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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Supreme Court >> AIC Ltd v Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria [2022] UKSC 16 (15 June 2022) URL: https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2022/16.html Cite as: [2022] 1 WLR 3223, [2022] WLR 3223, [2022] UKSC 16, [2023] 1 All ER (Comm) 1, [2022] 4 All ER 777 |
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[2022] UKSC 16
On appeal from: [2020] EWCA Civ 1585
JUDGMENT
AIC Ltd (Respondent)
v
Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (Appellant)
before
Lord Hodge, Deputy President
Lord Briggs
Lord Sales
Lord Hamblen
Lord Leggatt
JUDGMENT GIVEN ON
15 June 2022
Heard on 1 March 2022
Appellant
Riaz Hussain QC
Omar Eljadi
(Instructed by Squire Patton Boggs (UK) LLP (London))
Respondent
Paul Key QC
(Instructed by McDermott Will & Emery UK LLP (London))
LORD BRIGGS AND LORD SALES: (with whom Lord Hodge, Lord Hamblen and Lord Leggatt agree)
The Facts
The CPR, the FPR and the Authorities
“(1) These Rules are a procedural code with the overriding objective of enabling the court to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost.
(2) Dealing with a case justly and at proportionate cost includes, so far as is practicable -
(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing and can participate fully in proceedings, and that parties and witnesses can give their best evidence;
(b) saving expense;
(c) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate -
(i) to the amount of money involved;
(ii) to the importance of the case;
(iii) to the complexity of the issues; and
(iv) to the financial position of each party;
(d) ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly;
(e) allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases; and
(f) enforcing compliance with rules, practice directions and orders.”
As we have noted, sub-paragraph (f) was added by amendment in 2013.
“(1) These rules are a new procedural code with the overriding objective of enabling the court to deal with cases justly, having regard to any welfare issues involved.
(2) Dealing with a case justly includes, so far as is practicable -
(a) ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly;
(b) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the nature, importance and complexity of the issues;
(c) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing;
(d) saving expense; and
(e) allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases.”
“Thus one can see the Court of Appeal struggling to reconcile the apparent statement of principle in the Barrell case …, coupled with the very proper desire to discourage the parties from applying for the judge to reconsider, with the desire to do justice in the particular circumstances of the case. This court is not bound by the Barrell case or by any of the previous cases to hold that there is any such limitation upon the acknowledged jurisdiction of the judge to revisit his own decision at any time up until his resulting order is perfected. I would agree with Clarke LJ in Stewart v Engel [2000] 1 WLR 2268, 2282 that his overriding objective must be to deal with the case justly. A relevant factor must be whether any party has acted upon the decision to his detriment, especially in a case where it is expected that they may do so before the order is formally drawn up. On the other hand, in In re Blenheim Leisure (Restaurants) Ltd [The Times, 9 November 1999], Neuberger J gave some examples of cases where it might be just to revisit the earlier decision [ie a plain mistake by the court, the parties’ failure to draw to the court’s attention a plainly relevant fact or point of law and the discovery of new facts after the judgment was given]. But these are only examples. A carefully considered change of mind can be sufficient. Every case is going to depend upon its particular circumstances.”
The Relevant Principles
“The rule in Henderson v Henderson … requires the parties, when a matter becomes the subject of litigation between them in a court of competent jurisdiction, to bring their whole case before the court so that all aspects of it may be finally decided … once and for all. In the absence of special circumstances, the parties cannot return to the court to advance arguments, claims or defences which they could have put forward for decision on the first occasion but failed to raise.”
“The trial is not a dress rehearsal. It is the first and last night of the show.”
In that respect we are in full agreement with Coulson LJ, in the Court of Appeal at para 50, when he said:
“The principle of finality is of fundamental public importance … The successful party should not have to worry that something will subsequently come along to deprive him or her of the fruits of victory. The unsuccessful party cannot treat the judgment that has been handed down as some kind of rehearsal, and hurry away to come up with some new evidence or a better legal argument. … [T]here is a particular jurisdiction which permits a judge to change his or her order between the handing down of the judgment and the subsequent sealing of the order. But in most civil cases, the latter is an administrative function, and it would be wrong in principle to allow parties carte blanche to take advantage of an administrative delay to go back over the judgment or order and reargue the case before it is sealed. Hence it is a jurisdiction which needs to be carefully patrolled.”
Did the Courts below apply the correct principles?
Relief from Sanctions
Re-exercising the Discretion