S51 Nash -v- Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESC 51 (13 July 2017)

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Cite as: [2017] IESC 51

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Nash -v- Director of Public Prosecutions
Neutral Citation:
[2017] IESC 51
Supreme Court Record Number:
High Court Record Number:
2010 351 JR
Date of Delivery:
Supreme Court
Composition of Court:
Denham C.J., O'Donnell Donal J., Clarke J., Dunne J., Charleton J.
Judgment by:
Charleton J.
Court treats application as one to set aside judgment and dismisses that application. Judgment also by Judge Charleton.
Judgments by
Link to Judgment
O'Donnell Donal J.
Denham C.J., Clarke J., Dunne J., Charleton J.
Clarke J.
Denham C.J., O'Donnell Donal J., Dunne J., Charleton J.
Charleton J.
Denham C.J., O'Donnell Donal J., Dunne J.

An Chúirt Uachtarach

The Supreme Court

Denham CJ
O’Donnell J
Clarke J
Dunne J
Charleton J

Record number: 2010/35JR

Appeal number: 22/2013

Cross appeal number: 24/2013


Mark Nash


The Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment of O’Donnell J delivered the 13th of July, 2017.

1 Every judge, particularly a judge in a final court of appeal lives with the possibility, and sometimes the reality, of judicial error. This should not be surprising. If there was no possibility of judicial mistake, either in fact or law, there would be no need for an appellate system. At a more basic level, there is a well established jurisdiction to alter a decision prior to the making and perfection of the order in a case. See e.g.: Millensted v Grosvenor House (Park Lane) Ltd. [1937] 1 KB 717 and in the criminal context Richards & anor v. Judge O’Donoghue and D.P.P. [2016] IESC 74. It is not necessary here to discuss the circumstances in which such jurisdiction may be exercised in civil cases. (See Delany and McGrath, Civil Procedure in the Superior Courts, 3rd ed, paras. 24-32). Judgments and orders may also amended by the ‘slip rule’, Order 28, to which a reasonably generous interpretation is given: see the observations of Lowry LCJ in McNichol v Neely [1983] NI 43 quoted with approval by Murray J in McMullen v Clancy [2002] 3 IR 493. There is also a procedure for speaking to the minutes of a final order with a view to clarifying that order. None of this would be necessary if error, or at least the possibility of error, did not exist.

2 The possibility of judicial error in its broadest sense is a particular reality for a court of final appeal. No one has improved upon the statement of Justice Robert H Jackson in Brown v Allen, 344 US 443, 540, (1953):-

      “There is no doubt that if there was a super - Supreme Court a substantial proportion of our reversals of State courts would also be reversed. We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final”.
The awareness that error if made cannot be corrected is a sobering reality which explains in part the time and care courts take to try to ensure that the process is fair, and in particular the outcome, is correct.

3 Litigants, lawyers, witnesses and observers can all make mistakes. Judges, even judges in appellate courts reviewing decisions for error, make mistakes; they do not mean to but they do. But they try extremely hard not to, and for the most part succeed. And in particular, they try to get the decision correct. The core and irreducible function of any court, even in cases with obvious and profound general consequences, is to resolve the issues between the parties to the litigation. The facts must be ascertained and recounted, not to provide an authoritative record of information to future generations, but to identify the issues between the parties which has given rise to the dispute. Even then it is worth recalling that while a decision is binding between the parties as to the legal consequences, the decision as to what occurred in the past, or prediction of what may occur in the future, is made by a person who was not, or will not be, present. Any decision in a civil case is made on evidence sometimes limited and unsatisfactory, on a balance of probabilities, and is reviewed on appeal by the standard which considers whether such findings of primary fact were open to the trial court on the evidence. It is not perfection therefore; it is, or should be, however, the best that we can do. In fairness too, although there is an established jurisdiction to set aside a judgment, it is rarely invoked and even more rarely leads to the setting aside of an order and although the court receives occasional requests to address and clarify a factual matter contained in a judgment, that too is rare.

4 Despite the efforts of all involved, however, errors of fact can and do occur. I do not find this either surprising or ultimately troubling. For my part, I would prefer to have decisions made about me by a person conscious of the possibility of error rather than one who believed that appointment to the bench conferred a unique form of secular infallibility. Indeed, those who profess almost mystical belief in the impossibility of judicial error are most often to be found contending that even a small mistake justifies the setting aside, or even the reversal, of a judgment , and who, not coincidentally, point to just such an error in a judgment pronounced. But the legal system does not deny the possibility of mistake; rather, it recognises it and seeks to protect against it and provide a remedy if appropriate.

5 This case is concerned with alleged errors of fact contained in a judgment delivered in this Court on the 24th October, 2016, by Clarke J, with which Denham CJ, Dunne and Charleton JJ, and I agreed. The scope for significant error of fact, that is, an error which could have an impact on the outcome of a case, is much more limited in an appellate court than in a trial court, since an appellate court is concerned with issues of law and is not itself a court which normally makes any finding of primary fact. There will normally be a judgment of the trial court, and in most cases, one or more judgments of the Court of Appeal, and accordingly, the impact or significance of any error of fact recounted in the judgment of this Court which is not central or fundamental to the case must be limited. In this case, since there was affidavit evidence and only limited cross-examination it is also possible to point to the underlying evidence before the trial judge should the Supreme Court judgment be used as an account of all the facts and alleged to be incorrect. It is rare, therefore, for this Court to be invited to revisit factual matters.

6 I do not doubt that some errors of fact or description can creep into a judgment particularly in matters which are not central to the outcome and reasoning. Sometimes there is a lack of clarity in the information submitted. Sometimes, as occurred in People (DPP) v. McKevitt [2009] IESC 29, there is an error in the legal submissions which is then repeated in the judgment, and on other occasions, there is a simple misunderstanding which is not picked up or clarified in oral argument, or identified by the judge or his or her colleagues. What then is to be done when a party (normally the losing party) considers that a judgment contains errors of fact? In principle, this may arise in all courts but for present purposes I propose to consider only the position in the Supreme Court. In my view, the first thing that must be done is that the party, and if legally advised, his or her advisors, should make a careful assessment of the nature of the alleged error. If an error is identified, in principle it may be one which is trivial or inconsequential, or it may be of some significance either as a matter of simple accuracy, or because of its potential effect on the legitimate interests of the parties or indeed other individuals. As Clarke J. points out, an example occurred at an earlier stage in this case. Exceptionally, an error may be capable of being so fundamental and central that it should lead to the setting aside of a judgment including perhaps resulting in the reversal of the decision itself. It will be necessary to consider these matters in some more detail but at this stage it is important to emphasise the responsibility that lies upon the party and his or her advisors in making this analysis, and if appropriate advising upon it.

7 This responsibility flows from the significance of an application to court in respect of a judgment delivered. It is sometimes thought that such applications are not welcomed or encouraged because of the potential embarrassment of an error being publicly identified. As Baroness Hale observed in Re L and B [2013] UKSC 8, while judicial tergiversation is not to be encouraged, it takes courage and intellectual honesty to admit ones mistake. But those are features required at all stages. The obligation to do justice fairly, and without fear or favour, which guided the judge to give the original judgment, should extend to a willingness to acknowledge error if justice should require it. History has shown in any event, that courts have entertained applications and exceptionally made orders setting aside judgments already given. Courts are, however, reluctant to entertain such applications for different and good reasons. First, the revisiting of old ground inevitably adds to the costs incurred by and the stress imposed upon all the parties involved. It also requires the allocation of scarce time and resources which are therefore necessarily denied to litigants who have not yet had their case heard or considered on appeal. For example, this application has occupied considerable time both in and outside court. More importantly again, such an application in principle runs directly counter to an important value which the law, and it should be added justice, accords to finality. That applies with particular force in the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of Art. 34.4.6 which provides:-

      “The decision of the Supreme Court shall in all cases be final and conclusive.”
8 It should not be necessary to elaborate upon all the reasons why finality is both necessary and desirable. Litigation is hard fought and expensive. If a case has been fought to conclusion and appealed and determined, it will often be the case that it is a finely balanced one with much to be said on either side, or perhaps that one or both parties has become particularly entrenched and committed to the litigation. In some cases, both considerations may apply. If it were permissible to reopen cases, then the losing party, who by definition has no other route available, would often seek to do so however remote the possibility of success. That would be intolerable for the successful party but also for other litigants seeking hearings. It would also follow that there could be no theoretical point at which the process would stop. It would be the legal equivalent of the boy who loses a coin toss and immediately suggests best out of three. As Murray J. observed in the case of Riordan v An Taoiseach [2000] IESC 61 at 4:-
      “If a party, solely because he or she disagreed with the judgment of the Court of final appeal could by one means or another restart the proceedings to have issues tried all over again, and perhaps even again, it would undermine the functioning of the administration of justice and weaken the authority of the law, which are there for the benefit, not of the Courts, but of citizens as a whole.”
9 The requirement of finality in litigation is not therefore the product of judicial decision or statute. It is encapsulated in the provisions of the Constitution which establishes this Court and which it is bound to uphold. That imposes constraints upon the court when it is invited to alter or set aside its decision. On the plain words of the Constitution it is not permitted and the court is obliged to uphold both the text and the values it espouses.

10 Notwithstanding the apparently all-embracing terms of Art. 34.4.6, there is however an exceptional jurisdiction to revisit a judgment of this Court which is otherwise entitled to finality. The justification for this is perhaps the fundamental constitutional obligation of this Court to administer justice which is in unqualified terms and is the governing principle of Art. 34. Any tension between these two provisions may perhaps be reconciled by considering that where by reason of judicial error or some other extraneous consideration, it is plain that the outcome of the case cannot be said to be the administration of justice for the purpose of Article 34 then it cannot be said to be a ‘decision ‘for the purposes of Art. 34.4.6. It is not necessary to discuss here the possible circumstances in which such an exceptional application could be made. It is plain it must be something fundamental to the decision. One clear example is where a case of objective bias is established for some reason in respect of one or more members of a court. See for example the discussion in Bula Ltd. v. Tara Mines (No. 6) [2000] 4 IR 412 at 476, and in another jurisdiction R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2) [1999] 1 All ER 577 at 585. The jurisdiction was originally identified in Re Greendale Developments Ltd. (No. 3) [2000] 2 IR 514. There Denham J (as she then was) said at p. 544:-

      “The Supreme Court has a jurisdiction to protect constitutional rights and justice. This jurisdiction extends to an inherent duty to protect constitutional justice even in a case where there has been what appears to be a final judgment and order. A very heavy onus rests on a person seeking to have such jurisdiction exercised. It would only be in most exceptional circumstances that the Supreme Court would consider whether a final judgment or order should be rescinded or varied. Such a jurisdiction is dictated by the necessity of justice. A case will only be reopened where, through no fault of the party, he or she has been subject to a breach of constitutional rights.”
11 A case which may come close to the exercise of this jurisdiction was Abbeydrive Developments Ltd. v Kildare County Council [2010] IESC 8; [2010] 2 IR 397, where through, it must be said, no fault of the court, a body was not able to participate in proceedings and make submissions on an issue where it contended that the declaration made that a party was entitled to a default permission would be contrary to EU law. It is its own measure of the exceptional nature of this jurisdiction that this appears to be the only case since the decision in Greendale that an order has been set aside.

12 Important guidance as to the exercise of this jurisdiction was given by this Court in DPP v McKevitt [2009] IESC 29. There, Murray CJ (Denham, Hardiman, Geoghegan and Fennelly JJ concurring) delivered a ruling on an application to set aside the decision of the Court which had dismissed an appeal pursuant to s. 29 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 (as amended) on the grounds of an alleged error of fact in the judgment. The ruling referred to the explicit provisions of Art. 34.4.6, observing that when a party seeks to set aside a final decision of this Court a preliminary question always arises as to whether the court has jurisdiction even to entertain such an application. Two important factors had to be addressed in considering whether to re-open a decision which had been delivered:-

      “Firstly the application must patently and substantively concern an issue of constitutional justice other than the merits of the decision as such. Secondly, the grounds of the application must objectively demonstrate that there is a substantive issue concerning a denial of justice in the proceedings in question consistent with the onus of proof on an applicant.”

13 The jurisdiction therefore was aptly described as a “potential jurisdiction” (emphasis in original) to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances and an applicant was obliged to show cogent and substantive grounds which are objectively sufficient to enable the court to enter upon the exercise of wholly exceptional jurisdiction. In the circumstances of that case, the Court considered the error complained of, which had originated in the submissions made on behalf of the DPP but had not been identified or brought to the attention of the Court on behalf of the applicant, was in any event not central to, or indeed, necessary for the determination of the particular issue in the case. Accordingly, the Court did not consider it necessary to hear submissions from either party and refused the application. This decision illustrates, therefore, that the existence of the Greendale jurisdiction, exceptional as it is, does not subtract from the constitutional importance of Art. 34.4.6 , and if a court concludes at any stage that the case is one captured by that Article, then it must dismiss the application since to proceed further would arguably involve a separate breach of the provisions of the Article. The basic rule established by the Constitution is that justice itself requires that there be an end point to all disputes.

14 It may be, however, that an error identified is not considered either central to the reasoning in the case, or capable of establishing such a fundamental departure from the administration of justice as would justify the application of the Greendale jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the error, if it be such, may be considered of some significance either because of its impact on an individual, the potential for confusion and worse in relation to separate matters, or perhaps, for the sake of simple accuracy. There is and can be no objection either in principle or in constitutional law to the correction of such matters which do not affect the decision of the court captured by Art. 34.4.6. Often judgments are delivered marked “unapproved” and in the process of the approval of a judgment for promulgation on the website of the Courts Service, and perhaps for reporting in official or unofficial reports, such errors including typographical and grammatical errors, can be addressed. It is not desirable to announce a decision and judgment without circulating the judgment on that day and making it available. The delivery of judgment is a part of the administration of justice in public and normally comprehends making the text of a judgment publicly available. Some jurisdictions seek to avoid this problem by circulating a judgment in draft to the parties subject to an embargo on publication. As I understand it, any comments on the draft are normally limited to factual corrections. I am not aware that it has ever been suggested that such a system should be adopted in Ireland, or as a practical matter would be capable of operation. It follows, therefore, that the necessity for delivering a judgment in public and for making available the reasons for such a decision means that a judgment must be available on the day it is delivered. However, any such judgment, whether so marked or not, should be treated as unapproved and capable of factual correction for a limited period after delivery of perhaps two weeks. Either party could within that time write to the court, copying the letter to the opposite side, with any suggested corrections. Should the court consider it necessary to make such corrections it would then do so in the approved version. This would balance the demands of factual accuracy for posterity with the need for contemporaneous publication of the fullest reasons for a decision.

15 Finally, there are matters which may be errors but which are self-evidently trivial and inconsequential. To take a simple example, in a case which concerns a car accident, the judgment of this court may inadvertently describe a motor car as green when it was aquamarine or even blue. Save in cases where visual identification is central, the colour of the car will be entirely irrelevant to the question of negligence or damages etc. Some disappointed litigants (and it an unavoidable function of litigation that some litigants are disappointed in every case) engage in the form of reasoning that suggests that because the judge got the colour wrong, the decision is somehow of less force or could be set aside. In such circumstances, the party, and where represented the party’s advisors, also have an obligation to recognise that the point is trivial, inconsequential, and that no point is served by seeking to require a correction of it, still less an application to set aside the judgment. The obligation of solicitors, as officers of the court, and the duties of counsel appearing before a court requires all such lawyers to exercise responsibility in this matter as well.

16 It remains to consider into what category the issues in this case fall. One legitimate question is whether there are in truth any errors in the judgment that require to be addressed. The submissions of the applicant were surprisingly diffuse and imprecise in this regard. For the reasons set out in the judgment of Clarke J., with which I agree, it can be said that taking a scrupulous approach, there are two respects in which the judgment should perhaps be clarified. However, there was a lack of clarity as to what the applicant contends should follow from this.

17 A letter was delivered by hand to the Registrar of the Supreme Court on the 25th of October, 2016, that is the day after the delivery of the judgment suggesting that there may be “a significant error of fact which may require to be corrected”. The letter continued:-

      “The thought does occur to us however that it may be that the Court would prefer not to further promulgate the Judgment for instance by putting it on the Court’s Service website pending the clarification of this matter.”
A lengthy letter was sent on the same day to the Chief Prosecutions Solicitor identifying concern in relation to “two factual errors which appear to underpin the judgment”. It was suggested that it seemed the court “based its finding of no culpable delay on [a] mistaken view.” It was further suggested that the fact that the court had “proceeded on this mistaken basis” was clear from certain extracts from the judgments which were then set out and which are discussed in the judgment of Clarke J. The letter concluded:-
      “Unfortunately, therefore, as regards the period of time under scrutiny by the Court there again appears to be an error of fact underpinning the conclusions arrived at in relation to culpable delay which in our view requires to be addressed for the integrity of the judgment.

      We are anxious to agree with you how these two sensitive matters should be addressed before the Supreme Court and await hearing from you.”

18 The Director of Public Prosecutions responded by stating that the office considered there was not material errors in the judgment as delivered, and certainly none that would have made any difference to the court’s findings. In response to this, the applicant issued a notice of motion seeking:-
        “1 Liberty to be heard in respect of matters arising on foot of the judgment of this court delivered on the 24th day of October 2016;

        2 Further or other Order as to this Court shall appear meet;

        3 Costs.”

19 The motion was grounded upon an affidavit of the applicant’s solicitor. At para. 12 it stated that an “error of fact has now influenced the judgment of the Court on the question of damages and costs”. At para. 15 it was stated that:-
      “the mistakes of fact identified in the decision of Clarke J. could be material to the Court’s ultimate conclusion because the facts are recited in the Court’s finding of culpable delay. It seems to me that it is possible that the Court could have arrived at a different conclusion had it appreciated at the time of writing the judgment that a DNA sample was on file in the Forensic Science Laboratory since 1998.”
Paragraph 16 of the affidavit said:-
      “I believe and am advised that the Court has full jurisdiction to ensure that the record is factually correct including the power to revisit a judgment when errors of fact undermine the integrity of the reasoning in that judgment. I understand that the judgment has not been published on the courts website pending clarification of the issues arising and no order has been drawn pending a finalization of all matters arising from the judgment. I respectfully ask the Court to consider how best to remedy the errors appearing in the judgment or to clarify the Court’s position with regard to properly stated facts in this case.”
The affidavit also indicated that it was the intention of the applicant to make a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and wanted to clarify the facts for that purpose.

20 The notice of motion is in a curious form. The relief sought at para. 1 is at best redundant since the motion was heard. The application, therefore, becomes a generalised request for such order as the court may think appropriate. Normally the principles of adversarial litigation require one party to assert something and the other to respond, and the court to decide. It may be that the correspondence and application was framed in this vague and indirect fashion out of a respectful diffidence although that seems doubtful but if so, it was in any event misplaced. The references to errors underpinning the judgment and undermining the integrity of the judgment and proceeding on a mistaken basis all suggest that the applicant and his advisors consider that these matters could, or perhaps should, lead to the court setting aside its judgment. This also follows from the suggestion that the court refrain from drawing up an order which would normally suggest that the party was invoking the jurisdiction to invite the court to alter its decision before the final order was issued. If this is the case, it should be stated forthrightly and the factual and legal basis for the application accurately identified. There was in my view a surprising lack of precision about both the factual matters relied upon, and the legal framework for analysis. No written legal submissions were received from the applicant. It is sufficient to say that having considered the matter carefully, I agree fully with the judgment of Clarke J. that there could be no basis on which it is said that the matters identified, properly analysed and fairly understood could approach the high threshold which is necessarily required for this court to consider setting aside a judgment it has delivered. Insomuch as there are errors of description in the narrative of the judgment, I agree that the opportunity should be taken to correct the judgment in that regard. However, those are matters which could plainly have been dealt with in correspondence and by agreement if indeed it was considered that this was a case in which it was necessary to address such matters. Accordingly I would dismiss the application.

Judgment of Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the 13th July, 2017.

1. Introduction
1.1 This judgment is concerned with an application to revisit a previous judgment of this Court. On January 29, 2015, this Court gave an initial judgment on an appeal against that part of the order of the High Court in these proceedings which declined to prohibit a then pending criminal trial in which the appellant (“Mr. Nash”) was the accused. This Court dismissed that aspect of the appeal (Nash v. Director of Public Prosecutions
[2015] IESC 32 (“the prohibition decision”).

1.2 However, a second leg of the appeal which had been before this Court concerned the dismissal by the High Court of a claim by Mr. Nash for damages for an alleged breach of his entitlement to a timely trial under either or both of the provisions of the Constitution or the European Convention on Human Rights. After Mr. Nash’s criminal trial had gone ahead (and he had been convicted), that second aspect of the appeal came to be heard. The Court also dismissed that part of Mr. Nash’s appeal. (See Nash v. Director of Public Prosecutions, unreported, Supreme Court, Clarke J., 24th October 2016) (“the damages judgment” or “the judgment”). For reasons connected with the issues considered in this judgment, that damages judgment has not yet been published on the website of the Courts Service.

1.3 In passing it should be noted that Mr. Nash has appealed against his criminal conviction to the Court of Appeal and in that context it is particularly important that nothing is said in the course of this judgment which might potentially impact on that appeal. However, that being said, shortly after this Court had delivered the damages judgment, correspondence was received from solicitors acting on behalf of Mr. Nash which took issue with some of the facts appearing in that judgment. Thereafter a motion was brought which sought to have certain facts corrected and suggested that the Court might like to reconsider its order in the light of what was said to be the correct facts. Against that background it is necessary first to touch on the proper approach of the Court to an application such as that with which this judgment is concerned. In that regard, I agree with the judgment of O'Donnell J. on the legal framework within which applications of this type can and should be considered. I also agree with the observations of O'Donnell J. on the requirement that there be clarity on the question of whether it is contended by an applicant that the high constitutional threshold, which is required to be met if the result of a final decision of this Court is to be altered, is met. In that context I propose first to deal with the proper approach to the correction of errors.

2. The Proper Approach
2.1 As it happens a not entirely dissimilar issue has already arisen in this case. When the appeal came back before this Court for the purposes of considering the question of damages and costs, counsel on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions indicated that there was concern that some of the facts set out in the judgment of the late Hardiman J., given on the earlier issue of prohibition of Mr. Nash’s criminal trial, were not fully correct.

2.2 In a statement subsequently made by the Chief Justice on behalf of the Court on the 24th October, 2016 (at the same time as the damages judgment was delivered), the Court indicated that it was not satisfied that it was open to it to amend the judgment of Hardiman J. given that, tragically, Hardiman J. had died in the intervening period. However, the Court did point out that it was, of course, the case that a judge is free to correct any typographical or similar errors identified in an unapproved judgment handed out to the parties on the day when judgment is given. It was further noted that judges have always been willing in that context to consider correcting any errors of fact which are brought to their attention.

2.3 In the particular and unfortunate circumstances which then prevailed, the best which the Court felt it could do was to indicate that it was sure that Hardiman J. would have been happy to correct the relevant errors. The Court also directed that there should be published a document for inclusion alongside the judgment of Hardiman J. on the website of the Courts Service noting the relevant facts.

2.4 It seems to me that this is clearly the correct approach. If there truly are errors of fact in a judgment then a judge should, of course, be willing to correct them so that the record can be set straight. However, it does need to be said that this undoubted jurisdiction should only be exercised where the error is of some materiality, either to the case, or to the legitimate interests of any person who may either be a party to the case or whose actions may be described in the judgment. On the occasion just mentioned the reason why counsel for the D.P.P. expressed concern was that a senior garda felt that what were said to be factual errors reflected badly on him. The senior garda concerned was not, of course, a party to the proceedings and was not subject, therefore, to any potentially adverse order arising from the result of the case. On the other hand, the Court was cognisant of the fact that the senior garda concerned had a legitimate interest in ensuring that his involvement in the events surrounding the investigation into Mr. Nash’s potential culpability for the Grangegorman murders were accurately described.

2.5 It seems to me that this approach remains the appropriate approach to be adopted on this application. Insofar as any material error of fact can be established then it should be corrected if for no other reason than to ensure that the record is correct. That jurisdiction should only be exercised, however, where there is some reasonable materiality to the potential correction.

2.6 There is, of course, then a second question as to whether even if there be an error of fact same could be said to have any consequence for the case. That is a separate matter which needs to be considered but only after it has been determined whether there are any errors of fact.

2.7 Finally, it does need to be emphasised that what are described as “errors of fact” in this judgment are statements of fact which, on the basis either of uncontested or unchallenged evidence before the court of trial or undisturbed findings of the trial judge as to the facts, can be shown to be incorrect. Many cases involve disputed facts which are required to be resolved either by a judge sitting alone or, in appropriate cases, by a jury. The fact that one or other party may not like the facts as found by the decider of fact and may assert that the facts are as per evidence given by or on behalf of the party concerned, does not mean that it can be said that there is an error of fact simply because the appeal court holds that the findings of fact of the trial judge or jury cannot be disturbed on appeal and describes the facts accordingly.

2.8 It follows that the errors of facts asserted in this case must be reviewed by that test. Are the facts as described in the damages judgment at variance with facts which were either undisputed or found by the decider of fact? Against that background it is next necessary to turn to what are said to be the errors of fact.

3. The Alleged Errors
3.1 In substance three sets of facts are said to be erroneously set out in the damages judgment. The first two sets of facts are somewhat connected. To an extent they turn on the use, in that judgment, of the word “sample”. The relevant passages of the judgment are to be found principally in paras. 3.10 and 3.11.

3.2 The context, for the purposes of the appeal then under consideration, in which the facts are thus described was the situation which pertained during the early part of the investigation by An Garda Síochána into the Grangegorman murders when an attempt was made to obtain DNA samples from a jacket connected with Mr. Nash for the purposes of ascertaining whether those samples might be associated with the victims, thus providing evidence supportive of Mr. Nash’s guilt.

3.3 In the passages concerned two statements are made concerning samples which are said to be at variance with what actually occurred. The first is a statement that the original samples taken were tested to destruction and were no longer available. The second concerns a suggestion that no samples were retained by the forensic science laboratory during the period between when the initial attempts to identify DNA failed and the time, described in more detail in the judgment, when the issue was revisited leading to the identification of DNA which was said to match that of a victim and thus provide an evidential basis for the prosecution of Mr. Nash. It will be necessary to return to those two contentions in due course.

3.4 The third contention relates to the timing at which more advanced techniques of DNA testing which, it would appear, allowed DNA to be analysed from much smaller particles of material than had heretofore been the case, became available. It is said that those techniques were available at an earlier stage than is described in the judgment. It will also be necessary to turn to that aspect of the facts in early course. However, it is first appropriate to consider the “samples” issue.

4. The Samples Issue
4.1 The first significant mention of samples is to be found in para. 3.10 of the judgment. There, in describing the initial investigations, it is said that not only “were those samples insufficient to allow for results but also that, in the course of attempting to analyse the samples in question, same were necessarily destroyed so that the samples which had originally been taken were no longer available”. However, earlier in the same paragraph it is clear that the samples being spoken of are “blood samples found on clothing belonging to Mr. Nash”. It is, therefore, clear that what is being spoken of in that passage of the judgment are blood samples taken from Mr. Nash’s clothing and then tested to destruction without yielding any result.

4.2 It is obviously the case that what was retained, whether in the form of parts of that clothing such as a button and thread to which reference will subsequently be made, or, indeed, the clothing itself, was not tested to destruction. On behalf of Mr. Nash it is sought to be argued that that aspect of the judgment is incorrect because it is asserted that what are said to be “samples”, in the sense of samples of clothing such as the thread and button to which I have already referred, were retained and were available for further investigation at any time. But it is absolutely clear from para. 3.10 of the judgment that the reference to samples being tested to destruction was a reference to blood samples which were found on the clothing rather than to the clothing itself or any part of it.

4.3 Finally, it is worth noting that the whole topic of the early samples being destroyed in the course of testing was one which was raised in the course of oral argument by counsel for the D.P.P. and was not questioned by counsel for Mr. Nash in reply. One would have expected, had it been considered at the time that the issue was both important and that the Court had been given a misleading impression by counsel for the D.P.P., that the matter would have clearly been raised in reply.

4.4 In all those circumstances, I am not satisfied that under this aspect of the samples issue there can be said to be any error in the judgment. The judgment accurately records what happened. Samples were taken for testing. It can safely be assumed that the samples were blood but it makes no difference in practice if they happened to be of some other human material. The samples were destroyed while being tested and no samples of human material as such were retained.

4.5 The second aspect of the samples issue where it is said that there is a factual inaccuracy in the judgment is to be found in para. 3.11 which suggests that the buttons and thread to which reference has already been made were returned to the forensic science laboratory in July 2007. From that statement it might reasonably be inferred that the judgment operated on the basis that the relevant button and thread were, after the time of the initial earlier investigations, held by An Garda Síochána but only later returned to the forensic science laboratory. It would appear to be an accepted fact that the button and thread in question were retained by the forensic science laboratory during the relevant period. There is no doubt, therefore, that to that extent the judgment is inaccurate. It will be necessary to consider whether anything turns on the distinction between what is said in the judgment and what actually happened in due course.

4.6 However, it is worth noting that the passage from para. 3.11 which is not fully accurate makes reference to the judgment of Charleton J. given on the earlier occasion of the appeal leading to the prohibition decision. There is a reference in para. 11 of the judgment of Charleton J. in question to exhibits being brought back to the forensic science laboratory for further investigation in June (which, from the context, refers to June 2009). The judgment of Charleton J. immediately goes on to state that, on the 16th July, buttons and thread from the jacket of Mark Nash apparently developed a DNA profile matching that of one of the victims. The judgment then addresses the question of the examination of the jacket. While the judgment is not explicit on the question of whether the button and thread in question were part of the exhibits which were returned to the forensic science laboratory in June, one might have thought that had the distinction between whether that button and thread were held in the intervening period in the forensic science laboratory, or alternatively otherwise in garda custody, been considered to be important to the case, some clarification would have been made in the course of the oral hearing on the damages issue. In that context it must be noted that the judgments leading to the prohibition decision had, of course, been available to the parties for a considerable period of time in advance of the hearing relating to the damages question. Furthermore, it should be noted that while an application was made in the context of the hearing of the damages issue to admit as fresh evidence the transcript of Mr. Nash’s criminal trial, that application was refused. The only evidence before the Court on the damages issue was, therefore, the evidence given before Moriarty J. in the High Court. That fact may have contributed to some of the lack of clarity about precise details. In addition, it is worth noting that the basis on which it was sought to introduce the detailed exploration of the facts surrounding the forensic investigation which occurred at Mr. Nash’s criminal trial was not on the basis of a suggestion that the transcript was relevant to any of the issues currently being dealt with in this judgment. As appears from the affidavit sworn by Mr. Nash’s solicitor to ground the application to admit the transcript of his trial and other materials as fresh evidence, the application related to what were described as “twin issues”, being alleged prejudice arising out of the timing of Mr. Nash’s sentence and a risk of contamination of, or damage to, forensic evidence.

4.7 All that being said, it is appropriate that, the issue having been raised, the record be corrected and that it be made clear that the relevant button and thread were held in the forensic science laboratory for the period between the initial investigation and the later time when further investigations were carried out. As noted earlier, it will be necessary to turn, in due course, to the question as to whether that distinction is of any materiality to the issues which arose on this appeal. It is next, however, necessary to turn to the third issue on which it is said the judgment is factually inaccurate, being the timing of when the relevant advanced forensic techniques became available.

5. The Timing of the Advance in Forensic Science
5.1 In this context the first relevant passage from the damages judgment is to be found in para. 4.11 which indicates that the time by which there had been a sufficient advance in technology to enable smaller samples to produce usable DNA results had arrived by “2005 or 2006 although there was some suggestion at the hearing of this appeal that the time in question may have been earlier”. On the same topic it is suggested at para. 4.15 that it might “have been possible that such a review might have occurred two or three years earlier” with the reference to a review being a review using the new technology in question. It is clear that the ultimate decision to go ahead with a final attempt to find DNA samples was taken in early July 2009. It was, in fact, accepted in cross-examination that the relevant technology was available in Dublin from 2005 although the precise date in that year was not given in evidence. It follows that it would be more accurate to speak of the relevant technology as having been available in Dublin from 2005 rather than stating that it was available from 2005 or 2006 and it would also be accurate to state that the technology concerned was available three or four years earlier (depending on the time in 2005 from which it would have been available) rather than two or three years.

5.2 It should also be recorded that it was accepted in evidence before the High Court that the technology in question may well have been available outside Ireland from an earlier period, perhaps as far back as 2001.

5.3 It must also be recorded that the general presentation of the documents, materials and evidence and the focus of the argument at both the hearing leading to the prohibition decision and also at the hearing leading to the damages judgment did not reflect the detailed focus on the precise issues of fact raised on this application. It might have been thought that, had those matters been considered to be of particular materiality to the assessment which the Court was being invited to make, same would have clearly featured in the presentation of the case.

5.4 Be that as it may, it is necessary to record, therefore, that the statements contained in the damages judgment concerning the time when the relevant technology became available are not fully accurate. In summary, it would first have been better to describe separately the time at which the technology became available in Dublin and the time at which it might have been available outside the jurisdiction. In the former case, it would have been more accurate to describe it as having been available in 2005 as opposed to “2005 or 2006” and it would have been accurate, therefore, to describe it as having been available three or four years before it was actually deployed in the final cold case review of Mr. Nash’s case rather than the two or three years as appears in the damages judgment. In addition, it would have been more complete to record that the technology was available in other jurisdictions some three or four years earlier than it had become available in the forensic science laboratory in Dublin.

5.5 Having therefore identified two matters in the judgment which were not fully accurate, I am more than happy that the correct position should be recorded both in respect of the location of the button and thread during the period between the initial investigation and the final examination, and also the timing of the availability of the relevant technology.

5.6 On that basis it is necessary to turn to the question of whether those corrections require any change to be made to the overall assessment reached in the damages judgment to the effect that there was no culpable delay.

5.7 As indicated earlier, I am in full agreement with the views expressed by O'Donnell J. as to the legal framework within which any potential reopening of a final judgment of this Court should be approached. As O'Donnell J. points out, the fact that there may have been even a material error in a final judgment of this Court does not, in and of itself, and having regard to the constitutional principle of legal certainty, require that the final order of this Court must necessarily be revisited. However, given that the issue has been raised, and given that the damages judgment was a judgment of my own, I feel it appropriate to comment on whether any of the factual questions addressed would, in fact, have altered the proper assessment of the question of whether there was culpable delay.

6. Do the Factual Corrections Change the Assessment?
6.1 I propose dealing with the two factual matters identified separately. I should first say that I am strongly of the view that the correction to the facts surrounding the location of the button and thread during the relevant period could have no material effect on the overall assessment of culpability. It should firstly be pointed out that the forensic science laboratory is, by statute, and for important reasons of policy, independent of An Garda Síochána. The decision to conduct a cold case review is ultimately one to be taken by the police authorities. The forensic science laboratory carried out each of the tests which they did at the request of An Garda Síochána. It is impossible to see that it made any difference in practice that some of the materials which ultimately yielded results were, for the relevant period, in the custody of the forensic science laboratory as opposed to being held as potential evidence by An Garda Síochána. In one case, if a decision to conduct a cold case review including further forensic investigation was taken, it would be necessary simply to ask the forensic science laboratory to conduct the tests. In the other case, it would be necessary to bring the materials to the forensic science laboratory for testing. But, in the context of any question of delay, that is a difference which is wholly immaterial. I cannot see, therefore, how the fact that it may be appropriate to correct the record by making clear that the description of where those materials were during the relevant period, as set out in the damages judgment, is not accurate, could be said to make any difference to the result.

6.2 So far as the timing at which the relevant technology became available is concerned, it is true that the technology in question was available in Dublin for approximately one year more than described in the judgment and was available in other jurisdictions for, perhaps, four years before that. But it is important, in that context, to return to the ultimate reasoning behind the finding of lack of culpable delay which is to be found in the damages judgment.

6.3 At para. 4.14 it is made clear that the reasoning in question is based on the fact that “This was a cold case which was looked at again from time to time”. It is noted that on one occasion improved technology permitted results to be derived from further testing. It is true that it must now be accepted that it might have been possible to conduct that testing in Dublin perhaps one year earlier than is recorded in the judgment and that it might, in theory, have been possible to send the materials for testing to some other jurisdiction for a period of time before that. However, none of that takes away from the fact that this was a cold case and that there was no particular reason why any of the investigating gardaí could have expected that there was a particular likelihood that further testing, in the light of improved technology, might yield results.

6.4 It is in that context that the first of the samples issues analysed earlier is of some relevance. There was no blood or other samples of human material sitting, either in the forensic science laboratory, or in the custody of An Garda Síochána, during the relevant period. What was available, in part in the forensic science laboratory, and in part in the custody of An Garda Síochána, was an item of clothing (or, in the case of the forensic science laboratory, a button and thread taken from the item of clothing) from which it ultimately proved possible to obtain human material capable of generating a DNA profile.

6.5 There are, at any given time, many unsolved cases on the books of An Garda Síochána. There is, in the common law system, no legal formality as to when an investigation can be said to have commenced or be closed. Legal formality only arises in the context of the gathering of evidence by compulsion (including the arrest of persons for questioning) or by persons being formally charged with offences. But at all other times crimes are simply potentially under investigation and every such case which may have gone cold cannot realistically be the subject of constant review. It was that analysis which led to the conclusion of no culpable delay in the damages judgment. I do not see how, in the light of that reasoning, the fact that the technology might have been available a little earlier in Dublin and for a longer period elsewhere, affects the assessment.

6.6 I would not, therefore, consider that any legitimate basis has been put forward for suggesting that a different conclusion could have been reached. That being said I am happy that the record should be corrected in the manner identified in this judgment.

6.7 I should not leave this judgment without commenting on one matter set out in the affidavit sworn by Mr. Nash’s solicitor in grounding the application to which this judgment is directed. At para. 15 it is asserted that “a DNA sample was on file in the forensic science laboratory since 1998”. It does need to be recorded that that statement is simply untrue. It is correct that there was a button and some thread in the forensic science laboratory since 1998. It is true that it subsequently transpired that those materials contained a miniscule amount of DNA which proved, in the light of improved technology, to be capable of yielding a DNA result. But there was no known DNA sample held in the forensic science laboratory between 1998 and 2009. Nor was there evidence to suggest that there were indications visible to the eye or learned from previous investigations which would have suggested that such samples were there. It follows that it is a very significant overstatement of the facts to suggest that “there was a DNA sample on file” during the relevant period.

7. Conclusions
7.1 For the reasons identified earlier in this judgment, I would propose to correct the damages judgment in the following manner.

      (a) By deleting the second and third sentences in para. 3.11 and replacing them with the following:-
            “Since the time of the initial investigation into the Grangegorman murders, a button and thread had been retained by the forensic science laboratory but the jacket from which that button and thread had been obtained (being Mr. Nash’s jacket) had been separately retained by An Garda Síochána. In the context of a case review, the jacket was returned to the forensic science laboratory and tests involving new technology were applied both to the retained button and thread and to other aspects of the jacket.”
      (b) By amending the second sentence of para. 4.11 by deleting all of the words after “2005” and replacing them with “in Dublin”. Furthermore, an additional sentence should be added at that point stating as follows “That technology was available in certain other jurisdictions for approximately four years before that time”.

      (c) By amending para. 4.15 in the last sentence by changing “two or three years” to “three or four years” and by adding after the word earlier “or, indeed, at an even earlier time if the materials had been sent outside the jurisdiction for investigation”.

7.2 For the reasons set out in this judgment, I would not propose making any further amendments and, in particular, do not believe that it is necessary to make any amendments relating to the issues raised in relation, in particular, to paras. 3.10 and 3.11 concerning “samples”.

7.3 Having made the corrections referred to above, however, I am not satisfied, again for the reasons set out in some detail in this judgment, that those corrections alter the overall assessment as set out in the damages judgment which was to the effect that there was no culpable delay. I have indicated my agreement with the judgment of O'Donnell J. as to the legal framework within which applications to revisit final orders of this Court should be approached. However, for the reasons set out in this judgment, I would go further and indicate that the errors of fact identified would not, in any event, lead to any different conclusion on the question of culpable delay. I would not, therefore, propose that any order should be made other than to identify the corrections previously mentioned.

Judgment of Mr Justice Charleton delivered on Thursday the 13th of July 2017

1. In concurring with the judgments of O’Donnell J and Clarke J, it is necessary to offer some limited observations. The motion before the Court identifies my judgment of the 29th of January 2015 as the source of one of the alleged errors now complained of; that the tiny samples from the jacket of Mark Nash were not in the Forensic Science Laboratory immediately before these were tested to find an exact correspondence with the DNA of the two murder victims but had to be brought there from storage in a Garda station.

The written submissions of Mark Nash
2. The purpose of written submissions is to highlight for an appellate court the points which a party appealing a judgment of a trial court considers significant to the outcome. These will be related to the grounds on which an appeal is advanced. Hence, stating with precision the point in issue as a matter of law is of assistance but so also is giving the facts upon which that submission is argued to potentially succeed. When it comes to oral argument, this is useful in again directing focus on a point and on why it is claimed to be a point on which the appeal should turn.

3. At this late stage of the case, it is claimed that a small error occurred in my earlier judgment. That judgment was written on the basis of the materials before this Court on appeal and was also directed to the questions which extensive oral argument on behalf of Mark Nash had proposed as decisive to the outcome of that appeal. The written submissions of Mark Nash were dated the 7th of November 2013. These say little about what is now claimed to be a crucial point: the origin of the sample that was tested after several other samples had earlier been tested to destruction in an attempt to find out was there any connection that might be established beyond reasonable doubt to the effect that Mark Nash’s clothing had been stained by DNA from the two murder victims at this most bloody scene of violence. During this appeal it was even objected on behalf of Mark Nash that it would be conjecture to describe the samples finally tested and yielding DNA as “blood stains”; this despite there being no evidence of how any other human tissue could ever have ended up on the clothing of Mark Nash during the assault which ended the lives of the two ladies in the Grangegorman facility.

4. These written submissions of Mark Nash deal with the factual background to the case, including the ostensible confession of another individual to the murders, that is Dean Lyons, the unavailability of witnesses, adverse pre-trial publicity, the right to a fair trial, the principles of expedition and an analysis of the law on damages.

5. Under the part of those written submissions which deal with delay and under the heading related to the availability of forensic evidence, the submissions for Mark Nash claim that “there was very little activity in respect of the investigation of the appellant’s potential connection with the murders for most of the period between 1998 and 2009.” The submission states that though some examination took place “in 2004, nothing with a potential to link the appellant with the murder was examined.” This was an assertion that the prosecution challenged, in my view correctly. Reference is made to what is asserted to be a decision to re-examine aspects of the case in 2007. It is then claimed that the “decision to re-examine the jacket appears to have been taken, not in the context of the investigation, but because a further set of judicial review proceedings had been commenced by the appellant and it was incumbent on the respondent to demonstrate … that it was not unreasonable” that Mark Nash be refused his application to transfer his imprisonment back to England under the transfer of prisoners legislation. As to when the technology became available whereby tiny stains might yield DNA inside the cuff of a garment and on the thread of a button has been the subject already of detailed analysis in the judgment of Clarke J.

6. In the written submissions on behalf of Mark Nash of the 7th of November 2013 there are several references to the jacket. These submissions state that the jacket was in Garda custody. The submissions do not state that the jacket was at all times in the Forensic Science Laboratory, the point that is now urged to be of importance. A garment consists of parts. A jacket has sleeves, cuffs, threads in lining and in holding on buttons, and a collar. All are part of the jacket. If it is proposed, as it now is, to differentiate the thread under buttons from the jacket, or the inner lining or part of the inner cuff of the sleeve from the jacket, that should have been then stated. In the written submissions, however, no such distinction was drawn. These submissions were not accepted by the prosecution and are considered here solely in the context of whether there was any argument put forward as to the importance of where the jacket was or whether there was any difference urged as between the jacket and any of its ordinary component parts. References, in fact, in the written submissions on behalf of Mark Nash are to “the jacket” of Mark Nash. It is useful to set out the various references in those written submissions on behalf of Mark Nash that preceded my judgment:

7. As to what was done and when, and as to how technology had developed to enable DNA testing on tiny residual samples, as opposed to large blood stains etc, is correctly set out in the judgment of Clarke J and in my previous judgment in this case. What the above demonstrates is that the written submissions on behalf of Mark Nash: (a) did not suggest that any part of the jacket of Mark Nash was to be considered apart from the garment as such; (b) that any part of the jacket was stored in any place other than in Garda custody; (c) positively suggest that the jacket was at all times in Garda custody under the control of Assistant Commissioner Byrne; (d) does not suggest that the jacket was, or any component part of the jacket was, in any other place and in particular; (e) does not suggest that the jacket or any piece of it was in the Forensic Science Laboratory.

The judgment
8. Thus, my judgment refers to the Garda having that jacket in their custody. That is what the Court was told in writing. Further, knowledge of the actual practice of how samples are dealt with, which comes over many years of practice in the criminal courts, demonstrates two things. Firstly, samples – hair, clothing, blood, prints, parts of vehicles, potential weapons – are indeed collected during police work and are sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for testing as to those samples which detective analysis suggests might yield a useful result in the investigation of crime. The results of tests are notified by the laboratory and then samples are returned to police custody. It is the job of the police to retain and to produce samples in court and to establish that the sample produced is the sample taken at the scene or from the accused. Hence, the police retain or regain custody for the trial process. No one ever said on the appeal in this case that led to my earlier judgment that this was different. In fact, in express terms the submissions on behalf of Mark Nash said, or implied, that it was the same. Secondly, analysis or reanalysis occurs through interaction between the police the forensic science service. I had never heard of an independent decision being taken in the Forensic Science Laboratory to take out samples, supposing any were there in their actual custody, which cannot be supposed, without first being directed to do so by the police or without that suggestion having been made by the police.

9. One then comes to the relevant passages in my judgment. These reflected what the Court had been told on this appeal. At paragraph 7, a chronology begins which is completely accurate. That states that:

      …the murder charge against Dean Lyons was dropped by the prosecution. Later that year, in the Forensic Science Laboratory, a very small stain was found on the jacket of Mark Nash but it may then have represented too small a sample to test successfully. Testing also destroyed some samples. Some threads and buttons were forwarded for specialist DNA examination to a forensic science institute in the United Kingdom, but with no result. In October of that year, Mark Nash was tried with the other Roscommon murders and he was convicted, as indicated. This resulted in a lengthy sentence, nominally one of life imprisonment.

10. Paragraph 9 then deals with the interactions with Dean Lyons, who had confessed in the wrong to these murders, and says:

      Dean Lyons was visited by an officer of An Garda Síochána prominent in the investigation of the Grangegorman murders. Apparently as a result he was now willing to become a witness for the prosecution; presumably to rule out any credibility attaching to his apparent confession. Only a few weeks later, on 12th September, Dean Lyons died, apparently in consequence of his ongoing troubles with addiction. With developments in DNA profiling, a new extraction technique called low copy number (“LCN”) profiling became available. When Mark Nash’s first application for transfer to a prison in Britain had been refused, he initiated an unsuccessful judicial review application seeking to overturn that decision in July 2001. In May 2003 one of the buttons from the jacket mentioned earlier was tested as being a hopeful source of LCN profiling but, it seems, with negative or insufficient results. In March 2004 there was a cold case review involving An Garda Síochána and the Forensic Science Laboratory. Inherent in all of this was the view that Mark Nash could not be tried for these offences unless something was uncovered that would make a case weakened by what was considered by some gardaí to be the wrongful confession of Dean Lyons much stronger. In November 2004, a High Court judgment on the judicial review application refused to overturn the administrative decision by the prison authorities not to transfer Mark Nash to England. That judgment also noted that the excuse for not doing so, being that the cold case review was ongoing and that there was hope of a development, could not continue indefinitely. That same month, Mark Nash again applied for a transfer to serve out the remainder of his sentence across the Irish Sea.
11. Paragraph 11 then sets out how the samples had been tested so that a connection was established between the two women victims and Mark Nash. That paragraph states:
      In February 2009, a meeting between gardaí and forensic scientists came to the view that all the forensic tests that were available in Ireland had been completed but that it might be possible to pursue the most up-to-date DNA comparison techniques in another jurisdiction. In March of that year, the Department of Justice in the course of correspondence, apparently over the prisoner transfer issue, stated that the investigation was continuing and that this new area of DNA comparison had been “identified and is being pursued.” Mark Nash then initiated a further judicial review in relation to the refusal of his prison transfer application. Then in June a number of exhibits were brought back to the Forensic Science Laboratory for further investigation. That July, on the 16th, buttons and thread from the jacket of Mark Nash apparently developed a DNA profile matching the victim Sylvia Shiels. The jacket itself was re-examined and the seam of the right sleeve was opened. A DNA profile matching the victim Mary Callinan apparently emerged on the 24th of September. Matters moved swiftly on the receipt of the relevant scientific reports. That October members of the investigating team met. On the 10th October, on the direction of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Mark Nash was charged with the double murder at Grangegorman. The book of evidence was served that December. In the prisoner transfer application, opposition by the State was based upon the new developments.

12. It will be noted that this paragraph in my prior judgment in this case says that “a number of exhibits were brought back to the Forensic Science Laboratory” to be investigated. That was consistent with the written submissions of Mark Nash. That judgment also states that this was, as is the procedure, in the context of scientific and police personnel liaison. In addition to this small point, all of the points made at the oral hearing are also covered in the judgment, in addition to those in writing, including the point which dominated the oral hearing which concerned some prayer cards of a religious sect. Hence, I do not accept that there was any mistake made in the context of the submissions advanced on behalf of Mark Nash.

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