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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Theodosopoulou v. Bank of Cyprus (London) Ltd [2000] UKEAT 567_99_3101 (31 January 2000) URL: https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2000/567_99_3101.html Cite as: [2000] UKEAT 567_99_3101 |
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At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
MRS D M PALMER
MR S M SPRINGER MBE
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
Revised
For the Appellant | MR G MORTON (OF COUNSEL) INSTRUCTED BY: MR R H CRUDINGTON MESSRS GRANT SAW & SONS SOLICITORS 181-183 TRAFALGAR ROAD GREENWICH LONDON SE10 9EH |
For the Respondent | MR I ROGERS (OF COUNSEL) INSTRUCTED BY: MR I A ANGELIDES SOLICITOR BANK OF CYPRUS (LONDON) LTD LEGAL DEPT 87/93 CHASE SIDE LONDON N14 5BU |
JUDGE CLARK:
These appear to be uncontroversial and are, so far as is material, as follows. The Appellant commenced employment in the Respondent Bank's Birmingham Branch on 1st October 1996. She later transferred to the Camberwell Branch. In early 1998 she became pregnant and on 29th April she completed the form MAT B1 and notified the Respondent that she was pregnant and that her child was expected during the week concluding the 20th July 1998. She completed a Bank pro forma notifying her intention to stop work on 10th July. In fact, her last day of work was 3rd July but the Tribunal found that nothing turned on that date. Her baby was born on 5th August. She was due to return to work on 12th October, however, she requested and was granted a further 3 weeks annual leave which took her actual date of return to the 2nd November 1998.
"Dear Joanna
I am in receipt of your letter dated 25th September which arrived in my office on 29th September advising me that you wished to return to work on 12th October 1998 after your maternity leave. I must advise you that under the Employment Rights Act 1996 it is required that you give 21 days notice in writing of your date of return. This requirement has not been met. The date on which the Bank should have received confirmation of your return to work was 21st September 1998. I therefore regret advise to advise you that I am unable to accept you back on to the permanent staff."
The Tribunal was much taken by the approach of the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Martin. There, the Appellant was orally dismissed following an argument with a director of the Respondent Company, Mr Hammond. Within 5 minutes Mr Hammond realised that he had said things in temper which he was not authorised to do. He sought instead to suspend the Applicant for 2 days without pay. The Applicant refused to accept that decision and left. The IT found that there was no dismissal because the original words of dismissal were used in the heat of the moment and almost immediately withdrawn before any decisive action could be taken. The Applicant's appeal against that decision was dismissed.
Although strictly the sole ground on which the appeal was allowed forward at the preliminary hearing concerned the Employment Tribunal's application of the principle in Martin, we recognise that it would be unfair to the Appellant not to deal also with the Employment Tribunal's reasoning based on the case of Woodar. In these circumstances we have received submissions from Counsel on both points.
"The mere fact that a party to a contract takes a view of its construction which is ultimately shown to be wrong does not of itself constitute repudiatory conduct, it has to be shown that he did not intend to be bound by the contract as properly construed."
What emerges clearly from the cases is that it will be a question of fact for the first instance court to determine whether or not the party said to be in breach has evinced an intention no longer to be bound by the terms of the contract.