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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> W.L. Sleigh Ltd v. J & H Marsh & Mclennan (UK) Ltd [2002] ScotCS 35 (8th February, 2002) URL: https://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2002/35.html Cite as: [2002] ScotCS 35 |
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W.L. Sleigh Ltd v. J & H Marsh & Mclennan (UK) Ltd [2002] ScotCS 35 (8th February, 2002)
OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION |
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OPINION OF LORD EMSLIE in the cause W L SLEIGH LIMITED Pursuers; against J & H MARSH & McLENNAN (UK) LIMITED Defenders:
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Pursuers: Weir; Aitken Nairn, W.S.
Defenders: R W Dunlop, DLA
8 February 2002
"Had the defenders intimated the pursuers' claim timeously in accordance with the Claims Conditions the pursuers would have been entitled to indemnity in respect of legal liability for compensation (including costs and expenses) up to the limit of indemnity ...".
The issue thus raised and debated before me concerned the scope of the policy of insurance which the defenders had previously arranged for the pursuers with GA Bonus plc. For the defenders it was submitted that, properly construed, the policy specifically excluded any possibility of a claim arising out of the road traffic accident in question, with the result that the action was fundamentally irrelevant and should be dismissed. Alternatively, failing dismissal of the whole action, certain averments in Condescendence 9 were irrelevant and should not be admitted to probation. In response, the pursuers contended that the terms of the policy were wide enough to cover their claim, and that a proof before answer on the whole of the parties' averments should be allowed.
"Where the Insured is legally liable for Accidental Bodily Injury or loss of or Damage to Property arising out of the use of any motor vehicle in connection with the Business the Company will indemnify the Insured against such legal liability.
This indemnity will not apply
In counsel's submission, any question of the pursuers having a valid claim under that clause (on which they expressly founded in Condescendence 3) was excluded by sub-paragraph (a), in respect that the pursuers' alleged liability to third parties arose out of the use of a vehicle owned by the client, Mr Singer, and that in the circumstances narrated Mr Singer fell within the scope of the phrase "any principal for whom the Insured is working".
[6[ In reply, counsel for the pursuers maintained that, on a proper construction, Additional Clause 3(a) did not render his clients' action irrelevant. He took no issue with the authorities cited by the defenders regarding the proper approach to be taken by the Court in construing a contract, but submitted that the ordinary and natural meaning of the phrase "any principal for whom the Insured is working" was not that which had been advanced on the defenders' behalf. According to counsel, if the phrase was considered in its wider context, it was clear that it could not sensibly be held to refer to a customer or client of the pursuers. For one thing, the term "customer" was expressly used in several clauses within the Schedule to the policy, and this prima facie suggested that the term "principal" in Additional Clause 3(a) had been used to mean something else. More importantly, in his submission, Additional Clause 3(a) could and should be read as applicable to three analogous situations where the vehicle in question was owned or provided by someone other than a customer or client. Ownership or provision by the pursuers themselves was admittedly covered by the exclusion, as was ownership or provision by sub-contractors to the pursuers. It would therefore be logical and natural if sub-paragraph (a) were also held to cover ownership or provision by someone else on the supply side, to whom the pursuers were in the position of sub-contractors or agents. In other words, it was argued, the sub-paragraph struck at circumstances where the services provided to a customer included the provision of a motor vehicle "... by or by way of the pursuers".