made for the spouses and any dependent member of the family concerned.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), in deciding whether to make such an order as aforesaid and in determining the provisions of such an order, the court shall, in particular, have regard to the following matters:"
"(a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the spouses concerned has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future"
The husband earns a reasonably good salary whereas that of the wife is significantly less at present. These proceedings have consumed a lot of time and energy of both on top of the high costs incurred. This is apparent from the chronology of court appearances and from the pleadings and correspondence. The court is satisfied that both the husband and the wife are likely to improve their incomes once these proceedings are over because they will have more time available and their incentive to earn more will not be retarded by this family law litigation. While the wife does have to cope with health issues she did impress in evidence - and indeed on consideration of the papers in the case - as a highly intelligent and determined person. In her affidavit sworn in November 2022 the mother avers that she recently trained for another occupation because she thought that this might allow her to carry out extra work during A's school hours. She says however that when she was offered a position it required her to travel and this meant that she needed to send A to school early to their breakfast club so that she could commute. She asserts that A did not cope with this, in addition to managing the access schedule which changed weekly, and she had to turn the job down. As a matter of probability availing of such work should be easier for the mother at this stage, given the age of A, and should become increasingly easier to manage as A grows older and moves into his teenage years and into secondary school. It should also be borne in mind that this qualification is in addition to several other third level qualifications which the mother has. The evidence indicates that the wife had three streams of income until comparatively recently. At present she works as a Manager on a part-time basis. She was also doing some tuition for which she was paid cash until she stopped this around December of 2023. In addition, it seems that she was making a profit from a company she formed but ceased this work some 6 months or so before the Circuit Court case.
The financial resources of the husband do however exceed those of the wife as his income is greater at present and his property and business interests are not insignificant.
"(b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the spouses has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future (whether in the case of the remarriage [or registration in a civil partnership] of the spouse or otherwise),"
The parties' main responsibility is to their young child. The ordinary costs of daily living and accommodation have to be met whilst at the same time both have to defray legal bills which they have incurred in this litigation. It remains to be seen what the final bills will amount to and what any adjudication of costs results in [if sought by either client] . Ultimately, the proverb "cutting one's coat to measure " may apply. The limited resources available were apparent from an early stage and the mother did not seek legal aid as ought to have occurred by reason of the financial situation.
The father has already caused the creation of a Trust fund for A which is available at age 21 - with an investment of 56,280.00 via an inheritance which the father was to get but which he diverted to A. In addition there is 1917.00 in a bank account in the name of the father which is held by him in trust for A. This is worthwhile and important provision for A and any attempted criticism of the father for creating it is misplaced even if he can be fairly criticized for a reluctance in providing full details of it.
"(c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family concerned before the proceedings were instituted or before the spouses commenced to live apart from one another, as the case may be,"
The parties had a good life together after they married but it was nothing out of the ordinary. Sadly, the traumatic birth of their child changed everything. Health issues and medical concerns clearly dominated the time following the birth and put huge pressure on the husband and wife.
"(d) the age of each of the spouses, the duration of their marriage and the length of time during which the spouses lived with one another,"
The husband is 54 and the wife is 46. The marriage was a short one as indeed was the relationship before they got married. However, the proceedings were difficult and protracted. The substantive proceedings were eventually heard in the Circuit Court in July 2024. The marriage was in 2012 and the Divorce was granted in July 2024. Then the husband appealed to this court with the appeal being heard and determined in 2025. The wife argues that she has been held to the legal and factual consequences of being in a 12-year long marriage while simultaneously possibly being penalised for it being a short marriage.
The protracted nature of the family law proceedings is not the entire responsibility of the husband. Neither party can be absolved in this regard. Furthermore, the protracted nature of the proceedings is at least partly due to resourcing issues within the system - which hopefully will be addressed within the new Family Courts environment.
While the unravelling of the marriage was longer than it ought to have been one cannot ignore the fact that the actual marriage relationship was short lived - and ended after 4 years and six months or thereabouts. In essence, this was a short marriage. On the evidence, the failure of the marriage is tied closely to the traumatic birth of the couples only child and the consequences that followed. Neither party is in any way responsible for that cruel blow of fate or its consequences and re-casting the narrative of the marriage will not change that.
"(e) any physical or mental disability of either of the spouses,"
The wife and the husband have medical concerns which are detailed above.
The wife is generally in good health save for the ongoing problems due to the traumatic birth. She does require medical care into the future and her work, social and personal life are impacted by the injuries suffered. The nature of the work she can commit to is dictated by her medical condition but she is fortunate that she can accommodate her health condition with the work she does and is trained to do.
In the initial affidavit of welfare in the judicial separation proceedings the mother confirms that she had a bad bout of depression in her late teens to her early 20's and said she had therapy and treatment and resolved this. She goes on to say that she will probably be prone to a lower mood than average for the rest of her life, but she manages this well with support, therapy, sport and exercise and some medication. She says that she regularly sees her GP and for the most part is a happy and positive person.
The father has musculo-skeletal problems and has had to take time off work as a result. He has had to have Medical fitness examinations in order to be passed fit to work. It is clear that his continued employment depends on his medical/physical fitness and it would be wrong to dismiss his legitimate concerns about this. He has reason to be concerned about his future employment but it should also be said that the absence of a pessimistic prognosis is reason to be optimistic in that regard.
"(f) the contributions which each of the spouses has made or is likely in the foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family, including any contribution made by each of them to the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the other spouse and any contribution made by either of them by looking after the home or caring for the family,"
This consideration is to be viewed in the context of the medical issues resulting from giving birth which the wife has to live with. The mother's career and her enjoyment of life are altered through no fault of hers but because of something unforeseen. Again, it is important to point out that the husband is not responsible for this situation. He too has been affected by what has happened but is not left coping with significant medical problems as is the wife. The father is a committed parent even though the mother is the primary carer and equally committed. Despite shortcomings the father has been paying maintenance since the marriage breakdown and will be paying child maintenance during the dependency of A. Both parents have and are making significant contributions - financial and emotional - to the welfare of A. He is doing extremely well thanks to both parents input albeit he is suffering some overwhelm and emotional difficulties which are clearly associated with the acrimony existing between his parents and this protracted litigation.
"(g) the effect on the earning capacity of each of the spouses of the marital responsibilities assumed by each during the period when they lived with one another and, in particular, the degree to which the future earning capacity of a spouse is impaired by reason of that spouse having relinquished or foregone the opportunity of remunerative activity in order to look after the home or care for the family,"
Again, the point made at (f) can be repeated. It is again important to note that the medical issues which the wife must deal with are due to circumstances entirely outside the control of either party. It is also the case that her line of work is such that she can cope. She has shown that she can do so.
"(h) any income or benefits to which either of the spouses is entitled by or under statute,"
This is not a major issue. However, the mother is to retain the children's allowance going forward.
"(i) the conduct of each of the spouses, if that conduct is such that in the opinion of the court it would in all the circumstances of the case be unjust to disregard it,"
It is probably correct to describe the once loving relationship of the parties as one which rapidly deteriorated to a point of becoming toxic. As already stated, it seems likely that this was contributed to in large measure by the medical issues which the wife has as a result of giving birth - added to by real concerns at the outset for their child. An unfortunate combination of circumstances and personalities has led to a complete sundering of the previous loving relationship. However, this is not a gross and obvious misconduct case and it would be unjust to treat it as such.
"(j) the accommodation needs of either of the spouses,"
Both parties need secure accommodation for themselves and their child whom they parent.
"(k) the value to each of the spouses of any benefit (for example, a benefit under a pension scheme) which by reason of the decree of divorce concerned, that spouse will forfeit the opportunity or possibility of acquiring,"
The husband has pensions of value whereas the wife has pensions of only nominal value. This situation must be viewed in the context of the short duration of the marriage.
"(l) the rights of any person other than the spouses but including a person to whom either spouse is remarried."
This does not arise save to the extent that some of the husband's assets are properties in which other family members hold interests. His brother and he share a property together which they inherited and they own two other properties together in which their mother holds a life interest - having transferred her ownership subject to that interest being retained in each property as part of estate planning. This family dynamic is a circumstance to be considered and it would be unjust to ignore it.
40. The Circuit Court Order was ; -
"The Court in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 41.3.2 of the Irish Constitution grants a decree of divorce in respect of the marriage contracted between the parties herein on 27/07/2012.
And the court doth make the following ancillary orders:
An order pursuant to Section 18(10) of the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 that neither party shall on the death of the other party be entitled to apply for an order under this Section for provision of the other party's estate.
1. An order pursuant to section 13(1) of the 1996 Act directing the applicant to pay periodic maintenance in the sum of 1,100 per month for the dependent child, A, which is to include the child's expenses (provided the mother can reclaim the health insurance refunds directly), to commence immediately.
2. An order backdating periodic maintenance for A to the issuing of the motion for maintenance in November 2022. This sum of 12,600 in respect of arrears is to be paid by the applicant within 14 days of the date of this order. The monthly periodic maintenance payment of 1,100 is to commence on the 1st August 2024 and to be increased in line with the CPI on the 1st August 2025 and annually thereafter. The said sums are to be paid as heretofore. In the event that A goes to third level education, the fees are to be borne 50/50. The applicant is to discharge A's GAA and running club costs.
3. An order pursuant to section 13(1)(b) directing the applicant to secure the said maintenance by way of a policy of life insurance to the value of 200,000 for the duration of the dependency of the child, A. Premiums to be paid by the applicant and evidence of same to be provided to the respondent annually.
4. An order directing the applicant to pay a lump sum of 26,400 within 6 weeks of the date of the order, being equivalent sum of 550 per month for spousal maintenance, backdated to July 2020, being the date on which the husband ceased paying spousal maintenance.
5. An order pursuant to section 13 (1)(c) for a lump sum spousal maintenance payment in favour of the respondent in the sum of 137,500 (being the equivalent of 550 per month spousal maintenance into the future, until the wife is 67 years on in May of 2045), which sum is to be paid within 3 months of the date of this order. Therefore, the total sum of spousal maintenance going back to July 2020 and into the future, is 150,100.
6. A further order pursuant to section 13 (1)(c) for a lump sum payment of 173,500 in lieu of a pension adjustment order to equalise the parties' pension to be paid within 9 months. Liberty to apply for an order under section 17 (within a year), with a view to mirror these orders abroad, if that is the most efficient way to achieve equalisation of the parties' pensions. The applicant to bear all tax liabilities and costs of doing so. An order adjourning this matter, in order to investigate how best to equalize the parties' pensions.
7. An order under section 18(10) of the 1996 Act excluding the applicant from applying for provision from the estate of the respondent.
8. An order under section 18(1) of the 1996 Act precluding the respondent from applying for provision from the estate of the applicant, with a stay on this order until all lump sum payments order herein have been complied with.
9. An order pursuant to the provisions of section 15 (1)(b) of the 1996 Act (and section 36 of the 1995 Act) declaring that the applicant and the respondent herein are entitled to their assets and the income as outlined in their respective affidavits of means sworn herein and neither party shall make a claim in respect of the other's property assets or income in the future, save as is consistent with this order. A declaration that each of the parties is responsible for their own debts.
10. An order pursuant to section 6 of the Domestic Violence Act 2018 against the applicant until the 28th February 2034, directing him not to use violence, threaten to use violence, molest or put in fear, the wife, or to attend at, or in the vicinity of, or to watch or beset a place where the wife or a dependent person resides, or to follow or communicate (including by electronic means), with the wife or dependent person, except in relation to access with or in relation to the welfare of A, their dependent child, by means of the My Family Wizard app or other agreed similar app. There is to be no other unmonitored direct contact about any other matters through any other means.
11. An order lifting the in camera rule to the extent necessary to give effect to the orders herein.
12. An order directing the applicant to maintain in place health insurance at the same level for the respondent.
13. The orders in relation to access for the dependent child of the 27 March 2023 stand and are only varied insofar as the applicant will no longer make any FaceTime calls to A, who will be free to FaceTime the applicant if he wishes to do so.
14. An access related direction reiterating that the applicant is not to approach the front door of the wife and the dependent child's home for any reason.
15. A direction that the dog, (Z) should continue to go on access with A. When the applicant is collecting the child on Fridays, he must first collect the child from school and bring A to the house and A can collect Z. When returning A and Z after access, he should go first to the wife's home and A will return Z before the husband brings A to school. If it is not possible for Z to go on holidays with the husband and A, Z should stay with the wife and not with the husband's family. If it is not possible for the applicant to have the child collect and drop-off Z, then a direction that Z should not go on access. A direction that Z goes on access is for the child's benefit.
16. An access related direction that normal access is suspended during holiday access. There is no time in lieu.
17. An order adjourning a review of welfare and access on the application of the respondent only, with a recommendation from the Circuit Court Judge that Ms MO'F, or another agreed or appointed assessor, carry out the section 32 report required.
18. An order that the applicant pay to the respondent the sum of 61,500 (being 50,000 plus VAT) as a contribution towards her costs, (to include all the reserved costs and the costs of the applicant's High Court appeal, which were reserved back to this court), within 3 months of the date hereof.
19. An order granting the release of the DAR transcript of the Court's decision.
20. Section 36 of 1995 Act declaring that they are each entitled to their assets and claim in respect of other's property or assets or income consistent with the order. A declaration that each of them is responsible for their own debts.
21. The Circuit Court Judge will no longer retain seisin.
22. An order refusing a stay on the orders.
23. Liberty to apply.
41. Essentially, the parties do not take issue with the parts of the Circuit Court Order underlined above.
42. A significant issue on appeal is the Safety Order which was granted in the Circuit Court. It is worth pointing out that an open offer by the wife before the Circuit Court did not agitate this issue but the Circuit Court Judge felt it ought to be granted. An undertaking offered by the husband on the hearing of the appeal was not acceptable to the wife. The position of the wife on this issue is a further illustration of the toxicity and animus that now exists between both sides. However, there is an absence of objective or persuasive evidence to warrant the granting of such a safety order. There was no evidence proffered to this court which would allow it to conclude that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the safety or welfare of the mother or of A requires the granting of a safety order.
Some time was spent on the difficulties which the mother has with the behaviour of A. at home. And his behaviour at home is at times concerning. The video recording and voice recording are evidence of this - but they are not evidence that the father is the cause of the behaviour.
The sister-in-law of the father who was called to give evidence impressed as an extremely genuine and concerned relation of the child. She is a parent herself. The court is satisfied that she was honest and dignified in giving her evidence particularly when presented with the graphic video of a child - whom she knows and clearly cares deeply for - in an unusually distressed state. The volunteer football coach who knows A from football was equally impressive. The school reports are good. Yet, the court is invited to hold the father responsible for the behaviour of A. while he is at home alone with his mother. To hold the father responsible would not be justified.
Insofar as the allegations of misconduct levelled against the father at the hearing of the appeal is concerned the allegations essentially focussed on his breach of the court orders by approaching the door of the mother's house on occasion, his use of e-mails, his breaches of the in camera rule - and with the high point of the evidence against the father being the playing of the video recording of A when he was in a dysregulated state whilst with his mother. All this latter recording proves is that the child is dysregulated at times whilst in the company of his mother and it is very difficult to see how this could ever be regarded as evidence of some misconduct on the part of the father - or poor parenting by him.
The breaches of the in camera rule were minor breaches having regard to the evidence in that regard. The other breaches of the court orders should not have occurred and the father did acknowledge this and apologised at the appeal hearing. Having regard to the protracted nature of the proceedings and the toxic relationship between the parents it is incorrect to suggest that the father has displayed wholesale contempt for the court orders - if that is being suggested.
The court does not understand why the safety order granted refers specifically to violence and the threat of violence when it is common case that the husband never used violence to the wife - nor is there any evidence that he ever threatened to do so. There is no evidence that he is a violent person and no credible evidence that he poses a danger to anyone. The evidence establishes that he is a good parent with a responsible job in which he works hard and has done well - whilst at the same time involved in a very acrimonious separation.
The orders provided for in the 2018 Act are important. The severity of potential consequences for breach of such orders illustrates the fact that they are serious reliefs for serious situations when protection is needed. When such orders are sought the court must weigh the evidence carefully before deciding to grant an order. Section 6(2) of the act stipulates that the court must be of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the safety or welfare of an applicant or a dependent person requires the making of the safety order. This is an evidence based opinion. It may well transpire that the evidence is indirect or circumstantial as opposed to direct evidence as safety and welfare are at issue and there is usually some urgency. However, sufficient evidence to allow a court form an opinion of the existence of reasonable grounds is required. Such evidence is lacking here.
If an applicant wishes a court to grant a safety order then this requires an application grounded on evidence sufficient to persuade the court that there are reasonable grounds to grant it.
The court will set aside the safety order. The order granted pursuant to s.6 of the Domestic Violence Act 2018 by the Circuit Court judge is not justified by the evidence. Significantly, although a claim for such relief was included in the pleadings the fact of the matter is that the wife did not press for such an order at the hearing in the Circuit Court. The learned Circuit Court Judge took the view that it was necessary to grant such an order. However, this Court disagrees. The evidence presented at the hearing of the appeal - including the papers submitted - does not contain objective or any persuasive evidence to warrant the granting of such an order.
The court will include an injunction restraining the father from approaching the door of the mother's house or entering her property - simply to set necessary lines of demarcation.
43. Insofar as the provision made by the Circuit Court Judge in July of 2024 is concerned the court is satisfied that it is incorrect. One can understand a desire to be generous to the mother but one must be guided by the statutory criteria, the authorities and all of the circumstances when making provision. There must be some proportionality having regard to the fact that circumstances vary greatly from case to case. Proper provision in a 45-year marriage where most of the assets are accumulated during the marriage through the work and industry of either one or both of the spouses will necessarily be very different from proper provision in a marriage which lasted four and a half years and where little assets were accumulated by the work and effort of either one or both of the spouses during the marriage. The provision made here was excessive and fails to have due regard for all of the circumstances of the case, including; -
(a) This was a short marriage - and indeed a short relationship.
(b) The lumpsum spousal maintenance orders failed to have due regard for the fact that the mother currently has reasonable earnings from part-time employment and will likely increase her earnings once these divorce proceedings are finalised. To find or to suggest otherwise is not supported by the evidence.
(c) The lumpsum payment "in lieu of a pension adjustment order to equalise the parties' pensions and to be paid within nine months" would create very significant difficulties in terms of payment/compliance and is a totally disproportionate provision having regard to the length of the marriage. It is very difficult to understand how pension equalisation was considered fair or justified.
(d) The lumpsum payment of 61,500 as a contribution towards the costs of the wife disregards the fact that the wife chose not to apply for free legal aid although it is probable that she would have qualified for free legal aid if she did apply. Furthermore, the situation now is that the husband has incurred substantial legal costs in pursuing an appeal which was justified and successful in several respects.
(e) The lump sum orders do not give due weight to the facts that the father is to pay generous maintenance in respect of A and has already provided a sum of 58,000.00 approximately in a Trust Fund/Savings Accounts for A. All of this is provision in a real sense - which should not be ignored.
44. Amongst the orders made in July of 2024 by the Circuit Court judge was; -
"An order adjourning a review of welfare and access on the application of the respondent (mother) only, ..."
This order was in error. That this is so was conceded by the mother's side - at the hearing of the appeal.
45. Regrettably, the father is entitled to hold the view that much of the order of the Circuit Court of July 2024 appears punitive. The father's appeal must be allowed in several respects as failure to do so would be unjust.
46. I therefore make the following orders; -
(1) In so far as it necessary to do so the court will affirm the Decree of Divorce in respect of the marriage contracted between the parties on 27 July 2012;
(2) An order pursuant to s.13(1) of the 1996 Act directing the father to pay periodic maintenance in the sum of 1,100 per month for the dependent child, A, which is to include the child's expenses (if and provided the mother can reclaim the health insurance refunds directly).
(3) The maintenance payment in respect of A is to be increased in line with the CPI on 01 August 2026 and annually thereafter and the maintenance payment is to be made as heretofore. In the event that A goes to third level education then his fees are to be borne 50/50. In addition, the father is to pay the GAA and running club costs of A.
(4) An order pursuant to s.13(1)(b) directing the father to secure the maintenance payments in respect of A by an assignment of 200,000 benefit from his work policy to the wife for the benefit of A in the event of the father's untimely passing and for the duration of the dependency of A only. In the event of the father ceasing his current employment and obtaining employment elsewhere then he must provide similar security by way of an assignment of a life insurance policy (or part thereof) or similar alternative security - for the duration of A's dependency. The security provided is to secure maintenance payments falling due during dependency. Proof of the Policy Assignment is to be provided to the mother on or before 5/9/25 - and/or within two months of the father ceasing his current employment and obtaining employment elsewhere.
(5) An order under s.18(10) of the 1996 Act excluding the father from applying for provision from the estate of the mother.
(6) An order under s.18(10) of the 1996 Act precluding the mother from applying for provision from the estate of the father but with the caveat that the mother may apply to have any lumpsum due pursuant to this order, or any part thereof, or any arrears of maintenance, paid from the estate of the father should same exist on his death.
(7) An order pursuant to s.15(1)(b) of the 1996 Act declaring that the husband and the wife herein are entitled to their respective assets and income as outlined in their respective affidavits of means sworn herein and neither party shall make a claim in respect of the other's property, assets or income in the future, save as is consistent with and provided for in this order. In addition, a declaration that each of the parties is responsible for his or her own debts.
(8) An order lifting the in camera rule to the extent necessary to give effect to the orders made herein.
(9) An order directing the father to maintain in place health insurance in the same level as at present for the wife whilst he is in gainful employment. Proof of the Policy required is to be provided within 4 weeks of renewal each year to the mother.
(10) The orders in relation to access of 27 March 2023 remain but are varied to the extent that ;
(a) It is clear that Facetime contact is causing conflict and that neither parent is capable of engaging appropriately with the other to make it work routinely as a means of father/son contact. The court will direct that the father is not to initiate Facetime calls (or like social media calls) but that A is to be free to call his father anytime he wishes. Such contact is important and should be encouraged and promoted at home by the mother. The frequency and ease of such contact will be a matter for any review of access and may influence the extent of any increase in access.
(b) Holiday arrangements for the summer are to be exchanged on or before the 1st of May of each year.
(c) Play Therapy with an agreed Play Therapist or one appointed by the court in default of agreement is to be arranged for A as soon as possible. The parents are to drop A alternatively to the sessions and the sessions are to be arranged to suit each parent's schedule. The Play Therapist is not to be briefed by either parent but is to be provided with a copy of the Report of Dr. C and an agreed memo prepared by their Solicitors stating simply that play Therapy has been recommended in circumstances where his parents split in 2017 and the break up has been difficult and acrimonious - and like essential information including the parent's available schedules. Contact details of both parents are to be provided and any information and any progress reports are to be provided simultaneously to the parents by the Play Therapist by e-mail. Neither parent is to involve themselves in the work of the Play Therapist and the Play Therapist should be provided with this extract/paragraph from the court order. The Play Therapist has liberty to apply to this court by e-mail copied to both parents should he/she wish some variation of this latter direction. The Play Therapy is to be kept separate and apart from the conflict between the parents.
(11) An injunction restraining the father from going up the steps and approaching the front door of the mother's home and further restraining the father from entering any part of the mother's home or property [to include the garden] beyond the bottom of the steps.
(12) A direction that the dog, (Z) should continue to go on access with A. When the father is collecting the child on Fridays he must first collect the child from school and bring A to the house and A can collect Z. When returning A and Z after access he should go first to the mother's home and A will then return Z before the father brings A to school. If it is not possible for Z to go on holidays with the father and A then Z should stay with the mother and not with the father's family. If it is not possible for the father to have A collected and drop off Z , then Z should not go on access in circumstances where Z goes on access for the benefit of A.
(13) An access related direction that normal access is suspended during holiday access and there is no time in lieu.
(14) Communication between the parents in relation to access with or in relation to the welfare of A, is to be by means of the My Family Wizard app or other agreed similar app. Both parents are to be civil and respectful to the other at all times and are to avoid speaking negatively about the other. Both parents are to give each other a wide berth in public in order to avoid further rancour or recrimination. In the interests of the welfare of A and with the objective of reducing conflict the court recommends that the parents engage a Facilitator to assist concerning contact and communication going forward. The court is not making a direction in this regard as engaging a Facilitator is futile unless both sides willingly commit to it.
(15) An order adjourning a review of welfare and access on the application of either parent, with a recommendation that Ms MO'F, or another agreed or appointed accessor, carry out the s.32 report required. In this regard, consideration should be given to increasing the father's access time with A as A grows older.
(16) Liberty to apply to the Circuit Court save that any application concerning failure to agree on the Play Therapist/Play Therapy may be made to this Court.
47. It is necessary to direct a payment of a lumpsum by the husband to the wife. In this regard the husband has pursuant to the Circuit Court order already paid 12,600 to the wife plus 60,000. That is a total of 72,600. In addition the husband has offered to pay 100,000 to the wife which will make a total sum of 172,600. In this latter respect, the court will direct that the husband pay 100,000 to the wife within six months of the date of this judgment - in two tranches of 50,000 on or before 5/9/25 and the balance of 50,000 on or before 5/12/25.
48. The court has considered the quantum of a further lumpsum payment to be made to the wife. The court does not consider it appropriate to order spousal maintenance payments as such. It should also be pointed out that the tax advice received from the husband's accountant is that there is no tax benefit arising from spousal maintenance payments. This is specific to the circumstances of the husband in circumstances where the husband is employed by a Portuguese employer.
49. The available assets are approximately 1.1m.
50. When one considers the fact that this was a short marriage with little in the way of matrimonial assets generated during the course of the marriage and inheritances accounting for much of the husband's assets it is clear that proper provision in this case falls at the lower end of the scale or yardstick. Provision based on or guided by an apportionment of 25% of the available assets to the wife is in the circumstances appropriate.
51. Working on a figure of 1.1m - which the court considers appropriate - the total lumpsum provision for the wife at 25% amounts to 275,000.
52. It is necessary to observe that the wife's net assets are reduced to approximately 70,000 if one makes allowance for asserted legal fees of 213,911. The court is without persuasive evidence as to what legal fees the wife will ultimately have to discharge and considers it likely that it will be much less than this sum. It is also the position that the 60,000 paid by the husband to the wife's solicitors is shown as an asset belonging to her in the D v D schedule. The court is taking these factors into account - as well as the 12,600 arrears of child maintenance paid.
53. The court is setting aside the circuit court order in respect of legal costs and has had regard to the legal costs on both sides in deciding on proper provision. The legal costs are a matter for negotiation and/or adjudication on both sides and the ultimate liability in respect of same will have to be discharged by the spouses out of their limited resources.
54. The court is cognisant of the c. 58,000.00 set aside for A in the Bank Accounts/Trust Fund and those monies are separate and apart from the figure of 275,000.00 although representing further provision made by the father for his son. These monies are and will remain under the sole control of the father and of anyone nominated by him. The court is also cognisant of the child maintenance ordered which is generous. The total provision is made up of the lump sum cash payments, the child maintenance payments (and related orders concerning health insurance etc.) and the trust fund monies.
55. The court will direct the payment of an additional lumpsum of 102,400 (275,000.00 - 172,600.00) in the following tranches ; - 51,200.00 on or prior to 01 October 2026 and 51,200.00 on or before 01 October 2027.
56. Although the father has succeeded in this appeal the court is not making any order for costs as it has had regard to the costs on both sides and the assets and means of the parties and all of the circumstances in making provision.
57. Nil or nominal pension orders may be applied for in the High Court Pension Adjustment Order List when draft orders are ready.
Note - This Judgment has been redacted/anonymised and may lack some context as a result.